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**THE IRISH QUESTION FROM HOME
RULE TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND,
1891-1949**

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the Degree of Doctorate in British Civilization

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DEDICATION

...To the Memory of My Beloved Tender Mother...

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By the Name of God the Clement and the Merciful

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ABSTRACT

The Irish Question from Home Rule to the Republic of Ireland, 1891-1949, is an attempt to shed light on one of the most complex and puzzling political problems the contemporary world had ever witnessed. A study of the Irish problem *ab ovo* (“from the egg” in Latin, from the origins) would have taken volumes of consistent books, for it goes back to King Henry II’s first settlement in Ireland in the 12th century. No less than thirty seven monarchs and two Lord Protectors, from Henry II to George V had tried, in vain, to subdue the recalcitrant Irish who have never given up fight and resistance to the English” tyrants”.

Apart from the first chapter which is an introductory stage, we have decided to try to limit our analysis of the Irish question to contemporary times only starting in 1891, a highly significant date for it marks the death of Charles Stewart Parnell, the “Uncrowned King of Ireland”, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party. Parnell was the first Irish politician who asserted Home Rule and fought constitutionally for its application. This was the climax of the Irish question that went through different stages to reach its actual status of republic, from Home Rule to the Republic of Ireland.

Thus, the genesis of the Irish problem occurs in the first chapter (entitled the Origins of the Irish Question) which traces the political and social evolution of Ireland under British rule during almost three centuries, from 1603 to 1891. This chapter tells about the end of Gaelic Ireland and its replacement by a Protestant Nation, a prospect that, finally, failed when Ireland became united to Britain as a province in 1801 by virtue of the Act of Union. The nineteenth century had been a revolutionary one with the efforts of Daniel O’Connell to promote the Catholics’

rights, through his project of Catholic Emancipation, then his struggle to repeal the Act of Union, in vain. After a study of the calamity that was the Great Famine which struck Ireland in the 1840's, the chapter broaches the rise of the Fenians, members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B) who started a series of violent operations against British rule. It ends with the birth and growth of Parnell's Home Rule Party.

The second stage represented in the second chapter of our research tackles the period between 1891 and 1923, from Home Rule to the Irish Free State, going through the First World War, the Easter Rising of 1916, the Irish War of Independence and the Civil War upon controversies on the partition of the island and the dominion status of the Irish Free State.

The third chapter discusses the development of Ireland as an independent country and its relations with Britain and Northern Ireland. It focuses on the policies of two major Irish statesmen who led successively, and more or less successfully, Ireland from the Irish Free State to Eire, 1922-1937: William T Cosgrave and Eamon De Valera.

The fourth and final chapter which tries to conclude the Irish question analyzes the metamorphosis of Ireland from Eire in 1937 to the Republic of Ireland in 1949. It is divided into four points: First, the replacement of the dominion status of the Irish Free State by that of *Eire*. Second, the policies adopted by Eire towards Northern Ireland or Ulster. Third, the neutrality of Ireland during the Second World War. And finally, fourth, the end of the War and the birth of the Republic of Ireland in 1949.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

A.C.A: Army Comrades' Association.

A.C.C: Agricultural Credit Corporation.

D.C.H: Dublin Custom House.

D.M.P: Dublin Metropolitan Police.

D.O: Dominions Office.

D.T: Department of the Taoiseach.

D.U.P: Democratic Unionist Party.

F.I.C: Fiscal Inquiry Committee.

F.O: Foreign Office.

G.A.A: Gaelic Athletic Association.

G.P.O: General Post Office (Dublin).

I.A.O.S: Irish Agricultural Organization Society.

I.C.T.U: Irish Congress of Trade Unions.

I.F.S: Irish Free State.

I.L.L: Irish Land League.

I.L.P.U: Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union.

I.N.L.A: Irish National Liberation Army.

I.P.D: Irish Progressive Democrats.

I.R.A: Irish Republican Army.

I.R.B: Irish Republican Brotherhood.

I.R.S.P: Irish Republican Socialist Party.

I.T.G.W.U: Irish Transport and General Workers' Union.

M.P: Member of Parliament.

N.A.T.O: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

N.C.P: National Centre Party.

N.F.A: National Farmers' Association.

P.R.O: Public Record Office, London.

P.R.O.N.I: Public Record Office, Northern Ireland.

P.U.P: Progressive Unionist Party.

R.A.F: Royal Air Force.

R.I.C: Royal Irish Constabulary.

R.U.C: Royal Ulster Constabulary.

S.D.L.P: Social Democratic and Labour Party.

T.D: Teachta Dàla.

U.D.A: Ulster Defence Association.

U.D.P: Ulster Democratic Party.

U.D.R: Ulster Defence Regiment.

U.F.F: Ulster Freedom Fighters.

U.I.L: United Irish League.

U.I.P: United Ireland Party.

U.P.L: United Protestant League.

U.P.N.I: Unionist Party of Northern Ireland.

U.S.C: Ulster Special Constabulary.

U.U.C: Ulster Unionist Council.

U.U.P: Ulster Unionist Party.

U.V.F: Ulster Volunteer Force.

GLOSSARY OF IRISH (GAELIC) TERMS

-Clann na Poblachta: Party of the People.

-Cumann na nGaedheal: Community of the Gaels.

-Dàil Eireann: The Irish Parliament often referred to as simply the Dàil (assembly, pronounced “doil”).

-Fenian: a member of the 19th century Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.).

-Fianna Fail: “Soldiers of Destiny” (pronounced Feena Foil) a political party founded in 1927 by De Valera in terms of opposition to partition.

-Fine Gael: (pronounced Feen Gale) a right wing political party, with origins in the pro-Treaty group after 1922, barely distinguishable from Fianna Fail.

-Gaeltacht: Gaelic language speaking community.

-Garda Siochàna: (plural: Gardai, pronounced gar-dee) “Guardians of the Peace” the police force of the Irish Free State.

-Sinn Fein: (pronounced Shin Fine) “Ourselves Alone”, Nationalist organization founded in 1903 and nowadays a political party in Ireland, particularly strong in the North, where it represents the political wing of the I.R.A.

-Taoiseach: (pronounced “tee-shock”), the Prime Minister of the Republic.

-Teachta Dàla: T D (plural: Teachtaí Dàla, Dàil deputies) Member of the Dail Eireann (Irish Assembly)

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INTRODUCTION

Until relatively recently, the study of Irish history in most universities was part of the study of British history. This was because Ireland was until 1922 united with Britain (and the northeast corner of the island remains linked to this day) and until 1949 a member of the Commonwealth. The history of Ireland in the modern era has to be read in terms of its relationship to the neighbouring island, from political and cultural colonization to varying efforts at autonomy to actual independence. Since the beginning of the sixteenth century the modernization of the English state has involved the absorption of Ireland, as well as Scotland and Wales. The aim to anglicize Ireland was further spurred by Ireland's religious identity with England's continental enemies, namely the traditional if not hereditary ones: France and Spain.

The Irish historical experience of absorbing various settlers, even conquerors, ranging from the Vikings to the Normans to the English, and drawing from their strengths, especially in such matters as urbanization, commerce, agricultural modernization, and constitutional institutions, might provide insight to other relatively recently independent nations. One of the crowning glories of modern Ireland is its achievement and maintenance of constitutional democracy after independence and after a civil war more brutal and bloody than the war of independence. Even the incompletely resolved crisis in Northern Ireland provides extraordinary examples of creative efforts at resolution of community conflict. One example is the singular mechanism of power sharing, which guarantees cross-community participation in government even when the same group retains the majority permanently. That may well be an appropriate instrument for resolving community conflict in so many other parts of the world.

Ireland, which has often been described as both the first and the last colony of the British Empire, had to go through a set of inextricable hardships and experience misery and violence to achieve its independence at the price of immense sacrifices. The road to an independent Irish republic was too long and highly tortuous, but not impossible.

The aim of this present research is to shed light on one of the major problems Europe, in general, and Britain, in particular, had ever experienced: the Irish Question. Despite its independence Ireland still suffers Partition, and the everlasting problem of National Unity for the South, and that of Royal Union for the North persists as never before. Against all odds and in spite of latest compromises culminating, last but not least, at the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, neither side, north and south alike, feels yet ready to yield “not even an inch”.

This thesis tries to contribute to the understanding of the reasons and causes of the Irish conflict through analyzing the birth of the Modern Irish Nation. How did it occur? In which circumstances did it develop? What were the roles played by the two World Wars in its destiny? What makes the Irish problem so special, compared to the other ex-British colonies of the Commonwealth? Is it its insularity, its specific identity and different culture with its Roman Catholic religion? The Irish issue is difficult to deal with and the answers are not easy to find but, nevertheless, this modest attempt of research might help in, at least, knowing more about the Irish Question.

The subject matter of this research, entitled *The Irish Question from Home Rule to the Republic of Ireland (1891-1949)*, is to examine the Irish attempts at freeing their country and achievement of independence, and its political shape from the status of colony to that of a sovereign republic. From the political struggle for the autonomy of Ireland known as the Home Rule Project led by the leader of the Irish MP's in Westminster, Charles Stewart Parnell to the Proclamation of the Republic of

Ireland in 1949, the island underwent more than half a century of political uncertainty and trouble. How did this Home Rule project of autonomy for Ireland, granting the island a kind of a local government only, become an independence project, especially with the emergence of the Sinn Fein Party at the beginning of the twentieth century? More radical and overwhelmingly Catholic, the Sinn Fein Party soon replaced Parnell's Parliamentary Party on the Irish political scene. This long process of independence came to an end in 1949 through the proclamation of the Republic of Ireland although the Southern Irish never departed from their dream of ending Partition, once for all, and seeing the two Irelands united once again.

The demand for Home Rule was intense and several Liberal governments seemed willing to grant it until 1914, when World War I broke out. At Easter in 1916, however, members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B) took control of the Dublin General Post Office (G.P.O) and issued a proclamation declaring Ireland a republic -where the people share power through election and representation as citizens and not as subjects-. The Easter Rising was quickly put down by government forces and the leaders were executed. They became martyrs for many Irish. However, one of the men involved was spared due to his American family background (born in New York from an old Spanish ascendancy) and became one of the great leaders of the Irish Republic, once it was created. His name, Eamon De Valera, whose emblematic figure could be compared –for his admirers, at least– to the French De Gaulle or the Yugoslav Tito whereas, his antagonists might see in him a kind of Franco (Spain), or Salazar (Portugal).

In 1921, the Anglo-Irish Treaty was finally signed, partitioning Ireland into two separate and distinct parts. The six counties of the Northern Province, called Ulster, remained British while the twenty-six counties of the remaining three Provinces of Munster, Leinster and Connaught became part of the newly born form of dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations, called the Irish Free State.

This did not solve the Irish long pending problem, however, as the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A) added reunification to its list of demands.

The New Constitution of 1937, initiated by the leader of the Fianna Fail Party, De Valera himself as Prime Minister since 1932, changed the denomination of the Irish Free State into Eire, which is the Gaelic term for Ireland, turning it from a dominion to an independent republic. A new era, thus, started under republican auspices and aimed to cut all ties with Great Britain, through a policy of nationalization campaigns *vis-à-vis* the Crown. De Valera was so profoundly Anglophobic that he started by the removal of the Oath of Allegiance to the British King. This policy reached its climax with the neutrality of Ireland during World War II and the hostilities in Europe. Given its geostrategic position, Eire could have played an important and decisive role among the Allies to hasten the end of the War, if it came to join them, but De Valera decided otherwise and chose to be neutral towards either side.

After the War, it became clear that Ireland chose its path towards the building of a completely separate republic on the grounds of strong political institutions. Under the *Fine Gael* Party's banner, led by Prime Minister John. A Costello since 1948, Eire was proclaimed the new Republic of Ireland in 1949.

Our research is divided into four chapters (the first chapter being an introductory one) to show the three great periods of modern Ireland: pre-independent colony, autonomous state, and finally, fully independent republic, three decisive periods that shaped the actual political pattern of Ireland passing from parliamentary assertion to military action to reach independence. But only the South was concerned with independence, for Northern Ireland had been put aside as a British province that would never leave the Crown. Neither the British nor the Northern Unionists would agree to end Partition, which is still fought by the Southerners and their persuasive arm, the I.R.A. The prospect for a united Ireland is not for tomorrow, and the Irish

know that their case is different from the German one (Germany had been unified in 1989), but resembles the Cyprian (Cyprus is divided into an Orthodox Greek part and a Muslim Turkish one), or the Cashmere in India (between Muslims and Hindus).

The first chapter, which is entitled the Origins of the Irish Question, deals with the historical background of Ireland long before Home Rule. It covers the period of almost three centuries of English rule over Ireland, from the death of the last Tudor Elizabeth I in 1603 to that of Charles Stewart Parnell, the “Uncrowned King of Ireland”, in 1891. This chapter includes two important parts reflecting the two crucial periods that preceded the Home Rule Project era during the last years of the nineteenth century. The first part runs from the reign of the first Stuart King, James I, in 1603 to the proclamation of the Act of Union between England and Ireland in 1801; and the second one tackles the course of events in Ireland during the whole nineteenth century, from the Act of Union to the genesis of Home Rule.

The second chapter, Ireland from Home Rule to the Irish Free State, 1891-1923, focuses on the process of what became known as the Home Rule Project or the prospects for autonomy and self-government for Ireland. The year 1891 saw the death of the Home Rule Project’s initiator, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, Charles Stewart Parnell. During the 1880’s Home Rule discussions, Parnell’s partner and interlocutor on the British side was the Liberal Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone.

The Great War had postponed any negotiations about Home Rule till the end of hostilities. Meanwhile, the Easter Rising of 1916 in Dublin and its ruthless reprisals changed the course of events in Ireland, paving the way to new forms of contest and fight, the armed struggle. This issue ends chapter one, where the Irish War of independence, the Anglo-Irish Treaty that followed, and its direct aftermath, a Civil War in Southern Ireland, are developed.

The third chapter, Independent Ireland between the Two World Wars, 1922-1937, sheds light, as shown in its title, on inter-war independent Ireland as, at first, a British dominion, part of the Commonwealth of Nations under the name of Irish Free State. During the first ten years, the new Irish Free State was led by William T. Cosgrave and his Cumann na nGaedheal Party, seconded by his faithful assistant, the gifted Kevin O'Higgins. The Irish started to experience and appreciate their new status with a certain apprehension, for the problem of borders between the two states, managed by a Boundary Commission in 1924-25, was not yet resolved. The other apprehension resided in the presence of British soldiers on important ports and the controversial Oath of Allegiance which were still a sour reality. These points constitute the first part of this chapter

The second part of the chapter tackles the coming out of De Valera and the Fianna Fail Party as saviours and reformers to resolve what Cosgrave and his team failed to solve, after their success in the general elections of 1932. De Valera's reforms shaped new perspectives for Ireland, far different from Cosgrave's views but he needed a legitimate support, a plebiscite as a *carte blanche* to carry on, and the 1937 Constitution gave it to him.

The fourth chapter, From Eire to The Republic of Ireland, 1937-1949, is more consistent than the previous ones for it discusses four main issues: the newly born Eire, Ulster in the meantime, Eire and the Second World War, and finally, the Republic of Ireland after World War II. The first issue is about the birth of Eire, as stipulated by the new Constitution of 1937 and the end of the Irish Free State as well as the withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Nations. The previously Irish dominion -a self-governing territory of the British Commonwealth like Canada and Australia- became a fully independent Republic. The second issue is about the consequences of these changes *vis-à-vis* Northern Ireland and its Unionist government and how the latter reacted on the eve of another international conflict at the gates of the Green Island.

The third issue sheds light on the neutral role of Eire during the Second World War and its impact on Britain in particular and on the Allies in general. What were De Valera's motives to behave like Switzerland, Spain or Sweden? Ireland's involvement in the War, if ever it chose to stand on behalf of the Allies' side could have changed the course of things by hastening its end and sparing more lives.

The fourth and last issue concerns post-war Ireland and its *cheminement* towards the completion of its sovereignty as an emerging republic on the new world's political exchequer as foreseen by the victorious countries, among which, Ireland's intimate enemy, England itself. After the general elections of 1948, a new governmental coalition led by the Fine Gael Party, the Prime Minister (*Taoiseach*) John Aloysius Costello proclaimed the advent of the Republic of Ireland by virtue of an eponym Act introduced in the Dail a year after, and which took effect in April 1949.

CHAPTER ONE

THE ORIGINS OF THE IRISH QUESTION

This introductory chapter analyzes the development of political, social, cultural and religious events that shaped British policy in Ireland during three centuries, from the early years of the seventeenth century to the last decades of the nineteenth one. The first part of the chapter tackles the establishment of a Protestant nation in Ireland under English rule, from the reign of James I in 1603 to the Act of Union of 1801. How come that an ancient Catholic region of old monastic traditions came to be transformed into a protestant nation? What were the reasons and factors responsible for that metamorphosis? What was the role played by Britain as part of the Irish question? And finally, why did that prospected Protestant nation fail? All these questions will be treated in this first part.

The second part of the first chapter which covers the whole nineteenth century, from 1801, the year of the signing of the Act of Union by the British Prime Minister of the day William Pitt (the Young Pitt) to 1891, the year of the death of the Home Rule Project instigator, Charles Stewart Parnell, deals with the question of the Anglo-Irish union and its causes and consequences during the nineteenth century. Why and how was that union conceived? Could such an Act of Union resolve definitively the Irish crisis, or on the contrary, would it add to it? This is what will be examined in the second part of our first chapter.

I-Ireland, a Protestant Nation, 1603-1801

One reason why the year 1603 is so significant in Irish history is that the conquest of Ireland was ended, and the country was united for the first time under a central administration. When the British had occupied the island, they gave a new character to the political and economic life of the kingdom and the result was that the Ireland of the “Protestant ascendancy”, out of which the Ireland of today has arisen, took form during the first four decades of the seventeenth century.

The colonization of Ireland started in the north (Ulster), where the settlers tried to establish a Protestant nation throughout the island, but the local inhabitants never accepted that fact, and the struggle lasted about two centuries, until the Act of Union in 1801 when Ireland became part of the British Crown.

The first effective invasion of Ireland occurred in 1167, when the Anglo-Normans, led by Richard De Clare, Earl of Pembroke known as “Strongbow” ⁽¹⁾, came to help the disaffected Irish chief Dermot MacMurrough⁽²⁾ in his struggle against other clans. That invasion was facilitated by the existence of competing Irish dynasties with no established system of succession; and in 1170 an English colony around Dublin, known as “the Pale” was founded, and over time these early colonists were assimilated into the native Irish culture.

The religious Reformation ⁽³⁾ against the Roman Catholic Church, and Henry VIII’s break with Rome radically altered England’s role in Ireland. As England’s relationship with Spain and France (both Catholic) deteriorated, King Henry became concerned about the threat of an invasion. Ireland had now turned to an important strategic position and was raised to the constitutional status of a kingdom to assert royal power⁽⁴⁾. Religion became a cause of division when Henry VIII imposed Protestantism by force on a land which was considered as the cradle of Catholicism. Although Catholic, Queen Mary I, “Bloody Mary” (because of her persecution of

Protestants) initiated the first plantations in the midlands. It was under the reign of Elizabeth I that significant numbers of English settlers began to colonize the country and Gaelic culture (early Irish language and traditions) was seriously challenged for the first time. The way was paved for endless rebellions, massacres, and reprisals from both sides –the Irish as well as the British-, and the peaceful green island had become a bloody battlefield. ⁽⁵⁾

I. 1-The Irish Question in the Seventeenth Century

The four counties of Donegal, Tyrone, Derry, and Armagh together with the two counties of Cavan and Fermanagh became subject to the most systematic attempt to plant or settle strangers from England and Scotland in that northern part of Ireland. This was the so-called Plantation of Ulster, executed on a government programme between 1608 and 1610. ⁽⁶⁾

I. 1-1-Stuart Ireland, 1603-1649

The “Irish Society”, an organization composed of functionaries of the City of London and its companies, was made responsible for colonizing those parts of the forfeited lands of the earls O’Neill and O’Donnell who had flown from Ireland in 1607 ⁽⁷⁾. It was the Irish Society which changed the name of the city from Derry to Londonderry.

The city of London, with its great capital resources, had initiated the task of colonizing not only Derry itself but also the whole county. The Irish Society’s role was similar to that of the Virginia Society for colonizing America. The land was divided among wealthy City company’s drapers, salters, haberdashers, fishmongers and the rest.

The plan was that almost all the land of the county of Derry was to be distributed by these City companies to Scottish and English settlers who would not be allowed to take Irish tenants. A small proportion of the county-about five per cent-was to go to former soldiers, who were allowed to take Irish tenants.

By 1622 there were about 13.000 settlers, half English and half Scots –but the Irish still lived all around them. As a result, the Catholic Gaelic Irish, while actually occupying more land than had originally been allotted to them, lost none of their resentment because they regarded it all as theirs in the first place. ⁽⁸⁾ And the Protestants, less numerous, and less dominant than the Irish natives felt insecure and more like a” beleaguered garrison” ⁽⁹⁾ surrounded by ruthless enemies.

The really effective plantation of Ulster took place from a different source altogether through an originally small privately–organized Protestant settlement of Scots that had begun on the Ards peninsula of Ulster's east coast a few years earlier. For centuries, Scots had been coming across the North Channel and settling in this part of Ireland, usually becoming indistinguishable from the Gaelic Irish people among whom they settled, for they shared a lot of cultural and traditional similarities. But just before the 1610 plantation, in 1606 a private settlement had been undertaken by two Scottish Protestants named Montgomery and Hamilton after a deal with the local Gaelic chieftain. This eastern Protestant plantation of Ulster prospered rapidly and became the bridgehead by which, for the rest of the century and beyond, individual Scottish settlers flocked to Northern Ireland. They spread outward from there through the town of Belfast, over the whole area of Antrim and Down. They even spread right across Ulster to occupy territories left in the official plantation of the west.

The geographical distributions of Protestants ⁽¹⁰⁾ and Catholics ⁽¹¹⁾ in Northern Ireland today still reveal clearly the two separate settlements of Ulster of over 300 years ago. Thus, gradually and overwhelmingly, the English and Scottish Protestant-

Anglicans, ⁽¹²⁾ and Presbyterians, especially the Scots-settlement of Ulster were established in a land that counted a majority of Catholics and where Catholicism had deep roots. ⁽¹³⁾ Ulster, once the most Gaelic Irish and Catholic province of all Ireland, now had a mixed population of opposed interests and beliefs. ⁽¹⁴⁾

Old English families grew alarmed at these new Protestant threats to their property rights, and rebellion broke out in Ulster on 23 September 1641. Many of the leaders considered themselves loyal to the Crown, while others like Sir Phelim O'Neill ⁽¹⁵⁾ were probably more inclined to recover their lost land. The rebellion was directed against all new settlements everywhere in Ireland but because the Ulster settlement was the largest it was there that the effect was stronger.

The real revolutionaries were the dispossessed Irish natives who rebelled against the injustice of plantation and the consequent shortage of land. The 1641 rising had been considered in loyalist mythology as a savage sectarian massacre, and violent outrages were indeed inflicted on Protestant settlers. Many were stripped naked in cruel mockery of having arrived in Ireland with nothing, and driven from their homes to perish in the winter cold. As many as 8.000 or 12.000 Protestants may have died, but propaganda multiplied this number out of all proportion and revived anti-Catholic hatred with violent and exaggerated tales of torture and rape, and a premeditated plot to free Ireland from Protestants. The rising was used as a justification for the confiscation of two million acres of Irish land. ⁽¹⁶⁾

Awful events like massacres carried on religious grounds were slowly splitting the people of Ireland into two nations regardless of race: one Catholic and the other Protestant. And the man who was to do so much to enforce that process was to arrive in Ireland at the end of the decade. His name is Oliver Cromwell.

I. 1-2-Ireland under Cromwell

The 1640's was a particularly unstable decade in Ireland, beginning with the rising of 1641 ⁽¹⁷⁾ and ending with the fall of Drogheda ⁽¹⁸⁾ to Cromwell in 1649. Events were complicated by the outbreak of Civil War (1642-1649) in England ⁽¹⁹⁾, with royalists in Ireland on the defensive and the Catholic insurgents supported by King Charles I. A ceasefire was established but this broke down in 1646, and Cromwell who had by then won the Civil War against the King in England, came over in August 1649.

Oliver Cromwell arrived with an army of 20.000 men and heavy artillery; and after terrible cannon shots they succeeded in breaching the walls of the besieged town of Drogheda. But on his first attempt to storm the breach, his men were driven back with considerable loss. This set-back so inflamed him that when his men did succeed in penetrating the town, he behaved as "being in the heat of the action ". He wrote soon afterwards "I forbade them to spare any that were in arms in the town» ⁽²⁰⁾. And although the order was thus confined to the garrison itself, it seems more than probable that women and children were caught up in the process. On his own later admission, no priest was left alive.

Attacking with sword in hand, Cromwell and his troops drove the defenders back to a converted Viking fort's high tower known as Millmount. Trapped there, the town's governor commander Aston ⁽²¹⁾ and his officers surrendered, but were immediately executed. Those of the garrison who had temporarily managed to escape across the river to the other part of the town took refuge in various places; one of which was the tower of St Peter's Church. Cromwell had it burned down and those who fled from it massacred. Of the surrender of some 120 defenders caught in another tower, he wrote: "The officers were knocked on the head, every tenth man of the soldiers killed and the rest shipped to the Barbadoes ... I think that we put to the sword altogether about 2.000 men ". ⁽²²⁾

In a certain way Cromwell who was a fervent Puritan ⁽²³⁾ Protestant seems to have seen himself at Drogheda as accomplishing God's work by avenging the atrocities of the rebellion of 1641 against Protestants. But the inhabitants of Drogheda had played no part in that rebellion; the town had always been within the confines of the English "Pale"⁽²⁴⁾ though under English rule.

Cromwell's final ruthless campaign of the Civil War was devastating. In the name of the English government, all "barbarous and bloodthirsty Irish" Catholics were to be trodden under and Irish Protestants were to triumph. ⁽²⁵⁾

From Drogheda, Cromwell's Puritan Parliamentary armies marched victoriously south through Ireland. Some surrendering garrisons were treated with mercy, even with honour. But one town, Wexford, suffered even worse than Drogheda, being stormed while still negotiating surrender. Cromwell's men raided the town, killing at least 2,000, of whom 200 women and children were slaughtered in the market place.

After Wexford, the rest of the Parliamentary army's campaign was soon over, and Cromwell enacted a draconian measure against those of the defeated Irish Catholics who owned land. Catholic land in Ireland east of the Shannon was to be distributed among his soldiers and the adventurers who had financed his campaigns; those thus dispossessed Irish were transplanted beyond the Shannon river to the more barren and unprofitable province of Connaught, hence the saying "to hell or to Connaught". ⁽²⁶⁾ And with this final humiliation of the Irish Catholic landowners and their banishment to a remote region of their own country, what came to be known as "the curse of Cromwell " was complete. ⁽²⁷⁾

Only the landowners, their families and retainers were transplanted. The rest of the population, essentially former tenants and landless labourers of those who now had to make their homes in Connaught, stayed behind in the same capacity to serve

the new Protestant settlers who became their new masters. But the transplantation to Connaught was a symbol of a humiliated status to all Irish Catholics everywhere. The curse of Cromwell marked them all.

The percentage of the land of Ireland owned by Catholics which had shrunk by the time of the rebellion of 1641 to fifty-nine per cent was reduced by the Cromwellian land settlement to a mere twenty-two per cent. After further Catholic humiliation in great events to come, it was to shrink by 1695 to fourteen per cent and by 1714 still further to seven per cent. ⁽²⁸⁾

New dramatic events, such as battles and revolutions, were to follow the Cromwellian era in Ireland, especially after the Restoration. ⁽²⁹⁾ Those events, which originated from religious grounds, generated the long-standing conflict between Catholics and Protestants.

I. 1-3-The Siege of Derry and the Battle of the Boyne

When the restored monarch Charles II replaced Cromwell's regime in 1660, Irish Catholics hoped that he would restore them to their former status. But he was too crafty to upset Protestants who had given him back his crown. It was only when his Catholic brother James II succeeded to the throne that Irish Catholics felt their moment had come. King James II appointed Catholics to high offices in Ireland and a Catholic-dominated Irish Parliament passed an Act revoking the Cromwellian land settlement. But before it could be implemented, the kingdoms of England and Ireland were split temporarily into two.

For nearly 300 years, the City of Derry -also Londonderry, especially for the English and Irish Loyalists- had been the definitive symbol of Irish Protestant determination to stand firm against all apparent threats to their way of life. It was in

Derry, in 1688, when the Catholic King James II was replaced by the Protestant William of Orange that the crisis between Catholics and Protestants had increased. Protestants of Londonderry, with their sashes of the Orange Order and other ceremonial equipment, assemble every 7 December to celebrate the action of thirteen apprentice boys of the City who on that day in 1688, helped save Ireland from Catholics thanks to William of Orange.⁽³⁰⁾

James II, who had been deposed from the English throne, landed in Kinsale in 1689 with French troops sent by the French King, Louis XIV. The new King of England, William of Orange, allied with the Spaniards, the Dutch and the Pope, and together they were determined to oppose any increase in French power. Landing in Ireland, the threatening French were, thus, at the gates of England. “ If Ireland should be lost, England will follow “⁽³¹⁾ was the fear in the English Houses of Parliament when they voted funds of over £ 1 million for another army to land in Ireland and oppose King James’s forces. European politics became linked with the Catholic and Protestant struggle in Ireland, and the stage was set for another dramatic confrontation.

The defeat of James II was played out in two events that were to shape Ireland in fact and in myth: the resistance of Derry to King James’s army, and the Battle of the Boyne, north of Dublin. The military commander in Derry, Robert Lundy⁽³²⁾ was prepared to recognize James as the legitimate king before he arrived in Ireland, but many townspeople, alarmed at the thought of another 1641 massacre, thought otherwise. In December 1688, 13 apprentice boys slammed the gates of Derry and Lundy was forced to flee the city in disguise.

In April 1689 King James laid siege to a defiant Derry with the clarion call: “No Surrender “⁽³³⁾, until in July William of Orange’s fleet managed to break through with supplies and save the city from starvation.

In May 1689, the last Irish parliament to include Catholics assembled in Dublin and in July William's army defeated the partisans of King James II at Oldbridge, three miles upstream from Drogheda, but the decisive encounter occurred at Aughrim, and this was called the Battle of the Boyne. King James fled the battlefield, though Irish resistance lasted another year. The end of the war truly came with Patrick Sarsfield ⁽³⁴⁾ surrendering the town of Limerick in October 1691 after securing an honourable peace and exile to France, where he died two years later fighting William of Orange (then King William III) as a mercenary of the French king Louis XIV. This was the foundation of the triumph of Protestants over Catholics, of Orange over Green.

I. 2-The First National Reactions

After the triumph of William III -the former William of Orange or of Nassau-, a series of harsh and unfair laws penalized the majority of the Irish population just because they were Roman Catholics. These "penal laws" decreed that a Catholic could not hold any office of state, nor stand for Parliament, vote, join the army or navy, practise at the bar, nor, what was even more important for the social future of the country, buy land. A Catholic could not, by law, even hold land on a lease longer than thirty-one years; nor could he bequeath as he wished what he did hold. On his death, his land had to be divided among all his children, unless one of them turned Protestant, in which case he would inherit the lot. As a result, nearly five per cent of the land of Ireland remained in Catholic hands by the 1770's. ⁽³⁵⁾

I. 2-1-The Penal Laws

The penal laws ⁽³⁶⁾ did not, as is sometimes popularly supposed in Ireland, prohibit worship of the Catholic religion as such. But even in religious matters the letter of the law was harsh, placing severe limitation on the activity of the Catholic priesthood. Parish priests were allowed to officiate in Ireland provided they registered with the authorities. Friars (monks) of the regular orders of clergy (Augustinians, Dominicans, Franciscans etc ...), ⁽³⁷⁾ and all bishops and archbishops were not allowed by law to officiate, and some were banned on pain of transportation and even death; they were thus forced into precarious secrecy. Theoretically, this meant that all new ordinations of priests would be impossible and that the Catholic Church in Ireland would thus eventually disappear.

But the Catholic Church in Ireland did not die out. This was because the religious sections of the penal laws were in fact not severely applied and the enforcement of these religious sections of the penal laws was impossible for the Catholic Church had the support of the vast majority of the people of Ireland.

If the penal laws had been enforced, the Catholic Church in Ireland would have been destroyed as was the original intention. The fact that the Church was able to survive strengthened not only the Church itself but also its link with the majority of the Irish people who, deprived of all political and many other rights, saw the Church as the only representative organization they had . ⁽³⁸⁾

In the absence of all political rights, the only other organization which was to represent the majority of the people of Ireland was that network of agrarian secret societies which by the second half of the eighteenth century, under the name of “Whiteboys”, had to exercise a powerful and often ruthless influence locally in the countryside. These agrarian secret societies offered protection to the peasantry from

the worst excesses of rack-renting landlords by threatening them with crude violence and, at the same time, disciplining the peasants themselves who offended against their code by, for instance, taking land from which another peasant had been evicted. But although they were to continue as an all- important aspect of Irish social life until well into the following century, these secret societies rarely moved from local agrarian affairs to politics. The eighteenth century Whiteboys, in particular, made a point of stressing that they had no national political ambitions. ⁽³⁹⁾

Being deprived by the penal laws of political and social rights and living in what every traveller described as conditions of extreme poverty, the Irish reserved their loyalties for organizations outside politics, for their Church and the secret societies. Middle-class Catholics, who often made considerable fortunes in trade (from which they were not barred), looked to their prestige and wanted to emphasize their loyalty to the Crown in the hope of thus ensuring the continuance of a quiet and profitable existence.

It may therefore seem a paradox to say that it was precisely during this period of the eighteenth century that the first really effective talk of the Irish nation demanding its rights began. But the paradox is easily resolved : the talk, and not only talk but action, did not come from the Catholic majority of the Irish people, who were excluded from political rights, but from the Protestants of Ireland when the Protestant ruling class governed, and at a time Dublin flourished as their commercial and cultural capital. The Protestant ascendancy seemed too secure to ever feel threatened again.

I. 2-2-The Emergence of Protestant Nationalism

Nationalism is the devotion to one's own nation, patriotic feelings, principles or efforts; it is also a kind of movement favouring political independence in a country that is controlled by another. Geography, a common religion (which is the case here), and a common language are often significant attributes of nationalism. Ultimately, the most potent source of nationalism is simply a state of mind, a widespread feeling on the part of a group of people that they constitute a separate nationality and therefore, deserve to be a separate nation. ⁽⁴⁰⁾

The Protestants who started to assert their political and civic rights in Ireland were mainly settlers of quite recent times, but they included some old Catholics and even old Gaelic Catholics who had changed their religion -turning Protestant- to get some advantages and privileges. Those Protestants had high aspirations on their own account, as can be seen from the magnificent country houses they built for themselves all over Ireland, from the elegant planning of their town residences which still attract admiration in Dublin, and the splendour and style with which they decorated them. They elaborated for themselves a whole sophisticated culture, reflected not only in their magnificent houses, but also in the literature of Swift, Sheridan, Goldsmith, Burke and others. On this culture they based a claim, as Irish citizens, to be treated by Britain as an equal nation. And this as it now seems was the first version of modern Irish nationalism: a Protestant version.

From the beginning of the eighteenth century the Irish people, especially Protestants, had had a proud sense of their own individual identity. ⁽⁴¹⁾ It was early in that century that the Protestant Dean of St Patrick's in Dublin and famous author of *Gulliver's Travels*, Jonathan Swift, affirming his Irishness and the Irishness of his fellow Protestants, had urged them to burn everything English, except English coal and had helped develop a theory that the English parliament had, in fact no right to

legislate for Ireland at all. This, it began to be argued, was the right only of the Irish parliament.⁽⁴²⁾

With no real power of legislation, the Parliament of Dublin was rather a body without a soul. But as in the course of the eighteenth century the Irish Protestants developed their own culture, they also developed the political aspirations which grew from it. Talk of the “Protestant Nation”⁽⁴³⁾ became more excited as they took the example of spirited independence from colonists in America.

The American rebellion in the 1770’s had an important impact on Ireland where the Protestant nation took advantage of the British government’s necessity to form companies of armed “Volunteers”. Those Volunteers who were, nominally there to defend the Irish coasts against any invader in the absence of British troops fighting in America, in effect acted as a threat to the British government in Ireland.

In the Irish Parliament in Dublin, the “Patriot” party was led by an eloquent Protestant lawyer, Henry Grattan.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Strengthened by the existence of the Volunteers, Grattan finally won in 1782 a Declaration of Independence from the British government which on paper removed from Westminster the right to legislate for Ireland.

The new constitutional relationship between Britain and Ireland was to be two sovereign independent kingdoms linked by the inalienable identity of the Irish Crown with that of Britain. But it was this link which was in the end to make the Irish nation’s independence little more than nominal so long as the parliamentary system of both kingdoms remained unreformed, for the control of honours and patronage remained in the same royal ministers’ hands at Westminster. There was not the same near-unanimity among the Protestant Irish for parliamentary reform as there had been for “independence.” Nor was there any unanimity for the political rights of Catholics which, together with reform, might have enabled Ireland to be the “Nation” which

Protestants declared it to be. Because of divergence between Catholics and Protestants, and among Protestants themselves about the political conception of the long expected Irish state, the future of the “Independent Irish Nation” was in fact a failure.⁽⁴⁵⁾

I. 3-The Failure of the Protestant Nation

In 1789, there occurred in Europe an event which was eventually to sharpen and redistribute Irish political thinking altogether: the French Revolution. The news of this transmitted to all unstable societies the message that “the will of the people” in government was a practical possibility. Such news had a particularly strong emotional and intellectual impact on Ireland. An open radical organization was formed, mainly by Presbyterians from Belfast, to promote both parliamentary reform and the unification of the Catholic and Protestant nations into one. It was the Society of United Irishmen, enthusiastically joined by that young Dublin Protestant Theobald Wolfe Tone⁽⁴⁶⁾ who had to speak in the name of both Catholics and Protestants. By 1796 the United Irishmen had converted themselves into a secret society with radical aims and violent means. The year 1796 was to witness one of the most dramatic events in all Irish history and one of the most dangerous moments England ever experienced.

I. 3-1-The French Intervention in Ireland

On the evening of 21 December 1796, a great invasion fleet of thirty –five French ships carrying some 14.000 French republican troops fresh from their triumphs in Europe anchored in Bantry Bay. They had come to Ireland at the call of the United Irishmen to help them make a republican revolution which would unite Catholics and Protestants together in an Irish nation within an Irish republic and, as

Wolfe Tone himself put it: "...break the connections with England, the never failing source of all our political evils and to assert the independence of my country".⁽⁴⁷⁾

This was the beginning of talk about an Irish republic, inspired by the French model, and although Tone was then almost unknown in Ireland, he was to become in retrospect, after his death, the most famous Irish republican. He had in fact done much to persuade the French to send this expedition and had come with it into the bay wearing French uniform.

The French fleet had experienced some misadventures on the way, the most serious being that when in a storm at sea it lost its flagship carrying a brilliant young commander of the expedition, General Lazare Hoche.⁽⁴⁸⁾ After waiting in vain for him, the second-in-command decided to go ahead, but he was prevented from landing by a strong head-wind which was blowing harder every hour. There were almost no British government troops anywhere near the area and the way seemed open for the French to reach Cork and beyond. But nothing could be done until the wind stopped.

The wind had become a gale, and twenty of the great ships were driven down the bay and out to sea again. But the rest held on and tried to make their way up to more safe waters at the head of the bay. They made almost no progress at all. About 400 men of the militia stationed at Bantry eventually moved forward courageously on the shore to try and simulate that they were only the vanguard of a larger force. The owner of a fine house at the head of the bay, though a civilian, felt the dangerous menace and began to organize the local peasantry to counter any attack. One by one the great ships found that they could hold on no longer and, cutting their cables ran back down the bay to the open sea and returned to France. Wolfe Tone, who went with them, remarked rightly that England had not had such an

escape since the Invincible Armada two centuries before, when the invading Spaniard fleet perished in a storm. In 1798 Wolfe Tone was once again on board a French ship as part of a third invasion force but bad weather again prevented the expedition. ⁽⁴⁹⁾

I. 3-2-The Revolution of 1798

The Bantry Bay fiasco, though disappointing for the United Irishmen, was by no means totally discouraging to them because it at least proved that the French were prepared to act on their behalf and help them. However, this very fact proved to the government the extreme seriousness of the united Irish threat and military measures were immediately taken against the secret society in its stronghold among the Presbyterians and Catholics of Ulster. The ruthless way in which the army conducted its search for arms and information was remarkably successful and by the end of 1797 the conspiracy in that part of Ireland was virtually broken.

A National Directory of the United Irishmen for the whole of Ireland had been formed in 1798 in Dublin under the military leadership of a radical aristocrat, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, ⁽⁵⁰⁾ who tried to organize a national rebellion for the whole country, with the immediate expectation of French help. The method by which the United Irishmen hoped to provoke the internal rebellion was by incorporating within their organization the peasant agrarian secret society network, particularly a mysterious but widely spread society known as the “Defenders” which was already developing some vague national political thinking of its own among the Catholic peasantry.

Contacts with the “Defenders”, however, had only started when the United Irish Society was ruined by the work of informers, at least three of whom were highly placed in the organization. Almost the entire National Directory was arrested in one raid in March 1798, and although Lord Edward Fitzgerald himself escaped for a time, he too was betrayed soon afterwards and mortally wounded in the course of his arrest.

On May 24th, 1798, the first outbreak in Wexford had resulted from a sort of panic and determination not to submit any longer to the torture of flogging inflicted by the British army. A local priest, Father John Murphy, ⁽⁵¹⁾ took charge of the peasantry in that incident and he was to become the principal figure of the rebellion in Wexford which thus assumed more the character of an angry local peasants’ revolt than that of a national rebellion. The rebels won an important early victory over the North Cork militia, a particularly tough regiment of the yeomanry, in open country at Oulart Hill. From their victory at Oulart the rebels pushed on to take the town of Enniscorthy which they partly set on fire before setting up their main camp on a nearby prominence known as Vinegar Hill in the same region.

The essential lack of strategy in the rebels’ movement had been demonstrated by the fact that instead of proceeding immediately northwards from Vinegar Hill to try and join individual rebel groups in the Midland counties, they had first stayed southwards, capturing the town of Wexford itself but thereby giving the government forces time to concentrate against them effectively. When they eventually tried and moved northwards towards Dublin after the defeat at New Ross, they paid the price for the delay and suffered a further heavy defeat at Arklow on the Dublin road early in June. Finally less than a month after they had first taken the field, they were pushed from their main encampment in a decisive battle on Vinegar Hill itself.

A terrible slaughter of scattered rebels by government troops continued for some time. A local Protestant clergyman reckoned that more than half the estimated 50,000 dead in the rebellion had been killed in cold blood. But the rebellion in Wexford, indeed the United Irish rebellion altogether, was over. For although there was a courageous attempt at an uprising in Ulster where the United Irishmen had originated, the more or less sectarian attitudes there had been reinforced by news of the atrocities in the south, and the uprising ended in dismal failure with the movement quite disintegrating. And when several months later, a small French expedition did eventually land in Ireland in county Mayo and even won an initial victory over government troops at Castlebar, they found no one there awaiting them to co-operate with, and they soon afterwards surrendered. Finally, arriving off the northern Irish coast with a new French invasion fleet, Wolfe Tone was captured after a sea battle in which the French were defeated. He was brought for trial to Dublin where he committed suicide in his cell. ⁽⁵²⁾

I. 3-3-The Act of Union of 1801

The events of 1798 convinced Britain that only the abolition of the Irish Parliament and a union of the English and Irish kingdoms could guarantee security. "Ireland is like a ship on fire, it must be extinguished or cut adrift", ⁽⁵³⁾ observed the British Prime Minister William Pitt, who aimed at securing the Act of Union which came into effect in 1801. The Catholic clergy was gained by a promise of Catholic emancipation that would allow Catholics to sit in the new parliament and hold other important positions, and existing members of the Irish Parliament were paid with pensions and bribes.

The terms on which the legislative union between Great Britain and Ireland was to be established were embodied in eight articles to come into force on 1 January 1801. The first four articles settled the political basis of the union; the fifth related to the Church, the sixth to commerce, the seventh to finance, and the eighth to law and legal procedure.

Ireland was to be linked with Great Britain in one kingdom, to be known as “The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland”. The succession to the Crown was to continue as settled by the terms of the union between England and Scotland. The Parliament of the United Kingdom was to include Irish representatives in each House. In the House of Lords, Ireland was to be represented by four spiritual lords, holding hereditary titles, and sitting by rotation of sessions, and 28 temporal lords or life peers, elected for life by the peers of Ireland. In the House of Commons, there were to be 100 Irish members: two for each county; two each for the cities of Dublin and Cork; one for each of 31 other cities and boroughs, and one for the University of Dublin, Trinity College. Until the united parliament should decide otherwise, not more than twenty from the 100 members of the Irish representatives in the Commons might hold offices under the Crown in Ireland.

By the fifth article, the Church of England and the Church of Ireland were to be united and the maintenance of this united Church as the established Church of England and Ireland was to be “deemed and taken to be an essential and fundamental part of the union “. ⁽⁵⁴⁾

The sixth article provided that the king's subjects in Great Britain and Ireland should have the same privileges in all matters of commerce, and that there should be free trade between the two countries, save in two respects .First, while the excise duties on certain home products and the duties on certain foreign imports continued to be collected at different rates in Great Britain and Ireland, there was to be a system of compensating duties and disadvantages on such commodities passing from one

country to the other. Secondly, for a period of twenty years customs duties were to be maintained between the two countries on a few manufactured articles, of which cotton and woollen goods were the most important. By the seventh article, the financial systems of the two countries were to remain, for the time being distinct: each was to have its own exchequer, and to be responsible for its own national debt. They were to contribute to the expenditure of the United Kingdom in the proportion of fifteen parts for Great Britain and two parts for Ireland, which meant that Ireland was to pay two seventeenths of the whole. This proportion was to be reconsidered at the end of twenty years and subsequently from time to time. This article also provided that in certain conditions the two debts and the two exchequers might be united, the system of distinct contributions abandoned, and the national expense “defrayed indiscriminately by equal taxes imposed on the same articles in each country”.⁽⁵⁵⁾

The eighth article stipulated that all laws in force at the time of the union, and all courts of civil or ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in the two kingdoms, should remain as they were, subject only to such changes as might be made by the parliament of the United Kingdom. Law cases pending at the time of the union, in either the British or the Irish House of Lords, were to be decided in the House of Lords of the United Kingdom.

