


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**A Case Study on the US Policy in Humanitarian
Intervention: The Bosnian War
1992-1995**

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To my dear parents.

Abstract

This dissertation is a study of US foreign policy in the context of international relations in the post-Cold War era. It deals with the issue of US humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War as a case in point. More specifically, the study examines both the Bush and Clinton administration's policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The intent of this dissertation is to prove that US humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War was driven by power-political motivations, rather than primarily humanitarian concerns.

This study argues that the United States, under the Bush administration, chose to remain disengaged for there were no conceptualized national interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Clinton, however, campaigned on the Bosnian War from an idealistic perspective. His rhetoric was very much consistent with an approach to international relations based on the idealistic assumptions of morality and human rights. Yet, once in office, the Clinton administration operated on the realistic assumptions of realpolitik.

In this regard, this dissertation explains why, for more than three years of horror and absurdity, brutal atrocities and genocide, the United States remained disengaged and waited so long before taking the lead in mobilizing NATO airstrikes against the Serb positions. Simultaneously, this study highlights the motives behind the shift in US foreign policy from disengagement towards humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War.

ملخص

تسعى هذه الأطروحة إلى دراسة السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في زمن ما بعد الحرب الباردة. تتعامل هذه الدراسة مع قضية التدخل الأمريكي العسكري الإنساني في حرب البسنة، و بشكل أكثر تحديدا تبحث في سياستي كل من الرئيسين الأمريكيين بوش و كلينتون المتعلقين بالحرب التي وقعت في البسنة و الهرسك.

غاية هذه الأطروحة هي محاولة إثبات بان التدخل الأمريكي العسكري الإنساني في حرب البسنة كان بسبب دوافع سياسة في السلطة و ليس لأولوية الأسباب الإنسانية البحتة.

كما ترى هذه الدراسة بان الولايات المتحدة، في عهدة إدارة الرئيس بوش، اختارت سياسة عدم التدخل في الحرب و ذلك لعدم بروز أي دوافع تخدم المصلحة الوطنية. على عكس ذلك، الرئيس كلينتون روج في الحملة الانتخابية الرئاسية على حرب البسنة من منظور المثالية، فكان أسلوب خطابه على اتساق تام مع التطلع لعلاقات دولية مبنية على أساس التصور الأخلاقي و حقوق الإنسان. و لكن مباشرة بعد بدأ ادارة كلينتون عملت على افتراضات الواقعية باتجاه حرب البسنة.

و في هذا الصدد، توضح هذه الدراسة لماذا اختارت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية سياسة عدم التدخل لإخماد نار الحرب لمدة دامت أكثر من ثلاث سنوات اكتسحها الرعب و العبث و اعترتها فضائع الوحشية و الإبادة الجماعية. كل هذا قبل اخذ زمام المبادرة في قيادة ضربات الناتو العسكرية الجوية ضد القواعد الصربية. في نفس الوقت، فان هذه الدراسة تسلط الضوء على دوافع الولايات المتحدة من وراء التحول في السياسة الخارجية من عدم التدخل إلى تبني سياسة التدخل العسكري الإنساني في حرب البسنة.

Résumé

Cette thèse sert à étudier la politique extérieure des Etats-Unies durant la période de l'après Guerre Froide. Elle traite surtout sur l'intervention militaire et humanitaire américaine dans la Guerre de la Bosnie, et plus précisément examine la politique de l'Administration américaine lors du mandat du président Bush et Clinton vis-à-vis de la Guerre de la Bosnie.

Le but de cette thèse est de prouver que l'intervention humanitaire américaine dans la guerre était manipulée par des motivations politiques du pouvoir et non pas par des propos humanitaires brutes.

Cette étude estime que les Etats-Unies sous la présidence de Bush ont choisi la politique de non implication car il n'y avait pas d'intérêts nationaux conceptualisés en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Cependant, le président Clinton qui s'était basé dans sa campagne électorale sur des perspectives idéalistes. Son discours était compatible avec une approche des relations internationales fondée sur les hypothèses idéalistes de la morale et des droits de l'homme. Pourtant une fois au pouvoir, l'Administration de Clinton a utilisé des hypothèses de la *realpolitik*.

A ce regard, cette thèse explique pourquoi les Etats-Unies sont restés désengager de puis plus de trois ans d'horreur et l'absurdité, et attendu si longtemps avant de prendre la responsabilité de la mobilisation de l'OTAN contre des positions serbes. En même temps, cette étude met en évidence les motivations de l'évolution de la politique étrangère américaine de désengagement envers l'intervention humanitaire dans la Guerre de la Bosnie.

List of Abbreviations

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

CNN: Cable News Network

DPG: Defense Planning Guidance

EC: European Community

HDZ: Croat Democratic Union

HVO: Bosnian Croat Forces

ICFY: International Conference on Former Yugoslavia

IFOR: Peace Implementation Forces

JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff

JNA: Yugoslav People's Army

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PKO: Peacekeeping Operation

RSK: Republic of Serb Krajina

SDA: Party of Democratic Action

SDS: Serb Democratic Party

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UNSC Res: United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WEU: Western European Union

List of Maps

Map N°1: The Former Yugoslavia.....	27
Map N°2: Ethnic Majorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991.....	28
Map N°3: The Cutileiro Map, March 1992.....	46
Map N°4: The Initial Vance-Owen Map, January 1993.....	73
Map N°5: The Western Offensive, August-September, 1995.....	97
Map N°6: Key Territorial Issues at Dayton.....	101

Content

Acknowledgements

Dedication

Abstract

Abstract in Arabic

Abstract in French

List of Abbreviations

List of Maps

General Introduction.....1

**Chapter I: Theoretical, Historical Background of US Foreign Policy, and US-Yugoslav
Relations (1945-1990).....6**

I.1. Definition of Realism and Idealism in International Relations.....7

I.2. US Foreign Policymaking between Idealism and Realism.....8

I.2.1. Wilsonian Idealism.....9

I.2.2. Realism and Post-World War II US Foreign Policy.....10

I.2.2.1. US Realistic Policy of Containment: From theory into practice.....10

I.2.2.2. The Vietnamese War and the Cost of Militarized Containment.....13

I.3. A New Emphasis on Human Rights.....17

I.3.1. The Definition of Humanitarian Intervention.....21

I.3.2. The Debate on Humanitarian Intervention.....22

I.4. The US-Yugoslav Relations before the Breakup of the Bosnian War (1945-1990).....25

I.4.1. The US-Yugoslav Relations before the Tito- Stalin Split (1945-1948).....25

I.4.2. The US-Yugoslav Relations after the Tito-Stalin Split (1948-1990).....26

Chapter II: The Developments of the Bosnian War: The United States, the European Community and the United Nations' Reaction.....	34
II.1. Ethnicity and Politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1960s-1990s).....	34
II.2. The Causes of the Bosnian War.....	38
II.3. The US Sponsored Role in Bosnia's Secession.....	43
II.4. US Motivations behind Involvement in Bosnia's Secession.....	48
II.5. Fighting on the Ground: A War of Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide	49
II.5.1. Major Crises of the Bosnian War (1993-1994).....	51
II.5.2. Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide in the Bosnian War.....	53
II.6. The Bush Administration's Policy on the Bosnian War.....	57
II.6.1. The Bush Administration under Pressure.....	60
II.6.2. The US Action within the UN and its Collaboration with the EC.....	62
Chapter III: The Clinton Administration Faces the Bosnian War.....	69
III.1. The Bosnia Issue before and after Clinton's Inauguration.....	69
III.2. The Clinton Administration Thwarts a Negotiation Settlement.....	71
III.3. Clinton's Undecided Administration and Disengagement.....	75
III.4. Fighting Intensifies: The Muslim-Croat Conflict.....	78
III.5. The Strategy of Safe Areas and Betrayal.....	79
III.6. A Shift towards Reluctant US Leadership.....	81
III.6.1. US Sponsorship of the Muslim-Croat Federation	82
III.6.2. The 1994 NATO "Pinprick" Airstrikes.....	85
III.7. The Srebrenica Massacre: A Watershed in US Bosnia Policy.....	90

III.8. The Move towards Engagement and Military Intervention.....	93
III.8.1. US Offensive Strategy.....	93
III.8.2. The 1995 US-led NATO Airstrikes: A showcase for US Hegemony.....	96
III.8.3. The Dayton Accords and US Motives behind the Endgame.....	98
General Conclusion.....	107
Glossary.....	112
Bibliography.....	114

General Introduction

The conduct of the United States foreign policy has oscillated between two different world views: idealism and realism, both of which have dominated the thinking of US foreign policymakers at different times. Idealism and realism originate from different beliefs about how best to bring ideals and interests together; principles and power, moral purposes and military primacy.

Idealistic and realistic thoughts have shaped the frame of US foreign policy at least since the Second World War. For more than fifty years, the United States has attempted to develop a foreign policy that mirrors its idealistic values, but protected US national interests at the same time.

The emergence of the United States as a world superpower, along with the Soviet Union, played a role in forming the perception that the United States of America has been realistically acting, maintaining international order through political, economic as well as military strength. This standpoint has been supported by US interventionists. Proponents of non-intervention, however, have called for the individual welfare and general interest of all humanity.

Although, non-interventionist American policymakers have had their say, adherent internationalists have always had a penchant for military intervention on the international scene. Since the post-Cold War era, the United States has maintained a visible military presence in the European Continent, and has involved itself in regional conflicts. Nevertheless, as the US became more powerful and entangled in world affairs, more debate took place, in Congress, on how the United States should conduct its humanitarian interventionist foreign policy. American policymakers were simultaneously haunted by the aspiration for humanitarian military intervention and the fear from its consequences.

In the light of these concerns, the idea of humanitarian intervention has emerged as a source of hope, following the end of the Cold War, a period that was proved to be less stable. Conflicts in Haiti, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and several regions of the Sub-Saharan Africa suggested that civil wars and ethno-religious hatred had replaced East-West tensions. Such conflicts often result in atrocities and humanitarian emergencies which capture the attention of adherents of humanitarian intervention, who argue that armed action by major powers, led by the United States, can attenuate the most destructive effects of regional conflicts.

Post-Cold War supporters of humanitarian intervention connect humanitarian intervention with the crime of genocide. They emphasize that wars perpetrated by one ethnic group against a subordinate one, as in Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, bringing into attention the need for decisive actions, actions that entail the use of military force in order to prevent such a recurrence of genocide.

Within this belief, the United States of America, the world's militarily powerful nation, is addressed to lead humanitarian efforts. Ever since the dismantlement of the Soviet Union, US supremacy and hegemony have been inevitably required for the conduct of humanitarian intervention. Albeit the United Nations and the European Union would have a role to play, they would have to do so under the leadership of the United States.

US guidance to direct military interventions, in genocidal wars, is assumed to be moral and humanitarian. The use of force is motivated by the intention of protecting human rights. Does this motive really make humanitarian intervention easier to justify, and undertake? Could not the United States use humanitarian intervention as a pretext in order to justify the use of force to advance its economic as well as geostrategic position in the world? Great powers, like France, Germany, Great Britain and Russia, had, after all, justified their self-interested actions on the basis of moral purposes.

Genocidal crises that took place during the 1990s happened in remote regions. Such regions might be unimportant from the American grasp, and great powers' interests. The Cold War norms of *realpolitik* were said to be put aside. The idealistic norm of the United States to protect persecuted victims was, however, claimed to be the real purpose behind those interventions. In this context, humanitarian intervention has been conducted in a range of cases.

The US humanitarian intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina is one case in point. From 1992 through 1995, Bosnia, a small corner of Europe, was the scene of a horrible war that produced one of the continent's worst carnage of the late 20th century. The full name of the nation is Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is abbreviated to Bosnia-Herzegovina or Bosnia. In this dissertation, the shortened names are used interchangeably.

The Bosnian War was raged between the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs. It was triggered by power politics; by elites who manipulated deeply rooted ethnic tensions to benefit their quest for political and economic supremacy.

The ruthlessness of the war held the attention of the United Nations, the European Community and the United States of America. The result was foreign intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina on humanitarian grounds.

The Bosnian War was a major issue in two US presidents' foreign policy, President George Bush and President Bill Clinton respectively. Although there were supporters of military intervention within his administration, President Bush did not involve the United States in the Bosnian War by sending US troops to help end the conflict. Nevertheless, the US administration of the time was active only in supporting the United Nations' initiatives to resolve the Bosnian crisis.

During his 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton, however, criticized the Bush administration's policy in Bosnia. He expressed outrage over the Serb's atrocities against Bosnian Muslims. Clinton gave the impression that he would deal more forcefully with the irredentists in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, once in office, he worked at a slow pace to stop the slaughter. It was not until the end of 1995 that the Clinton administration took the lead in mobilizing NATO airstrikes, paving the way for a peace conference in Dayton.

In fact, US involvement in the Bosnian War did not follow a straightforward policy. President Bill Clinton delayed US military intervention for almost three years. At the outset, the Clinton administration pursued a policy of disengagement. Then, it reluctantly moved towards a more active role in Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout late 1993 and 1994. It was until late 1995 that the Clinton administration intervened militarily in the Bosnian War. At the time, most of Bosnia was destroyed, and thousands of its inhabitants were massacred.

The choice of this topic is motivated by the fact that very few studies have been done on this subject in my country, Algeria. Additionally, this dissertation is interested in examining the nature of US involvement in the Bosnian War, particularly at a time when the United States of America has become the world's sole superpower. One can discern that the US could have intervened militarily in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the outset of the conflict to stop the wholesale slaughter of innocent people. It had the volition to send its troops since no one could stand on its way. The former USSR had already been dismantled. Yet, it pursued a policy of disengagement and was reluctant to intervene in the Bosnian War.

The aim of this study is to analyze and interpret the nature of U.S. humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War. The research question addressed in this dissertation is: Why did the United States of America remain disengaged and wait so long before mobilizing NATO to impose airstrikes? And why did the Clinton administration opt for military intervention in the Bosnian War?

The dissertation also raises the following sub-questions:

1. What urged President Clinton to intervene militarily in the Bosnian War?
2. Was US involvement in the war due to domestic pressure, international pressure, or to both?
3. What was the US purpose from involvement in the Bosnian War?
4. To what extent did the United States (and NATO) succeed in ending the conflict between the different ethnic groups (Croats, Muslims and Serbs) in Bosnia?

In this work, I suggest a number of hypotheses. First, the reasons leading US Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton to delay military intervention in the Bosnian War were more or less the same. Second, US shift in policy from disengagement towards military intervention was motivated by geostrategic considerations of primacy and national security, as well as economic interests. In other words, US Bosnia policy was shaped by realistic concerns of US national interests, but not idealistic moral purposes. US humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War was driven by power-political motivations, rather than humanitarian considerations.

US intervention in the Bosnian War can be considered politically and economically. On the whole and methodologically, the dissertation combines descriptive and analytical approaches within a historical context. It is made up of three chapters. Since the objective of this research is to prove that US military intervention in the Bosnia War was not based on primarily idealistic concerns but on considerations of realpolitik, the first chapter aims at providing background on the international relations theoretical approaches of idealism and realism. Simultaneously, it traces the significant events whose aftermath would affect the American policy towards the Bosnian War. What comes next is an examination of the US practice of humanitarian intervention by the end of the Cold War period.

As long as this study revolves around US intervention in the Bosnian War on humanitarian grounds, chapter one is concerned with the definition of humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, it discusses the debate that was raised on the legality of the practice of humanitarian intervention, or otherwise. Then, it deals with the US-Yugoslav relations after the Second World War. It sheds light on the shift in the US policy towards Yugoslavia according to the circumstances that determined the fate of the US-Yugoslav relations.

The main part of the dissertation is made up of chapter two and three. The second chapter provides an overview on how ethnicity was looked upon by both the Bosnian population and the leadership before the breakup of the Bosnian War. In addition, it discusses the causes that led to the war, taking into consideration the role of the United States as events developed towards the breakup of the Bosnian war. This chapter also deals with the different reactions of the United States, the European Union and the United Nations to the emergence of the conflict.

The third and last chapter is concerned with the Clinton administration. It begins with a look at the Bosnia issue during the Clinton presidential campaign and after inauguration. It discusses how the Clinton administration pursued a similar policy of disengagement as his predecessor President Bush. This chapter highlights the administration's reluctance to find a peace settlement to the Bosnian War. Finally, the third chapter examines the shift in US Bosnia policy towards a more active leadership that led the United States to play an aggressive role in the Bosnian War, discussing US strategy and its motives behind the endgame.

The primary sources in relation to US humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War used in this study are letters, and news conferences of President Bill Clinton, Sen. Bob Dole's letter to President George H. W. Bush, and the US Department of Defense's Defense Planning Guidance document. In addition, the Richard Holbrooke's *To End a War*, and David Rieff's *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* are primary books used in this dissertation.

Chapter I

**Theoretical, Historical Background of US Foreign Policy,
and US-Yugoslav Relations (1945-1990)**

For more than two hundred years, US foreign policy has oscillated between two approaches to international relations, idealism and realism. The exceptional notion of American experience that was central to the founding of the American Republic gave birth to idealism in the political culture of the United States. First American policymakers had connected Europe with power politics, what today could be referred to as realism. They had thought that the driving force behind the conduct of foreign relations should not be the quest for national power.¹ These policymakers, instead, had an idealistic perspective of how the world should be.

As the United States grew and its power with it, US policymakers have become haunted by geopolitical spheres of influence, the pursuit of national interests, and the expansion of military power. The emergence of the United States as a powerful nation led to the perception that America has been acting on realistic assumptions, particularly ever since the end of the Second World War.²

American foreign policy towards the Balkan countries, precisely, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was oriented around the context of the Cold War. This orientation was determined by the US realistic concerns to roll back the Soviet expansion towards Western Europe.

In that respect, chapter one aims at providing background on the international relations theoretical approaches of realism and idealism. It also deals with significant events that would influence American policy on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then, it discusses US conduct of humanitarian intervention by the end of the Cold War period. In addition, this chapter is concerned with the definition of humanitarian intervention and the debate on its legality or otherwise. Finally, chapter one also discusses the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia prior to the breakup of the Bosnian War.

¹ Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., s.v. "Realism and Idealism," 313-315.

² *Ibid.*, 323.

I.1. Definition of Realism and Idealism in International Relations

Realism is a theoretical approach to the study and practice of international relations. Albeit definitions of realism vary in their details, realists tend to share four central beliefs.³ First, they put a great emphasis on the state. They hold that the state is a primary actor in world politics.⁴ Second, they believe that the world states interact in an environment of anarchy because there is no authority capable of regulating their interactions. As a result, states have to establish relations with each other on their own.⁵ Third, realism assumes that each state must pursue its national interests and ensure its own security. When states interact politically, they are principally impelled by their national interests in order to assure their survival.⁶ Finally, since the world states are driven by their national interest and motivated by ensuring their own security, they seek to amass resources and maximize power. Realists believe that power constitutes the essence of international relations, and that the acquisition of power is the proper rationale of foreign policy.⁷ Consequently, the interaction of states in an anarchical environment, where the world states are driven by their national interests, makes international relations a largely politics of power and security.

In such a dangerous, uncertain world, relations between states are determined by their level of power in terms of military force and economic capabilities. Thus, states must acquire the necessary military power in order to deter attacks. Realism, indeed, equates international politics with power politics. It is, therefore, often associated with *realpolitik*.⁸

On the other hand, idealism, as a theoretical approach to the study and practice of international relations, defines goals in ideal, moral forms.⁹ Idealists emphasize the importance of the role of international institutions, rather than the state. International institutions, according to the idealists, give priority to collective security as a means for the realization of national defence.¹⁰ Besides, they view the international system as not only

³ Christian Reus-Smith, and Duncan Snidal, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, 132. Four principal generations can be identified in the academic study of international relations: an interwar and wartime generation, the famous figures were Reinhold Niebuhr and E. H. Carr; an early Cold War generation, symbolized by Hans Morgenthau, including prominent figures like George Kennan and Raymond Aron; a *détente* generation, best presented by Kenneth Waltz, including leading exponents Stephen Krasner and Robert Gilpin; and a post-Cold War generation, led by John Mearsheimer.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 133-134.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁸ Tom Barry, "The U.S. Power Complex: What's New," 06.

⁹ Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., s.v. "Realism and Idealism," 311.

¹⁰ Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 221.

flawed, but capable of being bettered. According to the idealists, the world is not hopelessly corrupt. It can morally and politically develop through proper leadership.¹¹ Additionally, while the realists are concerned with the state's national interests and security, the idealists focus on the individual welfare and general interests of all humankind.¹² In this respect, they tend to see the state as being able to work selflessly with other states and international institutions.¹³ The aim of international institutions is to manage international relations, to restrain aggression through collective security and mediate conflicts, and to foster human rights as well.¹⁴

Realism and idealism comprise opposing approaches to international relations. While realism stresses the role of the state, idealism focuses on the role of international institutions. Realism views that states are compelled by their national interests which they define in terms of balance of power. Idealism, however, views the world states in more relative terms that they interact in an unselfish manner for moral motives; the general interests of all humanity.

Although realism opposes idealism to the role of the states in international relations and the pursuit of their national objectives, they both have influenced and guided the practice of US international relations in the world political arena. Many scholars have said that idealism frequently coexists with realism in America's foreign policy. However, it is often posited that the conduct of US foreign policy has oscillated between idealism and realism.

I.2. US Foreign Policymaking between Idealism and Realism

Idealism as well as realism vied for greater pride of place in the 20th-century US theoretical perspectives on world politics. American foreign policy cyclically swung between idealism and realism. The idealistic mood prevailed in times of US prosperity and optimism following the end of the First World War. US President Woodrow Wilson is closely identified with the development of ideal thoughts in the United States.¹⁵ The idealistic mood, however, was repudiated and realistic assumptions dominated the US policymakers' thinking after the Second World War.¹⁶

¹¹ Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., s.v. "Realism and Idealism," 311-312.

¹² Ibid., 313.

¹³ Charles Strohmer, "Realism and Idealism in International Relations," 06.

¹⁴ Ibid., 07.

¹⁵ Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 221.

¹⁶ Ibid.

I.2.1. Wilsonian Idealism

It is argued that moral principles were dominant among US policymakers over the first four decades of the 20th century.¹⁷ The ingredients of idealism were put into practice during the Wilson presidency (1913-1921). In order to avoid another war, Wilson's policy required that the world states relieve themselves of the balance of power and the pursuit of national interests.¹⁸ President Wilson put it himself that foreign policy should not be defined in "terms of material interest," and should be "more concerned about human rights than about property rights."¹⁹

In addition to his idealistic ethical approach, Wilson's vision of a peaceful world demanded the necessity of a democratic foundation. As a consequence, he put the promotion of democracy, to the emerging world order, at the centre of US foreign policy.²⁰ President Wilson assumed that democratic states were more stable and peace-loving. Hence, they were the most suitable building blocks of the international system as long as they recognized each other's legitimacy, Wilson contended.²¹ In this regard, Ikenberry argues that the promotion of democracy abroad, thus, dates back to Woodrow Wilson and the end of the First World War.²²

Furthermore, Wilson's vision of a new world order recommended that democratically constituted governments should maintain peace through a system of a collective military security and liberal economic exchange, under a body of treaties that would assure equal access to world markets.²³ For that reason, an international organization, the League of Nations, would be created.

Wilson's idealistic framework for world order after the First World War called for the promotion of human rights and democracy, in addition to a system of collective security and a liberal economic regime. According to him, the conduct of foreign policy should be given a moral cast.

¹⁷ John Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, 223.

¹⁸ Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., s.v. "Realism and Idealism," 323.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 276.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 276.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 266.

²² *Ibid.*, 203.

²³ Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle of Democracy in the Twentieth Century*, 84; Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., s.v. "Realism and Idealism," 323.

The Wilsonian agenda, however, seemed unable to create order after the end of the war.²⁴ This inability discredited Wilson's idealism leading to its abandonment over the inter war years, and thus setting the stage for the introduction of realistic thinking in the conduct of US foreign policy.

I.2.2. Realism and Post-World War II US Foreign Policy

Realism, as an approach to US foreign policy decision making, vied for a pride of place by the time the United States of America emerged as a hegemonic power after the Second World War. The idealistic strand of thought did not completely vanish in US foreign policy, though. Ikenberry notices that there was a great debate between "an ascendant realism and a beleaguered idealism" in US foreign policy.²⁵

The realistic paradigm was brought into dominance by Hans Morgenthau for the study and conduct of post-World War II American foreign relations. Declaring that leaders "think and act in terms of interests defined as power," Morgenthau sought to get the Americans rid of their belief in law, morality, and mutual interest as bases of world order.²⁶ This line of thought was reflected in the Cold War policy of containment.

I.2.2.1. US Realistic Policy of Containment: From Theory into Practice

At the end of the Second World War, the international system evolved into a bipolar balance of power in which the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as leading powers. The two superpowers became rivals competing for power in a struggle in which the United States perceived itself as the forebear of what was right. The American perceived threat of Soviet expansion was considered dangerous to US national security. To do right was to bring Soviet expansion into an end.²⁷

²⁴ Wilson's program of a moral liberal internationalism was seen to be a seeming failure because of the US failure to join the League of Nations, the debacle of the league and the rise of German as well as Japanese power during the 1930s.

²⁵ John Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, 276.

²⁶ Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, s.v., 414; John Ikenberry, *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, 276.

²⁷ The Soviet Union began moving southward even before the smoke from the Second World War cleared. Turkey, Greece and Iran were the first to feel the Soviet pressure. In 1945, Turkey was pressured by the Soviet Union about access to the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles Strait, a Turkish strait connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. In Greece, communist pressure was exerted on the government in an attempt to seize power in the country. In the meantime, the Soviets intensified pressure on Iran by refusing to withdraw their troops, which had been there since 1941, from Iran. Then, the Czech government was overthrown by the Communists in a coup d'état in 1948. Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 31-35.

In this context, George F. Kennan, the US State Department's expert on the Soviet Union, established the basis of the US strategy of containment that prevailed in the Cold War era. Kennan's policy depicted how the Truman administration should control the Soviet expansion. It was meant to limit and not permit the expansion of communism outside the borders of the Soviet Union territory.²⁸

Kennan believed that the Soviet Union did not pose a serious military problem to the United States since it was drained by the war. However, the Kremlin was "dealing in ideological concepts which [were] of a long-term validity," Kennan wrote.²⁹ Therefore, the United States had not to resort to the use of military power in a direct conflict with the Soviets. Instead, it should adopt a policy which, according to Kennan, had to be of a "long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment."³⁰

Kennan's containment strategy was accepted in Washington, whose leaders embarked on the task of translating its theory into initiatives. The containment strategy provided the foundation for subsequent doctrines that would define US foreign policy during the post-Second World War period. It found its first application in the Truman Doctrine.³¹

The Truman Doctrine pledged economic aid as well as military supplies for European countries that were on the verge of economic destruction, political and social upheavals. Since the United States could not allow the expansion of the Soviet Union, US policymakers had to plan for a resolution in order to help Western Europe recover. For that reason, Secretary of State George Marshall called for the European Recovery Program, later known as the Marshall Plan (1948-1952).³²

Marshall demanded that the European states devise a plan for their economic recovery. The United States would supply their funds, but they had to do the planning themselves. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 called for the creation of an integrated European market. As time went by, European leaders anticipated a united Europe independent

²⁸ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 39.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 40

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Turkey. Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 46. On March 12, 1947, the Truman Doctrine was born from President Harry Truman's speech delivered before a joint session of Congress in order to deal with the situations in Greece as well as Turkey.

³² *Ibid.*, 58.

of American pressure. To this end, the European Economic Community was established in 1957, paving the way for political unification.³³

Not only was the Marshall Plan presented to war-torn nations in Western Europe, but it was also open to all European countries, including the Soviet Union. However, Stalin rejected the plan and refused to participate.³⁴ His denunciation of the Marshall Plan resulted in the division of Europe into two blocs; one dependent on the United States, the other dependent on the Soviet Union.

Soon after the Marshall Plan was implemented, it was considered that economic measures would not suffice to roll the Soviet expansion back. The Soviet Union engineered a coup in Prague.³⁵ It also challenged the post-war division of Germany.³⁶ Therefore, it was clear that military security was necessary for Europe's recovery. Thus in April 1949, the ten European countries, with the United States and Canada, created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.³⁷ NATO formalized the policy of containment in serving two functions. The first function was to counter the Soviet through a collective defense of NATO members against Soviet provocations. The second function was to defuse the European states' rivalries by subordinating their military forces to the United States, the leader of the newly established alliance.³⁸

With the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO, the United States enlarged the containment policy beyond the economy into the military. This

³³ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 58.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 59. In rejection of the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union responded, in July 11, 1947, with the Molotov Plan, a series of trade agreement between eastern European countries.

³⁵ As the 1948 election approached in Czechoslovakia, Czech radicals, with Soviet backing, brought Communist to power in Prague. Eight non-communist police commanders were dismissed by the minister of the Interior, and replaced by party men. In the midst of a protest, over the question of who was to control the police during the elections, in the Cabinet, non-Marxist ministers resigned, but were rejected when they tried to return. The Communists staged strikes, armed workers' rallies, and a violent putsch. Then, the president of the liberal democratic faction, Edvard Benes, resigned clearing the way for the communist takeover. Britannica Encyclopedia.

³⁶ By the end of WWII, the victorious Allies agreed to divide Germany into four zones of occupation. The American, British, and French zones together made up the western two-thirds of Germany, while the Soviet zone comprised the eastern third. The former capital Berlin itself, which lay 110 miles inside the Soviet zone, was similarly divided into four zones, under the Allied Control Council's overall joint authority over the whole of Germany. The Soviet challenge took the form of a blockade of West Berlin in response to the West strong pressure to economically revive Germany and integrate the three Western Zones into the European recovery programme. In 1948, after the Western powers introduced, in the Western zone, a new currency reform, which was undertaken without the Soviet approval, the Soviet Union boycotted the ACC and blockaded all routes from the Western Zones to the Western sectors of Berlin. Britannica Encyclopedia; John Mason, *The Cold War 1945-1991*, 11-12.

³⁷ Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal.

³⁸ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 62-64.

reflects a foreign policy based on realistic assumptions of maintaining balance of power through economic as well as military strength.

Events in East Asia vouched for US decision of military intervention. Most notably was the US involvement in the Vietnamese War to repel communism from South Vietnam.

1.2.2.2. The Vietnamese War and the Cost of Militarized Containment

The American involvement in Vietnam began in 1950 when the United States committed its economic and military assistance to the French cause in order to fight Ho Chi Minh; the Vietnamese revolutionary who had organized the Vietminh as the Revolutionary League for the Independence of Vietnam.³⁹ Albeit the United States helped the French by providing \$1.2 billion in aid and sending several technicians as well as advisers to Vietnam, the French military was unable to win. As a consequence, President Eisenhower outlined his doctrine of the Domino Theory to justify US intervention in Vietnam.

Moreover, there was a shift in American public opinion in the context of the Cold War. Perceptions of the French presence in Vietnam changed from colonialism into fighting against communism. Then, the United States quickly moved to replace the French colonial rule as the anti-communist force in South Vietnam.⁴⁰

Between 1955 and 1961, the United States continued its economic and military aid to Diem's regime.⁴¹ However, the situation in Vietnam began to deteriorate in 1963. Vietminh forces were making headway against South Vietnamese army, increasing the level of violence.⁴² As a result, President John Kennedy escalated the US commitment in Vietnam. His administration criticized the Eisenhower administration's strategy of massive retaliation.⁴³ President Kennedy and his officials favoured the use of conventional military forces, instead.

³⁹ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 112. Since 1946, in a struggle with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the French had been trying to reestablish colonial rule in Indochina, a former colony of France comprising the present-day nations of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 113.

⁴¹ John Mason, *The Cold War 1945-1991*, 35.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 36. The Eisenhower administration reflected on the frustrating experience of the inclusive conventional war fought in Korea. It wondered why the West had not made more of its nuclear superiority. Besides, being worried about the economic burden of conventional rearmament, President Eisenhower assigned a greater priority to nuclear weapons. The strategy that emerged from these considerations became known as "massive retaliation", a strategy which was interpreted as threatening nuclear attacks against targets in the Soviet Union and China in reprisal for conventional aggressions anywhere in the world. Britannica Encyclopedia.

He sent 16,500 military advisers in order to train the South Vietnamese army to take the offensive against the Vietminh.⁴⁴

After Kennedy's death, Vice-president Lyndon Johnson took over, winning the 1964 elections on his ground that "we seek no wider war" in Vietnam.⁴⁵ However, in August 1964, North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked US destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf. In a retaliatory response, President Johnson ordered air strikes against North Vietnamese patrol boats.⁴⁶

In 1965, President Johnson further escalated US involvement in the Vietnamese War. He launched a campaign of air strikes against North Vietnam in response to the Vietminh attack on the US military base near Pleiku, an attack which killed eight, wounded more than a hundred, and destroyed several planes.⁴⁷ At the same time, President Johnson sent 200,000 troops to Vietnam and ordered 3,500 marines into combat, deepening the United States involvement in the war and turning the US escalating policy into a long-term commitment.⁴⁸

Despite the extensive airstrikes campaign and the steady increase in the number of US troops in Vietnam, the military situation was a stalemate throughout 1966 and 1967. However, what did change was the American public attitude towards the US involvement in the Vietnamese War. There was a public debate over the war which spread to most areas of the United States. It was particularly heated on college campuses, where activist students divided between war supporters and anti-war protestors, sponsored rallies. Another factor was television coverage of the war. Many Americans began to sense by what they saw on television that the US administration was hiding the truth about the course of the war in Vietnam.⁴⁹

The year of 1968 was a turning point in the war. The Vietminh, combined by North Vietnamese forces, started the Tet Offensive against twenty-six South Vietnamese cities. Albeit the US military and the South Vietnamese army recaptured control of all the cities and won many of the battles, the United States lost the war as the American public grew tired of the struggle in Vietnam. Violent protests, particularly in Chicago, continued spilling over bloody clashes with the police and protestors. The anti-war sentiments persisted, seemingly

⁴⁴ Steven Hook, *op. cit.*, 119.

⁴⁵ John Mason, *op. cit.*, 37.

⁴⁶ John Mason, *op. cit.*, 37.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 118; John Finding and Frank Thackeray, ed., *Events that Changed America in the Twentieth Century*, 173.

⁴⁹ John Finding and Frank Thackeray, ed., *Events that Changed America in the Twentieth Century*, 173.

without end, through the late 1960s and early 1970s as the war dragged on and as casualties, inflation and, taxes mounted.⁵⁰

Not only did the United States find itself in social upheavals, but in political turmoil as well. There was a division within the Johnson administration on both the right and the left, with the former urging an end to the Vietnamese War through escalation and the latter looking for an end to the war through de-escalation. In addition, disagreements over the war led to Democratic disunity of the president's party. Antagonism to the Vietnamese War was also expressed by many other politicians, professors, students, journalists, and television commentators.⁵¹

President Richard M. Nixon found his administration besieged by the war in Vietnam when he took office in 1969. On his promise to bring "peace with honor" to the United States, it was clear that Nixon would have to steer the nation on a different course in Vietnam.⁵² President Nixon's new direction was called Vietnamization, a plan that sought to gradually withdraw US troops while training Vietnamese soldiers in order to replace them in combat zones. US combat troops withdrawals did not, however, mean US total disengagement from Vietnam. The United States would continue its airstrikes operations.⁵³

With Vietnamization underway, President Nixon opted to intervene and ordered intense bombing campaigns deep into Cambodia in April 1970 without public knowledge.⁵⁴ Once this attack became known, a firestorm of protest was sparked all across the United States. During anti-war rallies, six college students, four at Kent State University and two at Jackson State University, were shot to death by National Guard troops.⁵⁵ As a result, campuses erupted nationwide and dozens of universities and colleges were shut down.⁵⁶

President Nixon became more anxious to win the war when North Vietnam launched, after the withdrawal of US troops from the battlefield in 1972, an unexpected, large-scale attack across the zone between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. With Vietnamization in

⁵⁰ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 127-129.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 127-128.

⁵² John Mason, *The Cold War 1945-1991*, 39.

⁵³ John Finding and Frank Thackeray, ed., *Events that Changed America in the Twentieth Century*, 174.

⁵⁴ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 131. Ostensibly to capture the communists who moved towards Cambodia in order to unseat the new government established by an anti-Vietnamese military regime that overthrown Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who had long tolerated the communist troops and supply lines in his country.

⁵⁵ John Finding and Frank Thackeray, ed., *Events that Changed America in the Twentieth Century*, 174.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

danger, President Nixon “re-Americanized” the war by ordering extensive air strikes against North Vietnam. Simultaneously, the Nixon administration pressured the North Vietnamese to enter negotiations in order to bring a successful end to the US involvement. The terms of the agreement included a cease-fire that would halt US bombing and withdrawal of all US forces with an exchange of prisoners of both sides. The result was the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in January 1973.⁵⁷

US involvement in Vietnam was central to the Cold War policies of a number of administrations and has had profound consequences for American foreign policy. Besides, the Vietnamese War had brought changes in the balance of power within American political institutions. It had shaped American opinions about the conduct of US foreign policy as well as the efficacy of military power. The decisions of Nixon’s subsequent successors were influenced by their attitudes towards the legacies of US involvement in the Vietnamese War. Both President Bush and Clinton’s administrations would be no exception while the decision making process would be conducted towards the Bosnian War.

The Vietnamese War had bad effects on the United States. The US waged a brutal war in which millions of soldiers and civilians died. For over than 20 years the United States fought a weak country, and did not attain victory although it had economic, technological and military superiority.⁵⁸

The massive use of US military, the loss of civilian life, the conduct of human rights atrocities against civilians and enemy troops, and the creation of thousands of refugees caused a growing number of Americans to question the wisdom of their nation and believe the war to be morally ambiguous, if not immoral. Disillusionment with the Vietnamese War led many Americans to believe that “their country’s reputation as the world’s ‘beacon of democracy’ had been tainted, and that during the war their leaders had been guilty of misjudgment, deception, and wanton destruction of human life.”⁵⁹

Furthermore, the Vietnamese War had an influence upon US foreign policy vis-a-vis the use of military power. The United States became less willing, more reluctant to commit its military resources abroad, particularly to a war that deeply divided the country.⁶⁰ The “Vietnamese syndrome” lingered in the United States until the end of the Cold War and

⁵⁷ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 131-132.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 135

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ John Finding and Frank Thackeray, ed., *Events that Changed America in the Twentieth Century*, 177.

beyond.⁶¹ The shadow of Vietnam would remain in the Bosnian War that would be considered by the Bush and Clinton administrations with more caution and greater interests.