These terms were not the result of direct negotiation between parliamentary commissions, as the terms of the Anglo-Scottish union of 1707 had been.⁽⁵⁶⁾ The prolonged opposition in the Irish House of Commons to the very idea of a union had made such a method of procedure impracticable; and the terms were accepted, during 1799, in consultations between the Irish executive and the British Cabinet, on the basis of resolutions agreed upon by the British parliament. However, it is improbable that Irish interests suffered as a result: if there was to be a union at all, the terms actually proposed were as favourable to Ireland as any that the British parliament was likely to accept.⁽⁵⁷⁾

II-The Irish Question from the Act of Union to Home Rule, 1801-1891

After the failure of Protestant nationalism in Ireland and its direct aftermath the Act of Union with Great Britain, a new tendency of Irish political activism arose under joint leadership, a Catholic one. Through the nineteenth century, Ireland had experienced a series of courageous attempts to attain a certain degree of welfare and religious freedom, especially with Daniel O’Connell, the outstanding Catholic figure who tried to bring about “Catholic Emancipation” on religious grounds, and the “Repeal of the Union” on political ones.

II. 1-The Policy of Daniel O’Connell

The man who was to lead Catholics to the first awareness of their strong political power had been ahead of his co-religionists in rejecting the Union from the start. He was a lawyer named Daniel O’Connell. O’Connell, who has sometimes been regarded as a precursor in modern Irish nationalism, did more than any other Irishman before, or perhaps since, to give power to the Irish to live freely on their land as a sovereign entity and to practise their own religion without any form of persecution or segregation.

But before he could begin to be active on the political scene, a short postscript to the rebellion of 1798 occurred as a reaction to the Act of Union; it was the rebellion of Robert Emmet ⁽⁵⁸⁾ in Dublin in 1803.

II. 1-1-The First Reactions against the Union

In fact, Emmet’s attempt turned to be a disorderly street riot rather than a well prepared rebellion. Though being an outstanding figure who had been a united

Irishman,⁽⁵⁹⁾ Emmet was inspired by all his former colleagues' revolutionary ideals. Indeed, it was his desire to assert those ideals that led him to make his most important contribution to the future: his solemn speech from the dock before execution.

His plan had been ambitious: to seize the Dublin Castle as a signal to the rest of the country to rise in arms. A proclamation of "The Irish Republic" had been printed; contacts were made with a band of outlaws who had been taking refuge in the Wicklow Hills since 1798. But the only part of the plan that really worked was the printing of the Proclamation of the Republic which was coming wet off the presses as the military arrived to seize it.

Hoping to assemble 2,000 men to attack the Dublin Castle, the headquarters of the British authorities, Emmet gathered only eighty, who, armed with pikes and blunderbusses, set out into the night of Saturday, 23 July 1803, headed by Emmet himself. Some of his followers detached themselves to kill Lord Kilwarden, the Chief Justice, who was passing through the streets in a coach at the time. Emmet, shocked by the cruel murderous rioting into which his attempt to establish an Irish Republic immediately degenerated, abandoned the project and ran away to hide for a month before being caught, tried, and executed.⁽⁶⁰⁾ His speech from the dock which immortalized him in Irish history contained the phrase: "Let no man write my epitaph.....When my country takes her place among the nations of the earth, then and not till then let my epitaph be written."⁽⁶¹⁾

II. 1-2-The Catholic Emancipation

The morality of the rebellion of 1798 for the Catholic people of Ireland was clear: they needed political leadership. The secret societies were too primitive and archaic to operate effectively on a national scale, even when linked to sophisticated

political leaders like the United Irishmen. The Catholic Church was still the only representative organization the people had, but it was going to be of marginal use for the redressing of Catholic grievances in an overwhelmingly imposing Protestant state. It was to this political sterility of the Catholic Irish people that O'Connell put an end and found an efficient remedy. He was to become known as "the liberator" because he liberated the great mass of the Irish people from their stubborn lack of political consciousness and absence of any kind of order and coherence. In the space of about twenty years, he inaugurated two great political campaigns in succession. The first was for Catholic Emancipation, or the removal of the remnants of legal discrimination against Catholics surviving from the penal laws. Principally this concerned the right of Roman Catholics to sit in parliament, from which they were still banned unless they took an oath abjuring certain fundamental Catholic beliefs. To campaign for Catholic Emancipation, O'Connell built up a strong mass organization with the help of able middle class assistants and more important members of the Roman Catholic clergy. And although it could be said that the right to sit in parliament or occupy high office of state was of little immediate interest to the ordinary Irish peasantry, yet it was as a symbol of the rising status of all Catholic Irish people that was pursued. Above all, it was a rallying cry for that people's right to have a say in their own affairs, a demonstration of their ability to assert that right regardless of what a government with roots in London might think.

An essential feature of O'Connell's political organization was its broad democratic basis. It required a penny a month to be a member of the Association and soon very large sums of money were flowing into it. Something like the first modern Irish political party machine, with strong clerical overtones, was created. ⁽⁶²⁾

O'Connell was conscious of the horror of popular violence as a result of the events of 1798 and was continually against it, whether for agrarian or wider political purposes. But at the same time he became adept at stressing, with disciplined crowds at great meetings and long processions, the physical power that lay in the mass

support behind him. Thus O'Connell and his followers were willingly decided not to give up. ⁽⁶³⁾

O'Connell appointed a Protestant pro- Emancipation candidate to contest a by-election in Waterford, a seat in which the power of the anti-Emancipation Tory (Conservative) landlords was incontestable. Now for the first time the power of the Catholic Association proved itself considerable, and tenants voted in mass against their landlords to put in the pro-Emancipation candidate. The victory encouraged O'Connell to stand in one of the most famous elections in Irish history at Clare in 1828. With the same powerful organization, his supporters actually marching in regular columns under officers without any of the drunkenness or disorderly behaviour that normally distinguished Irish elections, O'Connell won triumphantly. The Home Secretary, Robert Peel, commented on the "fearful exhibition of sobered and desperate enthusiasm" ⁽⁶⁴⁾ which attended the triumph, but O'Connell, being a Catholic, could not of course yet take the seat he had won; the government backed down before the implication of such a menacingly disciplined display of Irish force and it was this rather than the Emancipation Act (which was to follow) which was O'Connell's real victory. ⁽⁶⁵⁾

II. 1-3-The Repeal Association

At the beginning of the 1840's Daniel O'Connell used the same policy with an even more powerful organization with strong clerical backing, the Repeal Association, for the sake of an even more ambitious cause: that of Repeal of the Act of Union and a restoration of the rights of an Irish parliament which now would, no longer, be dominated by a Protestant minority but by the Catholic majority. In a certain way he sought the same constitutional position for Ireland as Grattan had done: no separation but a close partnership between two kingdoms, each with independent legislatures, united by ancient historical origins, ties and common

interests, the whole symbolized by the person of a joint monarch reigning over the two allied kingdoms of Ireland and Britain. But the argument by which he hoped to convince English opinion was one which all constitutional nationalists were to use in future, the recognition of Ireland's claim to be a nation. Only failure to grant such recognition could provoke separation ran the argument. But O'Connell did not rely chiefly on argument.⁽⁶⁶⁾

In a series of what became known as 'Monster Meetings', O'Connell once again deployed vast crowds of disciplined and good-natured supporters. The greatest of all such Monster Meetings took place on 15 August 1843 on the Royal Hill of Tara and its ancient Gaelic ruins (in county Meath, province of Leinster, Central North). Archaeologists who have found bones 4,000 years old at the bottom of one of the hills there, have also found, under the grass at the top, traces of wooden platforms and bits of clay pipes and whisky bottles from O'Connell's meeting. A writer in the *Nation* newspaper claimed "without fear of exaggeration" that there were three quarters of a million people there that day.⁽⁶⁷⁾ O'Connell himself, who never had the slightest fear of exaggeration, put it at one and a half million.

Vast crowds with banners and carriages were gathered by O'Connell's marshals on horseback. One young farmer said of O'Connell's voice: "you'd hear it a mile off as if it were coming through honey".⁽⁶⁸⁾ And on this day, in his honeyed voice, the Liberator declaimed: "We are at Tara of the kings – the spot from which emanated the social power, the legal authority, the right to dominion over the furthest extremes of the land".⁽⁶⁹⁾ As the most talented and eloquent orator Ireland had ever known, O'Connell who was to be a famous Irish figure continued:

The strength and majority of the national movement was never exhibited so imposingly as at this great meeting. The numbers exceed any that ever before congregated in Ireland in peace or war. It is a sight not grand alone but appalling – not exciting merely pride but fear. Step by

step we are approaching the great goal of Repeal of the union, but it is at length with the strides of a giant.⁽⁷⁰⁾

It is true that the Irish people were, under O'Connell, manifesting something of the strength of a giant in British politics, for they were, for the first time, united and determined. It was a strength which in the future was often to lie dormant but which when roused would finally prove more than Westminster could deal with. All Irish nationalists were to benefit from the strength that O'Connell had built. But the goal of Repeal itself was still far away to reach. When the government outlawed the Monster Meetings and banned one planned in the town of Clontarf, O'Connell and his closest colleagues were sentenced to a year in prison for conspiracy, though the judgement was reversed in the House of Lords.

O'Connell died in 1847 and before this a calamity had struck the Irish people beside which a political issue like Repeal of the Union seemed an irrelevant abstraction. This was the Great Famine of the years 1845 – 1849 in which the only consideration for most Irishmen and their families was how to try and stay alive.

For the long-term future what was to be of the greatest importance to nationalism was not only that source of national strength which O'Connell had achieved but also the way in which he had done so. For with his great organizational campaigns for Emancipation and Repeal, supported by priests and people, he had successfully channelled the power of the Catholic Church's link with some people into politics which made him a pioneer in that Herculean task. He himself linked Roman Catholicism and Irish consciousness into a great national movement. He linked them together so firmly indeed that as one famous modern historian J.C. Beckett⁽⁷¹⁾ put it, "succeeding generations have hardly been able to prise them apart."⁽⁷²⁾

II. 2-The Great Famine, 1845-1849

The famine of 1845–1849 is a major dividing line in the history of modern Ireland. Politically, economically and socially, the period that followed it appears clearly distinct from the period that preceded it. In some ways this appearance is misleading, for the famine provoked some changes which were to disguise the real continuity between the two periods. ⁽⁷³⁾ But the very rapidity of these changes affected their character; and the immense burden of human suffering by which they were accompanied left an indelible mark on the popular memory. The historical importance of the Great Famine lies not only in the physical results that followed it – the decline in population, the transfer of property, the changes in agriculture – but also in the great majority of the Irish people’s attitude to the government and to the ruling class.

II. 2-1-The Outbreak of Famine

From one point of view, there was nothing exceptional about the Great Famine except its extent and its intensity. Every year, a large section of the population was, for a period of two or three months, practically impoverished; and on several occasions during the earlier nineteenth century, notably in 1817 and 1822, this poverty had amounted to absolute famine in some parts of the country. This state of affairs seemed to be the inevitable result of social and economic conditions. Ireland in the 1840’s, with over 8.000.000 inhabitants, of whom more than four– fifths lived on the land, was one of the most densely populated countries in Europe. Even in some rural areas, the population was as high as 400 per square mile, and over the country as a whole it averaged 335 per square mile of arable land. About half this population depended for its subsistence on the potato cultivation and it was local and partial failures of the potato crop that had produced the earlier famine. What gave its

special character to the Great Famine was that the crop failed over the whole country, and that the failure was repeated in successive years.

Though the difficult problems characterizing the Irish situation had long been recognized, no government had proved capable of elaborating any means of ameliorating it; and with the increase of population the margin of safety, always precarious, had decreased and the condition of Ireland was seriously declining and seemed as desperate as ever. No one had foreseen a catastrophe such as actually occurred; and the noticeable fact that there had been earlier potato failures and earlier famines made it natural to suppose, at first, that this was no more than a repetition of a familiar phenomenon to end one day or another. When the “blight” on the potato crop was first reported, from the south of England, in August 1845, a few people among farmers quickly realized that its effect on the whole Ireland would be infinitely more disastrous than in Great Britain (for all Ireland relied on the potato crop); but even when the blight appeared in Ireland, in the following month, there was considerable divergence of view about its significance. And for a time this divergence was maintained by conflicting reports: the blight had spared some areas, and in others its effect was not immediately apparent, the potatoes seemed perfectly healthy when dug, but putrefying later on.

Difference of opinion about the seriousness of the potato failure did not arise only from variation in the reports; there was a political reason also. For some years, the British Prime Minister of the time, Sir Robert Peel ⁽⁷⁴⁾ had been moving slowly towards the belief that the Corn Laws ⁽⁷⁵⁾ had to be repealed, and events in Ireland convinced him that he would have to act at once. For the irreconcilable protectionists, it was a matter of policy to minimize the danger of famine. They declared that the reports on famine were exaggerated, and they discouraged the preparation of relief schemes as unnecessary. It was a misfortune for Ireland that the reality of the famine had become a political question, and that the preparation of

remedial measures had been involved in one of the most difficult parliamentary conflicts of the nineteenth century.

Peel did not allow personal or party interests to interfere with his plans for relief. Early in November 1845 he arranged, on his own responsibility, for the purchase by the government of £ 100,000's worth of Indian corn in the United States, and for its shipment to Cork. It was not his intention that the government should undertake responsibility for feeding the people; but he believed that by selling this grain cheaply it would be possible to keep down the general price of food, and prevent profiteering. He placed his main reliance, however, on local efforts by the gentry and professional classes; and a relief commission set up by the government in November had, as its first main mission, the organization of local committees, which were to raise funds and distribute food. At the same time, the programme was to start the construction of new roads, a traditional, though efficient method of providing employment in highly difficult years.

Peel himself took the initiative in these measures, naming as director Charles Trevelyan,⁽⁷⁶⁾ assistant secretary to the treasury, and one of the new generations that was transforming the character of the British civil service. Trevelyan worked day and night at his task; but his outlook was dominated by the prevailing "Laissez-Faire" philosophy, and sometimes, as a phlegmatic British he gave the impression that he was more alarmed for fear that the Irish should be demoralized by receiving too much help from the government than for fear that they should die of starvation through not receiving enough. "You cannot", one of his agents in Ireland reminded him, "answer the cry of want by a quotation from political economy";⁽⁷⁷⁾ but the warning had little effect. Nevertheless, during the first season of famine, from the autumn of 1845 to the summer of 1846, the government's measures were substantially successful. And this success was due mainly to Peel's foresight, promptness, and determination. Even the *Freeman's Journal*, an O'Connellite anti-Conservative newspaper, could pay him a retrospective tribute in 1847: "No man

died of famine during his administration, and it is a boast of which he might well be proud.”⁽⁷⁸⁾

The real test, however, was still to come. The failure of 1845, though widespread, had not been complete; and even in the affected areas the people, except the very poorest had still some reserves, something left that they could exchange for food; and they hoped that the next year’s harvest would be plentiful. It was when the blight struck again, in August 1846, that despair became absolute. But by this time Peel was no longer Prime Minister. His break with the protectionists of his own party had compelled him to rely on the support of the Whigs and Radicals, and with their help he carried the repeal of the Corn Laws, in June 1846. In ordinary circumstances the protectionists would have welcomed such a measure which serves Britain as well as Ireland; but they were so anxious for revenge on Peel that they readily joined forces with Whigs and Radicals, and the “blackguard combination” as Wellington⁽⁷⁹⁾ called it, was strong enough to turn Peel out. In July, a Whig ministry was formed under Lord John Russell;⁽⁸⁰⁾ and it was this ministry that had to face the renewed crisis in Ireland.

II. 2-2-The Whigs and the Famine

When Lord Russell took office as Prime Minister, the people expected some prospect of better times in Ireland; the weather in May and June had been warm, and the potatoes were flourishing. But the Irish hopes were soon to be disappointed. Father Theobald Mathew⁽⁸¹⁾ wrote early in August:

On the 27th of last month”, “I passed from Cork to Dublin, and this doomed plant bloomed in all the luxuriance of an abundant harvest. Returning on the 3rd instant, I beheld with sorrow one wide

waste of putrefying vegetation. In many places the wretched people were seated on the fences of their decaying gardens, wringing their hands, and wailing bitterly the destruction that had left them foodless.⁽⁸²⁾

Similar reports of destruction and despair followed from all over Ireland, for this time the failure was general. Already weakened by a season of incredible scarcity and with no resource, four million people faced the prospect of starvation.

This new disaster did not bring any immediate change in government policy. Trevelyan was still in charge of relief, and both the new Prime Minister and the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Charles Wood,⁽⁸³⁾ shared his views. “It must be thoroughly understood”,⁽⁸⁴⁾ wrote Russell in October 1846, “that we cannot feed the people.” The government was prepared to promote public works, to help with the organization of relief committees, and to make some financial contribution; but only under drastic conditions. Thus, for example no public money was to be spent on relief works that might be profitable to private individuals; and land reclamation and drainage, the improvements which were to bring immediate benefit to the country, were thus excluded. Again, relief committees were instructed not to sell food below the prices prevailing in their districts, otherwise the profits of normal traders could be endangered; and Peel’s sensible, and partly successful, method of keeping down prices was abandoned.

The ineffective character of government action in Ireland, though resulting mainly from the economic principles on which it was based, had other causes also. Russell’s parliamentary majority was weak and precarious, depending as it did on the continued co-operation of incompetent elements, originally allied only by their antagonism to Peel; and even within the ministry there was divergence of views over the Irish policy.⁽⁸⁵⁾ In these circumstances, it was sure that the government suffered

from an ignorance of Irish conditions so flagrant that it could to a certain extent justify the repealers' conviction that Ireland could never be fairly or satisfactorily ruled from Westminster. What Russell, Wood, and Trevelyan all alike failed to realize was that the economy of rural Ireland, especially in the areas most severely affected by the famine, was totally different from that of England. The peasant in these areas rarely handled money, and even scarcely used it for the purchase of food. He paid his rent by his labour; and he and his family lived on the potatoes that he grew himself. When the potato cultivation failed, he was helpless; and there was little use in paying him a wage for his labour on relief works, without at the same time improvising a system of retail distribution that would enable him to turn his wage into food.

The government's readiness to criticize the British landlords established in Ireland was understandable. Some landlords simply disowned responsibility for the welfare of their tenants; some took advantage of the situation to clear their estates by wholesale evictions. But, they were not, as a body, able to bear the burden that the government planned to place upon them. A lot of them, perhaps a majority, habitually lived beyond their incomes; their estates were heavily mortgaged, and a large part of their rents was absorbed in the payment of interest.

When, as it happened at this time, income rents shrank, or disappeared completely, they were faced with failure and even bankruptcy. To encumber them with the cost of famine relief might precipitate their ruin, but could bring little immediate benefit to their starving tenantry. What the landlords demanded (and on this point they agreed with the leaders of popular opinion) was that the cost of famine relief should be made a direct charge on the imperial exchequer: if Ireland was indeed an integral part of the United Kingdom, so the United Kingdom as a whole should be financially responsible for Ireland. It was a logical and reasonable argument, but one that neither government nor House of Commons would accept. The average British politician, in spite of the holiness of the union, persisted in

regarding Ireland as a distinct entity, and he looked with jealous caution on every proposal for the expenditure of “the British taxpayers’ money” on Irish objects. ⁽⁸⁶⁾

If the people of Ireland had been left, during the bitter winter of 1846-1847, to depend entirely on the more or less cautious assistance of the government and the doubtful and even improbable benevolence of their greedy landlords, they would have suffered even more than they did. But a great deal was also made for them by voluntary effort. Societies, committees, and individuals raised funds for the establishment of soup-kitchens, which for many months provided a large section of population, especially in the west, with almost their only regular means of subsistence. A leading part in this work was taken by the Society of Friends -the Quakers- ⁽⁸⁷⁾ who set up central relief committees in London and Dublin in November 1846. These committees did not only organize relief, but were also careful to look for honest testimonies and to collect accurate information about the real state of affairs: it was the reports sent in by Quaker agents in every part of the country that helped to inform and solicit British public opinion and the government about the true character of the dramatic situation in Ireland.

By January 1847 the Cabinet at last began to realize that the measures taken at that time proved ineffective, and that a radical change of policy was needed; even the intransigent Trevelyan was converted to the view that the provision of employment on relief works was not an adequate solution to the problem, that the people had, by no means, to be fed, and that the cost of feeding them, now far beyond the range of voluntary effort, had to be supported by the public funds. The principle of local responsibility was not, however, to be abandoned; the provision and distribution of food was a heavy charge; though the government would, where necessary, advance funds to start the new scheme, these advances were to be repaid, and running costs met by the rate-payers. This new policy could only gradually be operational, but by August over 3.000.000 people were being fed daily at the public expense. The burden was then naturally heaviest in the poorer unions, many of which were now

virtually bankrupt for the collection of rates -difficult enough, especially in the west, even before the famine- had become almost impossible. Nevertheless, the greatest part of the cost had therefore to be the responsibility, in the first place, of the treasury; and then boards of guardians were made legally responsible for the sums so advanced.

In adapting the poor – law system to the situation created by the famine the government had had to abandon the “workhouse test”;⁽⁸⁸⁾ for though the workhouses were over-crowded, and though additional accommodation had been provided, they could not contain more than a tenth of those now dependent on public support. But the system of an open air relief, reluctantly adapted, was intended as an emergency measure; its continuation throughout 1848, and until the late autumn of 1849, reflected the continuing pressure of famine.⁽⁸⁹⁾ The blight had spared the potato in 1847; but the area sown was very small, and the crop, though particularly good, was not to relieve that bad situation. The absence of blight in 1847 had even a chaotic effect. It raised fresh hopes and revived popular faith in the potato, which was extensively sown in the following season, excluding almost any other crop (which was really a lack of common sense), so that when blight reappeared in the summer of 1848, and the crop was destroyed, conditions were as bad as they had been in 1846. By the end of 1849, however, though there had been a partial failure of the potato crop, the worst was over; and for those who had survived, conditions gradually improved during the following decade.

II. 2-3-The Aftermath of the Great Famine

The loss of population from the high mortality of the famine years was surpassed by the loss through emigration. People were leaving from every port in Ireland. In the course of 1847 alone a quarter of a million Irish men, women and children left Ireland and the rate was to continue at that level and sometimes higher

for the next four years. It was a mass emigration which was to alter permanently the population structure of Ireland. Northern America was their suitable destination, the vast, rich and powerful nation across the Atlantic which most of the emigrants hoped to reach. But that immense exodus of the Irish people to the New World was to affect profoundly the future development of Irish nationalist feeling. The emigrants found that the end of the trip was not, unfortunately, the end of their miseries, for, neither Canada nor the United States welcomed their mass influx. The arrival of those innumerable sick and poor Irish emigrants, marked by fever epidemics that no quarantine regulations could prevent, represented a real danger for Northern Americans. They were also a heavy burden on the public and their low level of living threatened the security of the working class. But though generations were to pass before the Irish subjects were to become totally assimilated, their cohesion and their rapidly growing numerical strength soon gave them in the United States, especially in the east coast, a political importance that could not be ignored; and the rising considerable influence of the Irish Americans had an important effect on the politics of Ireland.⁽⁹⁰⁾

The combined effect of disease and emigration was a sudden and catastrophic fall in population: it was 8.175.000 in 1841 and the natural increase was expected to raise it to about 8.500.000 by 1851; in fact, the census of that year showed a population of 6.552.000. The famine did not only stop the process of growth, but completely reversed it: the decline continued unchanging, and by the beginning of the twentieth century the population of Ireland was only about half what it had been on the eve of the famine.⁽⁹¹⁾

In the early autumn of 1848, and after three successive years of famine in Ireland, the final blow fell: news that all over the country the new potato crop was once again almost totally blighted spread. 1849 was to be the most terrible year of all. And it was in that exceptional autumn that a list of exports of food from Cork on a single day, 14 November 1848, ran as follows:

- 147 bales of bacon
- 120 casks and 135 barrels of pork
- 5 casks of hams
- 149 casks miscellaneous provisions
- 1.996 sacks and 950 barrels of oats
- 300 bags of flour
- 300 head of cattle
- 239 sheep
- 9.398 firkins of butter
- 542 boxes of eggs ⁽⁹²⁾

In February 1849 the parish priest of Partree in county Galway, reported : “The great majority of poor located here are in a state of starvation, many of them hourly expecting death to relieve them of their sufferings.” ⁽⁹³⁾ At Ballinrobe in county Galway too, there were dead bodies everywhere. ⁽⁹⁴⁾ An eye-witness wrote:

Every village has dead bodies lying unburied for many days” , “Almost every hovel in the suburb of this town has its corpse... May God forgive our rulers for this cruel conduct towards God’s creatures here.... The poor are dropping into their graves in multitudes. ⁽⁹⁵⁾

The decisive influence of the Great Famine on the economic and social life of Ireland came directly from the sudden and continuing decline in the population in the cities as well as in the countryside. There were fewer people and also fewer holdings. In 1841 only one-fifth of the holdings had exceeded fifteen acres. By 1851 the proportion had risen to one half; but the total number of holdings had regressed from 690.000 to 570.000; and in most parts of the country the process was a continuing one. The change was due partly to the landlords, who were anxious to clear their

estates, and get rid of the poor Irish tenants by evicting them without any form of compensation. The relief legislation of 1847 excluded any person holding more than a quarter-acre of land from its assistance plan so that many small-holders were forced to abandon their land in order to escape starvation. From the 1850's onwards there was a decline in tillage with a concentration on cattle-raising, and in an agrarian economy based on cattle, there was little place for the very small farm. Conditions like those of the pre-famine continued to exist only along the western coasts; elsewhere, the multitude of tiny holdings was replaced by farms of economic size, and the ultimate establishment of a peasant proprietary in place of a landlord system was made possible.⁽⁹⁶⁾ (See Table 1)

Table 1: The Land Holdings in Ireland from 1841 to 1851.

HOLDINGS	1841	1851
1-5 acres	310.436	88.083
5-15 acres	252.799	191.854
15-30 acres	79.342	141.311
above 30 acres	48.625	149.090

Source: J.C Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland, 1603-1923*, London, Faber & Faber, 1981, p. 348.

When, in August 1849, Queen Victoria made her first visit to Ireland she was welcomed with immense popular enthusiasm; but it would be a mistake to consider this enthusiasm as a true indication of Irish cordial feelings towards Britain, and it certainly had no durable effect on British feelings towards Ireland. As the two countries approached the end of a half – century of parliamentary union, they were, perhaps, more completely unfriendly than they had ever been before.

II. 3-Home Rule

By the 1850's, the Great Famine was over and the Irish people renewed struggle against the British oppressors, but more violently this time. The origins of Fenians ⁽⁹⁷⁾ and Fenianism go back to the 1840's at the time of the Repeal Association of Daniel O'Connell, when a group of enthusiastic journalists known as the "Young Irelanders", created a weekly newspaper, *The Nation*, first published in October 1842. John Mitchel (1815 – 1875) ⁽⁹⁸⁾ pushed the "Young Ireland's" ⁽⁹⁹⁾ movement further forward by agitating for an independent Irish republic. He was sentenced to exile for 14 years in 1848, and a small rebellion broke out the same year but failed in achieving its goal. Irish tenants had no security of tenure on the land they rented, and if they did not pay the rent most landlords had them evicted so that the land could be rented to someone else. In 1850 a Tenant League ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ was formed for land reform, but in 1858 an organization of more consequence was established, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B), more popularly known as the "Fenians." The name "Fenian", apparently suggested by its founder John O'Mahony, ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ who was an enthusiastic Gaelic Scholar, was derived from "Fianna", the military force led by Fionn MacCuchail (Finn Mac Cool), a heroic warrior of the Celtic legend. The Fenians themselves most commonly spoke simply of "the Organization".

II. 3-1-The Fenians

The essential principles of Fenianism were concentrated essentially on the fact that nothing could be achieved for Ireland by constitutional means; that British power must be overthrown by force; and that any delay in action would be dangerous and even dramatic: “Soon or never” was an early Fenian slogan. Though it prospered on social discontent, claiming to be acting on behalf of “the Irish people”, Fenianism had no clear programme or reform plan. James Stephens ⁽¹⁰²⁾ had insisted from the beginning that he himself should hold supreme control, and the organization that he had set up was, above all, a military one. The Fenians did not proceed, as the Young Irelanders had done, to educate popular opinion or win mass support, partly, perhaps, because they thought that popular opinion was already, even if unconsciously, on their side, but also because they believed in the absolute divine right of nationality: it was their task to make Ireland independent, whatever the majority of Irishmen might say.

Nevertheless, Stephens soon realized the importance of propaganda in his struggle against the British, and in 1863 he established in Dublin a weekly newspaper, *The Irish People* which defended the Fenians and attacked the British in its columns. He himself was not a man of letters, though he contributed with a few articles in the early numbers; and the paper was mainly conducted by John O’Leary, Thomas Clarke Luby, and Charles Kickham, who were rather acid pamphleteers than journalists. All of them had been involved in the 1848 rising. ⁽¹⁰³⁾

During a relatively short existence of barely two years, *The Irish People* was largely concerned in supporting Fenianism against its Irish critics. Stephens had equipped the movement with an elaborate secret organization, designed to protect it against spies and informers of all sorts; but the fact that such a movement existed could not be ignored for a long time; and Fenian attempts to infiltrate or destroy every other movement of a nationalist character naturally alarmed and antagonized

those who still aimed at establishing a party to win self-government by constitutional means. Though some of these constitutional nationalists conceived, in principle, the right of armed insurrection, but only in suitable conditions, they were absolutely convinced that in such unfavourable circumstances it could lead only to useless bloodshed; and they strongly disapproved the conspiratorial character of the Fenian organization, for example William Smith O'Brien⁽¹⁰⁴⁾, who had returned to Ireland in 1858, published in *The Nation* a letter warning the people and preventing them to join secret societies. *The Irish People* denounced such caution as a betrayal of the national interest; but it was not, in fact, the constitutional nationalists who were to threaten Fenianism. The hostility of the Roman Catholic Church was infinitely more dangerous; and some of the bitterest attacks in *The Irish People* were those launched against the Catholic bishops. O'Leary and Luby stayed out of this controversy (the latter, perhaps, because he was a Protestant), and left the work to Kickham, whose anti-clerical attitude is clearly expressed in one of his articles: "If the people were submissive to the clergy in politics there would be no Fenian Brotherhood. Ireland would be allowed to perish without a hand being raised to help her".⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

Hoping to counter this Fenian propaganda, Archbishop Cullen⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ supported by most of the other bishops, combined with a group of constitutional nationalists to found a new movement, the National Association, in 1864. But the association's programme –land reform, disestablishment of the Church of Ireland (a church of Anglican obedience, similar to the British one), denominational education– contained nothing to attract those whose great aim was national independence; the association itself was weakened by internal divisions; and in the general election of 1865 its candidates were unsuccessful. The National Association survived for some years, and did something to sharpen popular hostility to the established church, but it had no effect on the position or prospects of Fenianism.

The outbreak of the American Civil War virtually compelled the I.R.B. to postpone action, against the British authority in Ireland, and after the end of the war,

The Irish People was suppressed; O'Leary, Luby and Kickham were arrested at once in September 1865; and Stephens was arrested in his turn a few weeks later, but soon escaped; the others were tried for treason and condemned, which proved excellent propaganda for the Fenians. When at last, after Stephens had left the country, an insurrection was arranged for March 1867, it collapsed in a single night and turned to a real fiasco.

The influence of Fenianism in Ireland was far more important and decisive than the one exercised by Repealers or Young Irelanders, because of the establishment since the famine of large Irish colonies in England which enabled the Fenians to transfer their hostilities to England itself. In 1866 they planned an attack on Chester Castle, which failed only at the last moment; ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ in September 1867 they rescued two Fenian prisoners in Manchester, killing a policeman in the process; in the following December an attempt to rescue another prisoner, at Clerkenwell, involved an explosion in which more than twenty people were killed.

The immediate effect of these activities was to engender a wave of anti-Irish fury; but, when this became less violent, public opinion was more ready than any time before to recognize that there must be something radically unfair in the political condition of Ireland, ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ and to accept the view that the British government and British parliament could not escape responsibility for finding and applying a solution.

II. 3-2-Parnell and the Home Rule Movement, 1870-1891

William Ewart Gladstone, who first became Prime Minister in 1868, had declared: "My mission is to pacify Ireland", ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ recognizing more readily than his fellow politicians the reality of Irish nationalism. His purpose was not to encourage it but to reconcile Irishmen to English rule. During the next twenty five years he led the

country on four separate occasions and tried desperately to find an efficient and a lasting solution to the Irish problem. First, he dealt with religious grievances. Only one Irishman out of ten belonged to the Anglican Church; so Gladstone “disestablished” the Anglican Church of Ireland in 1869 seizing its property (worth £ 15 million) and giving half to charity and education. This pleased the Catholic majority. The other major grievance concerned land, much of which was owned by Englishmen. Every year, hundreds of families were evicted from their smallholdings because their landlords found new tenants capable of farming the land more effectively and paying more rent. Gladstone’s Land Act of 1870 obliged landlords to pay outgoing tenants compensation for improvements they had made.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

The Secret Ballot Act of 1872 constituted a highly influential event of the 1870’s which had little observable effect upon the way the average Englishman voted, but despite the fact that the Act, indeed freed tenant farmers from the revenge of their landlords, it had a very noticeable effect upon the way Irishmen voted. Almost immediately the Irish electorate began to assert its independence. Of 103 M.P’s elected in Ireland in the general elections of 1874, some 59 called themselves neither Liberals nor Conservatives but Home Rulers.⁽¹¹¹⁾ The expression “Home Rule” had been coined by Isaac Butt,⁽¹¹²⁾ a Protestant Dublin lawyer who headed the group. His aim was to establish a parliament in Dublin in which Irishmen might control all domestic affairs while leaving imperial defence and foreign policy in the hands of the British Parliament at Westminster.

A more immediate solution to the agricultural problem seemed to reside in the Irish Land League (I.L.L), an organization founded in 1879 by Michael Davitt⁽¹¹³⁾, an ex-Fenian .Its slogan was “The Land for the People” and its purpose was to protect the peasantry against eviction and exorbitant rents. In the meantime, the economic depression and the apparent failure of Butt’s attempts at gentle persuasion brought to the forefront within the Home Rule ranks a Protestant young man named Charles Stewart Parnell,⁽¹¹⁴⁾ who decided that far more extreme measures were

needed. Being himself an Irish landlord, he distrusted Davitt's more radical proposals, but gave his blessings to the League, becoming its president. At the same time he replaced Butt, who died in 1879, as Home Rule leader at Westminster. Under Parnell's patronage, the Home Rulers began to receive a mass following in Ireland.

Parnell insisted on the fact that Ireland should be considered as a sovereign state and not as a subdued region or a province of Britain. He said: "Why should Ireland be treated as a geographical fragment of England as I heard an ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer call it some time ago? Ireland is not a geographical fragment but a nation." (115)

The new Gladstone ministry of 1880 let lapse the most recent of many temporary "coercion acts" (116) and it sponsored a bill to have the government pay compensation to evicted Irish tenants. As the I.L.L. renewed agitation in Ireland on behalf of evicted tenants, the House of Lords vetoed the bill. The I.L.L. advocated a system of social ostracism whereby anyone who purchased a farm from which the previous tenant had been unjustly evicted would be totally ignored by his neighbours. They would not talk to him, sell to him or buy from him. He was to be treated, in Parnell's own words, like a "leper of old". The first victim of this policy was Captain Boycott, an agent of a large landowner in county Mayo.

Gladstone met the problem of violence in Ireland and obstruction by the Home Rulers in Westminster by characteristic combination of sticks and carrots –the hope of reward and the threat of punishment–. The "sticks" consisted in a new "Coercion Act" in 1881 and changing parliamentary regulations in 1882 to shut off debate in the face of deliberate obstructionism initiated by Parnell's Home Rulers. The major "carrot" was the Irish Land Act of 1881, a piece of legislation piloted through the House of Commons by Gladstone himself. The Act granted to the Irish tenant farmers the "Three F's" they had long demanded: fair rent, free sale, and fixity of tenure. The Act of 1881 proved far more effective than any previous efforts by the

government to control landlord – tenant relations. It set down the principle that tenants as well as landlords had important rights on the land.

The autumn of 1881 witnessed new outbreaks of violence in Ireland. The British government passed another Coercion Act ⁽¹¹⁷⁾ to outlaw the I.L.L. and placed Parnell under arrest in Kilmainham Jail in Dublin. In April 1882, Gladstone and Parnell reached a compromise; the government would release the Irish leaders and pay the arrears in rent of 100.000 Irish tenants. Parnell would co-operate to end crime and disorder. This so called “Kilmainham Treaty” outraged many Englishmen. However, Gladstone had, despite his insistence on moral principle, a highly tactful sense of diplomacy, while Parnell was ultimately more a constitutionalist than a revolutionary. The haziness of Parnell’s ultimate aims enabled him to do what no other Irish leader since O’Connell had accomplished, to unite revolutionaries and moderates, temporarily on behalf of the cause of “Home Rule”. Four days after Parnell’s release, the new Chief Secretary for Ireland, Lord Frederick Cavendish had been murdered in Phoenix Park, Dublin. Parnell himself was outraged and denounced the crime, which led to still another Coercion Act. ⁽¹¹⁸⁾ Occasional acts of violence continued and the Parnellites opposed the Liberal Government in a number of instances, but affairs did not again reach the fever pitch of 1879 –1882.

Late in January 1885, the Gladstonian Liberals and Irish Home Rulers combined to “defeat” the Conservatives in the new Parliament. Salisbury, ⁽¹¹⁹⁾ the Prime Minister of the day, leader of the Conservatives, resigned, and Gladstone at the age of 76 became Prime Minister for the third time. This time Gladstone had been definitely converted to Home Rule (accepting and even defending the idea of autonomy for Ireland) and he was convinced that the Irish question was a moral issue which deserved his complete support.

In April 1886, Gladstone introduced a bill to create in Dublin a separate parliament and executive to handle Irish domestic affairs, whereas the Parliament at

Westminster would continue to have control on foreign policy, defence and coinage. In June 1886 the decisive vote fell; the proposed statute was defeated by 343 voices against 313. ⁽¹²⁰⁾ Gladstone, despite a number of masterful orations, found himself unable to convince two of his most important colleagues, Hartington, ⁽¹²¹⁾ the head of the Whig wing of the party and Joseph Chamberlain, a fervent imperialist. The dissenters were supported by a number of influent English intellectuals (Spencer, Tennyson, Lecky, Seely, Froude...). They decided to maintain the union between Ireland and Great Britain, and to break with Gladstone; eventually, they formed the Liberal Unionist Party strong of 93 members. Unlike the general elections of the previous year, there were now four parties in the field and the results were bleak for Gladstone: 316 Conservatives, 78 Liberal Unionists; 191 Liberals; and 85 Irish Home Rulers. For the moment, clearly, Home Rule was dead and the Liberal Party divided. ⁽¹²²⁾

The Conservative government of Salisbury (1886 – 1892), ruled Ireland with a firm hand, continuing the coercitive policy, and violence was more widespread than at any time since 1882, especially under the new Chief Secretary for Ireland Arthur Balfour ⁽¹²³⁾ and his diehard policy of Crime Acts. ⁽¹²⁴⁾

The year 1889 brought a rift in the clouds for Gladstone and Parnell. Two years before, at the very time when Balfour had been piloting his Crime Act through the House of Commons, a series of articles had appeared in *The Times* entitled “Parnellism and Crime”. One of these articles included a facsimile letter, apparently written by Parnell a few days after the Phoenix Park murder of 1882, which approved that crime. At that time the position of Parnell was frequently referred to as “the Uncrowned King of Ireland” ⁽¹²⁵⁾ and the champion of Irish rights against English tyranny; his popularity, especially in Ireland and America created him annoyances from his political enemies who tried by all means, to disparage him in the eyes of the public. Sometime later, *The Times* produced a letter allegedly written by Parnell in 1882, which looked like evidence of actual instigation of the Phoenix Park murder.

Parnell called it a forgery, which was to be confirmed by a judgment in February 1890. Tried in a law court, *The Times* was severely condemned, and in the meantime, another event, a private affair was to ruin Parnell's political career. He was accused of adultery. The revelation was a terrible shock to non-conformist sentiment in England and the Roman Catholic Clergy denounced the scandal. Parnell wore himself out and died in October 1891 at the age of 45.

To conclude, the defeat of the Irish chieftains in 1603 and the Flight of the Earls O'Neill and O'Donnell in 1607 left the Irish leaderless and opened the way for the Plantation of Ulster which began in 1610. The best land was confiscated from the native Irish and given to the British settlers, most of whom were Scottish Presbyterians. Dispossessed Catholics rose in rebellion in 1641 but were defeated when Cromwell's avenging army came in 1649. The most brutal English ruler, as far as the Irish are concerned, was Oliver Cromwell who sacked the Town of Drogheda in September 1649, killing over 3.000 people. His name remains an anathema to Irish Catholics.

After having been forced into abdication, James II tried to use Ireland to recapture his throne. On 1 July 1690, he was defeated at the famous Battle of the Boyne by his own son in law William of Orange. Political authority was restored to the Anglican ascendancy who, then, implemented the Penal Laws. These were a series of punitive measures against Catholics, to secure the political, economic and social future of the new Protestant masters.

There was no serious conflict between the 1690's and the 1790's. But following 1790 there were numerous rebellions, insurrections, and political movements which aimed at liberating Ireland from England. All the rebellions failed but there were political gains. On 2 August 1800, the Irish Parliament ceased to exist, and Ireland became officially part of the United Kingdom with representation at Westminster by virtue of the Act of Union of 1 January 1801.

The Union was not very favourable to the Irish Catholics, who regarded the Protestant minority as foreign invaders and oppressors. In the nineteenth century the island was scarcely able to support the population, and at times many people died through famine; great numbers of others crossed the Atlantic to America. The development of Ireland in the nineteenth century is best illustrated by a glance at the population figures. Between 1840 and 1900 the population of England rose from 16 million to 32 million. During the same period the population of Ireland fell from 8.5 million to 4.5 million.

After the terrible Great Famine of 1845-1849, some courageous Irish revolutionaries such as the “Young Irelanders” and the famous “Fenians” did their best and even more to liberate their country by force. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century a majority of Irish people were demanding some measure of self-government or “Home Rule”, and the Irish members of the United Kingdom House of Commons in London, led by a young Protestant landlord, Charles Stewart Parnell, became very active in expressing their grievances, denouncing British abuses and asserting Irish independence.

Notes:

(1)- E.A.Curtis, *A History of Ireland*, London, Methuen, 1961, p. 11.

(2)- Ibid., p. 13.

(3)- Reformation was a religious movement of the 1500's that led to Protestantism. It had a tremendous impact on social, political and economic life, and its influences are still felt today. The movement began in 1517 when Martin Luther, a German monk, protested against certain practices of the Roman Catholic Church. About 40 years later, Protestantism was established in nearly half of Europe. J. P. Kenyon, *the Wordsworth Dictionary of British History*, Ware, Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1994.

(4)- Ibid.

(5)- Ibid.

(6)- Kenneth O. Morgan, *The Oxford History of Britain*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 76.

(7)- The two flown earls were Hugh O'Neill, 2nd Earl of Tyrone who died in Rome in 1616 and Hugh Roe O'Donnell (1572-1602). The second was the son of Hugh O'Donnell (1557-1592) Lord of Tyrconnell and Irish chieftain of the O'Donnells. He was also called Red Hugh and represented the last of the old Gaelic kings of Ireland. Henry Boylan, *A Dictionary of Irish Biography*, New York, Barnes and Noble, 1978.

(8)- E.A. Curtis, op. cit., p. 15.

(9)- Kenneth O. Morgan, op. cit., p. 77.

(10)- Protestantism resulted chiefly from the Reformation, and the word Protestant comes from the Latin word "protestans" which means one who protests. It was first used in 1529 at a diet (formal assembly) in Speyer, Germany. At the diet several German leaders protested against an attempt by Roman Catholics to limit the practice of Lutheranism, an early Protestant movement. The leaders became known as Protestants. The name soon came to include all of the western Christians who had left the Roman Catholic Church. J. P. Kenyon, op. cit.

(11)- Catholics or Roman Catholics are members of a local parish, led by a priest called a pastor. The Parishes in an area form a diocese, a territorial district headed by a bishop. The Pope appoints bishops, and they are responsible to him. Bishops in turn appoint and oversee pastors. Cardinals are bishops chosen by the pope as advisers. Ibid.

(12)- Anglicans are Christians who belong to churches that are part of the Anglican Communion. These Churches developed from the Anglican Church of England which was established under King Henry VIII. Ibid.

(13)- L. W. Cowie, *the Wordsworth Dictionary of British Social History*, Ware, Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1996.

(14)- Ibid.

(15)- Sir Phelim O'Neill (1604-1653) was an Irish Roman Catholic rebel who initiated a major revolt against English rule in Ireland between 1641 and 1652. Henry Boylan, op. cit.

(16)- Pat Levy and Sean Sheehan, *Ireland Handbook*, Bath, Footprint Handbooks Ltd, 2002, p. 644.

(17)- Ibid., p. 645.

(18)- Kenneth O. Morgan, op. cit., p. 80.

(19)- Ibid., p. 81.

(20)- Ibid., p. 84.

(21)- L. W. Cowie, op. cit.

(22)- Kenneth O. Morgan, op. cit., p. 87.

(23)- Puritans were members of a religious and social movement of the 1500's and 1600's. The movement began in England and spread to America where it greatly influenced social, political and religious institutions. Such religious denominations as Congregationalism and Unitarianism developed from Puritan beliefs. J. P. Kenyon, op. cit.