The aftermath of US military involvement in Vietnam brought realism under heavy attacks at the end of the Cold War, weakening its hold on the conduct of US foreign policy. As a result, there was a resurgence of interests in the idealistic principle of the recognition of human rights.⁶²

I.3. A New Emphasis on Human Rights

Much of US predominant realism became soft by the 1960s. Rather than emphasizing the East-West conflict, US President Jimmy Carter identified human rights as the appropriate basis of US foreign policy.⁶³ Drawing on the idealism of President Wilson, President Carter argued that the best course for the United States was to reject power politics. He promised to condition American relations with other countries, poor or rich, on their respect for human rights. Therefore, human rights became President Carter's platform for his foreign policy.⁶⁴

After the 85,000 Soviet troops and tanks were deployed to Afghanistan in 1979, the Carter administration, however, reacted with rage to the Soviet invasion of the country.⁶⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, the US national security advisor, warned that the Soviet Union now threatened US interests from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan.⁶⁶ President Carter, then, shifted his considerations of moral concerns and human rights into US national interests. He revealed his fear of the nation's geostrategic and economic interests declaring that "a Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping stone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies."⁶⁷ Additionally, President Carter declared that the United States would "consider any threat to the Persian Gulf to be a direct threat to its

⁶¹ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 135.

⁶² Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 221-222.

⁶³ Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., s.v. "Realism and Idealism," 325.

⁶⁴ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 151-152.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 163.

⁶⁶ Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., s.v. "Realism and Idealism," 325.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 325.

own vital interests.”⁶⁸ This declaration would be one of many steps in the Carter administration’s transition to a more aggressive foreign policy.⁶⁹

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan pushed American hawkishness to a new high. President Ronald Reagan called for a massive buildup of US armed forces, believing that the United States must match the Soviet nuclear as well as conventional military.⁷⁰ US defence budget, which had begun in Carter’s last year, started to increase more notoriously under the Reagan administration.⁷¹ Reagan’s hostility toward communism was mirrored in his rhetorical offensive. Soviet leaders would “lie, steal, cheat, and do anything else to advance their goals,”⁷² avowed Reagan. Besides, he informed the Soviet Union that US will to confront Soviet expansion was now back, and “the Vietnam syndrome was a thing of the past.”⁷³

The Reagan administration’s foreign policy was, in fact, a return to the containment policy of the early Cold War years. The focal emphasis was on the Soviet Union as a communist expansionist state and on the need to rollback that expansion, even by the use of force if necessary.⁷⁴ President Reagan, therefore, adapted the Eisenhower domino theory to Latin America.⁷⁵ He declared that the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua would spread to El Salvador and ultimately to the rest of Central America.⁷⁶

Furthermore, President Reagan expressed his concerns of human rights, a policy that his administration adopted during its second term. In his message to Congress, Reagan advocated that “the American people believe in human rights and oppose tyranny in whatever

⁶⁸ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 164.

⁶⁹ Ibid. The Carter administration, then, stepped up military spending, stopped high-technology sales, embargoed grain shipments, and imposed a US boycott on the Olympic Games scheduled for Moscow in 1980. Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 164.

⁷⁰ Steven Hook, *op. cit.*, 167-168. In response to Reagan’s proposal of US military buildup, Congress approved to double American defence spending, and to match Soviet deployments of nuclear missiles in Europe with a new generation of NATO nuclear missiles deployments in Western Europe. Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 167-168.

⁷¹ Ibid., 171.

⁷² Ibid., 168.

⁷³ Ibid., 169.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 175-176.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 178.

⁷⁶ Moreover, the Soviet communist threat was applied to the US position, not only in Central America, but throughout the whole world. President Reagan asked, “If Central America were to fall, what would the consequences be for our position in Asia, Europe, and for alliances such as NATO? If the United States cannot respond to a threat near our own border, why should Europeans or Asians believe that we are seriously concerned about them?” Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 178, quoted in Ronald Reagan, “Central America: Defending Our Vital Interests,” *Current Policy* (US Department of State: April 27, 1983).

form, whether of the left or the right.”⁷⁷ The Reagan administration not only aided Nicaragua and El Salvador, but intervened in the small Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983.⁷⁸ President Reagan asserted that the “overriding” factor in his decision was “protecting innocent lives,” emphasizing his concern for the safety of American citizens and the importance of never repeating “the nightmare of [their] hostages in Iran.”⁷⁹ Accordingly, the American intervention in Grenada was justified on humanitarian grounds.

However, it turned out that US policymakers perceived the chaotic political situation as “a tactical opportunity to influence the authority structure in Grenada, rather than as a desperate situation for US nationals.”⁸⁰ Moreover, in the context of the Cold War, Ocran concludes that in the case of Grenada, it was easier to the United States to undertake an ideological battle in the form of direct military humanitarian intervention. President Reagan rejected Grenada’s participation in the programme of the Caribbean Basin Initiative one year before the political uprising in Grenada took place.⁸¹ Additionally, on another occasion, he attacked Grenada as bearing “the Soviet and Cuban trademark, which means that it will attempt to spread the virus among its neighbours.”⁸² Although US military intervention in Grenada was conducted on the basis of moral concerns, US policymakers considered the intervention as a means to advance US interests that were conceptualized in the context of the Cold War.

⁷⁷ Steven Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 179, quoted in “President Reagan’s March 14 Message to Congress,” *New York Times* (March 15, 1986).

⁷⁸ Before the US intervention, political chaos in Grenada happened when a coup d’état occurred which was followed by the murder of the Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and members of his cabinet by the People’s Revolutionary Army. The latter imposed a shoot-to-kill curfew on the residents of Grenada, and closed the airport preventing US citizens from leaving the island. Laura Wheeler, “The Grenada Invasion: Expanding the Scope of Humanitarian Intervention,” 413-414.

⁷⁹ Terry Nardin and Kathleen Pritchard, “Ethics and Intervention: The United States in Grenada, 1983,” 06. Additionally, in the General Assembly debate, US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick maintained that the use of force was legitimate because it was carried out in “the service of values of the Charter, including the restoration of the rule of law, self-defense, sovereignty, democracy and *respect for the human rights of the people of Grenada*.” International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, 64.

⁸⁰ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, 65.

⁸¹ The Caribbean Basin Initiative is a regime of a preferential tariff treatments of Caribbean countries’ exports produced with US materials.

⁸² Modibo Ocran, “The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping,” 31.

Similarly, the United States, under the Bush administration, invaded Panama in 1989, citing humanitarian claims among other reasons.⁸³ President George Bush sent about 26,000 troops into a military combat in Panama and launched a military offensive of Operation Just Cause in order to oust General Manuel Noriega from power.⁸⁴

Ved Nanda, however, held that Operation Just Cause was not a valid case of humanitarian intervention. He declared that the US military intervention in Panama was dictated by US political considerations, listing three concerns of the United States. The first factor was US government's uncertainties over the fate of the Panama Canal particularly as the Carter-negotiated treaties came closer to implementation. The Second concern was about the role of the Panama Canal in the US-central American drug trafficking. And finally, the United States was concerned about the intransigence of General Manuel Noriega who had been a good ally of the United States.⁸⁵ Again, US military intervention in Panama was justified on humanitarian grounds, but undertaken for national interests.

American humanitarian interventions in Grenada and Panama demonstrate that humanitarian justifications are less humanitarian. US national interests are not disregarded, but into the play. Besides, the expression of other motives, which are generally not openly stated, may suggest that either the right of humanitarian intervention is not considered to exist, or it is perceived to be essential to rationalize military actions.

The US practice of humanitarian intervention during the Cold War era was conducted in the context of ideological rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. For that reason, that conduct of humanitarian intervention may be less moral and influenced by the realistic assumption of national interests. One may think that it could be really humanitarian after the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. The United States, the world's sole superpower with its highly sophisticated military and strong economy, could intervene on ethical grounds, especially in an era of humanitarian crises and human rights abuse. In order to better understand humanitarian intervention, its definition, and the debate on its legality or otherwise are discussed in the following section.

⁸³ In justification of US military intervention in Panama, President Bush declared that he ordered the invasion in order "to protect American lives, to defend democracy in Panama, to apprehend Noriega and bring him to trial on drug-related charges for which he was indicted in 1988, and to ensure the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties." Modibo Ocran, "The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping," 33

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 38.

I.3.1. The Definition of Humanitarian Intervention

The concept of humanitarian intervention is defined by a number of writers. Roberts designates humanitarian intervention as “military intervention in a state without the approval of its authorities and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.”⁸⁶

Tenson assumes that humanitarian intervention is “the proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government.”⁸⁷

Welsh defines humanitarian intervention as “coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering.”⁸⁸

The above definitions convey two significant features of humanitarian intervention. First, the use of military forces when intervening is a central factor. This excludes a wide interpretation of the term intervention which includes political or economic interference within a state’s internal affairs.⁸⁹ Humanitarian intervention is not usually used in this broad sense.⁹⁰

Second, the term humanitarian indicates that violation of human rights on a large scale is involved. This means that humanitarian intervention is all about saving endangered people of the target state. Therefore, the use of armed forces must be initiated for primarily humanitarian reasons.

The use of military force by a state or a group of states has generated one of the most heated debates on the conduct of humanitarian intervention. Even if it is claimed that such interference is initiated for humanitarian reasons, the debate on the legitimacy or otherwise of humanitarian intervention is raised between its proponents and opponents.

⁸⁶ Vesselin Popovski, “The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Peter Siani-Davies, *International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995*, 43.

⁸⁷ Abiew, *The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention*, 31.

⁸⁸ Jenifer Welsh, *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, 03.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

I.3.2. The Debate on Humanitarian Intervention

The conduct of humanitarian intervention remains one of the most controversial issues in international law. At the heart of the debate on humanitarian intervention is the legality or otherwise of its practice, among both its proponents and opponents. In order to justify that humanitarian intervention is legitimate or illegal, both groups defend their position in relation to the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Advocates of humanitarian intervention claim that the UN Charter legalizes the right of intervention in the name of humanity.⁹¹ They assert that humanitarian intervention is neither directed against the territorial integrity of the target state, nor its political independence, and thus it is not inconsistent with Article 2(4).⁹² They argue that Article 2(4) only forbids the use of force when directed against the target state's territorial integrity as well as political independence.⁹³ Moreover, proponents of the right of humanitarian intervention argue that the UN Charter does not protect one single value that of peace.⁹⁴ However it has several purposes of fundamental human rights, to which it gives expression in Article 1(3) and Article 55.⁹⁵ Accordingly, advocates of the practice of humanitarian intervention consider it as legal under the UN Charter.

On the other hand, opponents of humanitarian intervention believe that the UN Charter prohibits all kinds of the use of force, including humanitarian intervention.⁹⁶ They assert that the provisions of Article 2(7) completely abolish the use of force in international

⁹¹ Robert Kolb, "Note on Humanitarian Intervention," 126

⁹² Ibid.,. The question of when one state or a group of states resort to force is dealt with Article 2(4) of the Charter. It declares that "[all] Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations." Jenifer Welsh, *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, 72-73.

⁹³ J. L. Holzgrefe, "The Humanitarian Intervention Debate," 37 in Holzgrefe and Keohane, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*. In support of the above argument, Teson asserts that if a "genuine humanitarian intervention does not result in territorial conquest or political subjugation...it is a distortion to argue that [it] is prohibited by article 2(4)."

⁹⁴ Robert Kolb, "Note on Humanitarian Intervention," 126.

⁹⁵ Ibid. Article 1(3) provides: "The purposes of the United Nations are . . . [t]o achieve international co-operation in . . . encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion". (Article 55) states: "The United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all." Holzgrefe, "The Humanitarian Intervention Debate," 39 in Holzgrefe and Keohane, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*.

⁹⁶ J. L. Holzgrefe, "The Humanitarian Intervention Debate," 37 in Holzgrefe and Keohane, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*.

relations.⁹⁷ Article 2(7) of the UN Charter states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...”⁹⁸ Besides, according to adversaries of humanitarian intervention, the legal prohibition against intervention is reaffirmed in the UN General Assembly Resolution 2625.⁹⁹ The resolution provides that “no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any another state.”¹⁰⁰ According to opponents of humanitarian intervention, Article 2(7) and the Resolution 2625 of the UN Charter render humanitarian intervention illegal.

Both advocates and adversaries of humanitarian intervention provide arguments in support of their views on whether the conduct of humanitarian intervention is legitimate or not. While the opponents reiterate that humanitarian intervention is not permissible under the provisions of the UN Charter, the proponents argue otherwise.

Nevertheless, that situation has been changed following the end of the Cold War. Humanitarian intervention has been made as “a far more benign force, one that genuinely reflects universalistic values.”¹⁰¹ The central values behind humanitarian intervention are the protection of minority groups from persecution, and respect of human rights which are to be given priority over the rights of governments. Advocates of humanitarian intervention consider it acceptable in order to alleviate human suffering, and a solution to the oppression of individual citizens.¹⁰²

Moreover, post-Cold War supporters of humanitarian intervention closely connect humanitarian intervention with the crime of genocide.¹⁰³ They emphasize that wars perpetrated by one ethnic group against a subordinate one, as it was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, bring into attention the need for decisive actions, actions that entail the use of military force in order to prevent such a recurrence of genocide.¹⁰⁴ Thus, genocide is now the main key that forms the argument for military intervention in order to bring it into an end and punish those who direct it.

⁹⁷ Jenifer Welsh, *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, 73.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 5.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 03.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

Furthermore, growing interests in humanitarian intervention result from dissatisfaction with the ways of resolving humanitarian crises, particularly through UN peacekeeping forces. These forces are intended to separate the fighters while mediation is made to achieve a political settlement. In addition, UN peacekeepers are slightly armed and not allowed to use force, only in self-defence, in order to operate on the basis of impartiality. Adherent of humanitarian intervention consider such practices as “overly hesitant and even cowardly.”¹⁰⁵ For them, in genocidal cases what is needed is decisive military intervention, instead.¹⁰⁶

Within these beliefs, the United States of America, the world’s militarily powerful nation, is addressed to lead humanitarian efforts. Ever since the dismantlement of the Soviet Union, US supremacy and hegemony have been inevitably required for the paradigm of humanitarian intervention. Albeit the United Nations and powerful states in Europe would have a role to play, they would have to do so under the supervision and the leadership of the United States, as it was the case in the Bosnian War.

Furthermore, major interventions which took place during the 1990s happened in remote regions. Such regions might be unimportant from the American grasp, and great power interests. The Cold War norms of realpolitik were said to be put aside. The idealistic norm of the United States to protect persecuted victims was, however, claimed to be the real motive behind those interventions.¹⁰⁷ In addition, humanitarian intervention was undertaken reluctantly in such remote regions because they did not threaten the great powers’ fundamental interests. In this view, Gibbs states, “from the standpoint of US interests, the most logical response to ethnic conflicts involving genocide is not to intervene at all, and to let the conflicts fester.”¹⁰⁸ After all, US-lead humanitarian intervention did occur in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a remote region in the midst of the Balkans. And whether US-led intervention, in the Bosnian War, was, indeed, for moral and human purposes or based on realpolitik considerations is to be unfolded in this study.

Overall, the United States actions outside the American borders were, in fact, steered by the realistic containment policy. Albeit the US conflict with the Soviet Union and its desire to halt the Soviet expansion were ideological, US policies towards both the Soviet Union and

¹⁰⁵ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 06.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 07.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 08.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 09.

other Eastern European countries were realistic in outlook. The former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia was no exception. US policymakers outlined the US relations with Yugoslavia in the context of the East-West Cold War conflict. In other words, Yugoslavia was like a pawn in a global chess match between the United States and the Soviet Union. The following section discusses the US-Yugoslav relations prior to the Bosnian War.

I.4. The US-Yugoslav Relations before the Breakup of the Bosnian War (1945-1990)

Following the end of the Second World War, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was made up of six republics, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, in addition to the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.¹⁰⁹ Yugoslavia was inhabited by multiple nationalities led by the head of the Communist Yugoslav Party, Jozip Broz Tito from 1945 until his death in 1980.¹¹⁰ During that time, the six republics operated autonomously to a great extent. Five of the republics were designated as homelands of their majority ethnic groups, and bore names to reflect this: the Croats in Croatia, the Serbs in Serbia, the Slovenes in Slovenia, the Macedonian Slavs in Macedonia, and the Montenegrins in Montenegro. However, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had no dominant majority and was regarded as a joint homeland for the Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims as well as the Bosnian Serbs (see map n°1 and n°2).

At the time of President Tito's rule of Yugoslavia, the country experienced two different phases during which the United States pursued its policy according to the events that shaped Yugoslavia's position in the international agenda of the United States. The first phase was before the Tito-Stalin split and the second was after Yugoslavia's break from the Soviet Union.

I.4.1. The US-Yugoslav Relations before the Tito- Stalin Split (1945-1948)

By the end of the Second World War, the United States determined its policies regarding Yugoslavia in the context of the West-East Cold War conflict. As a result of Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union, and US perception of Yugoslavia as part of the communist bloc, the Truman administration applied its containment policy on Yugoslavia.

¹⁰⁹ Britannica Encyclopedia, 2005.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

US-Yugoslav relations were characterized by mutual distrust and tension at the start of the Cold-War period. In 1945 a territorial dispute took place between Yugoslavia and Italy, the United States' ally, over Trieste. During the Trieste conflict, a war between Yugoslavia and the United States was narrowly averted.¹¹¹

Moreover, Yugoslav fighters attacked two American airplanes on the basis that the planes had violated the Yugoslav airspace in 1946.¹¹² In response, the US Embassy strongly rejected the Yugoslav note of protest. The shooting down of US airplanes incident coincided with the Paris Peace Conference where Yugoslavia was unsatisfied with the process about the Trieste conflict.

Not only were the Yugoslav relations critical with the United States, but with the Soviet Union as well. Stalin's disapproval on Tito's moves and aggressiveness resulted in the split of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc. This led to a subsequent shift in US foreign policy towards Yugoslavia.¹¹³

I.4.2. The US-Yugoslav Relations after the Tito-Stalin Split (1948-1990)

Yugoslavia broke away from the Soviet Union on June 28, 1948.¹¹⁴ The US leadership, then, began to review its relations towards Yugoslavia.¹¹⁵ American policymakers started to consider an independent Yugoslavia as a substantial strategic asset given its geographical location in Eastern Europe. The country was situated in a strategically significant location between the US-led member states of NATO, and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. It shared borders with two NATO member states, Italy to the west and Greece to the north-east. In addition, Yugoslavia geographically separated Italy from Greece and further isolated Turkey. As a result, Yugoslavia disrupted the continuity of NATO. Besides, the member states of the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, shared common borders with Yugoslavia. Since it remained a communist country, with the potential to fall back in line with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia's strategic geographical location was important to the United States.¹¹⁶

¹¹¹ Carl Savich, "Yugoslavia and the Cold War Part I."

¹¹² Leven Isyar, "Containing Tito: US and Soviet Policies Towards Yugoslavia and the Balkans," 41.


¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 54-56.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹¹⁵ Carl Savich, "Yugoslavia and the Cold War Part II."


¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Map N°1: The Former Yugoslavia



Source: Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 25.

Map N°2: Ethnic Majorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991



Source: Burg, Steven, and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (The United States of America: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 28.

Not only did the United States consider Yugoslavia to be geographically important during the Cold War, but also a country whose independence from the Soviet Union could influence other Eastern European states in order to alter subservient relationships to the Kremlin.¹¹⁷ Albeit Yugoslavia's leadership remained communist, the country began to move towards economic liberalization and political decentralization.¹¹⁸ US policymakers hoped that the Yugoslav model would influence the rest of Eastern European countries to break away from the Soviet Union.¹¹⁹

In this context, the United States implemented a new policy towards Yugoslavia. The first phase of the US-Yugoslav relations covered economic and military ties. The first American aid to Yugoslavia was initiated in 1949 after the US lift of trade embargo against Yugoslavia.¹²⁰ The US Export-Import Bank began providing Yugoslavia with loans. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development also granted Yugoslavia credits that led to the accumulation of the Yugoslav debts to the west which totaled \$2, 517 million by 1958.¹²¹ Additionally, the United States had given Yugoslavia military equipments under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The United States sold Yugoslavia, at reduced prices, guns, tanks, and 550 jet planes.¹²² The rational for US military aid to communist Yugoslavia was to help "Yugoslavia's dissident Communist Tito from falling into the Soviet Union's smothering embrace."¹²³

The Yugoslav rapprochement with the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin, however, alarmed the US policymakers who became concerned about the Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union. In order to put Yugoslavia under pressure, the United States signed the Mutual Security Act of 1956 which regulated US aid to Yugoslavia.¹²⁴ The Act required "termination of aid to Yugoslavia unless the President decided that continued assistance was in the American interest and that Yugoslavia remained independent of the Soviet Union."¹²⁵ After Tito's request of 300,000 tons of wheat, \$10 million loan, and major military help, the

¹¹⁷ Leven Isyar, "Containing Tito: US and Soviet Policies Towards Yugoslavia and the Balkans," 32.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Carl Savich, "Yugoslavia and the Cold War II."

¹²⁰ Carl Savich, "Yugoslavia and the Cold War Part III."

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

US President Eisenhower decided to grant Yugoslavia economic help, but continued to refuse to supply Tito with jet planes and other heavy military equipments.¹²⁶

The Kennedy administration closely reconsidered the issue of assisting Yugoslavia, especially when President Tito expressed his neutral stand that was shaped by its bilateral relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States.¹²⁷ *Time* reported that President Kennedy was “angered by the hostility Tito displayed towards the West at the Belgrade conference of neutrals.”¹²⁸ President Kennedy, then, retaliated by the use of the lever of economic aid to Yugoslavia.¹²⁹ It is obvious that the United States could influence and coerce Yugoslavia to act in a certain way by means of military as well as economic pressure.

During the Johnson presidency, the United States conducted its policy towards Yugoslavia on the basis of the Yugoslav position of nonalignment.¹³⁰ In fact, Yugoslavia’s nonalignment did not mean noninvolvement, neither with the Soviet Union nor the United States. President Tito gained benefits from both in terms of economic and military aid. Albeit Yugoslavia’s nonaligned course was criticized by being only a desire to get the best from both world powers, Yugoslav leaders coined the phrase of “active coexistence” for their neutral policy.¹³¹

Yugoslavia, with its position as a neutral country coupled with its communist ideology, adopted a strong critical attitude towards US policy in Vietnam.¹³² During the visits of former Ambassador George F. Kennan and Ambassador W. Averell Harriman to Yugoslavia, the Vietnam crisis was one of their main agenda items. Amid their meeting with Tito, Kennan urged him to “be patient regarding situation in Vietnam.” Tito’s response to Kennan’s request was that the US-Yugoslav relations “were bound to suffer because of differences of views on world developments.”¹³³

Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 influenced the US-Yugoslav relations. Yugoslav leaders were alarmed over the possibility that the Soviet Union was ready to opt for the use of force against any communist country that sought independence

¹²⁶ Carl Savich, “Yugoslavia and the Cold War Part III.”

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Jozip Mocnik, “United States-Yugoslav Relations, 1961-80: The Twilight of Tito’s Era and the Role of Ambassadorial Diplomacy in the Making of America’s Yugoslav Policy,” 69.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*, 77.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 77.

of the Union. In this respect, President Johnson clearly expressed his concerns over such a possibility, warning the Soviet Union not “to unleash the dogs of war” with the invasion of any other country.¹³⁴ Being afraid of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, the United States re-emphasized its interest in Yugoslavia’s independence, trying to rearrange its relationships with the country.¹³⁵

Although Yugoslavia now asked for no military or economic assistance, it expressed its interests in developing strong economic ties with the West. By 1964, the US-Yugoslav relations were further clarified. The Johnson administration shifted its focus on maintaining limited economic relations as well as developing educational exchanges with Yugoslavia for the improvements of the US-Yugoslav relations. The Fulbright Agreement providing for educational exchange was the first agreement to be signed with a communist government.¹³⁶

US relations with Yugoslavia under the Nixon presidency continued as they had been during the Johnson administration. The Nixon administration’s policy regarding Yugoslavia remained centered on the Soviet Union. President Nixon stressed the continued political significance of Yugoslavia. In 1970, he visited President Tito in Belgrade, and later sent his Secretary of State William Rogers in 1972.¹³⁷ Tito reciprocated by visiting the United States in 1971 in order to foster Yugoslav relations with the West.¹³⁸ This exchange of visits was under the spirit of friendship and mutual respect for the principles of freedom and independence. Yugoslavia welcomed President Nixon to promote trade relations with the United States and to show that the Tito regime was outside the Soviet sphere of influence.¹³⁹

The US President Ford continued Nixon’s practice of visiting Yugoslavia. Being cautious of Soviet overtures to Yugoslavia, the Ford administration pursued the same supportive policy towards the Yugoslav economic reforms by expanding economic consular officials.¹⁴⁰

The United States framed its view of Yugoslavia as strategically significant as both a geographical divide between the NATO and Warsaw power complexes, and as a regional

¹³⁴ Jozip Mocnik, “United States-Yugoslav Relations, 1961-80: The Twilight of Tito’s Era and the Role of Ambassadorial Diplomacy in the Making of America’s Yugoslav Policy,” 82.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 121.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 164-171.

model for other communist countries of Eastern Europe. Therefore, both the Carter and Reagan administrations maintained their economic supplies as well as military aid.¹⁴¹

From 1948 until 1990, the United States, thus, oriented its policies towards Yugoslavia around the Cold War. Yugoslavia was the clear case where the United States shifted its attitude from pursuing unfriendly relations, especially before the Tito-Stalin split, towards a more cordial, economically and militarily supportive relationships. Following the Tito-Stalin split, US policy towards Yugoslavia was to grant the Yugoslav government economic, military aid, and maintaining active diplomacy between the countries in order to prevent Yugoslavia from joining the Soviet Union.

However, once the Soviet bloc collapsed, Yugoslavia's geographically strategic location and independence became expendable, with no value to the United States.¹⁴² Ultimately, by the end of the Cold War, the motivating force driving US-Yugoslav relations crumbled since the United States had lost reason for its strategic interest in Yugoslavia.

To summarize, The United States actions outside the American borders were, in fact, steered by the realist containment policy. Albeit the US conflict with the Soviet Union and its desire to halt the Soviet expansion were ideological, US policies towards both the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries were realistic in outlook. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was no exception. US policymakers outlined the US relations with Yugoslavia in the context of the East-West Cold War conflict. In other words, Yugoslavia was like a pawn in the large global chess match between the world superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Still, the US practice of humanitarian intervention during the Cold War era was conducted in the context of ideological rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Therefore, one may argue that that undertaking of humanitarian intervention may be less humanitarian. But, could it be really conducted primarily for humanitarian reasons, particularly after the disintegration of the Soviet bloc? Following the end of the Cold War period, one may think that the United States, the world's sole superpower with its highly sophisticated military and strong economy could intervene on humanitarian backgrounds, especially in an era of humanitarian crises and human rights

¹⁴¹ Carl Savich, "Yugoslavia and the Cold War Part III."

¹⁴² Ibid.

abuse. The Bosnian War serves as a case in point for US military intervention justified on grounds of humanitarian concerns.

Chapter II

The Development of the Bosnian War: The United States, the European Community and the United Nations' Reaction

By the end of the Cold War, the Yugoslav Federation was no longer considered as an important strategic asset to the United States. US officials lost interest in the federation's affairs. They chose not to be entangled in the Yugoslav ethnic problems which resulted in the rise of ethnic sentiments.

While ethnicity was given solid grounds in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia in 1990, nationalism was not a major issue among the Bosnians. Ethnic divisions did not exist at that time. Being aware of possible danger, the Bosnian leaders were very sensitive in their approach when dealing with ethnic issues. In this respect, the second chapter provides an overview on how ethnicity was looked upon by both the Bosnian population and the leadership's policy before the breakup of the Bosnian War.

The Bosnian War was not as simple as one may think. For that reason, this chapter examines the crisis through providing answers to such questions as what were the causes that contributed to the emergence of the conflict? Did the United States play a role as events developed towards the breakup of the war? What were the different international reactions? In this regard, the response of the United States towards the Bosnian War during its early stages, the European Union's as well as the United Nations' is discussed.

II.1. Ethnicity and Politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1960s-1990s)

During the decades following the Second World War, ethnic conflict in Bosnia was not the norm.¹ Ethnic barriers began to break down as the number of mixed marriages escalated. By 1981, mixed marriages accounted for 15.3 percent of the total number of marriages in the republic.² According to Andjelic, one could hardly find any instances of ethnic grievances within Bosnia.³ "The League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not, at the time, confronted with significant appearances of nationalism and other opposition developments either within the ranks or in the immediate community," Andjelic quotes.⁴

Ethnic hatred was not widespread in Bosnian society nevertheless.⁵ While occasional nationalist disturbances took place in other Yugoslav republics, Bosnia, still, remained dormant. There was no expectation that a bloody civil war would take place in 1992.

¹ Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 36.

² Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 42.

³ Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 40.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 06.

Schuman notes that Bosnian citizens, of all ethnic groups, lived together in the numerous high-rise apartments which had been built in Bosnian urban neighbourhoods.⁶ Besides, they worked and went to schools all together. More than that, they freely intermingled and often intermarried with each other. By 1990, 40 percent of urban Bosnian marriages were mingled.⁷

The communist regime, in Bosnia, gave great importance to inter-ethnic relations⁸. The communist leaders put ethnic equality at the top of their agenda so that to avoid any possibly emergence for nationalist ideology. They created a Bosnian political identity by representing all three ethnic groups while maintaining their own ethnic identity.⁹

Furthermore, the communist regime's firm rule allowed ethnic self-expression, but very often banned ethnic organizations¹⁰. In other words, the regime did not consider individual ethno-national expression as dangerous to the political and social stability of Bosnia. However, it saw danger in organized groups as well as cultural programmes.

Nationality policy, hence, remained always at the top of the regime's agenda. In doing so, a carefully and strategically thought-out nationality policy was undertaken in the republic of Bosnia. One strategy of that policy was the non-reflection of the population by the party membership, but by the leadership¹¹. The executive body which led communist policies, in Bosnia, was usually composed of a dozen or so members from all three ethnic groups¹². Another strategy of the nationality policy shows that ethnic equality was carefully observed.

⁶ Michael Schuman, *Nations in Transition: Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 39.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 29-30.

⁹ Ibid., 37.

¹⁰ Ibid., 35.

¹¹ Ibid., 37.

¹² Ibid., The executive body was labelled different names in different periods. It was called the executive committee, secretariat, and presidency. It is clear from those names that ethnic equality was carefully observed, since the party did not mention the party members' ethnic belonging. Additionally, in 1965 there were 3 Serbs, 2 Muslims and 2 Croats in this Body. One of each was elected as a secretary of the committee. In 1967, there were, however, 5 Muslims, 4 Serbs and 2 Croats, and in 1974, the top positions in the party were held by 3 Croats, 2 Serbs and 2 Muslims. This indicates that the leadership did not mirror the membership of the party, but rather the society as a whole. The membership structure, nonetheless, changed during the 1970s and early 1980s, to reflect the ethnic proportions in society. The participation of the Serbs, who were in majority, dropped from 54.6 percent to 42.1 percent, while they made up 32.02 percent of the whole population in Bosnia. The number of Muslims in the party, however, grew from 27.8 percent to 34.6 percent coming closer to their percentage of 39.52 percent. The participation of the Croats, who made up 18.38 percent, was still the same percentage of only 11.3 percent of the communists. It is obvious that the membership structure reflected the ethnic groups in society. Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 37.

The three Bosnians at the top of the political pyramid belonged to different groups. During the 1980s, they rotated between all the highest political posts.¹³

Besides, it was never stated, in public, that the next leader of the central committee should be from a certain ethnic group.¹⁴ The leadership's chief concern had always been ethnic equality and the preservation of Tito's policy of "brotherhood and ethnicity". This policy was inaugurated in the war when Bosnia was depicted by ZAVONOBiH, the highest ruling body, as "...neither Serbian, nor Croatian, nor Moslem but also Serbian and Croatian and Moslem. It will be a free and brotherly country in which full equality of all Serbs, Moslem and Croats will be guaranteed."¹⁵ Thus, cosmopolitanism characterized the consecutive structure of the communist leadership.

On this basis, the communist leaders, under Tito's presidency, developed a nationalism policy, a strategy which captured the public approval as long as it lacked nationalist dissidents.¹⁶ Albeit there were, in the early 1970s, incidents of national dissidence in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, there were no significant incidents recorded in Bosnia.¹⁷ Bosnia remained serene; there were no public expressions in the Republic of Bosnia in support of any nationalist dissidents that were taking place in Croatia.¹⁸

Not only did the communist party take any nationalist attempt seriously during Tito's rule, but it put all its efforts into preventing similar incidents after Tito's death as well. In order to prevent any attempt of nationalist expressions, the regime invented show-trials which were aimed to be more preventive for the rest of the society than for the accused who had allegedly committed nationalist offences. One typical instance of the Sarajevo regime was the

¹³ Branko Mikulic, a Croat from central Bosnia, became a Federal Prime Minister in 1986. A Muslim from western Bosnia, Hamdija Pozderac, replaced Mikulic in 1988. A Serb from Mount Romanija near Sarajevo, Milanko Renovica, was delegated to the federal presidency. It is clear that the leaders had different ethnic background, yet they were not ethnic leaders. Rather, they were the first ones to criticize the emergence of nationalism in each of their ethnic groups. Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 37-38.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 35-36.

¹⁷ Andjelic holds that the only serious challenge of nationalist dissidents took place in 1972, when a group of terrorists, many of whom were Croat émigrés born in Bosnia, came secretly to the mountains of western, central Bosnia in order to destabilize the regime, since no revolt could have been expected to arise from within Bosnia. Those militant émigrés could not, however, get any support from the locals. In response to the terrorists, the political regime mobilized units of Territorial Defence, which were made up of ordinary people who were, in a majority, of the same ethnic origin as the attackers. Police units, accompanied by military police, were also involved in combat with the terrorists. The whole operation was over after all the Croats extremists ended up dead, mainly in combat. The few survivors were sentenced, and then executed. Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 38-39.

¹⁸ Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 36.

trial of Alija Izetbegovic. In 1982, Izetbegovic wrote a book entitled *Islam between East and West*.¹⁹ After the book was released, Izetbegovic was accused of “forming a hostile organization with the aim of overthrowing the constitutional order of the state.”²⁰ Consequently, he was sentenced to 14 years in prison.²¹

Again, the regime persecuted groups of alleged Serb nationalists in 1986. They were discovered in the Sarajevo suburb of Ilidza.²² In this case, which was another scenario similar to the case against the alleged Muslim fundamentalists, the Serb dissidents were persecuted because of being all suspects for their conversations in restaurants. An Orthodox priest Vlado Elez depicted the events: “I was summoned by the secret police more than fifty times. An inspector threatened me he would force me to spit on the Bible as they have forced Moslems earlier to spit on the Koran.”²³ The strategy that the regime followed in fighting such nationalist cases of dissidence was often depicted as the final resolution in a struggle against “nationalism of all colours.”²⁴

Albeit all of these instances of nationalist dissidence, Andjelic holds that there were not enough incidents to prove widespread activities of nationalism. He states that there were not even signs of a potential rise in minor nationalist cases.²⁵ Additionally, one can notice two kinds of danger for the regime’s policy of “brotherhood and unity,” one danger coming from outside Bosnia, the other alleged minor threat could be found within the country. The regime’s reaction of show trials in order to prevent nationalist expressions made the Bosnian regime more repressive than other republics’ in Yugoslavia.

Since ethnic hatred was not widespread in Bosnian, and while occasional nationalist disturbances took place in other Yugoslav republics, the republic remained dormant, then what were the factors that led to the disturbance of Bosnia’s calmness? Besides, there was no expectation that a bloody civil war would take place in a period when the communist regime gave great importance to inter-ethnic relations, putting equality at the top of their agenda. In

¹⁹ Micjael Schuman, *Nations in Transition: Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 40.

²⁰ Andjelic, *op. cit.*, 44.

²¹ Another case took place around the same time. Vojislav Seselj, who became later a notorious Serb nationalist, was sentenced to 8 years in prison for being condemned guilty of counter-revolutionary activities. Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 44.

²² *Ibid.*, 45.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

such circumstances one may think of the causes that were behind the breakup of the war in Bosnia.

II.2. The Causes of the Bosnian War

The causes that led to the Bosnian War were mainly economic and political. Economic problems gave grounds for political conditions that resulted in the end of a strong rule, the communist party of the Bosnian republic. Meanwhile, the rise of nationalism in the neighbouring republic, Serbia, substantially influenced Bosnia. The end of one-party rule, coupled with bad economic conditions, gave rise to competitive political parties which were divided on ethnic lines. They were three main parties that played a great role in the events leading to the breakout of the Bosnian War.

The economic conditions were deteriorating in late 1980s. They gave grounds for quiet dissent in Bosnia. The Agrokomerc scandal went public triggering stream of events.²⁶ In January 1987, a fire in one of the Agrokomerc factories attracted police inspectors to investigate all of the Agrokomerc's business. Major financial crimes had been committed by the enterprise management since the beginning of 1984.²⁷ What Agrokomerc had done was not uncommon practice in Yugoslavia, and Bosnia within it. The problem for the enterprise was that such a practice was made public.²⁸

Consequently, the population was dissatisfied with the Agrokomerc scandal in a period when economic conditions were so bad. Inflation was soaring. Besides, the economy suffered a further 4, 8% taxation of its profits. This brought taxes up to 53% of the whole profit, contributing further to popular anger.²⁹ In September 1987, students took to the streets, in Sarajevo for the first time in almost 20 years.³⁰ This was a sign that citizens might dare

²⁶ Agrokomerc is an agricultural enterprise in western Bosnia, Velika Kladusa.

²⁷ Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 54. It was reported that "Agrokomerc issued 17.681 promissory notes worth 1.214.936.000.000 Yugoslav dinars during the period between 1984 and ...1985. There were no debtor-creditor relations for this operation. 5.079 promissory notes worth altogether 302.914.000.000 dinars could not be refunded." This practice had brought huge amounts of money that were used for financing Agrokomerc's business activities, its building infrastructure and other projects, all without cover. Albeit in a period when investments were forbidden by the Federal government, Yugoslav banks accepted the promissory notes for they charged high interest. Agrokomerc owed money to 63 banks. The some of the unlawfully gained capital was roughly equal to the profit of the entire Bosnian economy for two years and a half when the scandal was discovered. Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 55.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 55.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

protest on the streets against official policies. At the same time, it disturbed the leadership in Sarajevo producing fear in governing circles and setting an example to dissatisfied workers.