(24)- The Pale was an area around Dublin and Drogheda where the English rule was effective from the Middle Ages to the complete invasion of the country under the Tudors. It is also called the "English Pale". S. J. Connolly, *The Oxford Companion to Irish History*, 2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

(25)- Ibid.

(26)- Henry Boylan, op. cit.

(27)- L. W. Cowie, op. cit.

(28)- Pat Levy and Sean Sheehan, op. cit., p. 149.

(29)- The Restoration refers to the return of the British monarchy in 1660, when Charles II became king after the rule of Oliver Cromwell. The Restoration refers to this event and the period after it, which is known for its lively developments in the arts, particularly in the theatre. *The Oxford Guide to British and American Culture*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.

(30)- Robert Kee, *Ireland, a History*, London, Abacus, 1980, p. 46.

(31)- Ibid., p. 49.

(32)- Pat Levy and Sean Sheehan, op. cit., p. 645.

(33)- Ibid., p. 645.

(34)- *The Oxford Guide to British and American Culture*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, op. cit.

(35)- This might be seen as a form of an economic reprisal against the Irish Catholics, by virtue of some coercive Acts of Parliament such as the Riot Acts, 1763-87 12.

(36)- The Penal Laws represent a legislation passed by the parliament of Ireland after the defeat of the Jacobite cause that sought to inhibit any Catholic political and social revival in Ireland and to guarantee the land settlement of the mid-16th century. The laws violated the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of Limerick in which the Catholics who had accepted the rule of William and Mary were guaranteed the rights they had held under Charles II. The pragmatic William did not approve the legislation, but accepted it in view of the determination of the Protestant Ascendancy that dominated the parliament and government in Ireland to guarantee their position. The laws, which were passed over a number of years, included the following: prohibitions on Catholics sending their children abroad for education, and on the establishment of Catholic schools; banishment from Ireland of all Catholic bishops and priests who were members of religious orders, and the required registration of any remaining priests; prohibition of religious intermarriage; prohibition of Catholics purchasing or inheriting land from Protestants, or taking leases longer than 31 years; the

requirement that the land of a Catholic be divided equally among his sons unless the eldest had converted to Protestantism; and exclusion of Catholics from public office, serving as officers in the military or as barristers, and barred from the right to vote if otherwise qualified. The aim of the legislation was to exclude Catholics from the public life of the country and to reduce those with wealth over a number of generations so as to confine Catholicism to the lower classes with the expectation of its eventual disappearance. After the failure of the Jacobite attempts to return to the throne of England in 1715 and especially again in 1745 and the minimal interest of Irish Catholics in the cause, many in the Irish Protestant Ascendancy lessened their apprehension of Catholics. Reduced fears of Catholicism combined with growing Protestant tolerance derived from both their acceptance of the notions of the Enlightenment and their own diminished religious enthusiasm to mitigate the enforcement of the Penal Laws. Between 1778 and 1793 most of the penal legislation was repealed. John P. McCarthy, *Ireland, a Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present*, New York, Facts On File Inc, 2006, p. 406.

(37)- Friar is the title applied to a member of one of the Roman Catholic religious orders of men who originally lived as mendicants (beggars). The term friar comes from a Latin word that means brother. The mendicant orders differ from monastic orders in that they were founded for active ministry in the world, such as preaching and missionary or social work. Thus friars are more mobile than monks, who generally spend most of their lives in monasteries. Friars live in houses called friaries. The Augustinians are friars of Saint Augustine order, and the Dominicans follow San Domingo De Guzman, whereas the Franciscans believe in the doctrine of Saint Francis of Assise. J. P. Kenyon, op. cit.

(38)- Pat Levy and Sean Sheehan, op. cit., pp. 645-646.

(39)- Refer to the Acts of Parliament concerning the Irish secret society, the “Whiteboys”, notably the ‘Whiteboy Acts’, 1761-87 12-14.

(40)- J. P. Kenyon, op. cit.

(41)- S. J. Connolly, op. cit.

(42)- L. W. Cowie, op. cit.

(43)- Pat Levy and Sean Sheehan, op. cit., p. 646.

(44)- Henry Grattan (1746-1820) was the leader of the movement that forced Britain to grant legislative independence to Ireland in 1782. Later he headed opposition to the union (1800) of England and Ireland. Henry Boylan, op. cit.

(45)- J.C Beckett, *A Short History of Ireland*, London, Faber & Faber, 1977, p. 50.

(46)- Theobald Wolfe Tone (1763-1798) was the Irish republican and rebel who sought to overthrow English rule in Ireland and who led a French military force to Ireland during the insurrection of 1798. Henry Boylan, op. cit.

(47)- R.F Forster, *Paddy and Mr Punch, Connections in Irish & English History*, London, Penguin Books, 1993, p. 122.

(48)- Lazare Hoche (1768-1793) was one of the most famous figures of the French Revolution. In 1798 he headed, as a General, the expedition of Ireland which failed. Jacques Verrière et Jean Guiffan, *L'Irlande, Milieu et Histoire*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1972, pp. 192-193.

(49)- Ibid, p. 194.

(50)- Lord Edward Fitzgerald (1763-1798), the Irish rebel who was renowned for his gallantry and courage, was a leading conspirator behind the uprising of 1798 against British rule in Ireland. S. J. Connolly, op. cit.

(51)- J.C Beckett, *A Short History of Ireland*, op. cit., p. 62.

(52)- R.F Forster, op. cit., p. 207.

(53)- Pat Levy and Sean Sheehan, op. cit., pp. 647-648.

(54)- Ibid., p. 649.

(55)- The Article provided, however, that there might be “such particular exemptions or abatements in Ireland...as circumstances may appear from time to time to demand”. Mark Leonard Morrison, “Hibernia versus Albion, Eight Centuries of Antagonism”, *Irish Economy and Social History*, Vol. V, May 1987, p. 36.

(56)- J.C Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland, 1603-1923*, London, Faber & Faber, 1981, p. 281.

(57)- Robert Kee, op.cit., p. 63.

(58) Robert Emmet (1778-1803) was the Irish nationalist leader who inspired the abortive rising of 1803. Emmet is still remembered as a romantic hero of Irish lost causes. S. J. Connolly, op. cit.

- (59) J.C Beckett, *A Short History of Ireland*, op. cit., p. 76.
- (60) On Emmet's execution, refer to the 'Coercion Acts', 1803-87 12-14.
- (61)- E.A Curtis, op.cit., p. 113.
- (62)- Ibid., p. 114.
- (63)- J.C Beckett, *A Short History of Ireland*, op. cit., p. 83.
- (64)- Robert Kee, op.cit., p. 74.
- (65)- A victory recognized by the Catholic Emancipation Act, 1829-12.
- (66)- E.A Curtis, op. cit., p. 116.
- (67)- Ibid., p. 117.
- (68)- Robert Kee, op.cit., p. 75.
- (69)- L.M Cullen, *An Economic History of Ireland since 1660*, London, Penguin Books Ltd, 1976, p. 384.
- (70)- L. W. Cowie, op. cit.
- (71)- Brian Inglis, *The Story of Ireland*, London, Faber & Faber, 1965, p. 20.
- (72)- Robert Kee, op.cit., p. 77.
- (73)- Despite the precarious situation of Ireland during the Great Famine, the British government never departed from its unchanging oppressive policies incarnated in coercive Acts of Parliament like the Crime and Outrage Act, 1847 13.
- (74)- Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850) was an English statesman who was Prime Minister of Britain several times. Sir Peel was in favour of the Catholic Emancipation in the United Kingdom and Ireland; he organized the Conservative Party and reintroduced the Income Tax in 1832 and in 1846 the bill of the abolition of the Corn Laws was voted thanks to him. L. W. Cowie, op. cit.
- (75)- The Corn Laws are a set of British laws, first introduced in the Middle Ages, which controlled the import and export of grain in order to protect the price of British wheat. They were unpopular in the 19th century when there was a shortage of wheat and the laws were

keeping the prices high. Many members of Parliament owned agricultural land and made large profits from these high prices. In 1846, under pressure from the Anti-Corn Law League, the government changed the laws. *The Oxford Guide to British and American Culture*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, op. cit.

(76)- F.S.L Lyons, *Ireland, since the Famine*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971, p. 9.

(77)- J.C Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland 1603-1923*, op. cit., p. 338.

(78)- Ibid., p. 338.

(79)- Arthur Wellesley Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) was an English General who was born in Dublin and who fought the French troops in Portugal and in Spain where he was successful. But Wellington or the “Iron Duke” is better known as the commander of the allied troops united in 1815 against France which was defeated at Waterloo (Belgium). Henry Boylan, op. cit.

(80)- John Russell, 1st Earl of Kingston Russell, Viscount of Amberley and Ardsalla, also called Lord John Russell (1792-1878) was Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1846-52 and in 1865-66. Russell was an aristocratic Liberal and leader of the fight for passage of the Reform Bill of 1832. Ibid.

(81)- Ibid.

(82)- J.C Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland*, op. cit., p. 339.

(83)- Ibid., p. 339.

(84)- Ibid., p. 340.

(85)- L.M Cullen, op. cit., p. 398.

(86)- S. J. Connolly, op. cit.

(87)- The Quakers are a religious sect, founded in England in the seventeenth century by George Fox (1624-1690). J. P. Kenyon, op. cit.

(88)- Ibid.

(89)- J.C Beckett, *A Short History of Ireland*, op. cit., p. 90.

(90)- Ibid., p. 93.

(91)- Ibid., p. 94.

(92)- Robert Kee, op. cit., p. 100.

(93)- Ibid., p. 103.

(94)- Ibid., p. 107.

(95)- Ibid., p. 110.

(96)- J.C Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland*, op. cit., p. 349.

(97)- The Fenian movement, pronounced Fee nee uhn, was led by Irish nationalists to free Ireland from English rule. In the late 1850's, a group of Irish patriots called Fenians began to plan a revolution. The Fenians took their name from Fianna, a band of mythical Irish warriors. Most Fenians belonged to a secret society called the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B), which was founded in the United States in 1858. Henry Boylan, op. cit.

(98)- Ibid.

(99)- Robert Kee, op.cit., p. 109.

(100)- Ibid., p. 125.

(101)- Brian Inglis, op. cit., p. 33.

(102)- Ibid., p. 37.

(103)- They were condemned by virtue of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848 280.

(104)- William Smith O'Brien (1803-1864) was a famous Irish patriot and leader of the literary political "Young Ireland" movement along with Thomas Osborne Davis, Charles Gavan Duffy and John Dillon. Henry Boylan, op. cit.

(105)- T.A Jackson, *Ireland Her Own*, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 114.

(106)- J.C Beckett, op. cit., p. 360.

(107)- T.A Jackson, op. cit., p. 119.

(108)- An unfairness that reached its peak with the Extradition Acts, 1870-95 279, 296.

(109)- R.J Cootes, *Britain since 1700*, London, Longman Group Ltd, 1982, p. 225.

(110)- Land Acts, 1870-1909 13.

(111)- The Home Rule refers to an autonomy project for Ireland, initiated by the Irish parliamentary leader Parnell and the British Prime Minister of the time, W.E. Gladstone, since 1886. After being rejected several times by Westminster, it finally came into effect after the First World War. John P. McCarthy, *Ireland, a Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present*, New York, Facts On File Inc, 2006, p. 291.

(112)- Isaac Butt (1813-1879) was a lawyer and Irish nationalist leader who, if not the originator of the term Home Rule, was the first to make it an effective political slogan. He was the founder (1870) and first chief of the Home Government Association and president (1873-77) of the Home Rule Confederation of Great Britain, but was superseded in 1878 as head of the Home Rule movement by the younger and more forceful Charles Stewart Parnell. S. J. Connolly, op. cit.

(113)- Michael Davitt (1846-1906) was the founder of the Irish Land League (1879), which organized resistance to absentee landlordism and sought to relieve the poverty of the tenant farmers by securing fixity of tenure, fair rent, and free sale (the three F's). Ibid.

(114)- Charles Stewart Parnell (1846-1891), represents one of the most famous and outstanding Irish figures of the late Nineteenth Century. As leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, he led a ferocious resistance to the excesses of the abusive *Irish* policy of the British landlords, and fought for an autonomy project for Ireland, the Home Rule Bill. John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 403.

(115)- T.W Moody and F.X Martin, *The Course of Irish History*, Cork, the Mercier Press, 1967, p. 28.

(116)- Such as the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 198.

(117)- The Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881 280, 296.

(118)- The Explosive Substances Act, 1883 57, 154, 198-9, 252, 270-1, 309-11.

(119)- Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil 3rd marquess of Salisbury, Earl of Salisbury, Viscount Cranborne, Baron Cecil of Essendon (1830-1903) was a Conservative political leader who was three-times Prime Minister (1885-86, 1886-92, 1895-1902) and four-times Foreign Secretary (1878, 1885-86, 1886-92, 1895-1900). He sought the wide expansion of Great Britain's colonial Empire. J. P. Kenyon, op. cit.

(120)- Michael Hursy, *Parnell and Irish Nationalism*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968, p. 133.

(121)- Walter Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today, 1830 to the Present*, Boston, Roosevelt University, D C Heath and Company, 1966, p. 151.

(122)- Jim Cordell, *Essential Government and Politics*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers Ltd, 1992, p. 258.

(123)- Arthur James Balfour, 1st Earl of Whittingehame, Viscount Traprain (1848-1930), was the British statesman who maintained a position of power in the British Conservative Party for 50 years. Prime Minister from 1902 to 1905, and Foreign Secretary from 1916 to 1919, he is perhaps best remembered for his World War I statement (the Balfour Declaration) expressing official British approval of Zionism. J. P. Kenyon, op. cit.

(124)- Such as the Criminal Law and Procedure Act, 1887 13, 138, 245.

(125)- Michael Hursy, op. cit., p. 140

CHAPTER TWO

IRELAND FROM HOME RULE TO THE IRISH FREE STATE, 1891-1923

The second chapter consists of two parts; the first part intends to analyze the rise and emergence of a new form of contest and struggle. A parliamentary struggle with constitutional methods at Westminster which asserted an autonomous status for Ireland on the eve of the new century failed and attempts to pass Home Rule Bills were frustrated. The House of Lords' constant veto to any prospect of self government for Ireland and the refusal of Northern Ireland to leave the British Crown destroyed the Home Rule Project and provoked a ruthless war of independence in Ireland.

The second part of the second chapter tackles the period between 1919 and 1923, from the beginning of the War of Independence to the establishment of the Irish Free State. It discusses the conditions of the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of London in 1921-22, the outbreak of Civil War that followed it between Pro-Treaty Partisans and Anti-Treaty Irregulars, and finally the partition of Ireland into two distinct political entities, the South was granted a dominion status whereas the North remained part of the United Kingdom.

For centuries, Ireland had experienced injustice and persecutions under the British yoke and its increasing pressure on the Irish of all shades. No social class was spared, and the farmers suffered most, especially during the Great Famine of 1845-1849, which led many of them to emigrate to the United States of America. Among those who remained in Ireland, some courageous but less-experienced revolutionaries such as the "Young Irelanders" and the famous "Fenians" did their

best and even more to repeal the Union of 1801 with Great Britain and tried to liberate their country by force but in vain. It was a Protestant landlord Charles Stewart Parnell and his Irish Parliamentary Party “Home Rulers”, who blazed a trail in modern Irish politics when they fought constitutionally for the autonomy of Ireland during the end of the nineteenth century. ⁽¹⁾

The beginning of the twentieth century marked the climax of the Home Rule movement which was about to be applied as a project for the autonomy of Ireland despite the continual veto of the House of Lords, but World War I had already started and the Home Rule prospect was put aside. At the time of the emergence of Sinn Fein as the legitimate, though more radical, inheritor of the Home Rule Party, the talk of Irish autonomy was gradually slipping to a claim for complete independence. A costly and controversial independence that provoked a bloody civil war of several months, causing thousands of dead and wounded Irish, led to the creation of the Irish Free State with the first effective government of independent Ireland. ⁽²⁾

I-The End of the Union, from Home Rule to the War of Independence, 1891-1919

Parnell’s Irish Parliamentary Party, after undergoing division and ultimate reunion, then gaining absolute domination over most local government in Ireland, was on the verge of achieving its *raison d’être*, Home Rule. Then events beyond its control, including a world war, rebellion in Ireland, and oppressive military repression, caused history to pass them by and allow the future of Ireland to be formed by others who were moved by new enthusiasms such as republican separatism and cultural nationalism. Furthermore, the commitment of the Protestant population in the Northeast to union with Britain remained unshaken, even if the union would be confined to their corner of Ireland. (See Map 1)

1-The Home Rule Crisis, 1891-1914

By virtue of the Act of Union of 1801 Ireland had become *de facto*, at least, as an entire and complete entity, part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain without the consent of the reluctant Irish, who had never been so fiercely and fervently opposed to this Union as during the Victorian Age. The Irish showed that refusal through different means, sometimes peacefully and at other times ruthlessly in order to obtain their independence or at least a certain degree of autonomy and freedom under what Parnell and Gladstone called Home Rule.

In the nineteenth century Ireland was scarcely able to support the population, and at times many people died through famine; great numbers crossed the Atlantic to America. The development of Ireland in this century is best illustrated by a glance at the population figures. Between 1840 and 1900 the population of England rose from 16 million to 32 million. During the same period the population of Ireland fell from 8.5 million to 4.5 million.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century a majority of Irish people were demanding some measure of self-government or "Home Rule", and the Irish members of the United Kingdom House of Commons in London became very active in expressing their grievances, denouncing British abuses and asserting Irish independence. Soon there was much violence and civil disturbance in Ireland, and the Irish question dominated British politics until the beginning of the Great War of 1914. One difficulty was that in the six northern counties of the province of Ulster Protestants (60%) did not want to be included in a self governing Ireland dominated by Catholics.

The fall of Charles Stewart Parnell and his death in 1891 left the Irish Parliamentary Party divided. A moderate nationalist, John Redmond ⁽³⁾ led the

“Parnellites” but his fraction received only 9 seats in the general elections of 1892; on the other hand, the “anti – Parnellites” won 72 seats.

Although both the Parnellites, who were partisans of a peaceful political issue to the Irish crisis, and anti–Parnellites, who aimed at an armed insurrection, supported Gladstone, again Prime Minister, who since February 13, 1893, had been in favour of a new Home Rule project. The second Home Rule Bill was adopted by the House of Commons by 301 against 267 voices on September 1, 1893, but a week later, it was rejected by the House of Lords by a great majority: 378 voices against 41. Some time later, Gladstone resigned; it was definitively the end of Gladstone’s era. The general elections of 1895 were favourable for the British Conservatives and their allies, the Northern Ireland Unionists (or Loyalists).

The defeat of the second Home Rule Bill did not solve the Irish problem. It had merely, as so often before, postponed it. The Unionist coalition, ruling from 1886 to 1892 and from 1895 to 1906 was against the political autonomy of Ireland, but on the other hand, it was in favour of important agrarian reforms. In 1891 The New Land Purchase Act presented by Balfour planned to distribute more credits to farmers wanting to be landowners and a law in 1896 reinforced that measure. Other important measures contributed to improve the Irish people’s condition. The founding of the Congested District Board in 1891 permitted to help the poor inhabitants of the coastline to create or develop fisheries and coastal industries. In 1898, the elaboration of county councils shifted the local administration from the hands of the landlords to the Irish peasants. ⁽⁴⁾

Passed in 1903, the Wyndham’s Act proved satisfactory to both sides, landlords and tenant-farmers. It parcelled out the big estates and encouraged the transfer of lands to the Irish peasantry. Between 1903 and 1906, there were thousands of purchases and the Irish who owned just 5% of the soil in 1878 were to possess the two thirds in 1914. In 1894, Sir Horace Plunkett ⁽⁵⁾ founded the Irish

Agricultural Organization Society (I.A.O.S), claiming for “better farming, better business, better living.” He succeeded in creating many cooperative stores, and contributed through a review, *The Irish Homestead*, to the emancipation of the rural world in Ireland. The cooperative movement continued on the spur of Arthur Griffith; as for Michael Davitt, the founder of the Irish Land League, his socialist orientation estranged him from the I.A.O.S. Being a partisan of the nationalization of lands, Davitt opposed Wyndham’s Act, joined the newly born Labour Party, but died some time later in 1906.

When the British Liberal government was formed in December 1905, the outlook for Ireland was hopeful. The reforms of the previous twenty years had solved many problems, the country was largely prosperous, and at least on the surface, the political situation was stable, for the more militant nationalists were unable to challenge Redmond’s predominant parliamentary party. In the north, the situation was different: the Protestants were loudly defiant. The Ulster Unionists, with a disciplined and well-equipped Volunteer Army of 100.000 men were decided to establish a government of their own. In the rest of Ireland, Redmond’s authority was slipping from his grasp, and the revolutionary forces were threatening to capture the whole nationalist movement. They were determined to fight for their independence.⁽⁶⁾

After the general elections of 1910, the first major legislation of the Liberal government duly abolished the veto of the House of Lords with the Parliament Act of 1911. Thus the way was clear for a new Home Rule Bill to pass through Parliament without being vetoed to solve definitively the question of autonomy for Ireland.

A new force, the “Irish Volunteers”, was formed by the end of 1913 to emulate what the Unionists had done in Ulster when they created the Ulster Volunteer Force (U.V.F) as a threat to forcefully resist Home Rule. Meanwhile, in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Council had formally turned itself into a provisional government

in September 1913, ready to take over the administration of the province as soon as the Home Rule Bill should become law and applied as such. A £ 1.000.000 guarantee fund had been established and fully subscribed for that purpose.

Early in March 1914, Prime Minister Asquith ⁽⁷⁾ induced Redmond to accept a proposal that any Ulster county could exclude itself from the operation of the Home Rule Act for a period of six years, and an amending bill embodying this proposal was shortly afterwards introduced in the House of Commons. The six counties of Ulster were thus free to stay within the United Kingdom, but for a period of only six years, after which they had to join the twenty six southern counties of Ireland, but the Ulster Unionists refused this alternative.

In the South, the Irish Volunteers carried out a landing of arms at Howth on 24 July. The Howth landing, as reported two days later by a Royal Commission, ⁽⁸⁾ was conducted publicly in broad day; and the Dublin Castle authorities, as soon as they knew what was happening, sent troops to seize the arms ⁽⁹⁾. This attempt failed; and the soldiers, marching back through a jeering, stone-throwing mob, opened fire and three civilians were killed, according to an official report of the Colonial Office. ⁽¹⁰⁾

King George V had called a conference of the opposing leaders to meet at Buckingham Palace on 21 July 1914. The question before the conference was whether Ulster or a part of Ulster should be permanently excluded from the Home Rule Bill. This was an issue on which both Carson and Craig, who represented the Ulster Unionists, or Redmond and Dillon ⁽¹¹⁾ who represented the nationalists, could afford to yield and it was with them, rather than with the Liberals and Conservatives, that the decision laid, for it was for the Irish themselves, North and South, to decide and choose either union or partition. The conference had failed, and the Home Rule Bill had to pass into law within few weeks, despite the House of Lords, but the outbreak of the First World War deferred the crisis and changed its character.

1. 1-The Sinn Fein Party and Home Rule

The beginning of the Twentieth Century in Ireland witnessed the emergence of some political movements which appeared as alternatives to the Irish Parliamentary Party, even though they would retain a minority position for a time. One was Sinn Féin (*Ourselves Alone* in Gaelic), which started its career as a political party in 1905, based on the ideas formulated by the journalist Arthur Griffith in his newspaper, *The United Irishman*, beginning in 1898. Griffith called for the members of Parliament elected from Ireland to refuse to take their seats in Westminster and form a separate parliament in Ireland, in other words, to proclaim Home Rule without formal parliamentary sanction. He advocated a “Dual Monarchy” arrangement in place of the Union, with the same King for the separate nations, Britain and Ireland, much like the Austro-Hungarian Emperor was of Austria and Hungary. Griffith also advocated economic protectionism for Ireland as a stimulus to its industrial development. Culturally he believed in Irish distinctiveness and was critical of some of the plays performed at the Abbey Theatre. His political party ran several candidates unsuccessfully for Parliament in the 1906 and 1910 elections, but they achieved some success in local government polls. The Sinn Fein movement remained a constitutional one and did not advocate violence.⁽¹²⁾

A message somewhat similar to that of Sinn Féin was the « Irish Ireland » of Waterford born journalist, D. P. Moran. His paper, the *Leader*, championed economic protection, cultural distinctiveness, and Irish language revival. He attacked the Irish Catholics who were unsympathetic to separatism, whether political or cultural. Very much an individualist, he was severely critical of many historical and contemporary Irish figures,⁽¹³⁾ including some members of Sinn Féin. Lastly, there remained the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B), in a semi-somnolent position since the late 1890's with an aged membership dwelling more on past glories than on future action. However, one former prisoner, Tom Clarke, who had returned from America, began to revive the organization by recruiting a number of younger men. It

remained very much underground until 1916 when it was ready to seek Ireland's opportunity while England was at a disadvantage, this time in waging the First World War. ⁽¹⁴⁾ The overwhelming Great War that was then crushing Europe constituted Britain's difficulty and, thus, Ireland's opportunity to rise against the bleeding enemy.

1. 2-The Liberal Party and Home Rule

In the January 1906 general election, the Liberals obtained a majority of over 200 seats. Such a majority was almost three times the size of the Irish Parliamentary Party membership in parliament, which meant that the Liberals did not need the Irish votes and could put Home Rule very much on the back burner. The most significant gesture to the Irish was the passage in 1908 of an Irish Universities Act, which ended the old Royal University (a purely examining body), established a new National University that included the old Queens Colleges of Cork and Galway (now to be known as University College Cork and University College Galway) and the Catholic University College Dublin, and transformed Queens College Belfast into Queens University, Belfast. The National University was de facto, if not de jure, Catholic. Another gesture to the Irish, an Irish Councils Bill, which would give some authority to a local council that would be partly elected and partly appointed and would direct some branches of Irish administration, was rejected by the Irish Parliamentary Party as a diversion from the central objective of Home Rule. ⁽¹⁵⁾

The Liberal government committed itself to other significant reforms, including old age pensions and labour exchanges for the unemployed, as well as naval rearmament to match a perceived German threat to British maritime supremacy. All these cost money, which prompted a budget with severely progressive taxation, especially on landed wealth. The Conservative dominated House of Lords rejected the budget and the government, headed by H. H. Asquith,

went to the people in calling an election in 1910. The Liberals anticipated an overwhelming victory in casting the election as a battle between the proponents of democracy against the defenders of hereditary privilege and in which a Liberal victory could be followed by legislation restraining the veto power of the Upper House ⁽¹⁶⁾

The results were surprising, with the Liberals getting 275 seats to the 273 for the Conservative-Unionists, which put Redmond and his contingent of 71 seats (more than the new Labour Party which held 40 seats only) ⁽¹⁷⁾ in a position to make or break the government. Rather than accept a situation in which the Irish would determine the government, and using the pretext that the new King (George V had succeeded his father Edward VII in May 1910) should not have to contend with such a constitutional crisis so early in his reign, a series of private meetings were held between the Liberals and Conservatives for almost half a year seeking alternatives, including a national coalition government. However, any potential agreement failed on the issue of what to do about Ireland. It was therefore decided to go to the voters again in December for a clearer mandate one way or the other.

This time the two major parties secured exactly the same number of seats, 273, while Labour increased to 42, and the Irish won 83. This meant that the Liberals would need the Irish votes to form a government and to pass legislation limiting the Lords' veto power. But if limitations were placed on the Lords' veto, then the passage of a Home Rule measure would follow in due course. The overwhelming majority of the Upper House resisted the proposed restriction on their veto power, but they yielded when confronted with the threat of the King employing his prerogative to appoint a sufficient number of new peers as to guarantee the measure's passage. Enough Lords were concerned about the exclusivity of their house so as to "hedge" and accept the reform in contrast to the determined minority wishing to fight to the end in the "ditch" for the full powers of their chamber. The measure stated that any bill which passed three years in succession by the House of Commons would

become law upon the King's signature, regardless of the position of the House of Lords. Subsequently, a Home Rule Bill was introduced in 1912, which would become a law by 1914. The measure called for a Two-House Irish Parliament, a popularly elected Lower House and an appointed Upper House, and a reduced Irish representation in the House of Commons at Westminster. The sovereignty of the Irish Parliament would be restricted, as the British government would retain control over the police for six years, over defense and foreign policy, and over excise and customs revenues permanently. Nor could the Irish Parliament legislate on religious matters.⁽¹⁸⁾

1. 3-The Unionist Resistance to Home Rule in Northern Ireland

According to the census of 1912, Protestants constituted a majority in the province of Ulster: 900.000 out of the 1.580.000 inhabitants of Ulster, and 300.000 (Protestants) out of 2.800.000 people in the other provinces of Ireland. Politically, 16 delegates out of 33 in Ulster were nationalists (Home Rulers), and in 1912, the Home Rule candidate won a complementary ballot in Derry. (See Table 2)

The prospects of Irish Home Rule being achieved spurred furious resistance on the part of Unionists in Northern Ireland. In this, they were abetted by the leadership of the Conservative Party even to a degree that went beyond parliamentary or constitutional opposition. A new leader had taken over the Conservative Party in the person of Andrew Bonar Law.⁽¹⁹⁾ He initiated a significant change in the party, as his predecessor, Arthur Balfour,⁽²⁰⁾ had an extraordinary pedigree as a son-in-law of the last Conservative Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, a descendant of the Elizabethan favorites, the Cecils. Bonar Law, on the other hand, was a Canadian born Scot, whose fortune was based on industry. He represented the new influence of business and industry over the Conservative Party, hitherto dominated by hereditary

Table 2: Seats won by Parties in Parliamentary Constituencies in Ulster, 1885-1910.

	1885	1886	1892	1895	1900	1906	1910i	1910ii
safe unionist seats								
Antrim (n)	C	U	U	U	U	Ind U	U	U
Antrim (m)	C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Antrim (e)	C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Antrim (s)	C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Armagh (n)	C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Armagh (m)	C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Belfast (e)	Ind C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Belfast (s)	Ind C	U	U	U	U	Ind U	U	U
Belfast (n)	C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Down (n)	C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Down (e)	C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Down (w)	C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
Londonderry County (n)	C	U	U	U	U	U	U	U
safe nationalist seats								
Armagh (s)	N	N	N*	N*	Ind N	N	N	N
Cavan (w)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
Cavan (e)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
Donegal (n)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
Donegal (w)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
Donegal (s)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
Donegal (e)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
Down (s)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
Fermanagh (s)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
Monaghan (n)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
Monaghan (s)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	Ind N
Newry	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
Tyrone (e)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	N	N
'swing seats'								
Belfast (w)	C	N	LU	LU	LU	N	N	N
Fermanagh (n)	N	N	U	U	U	U	U	U
Londonderry City	C	N	U	N*	U	U	U	U
Londonderry County (s)	N	LU	LU	LU	LU	LU	U	U
Tyrone (n)	C	U	U	L	L	L	L	L
Tyrone (m)	N	N	N*	N*	N	N	U	N
Tyrone (s)	N	LU	LU	EU	LU	U	U	U


Key. C = Conservative; Ind C = Independent Conservative; L = Liberal; LU = Liberal Unionist; N = Nationalist; N* = anti-Parnell Nationalist; and Ind N = Independent Nationalist. Unionists were Conservatives, Unionists and Liberal Unionists who opposed home rule; and Nationalists were Nationalists, anti-Parnellite Nationalists and Liberals who supported 'home rule'. There were two elections in 1910.

Source: Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, *the Politics of Antagonism, Understanding Northern Ireland*, London, the Athlone Press 1993, p. 89.

influences and landed wealth. Furthermore, he was a Presbyterian,⁽²¹⁾ and the Party had always been identified with the Church of England. This made him more responsive to the Presbyterian and industrial spirit of Northern Irish unionism and ready to endorse extra-legal action to block Home Rule. At an anti-Home Rule demonstration at Blenheim Palace (London) in July 1912, he suggested that “there are things stronger than parliamentary majorities,”⁽²²⁾ and that there was “no length of resistance to which Ulster can go in which I would not be prepared to support them, and in which, in my belief, they would not be supported by the overwhelming majority of the British people.”⁽²³⁾

This clear invitation to turn to extra-constitutional action was taken up by the Ulster Unionists in September of that year when nearly half a million of adult males supporters signed a Solemn League and Covenant to use all necessary means “to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland,”⁽²⁴⁾ and should such be forced on them “to refuse to recognize its authority.”⁽²⁵⁾ A few months later, in January 1913, the Ulster Unionist Council, the governing body of the Unionist Party in Ulster, approved the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (U.V.F.), a paramilitary organization of 100,000 members whose component branches had already been in the process of formation among the various Orange lodges.⁽²⁶⁾ A major figure in Ireland in the Unionist resistance to Home Rule or *Pope Rule*, as ironically called in Ulster, was Edward Carson,⁽²⁷⁾ a Dublin born barrister, member of Parliament for Trinity College, and leader of the Unionist Party in Ireland, renowned for his legal competence, including especially his successful and devastating cross-examination of Oscar Wilde in the libel suit that led to his ruination. Carson was generous in his attitudes toward concessions to Catholics, but he was ultimately governed by his commitment to the maintenance of the Union of the entire island of Ireland with Britain. (See Map 2) In other words, Carson was an Irish Unionist, anxious that the whole island of Ireland should be united with Britain. The other major figure in the opposition to Home Rule was James Craig,⁽²⁸⁾ an

MAP 2: Catholics in Ulster, 1911.



Source: Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

Ulster Presbyterian from a family that made its fortune from distilling. A Member of Parliament from County Down, his primary political commitment was to preserve the Ulster he knew, that was, one of Protestant predominance and linked to Britain.⁽²⁹⁾

In June 1912 a Liberal M.P, T. G. Agar-Robartes, proposed that the most Protestant of the Ulster counties, Antrim, Armagh, Londonderry, and Down, should be excluded from the Home Rule Act. Carson and the Irish Unionists accepted, but the measure was rejected by a majority of Parliament. In 1914, when passage of the measure was inevitable, the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, had received Redmond's approval for a six years exclusion from Home Rule of any of the nine counties of Ulster. The nine counties of Ulster were thus free to stay within the United Kingdom, but for a period of only six years, after which they had to join the southern counties of Ireland. This time Carson and his associates rejected the measure outright. In fact, the inevitability of a general election within the six years and the possibility of the return of a Conservative-Unionist majority might have made the exclusion permanent rather than temporary. They stated that Ulster is an indivisible part of the United Kingdom, and said: "We do not want sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years".⁽³⁰⁾

The main objective of the Ulster Unionists was now to complete the arming of the Ulster Volunteer Force, for though they had been smuggling rifles and ammunition for years, the quantities so far imported were relatively small, and only a minority of the force was fully equipped. F.H. Crawford, a Belfast businessman, had organized much of this smuggling, and early in 1914, in the night of 24-25 April, he landed 25.000 rifles and 3.000.000 rounds of ammunition, most of them at Larne and Donaghadee, before police or military could interfere. The way was actually paved, more than any time before, for a new era of violence not only in Ireland, but in the whole European continent, under the tragic sign of the Great War.⁽³¹⁾

2-Ireland during the Great War 1914-1916

The outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany in August 1914 meant, almost inevitably, the postponement of the application of Home Rule for the government shrank from giving effect to such a controversial measure in a crisis that demanded, above all, national unity. The leaders of the two main Irish parties (Southern Ireland and Ulster) accepted this view of the situation; both Redmond and Carson promised full support to the war effort, and agreed on a compromise by which the Home Rule Bill was to pass into law, accompanied by a suspensory act, postponing its operation until the end of hostilities and the return of peace.

2. 1-Towards Violence inside and outside Ireland

In November 1913, in reaction to the formation of the U.V.F, a nationalist militia force, the Irish Volunteers, was created. Inspired by what had happened in Ulster, the medievalist historian Eoin MacNeill, ⁽³²⁾ writing in the *Gaelic League* paper *An Claidheamh Soluis*, in an article titled “The North Began,” called for the nationalists to also form a volunteer force to advance their cause. MacNeill headed a provisional committee, which included more militant nationalists with I.R.B (Irish Republican Brotherhood) connections; including Bulmer Hobson. ⁽³³⁾ The movement grew in numbers within a few months to 75,000. Plans got underway to acquire arms in which the services of such Anglo-Irish sympathizers as the journalist Darrell Figgis, the writer Robert Erskine Childers, ⁽³⁴⁾ the ex-diplomat Roger Casement, ⁽³⁵⁾ and Mary Spring Rice, the niece of the British ambassador to Washington, were drawn. The Irish Parliamentary Party leaders became apprehensive about the movement and Redmond pressured MacNeill into allowing the party to name 25 members to the provisional committee of the Irish Volunteers, which guaranteed the party’s ascendancy over the movement in the same way the Ulster Unionists dominated the Ulster Volunteer Force.

Irish Unionism and Ulster Unionism in particular, had always a strong presence among the officer corps of the British army. When the prospects of violent resistance to the tentative Home Rule legislation grew closer, a group of officers stationed at the Curragh in Kildare indicated in April 1914 that they would resign rather than have to fight Ulster. Their commanders were able to exact a concessionary statement from the secretary of war, J. E. B. Seely,⁽³⁶⁾ that there were no intentions to use the army to crush political opposition to Home Rule. The Prime Minister forced Seely to resign, along with several generals, but the implication remained that the government might well be confronted with a mutiny should it attempt to coerce Ulster. Soon after, Major Fred Crawford, a zealous Ulster Unionist, who had earlier called for Ulstermen to look to another “King Billy” (Kaiser Wilhelm II Emperor of Germany) to rescue them, arranged successfully and without interference from the authorities the importation into Ulster at Larne and other ports of thousands of rifles, machine guns, and ammunition for the U.V.F and distribute them throughout the province within 24 hours.⁽³⁷⁾

At the end of July, when War had started in Europe, but which Britain had not yet entered, Childers and associates were able to land a few hundred rifles at Howth, outside of Dublin. When a crowd in Bachelor’s Walk in the city demonstrated in support of the landing, the army fired on them, killing three and wounding dozens, a response quite different from the apparent disregard of the earlier importation on behalf of the U.V.F.⁽³⁸⁾

Within a week, Britain had entered the War against the Central Powers, justifying its entry in opposing the German invasion of Belgium. A Home Rule Act was passed, as was another measure suspending the application of the Act for the duration of the War. The war spared Britain a potential civil war within Ireland, as well as calmed internal social confrontations in Britain itself, particularly those related to women’s suffrage and industrial unionism. Within Ireland, both factions—the Unionist Party and the Irish Parliamentary Party—gave their support to the War

and encouraged their members and the members of their respective Volunteer Forces, the Ulster and the Irish Volunteers, to enlist. Among the Nationalists this provoked a split, as the original founders of the movement, including MacNeill and Hobson, opposed Redmond's call to enlist. Redmond then formed a new group, the National Volunteers, which most of the 180,000 members of the Volunteers joined. A minority of about 12,000 remained with MacNeill and retained the name of Irish Volunteers. With this separation from the Parliamentary Nationalists, MacNeill's movement came more and more under domination by more extreme Nationalists, many committed to a violent uprising, although MacNeill adhered to the position that the movement should only turn to force as a defensive action if the authorities were to actually move against the nationalist groups.⁽³⁹⁾ (See Table 3)

During the War, thousands of Irish from both the Unionist and the Nationalist communities enlisted. The military tended to accept Ulster Volunteer units collectively for incorporation into the army, while the Nationalists enlisted only as individuals and were thus scattered among other units. Ironically, this discriminatory treatment probably lessened the number of casualties among Nationalist members of the Armed Forces, although there were many enough, especially incurred during some of the more mindless charges that accompanied several battles along the western front. The loss of life sustained by Ulster at the Battle of the Somme, where 20,000 British lives were lost in a single day in July 1916, stood as a blood sacrifice that worked to intensify loyalty to the British connection on the part of the survivors, who asserted that their compatriots had fallen fighting at its behest.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Table 3: Numbers Killed in Political Violence in Ireland, 1886-1990.

(1) Years (location)	(2) Numbers killed: estimates	(3) Population of location (census year)	(4) Ratio of (2)/(3) expressed as per cent
(a) 1813–1907 Communal riots (Belfast)	60	121,602 (1861)	0.05
(b) 1886 Home rule riots (‘six counties’)	86	1,304,816 (1881)	0.006
(c) 1916 Easter rising (Ireland)	(i) 514 (ii) 450	4,390,219 (1911)	0.01 0.01
(d) 1919–21 National war of independence or Anglo-Irish war (Ireland)	1,468	4,390,219 (1911)	0.03
(e) 1922–3 Irish Civil War (Irish Free State)	(i) 600–700 (ii) 4,000	2,971,992 (1926)	0.021 0.13
(f) 1920–2 Formation of Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland)	(i) 544 (ii) 428 (iii) 232	1,256,561 (1926)	0.04 0.03 0.02
(g) 1939–40 IRA bombings (Great Britain)	7	47,559,300 (1951)	0.00001
(h) 1956–62 IRA campaign (Northern Ireland)	(i) 18 (ii) 19	1,425,042 (1961)	0.001 0.001
(i) 1969–90 The present war (Northern Ireland)	2,849	1,488,077 (1981)	0.19

Source: Rogelio Alonso, *The I.R.A and Armed Struggle*, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 236.

2. 2-Labour Activism in Ireland

Irish Nationalism, whether of the Parliamentary variety or of a more militant character, whether advocates of violence such as the I.R.B, cultural separatists such as the *Gaelic League*, or political separatists such as Sinn Féin, had never been preoccupied with the issue of labour. This absence was due partly to the predominantly agrarian character of the Irish economy and partly to the minimal development of industry in most of Ireland outside of Ulster. The strong religious commitment by so many of the Irish population, whether Protestant or Catholic, also inhibited sympathy with the irreligious attitudes of many Socialists, still heavily inspired by the writings of Karl Marx. On their part, Socialist and Labour activists tended to concentrate their efforts in urban and industrial areas and failed to work among the many landless agricultural labourers, probably because of their narrow Marxism, which saw the coming revolution as a consequence of discontent among only the industrial masses.⁽⁴¹⁾

However, two figures stood out in early 20th-century Ireland as Socialist Leaders. Both were born abroad of Irish parents. One was James Larkin, born in Liverpool, who first came to Belfast in 1907 attempting to organize dockworkers in line with similar efforts in Britain and in Europe at developing the “New Unionism,” based on industrial rather than craft organizations. Sectarian rivalry impeded his efforts in Belfast and he moved to Dublin the next year, where he formed the Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union. It continued to grow until 1913 when he attempted to unionize the workers of the United Tramways Company, owned by the wealthy and influential William Martin Murphy, owner also of the *Irish Independent*. Murphy responded to a strike by locking out members of the Union. Tensions ran high throughout the autumn of that year. There was some rioting and violent police response. The British Trade Unions Council gave financial support to the strike. When the same body refused to undertake sympathy strikes in Britain, Larkin condemned them and cut himself off from their support. Ultimately the strikers

capitulated and returned to work on management's terms. Larkin left for America, where he was one of the early members of the American Communist Party, returning to Ireland and to participation in the Irish Labour Party a decade later.⁽⁴²⁾

The other figure was James Connolly, born of emigrant parents in Edinburgh. He also came to Ireland as a Socialist and Labour activist. He even sought to advance the cause in America for seven years. He returned to Ireland in 1910. In 1912 he and Larkin formed the Irish Labour Party and he was the assistant of Larkin in the tramway dispute and assumed leadership of the movement upon Larkin's departure. Disappointment at the failure of the strike stirred him to form an Irish Citizens Army, which several hundred joined.⁽⁴³⁾ Connolly sought to reconcile Socialism and Nationalism and even Socialism and Catholicism. This change in thought would bring him into contact with militant separatists, who would include him in their plans to strike violently while Britain was preoccupied with the War.⁽⁴⁴⁾

The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 led to the suspension of the Home Rule Act, and when Redmond, the leader of the Irish MP's, declared support for the war and willingness for nationalists to volunteer, this led to a decisive break with Sinn Fein. Redmond and the bulk of the Irish Volunteers formed their own group and the radicals, mainly members of the I.R.B, who were against them, began planning for an armed uprising in conjunction with James Connolly and the Irish Citizen Army.

3-The Easter Rising of 1916

Despite its involvement in the Great War, the British government had continued its awkward policy in Ireland. Unlike Ulsterians, the southern Irish could not form their own regiments, and the War Minister, Lord Kitchener (the famous hero of the Boer War, though born in Ireland) refused the proposition of Redmond to

have the Irish coasts guarded by his National Volunteers, and decided to maintain important English troops instead. The Irish scene, extremely critical, was then propitious and inclined to engender an insurrection.

Many movements and influences contributed to the insurrection of April 1916 but its planning and direction were the work of the I.R.B, which, in the previous January, had settled the date in collaboration with Connolly, and had arranged for a cargo of German arms to be landed on the coasts of Kerry a day or two before the insurrection was due to begin. Even though the I.R.B was the principal instigator of the rising, it depended on the Irish Volunteers to provide the men; and the Volunteers were officially committed to the defence of Ireland under MacNeill, their chief of staff, and Bulmer Hobson, their secretary. There were some Volunteers who rejected this passive function: Patrick Pearse ⁽⁴⁵⁾ himself, who was Volunteer director of operations, and Thomas MacDonagh, ⁽⁴⁶⁾ who was commandant of the Dublin Brigade, were also members of the I.R.B. military council, which was secretly preparing for the insurrection. For a long time they succeeded in keeping MacNeill out of their projects and bringing the whole force of the Volunteers into action without his knowledge and approval; but their attempt to overcome the difficulty produced, at the last minute, a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding.


The date fixed for the insurrection was Easter Sunday, 23 April; and early in the month Pearse, in his capacity as director of operations, gave orders for Volunteer field drills to begin on that day. This was planned to appear as a routine arrangement, and only a very small inner group knew that anything more was intended. MacNeill, whose suspicions had already been aroused, showed signs of uneasiness; but Pearse and MacDonagh reassured him that no aggressive move was being planned. It was not until 20 April (Maundy Thursday) that, only by accident, he learnt the truth. His first reaction was to prevent the insurrection by appealing to Pearse and the other I.R.B leaders, and by issuing instructions to the Volunteers. Then, on Good Friday, he was persuaded that things had gone so far that the government was obliged to

strike, and he agreed to collaborate in what he now considered a defensive action. But on Saturday he received fresh information about the government's attitude. The instructions to prevent insurrection were distributed over the country by special messengers and published in the press. (See Map 3)

In all this, MacNeill acted in strict accordance with his principles as a disciplined military officer, principles which were well known to the leaders of the I.R.B.; and any apparent inconsistency or failure in his conduct on the eve of the insurrection arose directly from the exclusion that had been practised towards him. Nothing that he could have done would have prevented an outbreak, but his countermanding order ensured that it would be confined to Dublin.

On 20 April a German ship, the *Aud*, landed on the coast of Kerry with a cargo of arms. But it was captured next day by the British and brought into Queenstown harbour, where its captain sank it. Almost at the same time, Roger Casement, who had been put ashore from a German submarine, was taken prisoner near Tralee. It was with this news before them that the I.R.B. military council met on the morning of Easter Day, and resolved, in spite of all, to strike at noon on Monday. The one thing in their favour was that the capture of the *Aud* had occupied the Castle authorities who had suspected for some time that a rebellion was prepared. Now they believed that the danger had been neutralized; and MacNeill's cancellation of operations, though not fully understood, confirmed this belief. There were only some 1,200 troops in Dublin, and no arrangements had been made to reinforce them; many of the officers had been given leave to attend a local race, and the Castle itself was garrisoned by half-a-dozen men with blank cartridges. These confidential details revealed afterwards in the report of a Royal Commission on the Easter Rising might well have been collected by the insurgents before the rising. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

MAP 3: Central Dublin during Easter 1916.



Source: Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916, the Irish Rebellion*, London, Penguin Books, 2005, pp. xiv-xv.

Dublin was so accustomed to Volunteer parades that the holiday crowds paid no special attention to the columns that marched through the streets on Easter Monday morning. Without opposition, they took possession of the General Post Office, where they set-up their headquarters; and from the steps in front of the building, Pearse read a proclamation declaring the establishment of a republic.

It began with an appeal to Irishmen and Irishwomen to support the struggle for the independence of their country which could no longer be denied by the English government. As mentioned in the report of the Royal Commission, the declaration appealed to constitute a provisional government of the Irish Republic, with the allegiance of all citizens.⁽⁴⁸⁾ It was only progressively that the people and the British authorities realized that this was something more than a mere demonstration; and by that time, the insurgents had already established themselves in well-selected strongholds. Before nightfall, almost the whole of the centre of the city was in their hands and they had a cordon of fortified posts in the suburbs.

There had been no real fighting on this first day, for the government forces were too weak to attack. But on Tuesday reinforcements started to arrive, especially artillery which was brought into play and the hopelessness of the insurgents' position soon appeared. They maintained resistance as long as they could, but they were almost helpless in face of artillery fire; they had no prospect of reinforcements; their strongholds were isolated from one another; on Friday, the General Post Office caught fire and was evacuated. On Saturday, at half past three o'clock in the afternoon, Pearse surrendered unconditionally and wrote out an order to the commandants of other posts to do the same. The insurrection was about ending.

The insurgents had resisted for a week with less than 2.000 men against all the forces that the British government could bring against them. Their appeal to the country had completely fallen and did not produce the expected popular echo for, the Irish and especially Dubliners, considered it as a desperate attempt which could succeed only to bring terror and reprisals against the helpless civilians, as it was the

case in the previous attempts of the past. Here and there, especially in Galway and Wexford, some Volunteers had acted, despite MacNeill's order; but their action was useless in front of an utterly hostile public opinion. The Dublin mob, while eagerly seizing the opportunity to pillage, had cheered the government troops, many of them Irish, as they moved to attack. In some areas, the National Volunteers had come to the assistance of the police and the military. Redmond denounced the insurgents in Parliament. *The Freeman's Journal*, the most widely-read newspaper in the country, summed up the general feeling when it declared on 5 May : "The insurrection was not more an insurrection against the connection with the Empire than it was an armed assault against the will and decision of the Irish nation itself constitutionally ascertained through its proper representatives."⁽⁴⁹⁾ The insurgents had been more or less prepared for a military defeat, but they seemed to have suffered an indelible moral defeat also.

It was the action of the government that transformed this situation. Birrell,⁽⁵⁰⁾ the Chief Secretary for Ireland resigned office, and the Cabinet, already afflicted and weakened by the conduct of the war in Europe, left Ireland for the time being to the military. Martial law had been proclaimed at the outbreak of the insurrection, and the captured insurgent leaders were tried by court martial: between 3 May and 12 May fifteen of them, including all the signatories of the republican proclamation, were executed. It is unlikely that any European government of the period, faced with a similar situation, would have acted less harshly. But Irish opinion was horrified; and as one day after another brought its curt official announcement of the names of those who had been tried, found guilty and shot, horror turned to anger against the government and admiration for the insurgents. According to another Royal Commission on the Easter events, the British authorities were, as the famous Irish writer and philosopher George Bernard Shaw warned them at the time, "Canonizing their prisoners."⁽⁵¹⁾

Before the middle of May executions had ceased and Asquith himself had come to Dublin in an effort to establish confidence and to restore prosperity. But it was already too late. Ireland was quickly passing under the most dangerous period of all.

4-Ireland and the End of the War, 1916-1918

The popular British press had tended to label the Easter Week uprising as a Sinn Fein event, even though Sinn Féin had nothing to do with it, nor was a violent uprising part of the Sinn Fein strategy to achieve an independently governed Ireland. However, many participants in it may have been Sinn Feiners and may have been introduced to separatism through Sinn Féin. The ultimate consequence of the uprising, and the British response to it, worked to transform Sinn Fein into an organization supportive of Separatist Republicanism rather than self-governance in a dual monarchy. Sinn Fein membership increased significantly in numbers and participants during the Easter Uprising. Many who were released from internment came to occupy important positions in the Sinn Fein Party. Adding momentum to the growth and transformation of the party was the success of three Sinn Fein candidates in three parliamentary by-elections, beginning with the February 5, 1917 victory of George Plunkett, the father of one of those executed, in North Roscommon, followed by the May 9 victory of Joseph P. McGuinness, ⁽⁵²⁾ still a prisoner, in South Longford, and then the July 10 East Clare victory by Eamon de Valera (Éamon de Bhailéarn), whose death sentence after Easter Week had been averted due to his holding American citizenship. Sinn Fein strengthened its uncompromising image by its refusal to join the Parliamentary Party in attending an Irish Convention that met futilely at Trinity College from July 1917 through April 1918 in an attempt to resolve the differing goals for the island held by Nationalists and Unionists.

David Lloyd George, who had replaced Asquith as Prime Minister the previous December, had called the Convention into being. Lloyd George, the Welsh Lion, as Sir Alistair Maxwell called him, was a modern politician of the democratic age. For all his political radicalism, Lloyd George was better able to relate to the military and imperial personnel whose talents were so essential for directing the War. Lloyd George was also sensitive to American opinion on the Irish question, which had become increasingly important with the American entry into the War on April 6, 1917.⁽⁵³⁾

In October the convention of Sinn Fein elected Eamon de Valera as its president. The next day he was elected president of the Irish Volunteers, thereby achieving a *de facto* unification of the two groups, the political arm and the potential military arm of the Irish separatist cause. One group not under de Valera's leadership was the I.R.B, in which Michael Collins, who had risen to prominence as an organizer of the prisoners interned in Frongoch, Wales, played a major role. The I.R.B, which called the Easter Rising and which had close contacts with the American support organization, *Clan na Gael*, and its broaderbased affiliate, the Friends of Irish Freedom, regarded itself as the organization bearing the true flame of Irish republicanism.⁽⁵⁴⁾

In April 1918 Lloyd George, in an effort to appease anti-Irish sentiment in Britain and among Unionists, introduced legislation empowering the government to extend military conscription to Ireland, although it was never attempted. This act spelled the death knell for the Irish Parliamentary Party, whose new leader, John Dillon (he replaced John Redmond who had died in March), opposed the measure and was forced to appear as part of an anticonscription coalition with De Valera, a cause also received the endorsement of the Irish Catholic hierarchy. As widely known, when moderates are forced into a coalition with extreme elements, the extremists gain. The Sinn Fein position, in terms of popular support, was further strengthened when the new Lord Lieutenant, Field Marshall Lord John French,⁽⁵⁵⁾

using powers under the Defence of the Realm Act, began apprehending leading members of nationalist groups, including Sinn Feiners and Volunteers, because of their involvement in a “German plot.”⁽⁵⁶⁾

When a general election was held in December 1918, a month after the end of the War, Sinn Fein swept the board in Ireland, taking 73 seats, leaving the Parliamentary Party with only six, while the Unionists won 26. The Report on the proceedings of the Irish Convention demonstrated that this election was the first held under conditions of universal suffrage for males over 21 years of age and suffrage for women who were 30 years of age or over.⁽⁵⁷⁾ (See Table 4)

II-From a State of War in Ireland to the Irish Free State, 1919-1923

After the death of Redmond, the Irish Parliamentary Party withdrew from Westminster Palace and left its place to the winner of the 1918 general election, the Sinn Fein Party, led by Eamon De Valera. In accord with their nationalist principles, the Sinn Fein members elected to Parliament refused to take their seats in Westminster. All those not still imprisoned because of the “German plot” arrests assembled in Mansion House in Dublin on January 21 and, calling themselves Dáil Éireann (Assembly of Ireland), formed an alternative government and drafted a provisional constitution for the Irish Republic, with the minutes recorded in Irish (Gaelic) and French. The same day at Soloheadbeg, County Tipperary, a group of Irish Volunteers ambushed a cart carrying explosives and killed two policemen, the first violent action in what would be the War of Independence.⁽⁵⁸⁾

Table 4: The Westminster Election in Ireland, 1918.

(a) all of Ireland (includes four university seats)				
Party	Seats won	(%)	Seats won unopposed	Votes won (%) in contested seats*
Sinn Féin	73	(69.5)	25	47.6
Irish Parliam'ary Party ¶	6	(5.7)	0	21.6
All Nationalists	79	(75.2)	25	69.2
Unionists #	23	(21.9)	0	25.7
Labour Unionists	3	(2.9)	0	2.9
LRC	0	(0.0)	0	1.2
All Unionists	26	(24.8)	0	29.8

(b) the twenty-six counties which became the Irish Free State (includes three university members)				
Party	Seats won	(%)	Seats won unopposed	Votes won (%) in contested seats*
Sinn Féin	70	(93.3)	25	65.5
Irish Parliam'ary Party ¶	2	(2.66)	0	29.0
All Nationalists	72	(95)	25	94.5
Unionists #	3	(2.85)	0	5.5

(c) the nine counties of historic Ulster (includes Queen's University seat)				
Party	Seats won	(%)	Seats won unopposed	Votes won (%) in contested seats*
Sinn Féin	10	(26.3)	2	23.5
Irish Parliam'ary Party ¶	5	(13.2)	0	15.7
All Nationalists	15	(39.5)	2	39.2
Unionists #	20	(52.6)	0	51.6
Labour Unionists	3	(7.9)	0	6.5
LRC	0	(0.0)	0	2.6
All Unionists	23	(60.5)	0	60.7

(d) the six counties which became Northern Ireland (includes Queen's University seat)				
Party	Seats won	(%)	Seats won unopposed	Votes won (%) in contested seats*
Sinn Féin	3	(10)	0	19.1
Irish Parliam'ary Party ¶	4	(13.3)	0	11.8
All Nationalists	7	(23.3)	0	30.9
Unionists #	20	(66.6)	0	58.3
Labour Unionists	3	(10)	0	7.6
LRC	0	(0)	0	3.1
All Unionists	23	(76.6)	0	69

Source: calculated from Walker (1978: 185–91).

* The votes for the four university seats, three of which were won by Unionists and one by Sinn Féin, have not been counted in calculating votes won in contested seats.

¶ Nationalists include Independent Nationalists.

Unionists include Independent Unionists.

Source: Kevin Kenny, *Ireland and the British Empire*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 363.

II. 1-The Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921

The War of Independence has to be understood in the context of a number of other factors. The general election that had returned so many Sinn Feiners from Ireland constituted a triumph for the Conservative-Unionist alliance in Britain as a whole, with the Liberal Party dwindling to a small fraction of its previous size and the new Labour Party still relatively small. The wartime Prime Minister Lloyd George continued in office, this time leading a coalition consisting of a handful of Liberals still loyal to him and the massive Conservative-Unionist majority. Britain had emerged triumphant from a destructive war and, within months, as a consequence of the peace settlement at Versailles, would be master, admittedly as a trustee for the League of Nations, over vast new areas that had been part of the pre-war German and Turkish Empires. While restive noises on behalf of self-rule were being made in India, it was the beginning of a slow but certain dismantlement of the British Empire, as Irish Republicans hoped. On the other hand, Britain was committed to the implementation of Home Rule for Ireland in spite of Unionist opposition in the northeast of the island.⁽⁵⁹⁾

It was not clear from the beginning that either the Sinn Fein mandate or the goal of the Dáil Éireann was to support a violent insurrection. De Valera had escaped from prison on February 3, 1919. The following month the remainders of the Sinn Fein detainees were released. Dáil Éireann was able to meet unimpeded in Dublin, where it elected de Valera as its President on April 1, 1919. A significant campaign undertaken by Dáil Éireann was to secure world recognition of its claim that it constituted the Government of Ireland. A mission to the Versailles Peace Conference obtained no audience. De Valera himself left Ireland in June for America, where he would remain for a year and a half, seeking financial support from the Irish-American community and recognition from the major American political parties, the U.S. Congress, and the Government. He was extremely successful in the first objective, but not in the latter goals, in which he alienated the leading Irish-American

supporters, Devoy and Cohalan, who saw his role as distracting and impractical. They suspected him of being likely to compromise on the issue of an independent Irish republic and they disliked his sympathy for the League of Nations, which they feared would be dominated by Britain. ⁽⁶⁰⁾

A very successful move by the Dáil Éireann was its call in June 1919 for the establishment of “arbitration courts” to which the people could turn as an alternative to the existing judicial system in Ireland. ⁽⁶¹⁾ In a very short time, these bodies would prevail over most of Ireland, aside from the Unionist areas of Ulster, and even opponents of Sinn Fein would utilize them for settling legal grievances. In August, to insure the subordination of military factions, the Dáil insisted that all its members and all the Irish Volunteers, considered as the Army of the Irish Republic -the future Irish Republican Army, I.R.A-, should swear allegiance to the Republic and the Dáil. By now the authorities became less tolerant of this movement proclaiming itself an alternative government for Ireland. Repressive proclamations were issued in certain localities outlawing groups such as Sinn Fein, the Gaelic League, and the Irish Volunteers, and, on September 12, the Dáil Éireann itself was declared illegal.


On the military front, the Irish Volunteers began a campaign against the Royal Irish Constabulary, most of whose rank and file were Irish Catholics. The fact of sharing the same religion with the Volunteers had the expected consequence of causing a substantial number of resignations from the force and an abandonment of remote barracks, leaving more and more of the countryside open to Irish Volunteer domination. The resignations were so many that the Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C) was forced to recruit thousands from Britain, especially demobilized soldiers, to fill its ranks. Because of a shortage of regular uniforms, the newcomers were given army tans and black RIC hats, earning them the nickname of “Black and Tans.” ⁽⁶²⁾ They would soon gain an unpleasant reputation for brutality in taking retaliatory actions against communities from which Irish Volunteers had come. The Irish Volunteers also began making attacks on the British military itself in Ireland. ⁽⁶³⁾

Still convinced that Sinn Fein success in the 1918 general election was a freak occurrence and not a true indication of popular sentiment, the Government called for local government elections in 1920 in anticipation that the old Parliamentary Party forces, as well as independents and some Unionists, would continue to hold the ascendancy. In these elections, held in January for urban bodies and in June for rural bodies, Sinn Fein enjoyed great success, controlling, with support from Nationalists and Labour, 172 of 206 urban councils, and being similarly successful in the rural council elections.⁽⁶⁴⁾ (See Map 4)

One of the most remarkable achievements of the Dáil Éireann government was the ability of its Ministry of Local Government, headed by William T. Cosgrave⁽⁶⁵⁾ and assisted by Kevin O'Higgins,⁽⁶⁶⁾ to direct the local government bodies in carefully harbouring their resources. This was essential after the British designated Local Government Authority began to withhold grants to the local bodies because of their non-compliance with specific orders and after many property owners became reluctant to pay their rates. The local bodies were instructed to use hidden (or laundered) bank accounts to avoid seizure of their funds by either the courts or the government authorities. They also relied to some degree on funds advanced by the Dáil Éireann Government itself.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The gaining of these local bodies' allegiance and their subsequent acceptance of the Dáil Éireann authority against the official Local Government Authority was possibly the clearest manifestation to the world that the Dáil Éireann had won the consensus of the Irish people.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Violence on both sides was intensified in 1920. Under pressure from the War Office, the British passed a Restoration of Order in Ireland Act⁽⁶⁹⁾ giving the authorities extraordinary powers of arrest and detention and of control over military tribunals. Ex-officers of the British army were employed as an auxiliary division to the RIC. Even the military commanders had reservations about the methods of this group in combating the IRA. Among the most brutal days in that year was November

MAP 4: Distribution of Sinn Fein Membership in 1919.



Source: Michael Laffan, *the Resurrection of Ireland, the Sinn Fein Party, 1916-1923*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 279.

21, “Bloody Sunday,”⁽⁷⁰⁾ when members of Michael Collins’s (Minister of the Treasury in the Dáil Éireann Government, and also Director of Intelligence and President of the I.R.B) elite “squad” killed 14 suspected British agents, for which the Black and Tans retaliated by firing on a crowd at a football match in Croke Park in Dublin, killing a dozen. The following Sunday, an IRA brigade ambushed 18 auxiliaries at Kilmichael in Cork. Two weeks later the Black and Tans and the auxiliaries sacked the city of Cork, destroying City Hall and the Corn Exchange, and causing millions of pounds in damage. In March of the same year the Sinn Fein Lord Mayor of the City, Thomas MacCurtain, was murdered by the R.I.C.⁽⁷¹⁾

But the same year would also see the passage of the Government of Ireland Act, an attempt to cut the Gordian knot of the Home Rule question by separating the island into a six-county Ireland in the North and a twenty-six-county Ireland in the South. Elections were called for Home Rule parliaments for each section. This division of the island also constituted a division of the province of Ulster, as three of its counties -Donegal, Cavan, and Monaghan- were included in southern Ireland. Had they remained in the northern part of Ireland, Catholics would have constituted the majority or near majority in the province, which would have contradicted the very reason for partition: to prevent the Protestants in Northern Ireland from coming under the domination of Catholics. Unfortunately, it meant that a substantial number of Catholics in Northern Ireland found themselves under the domination of Protestants. Elections to both parliaments were held in May 1921. The Unionists received 40 of the seats in the northern body, with Sinn Fein and the Nationalists winning six each. All candidates for the southern parliament were returned unopposed : 124 Sinn Feiners and four independents who represented Trinity College.⁽⁷²⁾

De Valera returned to Ireland from the United States just before Christmas of 1920. His return intensified certain divisions within the Dáil Éireann Government as to the proper approach in the struggle with Britain. One wing, headed by Michael

Collins and supported by the Chief of Staff of the I.R.A, Richard Mulcahy, ⁽⁷³⁾ was deeply involved in the IRB. Collins's revolutionary genius had been his ability to direct a guerrilla campaign against the British and their agents, whether local police, civil servants, and even bankers, rather than by direct military confrontation. The other wing, led particularly by Cathal Brugha, ⁽⁷⁴⁾ the Minister of Defence, and Austin Stack, ⁽⁷⁵⁾ the Minister for Home Affairs, was critical of the notoriety Collins had been receiving. Their strategy for waging the struggle would have entailed a traditional manning of barricades, full-fledged assaults on important posts, and carrying the struggle to Britain by high-profile assassinations. De Valera tended to side with them, consenting to a futile attack on the Dublin Custom House (D.C.H) on May 25. ⁽⁷⁶⁾ In the Intelligence Service report of the attack, nearly 100 of the I.R.A members were captured and important local government and other public documents were destroyed. ⁽⁷⁷⁾

The next month, following a peace overture made by King George V at the opening of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, there were meetings with intermediaries such as the South African leader, General Jan Smuts. Finally, on July 11, a truce was agreed on whereby both the British and the I.R.A ceased military operations and negotiations began as to the agenda for a peace conference. Meetings and exchanges of letters between de Valera and Lloyd George through the summer sought to reconcile their diverse purposes: the Irish aspiration for complete independence and the recognition of the Dáil Éireann as its government and the British wish that Ireland remains a dominion within the Commonwealth. A letter from Lloyd George to De Valera in September inviting him to send an Irish delegation to London to ascertain "how the association of Ireland and the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations." ⁽⁷⁸⁾

De Valera did not join the delegation, insisting that his position as president required that he not be part of any negotiations that might involve a solution that

produced less than an independent Irish republic. Instead, Cabinet members Collins, Griffith, and Robert Barton, ⁽⁷⁹⁾ and attorneys Gavan Duffy ⁽⁸⁰⁾ and Éamonn Duggan⁽⁸¹⁾ attended. Lloyd George and such senior figures such as Winston Churchill, Austen Chamberlain, and Lord Birkenhead ⁽⁸²⁾ represented the British side. Collins and Griffith played the major role for the Irish. The most they were able to obtain in the negotiations was dominion status, which De Valera rejected in a Cabinet meeting in Dublin in the first week-end in December, preferring a construct of his own for Anglo-Irish relations that he called “external association.” ⁽⁸³⁾ Although urged by the King himself to find a final settlement to the long standing Irish question, the negotiators were unable to win the British acceptance of De Valera’s alternative when they returned to London, and, faced with the prospects of a resumption of hostilities, they signed the treaty on December 6, 1921. ⁽⁸⁴⁾

II. 2-The Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Partition of Ireland, 1921-1922

The Irish Republicans and the British government were not the only parties involved in the conflict in Ireland; the Unionists of Ulster were no less deeply concerned in the outcome. Ever since the insurrection of 1916 they had been watching the course of events with growing anxiety and with increasing distrust in the government’s ability, or even willingness to protect their interests. The Dáil claimed authority over Ulster as over the rest of Ireland, and this claim was encouraged by the activities of the I.R.A. throughout the province. The rising sense of danger thus created among the Protestant population stirred up the sectarian passions which were never far below the surface of Ulster life; and these passions were further stimulated by reports, sometimes no doubt distorted or exaggerated, of the ill – treatment suffered by the scattered Protestants of the south and west.

The Home Rule crisis of the pre-war years had strengthened still further the religious element in the division, if not schism, between Unionists and Nationalists,

and in the circumstances of 1920 it was easy for the Protestant workman of the north-east to identify «Roman Catholic» with «Republican» (or, as he would have said, «rebel»), and to feel that the strong presence of a large Roman Catholic minority was a threat to his own safety as a Loyalist Protestant. It was this fear of the spread of republicanism and its overwhelming Catholic obedience that lay behind the fierce riots that broke out in Belfast in the summer of 1920, and recurred from time to time, both there and in other parts of Ulster, during the next twelve months. Sometimes the rioting was occasioned by a particular action of the I.R.A. as at Lisburn in August 1920, when it followed the shooting of a police inspector as he left church on a Sunday morning; sometimes it was, apparently, planned in advance. But whether spontaneous or planned, the riots always took the form of indiscriminate attack on the Roman Catholic population of the neighbourhood: thousands of families, who had no connection and often little sympathy with the I.R.A., were driven from their homes, not without immense damage to property and some loss of life, and the government seemed as powerless to protect the Roman Catholics of the north as the Unionists of the south.⁽⁸⁵⁾

The Unionist leaders viewed these developments with mixed feelings. They shared, at least in some measure, the fears of their more violent followers, and tried to justify their actions on the ground of extreme provocation. At the same time they were forced to recognize, with some natural resentment, that the conservatives' pre-war enthusiasm for the cause of the Ulster Protestants had almost withered away. Their best hope, therefore, lay in an imminent settlement; and when the government proposed terms they accepted them, though reluctantly, as the best they were likely to get.

The terms of the settlement were embodied in a new Home Rule Bill, decided on by the Cabinet in September 1920 and passed into law in the following December. This measure (the Government of Ireland Act) divided the country into: "Northern Ireland", consisting of the six Ulster counties whose exclusion from Home Rule had

been proposed in 1916, and «Southern Ireland», consisting of the remaining twenty six counties. Each part was to have its own parliament, made up of a House of Commons and a Senate, and a responsible ministry. The powers granted to these parliaments were very similar to those granted by the Home Rule Act of 1914, and the supremacy of the imperial parliament, in which both parts of Ireland were still to be represented, was explicitly preserved. The partition effected by this Act was not meant to be complete or, necessarily, permanent: certain matters of concern to the whole country were to be controlled by a «Council of Ireland» whose powers might be enlarged by agreement between the two parliaments; and the re-union of the country could be brought about at any time by the merging of the two parliaments into one, if both should so desire.

Ulster Unionists saw two disadvantages in this settlement: it involved the abandonment of all their fellow-Unionists outside the six county areas; and it weakened that link with the rest of the United Kingdom which they had for so long tried to maintain. But they were persuaded by the fact that, in the six counties left to them, they would be in a permanent majority. They were not to apprehend, as they had feared in the past, that their interests would be sacrificed by a British government seeking to conciliate Irish nationalist opinion. When the first election for a Northern Ireland parliament was held in May 1921, the Unionists secured 40 out of the 52 seats in the House of Commons; and a Cabinet was shortly afterwards formed. The Northern Ireland leader, Edward Carson had by this time given up the Unionist leadership, on grounds of age and ill-health, and it was Sir James Craig who, as Prime Minister, assumed the complicated and dangerous task of leading the new government. ⁽⁸⁶⁾

The Unionists' acceptance of the Government of Ireland Act was, in the long run, to prepare the way for a general settlement; but its immediate effect was to intensify the opposition of the republicans. They declared implacable hostility to partition, and set themselves, by every means, to destroy the new government in the

north, almost before it had come into existence. They did, however, benefit from the election for a Southern Ireland parliament, held under the terms of the Act in May 1921, as a means both of demonstrating their strength and of securing the election of a new Dàil. Of the 128 members elected to the House of Commons, 124 were Sinn Fein candidates who had been returned unopposed, for no one had dared to compete against them. The remaining 4 were the representatives of Trinity College, Dublin; and they alone appeared when the parliament was formally opened in June. “Southern Ireland” as a political entity was born.

The British government made a series of informal approaches to the republican leaders, and though one effort after another proved abortive, at least the line of communication was kept open. This anxiety for peace reflected not only the growing difficulty of the military situation in Ireland but, even more, the state of public opinion in Britain. An influential section of the British press consistently maintained the necessity for compromise; and thus newspapers, books, pamphlets, and public meetings attacked the conduct of the Crown forces in Ireland. The king himself, in private, and the archbishop of Canterbury, in public, expressed their discontent about that chaotic state of affairs. With the general feeling of the country in this mood, the government dared not employ its military resources to the full, nor could the army be counted on to wage an unpopular war. Sir Henry Wilson,⁽⁸⁷⁾ chief of the imperial general staff, though an Irish Unionist and violently anti-republican, had the common sense to recognize the realities of the situation: «Unless England was on our side», he wrote in June 1921, “we would fail, and if we failed we would break the army... unless England was on our side... it would be madness to try and flatten out the rebels”.⁽⁸⁸⁾

The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George knew very well that England would not support any attempt to crush the rebels. Though he had occasionally made warlike statements, he had never committed himself wholly to a settlement by force; and when an opportunity of opening formal peace negotiations occurred, he was

easily persuaded to take it. The opportunity came in the summer of 1921, when, speaking at the opening of the newly-elected Northern Ireland parliament in Belfast, on 22 June, King George V made a moving appeal for reconciliation: “I appeal to all Irishmen to pause, to stretch out the hand of forbearance and conciliation, and to join in making for the land which they love a new era of peace, contentment, and goodwill”.⁽⁸⁹⁾

The expressions of hope and relief with which the appeal was received, in Ireland as well as in Britain, showed clearly enough that, whatever skeptics and doctrinaires on either side might feel, the overwhelming desire of most people was to bring the struggle to an end. On 24 June, Lloyd George invited De Valera and Craig to a conference; a truce, on which the republicans insisted as a preliminary to negotiation, came into operation on 10 July; and two days later, De Valera was in London. The search for peace had begun.

Though the negotiations initiated in July lasted for almost five months, the issue was clearly defined from the beginning. During the first round of talks in London, the British Cabinet laid down two conditions on which it was resolved to stand: that Ireland must remain within the Empire, and that Northern Ireland must not be coerced; but, subject to these limitations, Ireland would be granted the fullest possible measure of self-government. In all that followed, the British never departed from these terms; and they formed the basis of the treaty ultimately signed in December 1921.

The long delay before the Irish accepted these terms resulted from the Dàil Cabinet’s failure to agree on a settled line of policy. At first, it refused the terms completely, but this was not regarded as final, and negotiations, though suspended, were not broken off. During the summer, the Sinn Fein leader, Arthur Griffith, always more concerned about the substance of independence than about its form, became increasingly disposed to compromise, and many of his colleagues supported

this view; others, especially the I.R.B. powerful members Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack, were utterly opposed to it, and De Valera, though uncommitted, stood by their side. But the matter was never pushed to a decisive vote; and, when the London talks were resumed in October, the Cabinet gave the appointed delegation no guidance at all as to what might not be conceded. Left to itself, without any preconceived plan, the delegation could probably have reached a settlement fairly quickly for it was headed by Griffith and made up of men in general sympathy with his views, though some of them, and notably Collins, were not at first prepared to go as far as Griffith himself in meeting the British demands. But though the delegates were formally invested with plenipotentiary powers, they were, somewhat inconsistently, told not to sign any treaty until the terms had been approved in Dublin, and De Valera, though he refused to go to London, tried to keep control of the negotiations in his own hands. ⁽⁹⁰⁾

This unresolved conflict among the Irish threatened to postpone a settlement, one way or the other, indefinitely. They had openly insisted, as an essential condition of agreement that Britain should recognize the republic, then, as Griffith said later, the whole negotiation would last five minutes. But De Valera, now almost completely under the influence, and even, military pressure of Brugha and Stack, preferred to play for time by securing the rejection in Dublin of any unacceptable proposal. With every week that passed, the delegates in London came nearer and nearer to a compromise with the British.

Despite constant control from Dublin, the delegates could not forget that they were plenipotentiaries; they felt that the issue of peace or war was in their hands; and Collins, in particular, was convinced that the I.R.A. could not renew the struggle with any prospect of success. Lloyd George played skillfully on their doubts and fears, and on their hopes of ending partition. By a subtle combination of persuasion and threat he led them from one concession to another; and in the end, induced them to sign a treaty without reference to Dublin.

This Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed at Downing Street, London at 2:30 a.m. on Tuesday 6 December 1921, embodied the settlement proposed by the British Cabinet in July. Ireland, under the name of the “Irish Free State”, was to become a self-governing dominion within the Empire, enjoying the same constitutional status as Canada; and members of the Irish Parliament were to take an oath of allegiance to the Crown “in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.”⁽⁹¹⁾ Britain was to remain, for the time being, responsible for coastal defence and was to be allowed to maintain naval establishments in certain Irish ports. Other articles settled the basis of future financial relations between the two countries and arranged for the setting up of a provisional government.

The treaty applied formally to the whole of Ireland; but the position of Northern Ireland was specifically safeguarded: if the Northern Ireland Parliament should, by an address of both Houses to the Crown, request to be excluded from the authority of the government and Parliament of the Irish Free State, then Northern Ireland would retain the constitutional status within the United Kingdom accorded to it by the Act of 1920. But in that event, the boundary between the two parts of Ireland was to be re-adjusted by a commission representing the Irish Free State, Northern Ireland and Great Britain. This provision was of the utmost importance because Lloyd George had let the Irish delegates to believe that the revision of the boundary would so reduce the area of Northern Ireland that its continued existence as a political unit would become impossible. They signed the treaty in the conviction that they had, at least, secured the ending of partition.⁽⁹²⁾ Two days later the delegates were back in Dublin: it remained to be seen whether they had brought peace, or an illusory image of it.⁽⁹³⁾

The conclusion of that Treaty was regarded in a rather different light by both sides. The British regarded it as having solved at last the ancient problem which had

bedeviled relations between the two islands for 750 years. Michael Collins soon after signing it, is reported to have said: "I have signed my death warrant." This proved to be true.⁽⁹⁴⁾

The effect of the Treaty was to give to twenty-six of the thirty-two counties of Ireland the constitutional status of the Dominion of Canada at the time, with its own army and navy and total control of its own affairs at home and abroad subject to membership of the British Commonwealth and an oath of loyalty to the King: "...in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to...the British Commonwealth of Nations." Instead of the "Irish Republic", the new state was to be called the "Irish Free State".⁽⁹⁵⁾

Two aspects of these negotiations and their final outcome are often overlooked. Firstly, the invitation to the Irish to come to England to negotiate had defined the purpose as how the "national aspirations of *Ireland*" could best be reconciled with the interests of the British Empire. The delegates were to be representatives of Ireland: Ulster was not mentioned. Secondly, in the Treaty itself sovereign powers over the whole of Ireland were technically given to the Irish signatories. These powers were temporarily suspended for one month in six of the Ulster counties (Londonderry, Antrim, Down, Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh).⁽⁹⁶⁾

It was stipulated that if at the end of that month those counties as a whole chose to opt out of the newly created Irish Free State they could do so. Everyone knew that they would; they did, and have remained outside ever since. But the Treaty had at least accepted that the Irish nationalist claim for Ireland to be one country had a seriously recognizable foundation. What was left unresolved in Irish minds, but treated by Britain as if it had been dealt with was the question of whether the claim of the majority in the six counties to be separate from the rest of Ireland had a greater or lesser foundation. In view of the apparent certainty with which the question was answered by that clause in the Treaty which permitted the six counties to opt out, and

the continuing certainty shown by succeeding British governments to the same effect, it is worth recalling what Gladstone had said on the subject thirty years before the Treaty: “I cannot allow it to be said that a Protestant minority in Ulster...is to rule the question at large for Ireland. I am aware of no constitutional doctrine tolerable on which such a conclusion could be adopted or justified.”⁽⁹⁷⁾ It was clear, then, that the northern only six counties could not stand, nor count, for the thirty two counties of the whole island.

At the time the situation was clouded by other aspects of the Treaty. One of these was a clause which appointed, in the event of the six counties of Northern Ireland opting out of the Free State, a Boundary Commission to adjust the border between the two areas “in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants”. Many nationalists, including Michael Collins, believed that if faithfully carried out this would remove the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, where there was a particularly large Catholic and nationalist population, from Northern Ireland to the Free State. The remaining four counties, it was contended, would not find themselves a viable political entity, and would be forced to join the Free State. Thus the issue of “partition” at the time could be made to look less final than it has become since.⁽⁹⁸⁾

Another aspect of the Treaty which made the failure to unite Ireland seem less urgent was the oath to the King which in the minds of many nationalist Irishmen seemed to be absolutely humiliating. Clause 4 prescribed the oath to be taken by members of the Free State’s parliament, the Dàil, as follows:

I do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established...and that I will be faithful to HM King George V, his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British

Commonwealth of Nations.⁽⁹⁹⁾

This was anathema to many republicans. Dan Breen, the man who had begun the republican violence in 1919 was to say that it made the Treaty “the negation of everything I ever fought for...I wasn’t going to be compelled to give allegiance to a foreign king.”⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

In fact, Collins, negotiating hard with Lloyd George had managed at the last moment to have the word “allegiance” in the clause shifted as far away as possible from the word “King”. He knew quite well what many people like Dan Breen⁽¹⁰¹⁾ who had helped him to his negotiating position were going to think about it. But he was to argue that the oath could be seen as a mere symbol necessary to secure a constitutional position from which it could later be abolished. “You’d take the oath to get rid of it,”⁽¹⁰²⁾ as one of his I.R.A supporters put it. I.R.A opponents on the other hand argued that it was the very symbols of British rule which had helped them easily clarify what they were fighting against.

Thus, while among the ordinary population of Ireland the general reaction to the Treaty was one of relief and thankfulness that the horror of the last two and a half years had been ended, with the greater part of Ireland freer from London government than she had been for centuries, the I.R.A itself was split, over half of them regarding the Treaty as a betrayal of all what they fought for, the independence of all Ireland.

The fact that Collins himself had signed it of course made it easier for many of them to accept it on his terms, namely that it gave “the freedom to win freedom”. His continuing control of the still existing Irish Republican Brotherhood enabled him to disseminate this argument forcibly, although the final I.R.B decision was to leave the matter to individual consciences. On the other hand the fierce opposition of an

outstanding figure of Irish resistance like Eamon De Valera to the Treaty precipitated the split of the I.R.A.

De Valera, the titular head of the republican “government” which negotiated the Treaty with the British, had remained behind in Dublin, essentially because he knew that some compromise on the full republican demand was inevitable and that all his political skills would be required there to make it acceptable. He had made the delegation in London his “plenipotentiaries”; on the other hand he had instructed them not to sign a final settlement without first referring it back to Dublin to consult with him on more than one occasion of deadlock in the negotiations, but impressed by Lloyd George’s sense of critical urgency during the last tense night of negotiation they had eventually signed without even resorting to the telephone -by no means such an easy means of communication in 1921 as it is today-. De Valera dissociated himself from the Treaty and the split in the I.R.A was thus reflected among the republican politicians themselves. ⁽¹⁰³⁾

II. 3-Civil War in Ireland, 1922-1923

After a series of agonizingly emotional debates in the course of which De Valera was in tears, the Dàil finally ratified the Treaty by a small majority. The country itself ratified the Treaty by a larger, though not overwhelming one, in the first Free State General Election held in June 1922. But few in the I.R.A had ever felt their nominal allegiance to the Dàil as primarily binding, and the country had never been consulted democratically at any time as to whether or not it approved of I.R.A violence. Civil War between those of the old I.R.A who had become part of the new Free State army and those who remained aloof from it but armed and organized and still often occupying former British barracks, broke out in June 1922. Civil War was precipitated by a series of grim events.

Earlier, in April 1922, when tension between the pro- and anti-Treaty sections of the I.R.A ran high and sincere hopes on both sides that it might be resolved were beginning to evaporate, leaders of the anti-Treaty elements had occupied and set up their headquarters in the Dublin Four Courts. The most prominent of the republican leaders there who regarded the Treaty Collins had signed as a sell-out were Rory O'Connor⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ who had been Collins's Director of Engineering, and Liam Mellows,⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ one of the few Volunteer leaders to have taken action outside Dublin in 1916. They were backed by some of the most successful leaders of flying columns in the "War" against the British: men like Liam Lynch⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ and Tom Barry⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ from the south, and in Dublin, by Ernie O'Malley,⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ who had been one of Collins's principal IRA organizers. A song was to express the feelings of their rank and file: "Soldiers of 22" against the Irish Free Staters, considered as traitors. One verse of which was:

Take it down from the mast, Irish traitors, The flag we
Republicans claim, It can never belong to Free Staters,
You've brought on it nothing but shame.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

The enrolment in the Free State army of many Irishmen who had been officers and men of the British army confirmed republicans in their view that the new state was merely a continuation of British rule in disguise, what today might be called a neo-colonialist venture. The fact that it was headed by the old leaders, Collins and Arthur Griffith, only increased republicans' bitterness.

In January 1922 Collins wrote to the Irish girl to whom he was engaged: "I am really and truly having an awful time and am rapidly becoming quite desperate. Oh Lord, it is honestly frightful."⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Such feelings were intensified by development in what was actually "Northern Ireland". Fears among the Protestant population there

that the Boundary Commission might indeed undermine their new state had stimulated them to behave as they had done for centuries whenever they felt a menace of an overwhelming Catholic majority in Ireland. Serious rioting took place early in 1922. There were 138 casualties in Belfast alone in February (three quarters of them Catholic) and 30 people were killed in a single night. Catholic refugees streamed south of the border.

The I.R.A, both north and south, did what they could to protect their fellow nationalists and Collins, though in honour bound by the Treaty to respect the integrity of the northern state, equally “could not stand idly by” and leave nationalists to be assassinated. He therefore found himself in the ambiguous position of supplying arms to the anti-Treaty I.R.A in the North while faced by a challenge to his authority and that of the Free State from their comrades in the Four Courts. The double crisis was brought to a head in June by revolver shots in London.

The situation in the North had by then deteriorated still further. Deaths in communal violence in the six counties in the first six months of 1922 amounted to 264, two-thirds of them Catholics. New parliamentary police forces organized by Sir James Craig’s government in the North (A and B Specials) were asserting law and order in a manner by no means meticulously consistent with the ethical principles of law and order. Craig’s security adviser in the North was the British Field Marshal, Sir Henry Wilson, a die-hard Unionist in Irish affairs. On 22 June 1922 Wilson was shot down by two I.R.A men on the steps of his home in Eaton Place, London. Curiously, though the men were acting on their own initiative, they had before the truce, received orders from Collins himself to “execute” Wilson. Their action now precipitated him into an even more painful phase of the crisis in which he was enmeshed, though his conscience led him to make strenuous but unavailing efforts with the British government to save those I.R.A men from execution.⁽¹¹¹⁾

The British government, which for months had watched with increasing anxiety the continued passive toleration by the Free State of anti-Treaty republican headquarters in Dublin, now assumed wrongly that the orders for the shooting of Wilson had come from there and insisted that Collins should take action against the Four Courts. ⁽¹¹²⁾ Otherwise they would regard the Treaty as abrogated. After stalling for some days Collins, provoked on his own account by the kidnapping of one of his Generals by the republican forces, eventually gave the Four Courts twenty minutes to surrender and, when they refused, began to shell them from the other side of the Liffey River with two field guns he had borrowed from the British. The army range was ridiculously short but since the only available shells were shrapnel it took two days to subdue them. Other anti-Treaty republican forces then took up their positions in buildings in O'Connell Street; guests who were breakfasting in a hotel were told by embarrassed I.R.A men to get upstairs, pack their bags and leave. A week later part of O'Connell Street was once again in ruins. The Irish Civil War had begun.

After eight days fighting in Dublin during which 60 people were killed and 300 wounded, the anti-Treaty republicans in O'Connell Street surrendered as those in the Four Courts had done. Cathal Brugha, a hero of 1916, had refused to do so and was mortally wounded. Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellows and other top I.R.A men were prisoners in Mountjoy Jail as so many I.R.A men had been in the time of the British occupation. But in other parts of Ireland, particularly in the south and west, the anti-Treaty I.R.A men were strong and they held the city of Cork.

As if relieved from the worst of his anxieties by the external breaking of the tension, Collins now threw himself into the campaign against his old comrades-in-arms with the same energy he had shown against the British during the War of Independence. He procured an extra ten thousand rifles from the British government and filled the ranks of the new Free State army both with former professionals of the British and American armies, of the old R.I.C , and with raw young country boys, many of whom only learned to load their rifles shortly before going into action.

Sweeps were made across the countryside towards Limerick in which the one-time British field guns which had been used to shell the Four Courts were trundled down country lanes into firing positions by traction engines.⁽¹¹³⁾

The pressure began to squeeze the often scattered anti-Treaty republican forces who could no longer rely on support from the population as they had been able to do in the latter part of the fight against the British troops. Because communications across the south of Ireland were still being effectively harassed by republicans (soon to be known as “Irregulars”) Collins sent Free State troops round by sea to take the city of Cork which they did without difficulty at the beginning of August 1922 and moved inland. Advancing apprehensively through the Cork streets they found slogans on the walls: “Collins marches through Cork. Why not through Belfast?”⁽¹¹⁴⁾ This meant that the Free State army was strong enough to reach Ulster and free it from both the British and the Unionists.

It was not only the anti-Treaty republicans that the pressure squeezed. A week after Cork had fallen, Ireland was shattered by the news that Arthur Griffith, only fifty, exhausted by overwork, had collapsed and died of a heart attack. Collins came up from the military operations in the south to help carry his coffin at the funeral. He then returned to the Cork area to tour the newly won Free State positions there. One of his military aides, Emmet Dalton, was responsible for his safety but Collins, a Cork man himself, had replied confidently: “Sure, they won’t shoot me in my own county.”⁽¹¹⁵⁾

At about 7.30 pm on 22 August the convoy in which he was traveling, consisting of a motor cycle outrider, his own open Rolls-Royce touring car, a Crossley tender and an armoured car, ran into a set of obstacles placed across the road in a gully called Bealnamblath between Macroom and Bandon. A party of anti-Treaty republicans had been waiting for them there all day. Firing broke out as the convoy halted. Half an hour later, and before it got dark, Collins was dead.

The death of a hero always invites legend. It is necessary to make the unbearable bearable by embroidering it in some way. As with Cuchulain, the ancient hero of Gaelic legend, so, in a more prosaic twentieth-century way it was to be with Collins. It was later said, and is still sometimes believed in Ireland even today, that he had been shot by one of his own side, either by the machine-gunner in the armoured car, who did indeed desert the republicans later, or by one of his closest colleagues, Emmet Dalton; it was also said that the whole ambush had been engineered by De Valera, who was indeed in the vicinity at the time but had no part in republican military operations. The truth seems to have been that as the firing died down and the ambush seemed to be over Collins stood up in the road and was hit either directly by a last lone sniper from the ridge above or by a ricochet. Emmet Dalton ran up the road and whispered into the ear of the man known to be dying if not already dead from a gaping wound in the back of his head.