The collapse of monomithic rule was mirrored in the forms of protest in Bosnia. Workers as well as citizens took to the streets more often in Sarajevo and other industrial centres. Not only did they demonstrate in front of the buildings, but they visited the highest institutions.³¹ This fact illustrated weak legitimacy of the top political bodies who were concerned about the growing dissatisfaction of Agrokomerc's workers. They also worried about the Agromerc scandal itself because of its connection with the ruling elite.³² Numerous strikes, health and housing problems, economic stagnation and recession, were serious problems that the leaders had to face.³³

Under these conditions, leading politicians started personal struggles for political survival. Unity was broken, and therefore the system, which had existed for decades, became defenceless. Popular dissatisfaction led to a clash within the party. Internal differentiation, between those who were involved in covering up the Agrokomerc scandal and those who were allegedly untainted by corruption, in addition to the inability of the institutions to influence society, led to individual calls for the democratization of the party. Still, systematic changes were ignored by top officials. It was this situation that enabled the rise of competitive parties on ethnic grounds, and thus was the end of the collapse of the ruling elite in Bosnia.³⁴

During that same period, the rise of nationalism in Serbia must be noted for it seriously affected events in Bosnia where hidden ethnic divisions and hatred were not widespread. The Republic of Serbia's leader, Slobodan Milosevic, was one of the key factors that destabilized Bosnia-Herzegovina and caused violence.³⁵ By the end of the 1980s, Milosevic controlled Serbian political structures and assumed the leadership of a growing Serb nationalist movement that cut across republic boundaries, including those of Bosnia, for which he planned to remain in the Yugoslav Federation.³⁶

³¹ Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 62.

³² The economy was heavily controlled by politics. Any major economic problem, hence, became a political affair.

³³ *Ibid.*, 62.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 62-66.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 98.

³⁶ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 44.

Milosevic's objective was to construct a "Great Serbia."³⁷ He diverted the dissatisfaction of Serbia's people over bad economic conditions onto the Croats and Muslims. He did so by controlling the media and later on by claiming that both the Croats and the Muslims had betrayed the Serbs because they opted for independence.³⁸ Dredging up historical memories incited hatred among the Serbs against the Croats and the Muslims. Memories of the Serbian struggle against the oppression by Ottoman Turks in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the genocide of the Serbs at the hands of the Nazi were resurrected.³⁹ Moreover, news programmes were dominated by reports of the Croatian government's move towards independence. The destruction of Serbian houses, flats and farms by Croat attackers flooded TV screens.⁴⁰ Besides, mass meetings that incited ethnic hatred against both the Croats and the Muslims were significant.⁴¹ These were all necessary to prepare the Serbs for war against both the Croats and the Muslims.

More than that, Slobodan Milosevic even controlled the JNA in order to use it as "his strike force in Bosnia,"⁴² He used the JNA army to build up the Bosnian Serb militias months before the fighting began. The JNA occupied the communication centers in Bosnia before the war broke up. It also helped the Bosnian Serbs construct heavy artillery positions around Bosnian towns.⁴³ According to General Morillon, who commanded the UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, "the army of the Serbs of Bosnia was the federal army."⁴⁴ When full-scale war started, the JNA backed the Bosnian Serbs. The federal army's support was crucial in advancing the Bosnian Serbs' position on the battlefield.⁴⁵ Milosevic had already planned for the war and thus he is one of the principal actors who influenced events leading to the breakout of the Bosnian War.

The Bosnian War was, on the other hand, linked to the disintegration of the former Yugoslav Federation. Slovenia and Croatia's national aspiration for independence from the federation influenced Bosnia. Although Milosevic publicly adhered to the idea of the preservation of Yugoslavia with a strong centralized government, his neighbouring republics,

³⁷ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 121.

³⁸ Jeanne Haskin, *Bosnia and Beyond: The "Quiet" Revolution that wouldn't go quietly*, 18-25.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴² David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 121.

⁴³ Evelyn Farkas, *Fractured States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, Ethiopia, and Bosnia in the 1990s*, 74.

⁴⁴ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 121.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Slovenia and Croatia, were apprehensive about Serbia's actual aims and about its dominance within the institutions of the former Yugoslavia, most notably the army. Believing secession would bring them prosperity and independence from Serbia's pursuit of a centralized Yugoslavia, both republics moved toward separation.⁴⁶

In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia officially seceded from Yugoslavia, representing the first phase of the breakup of the federation.⁴⁷ The secession of Slovenia and Croatia encouraged the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to declare independence from the Yugoslav Federation. The country officially ceased to exist following the resignation of Yugoslavia's Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, by December 1991.⁴⁸ These events proved to be tragic for they destabilized the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina "by disturbing the delicate fabric of relations among its constituent ethnic groups."⁴⁹ The Yugoslav Federation had long given a measure of security to the Croats, the Muslims and the Serbs who lived in an interethnic cordiality. Yugoslavia's destruction, however, brought Bosnia's atmosphere of security to an end, setting the stage for war.

The disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation led to the establishment of separate republic organizations. The Bosnian party leadership accepted the establishment of opposition parties, but on condition that such parties were not established along national lines. Besides, the leadership pushed for early elections, to be held in spring 1990, before nationalist forces had had time to organize. Albeit two non-ethnic parties consisting of former communists played a significant role, electoral competition was dominated by three explicitly ethnic, de facto parties.⁵⁰

Led by Alija Izetbegovic, the Party of Democratic Action was established in March 1990. The SDA formally affirmed support for the continuation of the Yugoslav Federation. Nonetheless, it defined the federation as "a community of sovereign nations and republics, within current federal borders."⁵¹ In addition, during the electoral campaign, Izetbegovic

⁴⁶ Carol McQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention and Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda*, 54.

⁴⁷ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 106.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 46. In preparation for the upcoming elections, the Bosnian parliament adopted an election law in March 1990 that banned political organization on ethnic grounds. More than 40 political organizations were established. Most of these small, they either formed coalitions, or were of no importance. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 46.

⁵¹ That was a declaration of Izetbegovic. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 47.

made it clear that if the republics of Slovenia and Croatia did secede, then he would not keep Bosnia “in a mangled Yugoslavia, in other words, in greater Serbia.”⁵² Izetbegovic further reiterated:

*There are three options for Bosnia: Bosnia in a federal Yugoslavia an acceptable option; Bosnia in a confederal Yugoslavia also an acceptable option; and finally an independent and free Bosnia. I must say here openly that if the threat that Croatia and Slovenia leave Yugoslavia is carried out, Bosnia will not remain in truncated Yugoslavia. In other words, Bosnia will not tolerate staying in a greater Serbia and being part of it. If it comes to that, we will declare independence.*⁵³

Opposed to any form of Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia, the Serb Democratic Party was established in July 1990, under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic. The SDS functioned as the nationalist leadership of the Serbs in Bosnia. It rejected any changes that might subject the Serb minority to rule by an ethnic majority.⁵⁴

As a branch of the ruling HDZ party in Croatia, the Croat Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina was established in August 1990. It called for the independence of the republic. The HDZ declared it would support “realization of the right of the Croat people to self-determination including secession.”⁵⁵ Within the party, there was rivalry between moderates who supported the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and extreme nationalists who sought to partition the republic and join Croatia.⁵⁶

The result of the 1990 elections was a victory for the nationalists. The post went to the leader of the SDA, Alija Izetbegovic. Although substantial political power was delivered to the Muslims, it was not enough to rule without support from parties. The nationalist parties,

⁵² Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 47.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 48.

therefore, pledged to cooperate with one another. As representative of the SDA, Izetbegovic assumed the most visible office, president of the state presidency. Jure Pelivan, a Croat and representative of HDZ, was chosen as prime minister, and Momcilo Krajisnik, a Serb of the SDS, was made president of the National Assembly.⁵⁷

Although the three nationalist parties chose to work together, they were internally divided among themselves. The Serbs, claiming that they were facing a coalition of Croats and Muslims that was disregarding Serb interests, refused to participate in the activity of the parliament. In autumn 1991, the Serbs began to form Serb Autonomous Oblasts (SAOs), which took over power. As a result, the stage was set for a confrontation over the fate of Bosnia; whether to secede from Yugoslavia or not.⁵⁸

Between December 1990 and April 1992 the fate of Bosnia hung in the balance. The polarization of the republic was coupled by an external chaotic environment, Serbia's war against both Slovenia and Croatia. Bosnia was a zone of relative quiet, surrounded on three sides by violence, ethnic cleansing, and destruction.⁵⁹

The ability of Bosnia to avoid violence was rapidly diminishing as a result of major developments. The appearance of the first division along ethnic lines within the political elite came only after four conditions were fulfilled, bad economic conditions, coupled with the Agrokomerc scandal, the destabilization of the communist system in Bosnia, and the rise of nationalism in Serbia which resulted in the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation that was tragic for the Republic of Bosnia. The tragic result of the combination of these developments was the breakup of the Bosnian war following the declaration of republic's independence. And here, the United States played a crucial role in the diplomatic process of an independent Bosnia.

II.3. The US Sponsored Role in Bosnia's Secession

The United States assumed a key role in arranging international recognition for an independent Bosnia. The Bush administration encouraged Izetbegovic's government's consideration of taking Bosnia out of the Yugoslav federation by holding a referendum on

⁵⁷ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 52-53.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 62. When war broke out in Croatia, Bosnian Croats and Serbs joined the fray. The Croats began training Muslims for war in Bosnia. On the other hand, the JNA trained and armed the Bosnian Serbs throughout Bosnia.

independence. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman stated, “the [US] embassy was for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”⁶⁰ The Bush administration became actively involved particularly when German officials were willing to consider lifting the trade restrictions on Serbia.⁶¹ In efforts to shore up Bosnia’s independence, the United States sent a note to Belgrade on January 10, warning Serbia against threatening the territorial integrity of Bosnia.⁶²

Moreover, despite the European powers’ reservation and reluctance to recognize Bosnia, the Bush administration continued to push the idea of an independent Bosnia.⁶³ The State Department’s Yugoslav officer, George Kenney, declared that, “from mid-February [1992] on, we were pushing the Europeans hard to recognize Bosnia.”⁶⁴ This move coincided with the referendum on Bosnia’s secession from the Yugoslav federation and the EC-sponsored conference on Bosnia in Lisbon.

The secession of Slovenia and Croatia encouraged the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to declare independence from the Yugoslav Federation.⁶⁵ The three ethnic groups, however, did not opt for the same choice. The Bosnian Muslims and Croats did not attempt to block the referendum because they did not want to remain in the Yugoslav Federation which was increasingly dominated by the Serbian republic.⁶⁶ Yet, the Bosnian Serbs did not opt for secession because they feared that an independent Bosnia would be governed by a Muslim or Croat government under which they would be in a less important status, a second-class citizenship.⁶⁷ Therefore, the Serbs refused to participate in the referendum which they considered as a step towards war, and thus remained adamantly opposed to any declaration of independence.⁶⁸

The official results of the February referendum showed that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, 62.68 percent of the population of the Republic, overwhelmingly voted in

⁶⁰ David Gibbs, op. cit., 108.

⁶¹ Ibid., 99.

⁶² Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 99.

⁶³ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 108.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 106.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 119. The Bosnian Croats wanted first to separate Bosnia from the Yugoslav Federation and then to create their own Croat state, which would unite with Croatia. Carl Savich, “The Origins and Causes of the Bosnian Civil War 1992-1995.”

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 117.

favour of independence.⁶⁹ The day following the result of the referendum, tension arose in Bosnia. Overwhelmingly dominated by the Serbs whose irregulars began setting up roadblocks, the JNA stepped in Sarajevo where its people took to the street in order to protest to the terror and the Serb seizure of territory all over Bosnia. Shortly thereafter, Izetbegovic went ahead and declared the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina on March 3, 1992.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, fighting broke out in the ethnically Croat area of Bosanska Posavina and Mostar where armed confrontation took place between JNA reservists and Croat irregulars. The Serbs, then, began the ethnic cleansing of Croat villages in Herzegovina, so did the Croats in the Serb village of Posavina.⁷¹ This first phase of the conflict was characterized by the national parties' takeover of power and by local confrontation mainly between the Serbs and the Croats, in anticipation of major horrendous battles with the Muslims to come.

Following the first engagement of the Serb forces from outside Bosnia when an armed confrontation between the Muslim Patriotic League and Bosnian Serbs' territorial units took place, Izetbegovic appealed for a halt to the fighting. The EC mediation activities, directed by the Portuguese diplomat José Cutileiro, then, sought a constitutional arrangement that might defuse ethnic tensions and eventually preclude a bloody civil war. In doing so, the three major ethnic groups' leaders were brought together for a series of international conferences. The European powers worked out a plan, which became known as the Lisbon agreement, on the hope of quietening the tension. The plan divided Bosnia into three separate cantons, each of which would have a high level of autonomy. The Bosnian Muslims would receive 45 percent of total area, the Bosnian Serbs 42.5 percent, and the Bosnian Croats would receive 12.5 percent.⁷² Besides, a confederal government, with only limited power, would be established in Sarajevo (See map n°3).

⁶⁹ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 117.

⁷⁰ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 17; Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 118.

⁷¹ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 119.

⁷² *Ibid.*

Map N°3: The Cutileiro Map, March 1992



Source: Burg, Steven, and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (The United States of America: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 111.

Albeit with some flaws, the three ethnic groups all endorsed the Lisbon agreement on March 17, 1992.⁷³ However, the United States totally opposed the plan contributing to its breakdown. The US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger made it clear that “the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina is absolutely and totally unacceptable to the USA.”⁷⁴ In line with this view, the Bush administration pushed harder for the support and recognition of an independent Bosnia.

Not only did the United States refute the Lisbon Plan, but urged the Izetbegovic government to repudiate it as well.⁷⁵ US efforts to undercut the EC-brokered plan began with the US ambassador to Belgrade, Warren Zimmerman, who encouraged Izetbegovic to renege on the Lisbon Plan.⁷⁶ A *New York Times* article notes that immediately after Izetbegovic returned from Lisbon, Zimmerman told him, “...if he didn’t like it, why sign it?”⁷⁷ Besides, according to former State Department official, George Kenney, “Zimmerman told Izetbegovic... [the United States will] recognize you and help you out. So don’t go ahead with the Lisbon agreement.”⁷⁸ Moreover, an official Dutch investigation, whose report’s section on this issue is entitled “The Cutileiro Plan and Its Thwarting by the Americans,” reported that the policy of the US Secretary of State Baker, “was now directed at preventing Izetbegovic from agreeing to Cutileiro plan...and informing him that the United States would support his government in the UN if any difficulties should arise.”⁷⁹ Along the same line of thought, EC mediator Peter Carrington stated that the “American administration made it quite clear that the proposals of Culiteiro...were unacceptable.”⁸⁰ Along the same line of thought, EC mediator Peter Carrington stated that the “American administration made it quite clear that the proposals of Culiteiro...were unacceptable.”⁸¹ It is obvious that the United States offered a direct incentive, US recognition of Bosnian independence, in exchange for Izetbegovic’s rejection of the peace plan. Given this chain of events, one may wonder why the Bush administration sponsored Bosnia’s independence.

⁷³ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 109; Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 111.

⁷⁴ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflicts and International Intervention*, 100.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁷⁶ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 110; Jeanne Haskin, *Bosnia and Beyond: The “Quiet” Revolution that wouldn’t go quietly*, 63.

⁷⁷ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 110.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

II.4. US Motivations behind Involvement in Bosnian's Secession

The motivations behind US policy of pushing for early recognition of Bosnia while undercutting EC mediation activities were shaped by the post-Cold War international context. Gibbs assumed that US policy of Bosnia was motivated by both geostrategic primacy as well as economic interests in Europe.⁸²

Following the period when Bosnia was preparing for independence, tension between the United States and major European powers intensified.⁸³ US officials worried about the idea that Europe was moving towards an independent foreign policy. That policy was termed the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), under the provisions of Maastricht Treaty which was signed in February 7, 1992, creating the European Union.⁸⁴ For US policymakers, this meant that Europe was to function outside US as well as NATO influence. The United States might, thereby, lose its dominant position in Europe. The Bush administration sought to contain Europe and keep it under hegemony.⁸⁵ Therefore, US opposition of the Lisbon Plan was steered by motivations of geostrategic primacy.

A second reason behind US involvement in a pre-independent Bosnia concerned US economic interests in Europe. A CFSP would grant the Europeans the opportunity to establish an independent world role more commensurate with the economic weight of the unified European states. There were expectations that, during the 1990s, Europe was moving towards a “fortress Europe.”⁸⁶ This idea was incarnated in the Maastricht Treaty which provided for the introduction of a central banking system and a common currency, the euro.⁸⁷ Such procedures were considered, by US statesmen, as proclivity for independent actions from the United States of America.⁸⁸

Europe's move towards a “fortress Europe” could not be accepted by the United States as long as it threatened US hegemony in the European continent. European increased military assertiveness and economic integration were faced with criticism. US former Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, stated that the Eurocorps was “an attempt to

⁸² David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 112-133.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 112.

⁸⁴ Britannica Encyclopedia, 2005.

⁸⁵ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 113.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Britannica Encyclopedia, 2005.

⁸⁸ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 113.

undermine NATO.”⁸⁹ President Bush himself, in his threatening words, declared: “Our premise is that the American role in the defense and the affairs of Europe would not be made superfluous by European Union. If our premise is wrong, if my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide individually for your own defense, the time to tell us is today.”⁹⁰

Major European states’ initiatives in the field of financial policy were looked upon as another threat to US economic interests in Europe. The would-be unified European currency, the euro, would pose a danger to the status of the US dollar as the international anchor currency. The dollar had long been considered a major source of US power in world affairs. The advent of the euro would, thereof, constitute a peril to the United States predominant position. Besides, the euro would pose another threat to US seigniorage benefits that accrue to the country’s status as the issuer of world’s key currency.⁹¹ C. Fred Bergsten, an American economist and political advisor, noted that “the euro is likely to challenge the international financial dominance of the dollar.”⁹² As a result, US economic interests would be damaged by the challenges posed by the developments brokered in the Maastricht Treaty.

The United States efforts to undermine the EC initiatives in order to resolve the conflict in Bosnia were motivated by geostrategic consideration of primacy as well as economic interests. While the United States reasserted its own power and dominance in the European Continent, it treated the EC as an adversary. Instead of supporting the EC meditative efforts, which, according to Gibbs, might have prevented the atrocious war in Bosnia, it altogether thwarted the EC-brokered Lisbon Plan. US officials rejected the division of Bosnia and urged the Izetbegovic government to repudiate it as well, pushing harder for an independent Bosnia, instead.

Finally, Bosnia became officially recognized independent from the Yugoslav Federation on April 6, 1992, at the same time full-scale war began.

II.5. Fighting on the Ground: A War of Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide

Following the international recognition of Bosnia, the Serb forces lay siege to the Muslim cities of Zvornic, Visegrad and Foca.⁹³ By mid-April, all of Bosnia was engulfed in

⁸⁹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 29.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 129.

war. During the first critical weeks of the war, Bosnian Serb forces were openly supported by the JNA troops that were brought to eastern Bosnia from Serbia, and by JNA units, retreating from Croatia into western Bosnia.⁹⁴

The war took a new phase when General Ratko Mladic was made commander of the newly formed army of the Bosnian Serb republic on May, 20. The event was preceded and followed by an escalation of violence all over Bosnia. Then, the second largest city of Bosnia, Banja Luka with its inhabitants massacred, fell to Serb forces.⁹⁵ These events marked the beginning of what Rieff called “the Bosnian slaughter.”⁹⁶

Fighting spread to Sarajevo which, in particular, was heavily surrounded by artillery and mercilessly shelled. As fighting, between the Serbs and the Bosnian forces, intensified on the ground, Sarajevo experienced severe shelling by the Serbs. “The European city,” Rieff notes, “was methodically reduced to rubble by the Serb gunners.”⁹⁷ The siege of Sarajevo was designed as what Ed Vulliamy calls a “violent piece of theatre.”⁹⁸

Meanwhile, outside Sarajevo, the Serbs had seized the Muslim-majority cities along the valley of Drina and Sava Rivers. The first major and most of the organized onslaught was directed there against unarmed civilians, expelling the cities’ inhabitants. Nevertheless, a joint Muslim-HVO (Croat Defense Council, or Bosnian Croat army) launched an offensive which reversed Serb advance into north as well as central Bosnia. Following the formal withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia, the Croat and Muslims irregulars retook cities that had fallen to the Serbs. Srebrenica, which had been taken by the Serbs in April 18, was gained back by the Muslim in the middle of May. Strengthened by the Muslim infantry, the HVO forced the Serbs to abandon Mostar.⁹⁹

However, the fortunes of the combatants varied substantially. In June, the Serbs, openly supported by the JNA, launched their counter attack and won back areas seized by the

⁹⁴ Ibid., 130.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 131.

⁹⁶ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 17.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 34.

⁹⁸ Jeanne Haskin, *Bosnia and Beyond: The “Quiet” Revolution that wouldn’t go quietly*, 67.

⁹⁹ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 133.

combined Croat-Muslim forces in central Bosnia. Cities farther to the west such as Jajce, Bosanska Gradiska fall to the Serbs by the late summer of 1992.¹⁰⁰

In January 1993, the Bosnian war took another face. As tension escalated, conflict broke out between Muslims and Croats, culminating in the destruction of much of Mostar. This is fully discussed in chapter three. The Bosnian Croats, along with Croatia whose regular army troops were dispatched to central Bosnia, engaged themselves in burning and plundering of villages, ethnic cleansing, set up detention camps, and laid siege to the Muslim quarters of Mostar.¹⁰¹ Not only did the 1993 witness atrocities between the Croats and the Muslims but also other major crimes committed by the Serbs against both the Muslims as well as the Croats.

II.5.1. Major Crises of the Bosnian War (1993-1994)

The first of the crises was the Serb onslaught on Srebrenica in April 1993. In fact, Srebrenica had been attacked right from the onset of the Bosnian crisis. The city had been isolated for several years and the living conditions of the population, which included thousands of refugees from surrounding areas, were harsh.¹⁰² Mladic had deployed a large number of troops and artillery around the enclave and slowly began to push inward. The Bosnian Serb targeted hospitals, water treatment plants, and refugee centers in order to produce the maximum amount of terror in the population. Village after village fell, until Mladic's troops were on the outskirts of Srebrenica itself.¹⁰³ According to Rieff, the attack on Srebrenica was devastating. "On one particular day, sixty civilians in the town, including a great many children, were killed by Bosnian Serb Army shellfire"¹⁰⁴.

The drama in Srebrenica unfolded against the backdrop of the Serb renewed bitter shelling on Sarajevo. Still, the Serb forces perpetrated heavy attacks on the city in 1993. In addition to the planned onslaught of unarmed civilians¹⁰⁵, humanitarian relief convoys had been prevented from reaching Sarajevo. An American relief team reported that the city was

¹⁰⁰ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 134.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 135-136.

¹⁰² Brunborg, Lyngstad, and Urdal, "Accounting for Genocide: How many were killed in Srebrenica?" 232.

¹⁰³ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 187.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 142. In July 12, a motor shell landed in a crowd queued up at a water pump, killing twelve people.

without electricity, water, or fuel and that it was on the verge of collapse.¹⁰⁶ The situation was a continuing strangulation of Sarajevo. Again in 1994, the Serbs set up their shelling of Sarajevo blatantly affirming their definitive rejection of the division plans brokered by Owen and Stoltenberg. The offensive of the Markala marketplace in February 5, 1994 caused heavy civilian casualties. This massacre was the culmination of more than a month of shelling of Sarajevo which resulted in soaring death toll.¹⁰⁷

Not only did Srebrenica and Sarajevo stick like a fishbone in General Mladic's throat, but other enclaves like Gorazde, Bihac, Zepa, and Pale as well. Mladic's plan for a Greater Serbia, stretching from Serbia all the way across Bosnia to the Bosanska Krajina, was being implemented. In March 1994, in eastern Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs, under General Mladic's command, attacked Gorazde pocket, an area that, before 1992, had had a Muslim majority.¹⁰⁸ Then, they shelled the city in April for successive days. Additionally, the Bosnian Serbs began to take hostages; some 200 UN and civilian personnel were detained.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, the heaviest fighting of the 1994, between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs, occurred in the Bihac pocket of the Bosanska Krajina region in north-west Bosnia. Although the attack produced rapid Bosnian advances, the tide of the battle shifted dramatically to the side of the Serbs in their counteroffensive of November. The fighting was on a multitude of fronts. Bihac was a battlefield for six different military formations, the Bosnian Serb army, the Serb army of the RSK located across the Croatian border in Krajina, Abdic's breakaway Bosnian Muslim faction, the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian government army under General Dudakovic, and the regular army of Croatia.¹¹⁰

According to Rieff, the Bosanska Krajina had been cleansed to the point where the possibility that any Muslim communal life was delusion to be ever reestablished except by force.¹¹¹ In fact, one may infer that an ethnically cleansed Bosnia could never be cured, not in terms of physical destruction, but fear that deeply lay at the hearts and engraved in memories of the Bosnian population; each ethnic group, be they Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims, or

¹⁰⁶ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 142.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 186-187. Other towns of the region, Foca, Cajnice, Bijeljina, and Zvornik, had been taken early in the war and ethnic cleansing had been particularly pursued ruthlessly there.

¹⁰⁹ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 147.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 155-156.

¹¹¹ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 120.

Bosnian Serbs, had been the victim of the other perpetrator's conduct of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

II.5.2. Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide in the Bosnian War

Ethnic cleansing can be, generally, understood as the expulsion of an unacceptable population from a given territory because of religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic, or ideological considerations, or a combination of these.¹¹² Ethnic cleansing is also dubbed ethnic purging which means “ridding an area of a national group regarded as undesirable in order to create an ethnically homogeneous region”¹¹³ However, ethnic cleansing is, at one end, almost distinguishable from forced emigration and population exchange while it merges with deportation and genocide at the other end.¹¹⁴

Reiff posits that ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was both the military strategy and the war aim of the Bosnian Serbs to reverse the fact that few areas of Bosnia had been all Serb and most villages, towns had been mixed. According to Reiff, the Serb war on Bosnia was so much as a crude grab of lands.¹¹⁵ Within this same line of thought, both Burg and Shoup hold that the goal of Serb ethnic cleansing was to secure, by force, Serb claims to the territory.¹¹⁶

Moreover, Rieff notes that ethnic cleansing was not only a war crime, but a tactic for holding captured areas without having to worry about their inhabitants.¹¹⁷ In doing so, ethnic cleansing took different shapes in the Bosnian war. A recurring feature of ethnic cleansing operations was the systematic killing of community leaders such as educated people, teachers and professionals, well-known figures, intellectuals, members of the SDA and businessmen.¹¹⁸

¹¹² Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” 110.

¹¹³ Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy*, 82.

¹¹⁴ Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” 110.

¹¹⁵ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 100.

¹¹⁶ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 175. According to Cigar, ethnic cleansing was “the direct and planned consequence of conscious policy decisions taken by the Serbian establishment in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This policy was implemented in a deliberate and systematic manner as part of a broader strategy intended to achieve a well-defined, concrete political objectives, namely the creation of an expanded, ethnically pure Greater Serbia.” Ronald Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, 98.

¹¹⁷ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 30.

¹¹⁸ Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy*, 82. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 173.

Furthermore, in eastern Bosnia, parts of eastern Herzegovina, the Sava river valley, Bosanska Krajina, and the suburbs of Sarajevo, a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing was initiated by the Bosnian Serbs right from the start in 1992. Muslim women and children were usually forced across the battle lines into Bosnian territory or transported out of the country.¹¹⁹ Besides, most women and children who were not imprisoned or killed, were totally at the mercy of their tormentors. Additionally, refugees trying to escape the fighting ran the risk of being shelled. Men and boys were interned, and many were killed outright.¹²⁰ Prisoners were held under abysmal conditions. Torture and execution of inmates was common in Serb camps.¹²¹ The Serb assault established a pattern that was to be followed on other occasions and by other groups throughout the war.

Reports of rape were also widespread. In 8 January 1993, an EC investigation into incidents of rape in Bosnia estimated that 200, 000 Muslim women had been raped by Serb soldiers as part of their campaign of terror.¹²² Mass rape was perpetrated mostly against Muslim women, but also against Croat women.¹²³ The discovery of the rape camps near the town of Foca, near Sarajevo in early 1993, seemed unthinkable. The Serbs had used rape as a weapon of war all over Bosnia, a way of terrorizing the Muslim population into flight and thus fulfilling the Serb war aim of ethnic cleansing.

Not only was ethnic cleansing in Bosnia as much about methodically humiliating a people and killing them, as it was about destroying the other's culture. Rieff stipulates that the Serb assault on the Ottoman and Islamic architectural legacy throughout the country was not a byproduct of the fighting, but "an important war aim"¹²⁴. The Serbs were guilty of the complete eradication of Muslim cultural monuments; mosques, libraries, and the like were totally destroyed in order to erase any linkage of the previous inhabitants of the land.¹²⁵ Besides, Rieff notes that the "Serbianization" of Bosnian areas that had been ethnically mixed before the war broke out could not be done simply by driving the non-Serbs out. However, a total eradication of villages was necessary otherwise ethnic cleaning would not be a success. Therefore, the massacres at the beginning of the fighting in the spring of 1992 had just been

¹¹⁹ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 173.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 175.

¹²² Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy*, 82.

¹²³ Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing," 119.

¹²⁴ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 96.

¹²⁵ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 174; Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy*, 82.

the start. The eradication of whole villages to ashes was a necessity which meant the destruction of the Bosnian past.¹²⁶

Ethnic cleansing, on the other hand, was not restricted to Serb-occupied territory. In fact, brutalities were committed by all the three sides. Serbs were also the victims of ethnic cleansing. In eastern Herzegovina, the combined Croat-Muslim offensive of May 1992 was accompanied by the burning of Serb villages and the expulsion of their inhabitants.¹²⁷

Croats were victims of ethnic cleansing in the early stages of the war. In March 1992 the Serbs took control of the area around Bosanski Brod where they were engaged in atrocities and ethnic cleansing against the Bosnian Croats.¹²⁸ In addition, Bosnian Croats were the victims of massacres perpetrated by the Muslims in the Konjic area. They were also forced to flee their cities and towns in central Bosnia during the 1993 Croat-Muslim war.¹²⁹

Furthermore, in the Croat-Muslim war, atrocities were carried out by both sides, the Croats and Muslims, in what Western observers called a war of “village against village”.¹³⁰ The Muslim offensive of Croat villages was accompanied by ethnic cleansing. Local Croats were driven out and many of whom were interned in the Muslim detention camps where reports of conditions were strikingly similar to accounts of camps held by the Serbs.¹³¹

In Croatian-occupied areas of eastern Herzegovina, Bosnian Muslims were ethnically cleansed. Detention camps were set up where prisoners were held under abominable conditions, fraught with torture and humiliation at the hands of the Croat authorities.¹³²

The attribution of such acts to all three sides is not an effort to minimize the difference among the ethnic groups, neither is it a means of neglecting the responsibility of the Serbs for the destructiveness and brutality of the war, and widespread ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population. All accounts make it obvious that one side, the Bosnian Muslims, was the aggrieved party. Yet, at the same time, all three parties, including the Bosnian Muslims, behaved in ways that undermined any claim to moral superiority. Thereby, what

¹²⁶ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 96.

¹²⁷ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 176.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 176-177.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 177.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 180.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*

was changing the face of Bosnia was the project of ethnic cleansing, a project which resulted in genocide.

The determination of genocide depends on one's definition of the phenomenon. Helen Fein identifies five conditions that differentiate genocide from other forms of warfare. First, there must be "a sustained attack, or continuity of attacks...to physically destroy group members." Second, Fein considers the perpetrator "a collective or organized actor or a commander of organized actors," Third, he holds that a war crime is genocide when "the victims are selected because they are members of a group," then "the victims are defenseless." Finally, Fein posits that genocide occurs when "the destruction of group members is undertaken with intent to kill and the murder is sanctioned by the perpetrators."¹³³

The victims were, unquestionably, selected because they were Muslims. Even though, violence was applied to Bosnian Serbs who refused to submit.¹³⁴ In the overwhelming majority of cases the victims were defenseless. Serb paramilitary units constituted a collective, organized actor. They played a major role in the killing, under the authorizations of "high-level Bosnian Serb and Serbian military commanders and political leaders."¹³⁵ Such authorizations, which were aimed at the destruction of the Bosnian Muslims, indicate that the killing was intentional. Therefore they strengthen the case for genocide.

Moreover, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was intended against unarmed civilians. Rieff notes that it was "a relatively slow, legalistic, and deliberate process, an ever tightening noose around the collective neck of the subject population, more often than it has been a single, terrible event."¹³⁶ He further adds that "it was one thing for Serb paramilitaries...to kill people quickly, an evening's work, in some out-of-the-way villages."¹³⁷ Killing unarmed citizens is another factor that identifies genocide.

Albeit ethnic cleansing and brutal atrocities occurred everywhere in Bosnia, their impact was felt above all by the Muslim population in Serb-occupied areas. As the war dragged on, however, each selected group, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, mainly defenseless civilians, suffered gruesome murder at the hands of their

¹³³ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 182.

¹³⁴ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 110.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 82.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

perpetrators. All three sides committed crimes and sowed terror among each ethnic group. Nevertheless, the Serbs were held to conduct the most bitter and widespread atrocities against the Muslims. In the midst of such atrocious events, one may ask such questions: How was the reaction of the United States towards what was happening on the Bosnian ground? What was the policy of the Bush administration on the Bosnian War? Was it based on intervention or disengagement?

II.6. The Bush Administration's Policy on the Bosnian War

By the time of the Bosnia's independence, the Bush administration was already involved in the conflict. It had encouraged the Izetbegovic government to secede from the Yugoslav Federation. Then, it hampered European efforts to resolve ethnic tensions through diplomatic negotiations. Once war actually erupted, nonetheless, the United States stepped away from the Bosnian cauldron.

The fundamental element of the Bush administration's policy on the Bosnian War was that Europe would have primary responsibility for managing the crisis. Senior officials within the Bush administration perceived the Bosnian conflict as a European problem, but not American. On May 24, 1992, Secretary State James Baker urged the EC to be more active in solving the conflict. He declared that there "was an undercurrent in Washington, often felt but seldom spoken, that it was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show they could act as a unified power."¹³⁸ At the same time, Baker made it clear that Washington "felt comfortable with European Community's taking responsibility for handling the crisis in the Balkans."¹³⁹ He picturesquely expressed his opinion, "we don't have a dog in this fight."¹⁴⁰ This statement set the direction for the Bush policy that the United States would not intervene in the Bosnian war. Still, the ever-cautious Baker added a caveat, "before we consider force, we ought to exhaust all of the political and economic remedies that might be at hand."¹⁴¹ Such statements imply that the Bush administration would not be militarily entangled as the slaughter worsened in southeastern Europe.

Throughout most of 1992, selective engagers continued to oppose any form of US military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When speaking of Bosnia, President Bush and

¹³⁸ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 201.

¹³⁹ Thomas Henriksen, *American Power After the Berlin Wall*, 82.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Making War to Keep Peace*, 167.

his advisers referred frequently to “a land steeped in ethnic hatreds dating back hundreds of years.”¹⁴² Indeed, they were able to frame Bosnia as a conflict fueled by ancient tribal and ethnic hatreds about which the United States could do little. Based on this justification, the administration publicly argued that the prudent policy was to avoid any US entanglement in the Balkans.¹⁴³

When violence erupted in the country in March 1992, there was widespread acceptance among US journalists, at least initially, that the conflict was simply a further manifestation of unchecked nationalist hatreds that had been widely reported. This influenced reporting during the first months of the conflict that portrayed the violence as tragic, but ultimately indorsed the Bush administration’s position that the conflict was caused by age-old ethnic hatreds in which all sides were culpable and equally to blame.¹⁴⁴

Further strengthening the Bush administration’s position was the support of General Powell and his senior advisers within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Powell and his advisers acknowledged their reluctance to support even limited military intervention. They strongly believed that US military intervention, in such conflicts, would inevitably degenerate Vietnam-like quagmires.¹⁴⁵ Powell “scoffed at the idea of limited intervention, arguing that this was a recipe for escalation at a later date, with high risks and an uncertain outcome.”¹⁴⁶ Besides, General Powell felt uncomfortable about the prospect of fighting in Bosnia’s mountainous terrain, given the fact that the US army has just fought in the very different environment of the Persian Gulf. In this respect, Powell noted, “we [in the army] do deserts, we don’t do mountains.”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴² Jon Western, “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia,” 120.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 121.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 120.

¹⁴⁶ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 130. In June, during a discussion on whether to US military aircraft in support of an emergency humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo, senior planners told members of Congress that even such a limited operation would require more than 50, 000 US ground troops to secure a thirty-mile perimeter around the airport. Jon Western, “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia,” 121.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 130.

The most fundamental explanation for the lack of direct US military intervention, in the early stages of the war, was the view held by key policymakers that the fighting did not threaten US national interests.¹⁴⁸ Hutchings, a US policy officer, declared:

*We never decided whether Yugoslavia mattered enough to invest considerable American leadership and, if need be, to place substantial numbers of American men and women in harm's way to halt or at least contain the conflict.*¹⁴⁹

Reinforcing the same belief, David Gompert, another senior policy officer, stated the case more directly, “clearly, and correctly American leaders did not see “vital” national interest imperiled by the Yugoslav conflict.”¹⁵⁰ Maintaining the same reason why the US military had opposed intervention from the beginning of the fighting, Secretary of State James Baker reported, “Our vital national interests were not at stake. The Yugoslav conflict had the potential to be intractable, but it was nonetheless a regional dispute.”¹⁵¹

Given these explanations that the Bosnian War is fueled by ancient, unchecked ethnic hatred, and that there were no US interests at stake, the American public, consequently, largely supported the Bush administration’s ruling out of any application of military intervention, even limited use of force.¹⁵²

However, as the war dragged on, US officials were divided. There were supporters of the administration’s decision not to use force on the one hand, and opponents of US reluctance on the other. Hence, the Bush administration became under pressure coming from both the American public and policymakers.

¹⁴⁸ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 200.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 200-201.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 201.

¹⁵² Richard Sobel, “Trends: United States Intervention in Bosnia,” 252.

II.6.1. The Bush Administration under Pressure

Through the summer and autumn of 1992, conditions in Bosnia grew steadily worse, demands for action by the United States grew more urgent, and protest against the Bush administration grew stronger. Bosnia became a major issue in the American press and within the State Department, where several young Foreign Service officers resigned to protest US policy of disengagement.¹⁵³ During August 1992, media revelations of the human rights abuses outraged the American public and intensified the Americans' opposition to the Serbs.¹⁵⁴

On the other hand, the central challenge to US selective engagers came from liberal humanitarianists who supported military intervention. They called for US deployment of combatant troops in order to provide relief to aggrieved populations, and to halt or prevent atrocities perpetrated against civilians. For that reason, they greatly intensified their pressure on the Bush administration to intervene in the Bosnian conflict.¹⁵⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, were not completely unified on the Bosnian War. The air force chief of staff, General Merrill McPeak, advocated military intervention. As a result, tension emerged on the JCS between pro-interventionists and selective engagers who completely opposed military action in the Bosnian conflict. MacPeak's opposition was, nevertheless, overruled at the JCS meetings where other services' representatives sided with the army, and thus accepted General Powell's reservations. Albeit caution prevailed in the JCS, there was growing pressure for military intervention in support of the Muslim government. Eagleburger at State, Wolfowitz and Khalilzad at Defense strongly supported US intervention.¹⁵⁶

In addition, congressional pressure on the Bush administration in favour of US military intervention in the Bosnian War came from both Republicans and Democrats as well. A leading advocate of intervention in the Bosnian War was Senate Republican Bob Dole.¹⁵⁷ In his second letter to President Bush, he again "urged [the President] to send a special envoy

¹⁵³ Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Bosnia and Beyond: The "Quiet" Revolution that wouldn't go quietly*, 174.