Devastating as the news were to many on both sides in the Civil War, particularly coming so soon after the news of Griffith's death the week before, there were also those who rejoiced when they heard it, so bitter had that Civil War now become. One Dublin woman who would have laid down her own life for Collins in the year before looked up from her newspaper with eyes shining the next day and exclaimed: "Isn't it great news?" Nationalist Ireland was being torn apart. But still worse was to come.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

Being less and less in a position to conduct military operations of any size in the field, the republicans resorted increasingly to standard "Irregular" methods: individual killings, destruction of property, blowing up of bridges, bank robberies. As for the Free State, with Collins and Griffith gone, the new leaders who took over were determined to prove their ability to hold it together at all costs. Principally these consisted of William Cosgrave, Kevin O'Higgins, Ernest Blythe⁽¹¹⁷⁾ and Richard Mulcahy. Prime Minister Cosgrave had been out in the 1916 Rising and condemned

to death but reprieved. O'Higgins, a former law student and ardent Sinn Fein supporter had been elected to the Dàil in the General Election of 1918. Blythe had been a supporter of Griffith before the 1914-18 War, and Mulcahy had been Collins's old Chief of Staff and was now in charge of the Free State army. Their impeccable nationalist credentials probably helped give them the strength to do what they now did.⁽¹¹⁸⁾

By the end of 1922, an Emergency Powers Bill was introduced and passed by the Dàil. The decision had been taken to shoot, after a period of grace allowed for surrender, any republicans taken in arms. The first of seventy-seven executions to be carried out in the next seven months took place in November when four rank and file members of the anti-Treaty I.R.A caught in arms in Dublin were shot by firing squads. But it was the executions that immediately followed these which were to prove so traumatic, scarring the political life of the new free Ireland for a generation and more. On 24 November 1922, the man who had proved the most effective propagandist for the republican cause in the days of the fighting against the British and was continuing the same work now against the Free State, Erskine Childers, was shot at dawn for possession of a small revolver which Michael Collins had once given him. When the angry anti-Treaty republican command decreed that any member of the Dàil who had voted for the Emergency Powers Act was liable to be shot on sight and began to put their decree into practice, the Free State government had the four chief members of the republican executive who had been taken prisoners in the Four Courts five months before, including Rory O'Connor and Liam Mellows removed from their cells in the middle of the night and shot without trial. The decision to do this had been supported by the entire Cabinet, though O'Higgins had wondered about any other alternative to the execution. It is reported that he asked for a moment: "Is there no other way?"⁽¹¹⁹⁾ recalling doubtless among other things that he had been Rory O'Connor's friend.

Such temporary squeamishness had no further place in the Free State Cabinet's thoughts. Thirty-four republicans were executed by firing squads in January 1923 alone in nine different towns of Ireland. Soon after the seventy-seventh execution in May of William Shaughnessy at Ennis, De Valera, whose role as a republican political leader had begun to resume significance as the I.R.A's military effort collapsed, issued an order endorsed by the I.R.A to "dump arms". He accompanied it with a stirring message to "soldiers of the rearguard"⁽¹²⁰⁾ which told them that now "other means must be sought to safeguard the nation's right."⁽¹²¹⁾ He was to devote the rest of his life to that pursuit.

Meanwhile the Free State's desperate but eventually successful struggle to survive had meant not only that a harsh bitterness now weakened Irish nationalists (with 13,000 republicans in jail, many enduring long hunger strikes for their lost cause) but also that the long-term objectives, such as a complete independence for all Ireland, for which Collins had signed the Treaty became lost to view as maintenance of the Treaty itself became the goal. This effect was reinforced by the fact that De Valera, after a year in jail himself, although elected together with other politicized republicans to mount an effective democratic opposition in the Dàil, refused to take that oath of allegiance which would have enabled them to sit in the Dàil. The real opposition in the country (apart from a relatively small Labour party) thus took no part in political life for the next four years. In such a situation it was easy for the Free State simply to concentrate on consolidation of its position. In particular this meant that the issue of partition subsided by default, in the absence of any other prospected consensus on the Irish question.⁽¹²²⁾

It was not until 1924 that the Free State asked the British government to set up the Boundary Commission stipulated by the Treaty. This immediately produced an embarrassing problem for the British inasmuch as Sir James Craig, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, refused to take part in it. The British had to appoint an Ulster representative of their own, a close friend of Craig, named Fisher, in addition

to their official representative, an imperially-minded South African judge named Feetham. The Free State's representative was Eoin MacNeill, the Gaelic League's co-founder and nominal head of the Volunteers in 1916, who was by no means an aggressive negotiator.

A radical difference of view set in at once as to whether the concept of adjustment of the border "in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants" meant more than a mere minor adjustment. In fact there could be no doubt whatever that the Catholic inhabitants of considerable areas of Tyrone and Fermanagh, together with smaller areas of Derry, South Down and South Armagh, wanted to be incorporated with their co-religionists and fellow nationalists in the Free State. On the other side, the Protestant inhabitants of strips of East Donegal and North Monaghan wanted to join Northern Ireland. But in an atmosphere conditioned by statements from British signatories of the Treaty to the effect that what had been intended was merely to simplify and thus consolidate the Northern government's jurisdiction over the six counties, there could also be no doubt that the two British-appointed representatives on the Commission would determine the issue in this way. After a whole year's desultory argument during which the Free State showed itself curiously inert on the subject, MacNeill resigned when by the inevitable two-thirds majority the Commission had decided that indeed only very minor adjustments would be made, actually including the transfer of some territory in Donegal from the Free State to Northern Ireland.⁽¹²³⁾

It is not difficult to imagine how Collins would have reacted if he had ever allowed the deliberations of the Boundary Commission to get this far. What the Free State government did was to go to London in December 1925 and agree to an amendment of the Treaty by which the Boundary Commission was abandoned altogether in return for a cancellation of certain financial obligations of the Free State to the British government under the Treaty. Cosgrave and O'Higgins, returning to Dublin, declared publicly: "Today we have sown the seeds of peace..."⁽¹²⁴⁾

Ironically they had settled for a compromise on Ulster far more injurious to the cause of Irish nationalist unity than anything John Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party had ever considered, especially the issue of partition. Yet it was on the grounds that Redmond and the Parliamentary Party had been prepared to compromise over Ulster that Sinn Fein had been able to replace them in popularity with the Irish electorate. “Sowing the seeds of peace” seemed to be, more than any time before, no more than an eternal wish. ⁽¹²⁵⁾

Quite apart from this legal consolidation of the partition of Ireland there had been an important psychological consolidation of it in the minds of the Protestant Unionists of the North. No one summed this up better than Kevin O’Higgins himself, explaining bitterly in the Dàil the effect on north-east Ulster of the Civil War and its lawlessness in the south:

We had an opportunity of building up a worthy State that would attract and, in time, absorb and assimilate those elements....We preferred to burn our own houses, blow up our own bridges, rob our own banks, saddle ourselves with millions of debt for the maintenance of an army....Generally we preferred to practise upon ourselves worse indignities than the British had practised on us since Cromwell...and now we wonder why the Orangemen are not hopping like so many fleas across the border in their anxiety to come within our fold and jurisdiction ... ⁽¹²⁶⁾

In short, the last years of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a new demand for autonomy for Ireland, initiated by Parnell’s Irish Parliamentary Party and accepted by the Prime Minister of the day, Gladstone: the Home Rule Project. The Project was reluctantly opposed by the members of the House of Lords, who refused any prospect of an autonomous government for Ireland and rejected it in

each session until the outbreak of the Great War. Meanwhile, a new political entity which replaced the old Irish Parliamentary Party emerged as the first political force in the country, the *Sinn Fein* Party with more ambitious perspectives, converging on independence. The 1916 Rising was an attempt for a large scale insurrection that was crushed in bloodshed. The Irish had to wait until the end of the First World War to wage their own war of independence in 1919. That war resulted in the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921-22, and the partition of Ireland into two distinct entities, Ulster in the North remained British, whereas the South was granted the status of an independent dominion of the Commonwealth. Thus, the island was set on a ruthless bloody conflict that soon turned to a civil war between the pro-Treaty supporters and their antagonists, the anti-Treaty.

Notes:

(1)- John P. McCarthy, *Ireland, a Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present*, New York, Facts On File Inc, 2006, p. 412.

(2)- Ibid., p. 414.

(3)- John Edward Redmond (1851-1918), was born in Ballytrent. He was the Irish leader who succeeded Charles Stewart Parnell. When Redmond became chairman of the Irish Nationalist Party in 1900, he healed the split in the party caused by Parnell's disgrace. Redmond believed in moderation and was shocked by the bloody Easter Rebellion in Dublin in 1916. But the Sinn Fein Party, which used violence, gradually displaced Redmond's party. Ibid., p. 418.

(4)- Art Cosgrove, *A New History of Ireland*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 134.

(5)- Sir Horace Plunkett (1854-1932) is an Irish agricultural reformer who had been a Unionist member of parliament for South Dublin from 1892 to 1900. Partisan of a "Constructive Unionism", he headed the Department of Agriculture and Industries from 1900 to 1907, and had been one of the founders of the Irish Co-operative Movement in 1889 and a member of the Congested District Board. Plunkett chaired the Irish Convention over the Irish national question in 1917. Paul. L Rempe, "Sir Horace Plunkett", *Eire-Ireland*, Vol. XII, No 3, Fall 1978, p. 114.

(6)- Alvin Jackson, *Ireland 1798-1998, War, Peace and Beyond*, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell Ltd, 1999, p. 237.

(7)- Herbert Henry, First Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Viscount Asquith of Morley (1852-1928) was the Liberal Prime Minister of Great Britain (1908-16) who was responsible for the Parliament Act of 1911 limiting the power of the House of Lords. Asquith led Britain during the first two years of World War I. Ibid, p. 241.

(8)- Royal Commission on the Landing of Arms at Howth on 26th July 1914, Report (1914), Cd. 7631.

(9)- Built in 1204, the Dublin Castle represented the centre of British rule in Ireland and the official residence of the British Governor General for Ireland (previously, Lord Lieutenant). Although depending from the authority of the Colonial Office in London, the Governor

General was, after all, a plenipotentiary minister and his spontaneous reaction to the Howth Landing was logical and legitimate. Colonial Office, CO. 903.Dublin Castle records.

(10)- Colonial Office, CO.904/20.Nationalist organizations.

(11)- John Dillon (1851-1927) was a leader of the Irish Nationalist Party in the struggle to secure Home Rule by parliamentary means. Through the 1880's he was the most important ally of the Irish Nationalist, Charles Stewart Parnell, but after Parnell's involvement in a divorce case, Dillon repudiated him for reasons of political prudence. John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 244.

(12)- Michael Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland, the Sinn Fein Party, 1916-1923*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 156.

(13)- Ibid., p. 157.

(14)- It became then obvious that, with the outbreak of the First World War, England's difficulty meant, more than ever before, Ireland's opportunity, and the Sinn Feiners were, according to reports from the Intelligence Service, keen and ready to seize that opportunity. Colonial Office, CO.904/23.Sinn Fein movement.

(15)- Charles Loch Mowat, *Britain between the Wars, 1918-1940*, London, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972, p. 37.

(16)- Kevin Kenny, *Ireland and the British Empire*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 133.

(17)- Dorothy MacArdle, *the Irish Republic*, Dublin, Corgi Books, 1968, p. 49.

(18)- Robert Hull, *the Irish Triangle*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 124.

(19)- Born in Canada, Andrew Bonar Law (1858-1923) was a British Conservative politician, who after a successful business career, entered Parliament in 1900 and became leader of the Conservative Party in 1911. He was Prime Minister from 1922 to 1923, but resigned because of poor health and was replaced by Stanley Baldwin. Bryan Farrell, "The Paths of Liberty; from Revolt to Revolution", *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. XX, No 7, April 1978, p. 77.

(20)- Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Whittingehame, Viscount Traprain (1848-1930), was the British statesman who maintained a position of power in the British Conservative Party for 50 years. Prime Minister from 1902 to 1905, and Foreign Secretary from 1916 to 1919, he is perhaps best remembered for his World War I statement (the Balfour

Declaration) expressing official British approval of Zionism. Michael Hursy, *Parnell and Irish Nationalism*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968, p. 85.

(21)- Presbyterians form a large group of Protestant denominations in English-speaking countries. Elsewhere, most churches of this tradition are called “Reformed”, for example, the Dutch Reformed Church. About 100 denominations belong to the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. Brendan Bartley & Rob Kitchin, *Understanding Contemporary Ireland*, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 66.

(22)- Bryan Farrell, op. cit., p. 79.

(23)- Ibid.

(24)- Alvin Jackson, op. cit., p. 244.

(25)- Ibid., p. 246.

(26)- The Orange order owes its name to William of Orange, Duke of Nassau in the Netherlands, the future William III King of England and the famous Battle of the Boyne in 1689 against James II. The Orangemen are die hard Protestants of Northern Ireland, and they always have been strongly opposed to Home Rule for the Province of Ulster (which represents all Northern Ireland). They annually march on processions in July in remembrance of the victory of William over James II, provoking thus the Catholic sentiments. Edward Bridgefield, “A Shamrock with Two Leaves“, *Etudes Irlandaises*, December 1976, p. 65.

(27)- Sir Edward Carson (1854-1935) was an Irish Protestant barrister and senior Member of Parliament for Dublin University. He was leader of the Ulster Unionist Council. Dorothy MacArdle, op. cit., p. 56.

(28)- James Craig, First Viscount Craigavon (1871-1940) was a Northern Irish soldier and statesman. He was considered as a leading advocate of maintaining the union between Ireland and Great Britain, and the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from 1921 to 1940. Ibid.

(29)- J.C Beckett, *the Making of Modern Ireland, 1603-1923*, London, Faber & Faber, 1981, p. 147.

(30)- Ibid., p. 148.

(31)- Peter Bew, *Land and the National Question*, Dublin, Earl O’Flaherty, 1978, p. 77.

- (32)- Eoin MacNeill (1867-1945) was one of the most famous Irish scholars of the 20th Century. He was also a renowned historian and politician. Ibid., p. 79.
- (33)- Bulmer Hobson (1883-1969) was a famous Irish revolutionary and nationalist, who is considered as one of the most influential founders of the Sinn Fein Party. He opposed the 1916 Easter Rising but joined the Irish Free State government. J.C Beckett, op. cit., p. 153.
- (34)- Robert Erskine Childers (1870-1922) was an Irish revolutionary and politician. He is one of the instigators of the Howth landing in 1914. An anti-Treaty partisan, Childers was court-martialed for possession of a weapon under the emergency provision resolution passed by the Dàil and executed in 1922. Ibid., p. 155.
- (35)- Sir Roger Casement (1864-1916) was a British diplomat and Irish nationalist who was hanged by the British for trying to organize support for an Irish uprising. Peter Bew, op. cit., p. 79.
- (36)- Charles Loch Mowat, op. cit., p. 42.
- (37)- Ibid., p. 45.
- (38)- James Bell Bowyer, the *Secret Army*, London, Heinemann, 1970, p. 175.
- (39)- Peter Bromhead, *Life in Modern Britain*, London, Longman Group Ltd, 1971, p. 69.
- (40)- Ibid., p. 73.
- (41)- Ibid., p. 74.
- (42)- Maureen Murphy, "The Torn Curtain", *Eire-Ireland*, Vol. XIV, No 3, Fall 1979, p. 29.
- (43)- Walter Arnstein, *Britain Yesterday and Today, 1830 to the Present*, Boston, D. C Heath & Company, 1966, p. 89.
- (44)- Ibid., p. 90.
- (45)- Patrick Henry Pearse (1879-1916) was a famous leader of Irish nationalism and Irish poet and educator. He was the first president of the provisional government of the Irish Republic proclaimed in Dublin on Easter Monday, April 24, 1916, and was commander in chief of the Irish forces in the anti-British uprising that began on the same day. Robert D. Edwards, *Patrick Pearse*, London, Random House, 1977, p. 74.

- (46)- Thomas MacDonagh (1878-1912) is a very sensitive Irish poet and revolutionary and a close friend to Patrick Pearse. Department of External Affairs, Republic of Ireland, *Cuimhneachàn 1916-1966: a Record of Ireland's Commemoration of the 1916 Rising* (Dublin 1966).
- (47)- Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland. Report of Commission (London, 1916), Cd. 8279.
- (48)- Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland. Minutes of Evidence and Appendix of Documents (London, 1916), Cd. 8311.
- (49)- Robert D. Edwards, op. cit., p. 77.
- (50)- Augustine Birrell (1850-1933) was a politician and a man of letters whose policies as British Chief Secretary for Ireland (1907-16) contributed to the Easter Week rising of Irish nationalists in Dublin (1916). Robert D. Edwards, op. cit., p. 75.
- (51)- Royal Commission on the Arrest and Subsequent Treatment of Mr. Francis Sheehy Skeffington, Mr. Thomas Dickson, and Mr. Patrick James McIntyre, Report (29 September 1916), Cd. 8376.
- (52)- Peter Bew, op. cit., p. 82.
- (53)- National Archives, Public Record Office, London, PRO 32/451/6897, Maxwell to Richardson, 23 May 1917.
- (54)- Ralph Young, "The Insurgents of 1916 and the Signatories of 1998", *Eire-Ireland*, Vol. XIX, No 1, Winter 1999, p. 27.
- (55)- The choice of Field Marshal Lord John French as new Lord Lieutenant for Ireland instead of Lord Kitchener or Lord Haig was motivated by his immense prestige and fame as a national hero of the Great War. The Irish Convention, confidential report to His Majesty the King by the chairman (London, 1918).
- (56)- Despite the famous Volunteer slogan: "We serve neither King nor Kaiser, but Ireland", the memory of the *Aud*, the German ship carrying arms for the Irish nationalists, was still alive, and, as the Sinn Fein archives attest, the German-Irish relations during the War were a *secret de Polichinelle*. Sinn Fein Funds Case, 2B. 82. 116-18.
- (57)- Report on the proceedings of the Irish Convention (London, 1918), Cd. 9019.
- (58)- Brian Inglis, the *Story of Ireland*, London, Faber & Faber, 1965, p. 19.

(59)- Ibid., p. 22.

(60)- Walter Arnstein, op. cit., p.103.

(61)- Brian Inglis, op. cit., p. 23.

(62)- The Black and Tans were Auxiliaries recruited in Britain in 1920 to reinforce the ranks of the Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C) whose members had seriously declined because of IRA attacks and numerous resignations. They were called so because of their uniforms, and they gained a very bad reputation of brutality and reprisals. They were joined in the middle of 1920 by another force, the Auxiliaries, or, as called by the Irish: "*Auxies*". John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 195.

(63)- Ibid., p. 202.

(64)- It is worth remarking that the British authorities always referred to Sinn Fein as the Sinn Fein "movement" and never as the Sinn Fein "party", in spite of its legitimacy as the first Irish party since 1902. Documents relative to the Sinn Fein movement (London, 1921), Cmd. 1108.

(65)- William T. Cosgrave (1880-1965) is an Irish revolutionary and politician who, as the first president of the Executive Council (Cabinet), led repression against the Republican insurgents (Anti-Treaty supporters) during the Civil War. Cosgrave presided over the new born Irish Free State from 1923 to 1932. John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 229.

(66)- Kevin O'Higgins (1892-1927) is an Irish politician who, after the death of Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins, became Minister for Home Affairs (later renamed Justice) and assistant of Cosgrave in the Executive Council of the Irish Free State. He was assassinated in 1927 by IRA extremists. Ibid., p. 238.

(67)- Malcolm Forester, *Michael Collins*, London, Longman Group Ltd, 1971, p. 56.

(68)- Ibid., p. 57.

(69)- Field General Courts Martial, Civilians, WO.71.

(70)- Michael Collins directed raids on the residences of suspected British agents in Dublin early on the morning of Sunday, November 21, 1920 (Bloody Sunday). 14 agents were killed and 6 others were wounded. That afternoon, the Auxiliaries fired on a crowd at a football match in Croke Park. 13 were killed and 60 were wounded. The same day three Republican prisoners were killed "trying to escape" from Dublin Castle. John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 197.

(71)- The Royal Irish Constables represented the main targets of the I.R.A violent campaign during the War of Independence, to such an extent that an inevitable massive resignation from the R.I.C followed, prompting the British government to recruit as substitutes the famous Black and Tans and an auxiliary force called the Auxiliaries (see note 62). Colonial Office, CO.904/99-116, RIC county inspectors' reports, 1916-21.

(72)- Christopher Keegan, "Eire, Birth of a Nation", *Irish American Studies*, Vol. IV, No 2, January 1976, p. 92.

(73)- Richard Mulcahy (1886-1971) is an Irish revolutionary soldier and politician, pro-Treaty member of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B), who had been Minister for Defense in the Provisional Government and then in the Irish Free State government until 1924. Minister for Local Government in 1927 and member of the *Cumann na Ngaedheal* Party, Mulcahy was one of the founding members of the emerging *Fine Gael* Party and led it from 1944 to 1959. John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 360.

(74)- Cathal Brugha (1874-1922) is one of the most famous Irish revolutionaries of the War of Independence. He led a strong resistance to the Anglo-Irish Treaty at the head of the Irregulars Army during the Civil War. Ibid., p. 206.

(75)- Austin Stack (1880-1929) is an Irish Republican politician who, as his friend and colleague, Cathal Brugha, took part in the Easter Rising of 1916, opposed the Treaty, and showed hostility to Collins and his warfare methods. Stack was also an influential member of the Sinn Fein Party. Ibid., p. 440.

(76)- Michael Laffan, op. cit., p. 166.

(77)- Although both the M I 5 (internal secret service or counter espionage service) and the M I 6 (or SIS, Secret Intelligence Service, in charge of external security and espionage) had been founded on August, 1st 1909. The general term, until at least the end of the Second World War, has always been referred to as the *Intelligence Service*. Colonial Office, CO.904/157/1, Intelligence officers' reports.

(78)- Malcolm Forester, op. cit., p. 63.

(79)- Robert Childers Barton (1881-1975) is an Irish Republican politician and an important agriculturalist who, as a Sinn Feiner, took part in the Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations delegation and signed that Treaty. Retired from active politics, he presided the Irish Agricultural Credit Corporation from 1934 to 1954. Ibid., p. 65.

(80)- George Gavin Duffy (1882-1951) is the son of Charles Gavan Duffy. He was a gifted lawyer and politician who, as a plenipotentiary delegate, negotiated the Treaty in 1921.

Appointed to the High Court in 1937, he became its president in 1946. He contributed to the drafting of the 1937 Constitution. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

(81)- Eamonn Duggan (1874-1936) is an Irish lawyer and politician who was member of the *DAIL EIREANN* (Irish Assembly) from 1918 to 1933 and elected afterwards to the *SEANAD* (Irish Senate) in 1933. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

(82)- *Ibid.*, p. 69.

(83)- Michael Laffan, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

(84)- Correspondence relating to the proposals of His Majesty's government for an Irish settlement (London, 1921), *Cmd. 1502*.

(85)- Reginald Jackson, "Understanding the Irish Experience", *Irish American Studies*, Vol. III, No 4, March 1975, p. 83.

(86)- Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916, the Irish Rebellion*, London, Penguin Books, 2005, p. 75.

(87)- *Ibid.*, p. 76.

(88)- Charles Townsend, *The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-21*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 130.

(89)- *Ibid.*, p. 132.

(90)- Reginald Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

(91)- Brian Inglis, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

(92)- Seamus Aronson, "The Green Erin of Mine", *Anglo-Irish Studies*, Vol. II, No 17, June 1976, p. 26.

(93)- *Ibid.*

(94)- Michael Hursy, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

(95)- Charles Townsend, *The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-21*, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

(96)- Mark Leonard Morrison, "Hibernia versus Albion, Eight Centuries of Antagonism", *Irish Economy and Social History*, Vol. V, May 1987, p. 36.

- (97)- Charles Townsend, *The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-21*, op. cit., pp. 138-39.
- (98)- Michael Laffan, op. cit., p. 173.
- (99)- Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916, the Irish Rebellion*, op. cit., p.79.
- (100)- James Bell Bowyer, op. cit., p. 188.
- (101)- Dan Breen (1894-1969) was an Irish revolutionary and politician who served in the ranks of the I.R.B and the Irish Volunteers, then as an I.R.A member. He opposed the Anglo-Irish Treaty and was elected TD (member of the Dàil) several times until 1965. Breen wrote about his revolutionary exploits in *My Fight for Irish Freedom* (1924). John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 203.
- (102)- Michael Laffan, op. cit., p. 175.
- (103)- Ibid., p. 177.
- (104)- Rory O'Connor (1883-1922) is an outstanding Irish revolutionary and Republican politician. Malcolm Forester, op. cit., p. 72.
- (105)- Liam Mellows or Mellowses (1892-1922) is an Irish Republican and socialist revolutionary. Ibid., p. 73.
- (106)- Liam Lynch (1890-1923) is an Irish revolutionary soldier. Ibid., p. 73.
- (107)- Tom Barry (1897-1980) is a very famous Irish rebel soldier. Rogelio Alonso, *the IRA and Armed Struggle*, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 304.
- (108)- Ernest O'Malley (1898-1957) is an Irish Republican revolutionary. Ibid., p. 306.
- (109)- Ibid., p. 307
- (110)- Ibid., p. 308.
- (111)- William. H, Barber Ross, "The Men of the Four Courts", *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. XIX, No 16, September 1975, p. 38.
- (112)- The Four Courts represent the central building in the Irish judicial system that houses both the Supreme Court and the High Court. Under the Act of Union it housed the traditional four courts of the time: Chancery, King's Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas. The opening shot of the Irish Civil War occurred there as the provisional government sought to

dislodge a group of anti-treaty members of the I.R.A from their occupancy of the building. The successful assault resulted in major destruction, including fires, which destroyed priceless and irreplaceable public records. John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 269.

(113)- Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916, the Irish Rebellion*, op. cit., p. 93.

(114)- Charles Townsend, *the British Campaign in Ireland 1919-21*, op. cit., p. 139.

(115)- Ibid., p. 140.

(116)- Seamus Aronson, op. cit., p. 30.

(117)- Ernest Blythe (1889-1975) is a famous Irish politician and diplomat. John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 198.

(118)- Michael Wall, *The Making of 1916*, Dublin, Sean Mac Gillian Ltd, 1969, p. 135.

(119)- Laurence O'Broin, *Dublin Castle and the 1916 Rising*, Limerick, Norton Books, 1966, p. 111.

(120)- Ibid., p. 112.

(121)- Michael Wall, *the Penal Laws*, Dublin, Sean Mac Gillian Ltd, 1961, p. 57.

(122)- A. Calton Younger, *Ireland's Civil War*, Waterford, Parminton and Co Ltd, 1970, p. 88.

(123)- Alice Curtayne, "Civil War", *Eire-Ireland*, Vol. XV, No 1, Spring 1980, p. 11.

(124)- Michael Wall, *the Making of 1916*, op. cit., p. 142.

(125)- Laurence O'Broin, op. cit., p. 113.

(126)- Robert D. Edwards, op. cit., p. 90.

CHAPTER THREE

INDEPENDENT IRELAND, 1922-1937

This chapter discusses a crucial period in the history of Ireland, for it concerns the genesis of contemporary Ireland after the independence. The Irish of the South, as well as those of Ulster, were bound to accept partition as a *sine qua non* condition for independence. Meanwhile Northern Ireland chose to remain under British rule as any other province or region -Scotland, Wales, Gibraltar or the Falklands are part of the *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*-, and Southern Ireland opted for an Irish Free State.

The status and destiny of the newly born Irish political entity constitutes the subject of this chapter. The first fifteen years of the new Irish state are divided into two parts to be dealt with: the era of Cosgrave as Prime Minister of independent Ireland's first government, 1922-1932, its relation with Northern Ireland, including the elaboration of the famous Boundary Commission about the borders' question, and that with Britain on an overall withdrawal of British troops from the island. De Valera's Ireland, 1932-1937, constitutes the second part of the chapter; it shows a different face of the Irish Free State, more radical and less conciliating. De Valera, whose name is eternally linked to the Irish republic, had tried to cut all ties with the Crown through his nationalist policies. He undertook a project of an Irish renaissance by initiating social, cultural, and economic reforms. Politically, he created the Fianna Fail party to achieve his most important purpose, the creation of Eire, the Irish republic.

The Anglo-Irish Treaty provided that the future Ireland should have the same constitutional status in the community of Nations linked to the British Empire as the

Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa with a parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Ireland.

The new dominion was to be known as the Irish Free State. The peace agreement ratified by the British Parliament became operative when it was passed in January 1922 by a meeting of the Dàil. The new state comprised only 26 of the island's 32 counties; the north-eastern area, known as Northern Ireland, remained part of the United Kingdom. ⁽¹⁾

I-The Cosgrave Ministries, 1922-1932

With the death of Griffith and Collins, the Irish government lost its two prominent leaders. Officials and ministers could not appear openly without armed protection. Moreover, by the terms of the treaty, the newly elected Dàil was required to frame its constitution before December 6, 1922. It met on September 9, elected as the new president of the executive council William Thomas Cosgrave, and in the absence of the republican deputies, quickly passed the clauses of the constitution defining the relations of the Irish Free State with the British Crown and outlining arrangements for imperial defence. The new constitution was also ratified by the British Parliament.

I. 1-The Irish Free State, a New Form of Government 1922–1932

The rigorous conservatism of the Irish Free State has become a cliché; what matters most about the atmosphere and mentality of twenty-six-county Ireland in the 1920's is that the dominant preoccupation of the regime was self-definition against Britain. Other priorities were consciously demoted. As stipulated by the 1921 Treaty,

British police and military forces were rapidly evacuated; by May 1922 all were gone except the Dublin garrison. A continuing British presence in Ireland remained through the institution of a Governor-General office representing the “Crown”. But this figure was an Irishman, and both government rhetoric and the constitution itself continually emphasized that the roots of legitimacy lay in popular sovereignty and allegiance to the Treaty. ⁽²⁾

At the same time, unease persisted about the imperial connection, which provided the republican opposition with a convenient and much-employed debating point; from the early 1920’s, Free State representatives tried to loosen the bonds of colonial connection. The word “colonial” itself raised difficulties in the literal, let alone the psychological, sense. Relations with Britain had been formed by the Treaty, amounting to an international agreement between equals; much was made of the Free State’s right to individual representation (and an independent policy line) at League of Nations assemblies; support was anxiously canvassed from some dominions like Canada, Australia and New Zealand, with a view to extending the autonomy of all. This was archived by the Statute of Westminster in 1931, which in practice marked the end of the “Irish Free State” status as clearly as De Valera’s accession to power the following year. ⁽³⁾

In the preceding period there was a deeply felt need for the presentation of something like an Irish philosophy in government. During the 1920’s, the regime necessarily laid heavy emphasis on the “Gaelic” nature of the new state. The Dàil and the Senate privileged “traditional” Irish forms; Irish cultural activities were widely intensified; most of all, the promotion of the Irish language became the necessary bench-mark of an independent culture. In 1911 those able to speak Irish (Gaelic) at all, let alone speaking it regularly had numbered 17.6 per cent of the population. ⁽⁴⁾ The Free State government embarked upon ambitious policies to spread the Gaelic language. Compulsory measures had been built into the educational system by the early 1930’s, and proficiency in “the national language”

was technically required as a qualification for a wide variety of state employments. But its official use remained obstinately restricted. In the schools very few teachers were proficient enough to teach subjects through the medium of the language, though encouraged by generous salaries and capitation grants. As a discipline on its own, Irish became a “fundamental” subject in the new secondary school examinations (Intermediate and Leaving Certificates) set up in 1924. ⁽⁵⁾

Outside the schools, Gaelicization of the new state was a major preoccupation, the kind of process typical of many post-colonial states -like post-independence campaigns of Arabization in Algeria-, highly sensitive to the influence of a once-dominant neighbour. From the early 1920’s a series of important conferences and commissions on education stressed that the chief aim of teaching Irish history should be “to inculcate national pride and self respect...by showing that the Irish race has fulfilled a great mission in the advancement of civilization”; that “English authors, as such, should have just the limited place due to English literature among all the European literatures”; that education should be structured “in order to revive the ancient life of Ireland as a Gaelic state, Gaelic in language, and Gaelic and Christian in its ideals” ⁽⁶⁾ Given the events of recent Irish history, this was to be expected. But the policy of reviving the spoken language, on which much of this depended, foundered. The artificial maintenance of Irish-speaking areas in the south and west never reversed the process of decline, and in many ways deserved the excoriating satire of Flann O’Brien’s ⁽⁷⁾ *An Béal Bocht* (The Poor Mouth); while investigations and reports from the later 1920’s gloomily admitted that giving the language an official status and positively discriminating on behalf of Irish-speaking applicants for official positions were not creating an Irish-speaking nation.


This obsession with enforcing public modes of “Irishness” owed much to the Free State regime’s sensitivity about accusations that they had sold out a separatist republic; it was, in a sense, a continuing result of the Civil War (1922-1923). Another, more obvious, result of the recent conflict was a preoccupation with

maintaining social and political stability –effectively achieved, though at some considerable cost. In its early years, this was facilitated by the fact that the pro-Treaty (Treaty of London, 1921) party, Cumann na nGaedheal, effectively ran a one party state, De Valera’s republicans staying aloof until 1927, and independent parties remaining in a small minority. Though “liberal” rights were ostensibly guarded in the constitution, the new government was certainly authoritarian. Sinn Fein’s air of innovation and experiment was conspicuously absent. As the new power elite settled into place, a covert continuity with the values and priorities of the old Irish Parliamentary Party was, to some eyes at least, more and more evident. ⁽⁸⁾

The new regime believed in “strong”, not to say ruthless, government. Any ideas of a social-welfare utopia were rigorously dismissed; the old age pension was actually cut by a shilling a week in 1924. Unemployment and other labour benefits remained minimal, pegged at pre-1922 levels. These drastic measures reflected an adjustment to the realities of fiscal autonomy: the resources of the Free State could come nowhere near funding social expenditure at the levels set by imperial governments since the Liberal administration of 1906. Given the age structure of the Irish population, old-age pensions were an extremely heavy drain on public funds: £ 3.300.000 out of £ 20.000.000 state expenditure in 1922-23 ⁽⁹⁾. But the political effect of such a step was so enormous that it could probably only have been tempered by a government faced by a conveniently abstentionist “opposition”. Irish poverty, especially in remote rural districts, remained exceptional by contemporary Western standards; the problem of the “congested districts” obstinately endured. The most notorious statement by a Free State minister remained that of Patrick McGilligan ⁽¹⁰⁾: “People may have to die in the country, and die through starvation”. ⁽¹¹⁾ “Independence” had its price.

Religious influence was an important factor in the Irish Free State: the Church was strongly committed to influence in matters of health and welfare, as in education. (See Map 5) Labour’s political paralysis proved to be another important

MAP 5: The Percentage rise and fall of Catholics in Ireland between 1911 and 1926 (by counties).



Source: C.C O'Brien, *A Concise History of Ireland*, Galway, McBride Press, 1972, p. 402.

factor: the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union (I.T.G.W.U) was split in the early 1920's. The "radical" wing in Irish politics was dominated by purist republicans, especially after De Valera's followers entered the "slightly constitutional" sphere in 1926; where a left-wing analysis was adopted by a group like *Saor Eire* ⁽¹²⁾ in 1931, it tended to be obscured by zealous republicanism, necessitating some awkward ideological policies where the Ulster working class were concerned. Under the cautious rule of William T. Cosgrave the discourse of Free State politics remained dogmatically buried in the issues over which the Civil War had been fought, and practically obsessed by steering a conservative, rural, strongly *petit bourgeois* state through the obstacles raised by fiscal autonomy and international economic instability. ⁽¹³⁾

Socially, the Free State had to cope with new challenges of the utmost difficulty. A cautious clause in the constitution laid some claim to state ownership in natural resources; but O'Higgins lightly referred to Pearse's social ideas as "largely poetry", ⁽¹⁴⁾ and economic notions within the government were too varied to amount to anything like a coherent, let alone radical, framework. Economically, the innovative idea of "semi-state" corporations set up with money to run certain areas of the economy evolved rather than being invented; a failure of public investment often impelled the government into promoting companies (like the Agricultural Credit Corporation) more comprehensively than originally intended. Where state intervention had a notable effect was in various forms of energy exploitation from the mid-1920's, under the state-controlled Electricity Supply Board: the hydro-electric project to exploit the River Shannon, carried out with the help of German expertise, became a masterpiece of innovation.

Politically, things proved worst than ever before and reforms were needed to redress the situation. The framework of government, as well as its staff, tended to

militate against radical streams. It was conducted by means of carefully defined departments and a powerful, professional civil service, with a strong sense of its independence. Departments were administratively centralized and rigorously controlled. The *corps d'élite* was the authoritative and conservative Department of Finance,⁽¹⁵⁾ which was strongly influenced by the sweeping reforms of the Treasury. It also embodied the traditions of the brilliant Collins, whose skills as Minister of Finance for the Dail from 1919 were as legendary, and nearly as important, as his military exploits.⁽¹⁶⁾ The department's economic success with the first national loan in 1923 established its position. Senior Finance civil servants continued to take extremely far-ranging decisions, often in circumstances of effective autonomy while the Department's primacy within government was acknowledged by the practice of submitting bills originating from other departments to the Department of Finance for approval before final drafting. Local government, while reorganized to allow for poor relief on a county basis, was not decentralized; ministerial initiatives, and the increasing tendency to appoint professional administrators like the "City Managers", gave it a particular stamp. In some areas, the continuities from the days of British rule were notable: in the early days of the Free State, 98 per cent of civil service personnel had served in the pre-1922 system, and as late as 1934 the proportion was still as high as 45 per cent.⁽¹⁷⁾

The legal system, inherited from the status quo under the Union, created from 1924 a recognizable hierarchy of district courts, circuit courts, a high court, a court of criminal appeal and a supreme court.⁽¹⁸⁾ The ease and frequency of divorce under the Gaelic social order may have provided one reason, since on that issue the Free State establishment, political and legal, demonstrated its ostentatious commitment to the norms of Catholic social teaching; a teaching that, as commonly known, forbids divorce. In this, as in civil administration, the framework of a separate dominion with a recognizably "Irish" stamp was created; the evolution of dominion autonomy within the Commonwealth would advance the process further on a constitutional level.

On the economic level, the logic of the British connection continued; 98 per cent of Irish exports went to the U K in 1924. The prevalence of the Irish pasture farmer and its favoured position closely linked to the British market remained unchanged. Partition had deeply affected the agricultural-industrial balance in both the new states: the proportion of Northern Ireland's population employed in industry was very high, while in 1926 more than half of the gainfully employed population in the Free State were directly engaged in agriculture. The general trends of the post-famine Irish economy continued consolidation of medium-sized farms, decline of tillage, and the redistribution process of land purchase. Under the Land Commission, set up in 1923, 450.000 acres were distributed to 24.000 families by 1932. ⁽¹⁹⁾

Agricultural initiatives were taken by the state in areas like livestock-breeding and poultry farming, but agricultural productivity remained extremely low (half that of Denmark). Cattle-raising remained dominant: so did the interests of farmers, further entrenched by the establishment of the state-sponsored Agricultural Credit Corporation (A.C.C) in 1927, advancing working capital to farmers with their properties as security. Politically and economically, the interests of the farming community were seen as vital: maximizing the farmers' incomes was defined as the necessary pre-condition of general prosperity. Significantly, one of the arguments against tariffs produced by the Fiscal Inquiry Committee (F.I.C) in 1923 was that they would increase agricultural labourers' wages. ⁽²⁰⁾

Despite the Sinn Fein pedigree of the government's leaders, the new state's policy of protectionism proved incoherent and did not develop. High tariffs were imposed on imported goods to encourage home production and no overall fiscal readjustments were made with a purpose of developing new industries. Output figures for industry stayed unspectacular; industrial exports actually declined, though exports overall increased to peak £ 47.300.000 in 1929, with nearly 77 per cent of imports. But public probity and, yet again, political stability were seen as indissolubly linked to conservative finance. A balance of payments crisis was

avoided through substantial remittances from emigrants; it should also be stressed that the state began its life with considerable overseas assets. In another way, the heritage of the Civil War made itself felt: until 1927, defence expenses and compensation costs arising from the military efforts of 1922-24 represented a heavy burden for the country, with 30 per cent of all national expenditure for “defence”. By 1929 it could be brought down to £ 1.500.000. ⁽²¹⁾ By then, too, the political advantages of cautious finance were evident: unlike many European countries, Ireland had avoided hyperinflation and maintained an excellent international credit rating.

Thus the Free State government remained cautious about encouraging credit expansion, or funding employment schemes; consequently it did nothing to counter emigration trends, in many ways exacerbated by the priority given to the maintenance of traditional farming structures. Defence costs were lowered and most of the social expenditure went to old-age pension payments which absorbed much of the money available. Any revenue balance went to keep down income tax, not to build up social services. Much of what had made pre-war Ireland a hostile country was equally true of the new dominion. ⁽²²⁾

In many ways, however, to indict the new regime for cautiousness in social and economic policies is to ignore the constant threat, at least in its early years, of political or military anarchy. It was, after all, a post-revolutionary as well as a post-colonial state. An unarmed police force had been created *de novo*: the Garda Siochana (Civic Guard), ⁽²³⁾ who rapidly achieved notably good relations with the local community; but the old anomaly of the distribution of power between Dàil and I.R.A remained, in a different form, and precipitated an army crisis in 1924. The I.R.A elements who had supported the Treaty had become the Free State army; but the ethos of independent Volunteering remained powerful. Partly for this reason, some shadowy government squads like the Citizens’ Defence Force proceeded against Irregulars when the reliability of the army was not considered absolute. The

worried Attorney General of the Free State declared in 1923 that the state was threatened by “an almost independent army executive, possessing its own organization and powers, the direction and control of its policy, the mode and authority of its appointments.”⁽²⁴⁾

By 1924 Old I.R.A men within the army had remained fervently reconciled to the post-Treaty world, especially after the death of the charismatic and authoritative leader Michael Collins. Further resentment at rapid demobilization, as well as pay cuts and removal of subsidies, produced a challenge that became a threatened mutiny against the Army Council. The real issues may well have been jobs and promotion; but it is significant that the unpopular Army Council was influenced by an I.R.B group, and that the mutineers called for a return to Collins’s tactic of merely using the London Treaty as a stepping-stone towards the republic. “We are all still revolutionaries”,⁽²⁵⁾ claimed the Old I.R.A element who demanded the abolition of the Army Council “because our freedom is not yet complete.”⁽²⁶⁾

The challenge of those recalcitrant Old I.R.A elements was defused by O’Higgins’s rapid action, giving special powers over the army to the Garda Commissioner Eoin O’Duffy⁽²⁷⁾ and enforcing the resignation of Mulcahy and others. In a sense there had been three parties to the struggle: the government’s strong men, the dissatisfied Old I.R.A element in the army (the so-called I.R.A Organization) and those government members sympathetic to the latter, who did not want to see them go too far, but had been trained in the same school. Kevin O’Higgins, characteristically, moved ruthlessly against the last two elements, and asserted the principle of civil over military supremacy in the government as well as army circles.⁽²⁸⁾ The crisis also indicated an attempt to reclaim the I.R.B as custodian of the visionary and uncorrupted republic, and to tear it away from its commitment to validating the Treaty; the I.R.A Organization’s secret statement of purpose was significant. They declared an intention to expand their membership until being powerful enough:

To demand a strong voice in army policy, with a view of Securing complete independence when a suitable occasion arose. It was also decided that the members of the new organization would make every effort to get control of the vital sections of the army and oust those undesirable persons who were and are holding those positions. ⁽²⁹⁾

One of Cosgrave's ministers was intimately involved and the episode indicates that the much-reviled Free State government was threatened even from within by those who still yearned for the simplicities of pure republicanism. Simultaneously, of course, they continued to be more overtly threatened by similar elements outside their ranks.

De Valera had embarked, from 1925, on a characteristically tortuous course of adapting his position *vis-à-vis* the institutions of the Free State but some of his followers among the I.R.A Irregulars (now generally called the I.R.A or, almost interchangeably, Sinn Fein) continued an episodically violent policy of attacks on police stations and assassinations of jury members and politicians, with Kevin O'Higgins their most celebrated target in 1927. By 1926 De Valera had convinced enough of his followers in Sinn Fein that the time had come for a constitutional initiative: he founded a new party, Fianna Fail ⁽³⁰⁾ with the declared intention of entering the Dail. His political charisma, his own aura of austere and incorruptible authority helped bring him forty-four seats to the government's forty seven. The outstanding problem, before entering the Dail, was inevitably the Oath of Fidelity (or Allegiance to the British Crown). Fianna Fail manoeuvres about this were menacing to tip politics into a state chronic instability when O'Higgins's assassination gave the government the opportunity to pass emergency legislation enforcing the Oath as a *sine qua non* condition of entering constitutional politics on any level. Fianna Fail abruptly gave way and took the Oath, while declaring that they

viewed it as an empty formula.⁽³¹⁾ For the first time the government party was faced with a real opposition.

The opposition, moreover, succeeded to power in 1932. By a complex convolution, De Valera had reached the position that logically, he ought to have occupied exactly ten years before: constitutional opposition to the Treaty, relying on the flexibility of constitutional forms to enable a reconstruction of Ireland's status *vis-à-vis* the British Empire.⁽³²⁾

I. 2-The Irish Free State and Northern Ireland:

In Ulster, too, the patterns set in the 1920's cast long shadows to the future. Partition was now a fact, though its British architects had expected it to be temporary and built in several unrealistic inducements to future unity. The Anglo-Irish war had not, generally, been fought in the north-east but 1920-22 had seen a violent reaction there, producing large-scale sectarian attacks on Catholic communities. As violence spread to the shipyards and other workplaces, I.R.A activity escalated; more Catholics than Protestants were killed, but in some areas the confrontation resembled civil war rather than pogrom.⁽³³⁾ In Belfast 455 people were killed, and an estimated 1.766 wounded.⁽³⁴⁾

From 1922 the reaction of the Ulster state was to turn in on itself and contain such violence by its own methods, though not immediately. The terms of the abortive Craig-Collins Pact of March, 30th, 1922 are interesting in showing how far Northern Ireland was then prepared to go, in its unyielding policy of remaining, against all odds, part of the United Kingdom.⁽³⁵⁾ Craig's proposal to replace the Council of Ireland with joint meetings of both Cabinets indicates the sort of co-operation technically possible within the Commonwealth framework, which would become out of the question when the Free State converted itself to a republic. Such a republic

would soon cut all ties with the Commonwealth. But this initiative (especially the idea of a half-Catholic police force) provoked the predictable Ulster Unionist backlash, with attacks on Belfast Catholics. These were not investigated by a joint commission, as arranged under the pact, which therefore broke down in recriminations.⁽³⁶⁾

Thus the status of Northern Ireland as a British province remained a *fait accompli* with its origins indelibly marked by internal violence. The Boundary Commission promised by the Treaty, initiated in 1924-25, ended in fiasco, and left the border as it was. This was partly due to Eoin MacNeill's misunderstanding of his role as the Free State representative and the *status quo* persisted. The Free State government went into it no longer expecting anything that could bring about unity; Prime Minister Cosgrave's ideas apparently stopped at some reorganization of boundaries, and alterations that would allow the Catholic minority into the structure of the Northern Ireland state. Northern Ireland's Prime Minister Craig, for his part, received assurances from sympathizers in the British government that all the Commission would do was produce minor readjustments. The whole enterprise was approached on the basis of Northern Ireland existing *de facto*; the Chairman, who favoured the Ulster line, indicated that the onus of proof lay with those wanting any change in the 1920 arrangements.⁽³⁷⁾

Certain structures such as the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (I.C.T.U), the banks, sporting organizations, continued to operate across the border in Northern Ireland, but the 1920 Act had created an enclave whose two-thirds majority, and whose governing class, representing only that majority in Ulster, remained obsessively conscious of the need to proclaim their British connection. Parliament was established in 1932 in the grandiose shell of Stormont, Belfast, executive power for local issues was exercised by a one-party "Cabinet" of Unionists, though the sovereign and its representative Governor-General were the technical rulers. There was no alternative government-in-waiting, if a Unionist Cabinet resigned, thus

London never wanted to precipitate such a crisis by interfering in legislation. This gave free rein to the Unionist conception of the state as representing something *engagé*, embattled against irredentism outside and traitors inside. Thus security, for instance, could not be “neutral”. If elements within the bourgeois leadership of Unionism were occasionally disposed to conciliate the minority, they were invariably dragged back into line by their grass-roots, a continuing pattern in Ulster political history.