¹⁵⁴ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *op. cit.*, 201-202.

¹⁵⁵ Jon Western, "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia," 200.

¹⁵⁶ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 130.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 131.

to provide American leadership to mediation efforts.”¹⁵⁸ Senator Dole believed that US direct involvement “would increase the chances for a just settlement of the crisis.”¹⁵⁹ On the other hand, the Bush administration was under domestic political pressure from the Democratic candidate for presidency, Bill Clinton, who called on President Bush to “do whatever it takes to stop the slaughter of civilians”¹⁶⁰ Moreover, having criticized the Bush administration for doing nothing to stop the Bosnian genocide, candidate Clinton, during the election campaign, promised to use American power so that to bring ethnic cleansing in Bosnia to a halt. Bill Clinton promised to do what President Bush did not, that is to send US troops so that to stop the genocide in Bosnia.¹⁶¹

Furthermore, there were demands that advocated a NATO role in settling the Bosnian War. These demands emanated from the Centre for Security Policy at the Pentagon. Gibbs quotes:

*Serbian-led forces occupying areas of...Bosnia-Herzegovina must be expelled –by force if necessary.... There is in fact only one organization capable of taking on and successfully executing this daunting task: NATO. Only the Alliance has the dedicated, highly trained, and rapidly deployable forces needed to thwart Milosevic’s hegemonic designs.*¹⁶²

If NATO had taken on the deployment of combatant forces, assuming a major role in the Bosnian conflict, this would have required the United States to send troops. Still, US foreign policymakers were not willing to do so in 1992.

The Bush administration sought to combat increasing pressure in Congress. Had Clinton campaigned on an active Bosnia policy, Powell and the JCS changed gears in support of intervention in Somalia which was suffering from a massive famine induced by a civil war.

¹⁵⁸ Sen. Bob Dole, “Again Urges the President to Send a Special Envoy to Yugoslavia to Provide American Leadership in Mediation Efforts to Settle the Crisis in Yugoslavia,” September 16, 1991, Bush Presidential Records, WHORM Subject File, General, Scanned Records, CO 176 [269969], George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁵⁹ Sen. Bob Dole, op. cit.

¹⁶⁰ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 201.

¹⁶¹ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 27.

¹⁶² David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 131.

Powell decided that if the United States were going to intervene in a humanitarian crisis, Somalia would prove tenable than Bosnia.¹⁶³

Arguments for intervention in the Bosnian War, consequently, failed to overcome the basic caution and reluctance that prevailed within the Bush administration. Given these constraints, the Bush foreign policy team preferred to pursue a diplomatic solution rather than a military one for the unfolding conflict in Bosnia, under the auspices of the United Nations and with collaboration of the European Community.

II.6.2. The US Action within the UN and Its Collaboration with the EC

The war in Bosnia was characterized by unprecedented degree of involvement on the part of the international community and the EC. Western entanglement in the conflict took different forms. Initial international response was characterized by three aspects. Specific policy responses to the war concerned the different attitude of the United States, the European Community, and the United Nations.

First and foremost, the United States did not assume a leadership role in the 1992 fighting. Secretary of State James Baker asserted that the United States would not use unilateral force and would only consider using it if its European colleagues were prepared to do so under Chapter VII of the UN charter.¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, US attitude was welcomed by the Europeans, most notably France. The Europeans insisted that this humanitarian problem was theirs, asserting their own prerogative on resolving the Continent's trouble. David Gompert notes:

*Key European allies, already disappointed with Washington's cold reception to the idea of an EC-based common defense policy, would have considered unfriendly any attempt by the United States to frustrate their wish to treat Yugoslavia as a matter of EC common foreign policy.*¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Evelyn Farkas, *Fractured States and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 80.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 80.

Additionally, Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacque Poos emphatically declared, "This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the American."¹⁶⁶ For Poos, it was the moment for the EC to prove itself on the foreign policy front. The Europeans were determined to fashion a common policy in order to bring the Bosnian War into an end. If they chose that option, the Western European Union, the EC's defense arm, would represent an independent military apparatus from the US-dominated NATO.¹⁶⁷

Sponsoring political negotiations for peace settlement presented the EC with an opportunity to strengthen its foreign policy ambitions for the development of a CFSP, as reflected in the Maastricht Treaty. This indicated that the EC could solve problems in its own backyard without the United States. However, as tension among the European member states prevented unity, and as the fighting reached its large-scale ethnic cleansing and killings, the venue for dealing with the Bosnian war shifted to the United Nations.¹⁶⁸

The first key aspect of the UN early approach to Bosnia was containment, a policy which was a hold-over from the response to the war in Croatia.¹⁶⁹ In order to prevent the conflict from spreading, the UN imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia through UNSC Res 713 in September 25, 1991 for the war that the Serbs were waging against a secessionist Croatia.¹⁷⁰

Following the severe shelling of Sarajevo during successive days, the UN reaction was the imposition of a series of economic sanctions designed to penalize Serbia by beginning in May 1992.¹⁷¹ The sanctions were "heavier than those ever before imposed by the United Nations on a country. Import and export, together with transport to and from [Yugoslavia] were forbidden; financial transactions were almost totally forbidden; all scientific, cultural,

¹⁶⁶ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 82.

¹⁶⁷ Thomas Henriksen, *American Power After the Berlin Wall*, 82.

¹⁶⁸ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 207. American internal differences over the use of military power were matched by differences among the Europeans. They differed over how they would implement their interventionist policy. For instance, the French pressed for a European mission carried out through the WEU. However, the British opposed greater involvement and sought to direct it through NATO so that to involve the US. Besides, the Russians were also internally divided. They opposed the use of force. As a result, the Western powers, including Russia, appeared to be backing away from entanglement from the Bosnian War.

¹⁶⁹ Carol McQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention and Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda*, 56.

¹⁷⁰ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 27.

¹⁷¹ Shoup and Steven, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 132; David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 133.

and sporting contacts were broken off; and the level of diplomatic representation was drastically reduced.”¹⁷²

Additionally, the UN ordered the withdrawal of the JNA. Albeit the federal troops began officially to withdraw from Bosnia in May 1992, their withdrawal was “a fiction.”¹⁷³ According to General Morillon, JNA units were, “repainted with new insignia and became officially the army of the Serbs of Bosnia, but they were the same forces, the same officers, the same equipment.”¹⁷⁴

The second aspect of American and European reaction was their collaboration in the delivery of aid to Sarajevo and other besieged cities. The threat of public backlash was great, particularly as the press uncovered Serb atrocities in the form of concentration camps. Therefore, the great powers had to do something. On 13 August, 1992, the UNSC Res 770 and 771 were adopted. The former authorized states to deliver food, medicine and fuel, imposed a ban on military flights over all Bosnia except for flights in support of UN missions.¹⁷⁵ It also recognized “that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an important element in the Council’s effort to restore international peace and security in the area.”¹⁷⁶ The latter demanded respect for humanitarian law.¹⁷⁷ Successive resolutions by the Security Council for humanitarian aid were expressed in the same words. They aimed to exhort the belligerent parties so that to comply with the resolutions’ provisions that they continued to ignore.¹⁷⁸

Furthermore, media outrage and public disgust of large-scale ethnic cleansing prompted some stronger language, but the only taken action was under UN auspices. Acting only as a part of a UN-sanctioned multinational effort aimed at humanitarian relief, the Bush administration, undertook a massive airlift to Sarajevo and airdrops supplies to communities outside the city.¹⁷⁹ In a Statement on Humanitarian Assistance of October 2, 1992, President Bush declared:

¹⁷² David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 133.

¹⁷³ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 121.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Bosnia and Beyond: The “Quiet” Revolution that wouldn’t go quietly*, 170.

¹⁷⁶ Jenifer Welsh, *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, 104-105.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 105.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Thomas Henriksen, *American Power After the Berlin Wall*, 87.

We took several important initiatives in August, and today I am announcing further steps to ease this conflict.... I want the American people to know that the United States intends to do to help prevent this dreadful forecast from becoming a tragic reality.... First, having authorized a resumption of US relief flights into Sarajevo, I am prepared to increase the US share of the airlift. Second, we will make available air and sea lift to speed the deployment of the new UN force needed immediately in Bosnia to protect relief convoys.... Third, the United States will furnish \$12 million in urgently needed cash to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for the purpose of accelerating preparations for the winter.... Fourth, we will offer to the United Nations and the Red Cross help in transporting and caring for those who are being freed from detention camps.... Fifth, in cooperation with our friends and allies we will a new UN Security Council resolution, with a provision for enforcement, banning all flights in Bosnian air space except those authorized by the United Nations.... We will persist in our strategy for containing and reducing the violence...¹⁸⁰

Bush's statement indicated that US policy on Bosnia was driven, not by a resolve to defeat aggression, but only by a desire to bring humanitarian relief and deter spillover. Additionally, President Bush maintained that the United States would not take unilateral humanitarian actions. The United States would act with the cooperation of the Europeans and under the authorization of the United Nations. Besides, he ruled out any application of the use of military force, insisting that a strategy of containment of the fighting would prevail and continue. Even if US officers, under the Bush administration, responded by undertaking humanitarian actions, they did not stop the fighting. They impeded no ethnic cleansing. Serbs steadily pushed their attack against non-Serb civilians. Thus, US air operations were, according to Henriksen, "a mere stopgap."¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ Jeanne Haskin, *American Power After the Berlin Wall*, 85-86.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 88.

The third essential aspect of the early United Nations as well as European Community approach towards the war in Bosnia was based on two pronged strategies which were to remain prevalent throughout the entire conflict. The first policy was the deployment of peacekeeping troops to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. In time, the UNPROFOR mission, which was an extension of the existing UNPROFOR in Sarajevo for the PKO in Croatia, would mushroom into one of the largest peacekeeping operations in UN history, with a full strength of 40 000 troops from more than 40 countries.¹⁸² Peacekeepers were sent to Bosnia in June 1992 in order to open Sarajevo's airport to humanitarian assistance. The UN SC authorized a progressive expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate and the deployment of more UNPROFOR troops in order to grantee the safety of humanitarian personnel, and to support the delivery of humanitarian aid.¹⁸³

The second strategy was the negotiation of peace settlement through international conferences on the former Yugoslavia. Unwilling to impose a settlement by force, the great powers chose to pursue negotiations among the warring parties. In August 1992, the United Nations and the European Community convened the first London Conference which established the name International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, in order to facilitate negotiations between the belligerents. The ICFY was co-chaired by Cyrus Van, former US secretary of state, as an envoy of the secretary-general of the UN and David Owen, former British foreign secretary for the EC.¹⁸⁴

Right from the outset, the ICFY process was closely connected to major European governments than to that of the United States. This was the result of both US unwillingness to participate in or support the negotiations, and the direct integration of the ICFY into the European diplomatic network.¹⁸⁵ Major troop-contributing countries, mainly the UK and France, remained particularly well informed. The United States and Russia, in contrast, appeared to be less informed with respect to the details, and unwilling, at first to participate in the mediation effort.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 132; Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, 98.

¹⁸³ Carol McQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention and Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda*, 57.

¹⁸⁴ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 211.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 211-213.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 213.

Nonetheless, international efforts to mediate a negotiated settlement of the conflict repeatedly failed to gain the agreement of the warring parties. The Bosnian government opposed any peace proposal that granted the Bosnian Serbs political control over areas that they had ethnically cleansed. The Bosnian Serbs, for their part, had little incentive to negotiate a settlement of the war as long as they continued to dominate the battlefield.¹⁸⁷

According to Gibbs, the effects of the UN peacekeepers were, however, not great. He notes that “the relief efforts helped alleviate the effect of the war on the civilian population, but only to a limited extent. And the UN troops could not act as peacekeepers in any meaningful sense, since there was no peace to keep.”¹⁸⁸ Besides, he views that the basic problem was that albeit UNPROFOR had almost the authority or the resources that would have been necessary to stop the fighting, the Secretary Council members, including the United States, were not yet willing to commit themselves to a combat presence in Bosnia. “At the same time they did not wish to seem unconcern about the suffering caused by the war,” Gibbs reiterates.¹⁸⁹

Finally, under pressure from several Arab states, in December 1992 the Bush administration attempted to persuade the Europeans to support lifting the international arms embargo on Bosnia. France and the United Kingdom remained opposed, and the United States gave up the effort. Accordingly, the United States, the European Community, and the United Nations failed in bringing an end to the Bosnian war in 1992. They all followed one same lead.

Overall, the ability of Bosnia to avoid violence was rapidly diminishing as a result of the appearance of the first division along ethnic lines within the political elite. Bad economic conditions, coupled with the Agrokomec scandal, and the rise of nationalism in Serbia which resulted in the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation were also tragic for Bosnia. These factors led to the breakup of the Bosnian War just after the declaration of the republic’s independence, during which the United States played a crucial role in the diplomatic process of an independent Bosnia.

US efforts for an independent Bosnia undermined the EC initiatives that aimed to resolve the conflict. US motivation for Bosnia’s independence was steered by geostrategic

¹⁸⁷ Ronald Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, 98.

¹⁸⁸ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 133.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

consideration of primacy as well as economic interests. At the time Bosnia became independent, full-scale war began. Ethnic cleansing and genocide were perpetrated against the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs. Each ethnic group had been the victim of the other perpetrator's atrocities.

By the time of the Bosnia's independence, the Bush administration was already involved in the conflict. Once war actually erupted, the Bush administration, nevertheless, chose to stand aside and let the Europeans take charge. The most fundamental explanations for the lack of direct US military intervention were that the war was fueled by ancient tribal and ethnic hatreds about which the United States could do little, and that fighting did not threaten US national interest. However, as the war dragged on, the administration became under pressure coming from both the American public and policymakers. US policymakers, then, preferred to pursue a diplomatic solution rather than a military one, under the auspices of the United Nations and with collaboration of the European Community.

The reluctance of the United States to be drawn into the conflict was matched by the reluctance of the great powers. Their policymakers were prepared to support measures such as Security Council Resolutions. Efforts such as the imposition of arms embargo, introduction of economic sanctions, UNPROFOR troops' deployment as well as humanitarian relief supplies went for naught. The result was a weak UN peacekeeping presence. So to speak, there was peace to keep. The peacekeepers were, in fact, hardly a solution to the Bosnian problem. But they were perhaps better than nothing at all.

The United States, the European Community as well as the United Nations failed in bringing an end to the Bosnian war. Was not that lack of any direct intervention in the Bosnian war putting US credibility at stake? Would the United States, under the Clinton presidency, continue to undercut EC efforts to resolve the crisis, or would it treat the major European powers as allied, and not adversaries bringing an end to the bloody war? Such questions are thoroughly discussed in the third chapter.

Chapter III

The Clinton Administration Faces the Bosnian War

During his presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton appeared to be more hawkish than President George Bush in terms of intervening in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the Serb-held concentration camps became public knowledge in the summer of 1992, candidate Clinton called for stricter economic sanctions on the Serbs, the use of force for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and bombing Serb military units that had been shelling Sarajevo since the start of the war. Yet, once in office, President Clinton continued the policy of disengagement that had been adopted by the Bush administration.

This chapter starts by discussing the Bosnia issue during the Clinton presidential campaign and after inauguration. Then, it explains how the Clinton administration pursued a similar policy of detachment, thwarting peace negotiations for peace settlement. As the war dragged on with massive human rights abuse and heavy atrocities being public knowledge, the Clinton administration became divided between hawks and doves on how to handle the Bosnian war.

Then, the third chapter examines the shift in US Bosnia policy towards a reluctant leadership only after fighting had intensified and the failure of safe areas. It also considers the shift that occurred in US foreign policy in 1995 that led the United States to play a more aggressive role in the Bosnian War, shedding light on US strategy to end the war and US motives behind the endgame.

III.1. The Bosnia Issue before and after Clinton's Inauguration

The Bosnian War was one issue that held Clinton's attention during his presidential election campaign and after taking office as well. Over the course of his campaign in 1992, candidate Bill Clinton focused on human rights violation in Bosnia as "an affront to traditional US values."¹ He expressed outrage over the Serb's brutal atrocities against Bosnian Muslims. Clinton confidently claimed that he "would begin with air power against the Serbs to restore the basic conditions of humanity."²

In addition, candidate Clinton criticized the Bush administration's inaction. He condemned President Bush's resistance to "engage US troops in a combat role."³ Arguing for a more forceful action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Clinton stated that "President Bush's policy toward former Yugoslavia mirrors his indifference.... Once again, the administration is

¹ Ryan Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers*, 73.

² *Ibid.*, 73.

³ *Ibid.*, 72.

turning its back on violations of basic human rights and our own democratic values.”⁴ While Governor Clinton called on President Bush to show “real leadership,”⁵ he urged air strikes, supported by the United States, against the Serbs if they continued their block of the delivery of humanitarian goods to Sarajevo.⁶

Furthermore, candidate Clinton promised to use the American force in order to bring this Bosnian genocide to a halt.⁷ In the campaign, Clinton had discussed “the establishment of an international rapid deployment force under the UN, which could go beyond traditional peacekeeping to preventing mass international violence and aggression in addition to providing humanitarian relief.”⁸ The Bosnia issue clearly presented itself most starkly during Clinton’s campaign. Was it that because Bosnia fit well both parts of Clinton’s strategy; to embarrass President Bush as well as to show him as slightly more forward-looking than the President himself? Would the Bosnia issue continue to be at the top, among other issues, of Clinton’s agenda after his inauguration?

When the Clinton administration was inaugurated in January 1993, the Bosnian War was immediately considered as a major challenge. Richard Holbrooke set the tone, “Bosnia will be the key test of US policy in Europe. We must therefore succeed in whatever we attempt.”⁹ Immediately upon taking office in January 1993, President Clinton ordered a full policy review with his principal foreign policy advisors. The Clinton administration began with high hopes that the Bosnian crisis could be dealt with through the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations. Madeline Albright, the US ambassador to the UN, was particularly keen on enhancing the role of international peacekeeping. In this concern, she coined the term “assertive multilateralism.”¹⁰ Besides, Lake had initiated a number of policy reviews, with peacekeeping one of the Bosnian crisis. He stated that “this was to end up the object of a year-long battle.”¹¹

After three long Principals meetings had been held in February 5, President Clinton said that the United States had to lead on Bosnia, for humanitarian reasons if no other.¹²

⁴ Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency*, 138.

⁵ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 42.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁷ David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*, 27

⁸ Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency*, 145.

⁹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 141.

¹⁰ Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency*, 145.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 145.

¹² *Ibid.*, 146.

Several European countries had already contributed ground troops to the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia. “If the United States does not act in situations like this,” the President declared “nothing will happen.” He further asserted that “a failure to do so would be to give up American leadership.”¹³ It is obvious that the President himself recognized that any US non-success in Bosnia would humiliate the credibility of US dominant role in the world.