Northern Ireland also sent twelve MP’s to Westminster to vote on imperial and external concerns; the Stormont parliament could neither repeal nor alter Westminster statutes and its attitudes to central government remained problematical. A complicated and argumentative relationship developed over revenue and expenditure. ⁽³⁸⁾ Financial difficulties existed from the beginning, compounded by deepening industrial depression almost from the foundation of the state. By 1925 arrangements were reorganized to ensure that Northern Ireland’s expenditure, especially in social welfare, would exercise a prior claim on revenue to the Imperial Exchequer. With soaring unemployment, this was the beginning of a running sore. The “imperial contribution” to be levied for army and navy, servicing the national debt, and so on, dwindled from £ 8.000.000 per annum to a few thousands by the mid-1930’s. The scenario that quickly evolved was a nearly bankrupt Northern Ireland constantly making begging expeditions to the British Treasury, a far cry from the position envisaged in 1920. ⁽³⁹⁾

The central state apparatus concerned itself very little with what was done in its truculent offshoot. Northern Ireland’s local government structures adhered to the English model, but the property franchise weighted representation heavily in favour of the prosperous Protestant community as, indeed, did the plural business votes they enjoyed for Stormont elections. The abolition of proportional representation ⁽⁴⁰⁾ for local elections in 1922 entrenched their position still further; proportional representation was also abolished for parliamentary elections in 1929, making

dramatic changes in areas like Fermanagh, though the official strategy behind the step had been to marginalize independent Unionist and labour representatives rather than nationalists. Moreover, electoral boundaries in local constituencies were carefully engineered. Belfast's representatives in Stormont went up to sixteen in 1921 but, as in the days when it had been four, only one was a nationalist. (See Table 5)

The unattractive picture of the statelet was given further prominence by its reliance on draconian special-powers legislation, brought together in a permanent Act in 1933. An armed Special Constabulary was formed, to contain the endemic sectarian violence and impose order on mixed areas (Protestants and Catholics). In 1922, 232 people were killed, 1,000 wounded and property worth £ 3,000,000 destroyed. Given that the notorious "B-specials"⁽⁴¹⁾ absorbed not only the remnants of the Ulster Volunteer Force (U.V.F.), but also unsavoury murder gangs like the United Protestant League (U.P.L.), the results were predictable.

Irish Catholics emigrated to Northern Ireland in significantly disproportionate numbers, constituting approximately 35 per cent of the province's population, where they composed almost 60 per cent of its emigrants. Nevertheless, Catholic alienation became institutionalized, and their permanent minority status was reflected in the hopelessly small number of MP's elected, usually abstaining from taking their seats.. Attempts to enforce a non-sectarian principle were fought down by powerful Protestant pressure groups, though it should be said that both Catholic and Protestant opinion were overwhelmingly in favour of the necessity of denominationally controlled education, and continued to be. On this and other levels, a religiously divided society settled into stasis. The immovable and, in terms of personnel, almost unchanging Unionist government rested on the formidable class alliance of the "Protestant people"; Orangeism⁽⁴²⁾ flourished; labour politics ossified, with trade unions looking to Britain or, occasionally, to the Free State.

Table 5: The Northern Ireland Parliamentary General Elections 1925 and 1929.

Party	Percentage of the vote * Percentage of seats	Percentage of seats
Ulster Unionist Party	55.0	61.54
Independent Unionists	9.0	7.69
Nationalists	23.8	19.23
Republicans (Sinn Féin)	5.3	3.85
N. Ireland Labour Party	4.7	5.77
TT (Belfast tenants assoc)	0.9	0
UTA (farmers' assoc)	1.3	1.92

$HHv = 0.37$; $Nv = 1/HHv = 2.70$; $HHs = 0.4268$; and $Ns = 1/HHs = 2.343$.
Therefore $r = 13.22\%$.

Party	Percentage of the vote	Percentage of seats
Ulster Unionist Party	50.6	71.15
Independent Unionists	14.3	5.77
Nationalists (Nat League)	11.7	21.15
Independent Nationalist	1.3	0
N. Ireland Labour Party	8.0	1.923
Independent Labour	0.8	0
Liberal	6.3	0
Loc Opt (temperance movt)	3.4	0
TT (Belfast tenants assoc)	2.4	0
Independent	1.2	0

$HHv = 0.302$; $Nv = 1/HHv = 3.306$; $HHs = 0.5546$; and $Ns = 1/HHs = 1.803$.
Therefore $r = 45.46\%$.

Note: * = percentage of the first-preference vote.

Source: Arthur Stewart, *The Ulster Crisis*, London, Harper Collins, 1967, p. 196.

The proportion of Catholics in the Northern Ireland civil service, already small, continued to decline through the 1920's; there are endless unedifying examples of outlandish paranoia, flourishing in the imagination of the Unionist establishment. (See Table 6) One may suffice: Sir Richard Dawson Bates, Minister for Home Affairs, refusing to use the telephone for any important business in 1934, having learned "with a great deal of surprise, that a Roman Catholic telephonist has been appointed to Stormont". The telephonist did not last.⁽⁴³⁾

This kind of gesture was, of course, conditioned by a public audience that expected constant proofs of probity on the part of its leaders: "not an inch" must be yielded to Catholics, and the pattern was reinforced by perceived threats from the South. Devlin,⁽⁴⁴⁾ as leader of Ulster nationalists in the late 1920's, began a policy of cautious *rapprochement* between Ulster nationalists and unionists by encouraging participation in Stormont; but this was negated by the effect of triumphalist nationalism from Dublin under De Valera dispensation. In the Free State, the realistic arguments of those actually born in the North, like Ernest Blythe, cut no ice against tactics like the boycott of Belfast goods instituted from Dublin in 1920-22. Ulster traditions, let alone Ulster's sense of separateness, were seen as officially illegitimate, and some extremist republicans suggested, even, mass expulsion of Unionists from Northern Ireland.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Ulster was invariably described by Southern politicians in terms of its ancient Gaelic identity, from the Red Branch dynasties to the O'Neill wars,⁽⁴⁶⁾ rather than its centuries of Protestantization and industrialization. The views of the highly influential Professor Timothy Corcoran,⁽⁴⁷⁾ a power behind the government's education, Gaelicization policies as well as a constant contribution to the extremist *Catholic Bulletin*, were reflected in that journal's editorial columns, in terms that gave Ulster Unionists every excuse for paranoia:

The Irish nation is the Gaelic nation; its language and literature is the Gaelic language; its history is the history is

Table 6: Estimated Impact of Emigration on Northern Ireland's Religious Balance, 1926-1981.

Source: adapted from Rowthorn and Wayne (1988: 209)

	Catholics	non-Catholics
1. population in 1926	420,000 (33.4% of total)	836,000 (66.6% of total)
2. natural increase 1926–81	431,000 (102.6%)	289,000 (34.6%)
3. hypothetical population 1981	851,000 (43.1% of total)	1,125,000 (56.9% of total)
4. actual population in 1981	588,000 (38.3% of total)	947,000 (61.7% of total)
5. effect of emigration (4 – 3)	-263,000	-178,000

Source: Jeremy Smith, *Making the Peace in Ireland*, London, Pearson Education Ltd, 2002, p. 342.

the history of the Gael. All other elements have no place in Irish national life, literature and tradition, save as far as they are assimilated into the very substance of Gaelic speech, life and thought. The Irish nation is not a racial synthesis at all; synthesis is not a vital process, and only what is vital is admissible in analogies bearing on the nature of the living Irish nation, speech, literature and tradition. We are not a national conglomerate, nor a national patchwork specimen; the poetry of life of what Aodh de Blacam calls Belfast can only be Irish by being assimilated into Gaelic literature.⁽⁴⁸⁾

As already mentioned, at the conclusion of the Boundary Commission the Irish government accepted the border. Cosgrave, the president of the Executive Council refused to allow a delegation of Northern nationalists present a petition opposing its outcome, and his vice president and at the same time Minister for Justice, O'Higgins actually claimed that most Northern nationalists were happy to leave the border as it was. The attitude of the Southern government towards Northern nationalists expressed an embarrassed ambivalence and a wish that they would comprehensively cooperate with them. Even before Collins's death, Blythe, Minister for Trade and Commerce, and O'Higgins, Minister for Justice and vice president of the Executive Council, forcefully advised their fellow-ministers that the Northern state was too solidly established to be influenced or disrupted; all future pressure should be brought to bear by normal constitutional channels. The Free State government's Northern Advisory Committee arrived at the bleak conclusion that they could do nothing practical to help the beleaguered Catholics in the North.⁽⁴⁹⁾ And in June 1922 Collins himself expressed what would continue to be the official line of the Southern government in office: "There can be no question of forcing Ulster into union with the Twenty-Six Counties. I am absolutely against coercion of this kind. If Ulster is going to join us it must be voluntary. Union is our final goal, that is all."⁽⁵⁰⁾ Collins's acceptance of this strategy signals the relegation of a "united Ireland" under the nationalist banner to the status of an idealist aspiration.

Nevertheless, not all the Irish political class agreed with the Head of the Irish Free State, Cosgrave's opinion and policy, especially on the Ulster question. For those out of office, however, "verbal republicanism" prevailed inconsistently. De Valera is a celebrated case in point. Up to 1921 he firmly advocated coercion of Ulster's Protestants, refusing to admit any concession or different treatment regarding their particular case: "an accident arising out of the British connection, which will disappear with it".⁽⁵¹⁾ In 1921 he followed a more tortuous path, suggesting the idea of Ulster counties opting out of the Free State, if they wished, by local plebiscites; he also contemplated an interim federal solution. His "Document No. 2"⁽⁵²⁾ alternative to the 1921 Treaty, did not include the arrangements made for Ulster, though unequivocal evidence seems to show that he also admitted he would consider accepting the Treaty if Ulster came in on its terms.⁽⁵³⁾

I. 3-The Policies of the Irish Free State

Domestically, and in spite of its new status of an independent government, the Irish Free State's task to carry out political reforms was not easy. A two-party, British-style democracy had ostensibly developed, though the adoption of proportional representation, and the suppositions of its constitutional architects, reflected an idealized blueprint of myriad small parties and a large degree of independence for parliamentary delegates. Constitutional experiments like "extern" ministers, and sweeping popular rights of referendum and initiative, were also introduced to this end. The emergence of Fianna Fail and its entry into politics, and the enduring line of the Civil War, ensured a two-party system, divided by interpretation of "republicanism".

Political life in Ireland was dominated by the two major parties of the time: Cosgrave's Cumann na nGaedheal and De Valera's Fianna Fail, leaving little space to smaller parties like the National Centre Party, N.C.P or the Irish Republican

Socialist Party, I.R.S.P which failed to develop. The Labour Party, while increasing in seats from fourteen to twenty-two in the 1927 election, only gleaned a low number of first preferences; this election remained their high-water mark for over forty years. And even in the 1927 campaign, a certain ideological defeatism occurred. Commenting his party's opinion, Thomas Johnson ⁽⁵⁴⁾, the Labour leader, claimed: "We have had one revolution, and one revolution in a generation is enough." ⁽⁵⁵⁾ However, in considering why "class politics" failed to emerge in the new state, the Treaty debate, and the readiness of Cumann na nGaedheal to use all tactics in the early 1920's, do not provide the full answer. It is also necessary to remember the manner in which nineteenth-century political mobilization had occurred, and the interests that it represented, for much of this was transferred to the new order.

The repercussions of the Free State's policies on social Ireland aroused a lot of controversy among the Irish people. The country witnessed the emergence of a conservative bourgeois dominion similar to the British gentry and with a retarded agricultural base; different from the imagined new world of the Sinn Fein republican leaders and their socialist principles; and criticism was accordingly forthcoming. Francis Stuart, ⁽⁵⁶⁾ more categorical than most anti-Treatyites, declared that: "they had fought against, and been defeated by, the spirit of liberal democracy." ⁽⁵⁷⁾ The class of Free Stater *haute bourgeoisie* became a target for irony and satire, and in 1924 Mulcahy discerned a "Ballsbridge" complex centred round O'Higgins, working to unseat him. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ In the withering phrase of one puritanical young republican: "*saumon fumé* (smoked salmon) became the symbol of those risen people, the emerging new *bourgeoisie*." ⁽⁵⁹⁾ Tom Garvin summed up the situation, asserting: "the state inherited a tradition of alienation from government combined with an equally ingrained tradition of passive dependence on government aid". ⁽⁶⁰⁾

One index of "foreign-ness", carefully cultivated by the Free State to express its separate identity, was neutral status in international affairs. From 1922 the Free State government took a very deliberate decision to follow a policy that would keep

it aloof from the strategic designs of larger powers: a policy that involved maintaining good relations with Great Britain itself. The Free State Ministers took every opportunity to emphasize that the right to remain neutral in time of war had been won. Here again there was a desperate necessity to demonstrate that the Treaty had conferred advantages worth fighting for.

Religiously, it must be stressed that there had been almost no confessional problems in the Irish Free State, for Southern Ireland is, by definition, a Catholic land. Though, if the new state was only patchily Gaelicized, it was almost entirely Catholic. Southern Protestant interests were nonetheless carefully cultivated; their religious and educational freedoms were guarded by statute; they were awarded weighted representation in the Free State Senate, though its functions became ornamental. By the end of the decade the proportion of Protestants in the twenty-six counties fell by 3 per cent, down to 7.4 per cent. It is interesting, however, to note their occupational proportions in 1926, when they were 8.4 per cent of the population: they still accounted for 28 per cent of farmers with over 200 acres, and 18 per cent of the entire professional class. By 1936 the Protestant proportion of Irish employers and business executives was 20-25 per cent; bank officials, 53 per cent; commercial representatives, 39 per cent; and lawyers, 38 per cent. ⁽⁶¹⁾

The Free State constitution, as well as the traditions of separation between the Church and the State, denied Roman Catholicism the official status of national Church. For all this, the new regime was in a very real sense confessional. From its origins, the Free State government had carefully lined up the Roman Catholic hierarchy on its side, consulting bishops on constitutional matters, and receiving in return powerful support during the edgy days of the Civil War, when a joint pastoral branded the I.R.A Irregulars as murderers. In turn, the Church made its line clear on social policy. It had been flintily against state initiatives in educational and welfare policies under the Westminster regime; and it was no more prepared to see central

power increased now. The Central Association of Catholic Clerical School Managers had issued a clear warning in 1921:

We are confident that an Irish government established by the people for the people, while safeguarding the material interests of the new state, will always recognize and respect the principles which must regulate and govern Catholic education. And in view of the impending changes in Irish education we wish to reassert the great fundamental principle that the only satisfactory system of education for Catholics is one wherein Catholic children are taught in Catholic schools by Catholic teachers under Catholic control.⁽⁶²⁾

This was the price of support for the new regime: ideas of councils of education, or locally constituted authorities, were ruthlessly denounced. In education, as in social law, the state followed the Catholic line: divorce was excluded, birth control outlawed, and the Catholic conditioning of children of mixed marriages enforced.

If this seemed to the tiny Protestant minority the fulfilment of their most dire prophecies, it should be remembered that they were, in the new state, a shrinking and infinitesimal proportion compared to the huge Catholic majority. Moreover, the president of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State Cosgrave's whole-hearted commitment to endorsing clerical influence in government also reflected a shrewd need to guard his flank. His extraordinary idea of a theological senate to evaluate the Catholic orthodoxy of all mooted legislation should be seen in the light of his knowledge that not all members of the hierarchy were supporters of his ruling party, the Cumann na nGaedheal. Some powerful clerics, notably John Hagan, Rector of the Irish College at Rome, and Professor Michael Browne at Maynooth, kept open lines to De Valera and would influence the making of Fianna Fail.

The cultural chauvinism and insularity of the Free State are easy to deride from a distance, with its official anathematizing of everything from jazz to modern fiction. In 1929 the institution of the much-reviled Censorship Board banned most of the 20th century outstanding literary and philosophical works such as those of: Nietzsche, Freud, Darwin, Lawrence, Sartre, Henry Miller, Orwell...as well as masterpieces of Irish writers like Oscar Wilde, John Millington Synge, George Bernard Shaw, Sean O'Casey and James Joyce. ⁽⁶³⁾ As in contemporary Russia, dissidence was the business of the intelligentsia rather than the politicians in the Irish Free State. But in common with most ex-colonial countries, the concomitant of nationalist polarization was a need to assert a separate identity, by social and cultural engineering if need be. In the Irish case, it was important to stress the supposed message of Irish history. Not only was the record of parliamentary nationalism more or less dismissed; the real nature of pre-1916 Irish society had to be glossed over, including, among much else, the hundreds of thousands of Irish who had volunteered in the Great War. The professionalism of the Free State government, and the political stability that ensued from its regime, is impressive; future generations owed them much. By the beginning of the 1930's, the president of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State, William T. Cosgrave and his staff had to leave the political arena in Ireland for another charismatic leader: Eamon De Valera.

II-De Valera's Presidency, 1932-1937

The 1932 general election was held in February and resulted in Fianna Fail gaining a plurality, to which were added the seven votes of Labour Party TD's, ⁽⁶⁴⁾ so as to give a clear majority with which to form a government. There was apprehension that some in the government, particularly in the military, might not accept the mandate of the electorate, and some members of Fianna Fail TD's were reported to have arrived in the Dàil Eireann with weapons in case a counterrevolutionary coup d'état was attempted. Fortunately, the outgoing government accepted the wishes of

the people and transferred power to those who, a decade earlier had been their armed enemies. The acceptance, along with the willingness of the new state's civil service and military to work with the new government, marked the final evidence that a democratic and constitutional independent Irish state had been created.

On becoming President of the Executive Council, De Valera also assumed the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, which post he would retain until 1948. He named his closest loyalists to office: Sean T O'Kelly became Vice President of the Executive Council, Frank Aitken, Minister for Defence, and Sean MacEntee, Minister for Finance.

II. 1- Socio-Economic Ireland in the 1930's

De Valera's judicious pragmatism first brought his party –Fianna Fail– to power, and then enabled the reconstruction of Anglo-Irish relations into the form of “external association”, ⁽⁶⁵⁾ climaxing in the policy of Irish neutrality during the Second World War. In retrospect, the success of these manoeuvres tends to conceal the constraints imposed upon the ex-revolutionary turned constitutional politician. It is salutary to remember that in 1932 many commentators, among the republican left as well as the British sceptics, drew the same analogy: Kerensky, ⁽⁶⁶⁾ ineffectively holding the ring against the Bolsheviks in 1917.

The comparison would have seemed less apt if it had been more generally realized that De Valera had never really been happy with his I.R.A associates, and that the external-association ideas of his “Document No 2” ⁽⁶⁷⁾ had always been far nearer to the Commonwealth than to an independent republic. Moreover, in power Fianna Fail embodied two aspirations: one was to redefine Ireland's relations with the Empire, and the other was to institute a state of “protectionism”, both economic and cultural. The economic aspect of this has been dismissed by historians like

Raymond Crotty as the aspiration of the urban classes to share in the economic surplus accruing to ownership of Irish land, by requiring the farming classes to pay higher prices for domestically manufactured goods; but it still had a psychological dimension that was at least as important.

“Protection” might also be linked to the introspection and conservatism of a state where those whose interests were not met by the status quo tended to leave instead of trying to change it. De Valera’s Ireland became a twenty-six-county state with thirty-two-county pretensions, institutionalizing a powerful Catholic ethos that was symbolically celebrated in the Eucharistic Congress of 1932, and effectively enshrined in the constitution of 1937. The construction of the De Valera dispensation created its own satisfactions, its own affirmations and its own precedents: some of which would enforce their own tyranny in the course of time. ⁽⁶⁸⁾

The social conditions of Ireland, at least, of rural Ireland, during the 1930’s have been anatomized in microcosm by a number of classic texts; including an impressionistic anthropological masterpiece, Conrad Arensberg’s *The Irish Countryman* (1937), as well as series of memoirs from the western islands that rapidly became cult classics such as Peig Sayers’ works ⁽⁶⁹⁾. Housing remained dominated by the single-storey cottage; living conditions were almost basic, families grew larger, emigration increased, and diseases, especially tuberculosis, became part of life. The childhood memoirs of Noel Browne, later a revolutionary Minister of Health, provide a frightening first-hand picture, with no room for nostalgia. ⁽⁷⁰⁾ But the two-storey slated farmhouse was appearing alongside the thatched cottage. Land Commission dwellings were raised in considerable numbers through the 1930’s, as part of the same policy that encouraged state-sponsored urban housing programmes; in 1938, a survey found 60 per cent of Dublin’s tenements and cottages, containing 65,000 people, unfit for human habitation. The new houses were basic enough, too; and in 1946 only 5 per cent of farm dwellings had an indoor lavatory, while 80 per cent had no “special facilities” at all. Similarly, some machinery, notably the tractor,

was beginning to erode ancient agricultural practices; but demeaning survivals like the hiring fair continued through the 1930's.

Old fashioned farming and inadequate sanitation did not, in any case, rank high among De Valera's targets; his vision of Ireland, repeated in numerous formulations, was of small agricultural units, each self-sufficiently supporting a frugal, industrious, Gaelicist and anti-materialist family. His ideal, like the popular literary versions, was built on the basis of a fundamentally dignified and ancient peasant way of life. But this had little to do with the objective forces shaping rural existence in fact; the influential Folklore Commission was founded at the very moment (1935) when the society it celebrated was entering its final stage.

The brokers of an ideal rural Ireland tended to ignore metropolitan Ireland, represented in the large country towns as well as in Dublin and Cork. Here, Anglicized cultural norms had taken firm hold, along with the cinema, the popular press, golf-clubs and race-meetings, and, in some quarters, a repudiation of "the inhibiting values of farm and shop."⁽⁷¹⁾ Dublin was a "professional" city; the 1946 census showed that 21.1 per cent of its inhabitants worked in commerce and finance, 12 per cent in administration, 8.9 per cent in professions, 13.7 per cent in personal services and 32.2 per cent in non-agricultural production. By the Second World War, the electrification of urban Ireland had nearly been achieved, although the completion of rural electrification had to wait until the 1970's. Even in industrial development, it has been pointed out that Ireland was not backward by European standards, but on a par with Portugal, Scandinavia and Italy. Nonetheless, the inevitable comparison was between "backward" rural Ireland and "modern" industrialized England; and the removal of Ulster skewed the picture. The idealization of the Ireland represented by Tomas O Criomhthain's *An t-Oileanach* (The Islandman) or Muiris O Suileabhain's *Fiche Blian ag Fas* (Twenty years A-growing) remained a psychological necessity.⁽⁷²⁾

The fundamental reality behind the image of rural Ireland remained that of an emigrating population. The total twenty-six-county population remained about the same, at just under 3.000.000 because of late marriages. In 1929, the Irish age of marriage was the highest in the world -34.9 for men, 29.1 for women- while one quarter of the female population were unmarried by their forty-fifth birthday; but high birth-rate continued within marriage. And population growth was counteracted by the rate of emigration: 6 per 1.000 of the total population through 1926-46, with single people, especially women, predominating, and a pronounced rural-urban drift. England remained the chief destination, especially after economic recession struck the U.S.A. The figures were further affected by what appears to be an unprecedented dramatic rate of Protestant emigration from the twenty-six counties possibly as much as 26 per cent.

The famous Irish sociologist and anthropologist, Terence Brown ⁽⁷³⁾ has indicated a change in the perception of emigration from the late 1930's. Up to then, a commitment to sustain the traditional patterns of farming society was evident: leaving the farm to a sibling represented an affirmation that the old ways must continue. But by the 1940's, at least as indicated by the report of the Commission on Emigration set up in 1948, a more wholesale rejection of rural norms seems apparent. Discontent with the De Valera vision can be seen, perhaps most vividly in Patrick Kavanagh's ⁽⁷⁴⁾ poem about the sterility and frustration of rural life, *The Great Hunger* (1942). "If there is a case for viewing a major work of art as an antenna that sensitively detects the shifts of consciousness that determine a people's future, *The Great Hunger* is that work." ⁽⁷⁵⁾

The response of government to the frustrations of rural life was conditioned by the general economic malaise of the early 1930's. Fianna Fail took over a gloomy financial picture and, to judge by the memoranda produced even before the economic war with Britain, were ready to meet it with the same stern approach as Cosgrave's Cumann na nGaedheal Party before. ⁽⁷⁶⁾ The structure of economic policy, however,

was rapidly conditioned by the political relationship with Britain: Fianna Fail's predisposition to protectionism was augmented by the campaign of economic sanctions that followed De Valera's policy of withholding land annuity payments still due to the British Exchequer under the terms of the Land Purchase Act. A similar policy might have followed Britain's own shift from free trade in any case; the collapse of the agricultural export market, and the decreased opportunities for emigrants, also enforced a change of approach. It tied in with the Fianna Fail preoccupation of encouraging a distribution of rural resources and reliance upon small-scale domestic industry, to counterweight the pull towards emigration. Arthur Griffith's theory of agricultural and industrial interdependence and his notion that the country could support an almost infinitely larger number of inhabitants, ideas abandoned by his political heirs, remained articles of faith for those who had opposed him over the Treaty.

Fianna Fail economic planning in the 1930's stressed the national duty to set up native industries. The growth of a more sophisticated market and the production processes necessary for the new industries, in fact ensured a continued dependence upon imports. Nonetheless finance and credit structures to float new businesses were introduced along with quotas, licences and tariffs. And, given the paucity of private venture capital, the "state sponsored" corporations started in the 1920's were extended for specific purposes: notably the processing of energy resources, but also various enterprises in transport and commerce. By 1948 eighteen of these organizations had been added to the six inherited. ⁽⁷⁷⁾

This did not, however, indicate a commitment to structural reorganization in the interests of a new economic approach. Though many Irish intellectuals were sympathetic to the ideas of corporate government floated in Catholic social theory at the time, the heavy-weight and imaginative report of the Commission on Vocational Organization (1939-43) was politely ignored. It had suggested social, economic and political reorganization, influenced as much by English guild socialism as by

continental examples. The Commission's recommendation that representative non-party boards of employers and workers in various sectors of employment elect a National Assembly which would manage the national economy through its own governing body and bureaucracy, was met with resounding silence. Vested interests and influential individuals were alienated, including Sean Lemass,⁽⁷⁸⁾ already the most receptive and radical of Fianna Fail ministers. Nor was the civil service sympathetic; the powerful and British-derived bureaucratic structure of Free State government would remain.

Another area in which Fianna Fail's natural predispositions were encouraged by the economic conditions of the 1930's concerned the policy of reorienting agricultural production away from cattle and towards tillage. Price guarantees and subsidies, bounties and import controls were closely associated with the economic war with Britain, which affected the cattle trade so disastrously. The production of wheat, as so often before, was advocated on a large scale, so was sugar-beet, under the auspices of the state-sponsored Irish Sugar Company, often the subject of optimistic eulogies.⁽⁷⁹⁾ But the basic pattern of Irish agriculture showed little sign of change and the increased concentration on tillage did not, contrary to expectation, provide more employment on the land; through the 1930's and 1940's the percentage of males engaged in farm work continued to drop. By another unexpected convulsion, the economist Raymond Crotty's analysis claims that the effect of state payments to dairy farmers acted as an unintended boost for graziers, by effectively subsidizing lower payments for store cattle and enabling them to expand. Overall, looking at the 1930's, "an analogy might be drawn between Irish agriculture and primitive zoological or botanical species which, while never achieving a high or productive level of development, are supremely well adapted to survive under extremely adverse biological conditions."⁽⁸⁰⁾

In many ways, Irish economic conditions before the Second World War presented a variant of the general European dilemma: how to approach the problems

of recession in a manner that provided an alternative both to failed free-market capitalism and untried but alarming totalitarianism. The social ideas advanced in papal encyclicals and the theory of economic organization by means of vocational corporations were both tinkered with and adapted to specifically Irish themes.⁽⁸¹⁾ But what mattered more immediately were the preoccupations of Irish nationalist ideology; Irish history, recent and distant, did much to impose the frameworks that did emerge.⁽⁸²⁾ In considering this process, the unique nature of De Valera's political party played an important part.

II. 2- Fianna Fail, a Republican Party

Fianna Fail called itself, as a subtitle, the "Republican Party", and this constituted an important part of its appeal. But "Republican" could stand for anything from merely anti-British to agrarian-syndicalist-revolutionary, not to mention exclusivist-Gaelic-Catholic; it was a moral stance as much as political affiliation. Indeed, a 1929 pamphlet commemorating the revolutionary Austin Stack, who died the same year, declared: "the name Republican in Ireland, as used amongst Republicans, bears no political meaning. It stands for the devout lover of his country, trying with might and main for his country's freedom."⁽⁸³⁾ Another commentary defines republicanism as: "above all, against those who embrace politics as a family trade and the nation as a prey...The Republic is not a formula to be dispensed at ballot boxes once in every five years. It is the way of life."⁽⁸⁴⁾

Given that Fianna Fail had accepted the ballot box, this cast some doubt on their acceptability as the "Republican" party. One way round this was implicitly to redefine republicanism yet again: this time as populist nationalism, with a strong Catholic colouration and a commitment to Gaelic revivalist pieties. Another mechanism involved using the ballot box to alter the Free State's status within the Empire to the point where the technical appellation of "Republic" was an obvious

next step. De Valera instituted both these developments; but there would always be those who adhered to the republic as “a way of life”, and for them De Valera’s Fianna Fail had betrayed the ideal even more comprehensively than Cosgrave’s Cumann na nGaedheal.

Thus the new ruling party’s relationship with the republican flank was an uncertain one. I.R.A prisoners were released and the ban on public drilling and publication of newspapers lifted; but in other areas caution prevailed. For the moment, Fianna Fail retained credibility by the apparent radicalism of its “external relations” strategy, as the government steamrolled through constitutional legislation, dismantling various clauses of the Treaty. A “Republican” profile was aided by the opposition of the Senate, whose powers and constitution were accordingly suspended, as were a number of multiple-member constituencies, and university representation in the lower house. Republican credibility was also enhanced by the frosty relations between some government members and their senior civil servants looked upon as “a crowd of Free State bastards”, in the view of one Fianna Fail recruit.⁽⁸⁵⁾

The real key to the party’s development lay in its local organizations. Though often and usefully based on I.R.A structures, they also inherited the traditional local-versus-central antipathies characteristic of Irish political formations since the Union at least. The vigour of Fianna Fail’s local organization, and the astute use of appointments when in power, enabled the party to represent a geographical spread of influence, unlike the increasingly Dublin-based Cumann na nGaedheal. The two parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, as Cumann na nGaedheal eventually became, were considered as factions of the old pan-nationalist party, which continued to exist in a sort of ghostly form. The difference between the two “parties” from their origin up to the present which is still vivid in the Irish collective memory is that, for the moderate Fine Gael, Fianna Fail was a radical party, and in the eyes of the republican Fianna Fail, the former Cumann na nGaedheal and actually Fine Gael was a

bourgeois party, subordinate to the British. But what was remarkable about Fianna Fail was its social profile, which gave it an apparently unassailable hegemony over Irish politics by the 1940's. To its social base of small farmer, land-hungry and I.R.A-oriented, it had added elements of labour, the larger farmers, the business classes and many others.

De Valera's ideology of austere anti-materialism started to emerge and became more palpable than ever before. His belief that "no man is worth more than £ 1.000 a year", and his attempt to inaugurate a "social justice" policy in 1932 by cutting civil service salaries, became moderated by force of circumstance.⁽⁸⁶⁾ The powerful and coherent resistance of the civil service was tacitly accepted, though salary cuts for teachers, policemen and army officers continued to be recommended. De Valera would have agreed with the minority report appended to the cuts committee that stated: "an impoverished country with such an elaborate Governmental machine is best likened to a Tin Lizzie fitted with a Rolls-Royce eight-cylinder engine".⁽⁸⁷⁾ The comparison of poor Ireland with an old cheap car fitted with the heavy duty engine of the government's stern policies reflects the reality of the country at that time. The new regime took on the trappings of the old one, and in many ways, the triumph of the De Valera dispensation was one of rhetoric, squaring the circle between the mundane limitations of reality and the aspirations of the republic. This is probably best exemplified by De Valera's constitution of 1937 which paved the way for a new era in Ireland's history.

On the whole, the third chapter: "Independent Ireland, 1922-1937", covers –as it is shown in its title– the inter-War parenthesis which coincided with a *période charnière* (a period of the utmost importance) for Ireland. It ran between the establishment of the Irish Free State (the first denomination of independent Ireland as a new political entity, a dominion) in 1923 under William T. Cosgrave's presidency, and the proclamation of *Eire* (a new form of state, a republic) by the Prime Minister of the time, Eamon De Valera in 1937. Cosgrave and De Valera had been two major

figures in Irish history, with two different conceptions of what would be post-Treaty Ireland.

At the end of August 1923 the fourth Dàil was elected, on a basis of adult suffrage for men and women. De Valera retained his personal following, and his party won more than one-third of the seats in the Dàil. Cosgrave's party won less than half the total number of seats, but as the republicans refused to sit in the new Dàil, he had a majority among those who did attend. The absence of any effective opposition party greatly strengthened the power of the new government, and in the following years it displayed great energy. Despite initial economic difficulties, it pursued an efficient farming policy and carried through important hydroelectric projects. Government was increasingly centralized, with the elimination of various corrupt borough corporations; Kevin O'Higgins as Minister for Justice, carried through many judicial reforms and an efficient civil service was organized.

The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 had provided that, if Northern Ireland did not enter the Irish Free State, a boundary commission must establish the frontier between the two countries. Two of the six excluded counties, Tyrone and Fermanagh, contained clear, though small, nationalist majorities, and the southern portions of both Down and Armagh counties had for years elected nationalist members. Despite Northern Ireland reluctance, the Boundary Commission was established and sat in secret session during 1925. But it recommended only minor changes, which all three governments rejected as less satisfactory than maintaining the status quo. ⁽⁸⁸⁾

In the general election of June 1927, William Cosgrave's support in the Dàil as president of the Executive Council was further reduced, but he nevertheless formed a new ministry, in which Kevin O'Higgins became vice president of the Executive Council and Minister for Justice. O'Higgins's assassination by republicans on July 10 suddenly revived old feuds, and Cosgrave passed a Public Safety Act, declaring all revolutionary societies treasonable. He forced the republicans to acknowledge

allegiance to the British Crown before being seated in the Dàil, though De Valera decried the Oath of Allegiance as an “empty political formula”.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Shortly thereafter the new Republican Party, Fianna Fail, led by De Valera, albeit reluctantly accepting the legitimacy of the Irish Free State and allied with the Labour Party and the National League, almost defeated Cosgrave, who thereupon dissolved the Dail. In new elections, Cosgrave won 61 of the Dail’s 128 seats as compared with Fianna Fail’s 57 and again formed a ministry. In the economic depression of the early 1930’s, unemployment and general discontent with the government led to its defeat in February 1932. Fianna Fail won enough seats for De Valera, with Labour Party support, to be able to form a new government.

De Valera entered office with a policy of encouraging industry and improving the social services. He abolished the Oath of Allegiance to the Crown and also stopped payment to Britain of interest on the capital advanced under the Land Acts of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This refusal led to a tariff war with Britain. The country endorsed his policies in January 1933 by returning him to the Dail with 77 seats and the support of the Labour Party.

De Valera invoked the Public Safety Act against the Blueshirts, a quasi-fascist body organized by Cosgrave’s militant supporters allegedly to protect treatyites (pro-Treaty partisans) from republican extremists at public meetings. The government’s relations with the republicans who still refused to recognize the Irish Free State also deteriorated and many were arrested and imprisoned in the mid-1930’s.⁽⁹⁰⁾

Notes:

(1)- The Irish Free State territory counts three provinces: *Leinster*, *Munster*, and *Connacht* (*Connaught*) with twenty six counties whereas Northern Ireland consists of only one province: *Ulster* made of six counties: **Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, and Tyrone**. Richard Muir, *Traveller History of Britain and Ireland*, London, Book Club Associates, 1989, p. 7.

(2)- The constitution was reviled by republicans for having sold the republic: but the chief authority on it defined it as an “essentially republican Constitution on most advanced Continental lines”. It emphasized democratic authority and fundamental rights, and references to monarchical authority and Commonwealth membership were perfunctory. At least one contemporary constitutional lawyer thought it was flexible enough to lead to a republic. Art Cosgrove, *A New History of Ireland*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.143.

(3)- Kerwin Hayesley, “The Irish Free Stake”, *Eire-Ireland*, Vol. XIII, No 2, Winter 1982, p. 51.

(4)- O. MacDonagh, *Ireland: The Union and Its Aftermath*, Dublin, Earl O’Flaherty, 1977, p. 276.

(5)- N.S. Mansergh, *the Irish Question*, Galway, McBride Press, 1975, p. 83.

(6)- Quotes from National Programme Conference on Primary Instruction, meeting from January, 6th, 1921. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

(7)- Brian O’Nolan (Flann O’Brien) (1911-1966) was born in County Tyrone, and educated at University College, Dublin. Civil servant from 1932 to 1953, he wrote an *Irish Times* column as Myles na gCopaleen between 1940 and 1966, and published *At Swim Two Birds* in 1938, *An Béal Bocht* in 1941, *Faustus Kelly* in 1943, *The Hard Life* in 1961, and *The Dalkey Archive* in 1964. *The Third Policeman* appeared posthumously. O. MacDonagh, op. cit., p. 277.

(8)- Kevin Nowlan and David Williams, *Ireland in the War Years and After*, Dublin, McBride Press, 1969, p. 66.

(9)- Humphrey Ogilvy, “The Logic of Violence in Ireland”, *The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies*, June 1988, p. 7.

(10)- Patrick McGilligan (1889-1979) was born in County Derry (Ulster) –now, Londonderry-, and graduated from Clongowes and University College, Dublin. A Sinn Fein member since 1910, he was a pro-Treaty Secretary of O’Higgins in the first Dail (assembly) and T D (Teachta Dàla, Gaelic for Dàil deputy) for National University of Ireland, 1923-37, and various Dublin constituencies from 1937 to 1964. McGilligan negotiated the shelving of the Boundary Commission in 1925 and co-drafted the 1931 Statute of Westminster. He had been, successively, Minister of Industry and Commerce, 1924-32; Minister for External Affairs, 1927-32; Minister of Finance, 1948-51, and Attorney General, 1954-57. T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin, *the Course of Irish History*, Cork, the Mercier Press, 1967, p. 56.

(11)- Ibid., p. 57.

(12)- J.C. Beckett, *a Short History of Ireland*, London, Faber & Faber, 1977, p. 303.

(13)- Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus*, London, Longman Group Ltd, 1971, p. 54.

(14)- Robert D. Edwards, *Patrick Pearse*, London, Random House, 1977, p. 81.

(15)- The only government department to receive a full historical treatment. L.M Cullen, *an Economic History of Ireland since 1660*, London, Penguin Books Ltd, 1976, p. 97.

(16)- The government had responded in kind. The flippant diary of one Dublin Castle Under-Secretary describes an incident of late October 1920 featuring Ormonde Winter, head of British Intelligence at the Castle: “O. came in this evening in a chestnut moustache and wig, trench coat, flannel trousers and bowler hat –looking the most complete swine I ever saw- he had been pinching M C’s “war-chest” from the Munster and Leinster Bank –quite illegally I expect- brought in about £ 4.000. £ 15.000 more to come. Malcolm Forester, *Michael Collins*, London, Longman Group Ltd, 1971, p. 73.

(17)- Art Cosgrove, op. cit., p. 149.

(18)- Ibid., p. 154.

(19)- Charles Loch Mowat, *Britain between the Wars, 1918-1940*, London, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972, p. 247.

(20)- J.C. Beckett, *the Making of Modern Ireland, 1603-1923*, London, Faber & Faber, 1981, p. 147.

(21)- C.C. O’Brien, *a Concise History of Ireland*, Galway, McBride Press, 1972, p. 30.

(22)- Ibid., p. 31.

(23)- Literally: “*Guardians of the Peace*” in Gaelic, previously the “Civic Guard” which constituted the Irish police force, and which was formed in 1922 by the Provisional Government of the new Irish Free State (see the Appendix). N.S. Mansergh, op. cit., p. 101.

(24)- John P. McCarthy, *Ireland, a Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present*, New York, Facts On File Inc, 2006, p. 358.

(25)- Ibid., p. 359.

(26)- Ibid.

(27)- Eoin O’Duffy (1892-1944) is an Irish engineer who fought in the Anglo-Irish war, supported the 1921 Treaty, and held different posts: I.R.A Director of Organization, 1921, Chief of Staff, 1922, first Commander of Garda Siochana, 1922, (dismissed by De Valera in 1933), leader of the Army Comrades Association (the Blueshirts), July 1933, and first President of Fine Gael Party, 1933-34. O’Duffy launched the National Corporate Party in June 1935, and led pro-Franco Irish Brigade to Spain in 1936-37. C.C. O’Brien, *a Concise History of Ireland*, op. cit., p. 40.

(28)- The supremacy of civil over military in the government as well as in the army circles reminds us the Algerian case during and after the War of Independence. During the Revolution, between the Soummam Congress initiator, the civilian Abane Ramdane and his collaborators on the one hand, and the army colonels, Krim Belkacem, Amirouche, Boussouf...on the other. After the independence, the same dilemma persisted between the G.P.R.A civilian leaders, Ferhat Abbas and Benkhedda and the military Oujda Clan and later Group of Tlemcen of Ben Bella and Boumediene. The second group had established and institutionalized the opposite formula since 1962.

(29)- Robert Kee, *Ourselves Alone*, Vol III of *the Green Flag*, London, Abacus, 1976, p. 133.

(30)- Literally, “Soldiers of Destiny”: Inis Fail, the Island of Destiny, being a poetic name for Ireland, and the “Fianna” a mythological band of warrior-comrades. C.C. O’Brien, *States of Ireland*, London, Abacus, 1972, p. 229.

(31)- A solution forecast five years before, appositely enough by the Professor of Metaphysics of University College, Dublin. Ibid., p. 231.

(32)- Liam Delaney and Guillermo Alvares Zarzete, “The Irish Guerrilla”, *Irish University Review*, Vol. 6, No 4, Spring. 1985, p. 47.

(33)- *Pogrom* is a Russian word which refers to an organized persecution or killing of a particular group or class of people, especially because of their race or religion, such as the Russian pogroms of Jews in the late 19th Century. Andrew Boyd, *Holy War in Belfast*, Tralee, Anvil Book, 1969, p. 302.

(34)- *Ibid.*, p. 302.

(35)- It provided for meetings to discuss unity, or failing that, the boundary; the reinstatement of expelled workers in Northern Ireland; the release of prisoners; a weighted committee of Protestants and Catholics to investigate outrages; and a special police force, half Catholics and half Protestants, for mixed districts of Belfast. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

(36)- Marc Mulholland, *the Longest War, Northern Ireland's Troubled History*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 456.

(37)- Originally established to revise the boundary between Ulster and the new dominion, the Irish Free State, “*in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions*”, the Boundary Commission failed to reach that goal because of the lack of a real political will from the part of the Northerners and their British ally to put an end to that status quo. Dominions Office, DO 04/3510, Confidential, ‘Report on the Boundary Commission’, 02 September 1926.

(38)- Most accessibly followed in F.S.L. Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971, p. 688; also see Patrick Buckland, *the Factory of Grievances: Devolved Government in Northern Ireland, 1921-39*, Dublin, Mallohan Press, 1979, pp. 83-4.

(39)- Marc Mulholland, *op. cit.*, p. 459.

(40)- *Ibid.*, p. 461.

(41)- A discontinued and notoriously sectarian unit of Northern Ireland auxiliary police force that became, later, known as Ulster Defence Regiment (U.D.R.). *Ibid.*, p. 463.

(42)- See Patrick Buckland, *op. cit.*, pp. 247, and 264-5, for the abandonment of non-sectarian guidelines in education.

(43)- Liam De Paor, *Divided Ulster*, London, Penguin Books, 1970, p. 28.

(44)- Joseph Devlin (1871-1934) was a Northern Irish politician. Of West Belfast working-class origins, Devlin was elected to Westminster in 1902 for Kilkenny as a member of the Irish Parliamentary Party, and then served for West Belfast from 1906 to 1922. He supported

John Redmond in his call for the Irish Volunteers (as National Volunteers) to support the British war effort in 1914, took part in the failed 1917–18 Irish Convention, declined to succeed Redmond as leader of the parliamentary nationalists, but led the Nationalists in Ulster and even defeated Sinn Fein candidate Eamon De Valera in the 1918 general election. He opposed partition and was a leader of the Irish nationalists elected to the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1921, who did not take their seats until 1925. He also represented Fermanagh-Tyrone in Westminster from 1929 to 1934. Devlin was highly committed to working-class issues, but he was also a champion of Catholic causes and played a large role in the revivification in 1905 of the Ancient Order of Hibernians as an activist social organization. John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 243.

(45)- That extremist republican was the T.D (member of the Dàil, see List of Acronyms and Appendix 1) Ben K. Sheehan, to whom Craig replied: “*This must be a joke...The funniest joke I’ve ever heard!*” Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast, PRONI 41/928/35, Campbell Bannerman to Carmichael, 08 June 1928.

(46)- A red right hand is the central symbol on the flag of the province of Ulster, which had been on the coat of arms of the Red Branch of the O’Neill dynasty, the Earls of Tyrone, and is on the coat of arms of the government of Northern Ireland. It is reputed to be taken from the story of two rival Vikings engaged in a ship race to Ulster with the one who first touched land receiving the province as a prize. One of the contestants cut off his hand and threw it ashore and thereby won. Loyalist groups in particular have employed the symbol for their cause. Tim Vicary, *Ireland*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 10.

(47)- Curiously, Father Corcoran, a powerful voice in favour of educational Gaelicization, did not himself speak Irish. Terence Brown, *Ireland: a Social and Cultural History, 1922-79*, London, Penguin Books, 1981, p. 63.

(48)- Ibid., p. 50.

(49)- Field Marshal Douglas Haig, later Earl Haig, summed up the Catholics situation in Northern Ireland as: “*Being Catholic in Belfast or Londonderry mustn’t be different from being Protestant in Dublin or Cork!*” PRONI 68/402/07, Field Marshal Haig to E. Carson, 17 August 1923. (Belfast).

(50)- Jason Darby, *Conflict in Northern Ireland*, Dublin, Mallohan Press, 1976, p. 135.

(51)- Malcolm Forester, op. cit., p. 82.

(52)- Lord Longford and T.P. O’Neill, *Eamon de Valera*, London, Heinemann 1970, p. 94.

(53)- Marianne Elliott, *the Long Road to Peace in Northern Ireland*, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2002, p. 19.

(54)- Thomas Johnson (1872-1963) is the co-founder of the Irish Labour Party in 1912, and Vice-Chairman of its executive from 1912 to 1923. Secretary of Irish Trade Union Congress, 1920-28, T D for County Dublin and leader of Parliamentary Labour Party, 1922-27, he denounced Provisional government's execution of republican prisoners, 1922-23. Senator, 1928-36. Johnson was a founding member of the Labour Court between 1946 and 1956. Lord Longford and T.P. O'Neill, op. cit., p. 98.

(55)- Ibid., p. 106.

(56)- Francis Stuart (1902-2000) was born in Australia of Ulster parents; he was educated at Rugby School, Warwickshire. He married Iseult Gonne, the daughter of Maud Gonne. Stuart supported the Irish War of Independence and the anti-treaty side in the Irish Civil War. He wrote a book of poetry, *We Have Kept the Faith* (1924), and a number of novels such as *Pigeon Irish* (1932), *The White Hare* (1936), and *The Coloured Dome* (1936), which received some acclaim. He converted to Catholicism and, in 1939, accepted a position as lecturer at a university in Berlin. During the Second World War, his broadcasts on German radio were interpreted as pro-Axis propaganda and he was interned for a year by the English after the War and declared "outside the diplomatic protection of his own government" by the Irish Department of External Affairs. He returned to Ireland in 1959. Stuart wrote a number of novels after the war, including *The Pillar of Cloud* (1948), *Redemption* (1949), and the autobiographical Blacklist, *Section H* (1971). John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 442.

(57)- Ibid., p. 443.

(58)- This group (or, as they were usually referred to, *clique*) included Desmond Fitzgerald; and sixty years later, when Fitzgerald's son Garret was Taoiseach, the derisory sobriquet for his supposed middle-class-intellectual-professional base was "Dublin 4", a postal area which in fact included Ballsbridge. Pat Levy and Sean. M. Sheehan, *Ireland Handbook*, Bath, Footprint Handbooks Ltd, 2002, p. 34.

(59)- Ibid., p. 37.

(60)- See Brendan Bartley & Rob Kitchin, *Understanding Contemporary Ireland*, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 60. See also "Man of No Property" by C.S Andrews, for his recollections of republican mentality in the early 1920's. "In our estimation, all Republicans lived conspicuously virtuous lives, free from the taint of scandal and proof against character assassination. This may sound like a naïve, self-righteous statement, but it is true. We looked with contempt upon our Free State opponents who, with the pretensions of the *nouveau riche*, had adopted a lifestyle of which dinner parties, card parties, garden parties, dances,

and, of course, horse-racing became the favourite ingredients. Many of them to our satisfaction succumbed to drink, debt and fornication. That too sounds priggish, but it is also true". C.S Andrews, *Man of No Property*, Dublin, Hodgkinson House, 1982, p. 50.

(61)- Pat Levy and Sean Sheehan, op. cit., p. 41.

(62)- Robert Hull, *the Irish Triangle*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 84.

(63)- The most significant example being that of James Joyce's novel *Stephen Hero* which had been censored in Ireland (curiously, not the expected, and more controversial *Ulysses*). T.A. Jackson, *Ireland her Own*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, p. 209.

(64)- Teachtaí Dála or Dáil Deputies are members of the Irish Parliament: the *Dáil*, which means assembly in Gaelic. See the Glossary of Irish (Gaelic) Terms.

(65)- T.A. Jackson, op. cit., p. 213.

(66)- Aleksander Feodorovitch Kerensky is a Russian politician and statesman, born in 1881 in Simbirsk. He had been Supreme Head of the executive power after the abdication of Czar (Tsar) Nicholas II (Nikolai II) of Russia, but he was, soon afterwards, reversed by the Bolsheviks in November 1917. Ibid., p. 333.

(67)- Document No 2: Eamon De Valera proposed an alternative to the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 to his cabinet. He was reluctant to make it public during the Dáil Eireann debates on the Treaty itself, but the document was ultimately included as an amendment to the Treaty. It did not differ significantly from the Treaty other than its insistence that Ireland was to be associated with the British Commonwealth, of which association the King was head, but that Ireland was not a dominion and an oath to the King as head of the association was not to be required. It allowed British control of naval facilities in Ireland and granted Northern Ireland the same options available in the London Treaty. John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 245.

(68)- The British Civil Servant David Foxworthy went even far when he compared De Valera to (the Republican) Oliver Cromwell, the Executioner of Drogheda, whom the Irish, after all, abhor. Prime Minister's Office, PREM 687/58112/921455/D, Secret, 'Note on the Ecclestone Committee's Report by David Foxworthy, 13 February 1932.

(69)- Peig Sayers (1873-1958): born in County Kerry, she lived on Great Blasket Island for over fifty years, and came to public attention after a Folklore Commissioner recorded some 400 of her tales and songs of Gaelic Ireland, and her fame spread after the publication of an autobiography, *Peig*, 1936. The government resettled the few remaining Blasket Islanders on the mainland in 1953, and she spent the last years of her life in a Dingle hospital. G.D Zimmermann, *Songs of Irish Rebellion*, Dublin, Earl O'Flaherty, 1967, p. 120.

(70)- Kevin Kenny, *Ireland and the British Empire*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 264.

(71)- Brian Inglis, *the Story of Ireland*, London, Faber & Faber, 1965, p. 57.

(72)- John Bowman, *De Valera and the Ulster Question, 1917-73*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 330.

(73)- Terence Brown, op. cit., p. 171.

(74)- Patrick Kavanagh (1904-1967) was an Irish small farmer and cobbler who published his first poems in 1938 and launched, as a journalist, *Kavanagh's Weekly*, offering a lively and critical account of the state of Irish life in 1958; further collections of poetry and a novel followed, but only recognized as a major talent with the publication of *Collected Poems* in 1964, and *Collected Prose* in 1967. G. D Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 133.

(75)- Kevin Nowlan and David Williams, op. cit., p. 88.

(76)- Raymond Crotty, *Irish Agricultural Production: Its Volume and Structure*, Cork, the Mercier Press, 1966, p. 63.

(77)- Terence Brown, op. cit., p. 187.

(78)- Sean Francis Lemass (1899-1971) was an Irish patriot who joined the Irish Volunteers in 1915 and fought in the G.P.O on Easter 1916. Interned between 1920 and 1921 and in 1923, he was a fervent opponent to the Treaty. As a politician, he had been T.D for Dublin City, 1924-69; a founder and organizer of Fianna Fail, 1926; Minister for Industry and Commerce in every De Valera administration, 1932-59; and Taoiseach (Prime Minister) from 1959 to 1966. Lemass re-established free trade with Britain in 1965, resigned a year after, and inspired and served on the committee that sought to revise the wording of the Republic's constitutional claim to Northern Ireland, making it aspirational. Robert Kee, *Ourselves Alone*, op. cit., p. 158.

(79)- Ibid., p. 190.

(80)- See the sceptical Raymond Crotty: "It is quite impossible to judge the operating efficiency of this body. Parliamentary control was practically non-existent and the company's accounts have been described as designed to control rather than reveal information." Raymond Crotty, *Irish Agricultural Production: Its Volume and Structure*, Cork, the Mercier Press, 1966, p. 148.

(81)- Ibid., p. 159.

(82)- Clare O'Halloran, op. cit., p. 104.

(83)- Timothy Patrick Coogan, *I.R.A.*, Paris, Alain Moreau, 1972, pp. 281-83.

(84)- Ibid., p. 288.

(85)- Ibid., p. 290.

(86)- Sir Garland Chapman, to whom De Valera was rather a *pater familias* for the Irish people, saw in him a Celtic Mustapha Kemal Ataturk (father of the Turks), but a socialist one. PREM, 701/12450/007896/D, Sir Chapman to Pendleton, 03 November 1935.

(87)- Lord Longford and T.P. O'Neill, op. cit., pp. 132-33.

(88)- Cullen, L.M, *an Economic History of Ireland since 1660*, op. cit., p. 412.

(89)- Ibid., p. 414.

(90)- Lord Longford and T.P. O'Neill, op. cit., p. 137.

CHAPTER FOUR

FROM EIRE TO THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND, 1937-1949

This fourth chapter which ends the thesis consists of four parts, dealing with four important distinct steps in the framing of the Republic of Ireland. The first part, covering the period between 1937 and 1939, from the 1937 Constitution to the beginning of the Second World War, tries to shed light on the metamorphosis of Ireland from the Irish Free State into Eire, adopting the Gaelic name of the island, in an effort to reconcile it with its Celtic origins and revive its sentiment of Irishness. The second part stresses the relation between Eire and Northern Ireland (Ulster) and their respective policies during the 1930's and 1940's. Part three analyzes the situation of Ireland and its positions vis-à-vis World War II, during which it opted for neutrality despite Allied pressure and German air attacks on Dublin. Finally, the fourth and last part of this chapter discusses post-war Ireland, and the shaping and adoption of its new status of republic in 1949, the Republic of Ireland.

I-Eire, the New Ireland, 1937-1939

De Valera, president of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State, had transformed the nature of the Irish state making it a sovereign independent country in the fullest sense and a Republic, though in its first stages. He had done this by two major contributions, one legalistic, the other psychological. In the first place, in 1937, he had introduced a new Constitution which named the state "*Eire*", meaning Ireland in Gaelic, and claimed sovereignty over the whole island including the six northern counties. Another article of the 1937 Constitution recognized what it

described as “the special position” of the Roman Catholic Church as the official and legitimate religion of “the great majority of citizens”, a fact that nobody could contest in Southern Ireland. This status was in fact a compromise accepted by De Valera and his Cabinet after great pressure had been put on it by the Roman Catholic hierarchy. De Valera, despite all his personal devoutness, had been deeply opposed to the increasing power and influence of the Roman Catholic Church. ⁽¹⁾

I. 1-The Constitution of 1937

The Constitution of 1937 embodied the language of popular sovereignty, with strong theocratic implications: a popularly elected President appeared as guardian of the people’s rights, empowered to refuse to sign a bill if he felt the will of the people ought first to be decided by referendum. ⁽²⁾ The first Irish personality to hold this office was Douglas Hyde ⁽³⁾; later, the office was occupied by De Valera himself. Otherwise, the system of government located a great deal of authority in the executive head of government, the Taoiseach; a much-weakened Senate was restored, and proportional representation retained for election to the Dàil.

But the democratic, popular-sovereignty approach was combined with an assumption that the nature and identity of the Irish polity was Catholic, reflected in five articles defining “rights”. These were much influenced by papal encyclicals and current Catholic social teaching. Divorce was prohibited; the idea of working mothers denounced; the Roman Catholic Church granted a “special position...as the guardian of the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens”, ⁽⁴⁾ though the rights of minority Churches were defined. The reaction of the small Protestant minority in the twenty-six counties is symbolized by a sudden rash of pamphlets attempting to stress that the Church of Ireland represented the true, original Church of St Patrick; ⁽⁵⁾ on more visceral levels, the pervasive fear of mixed marriages

leading to total extinction of the Southern Protestant community took an even stronger hold.

The Constitution also embodied some comment on behalf of equal opportunities, as well as an implication of equitable distribution of resources.⁽⁶⁾ The first articles of the Constitution claimed that the name “Free State” was actually abandoned and replaced by that of “*Eire*”, the Gaelic name of Ireland, including all thirty-two counties; and that therefore, the subsequent provisions applied to the North as well, though only on a platonic level, “pending the reintegration of the national territory”. Thus the “Republic” was appeased, and thus it was demonstrated to Ulster Protestants that the institutions of a United Ireland would be, as they had always claimed, oppressively Catholic.

For twenty-six-county purposes, the Constitution gratified the aspiration towards a united, republican Ireland, placing a high priority on the restoration of Irish language and culture (Gaelic), and emphasizing that the Commonwealth had no moral claims on Ireland’s membership. It was the world view also propagated by the Fianna Fail newspaper, the *Irish Press* (founded in 1931 and promptly prosecuted by the Free State government, to its advantage). The party’s public profile continued to highlight the aspirational (and safe) aspects of republicanism as they had redefined it, notably language revival. The teaching profession had become increasingly restive regarding compulsion, especially about teaching subjects through Irish to children whose home language was English. But Fianna Fail Ministers of Education adhered to the party line. The Minister for Education, Tomas Derrig⁽⁷⁾ declared in 1943 the necessity of: “waging a most intense war against English and against human nature itself, for the life of the language.”⁽⁸⁾ Many of the intelligentsia had already arrived at a more tolerant and realistic approach: preserving and encouraging Irish as a second language, giving access to Gaelic culture and history, rather than expecting it to reconquer its old position as the “first national language”, at a time when the


number of native speakers in the designated Gaeltacht areas halved between 1922 and 1939. ⁽⁹⁾

During the 1930's, in fact, the compulsory Gaelicization policy was speeded up; a pass in Irish became mandatory for the school-leaving examinations from 1934, and time devoted to other subjects accordingly curtailed. The approach was tacitly recognized as unsuccessful by everyone who had anything to do with it, though Education Ministers and Gaelic League officials resisted any attempts to quantify or examine the actual results of the policy. To illustrate the government's policy of Gaelicization, an Irish teacher of Gaelic commented: "The system, as developed hastily and *ad hoc* in the 1920's, simply sat atop Irish education for the next forty years. It became in effect a sort of Irish weather, felt, vaguely, to be oppressive but inevitable."⁽¹⁰⁾ (See Map 6)

Otherwise, "all educational policies", according to one authority: "were subject to one qualification: they could not interfere with those prerogatives of power which had accrued to the Church in the school system". ⁽¹¹⁾ And these were considerable. Government policy during the 1930's had encouraged the Clergy to take on teaching duties, while effectively discouraging the laity; the confessional stamp on Irish society was impressed more and more deeply.

A less predictable inheritance of the Fianna Fail years was their record in social welfare: less draconian than Cumann na nGaedheal about matters like pension entitlements, and more prepared to extend unemployment insurance. In other areas, the social benefits enshrined in the Constitution came strongly through: the 1935 Conditions of Employment Bill imposed a quota with a maximum proportion of women allowed to work in industry, infuriating the remnant of the Irish feminist movement still active. Articles 40, 41 and 45 of De Valera's Constitution implied or declared that a woman's place was in the home; the image of rural idealism was incompatible with an industrialized female workforce or, it might be added, with any

MAP 6: Irish (Gaelic) Speakers 1851-1961.



Source: J.C Beckett, *A Short History of Ireland*, London, Faber and Faber, 1977, p. 517.

industrialized workforce at all. The ideology marketed by Aodh de Blacam,⁽¹²⁾ an important Fianna Fail propagandist and a close associate of De Valera, postulated the idea that the day of industrialization and urbanization was past and a new, decentralized agrarian era had come.

Thus the Fianna Fail Ireland was a nation set apart, by Catholicism and nationality, the interlocking relationships of Church and politics helping to define a unique, God-given way of life. Economic ideals of self-sufficiency could obviously be related to this; state investment in the Irish Sugar Company (1933) and the Turf Development Board (*Bord na Mona* in Gaelic, 1934) was significant for economic reasons. And “protectionism” could be cultural, too: a fierce suspicion of cosmopolitanism is evident in many Fianna Fail manifestos, notably De Valera’s St Patrick’s Day broadcasts on the new national radio station. Thus in 1935:

Ireland remained a Catholic nation, and as such set the eternal destiny of man high above the “isms” and idols of the day. Her people would accept no system that decried or imperilled that destiny. Song as that was their attitude none of the forms of state-worship now prevalent could flourish in their land; the state would be confined to its proper functions as guardian of the rights of the individual and the family, co-ordinator of the activities of its citizens.⁽¹³⁾

The Fianna Fail Party came to speak, not only for the small-farming, shopkeeping and artisan classes of rural Ireland, but also for many of the bourgeoisie. Between the 1920’s and the 1950’s the concentration of Fianna Fail’s first-preference votes inexorably moved from west of the Shannon, Ireland’s greatest river, to the more prosperous midlands and east.⁽¹⁴⁾ The party also captured the “Labour” interest, though the left wing of the I.R.A appropriated the rhetoric of expropriation and class war waged upon what they called “ranches and banks”. But the I.R.A, increasingly resentful, were marginalized throughout the first decade of Fianna Fail rule, despite

isolated outbreaks and some grisly murders. By the mid-1930's De Valera was arraigning I.R.A members before military tribunals, using the Article 2A introduced by Cumann na nGaedheal; in June 1936 the I.R.A was declared an unlawful organization.⁽¹⁵⁾

I. 2-The I.R.A Question

The I.R.A, underground, split over tactics; a rump under Sean Russell⁽¹⁶⁾ embarked upon a bombing campaign in Britain through 1938-39. Otherwise, the irreconcilable residue seemed condemned to policies of obscure retaliations and vengeance, bank robberies, odd streetfights, ineffective conspiracy with Nazi Germany, or internment in the appalling conditions of Portlaoise gaol and the Curragh.⁽¹⁷⁾ In 1932 the I.R.A had numbered an estimated 30.000 in the twenty-six counties; by 1944 "there no longer was a Chief of Staff or an Army Council",⁽¹⁸⁾ hardly even an I.R.A, though reconstruction came in the late 1940's, and in the North the movement became efficiently organized underground. The newspaper *An Phoblacht (the People in Gaelic)*, particularly under Peadar (Peter) O'Donnell's editorship, remains the record of an alternative politics, more in accordance with the Irish concerns, in the 1930's and 1940's (much as the *Bell* under Sean O'Faolain⁽¹⁹⁾ stands as the record of an alternative culture); but official republicanism had been monopolized by De Valera and his near-totalitarian ambitions. For those who believed they had kept the faith, he was the worst apostate of all: linked by *An Phoblacht* in July 1935 to Churchill, Greenwood,⁽²⁰⁾ Collins and Cosgrave.

Politically, the old Free State-versus-republican divide was still vividly lasting; and Fianna Fail had managed to attract many of the anti-Treaty I.R.A. Moreover, the line of demarcation between government and opposition was pointed up sharply by the development of potentially paramilitary activity in the early 1930's, under the umbrella of the Army Comrades Association (A.C.A): an anti-Fianna Fail faction

that recruited to its leadership the dismissed Police Commissioner, General O’Duffy in 1933 and subsequently developed into a Fascist-inspired organization called the Blueshirts and later the National Guard.

The Blueshirts’ penchant for marches, demonstrations and Italian-inspired anti-democratic rhetoric ⁽²¹⁾ led to fears of a *coup d’état*, though the enemy they identified tended to be the I.R.A rather than communists. The National Centre Party (N.C.P.), founded in 1932, was essentially a pro-Commonwealth party under James Dillon ⁽²²⁾ and Frank MacDermot. ⁽²³⁾ Though they embodied distinctive policies on agrarian, economic and Northern policy, they were inevitably tagged as “pro-British”, an indication of the neo-colonial obsessions prevalent in “independent” Ireland. Eventually, coalition between the National Centre Party, the National Guard and Cumann na nGaedheal produced the United Ireland Party (U.I.P.); after several disastrous initiatives by the hysterical O’Duffy, they were reconstructed into Fine Gael, a party that remained basically pro-Commonwealth. General O’Duffy departed to fight for Franco ⁽²⁴⁾ in Spain, and then declined into insignificance and oblivion. Because of its fascist tendencies, the Blueshirt parenthesis remained an embarrassing episode in the pedigree of Fine Gael and in that of several sympathetic intellectuals, including the great poet William Butler Yeats. ⁽²⁵⁾

“Irish fascism” remains an open question, ideologically speaking, at least for the early 1930’s. Threats from extremists, however, enabled Fianna Fail to demonstrate strong government; and Article 2A, initially used to discipline Blueshirt rowdies, would eventually be used against the I.R.A. War on England was declared by means of bombs in suitcases and the marginalization of intransigent republicanism was both a result, and a reflection, of the fact that by 1939 Fianna Fail had achieved its own *modus vivendi* with Britain.

I. 3- The End of the Dominion Status

The charismatic figure of De Valera made him the incontestable leader of Irish nationalism in the post-colonial period. From the moment he assumed power, secession from the Commonwealth and the declaration of a republic appeared to be his ultimate objective and if his strategy looked extreme when seen from London, it was perceived by many of his Irish supporters as the least he could possibly do.

Almost De Valera's first action was to announce his intention to remove the Oath of Allegiance, the hedges that had been built around the Constitution Act, supposedly protecting the provisions of the Treaty, were ruthlessly trampled down. The Fianna Fail government proceeded to attack the practice of appeals to the Privy Council, already causing some legal and constitutional resentment and, as a reaction to the Governor-General's refusal to resign, De Valera relegated this post to a virtual and superfluous office.

In many ways, the 1931 Statute of Westminster⁽²⁶⁾ had made decisions like the removal of the Governor-General's office possible; India was only one dominion that would follow the Irish example in testing the logic to its limit. The political analyst, Deirdre McMahon has shown how the 1933 Oath Bill, the External Relations Act of 1936 altering the position of the King in the wake of Edward VIII's abdication and the Constitution of 1937 did not operate as an autonomous juggernaut, but interacted closely with British policy and Irish conditions.⁽²⁷⁾ However, the 1937 Constitution deserves close attention in this context, not only as another precedent for restless dominions to follow, but as an example of De Valera's constitutional sleight-of-hand. He wanted the charter about the end of the dominion, in his own words eleven years later: "to be as explicit as it possibly could be, with as few fictions as possible".⁽²⁸⁾ Interestingly, the antagonistic Head of the Department of Finance used the same image:

Stating at the outset what will be described, and with some justice, as a fiction, and one which will give offence to neighbouring countries with whom we are constantly protesting our desire to live on terms of friendship. Having been at such pains to expel fictions from the existing Constitution...it seems inconsistent now to import an even greater fiction. ⁽²⁹⁾

The claim to legislate for Ulster may have been “fictional”, but the articles dealing with Commonwealth relations were not. The Governor-General and the Crown were removed from internal Irish affairs, merely retained as the symbols of “association” with the Commonwealth. It is worth noting that the King was still accepted as an external authority: old republican repugnance to this should not be underestimated. And even if the King was empowered to act for external purposes, this was a conditional power to be exercised “as and when advised by the Executive Council so to do”; ⁽³⁰⁾ and only so long as other Commonwealth countries followed similar practices.

The dominion ⁽³¹⁾ settlement of 1921 was dismantled; the name “Irish Free State” was replaced by “Eire” or “Ireland”; authority in internal affairs resided in the Dail. Just enough continuity was retained from the Free State dispensation not to recreate civil war divisions, but in practice the new status was not much different from a formal republic within the Commonwealth. ⁽³²⁾

The British reaction, after deliberation, was to treat “Eire” as substantively occupying the Free State’s place in the Commonwealth. This had considerable practical advantages for Fianna Fail, notably in leaving undisturbed the vital emigration-outflow to Britain. On both sides, too, there was a recognition that extreme gestures: a formal declaration of a republic, or the severance of all British links, would finalize Partition. But the diplomatic discussions, conducted at a time when the economic dispute created conditions of considerable tension, were anything

but emollient. Each side spoke a different language: the British paying elaborate attention to legal niceties, the Irish stressing the popular will as Fianna Fail conceived it and the burden of history as De Valera visualized it. From late 1935 a change of tempo is discernible with the arrival of the conciliatory and adroit Malcolm MacDonald ⁽³³⁾ as Dominions Secretary, a process that was accelerated when Neville Chamberlain came to power as the British Prime Minister. After the proclamation of Eire in 1937 and the end of the dominion status, the newly born Eire had to face the entangled issue of its economic issue.

I. 4- The Economic Issue and the 1938 Agreement

One of De Valera's first actions on the economic issue had been to declare that the land annuity payments made by the Free State to Britain were not legitimate, and should have been included in the general release of Ireland's liability from the U K's public debt. De Valera invoked the moral argument against exacting land purchase payments at all, though they continued to be lodged with the Irish government. The British reaction, especially among Treasury officials, deeply committed to the Treaty and all its works, was initial fury, tempered by caution. Retaliatory duties were imposed on agricultural imports from Ireland, notably a crippling duty on cattle per head reaching 68-88 per cent *ad valorem* by 1935. Further duties followed, as well as restrictive quotas on Anglo-Irish trade; this was confidently expected to have a severe effect on the Irish economy.

To some extent, this was the case, though retention of the land annuities helped offset losses, and a budget surplus was maintained until the deadlock was broken by both sides in 1935. Moreover, retaliatory Irish restrictions imposed on imports from Britain, notably coal, cement, sugar, iron and steel, and machinery, did more damage to British trade than is often realized. Above all, De Valera used the "economic war" to brilliant political effect in domestic Irish terms. Traditional Anglo-phobia

responded to the Fianna Fail rhetoric of sacrifice in the face of foreign oppressions; the snap election that returned Fianna Fail in 1933 was largely fought on this basis. Given that 96 per cent of Irish exports went to U K markets, the practical results were necessarily severe; the value of Irish agricultural exports fell by nearly two-thirds between 1929 and 1933, though these figures are exacerbated by a worldwide collapse of agricultural prices.

However, the interim coal-cattle pact arranged at the end of 1934 with the British government had eased the pressure in the two areas most severely affected; and the general lines of the dispute were fortuitously compatible with Fianna Fail's belief that the cultivation of wheat and sugar-beet should be encouraged in order to reverse the tendency, mistaken though the remedy proved. In many ways, what was most important about the "economic war" tended to be the assumptions that were wrongly made about its political and social effects. British strategists expected it to annihilate De Valera's credibility and return the sympathetic Cumann na nGaedheal to power. The protectionist champion and fervent partisan of radical austerity in national economy, Sean Lemass, Minister for Industry and Commerce stated:

Ireland (could) be made a self-contained unit, providing all the Necessities of living in adequate quantities for the people residing in the island at the moment and probably for a much larger number... Until we get a definite national policy decided on in favour of industrial and agricultural protection, and an executive in office prepared to enforce that policy, it is useless to hope for results. ⁽³⁴⁾

This statement shows that Lemass was the main director of the policy of economic protectionism that characterized Ireland in the 1930's and 1940's, and in the early stages of which there had been significant industrial development, house construction, and road building, although losses in agricultural employment

occurred. Sean Lemass was balked in his plans for reduction of agricultural production, public works, price controls, state credits for industrial expansion and “drastic restrictions of imports” by the powerful opposition of the Department of Finance and the monolithic political inertia of the government. But the initiatives that his Department of Industry and Commerce displayed throughout the 1930’s represented the attempts of Fianna Fail to break with traditional counsels of caution.

By the time a final agreement with Britain was negotiated in 1938. The annuities were cancelled for £ 10.000.000 lump payment, trade duties and restrictions were greatly reduced, and some preference allowed to U K goods. From the Irish side, the domestic economy had hardly benefited; the Commission of Inquiry into Banking, Currency and Credit reported in 1938 that cattle and cattle products had declined in value from £ 54.600.000 in 1929-30 to £ 31.100.000 in 1935-36; crop production, excluding potatoes, had risen from only £ 4.100.000 to £ 5.000.000 though imports from Britain had been reduced from 81 per cent of the total to 50 per cent, other markets had not been developed; and the 96 per cent of Irish exports that had gone to Britain in 1931 had fallen to 91 per cent. Northern Ireland’s imports from Eire had apparently halved, though these figures do not take into account a vigorous smuggling subculture, notably in cattle. De Valera’s rhetorical victory did not come cheaply.⁽³⁵⁾

The main success of the 1938 Agreement with the British, however, was the return of the Irish ports retained by Britain under the Treaty and its advantages for the Irish: harbour facilities at Berehaven, Cobh and Lough Swilly, and fuel storage at Haulbowline and Rathmullen. These were handed over with little deliberation on the British side; in some ways, their upkeep was seen as a liability, and there was a general expectation that in time of war they might be made available again. The British high officers acquiesced in this gesture of Prime Minister Chamberlain’s appeasement as regrettable but inevitable; the infuriated Conservative MP Winston Churchill was in a small minority of parliamentary opposition.

From the Irish side, De Valera saw the 1938 Agreement as his greatest political achievement. It certainly established him as the leader of reconstructed twenty-six-county state. But, to quote the analyst, John Bowman, the most striking thing about the 1938 Agreement, seen in the wider context, is that “De Valera’s primary concern was not Partition, which he believed intractable in the short term, but the return of the Treaty ports, thus facilitating Southern neutrality in a European war which he believed imminent.”⁽³⁶⁾

II-Eire and Ulster

The sovereignty of Eire had been emphatically demonstrated; and the form it had taken was not reconcilable with unity for the immense difference occurring between the Catholic Republican South and the Protestant Unionist North. Fianna Fail had remained cautious about Ulster, claiming that they accepted “existing realities” and were not in favour of “attacking the North-East”, though some of De Valera’s American speeches implied otherwise. Partition, nonetheless, remained a constant rhetorical target, perceived publicly as a problem of British creation, involving only what De Valera called an “Ascendancy party” in Down and Antrim, two Ulster counties. There are grounds for believing that De Valera’s awareness of the insurmountable nature of the Northern problem increased with time, as any prospect of seeing Ireland once for all united seemed impossible.

Meanwhile, Northern Ireland pursued its own way. Politics there remained unchanged in a permanent status quo: a strong and largely uncontested Unionist majority was returned regularly to Stormont, enforcing a stultifying continuity. The administration of the province continued to be trapped by the Sisyphean task⁽³⁷⁾ of keeping social benefits up to U K standards, while the Depression eroded industry. A senior Treasury official, explaining yet another plea for assistance from Belfast in 1934, told the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain:

This is not due to extravagance on their part. On the whole I think it could be said that they have economized pretty well. The fact is that they copy all our legislation and that therefore we set their general standard and, for better or worse, in times like these that standard means bankruptcy for a small country which is suffering terribly from unemployment. ⁽³⁸⁾

Certainly, industrial unemployment, in an area characterized by heavy industry and urban concentrations of population, rapidly became drastic. Ulster's traditional industries, shipping and linen, entered worldwide decline during the 1930's; new style industry did not relocate in the province, aircraft production apart. Unemployment in the 1930's averaged 25 per cent, and was often noticeably higher.

Agricultural output diversified and increased during the 1930's, encouraged by British policies of imperial preference, from which Eire was excluded by the economic war. In some ways, administrative devolution worked well for the special conditions of Ulster agriculture. But agricultural practice remained founded on the small, diversified family farm, and the approach of the farming lobby towards centralized policy did not develop beyond a strong determination to keep prices up, much resented by urban interests. After indirectly profiting from the economic war between Eire and Britain, Northern Ireland's interests were apparently threatened by the 1938 Agreement in areas like butter production, though vociferous complaints from some Northern Irish farmers met with irritation from the Treasury: "Are we never to be allowed by Ulster to come to terms with the South? Is the tail always going to wag the dog?" ⁽³⁹⁾ Nonetheless, as in other areas, London's attitude towards Ulster administration opted for complacency and keeping up appearances. And it is suggestive that the most reassuringly sectarian speeches tended to come from Ministers of Agriculture, since they had to cover their flank from criticism for

engaging even in limited co-operation with Southern interests. Beneath the surface the irreducible divide remained.

The capital of Northern Ireland, Belfast profited less from administrative devolution. The industrial slums there remained legendary; no clearance scheme was raised; the response of local authorities to building initiatives was utterly negative. House-building subsidies were, in fact, calculated differently from those in Britain: kept at lower levels, subject to variability, and disastrously reliant upon local builders. The case can be made that demographic patterns were different in Britain. Belfast's health and sanitation standards remained statistically appalling; tuberculosis was at epidemic proportions, infant mortality and deaths in childbirth were exceptionally high, the threat of the workhouse hanging over the poor. The year 1932 saw the celebrated riots by the poor of both religions against the parsimony of Belfast Poor Law Guardians. ⁽⁴⁰⁾ By 1934 poor relief expenditure in Belfast accounted for more than one-third of all rates income, much resented by the propertied. By 1939 a horrific proportion of the city's working class was living at the degraded level described as "absolute poverty", faced by a penny-pinching approach on the part of local authorities determined to peg rates as low as possible. ⁽⁴¹⁾

If lethargy and corruption marked local government, initiatives were not forthcoming from the central authorities either. "Distributing bones" was the phrase favoured by the ageing Northern Ireland Prime Minister, James Craig, now Lord Craigavon, as he walked around his province happily advocating huge expenditure on Musgrave Street police barracks after an ex-public-school cadet complained about conditions there. Equally characteristic was his solemn warning to Joseph Lyons, the Prime Minister of Australia, to "watch" his Catholic population, "they breed like bloody rabbits" ⁽⁴²⁾, he said. The unfortunate fact that Lyons was himself a Roman Catholic was evidently so inconceivable a thought to Craigavon as not to be worth entertaining.

A report about the position of the Northern Irish Catholics and their conditions of life at the time has been well put by an impartial authority:

Lack of senior positions in the civil service and the judiciary proportionate to their numbers simply highlighted the much broader range of discrimination in the patronage system of public bodies, high and low. Catholics were excluded from power, their political representatives were rendered impotent, their votes were nullified, their children were disadvantaged despite the extra financial sacrifices their parents were called upon to make for their education, and the community was then mocked for not having sufficient qualifications for positions of importance.⁽⁴³⁾

The responses of the stern and unyielding Unionist government continued to follow a Pavlovian⁽⁴⁴⁾ dictates of sectarian reassurances, exacerbated by the apparent establishment of a triumphalist Catholic republic in the South. Catholic politics in Northern Ireland were effectively confined to the ghetto. While the extent of overall gerrymandering is by no means easily established, the scandal of Derry's representation –shamelessly rigged for purposes of both parliamentary and local government– was of tremendous symbolic importance. In the 1930's ward boundaries were reconstructed and the size of the Corporation reduced, purely to contain a threatened Catholic preponderance; and even this was a disguised version of the crude readjustment initially proposed by local elements. The outcome in 1930 was that 9,961 nationalist voters returned eight councillors, and 7,444 Unionists returned twelve.⁽⁴⁵⁾

The religious riots of July 1935 were particularly violent and squalid; the British view of Ulster, even from a National Government that included a rump of fervent Unionist supporters, was often ambivalent. The Treasury certainly perceived Partition as an increasing drain on British resources, though there is some evidence

of disagreements in Belfast between those who pressed for hand-outs *ad absurdum* (the Craigavon line) and the more imperially minded approach of local civil servants like Spender, ⁽⁴⁶⁾ who believed Ulster should budget within its own limitations and adapt British practice to local conditions. The general picture remained that of a dependent economy, operating at a very slow level, and an administration boosted by injections of central funding. By the late 1930's many observers, including well-informed civil servants, were wondering how long this state of affairs could continue. What would have happened to Ulster without, yet again, a world war to deliver it? ⁽⁴⁷⁾

By 1939 the return of the Treaty ports gave Northern Ireland a vital role in Britain's marine defences, as well as a strategic location for air bases, and eventually American troops. During the war, the number employed in the shipyards trebled, strikes notwithstanding; engineering workers doubled; those employed in aircraft production increased fivefold. Northern Ireland produced 140 warships, 10 per cent of the entire merchant shipping of the U K, 1,500 heavy bombers and innumerable quantities of guns, tanks and ammunition. Agricultural productivity was also boosted, by a system of uniform prices; mechanization and fertilization techniques went into a sudden over-drive. Ulster's economic and strategic importance to the British war effort was one vital factor in altering the province's position. Another, of course, was the unparalleled horror of the blitz ⁽⁴⁸⁾ of Belfast in the spring and early summer of 1941. Such developments affected the relationship of the province to Britain during post-war readjustments. ⁽⁴⁹⁾

The central funding authorities, for one thing, looked more benevolently upon Northern Ireland's constant need for subventions. The idea of a "balanced" Northern Ireland budget was effectively forgotten; the province would share in the new age of welfare. Living standards, roughly on a par with the Free State in 1930, had advanced nearly 75 per cent above those of Eire by the late 1940's. Post-war agreements, taking effect between 1946 and 1951, established parity between

Britain's and Northern Ireland's services and taxation levels; unemployment funds in both areas were amalgamated, relieving Northern Ireland of a great weight of national insurance costs. Similarly the social services agreement spared the province much of the cost of national assistance, family allowance, non-contributory pensions and health-scheme costs. Just as in 1918, Ulster emerged from the War with its position strengthened and its vociferous claims to special treatment ensured a hearing. By the same token, the contrast with the path taken by Eire was thrown into sharper relief than ever.

III-Eire and the Second World War, 1939-1945

Irish neutrality in the Second World War should be seen against the background of international politics between the wars, as well as of Anglo-Irish relations. The Free State and Eire had played a leading part in the League of Nations, De Valera serving as President of the Council in 1932, and subsequently as President of the Assembly; the failure of League policies disillusioned him deeply. Neutrality was the traditional policy of small European states, whose example the Irish government rather self-consciously stressed rather than that of other dominions: Eire's special position as the only neutral behind Allied lines was not formally acknowledged, and De Valera affected to see the war as an "imperial adventure".⁽⁵⁰⁾ Above all, an independent Irish foreign policy was perceived as the *sine qua non* of any real form of independence in the larger sense. Neutrality was, therefore, carefully defined by Frank Aiken,⁽⁵¹⁾ the Fianna Fail Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures in January 1940:

(It) is not like a simple mathematical formula which has only to be announced and demonstrated in order to be believed and respected. It has in fact always been one of the difficult problems in human

relationship (*sic*). Instead of earning the respect and goodwill of both belligerents it is regarded by both with hatred and contempt. “He who is not with me is against me”. In the modern total warfare it is not a condition of peace with both belligerents, but rather a condition of limited warfare with both, a warfare, tend to expand to coincide with those of total warfare. In cold economic and military fact it is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish between the seriousness of the two emergencies called war and neutrality.⁽⁵²⁾

Aiken’s words as a government official reflected the feelings of the majority of the Irish citizens towards the two belligerents, and that there was a fervent popular determination to maintain official neutrality at all costs. “Emergency” became, in fact, the official word for the conditions of 1939-1945 in Ireland. The Irish approach amounted to neutrality, as De Valera had speculatively insisted in the 1920 negotiations: secret intelligence and strategic liaisons were made with Britain and the United States, not often realized at the time or since. Simultaneously, the strict diplomatic forms of non-belligerence were publicly observed and Irish politicians never lost sight of the vital importance of establishing sovereignty by maintaining neutrality.

It might be added that this was never perceived by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who constantly referred to the Irish constitutional position as “anomalous” and described Irish strategy as “at war but skulking.”⁽⁵³⁾ The British army planned to reoccupy the Treaty ports by force if need be; Germany ruled out the option of a direct Irish attack early on, after drawing up detailed plans and considering a destabilizing invasion of Northern Ireland, imaginatively suggested by the *Fuhrer* himself –Hitler– for the twenty-fifth anniversary of Easter 1916. The Reich⁽⁵⁴⁾ still retained a strong diplomatic and intelligence presence: “German spies in Ireland” were everywhere. Their activities, however, were more or less confined to

inept liaison with the I.R.A agents, whom De Valera had considered as traitors to the nation.⁽⁵⁵⁾

The position of the partitioned island, at war and not at war, was curious. A diplomatic ballet was danced in 1940 around the chances of North-South co-operation in defence matters, and even around the possibility of Britain supporting Irish unity in return for Eire's open alliance in the war effort;⁽⁵⁶⁾ this provoked predictable outrage from Ulster, whose acquiescence was the most unrealistic part of the proposed arrangements, and was in any case rejected by De Valera. Part of the reason may have been his scepticism at Britain's ability to resist; he was probably further swayed by the belief that Britain was losing the war; he also remembered how the leader of the Irish Nationalist Party, John Redmond had forfeited support in 1914. Most of all, though, the principle of neutrality was too closely bound up with Irish identity and Irish sovereignty to be easily relaxed.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Much of Eire's wartime experience simply provides harmless diversion for counter-factual speculation (or the writers of might-have-been thrillers). Ulster's war was, by contrast, vivid and committed: and the war effort allowed Unionist flag-waving, giving them *carte blanche*. The Home Guard was manned by the B-specials; the Unionist leaders led by Craig, made much of being "King's men"; the Northern Ireland Labour Party was precipitated into a split over the question of commitment to the Union (and, implicitly, the war effort, taken to stand for social progress, unlike "outworn nationalism"). By November 1941, 23,000 Northern Irish recruits had joined up the British; conscription was avoided, though Unionist politicians thirsted for it. The disaffected third of the population were, as usual, ignored.

Strategically, Ulster was not vulnerable to long-range attack; even German possession of the French seaboard failed to alter this mentality. 1941 changed everything. On 15 April, 180 German planes unloaded more than a hundred tons of bombs over Belfast's residential areas, killing at least 745 in one night. On 4 May,

204 aircraft returned and dropped 95.000 incendiaries on the harbour and shipyards, killing 150 and devastating the war production machine. Altogether, 56.000 houses were damaged, and 3.200 levelled; help came from Eire's fire brigades, a highly symbolic gesture. A generalized fear of further raids persisted, with a nightly exodus from the city to the countryside. ⁽⁵⁸⁾

Another symbolic reaction was that of the Northern Irish Prime Minister Craig's very old Cabinet, spending hours deliberating about how to protect Lord Carson's statue, the founding father of the Ulster Unionist Council ⁽⁵⁹⁾ at a time when the city still had no air-raid shelters. The inadequacy of Ulster's political leadership was never more vividly demonstrated. ⁽⁶⁰⁾

After America's entry into the War, Ireland became less strategically important and Irish neutrality ⁽⁶¹⁾ became less significant; from 1942 stranded Allied air-crews were sent straight to Northern Ireland while Germans were interned. Ironically, the Irish relations with the U S A deteriorated over the neutrality issue; the Irish involvement in the War could effectively have helped the Allies in precipitating the end of the War by enabling the Americans to land on the Irish coasts instead of North Africa, Italy and Greece. Those with Britain improved and the TD and founder of the Fine Gael Party, James Dillon ⁽⁶²⁾ remained the only outspoken public voice against neutrality and against Hitler issuing dire warnings about Ireland's fate if Germany won, warnings later corroborated by an *ex-Abwehr* agent ⁽⁶³⁾. There is still controversy about the number of Eire citizens serving in the War; it may have been about 42.000. But Eire's only direct engagement was an air-raid by German planes, killing thirty-four Dubliners on 30 May 1941.

Otherwise, the War affected Ireland in terms of internal transport disruption, fuel shortages, some food and energy rationing; the government assumed sweeping powers of economic organization, and "planning" was infiltrated into the Department of Supplies under the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Sean Lemass. The

Fianna Fail predisposition towards protectionism and austerity had provided valuable psychological preparation. Tillage was increased; wheat cultivation expanded still further, and turf production exploited; mercifully, the meat trade stayed buoyant, though overall economic growth stagnated. Some potentially oppressive legislation was passed: the Wages Standstill Order, in operation from 1941 to 1946, removed legal protection for strikes in pursuance of higher wages and the 1941 Trade Union Act restricted rights of collective bargaining and even of affiliation to particular unions. The atmosphere of wartime Eire was cautiously authoritarian.

But overall, neutrality was an affirmative rather than a negative stance; even the antagonistic James Dillon called it “a masterly political stroke” on De Valera’s part. The writer Elizabeth Bowen ⁽⁶⁴⁾ astutely noted the national mood in her wartime reports sent back to the British Government:

I find a great readiness, in talkers of all classes, to stress the “spirituality” of Eire’s attitude towards world affairs. At the root, this is not bogus: that this country *is* religious in temperament and disposition as well as practice is, I take it, an accepted fact. Unhappily, religion is used to cover or bolster up a number of bad practices. I... still see a threat of Catholic-Fascism. And officially the Irish Roman Catholic Church is opposed to progress, as not good for the people. “The most disagreeable aspect of this official “spirituality” is its smugness, even phariseeism. I have heard it said (and have heard it constantly being said) that “the bombing is a punishment on England for her materialism”.....Sympathy for Petainist France (ideas of spiritual rebirth) if not on the increase since last summer is certainly not on the decrease. The equally reconstructive side of the Free French programme seems to be overlooked. And there is still admiration for Franco’s Spain... The effect of religious opinion in this country (Protestant as well as Catholic) seems still to be, a heavy trend to the Right.” ⁽⁶⁵⁾

This kind of reports on Irish attitudes, especially religious ones, during the Second World War to the British Ministry of Information was seen as an act of

treason by some Irish radical politicians. The Dublin government was far from the pro-Nazi cabal imagined in Ulster and elsewhere. But anti-Semitic outbursts were not unknown in the Dail; ⁽⁶⁶⁾ and the famous journalist and writer Robert Fisk has uncovered a “grubby neo-Nazi underworld that awaited the Germans in Dublin”, meeting for weekly Swastika, the famous Nazi Cross, and oysters sessions at the Red Bank restaurant involving the ex-commander of the Blueshirts, General O’Duffy. ⁽⁶⁷⁾ At the very time when De Valera’s celebrated St Patrick’s Day broadcast of 1943 called up a vision of an Ireland characterized by cosy homesteads, athletic youths and comely maidens, a beautiful dream was cherished by some at least of his fellow-citizens.

Neutrality remained, observed with “mathematical consistency” but De Valera’s punctilious visit expressing formal condolence on the death of Hitler to the German diplomatic representative was perceived as an offence, not only to the British but to all the Allies. Revelations of the death camps were already coming in, and De Valera’s gesture appalled many. Robert Fisk’s judgement deserves to be quoted: “Morally, it was both senseless and deeply wounding to the millions who had suffered in the War; politically, it could have been disastrous. But symbolically, it could not be misunderstood: Eire had not accepted the values of the warring nations and did not intend to do so in the future.” ⁽⁶⁸⁾

IV-The Republic of Ireland, 1945-1949

Post-war Ireland’s picture was very bleak: agricultural and economic crises loomed, rationing and shortages continued, traumatic strikes involved farm labourers and schoolteachers, as well as industrial workers. Inflation ⁽⁶⁹⁾ and revived emigration disadvantaged the Fianna Fail government further.

This was expressed by the proliferation of small parties like Clann na Talmhan, ⁽⁷⁰⁾ calling for land division and sarcastically reminding Fianna Fail of the days when they were defending the small farmers' interests. In their search for other adversaries to blame, they showed a penchant for discovering Jews and Freemasons. More importantly, a new political grouping called Clann na Poblachta ⁽⁷¹⁾ brought together old Republicans, anti-Partitionists, socialists and dissident members of Fianna Fail in what has been called a "negative consensus" because a powerful I.R.A group dominated their inner councils. In 1948 Clann na Poblachta formed a coalition government with John Costello's Party, Fine Gael, the Labour Party and Clann na Talmhan. The coalition was initiated by the physician Noel Browne, ⁽⁷²⁾ who became Minister for Health in that government.

The combination of Fine Gael's Mulcahy and McGilligan with hitherto intransigent republicans was as surprising as any other *rapprochement*, but it held together through not being Fianna Fail. The coalition also demonstrated a reassuringly ostentatious piety, assuring the Pope (Pius XII, 1939-1958) that their government represents the pious Catholic Irish who: "reposed at the feet of your Holiness the assurance of our filial loyalty and of our devotion to your August Person, as well as our firm resolve to be guided in all our work by the teaching of Christ and to strive for the attainment of a social order in Ireland based on Christian principles." ⁽⁷³⁾ This had facilitated the task of Sean MacBride, ⁽⁷⁴⁾ recently Chief of Staff of the I.R.A, as Minister for External Affairs in the new coalition government to strengthen the diplomatic ties with the Vatican.

Economically, the Department of Finance had to face many challenges related to development, monetary funds, unemployment, credits and other economic threats. Clann na Poblachta's manifesto promised: "a national monetary authority will be established whose function will be to create currency and credit for the economic needs of full employment, and full production, and to provide credits, free of interest, for full employment and national development." ⁽⁷⁵⁾ Though the Department of

Finance by and large fought off these threats, the beginnings of the debate on economic policy that would characterize the 1950's can be discerned in the coalition's advent to power.

However, the success of the coalition experiment which succeeded De Valera's Fianna Fail to power, resides in the old obsession with sovereignty *vis-à-vis* Britain for in 1949 the External Relations Act was repealed and the Republic finally declared. The initiative was taken in a controversial and extraordinarily sudden manoeuvre: apparently the result of the Taoiseach, John Costello's ⁽⁷⁶⁾ visit to Ottawa, Canada, in September 1948 where he declared, in his official speech, the birth of the Republic of Ireland. But the development was not unexpected. No one in the Cabinet dissented, and if, as alleged, he offered to resign, it was not accepted. The legislation went ahead: arguably weakening Fianna Fail, but at the same time ruining any slim chance of ending Partition. Any prospect for union between the Irish Republic and Ulster proved ultimately null. Northern nationalists continued, elaborately, to refer to the twenty-six counties as "the Free State", implying that the constitutional manoeuvres that produced the "Republic" were irrelevant; the name was platonically preserved for the visionary thirty-two-county separatist state. But this was now further away than ever.

The new Republic retained special citizenship and trade preference arrangements with Britain. But the reaction was the retaliatory Ireland Act passed in 1949 by Westminster providing that Northern Ireland would never leave the U K except by "consent". Constitutional bonds were welded even more closely by the practical effects of assurances that Northern Ireland's social security benefits and schemes in the post-Beveridge age would be the same as Britain's. ⁽⁷⁷⁾

As Clement Attlee, British Prime Minister from 1945 to 1951 drily put it: "the government of Eire considered the cutting of the last tie which united Eire to the British Commonwealth as a more important objective than ending Partition". ⁽⁷⁸⁾

Objectively, this seems no more than the truth. However, the official line from Dublin continued to place all the blame for sustaining Partition on London's shoulders. Invitations to join N.A.T.O were rejected on the grounds that Partition made it impossible for the Republic to join Britain in such an alliance, though the same arrangement was apparently considered by the coalition in return for a British declaration against Partition. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, MacBride, visiting the United States in 1949, pledged Ireland to full N.A.T.O membership if Britain withdrew from Northern Ireland, assuring Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State, that the British would welcome American intervention to get them off the Partition hook. As so often before, the dissonance between Ireland's and Britain's perceptions of their joint relationship was total.

Where did Ireland stand after 1949? The twenty-six-county Republic retained a, more or less, special relationship with Britain due to their common history, which owed much to De Valera's theoretical precedents. ⁽⁷⁹⁾ Within its borders the Church had achieved the kind of political power where it could not only short-circuit the social-welfare schemes attempted by the coalition government, but could also during 1936-39 forbid the Labour Party to include in its constitution the aim of: "a Workers' Republic founded on the principles of social justice sustained by democratic institutions and guaranteeing civil and religious liberty and equal opportunities to achieve happiness to all citizens who render service to the community". ⁽⁸⁰⁾ This is due to the extremely devoted religiosity of the Irish people as Roman Catholics, a fact that made of Ireland a theocratic state like Iran or Saudi Arabia. A strong minority articulated the case for change; but the intelligentsia tended to be forced *ipso facto* into an adversarial position. The achievement of the Republic did not solve the arguments that had continued throughout the 1930's about what form of government an independent Ireland should adopt.

If the threats of fascism, destabilization and economic collapse had been avoided, so had the possibilities of social democracy. In this process, the Church had

played a powerful part, acting as a brake on every secularizing tendency. In 1947 the bishops could publicly condone the boycotting of a divorced Protestant elected mayor in county Galway; similar assumptions were very obvious in other contemporary statements on other controversial issues ⁽⁸¹⁾, and on several highly publicized cases regarding adoption law and mixed marriages. In the late 1940's the important point, perhaps, was that such cases were arousing controversy. But the power of the Church to command over politicians was formidable. ⁽⁸²⁾ The hierarchy's assumption that this was their right and duty as representatives of the Lord on Earth and Defenders of the Faith, was probably shared by a large majority in the Republic; but this made it all the more sinister when viewed from the North (Ulster).

In a sense, the scant attention paid to material progress was firmly established in the De Valera tradition. He may have believed what he was saying when he remarked in Ennis in 1948 that there was: "probably not in the whole world at present a country in which there is such a decent standard of living as there is in this part of Ireland", ⁽⁸³⁾ despite statistics of relative incomes. But it cannot have escaped him that, twenty years after Fianna Fail entered politics, the two things closest to his heart were no nearer achievement: the restoration of the Irish language and the ending of Partition. ⁽⁸⁴⁾

On the whole, this fourth and final chapter tackles the period of maturity and ambition for the newly born *Eire*. The way for a democratic and popular sovereign republic was being paved under the auspices of Irishness, republicanism, and Roman Catholicism; a slogan that reminds the French revolutionary: liberty, equality, and fraternity, the three pillars of the first French republic in history, an example for De Valera's republican government to meditate on.

De Valera introduced proposals for a new constitution in 1937. The power of the Crown was ended by the removal of the oath of allegiance, and the office of

Governor-General was replaced by that of a President elected by a national suffrage. The first President was Douglas Hyde, a Celtic (Gaelic) scholar who had been associated with the Gaelic revival since 1890. The new Constitution did not proclaim an independent republic, but it replaced the title of the Irish Free State with Eire (Ireland). The new Constitution was ratified by a plebiscite in the 1937 general election in which De Valera was again victorious and became operative on December 29, 1937.

The Land Annuities, the mortgage-type payments which Irish farmers had been paying into the British Exchequer under the Land Purchase Acts to make them owners of the land they farmed, were arbitrarily suspended and thus became the cause of an economic war, involving reciprocal tariff restrictions, with the British government. An agreement in April 1938 ended British occupation of three naval bases that had been left in British hands by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. The dispute over the land-purchase annuities was settled, and the tariff warfare abated.

At the outbreak of World War II, De Valera renewed his statement made in 1938 that Ireland would not become a base for attacks on Great Britain. Under the Emergency Powers Act of 1939, hundreds of I.R.A members were interned without trial, and six were executed between 1940 and 1944. His government, re-elected in 1943 and 1944, remained strictly neutral, despite German air-raids on Dublin in 1941 and after the United States entered the War in December 1941.

In the general election of 1948, Fianna Fail won 68 of the 147 seats in the Dail, but De Valera refused to enter a coalition. John A. Costello emerged as the leader of a bloc composed of his own party Fine Gael and several smaller groups, namely the Irish Labour Party, Clann na Poblachta and Clann na Talmhan. Out of office, De Valera toured the world advocating the unification and independence of Ireland. Fearful of De Valera's prestige and charisma as the most famous Irish leader, Costello introduced in the Dail the Republic of Ireland Act, which ended the fiction

of Commonwealth membership that had been maintained since 1937. The Act took effect in April 1949. Britain recognized the new status of Ireland but declared that unity with the six counties of Northern Ireland could not occur without consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland. Economic difficulties and a controversy between the Minister for Health Noel Browne and the Roman Catholic hierarchy over the Public Health Act weakened Costello's government, and, after the general election 1951, De Valera again became Taoiseach (Prime Minister).

Notes:

(1)- Art Cosgrove, *A New History of Ireland*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.156.

(2)- Ibid., p. 156.

(3)- Douglas Hyde (1860-1949) was a distinguished Gaelic scholar and writer and first president of the Republic of Ireland (*Eire*). He was an outstanding figure in the struggle for the preservation and extension of the Irish language from 1893 when he founded the Gaelic League, to 1922 when the founding of the Irish Free State accorded the Irish language equal status with English. E.A Curtis, *a History of Ireland*, London, Methuen, 1961, p. 212.

(4)- Ibid., p. 213.

(5)- Just as St George for England or St Andrew for Scotland, St Patrick (*Padraic* in Gaelic) is the Saint Patron of Ireland. Art Cosgrove, op. cit., p. 193.

(6)- “The Department of Finance argued that articles dealing with social policy were not of a kind usually enshrined in a Constitution. They will not be helpful to Ministers in the future but will provide a breeding ground for discontent, and so create instability and insecurity. They are consequently objectionable and even dangerous. Their provisions are too vague to be of positive assistance to any Government and are yet sufficiently definite to afford grounds for disaffection to sections of the community, who might claim that the Government were not living up to the Constitution...”

Further, the provisions are mostly unnecessary. Distinct advance along the lines of social and economic policy outlined have already been made without the aid of these declaratory provisions, some of which are themselves, it should be noted, repugnant to present Government policy, e.g. we do not settle “as many families as practicable” on the land (see Art. 45, 2, v). “Five acres and a cow” would suffice if that were the policy. We create economic holdings of twenty-five acres...

Also, the provisions are contradictory. The state has established monopolies in important articles such as sugar, electricity, cement, tyres, oil, etc. (despite Art. 45, 2, iii). The reference to the “economic domination of the few in what pertains to the control of credit” is not understood (the phrase, in diluted form, appears in Art. 45, 2, iv). In so far as one can attach any intelligible meaning to it, it is untrue, but it could easily be worked up by agitators as a weapon of attack on the Banks, the Agricultural Credit Corporation, the Industrial Credit Co., or against any large joint-stock concern.”

Quoted in Raymond Crotty, *Irish Agricultural Production: Its Volume and Structure*, Cork, the Mercier Press, 1966, p. 176.

(7)- Tomas Derrig (1897-1956) was born in County Mayo, and educated at Christian Brothers School and University College in Galway. He, successively, joined the Irish Volunteers in 1915, was deported in May 1916, joined Sinn Fein in 1917, was imprisoned in German Plot arrests in 1918, and was elected to the Dail for South Mayo in 1921. Derrig, who rejected the Treaty, had been T D for Carlow-Kilkenny between 1923 and 1954, a founding member of Fianna Fail in 1926, and, several times, Minister; of Education, 1932-48, for Posts and Telegraphs, 1939, and for Lands from 1951 to 1954. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

(8)- Frederick Pakenham, *Peace by Ordeal*, London, Faber and Faber, 1972, p. 114.

(9)- The term Gaeltacht describes areas of Ireland in which Irish is the vernacular tongue, although the term originally applied to areas in Scotland where Gaelic was spoken. With the establishment of the Irish Free State a committee was created to determine which districts of the country were *fior-Ghaeltacht* (fully Irish), where Irish was spoken daily by more than 80 percent of the population, and *Breac-Ghaeltacht* (partially Irish), where between 25 and 79 percent spoke Irish. Gaeltacht areas were determined to exist in 12 counties. Various public benefits were made available to residents of those areas who qualified as Irish speakers. In the 1950s a further study resulted in a revision of the Gaeltacht boundaries, which resulted in a substantial shrinkage of area. Extraordinary efforts to develop those areas have been made, including the establishment in 1957 of a public agency, *Gaeltarra Éireann*, to stimulate economic development and investment. In 1980 a public board, *Udaras na Gaeltachta*, which would be elected by Gaeltacht residents, was established to direct development in the areas. In 1996 a public television station was established to broadcast in the Irish language. Nonetheless, census returns from the areas indicate a further decrease in the proportion of the resident population who speak Irish on a daily basis. The population of the entire Gaeltacht in 1996 was less than 90,000 and only slightly more than 20,000 spoke Irish daily. The influx of non-Irish speakers, partly as a consequence of development, has hastened the decline. John P. McCarthy, *Ireland, a Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present*, New York, Facts On File Inc, 2006, p. 273.

(10)- O. MacDonagh, *Ireland: The Union and Its Aftermath*, Dublin, Earl O'Flaherty, 1977, p. 317.

(11)- *Ibid.*, p. 321

(12)- Aodh de Blacam (1890-1951) was born in London of Ulster stock, he learned Irish (Gaelic) and settled in Ireland in 1915. Well-known for writings as the Sinn Fein "Roddy the Rover" during the Anglo-Irish war, he was interned in 1919, and sat on the subcommittee on Partition. Member of Fianna Fail national executive, 1938-47, de Blacam joined Clann na

Poblachta and published *Gaelic Literature Surveyed* in 1929, *Wolfe Tone* in 1935, and *The Black North* in 1938. Terence Brown, *Ireland: a Social and Cultural History, 1922-79*, London, Penguin Books, 1981, p. 214.

(13)- Geoffrey Wolveston, "The 1937 Constitution, the Era of Eire", *Irish University Review*, Vol. 6, No 2, Summer 1984, p. 80.

(14)- Richard Muir, *Traveller History of Britain and Ireland*, London, Book Club Associates, 1989, p. 48.

(15)- N.S. Mansergh, *The Irish Question*, Galway, McBride Press, 1975, p. 98.

(16)- Sean Russell (1893-1940) was member of the Sinn Fein and I.R.A Director of Munitions in 1919-21. Russell broke with De Valera upon the founding of Fianna Fail, opposed the left-wing tendencies of O'Donnell and Ryan, and as the I.R.A's Chief of Staff, supported the bombing campaign in Britain in 1939. He also sought to re-enter Ireland with German assistance, but died *en route* in a German U-boat (submarine) and was buried at sea. Timothy Patrick Coogan, *I.R.A.*, Paris, Alain Moreau, 1972, p. 307.

(17)- Mark Leonard Morrison, "Hibernia versus Albion, Eight Centuries of Antagonism", *Irish Economy and Social History*, Vol. V, May 1987, p. 36.

(18)- James Bowyer Bell, *the Secret Army: a History of the I.R.A 1916-70*, London, Heinemann, 1970, p. 279.

(19)- Sean O'Faolain (born in 1900) joined the I.R.A during the Anglo-Irish war, rejected the Treaty, and was responsible of the making of bombs for the Irregulars during the Civil War. Acting Director of Publicity in 1922-23, and a founding member of the Irish Academy of Letters in 1933, O'Faolain founded the *Bell* in 1940, which he edited until 1946. He is also a popular historian and a gifted biographer, and author of numerous short stories as well as novels. Rogelio Alonso, *the IRA and Armed Struggle*, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 84.

(20)- Sir Hamar Greenwood (1870-1948) was a British politician. Born and educated in Canada, Greenwood became a member of parliament in 1906; he was made chief secretary for Ireland in 1920 during the height of the War of Independence. He also was a member of the British party that negotiated the Anglo-Irish Treaty. John P. McCarthy, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

(21)- Referring to the Fascist extraordinary propaganda of the *Duce* Benito Mussolini in the 1920's and 1930's. E.A Curtis, *A History of Ireland*, London, Methuen, 1961, p. 117.

(22)- James Dillon (1902-1986) is the son of the renowned John Dillon. He was Minister of Agriculture in coalition governments in 1948-51 and 1954-57, and leader of the Fine Gael Party from 1959 to 1965. Ibid., p. 121.

(23)- Frank MacDermot (1886-1975) is the co-founder of the National Centre Party (N.C.P.) in 1932, Vice-President of the United Ireland Party (U.I.P.) in 1933, and Senator in 1936-42. He had been Dublin, New York and Paris correspondent of the *Sunday Times*, and (like Aodh de Blacam) wrote a life of Wolfe Tone in 1939. T.P Coogan, op. cit., p. 95.

(24)- General Francisco Bahamonde Franco -the future *Caudillo* (1939-1975) of Spain -, leader of the Nationalist factions during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. This is already mentioned in note 27 of the second chapter concerning O'Duffy's adventure in Spain. C.C. O'Brien, *a Concise History of Ireland*, Galway, McBride Press, 1972, p. 40.

(25)- E.A Curtis, op. cit., p. 124.

(26)- The Statute of Westminster: This statute, passed in 1931 by the Westminster Parliament, gave legal status to the 1926 British Commonwealth Conference recommendations that the dominions possessed legal autonomy from Britain and that they have the power to void Westminster legislation which effected them. It essentially gave the Irish Free State the right to void parts of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which the British regarded as deriving its legitimacy from having been legislatively sanctioned by the Westminster Parliament, if it chose. Paradoxically, Cumann na nGaedheal took the position that alterations to the Treaty, as an international agreement, required the consent of both signing parties. The party subsequently opposed Eamon De Valera's successful attempts to eliminate offensive Treaty provisions from the Free State constitution. C.C. O'Brien, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

(27)- Deirdre McMahon, *Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930's*, London, Longman Group Ltd, 1984, pp. 198-202.

(28)- John Bowman, op. cit., p. 147.

(29)- Ibid., p. 149.

(30)- Ibid., p. 151.

(31)- In its broader sense, the term dominion refers to an area controlled by one government or ruler, but here, it is related with one of the formerly self-governing territories of the British Commonwealth, Southern Ireland. *The Oxford Guide to British and American Culture*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.

(32)- The Irish government sought to bring back Ireland to its Gaelic origins and reconcile it with its Celtic roots, and at the same time keep it away from any English reference such as Commonwealth, dominion...etc. Eire or Erin (hence the female name) refers to the Gaelic word for Ireland. Provisional Government, Cabinet Minutes, G1. (Dublin).

(33)- Malcolm MacDonald (1901-1981) is the son of the notorious British Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald. M.P during twenty years, he was Dominions Secretary from 1935 to 1939 when he negotiated the end of British-Irish trade war, and settled the annuity and “treaty ports’ disputes in 1938. Minister of Health in 1940-41, MacDonald visited De Valera to discuss Ireland’s role in the War in June 1940. High Commissioner to Canada in 1941-46, he supervised the granting of self-government to many former colonies after 1946 and remained a roving ambassador for Britain into the 1970’s. Deirdre McMahon, op. cit., p. 204.

(34)- John Bowman, op. cit., p. 153.

(35)- Raymond Crotty, op. cit., p. 202.

(36)- Mark Leonard Morrison, op. cit., p. 39.

(37)- John Bowman, op. cit., p. 181.

(38)- According to the Greek Mythology Sisyphus is a Corinthian King who had been condemned by Zeus to roll a huge rock to the summit of a mountain, but its heavy weight, once there, pulls him down and obliges him to restart, again and again, for eternity. This figure was immortalized by Albert Camus in his “*Le Mythe de Sisyphe*”. Jean-Claude Evrard, « Le Bourbier Irlandais de Drogheda à Derry », *Etudes Irlandaises*, Décembre 1989, p. 108.

(39)- Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, *the Politics of Antagonism, Understanding Northern Ireland*, London, the Athlone Press, 1993, p. 78.

(40)- Arthur Stewart, *the Ulster Crisis*, London, Harper Collins, 1967, p. 147.

(41)- Jeremy Smith, *Making the Peace in Ireland*, London, Pearson Education Ltd, 2002, p. 36.

(42)- D.P Barritt and C.F Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem*, London, Faber & Faber, 1982, p. 19.

(43)- Ibid., pp. 22-23.

(44)- Referring to the famous theory of *stimulus-response* on the conditioned reflex of the outstanding Russian neuropsychologist Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936), Nobel prizewinner in 1904. Jacques Verrière et Jean Guiffan, *L'Irlande, Milieu et Histoire*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1972, p. 79.

(45)- Graham Spencer, *the State of Loyalism in Northern Ireland*, London, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2008, p. 123.

(46)- Wilfrid Bliss Spender (1876-1960) had been successively: First Secretary to Northern Ireland Cabinet between 1921 and 1925, Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Finance and Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service in 1925-1944, and member of the joint Exchequer Board from 1933 to 1954. D.P Barritt and C.F Carter, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

(47)- Colin Wilkinson, "The De Valera Dispensation", *Irish Economy and Social History*, Vol. III, March 1983, p. 95

(48)- An originally German word which means a sudden intensive military attack through air bombing. The most famous one is certainly the Blitz of London by the German *Luftwaffe* (air forces) in 1940. Charles Loch Mowat, *Britain between the Wars, 1918-1940*, London, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972, p. 269.

(49)- Jonathan Glazer and Patsy Remigan, "The Irishness Richness", *Anglo-Irish Studies*, Vol. II, No 21, December 1977, p. 69.

(50)- Deirdre McMahon, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

(51)- Frank Aiken (1898-1983), an I.R.A Chief of Staff in 1924, is also a founding member of The Fianna Fail Party in 1926, and had been successively: Minister of Defence in 1932-39, and for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures during World War II (1939-45), Minister of Finance 1945-48, of Agriculture 1951, and for External Affairs from 1951 to 1954 and between 1957 and 1968. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

(52)- Alvin Jackson, *Ireland 1798-1998, War, Peace and Beyond*, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell Ltd, 1999, p. 297.

(53)- Jim Cordell, *Essential Government and Politics*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers Ltd, 1992, p. 256.

(54)- Reich means "*Empire*" in German. The 1st Reich (962-1806) and the 2nd Reich (1870-1918) served as references to Hitler's Nazi State: the 3rd Reich. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

(55)- Those I.R.A men might have followed the famous saying: “my enemy’s enemy is a friend of mine.” Ibid., p. 272.

(56)- We can make a parallel here with the French government’s –De Gaulle’s government in Algiers not Petain’s at Vichy (France) – promises of independence to the Algerians in return for their participation in war effort with the Allies during World War II.

(57)- Churchill’s famous telegram to De Valera when America entered the War, using the phrase “A Nation Once Again”, had nothing to do with an offer of United Ireland: the intention was, rather obscurely, to convey that Ireland could redeem its soul by entering the War. Eunan O’Halpin, *Defending Ireland, the Irish State and its Enemies since 1922*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 335.

(58)- Colin Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 97.

(59)- Both Ulsterian leaders are mentioned in the first chapter. Edward Carson was more than Craig’s hierarchical superior, he was considered by the latter as a mentor or a spiritual father in politics. Jacques Verrière et Jean Guiffan, op. cit., pp. 110-11.

(60)- Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, op. cit., p.84.

(61)- If Ireland had joined the Allies, it could have played the same role as the North African coasts –Casablanca, Oran and Algiers– in November 1942, with the settlement of the American troops preparing for the D-Day in Normandy on June, 6th, 1944 –Operation Overlord–. Jim Cordell, op. cit., p. 261.

(62)- James Dillon (1902-1986) was an Irish politician. Son of John Dillon and grandson of John Blake Dillon, James Dillon was elected as an independent TD for West Donegal in 1932. Although he had cast a vote for the formation of the first government of Eamon De Valera, he soon after founded a party, the National Centre Party, which soon merged with Cumann Na Ngaedheal and the Blueshirts to form Fine Gael, of which he became a vice president. From 1937 until 1969 he was TD for County Monaghan. Dillon represented the older parliamentary nationalist perspective in contrast to the Sinn Féin origins of many in Fine Gael and was also a remarkable parliamentary orator. In 1942 he withdrew from the party when his appeal for support for the anti-Axis allies in the Second World War was rejected and he remained an independent until 1951. However, Dillon did serve as minister for agriculture in the 1948–51 coalition government and rejoined Fine Gael in 1951, serving in the same position in the 1954–57 government, and then becoming leader of the party from 1959 until 1965. John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 244.

(63)- *Abwehr* means “defence” in German and refers here to the German terrestrial forces – infantry– which, with the *Luftwaffe* –air forces–and the navy, constitute Hitler’s Army: the

Wehrmacht. See Robert Fisk, *In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939-45*, London, Penguin Books, 1983, p. 332, quoting Helmut Clissmann:

“Hitler would have sold the Irish down the river. I would have told the Irish that their freedom was coming. I would have been a Lawrence of Arabia. It happened to several friends of mine, with the Bretons and the Walloons. Their freedom was promised but then, when the Germans had what they wanted, the separatist groups were abandoned. Northern Ireland would have been given to a “Vichy”- type government in London. Hitler did not want to harm the British Empire.”

(64) Elizabeth Bowen (1899-1973) was an Irish woman writer. Born and raised in Dublin as well as in the family home in Cork, Bowen’s Court, Mitchelstown, Bowen lived at different times in Ireland, England, and the United States. She moved permanently to Kent in 1959 after selling the house that was the subject of her 1942 book, *Bowen’s Court*, which gives a picture of Anglo-Irish Ireland. The theme of the “Big House” and of ancestors appears in much of her writing such as the novel *The Last September* (1929). She reported on Irish attitudes to the British Ministry of Information during the Second World War. Another novel, *A World of Love* (1955), was set in Ireland. She also wrote *Seven Winters: Memoirs of a Dublin Childhood* (1943). Her many other novels are not Irish in subject or theme, but reflect the same introspective character, such as *The Hotel* (1927), *The House in Paris* (1935), and *Friends and Relations* (1931). John P. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 202.

(65)- Robert Fisk, op. cit., p. 371.

(66)- Notably by Oliver Flanagan, who in 1943 called for emergency orders: “directed against the Jews, who crucified our Saviour nineteen hundred years ago and who are crucifying us every day in the week... There is one thing that Germany did, and that was to rout the Jews out of their country. Until we rout the Jews out of this country, it does not matter what orders you make.” (*Dail Debates*, vol. 91, cols. 569-72). Flanagan remained a TD (Fine Gael) for over forty years. Eunan O’Halpin, op. cit., p. 342.

(67)- The principal German agent to Ireland during the War was a certain Hermann Goertz. Dropped by parachute in May 1940, his radio transmitter came down on a separate parachute but he was unable to find it. He made contact with the I.R.A but for a long time they were unable to provide him with an effective transmitter, and those they did produce for him proved useless. Before he was arrested and interned the following year he left them in no doubt about his view of their struggle. He said to them: “*You know how to die for Ireland...But to fight for it you have not the slightest idea.*” War Office, WO 579/281/04,

Stanley to Rutherford, Secret, 'Memorandum on Pro-German Activism in Ireland', 19 April 1941.

(68)- Ireland remained officially neutral during the Second World War. Conscription was never extended to Northern Ireland. Yet 68.000 men enlisted from Southern Ireland, 52.000 from Northern Ireland. Southern Irishmen won eight Victoria Crosses; one went to a Belfast sailor. Robert Fisk, *op. cit.*, pp. 373-77.

(69)- The excess of imports over exports in the first six months of 1945 amounted to £ 15.000.000 which is equal to the total annual excess in the pre-war period, and the budget of the most costly Irish Department –Finance– reached £ 54.000.000 (excluding provision for capital items and Transition Development Fund) that year. Deirdre McMahon, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

(70)- Clan na Talmhan is an Irish political party founded in 1938 to champion the interests of small farmers. Its greatest electoral success was its winning 14 seats in the 1943 general election. The seven seats it obtained in the 1948 election enabled its leader, Joseph Blowick, to obtain a ministry, Lands and Fisheries, in the coalition government headed by John A. Costello from 1948 to 1951. Afterward the party's strength dwindled. Clan na Talmhan had ceased to exist by 1965. John P. McCarthy, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

(71)- Clann na Poblachta is an Irish political party founded in 1946 by a number of republicans and social radicals. Its leader was Seán MacBride, former I.R.A chief of staff. Its success in several by-elections prompted the group to run many candidates in the 1948 general election, in which it won only 10 seats in contrast to its 13 percent of the vote. However, it did become part of the first coalition government, headed by John A. Costello from Fine Gael and including members of Labour, National Labour, and Clann na Talmhan. The party's strength quickly dwindled with MacBride, as Foreign Minister, failing to support fellow member, Noel Browne, Minister for Health, in his Mother and Child Scheme that had run afoul of the medical profession and the Catholic hierarchy. The party itself was dissolved in 1965 when it held only one seat in the Dáil Éireann. *Ibid.*

(72)- Noel Browne (born in 1915) had been successively: Clann na Poblachta T D (representative) for Dublin South-East in 1948, Minister of Health in 1948-51, Independent T D in 1951-54 and 1957-58, and co-founder of the National Progressive Democratic Party, for which he sat in 1958-63. Browne joined the Labour Party, and sat as T D in 1969-73, became Senator in 1973-77, and finally, sat as a solitary T D for the Socialist Labour Party in 1977-82. He wrote his autobiography: *Against the Tide* in 1986. Deirdre McMahon, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

(73)- Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, *op. cit.*, p.87.

(74)- Sean MacBride (1904-1988), the son of Maud Gonne and Major John MacBride, is a major Irish figure of rebellion and armed struggle; Chief of Staff of the I.R.A in 1936-38, he broke with it in protest at the 1939 bombing campaign, defended republicans during the 1940's as a leading barrister, founded Clann na Poblachta in 1946, and led his party into the 1948-51 coalition, in which he was Minister for External Affairs. Secretary General of the International Community of Jurists in 1963-70, MacBride co-founded Amnesty International, and is still remembered as co-author of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights; he got also the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 and the Lenin Peace Prize in 1977. Ibid., p. 303.

(75)- Ibid., pp. 305-6.

(76)- John Aloysius Costello (1891-1976) is a prosperous lawyer who had served as Attorney General. He owed his selection as prime minister to a coalition of several parties (including his own Fine Gael) and prominent independent politicians united in opposition to Eamon De Valera's Fianna Fail (Republican Party). During his first term as Prime Minister, he introduced into the Dáil Éireann (Irish Assembly) the Republic of Ireland Act (1948), by which Ireland withdrew from the Commonwealth of Nations. His second government was marked by a sharp increase in acts of terrorism by the unlawful Irish Republican Army (IRA). He resigned as opposition leader in 1959, when De Valera became president and Sean Lemass Prime Minister. Costello was Prime Minister (Taoiseach) of Ireland from 1948 to 1951 and from 1954 to 1957. Gerard Hogan and Clive Walker, *Political Violence and the Law in Ireland*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1989, p. 147.

(77)- The Beveridge Report about social conditions in Britain, produced in 1942 by a committee led by the economist William Beveridge (1879-1963) led to the post-war development of the welfare state. It highly influenced the Irish government and inspired frequent debates at the Dáil. Records of the Dáil Eireann Courts (winding up) Commission, DE. 9-15.

(78)- Thomas Pakenham, *The Year of Liberty*, Wexford, Max Statehower, 1972, p. 277.

(79)- In July 1945, questioned in the Dail, De Valera had actually stated that Ireland was, in fact, a republic "associated as a matter of our external policy with states of the British Commonwealth"; Costello made a more or less similar remark in July 1948. Gerard Hogan and Clive Walker, op. cit., p. 153.

(80)- Ibid., p. 156.

(81)- A Dublin T.D defined the 1940's Ireland: "*We had to choose between autocracy and theocracy... We have chosen both!*" Department of Local Government files, DELG. (Dublin).

(82)- Religion (the Roman Catholic Church) goes hand in hand with political power in Ireland, a fact that makes of the Irish Republic a theocratic state, like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Sunnite), or the Islamic Republic of Iran (Shiite). Jim Cordell, op. cit., p. 294.

(83)- J.C Beckett, *a Short History of Ireland*, London, Faber & Faber, 1977, p. 318.

(84)- Three times Taoiseach (Prime Minister, see Appendix 1) and President from 1959 to 1973, Eamon De Valera's only regret has been his failure to restore the Irish language (Gaelic) as the first national tongue of Ireland instead of English. He said: " *It worked with Hebrew, why not with Irish?!*" Department of the Taoiseach (D/T), S files. (Dublin).

CONCLUSION

As for theatre in general and tragedy in particular with their theory of the three rules of unity: the same space, the same time, and one indivisible action, a nation, as it is widely known, stands on three strong pillars that are: the same geographical area in one territory, the same origin or race together with the same historical experience, and the same language and culture. Nevertheless, religion can be considered as a fourth but sustaining pillar, for it contributes in cementing unity between people who already share other common features. And if ever, the religious element fails in the constitution of a nation, setbacks could be pernicious and even lethal for the fate of this nation. The case of Ireland illustrates this, for although it is primarily a political problem, religious differences between Catholics of the Republic of Ireland and Protestants of Northern Ireland still obstruct any attempt at compromise.

The present pattern of Irish politics is directly linked with its relations with Britain since Norman times. Colonial settlement of the north (now the province of Ulster and its six counties) by Scottish Presbyterians and confiscation of land began with Elizabeth I in 1600-1603, and was continued by Cromwell 150 years later. By 1700, only about five percent of useful land in Ireland was owned by Catholics, and the Protestant predominant class ruled the country. In a Parliament completely subordinate to Westminster, only Protestants were allowed to vote until the constitutional changes of 1792 that came to be known under the terms of “legislative independence”. The end of the eighteenth century that engendered the tumultuous events of the 1798 uprising, saw the birth of both Republicanism and Unionism, but

two years later, the British Prime Minister William Pitt persuaded the Irish Parliament to preside over its own dissolution and to accept union with Britain.

With his policy of “Catholic Emancipation” and “Repeal Association” movement, the Irish Catholic agitator Daniel O’Connell (1775-1847), tried to defend the Catholics’ interests by granting them the rights to practise their cult freely, without being persecuted or excluded, and a certain political autonomy with the repeal of the Union with the British kingdom. Unfortunately, the Great Famine of 1845-1849 which struck Ireland, destroyed that hope, and such a national catastrophe, killed thousands of Irish men, women, and children, obliging the others to emigrate to the New World. Nevertheless, in the 1860-1870’s some Irish ex-soldiers called the Fenians, and other intellectuals known as the “Young Ireland” fighters, accusing the British of being responsible for the Irish people’s starvation and misery, wanted to react by separate and ill-prepared attacks which failed because of lack of necessary means. In the 1870’s, the Irish political pattern was changing and the newly born Home Rule movement took charge of the Irish question of autonomy. In 1875 the Irish MP’s were effectively organized into a Home Rule party. Led by Parnell, the Home Rulers asked for the autonomy of Ireland. At the same time Gladstone’s attempts at moderate Home Rule were balked by the House of Lords and his own party.

After the death of Parnell in 1891, the emerging Sinn Fein (*Ourselves Alone*) party, which was formed in 1907, started to assert complete separation from the United Kingdom and not just the autonomy project of Home Rule. And the idea of withdrawing elected Irish MP’s from the British Parliament at Westminster began to take shape. At this stage MP’s were still committed to Home Rule rather than complete independence, and when elections in 1910 left the nationalists holding the balance of power it seemed certain that the Liberal party would have no choice but to push through a Home Rule Bill. The ability of the House of Lords to veto legislation was limited by the Liberals to two years, and when Home Rule legislation was

blocked by the House of Lords in 1912, it was only a matter of waiting. In September 1914 the bill became an act. By that time, however, events outside parliament's control were shaping Ireland's future.

Home Rule was, thus, agreed on by the British government shortly before the beginning of the First World War. It was expected, however, that the Protestants in the north would start a civil war in the province of Ulster (Northern Ireland consists of only one province) if Home Rule was introduced; they coined it "Rome Rule" or "Pope Rule" because Home Rulers were Catholics. For this reason, when the Great War began in 1914, the British government delayed the introduction of Home Rule into Parliament, and called on Irishmen to join the Royal Army. Many thousands responded, encouraged by their M P's of the Irish Parliamentary Party, the party founded by the Protestant Charles Stewart Parnell, who hoped that this show of loyalty would help Ireland win self-government after the end of the War.

There was another group of Irishmen, however, who did not see why they should die for their traditional enemies and persecutors for centuries, the British. Those first republicans claimed that "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity" and instead of defending it, they could seize that opportunity to rebel, since the British soldiers were fighting on the European front. They did not only want Home Rule, but full independence. At Easter 1916 –which were not *joyeuses Pâques* for the British, that year–, these republicans such as De Valera, MacNeill, Pearse and Bulmer Hobson rebelled in the city of Dublin, occupying the General Post Office where they barricaded and fought. They knew that they could not win, but they hoped their rising would persuade other Irishmen to join the republican movement. The "Easter Rising" was quickly put down, and most Irish people disapproved of it perhaps one of the main reasons of its failure. But the British government, ruthlessly, executed all the leaders, which was a serious mistake. The public was shocked, not only in Ireland, but also in London. Irish Americans were also angry, just at the moment when America had joined Britain in the War against Germany. The British

never thought that they were making of the executed insurgents more than heroes, martyrs, and this fact changed completely the situation prevailing then in the island.

In the 1918 elections the republicans, led by the Sinn Fein Party of Arthur Griffith, won in almost every area except Ulster, for the Northern Irish were loyal to the British Crown and thus against any prospect for Home Rule. Instead of joining the British Parliament, however, they met in their own parliament, the Dail in Dublin, and announced that Ireland was now a republic. Irishmen joined the republic's army of Michael Collins and Cathal Brugha, and guerrilla fighting against the British began. As a result His Majesty's government, King George V, headed by the old Prime Minister David Lloyd George decided to make peace. In 1921 it agreed to the independence of the twenty-six counties of the three provinces of southern Ireland. But it also insisted that Ulster, or Northern Ireland as it became known, should, by no means, remain united with Britain. This was also the wish of the Northern Irish themselves, the Unionists.

The Anglo-Irish Treaty of November 1921 led to civil war between the southern Irish themselves: the pro-Treaty group of Griffith, Collins and Cosgrave against the anti-Treaty faction of De Valera, Brugha and Austin Stack. By this treaty the new "Irish Free State" under the presidency of William T. Cosgrave, leader of the Cumann na Ngaedheal Party, accepted continued British use of certain ports, the sovereignty of the British Crown expressed through the controversial Oath of Allegiance and most important of all, the loss of Northern Ireland, which remained under British control. The pro-Treaty forces won, and the republicans, who insisted that all Ireland, including Northern Ireland, should be an independent republic, were defeated.

When the Irish finally took charge of their own country -or at least most of it- they inherited a sorry state of affairs. The British had confined industrial activity to the north, and the rural economy of the new state was stagnant after years of neglect.

The political and social conservatism of the Catholic Church helped institutionalize a national malaise that was to last nearly half a century. In 1927 De Valera left Sinn Fein and founded a new party, Fianna Fail (Soldiers of Destiny), which became the main opposition in the Dàil.

Disagreement with Britain over the payment of land annuities -De Valera refused to pay- led Britain to impose high tariffs on Irish imports. Ireland retaliated in like manner, and life was hard for many Irish. After the turmoil of revolutionary struggle and a bitter civil war, Ireland's leaders embarked on a social and political programme decidedly unrevolutionary in nature. In 1926 a Committee of Inquiry into Evil Literature led to the creation of a censorship board that kept most 20th century classics out of the country. Freud, Sartre, Steinbeck, Salinger, Orwell, Gide, Mailer, Tennessee Williams, Dylan Thomas were all banned, not to mention every Irish writer then winning recognition elsewhere: Shaw, O'Casey, Joyce, Beckett, Behan, Kate O'Brien...etc. Under successive De Valera governments the country went into a near-terminal state of moribund conservatism and stern religiosity that reminds Cromwell's Commonwealth Puritan dictatorship over England during 1649-59. The country closed in on itself, and the legacy of resentment at England saw Ireland refuse to take sides in World War II, withdraw from the Commonwealth and decline to join the NATO.

The Fianna Fail party had won the general election of 1932 and the new Prime Minister, Eamon De Valera, began to undo the Treaty, and in 1937 ended the epoch of the Irish Free State by a scratch of a pen, and declared southern Ireland a republic under the name of "Eire" by virtue of the new Irish Constitution of the same year. The same Constitution that expelled the remaining British troops from important Irish ports ceased the payment of Land Annuities to the Crown, and, above all, annihilated the Oath of Allegiance, seen by a majority of the Irish as alienating and humiliating. The British Crown was now no longer sovereign in Ireland. *Albion* (England) had lost *Hibernia* (Ireland) forever. The 1937 Constitution also enshrined

Church ideology: blasphemy was made a crime, divorce made impossible and, until the 1998 referendum allowed for their change Articles 2 and 3 claimed the right to unite the whole of Ireland and oppose partition. In a radio broadcast in 1943 De Valera evoked a vision of Ireland as a rural paradise.

The “neutrality” of Eire during the Second World War deeply affected the course of the War, especially the Allies’ position, for, the latter never expected it. But De Valera had his reasons that he expressed in his famous radio broadcasts. Nevertheless, some Irish felt for the British misfortunes, and the Fine Gael member of the Dail, James Dillon was the only outstanding representative who condemned Ireland’s neutral policy.

In the general elections of 1948 De Valera and Fianna Fail were finally replaced with the swing of the democratic pendulum by a new and remarkable coalition, consisting of the inheritors of Cosgrave’s party, Fine Gael, now under the leadership of John A. Costello, and a new radical Republican Party, Clann na Poblachta, led by Sean MacBride. This eventually completed the constitutional formality from which De Valera had held back in the belief that it would make the ending of Partition more difficult if not impossible. Ireland was finally declared a Republic in 1949, and it was recognized by Britain with guarantee of support to Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom the same year.

After having served, once again, as Prime Minister from 1951 to 1954, and from 1957 to 1959 (his last administration), De Valera retired from office as Taoiseach but was elected to the presidency, serving until 1973. Edward George De Valera (*Eamon de Bhailéara* in Gaelic) died in 1975, two years after the end of his second term, at which time he was the oldest head of state in the world at the age of ninety three.

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APPENDIX

PROCLAMATION OF THE REPUBLIC

Poblacht na hEireann

The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic to the People of Ireland

Irishmen and Irishwomen: In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom.

Having organized and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organization, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organizations, the Irish Volunteers, and the Irish Citizen Army, having perfectly perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory.

We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty; six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish republic as a sovereign independent state,

and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades-in-arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and of its exaltation among the nations.

The Irish republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past.

Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent national government, representative of the whole people of Ireland, and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provisional Government, hereby constituted, will administer the civil and military affairs of the republic in trust for the people. We place the cause of the Irish republic under the protection of the Most High God, whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonor it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline, and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.

Signed on behalf of the provisional government,

Thomas J. Clarke, Sean MacDiarmada, Thomas MacDonagh, P. H. Pearse, Eamonn Ceannt, James Connolly, Joseph Plunkett.

Printed at Liberty Hall on 23 April 1916 (National Museum of Ireland). Text reproduced from Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916, the Irish Rebellion*, London, Penguin Books, 2005, p. xx.

ABSTRACT

The Irish Question from Home Rule to the Republic of Ireland, 1891-1949, is an attempt to shed light on one of the most complex and puzzling political problems the contemporary world had ever witnessed. A study of the Irish problem *abovo* (“from the egg” in Latin, from the origins) would have taken volumes of consistent books, for it goes back to King Henry II’s first settlement in Ireland in the 12th century. No less than thirty seven monarchs and two Lord Protectors, from Henry II to George V had tried, in vain, to subdue the recalcitrant Irish who have never given up fight and resistance to the English” tyrants”.

Apart from the first chapter which is an introductory stage, we have decided to try to limit our analysis of the Irish question to contemporary times only starting in 1891, a highly significant date for it marks the death of Charles Stewart Parnell, the “Uncrowned King of Ireland”, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party. Parnell was the first Irish politician who asserted Home Rule and fought constitutionally for its application. This was the climax of the Irish question that went through different stages to reach its actual status of republic, from Home Rule to the Republic of Ireland.

Key words:

Republicans; Unionists; Home Rule; Catholics; Protestants; Ulster; Sinn Fein; Partition; Eire; Northern Ireland.

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