Despite these concerns, the Clinton administration’s first year produced little changes. The new President’s Bosnia policy was initially similar to Bush’s. A list of options was considered. These included becoming directly involved in humanitarian actions, lifting the UN arms embargo, enforcement of the no-fly- zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, seeking a tightening of the economic sanctions against Serbia, and most importantly to help enforce a peace agreement among the Bosnian parties to stop fighting.¹⁴

Furthermore, one of President Clinton’s first statements on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was his pledge to provide up to 25,000 US ground troops to a multilateral peacekeeping operation in the event that a comprehensible peace settlement was reached.¹⁵ However, as the war dragged on President Clinton ruled out US deployment of ground troops into Bosnia. Instead, exactly as the Bush administration disdained European diplomatic efforts to settle the war, the Clinton administration began by blocking a series of European and UN mediation activities.¹⁶

III.2. The Clinton Administration Thwarts a Negotiation Settlement

When Bill Clinton took office, the European Union was seeking, once again, with the support of the United Nations, to mediate the Bosnian conflict. Former British foreign secretary David Owen, representing the EU, and former US secretary of state Cyrus Vance, representing the UN, directed the ICFY mediation.¹⁷ In January 1993, they presented a new plan which became known as the Vance-Owen peace plan. In a manner that was reminiscent of the 1992 Lisbon Agreement, the plan proposed the decentralization of power in Bosnia and the creation of a weak central government. The Vance-Owen peace plan, however, called for the division of Bosnia into ten cantons, which were all to be ethnically mixed. According to

¹³ Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency*, 146.

¹⁴ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 232; Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency*, 146.

¹⁵ Ryan Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers*, 73.

¹⁶ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 141.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 142.

Gibbs it was, nonetheless, understood that one ethnic group would form a majority.¹⁸ The Serbs were to control 43 percent of the land area of Bosnia, 32 percent would go to the Croats, and 25 percents to the Muslims (See map n°4).¹⁹

Albeit, European negotiators view the Vance-Owen peace plan positively, as a fair resolution to what seemed an intractable crisis, US officials opposed the plan and sought to impede the negotiation process.²⁰ When Owen appeared as a prosecution witness at the Milosevic trial in 2003, the following exchange was produced:

Milosevic: “The Vance-Owen peace plan was abandoned in the first place by the Americans, or rather they didn’t even support it. They didn’t want to support it. Isn’t that granted more land than either of the other ethnic groups. Given the fact that the Serbs were true?” ...

Owen: “There’s a great deal of truth in that.”²¹

US officials justified their opposition to the peace plan by claiming that the plan ratified ethnic partition.²² Second, it was unfair because it favoured the Serbs. They were only 31 percent of the population, US officials considered the 43 percent figure far too high.²³ Warren Christopher, President Clinton’s Secretary of State, posited that the plan “simply appeases Serbian aggression.”²⁴ According to such claims, one may argue that the United States was, indeed, acting on the basis of moral principles.

¹⁸ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 142.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* How to apportion high quality land areas, and to ensure that most of these lands would be returned were major challenges to the mediators. Besides, the main objective of the peace plan was restoring the demographic status quo, at least an approximation of it, which existed before the breakup of the war. David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 142-143.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 143.


²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 233.

²³ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 144.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Map N°4: The Initial Vance-Owen Map, January 1993



Source: Burg, Steven, and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (The United States of America: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 223.

Gibbs notes that the Vance-Owen peace plan was not favourable to the Serbs. The 43 percent of Bosnia's land area, which the Serbs were to have, was less than the land area they controlled prior to the onset of the war. The Serbs had owned 56 percent of the total land, a proportion above what they were given by the Vance-Owen peace plan.²⁵ Gibbs concludes that the plan was not generous to the Serbs. For him "arguments to the contrary have little merit."²⁶

On the other hand, the Clinton administration's hostility towards the plan had an impact on the negotiation process. At the beginning, the plan seemed to be successful. The peace plan was better for the Muslims because it aimed to reduce Serb gains. Therefore, the Izetbegovic government supported it. US diplomat Warren Zimmermann noted that the "Bosnian government's reaction to the [Vance-Owen] plan ... was not only positive, it was enthusiastic."²⁷ Additionally, both the Serbs and Croats were receptive as well. Thomas Friedman writes, "The Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats have signed their willingness to accept the plan."²⁸

However, the Izetbegovic government shifted its position and turned resistant to the peace plan once the Clinton administration exerted itself. Although it had agreed to sign the plan, it now refused to do so.²⁹ One may wonder why this change in attitude? A Dutch investigation emphasizes the role of the Clinton administration. It argues that Izetbegovic changed his position after he had "travelled to the United States to consult with the Clinton camp."³⁰ He returned "under the impression that intervention was imminent."³¹ Burg and Shoup note that Izetbegovic was encouraged to wait for US intervention by being promised "a firmer US line and increased US involvement."³²

Negotiations on the peace plan continued with negative results. The Izetbegovic government insisted that they would sign the plan only if they were given territorial concessions.³³ In response to the Muslims' demands, the European negotiators reluctantly changed the map in order to obtain their agreement. With the Vance-Owen map altered in

²⁵ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 144.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 145.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 146.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 234.

³³ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 146.

their favour, the Muslims, with their Croat allies, signed the peace plan by the end of March 1993. However, the Serbs, in their turn, did not accept the amended plan. As a result, the Vance-Owen peace plan was dead by late spring.³⁴

At this point, Gibbs indicates that albeit it may seem that Serb intransigence led to the failure of the plan, it is obvious that US policy helped create the conditions leading to the intransigence. Thus, the United States played a key role in bringing an end to the peace plan.³⁵ Just as the Bush administration blocked EU peace negotiations by rejecting the Lisbon Plan, the Clinton administration thwarted yet another peace effort for ending the Bosnian War.

Again, the Clinton administration acted to foil other negotiated peace plans by the European powers and the United Nations during the period 1993-1995. These, plans, directed by Owen and the Norwegian diplomat Stoltenberg, entailed the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines, with the decentralization of power away from Sarajevo. None of the peace plans received a strong support on the part of the United States. The Clinton administration, instead, continued to derogate the negotiation process.³⁶ Owen wrote, “from the spring of 1993 to the summer of 1995, in my judgment, the effect of US policy...was to prolong the war of the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whether prolongation was recognized [by the US] as being the policy I don’t know.”³⁷

Given this chain of events, the Bosnia War, which might have ended in 1993, would drag on for another two and a half years. Meanwhile, although death toll in Bosnia was substantially soaring and vile atrocities were committed against defenceless civilians, US policymakers were still undecided as to what to do concerning the Bosnian War.

III.3. Clinton’s Undecided Administration and Disengagement

The Clinton administration was able to block the Vance-Owen plan. This might render the administration as being obstructionist. What was needed was an alternative to the plan. That is a US plan to bring the Bosnian war into an end.³⁸ President Clinton himself was,

³⁴ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 146-147; Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 237- 239.

³⁵ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 147.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 148.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 148-149.

however, undecided about how to proceed as to find a precise option to pursue. The Clinton administration was also divided between hawks and doves.³⁹

Advocates of military intervention were concentrated in the State Department. Madeline Albright and Richard Holbrooke played the leading roles. The interventionists called for direct military support for the Izetbegovic government. Furthermore, hawkish views were shared by Vice President Al Gore and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, in addition to First Lady Hillary Clinton. There were impassioned demands for US intervention from both Democrats and Republicans. Senator Bob Dole requested, “Mr. President, innocent men, women, and children are dying today in Bosnia.... We must not stand by and invent excuses for inaction. We’re the world’s supper power. We must act.”⁴⁰

On the other hand, calls for non-intervention came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A leading figure was the JCS chair, Gen. Colin Powell, a holder from the outgoing Bush administration. Powell persisted on firmly opposing US intervention in the Bosnian War. Still, he stuck to the idea that intervention might lead to a Vietnam-style quagmire. Powell’s opinion carried weight with the new President’s decisions on the war.⁴¹

In spite of Powell’s opposition, hawks within the administration developed an interventionist strategy which became known as “lift and strike.”⁴² These officials urged, under UNSC authorization, a lifting of the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian army while maintaining the embargo against the Serbs. The second aspect of “lift and strike” policy entailed US and NATO air raids against Serbian artillery in besieged cities.⁴³ Thus, air campaign would end the war on terms that were agreeable to the Izetbegovic government. Meanwhile, the whole operation would assert the United States’ leadership role.⁴⁴

The policy of “lift and strike” was controversial within the US military nevertheless. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Marrill A. McPeak said that there would be “virtually no risk to American pilots.”⁴⁵ Army Lt. Gen. McCaffery, the new strategic planner for the JCS, however, testified that air raids would be “quite a severe challenge for the use of air power,”

³⁹ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 251.

⁴⁰ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 149.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Jeanne Haskin, *Bosnia and Beyond: The “Quiet” Revolution that wouldn’t go quietly*, 92.

⁴⁴ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 149-150.

⁴⁵ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 251.

seeing no military solution.⁴⁶ Emphasizing the same idea, Gen. Powell objected to the proposed use of US air strikes.⁴⁷

Furthermore, the idea of “lift and strike” ran into another source of opposition. Lifting the arm embargo was strongly opposed by the Russians and the Europeans. The European allies viewed any lifting of the arms embargo as likely to increase the vulnerability of their forces. The British and French governments roundly denounced “lift and strike,” especially that both had large troop contingents in the UNPROFOR. They feared that the scale of violence would escalate and endanger the safety of their troops. The French foreign minister Juppe made it clear that France would withdraw its troops from the UNPROFOR if the embargo were lifted.⁴⁸

US advocacy of military action with no supply of ground troops was viewed hypocritical and reckless by the Europeans. British Prime Minister Major commented, “...this approach [lift and strike] avoided committing American troops, yet maintained a high moral tone and a strident appearance of engagement with the [Bosnian] crisis.”⁴⁹ Besides, Gibbs notes that not only did many Europeans doubt the idea of arming the Muslims, but they resented US efforts to undermine the Vance-Owen peace plan.⁵⁰

The European key allies’ negative reaction to the lift-and-strike approach, coupled with the opposition from the US Army, led to its failure. What’s more, President Clinton himself “developed doubts about the intervention strategy.”⁵¹ By June 1993, he was increasingly viewing the Bosnian war as irresolvable stating that the US plan “shows that a civil war which has roots going back centuries, literally centuries, based on ethnic and religious difference, has not been resolved in the way that I certainly would have hoped.”⁵² At this point “lift and strike” plan died emphasizing the Clinton administration’s reluctance to be militarily involved in the Bosnian conflict.

⁴⁶ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 251.

⁴⁷ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 150.

⁴⁸ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 251.

⁴⁹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 150.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² President Bill Clinton, “The President’s News Conference,” June, 17, 1993, in Peters and Wooley, *The American Presidency Project Document Archive*, www.Presidency.ucsb.edu/ws.?pid=46708.

The first year of Clinton's Bosnia policy was, thus, characterized by indecision within the administration. The President's indecision reflected a drifting administration divided between interventionists and non-interventionists. The 1993 administration policy towards Bosnia is better summarized by State Department Official John Korbblum:

*We went through the first year in a really...depressed, almost disastrous state in the Balkans. We had essentially no policy. [The Clinton team] didn't seem able to put together a clear picture of what they wanted to do on Bosnia. And there was total disinterest or confusion.*⁵³

President Clinton, then, became disinterested and turned his attention away from the bloodshed in Bosnia in order to refocus on domestic issues.⁵⁴ Would he and his team reconsider drawing another policy in the coming years particularly as the situation deteriorated and fighting intensified on the Bosnian ground? Would the United States and major European powers be able to reach consensus and find a solution to end the war?

III.4. Fighting Intensifies: The Muslim-Croat Conflict

Fighting, that was erupted between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in January 1993, increased in April. As a result, political breakup between the Muslims and the Croats ensued. The origins of the conflict between the Muslims and the Croats were related to the division of Bosnia brokered in the Vance-Owen plan. Whatever its causes, the Muslim-Croat split generated new rounds of atrocities. Both ethnic groups massacred each other, adding another source of insecurity.⁵⁵

The Bosnian Croats, along with Croatia whose regular army troops were dispatched to central Bosnia, engaged themselves in burning and plundering of villages, setting up

⁵³ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 150-151.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 150.

⁵⁵ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 134. It was assumed that fighting was sparked by the Croats who directly, aggressively attacked the Muslims. Charles Shrader, however, argues that it was the Muslims who began their offensive against their allies, the Croats. David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 151.

detention camps, and laying siege to the Muslim quarters of Mostar.⁵⁶ The Muslims, on the other hand, “employed the same hideous ethnic cleansing and grotesque internment camps that they had been subjected to by Serbs and Croats.”⁵⁷ The official Dutch investigation described:

*Some of the most appalling acts in the Bosnian war took place in the battle between Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia, such as the Croat mass slaughter of Muslims from Ahmici in [April] 1993, or the atrocities perpetrated by the [Muslim] forces against the Croatian inhabitants of the village of Uzdol, in the hills east of Cronji Vakuf in mid-September. Another mass murder took place in Stupni Do, where people and cattle were set on fire by the [Croat] Bobovak brigade.”*⁵⁸

Both Muslims and Croats perpetrated horrendous crimes. Each ethnic group had been the victim of the other’s conduct of ethnic cleansing. The Muslim-Croat conflict showed how complex the Bosnian War was. At this point, the Bosnian conflict became a multi-front war between the Croats, Serbs, and Muslims.⁵⁹ This phase of the war made it more difficult than before for the Western powers to stop fighting. Besides, “Given the bureaucratic deadlock and interstate cleavages,” Gibbs notes that the great powers remained incapable of imposing a ceasefire.⁶⁰ In the absence of a definitive solution to end the Bosnian War, the result was the creation of safe areas.⁶¹

III.5. The Strategy of Safe Areas and Betrayal

The safe-area plan was authorized by UNSC resolutions during April-June 1993. Sarajevo and five other predominantly Muslim enclaves were designated as special havens, which were to be protected by UNPROFOR troops. The UNSC Res 824 declared that the

⁵⁶ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 135-136.

⁵⁷ Jeanne Haskin, *Bosnia and Beyond: The “Quiet” Revolution that wouldn’t go quietly*, 90.

⁵⁸ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 151.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 152. The Bosnian Croats were supported by the Croatian Republic. President Franjo Tudjman now appeared to be seeking a Greater Croatia, just as Milosevic was seeking a Greater Serbia. Therefore, the Tudjman government supplied the Bosnian Croats with thousands of soldiers.

⁶⁰ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 152.

⁶¹ Thomas Henriksen, *American Power after the Berlin Wall*, 89.

Bosnian towns of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and Srebrenica to be safe areas, “free from attacks and from any other hostile acts.”⁶² Additionally, NATO aircraft were to provide cover for the UNPROFOR troops and enforce a no-fly zone that was established by the UNSC over Bosnia.⁶³

Following the failure of US efforts to win European approval on the lift-and-strike strategy, the Clinton administration reluctantly accepted the establishment of safe areas. President Clinton declared that the plan was a “step towards ending ethnic cleansing and slaughter by staking out the safe havens...in such a way that was clearly designed to end the slaughter, provide safety and humanitarian aid.”⁶⁴

However, the strategy of safe areas was not greeted with enthusiasm from Secretary of State Christopher. He viewed the safe-area-plan as a way to get US Bosnia policy off the agenda and out of the headlines, “a new way to shunt Bosnia to the sidelines...[to] allow Clinton to do what he should –focus on the domestic agenda.”⁶⁵ Furthermore, Christopher considered the scheme as only a strategy of containment, which he defined as “one of the prime goals of President Clinton.”⁶⁶ Shoup and Steven note that the goal of US policy became “to contain and stabilize the situation” and “to put the brakes on the killing.”⁶⁷ Additionally, the plan of safe areas did not receive total support in Washington. It was criticized as being “unmanageable” and creating “six little West Banks in Western Europe.”⁶⁸

This approach was confirmed by President Clinton himself in the President’s News Conference. Emphasizing the decision that the United States refused to supply ground troops for Bosnia, he reiterated, “I do not believe the United States has any business sending troops there to get involved in a conflict in behalf of one of the sides. I believe that we should

⁶²Thomas Henriksen, *American Power after the Berlin Wall*, 89.

⁶³David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 153.

⁶⁴Leonie Murray, *Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism: Rise and Fall of a Policy*, 48.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 264.

⁶⁷Ibid., 264.

⁶⁸Ibid.

continue to turn up the pressure.”⁶⁹ In May 22, 1993, the United States, together with Britain, France, Spain, and Russia, agreed to a “Joint Action Plan” to protect the safe areas.⁷⁰

The safe-area policy was not viewed as a solution to the war as long as fighting did not stop. The UN peacekeepers could not provide protection because the UNPROFOR soldiers were “far too few in numbers, and too lacking in heavy weapons to accomplish their task.”⁷¹ The peacekeepers were repeatedly attacked and taken hostages. The French representative to the UN acknowledged that the safe-area strategy was “only a temporary measure” pending a final settlement of the war.⁷² Similar statements were expressed by the UN representatives of China and Britain.

Given such acknowledgment, one may think that the United Nations was not looking for a final solution to pacify the war, but just trying to adopt alternative policies to unsuccessful ones. There might be reasons behind UN reluctance since it did not end fighting while its primary task is to stop human rights abuse.

Gibbs concluded that the creation of safe areas was “yet another instance of international realpolitik.”⁷³ He supported his argument by the Dutch investigation which determined that the policy of safe areas was “designed to ensure that the tense relations with the [NATO] alliance of America and Europe no longer persisted.” The scheme “had less to do with the reality of Bosnia than with the need to restore transatlantic relations.”⁷⁴ Therefore, the safe-area plan papered over the earlier rift between Europe and Washington. Meanwhile the United States began to set its reluctance aside, and take active actions towards the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

III.6. A Shift towards Reluctant US Leadership

The Clinton administration moved into a more active role. This shift in US Bosnia policy was due to “subtle, but significant changes in the bureaucratic politics of the Clinton

⁶⁹President Bill Clinton, “The President’s News Conference,” May 14, 1993, in Peters and Wooley, *The American Presidency Project Document Archive*, www.Presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46561.

⁷⁰The Joint Action Plan expressed a series of procedures; to establish a war-crimes tribunal, to monitor the border between Bosnia and Serbia to secure the latter’s compliance with the embargo on the Bosnian Serbs, and to increase the presence in Kosovo and Macedonia in an attempt to contain the spread of conflict.

⁷¹David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 154.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid.

presidency.”⁷⁵ The main opponent of US military intervention in Bosnia, General Powell, stepped down as chair of the JCS in September 1993. He was replaced by General John Shalikashvili who was more open to intervention. In addition, it was perceived that NATO prestige had already been committed to Bosnia as long as NATO airplanes protected the six safe areas and enforced the no-fly zone as well.⁷⁶

Moreover, the Sarajevo marketplace attack of February 1994, followed by the horrors in Srebrenica and Zepa, sparked a public outcry for action. Worldwide coverage of the event, along with the failure of international efforts to end the war, intensified pressure on Western policymakers, and the United States within it. Senior national security advisors of President Clinton held that “it was time for the United States to undertake a new initiative.”⁷⁷ President Clinton, then, started to deliberate with his advisors on the Bosnian War.⁷⁸ He also began to lobby other NATO leaders to take action activities that he had refused to undertake until now.⁷⁹ These factors helped generate a more active US policy towards the Bosnian War albeit it was still reluctant to enter the fray with US troops. What else could the Clinton administration have done? The first objective of this policy was to resolve the Muslim-Croat war.

III.6.1. US Sponsorship of the Muslim-Croat Federation

The United States engineered the turnaround in Bosnia by first brokering a Muslim-Croat federation. Gibbs posits that “US officials worked behind the scenes to orchestrate such a resolution.”⁸⁰ The Bosnian Croats and Muslims settled their conflict in an agreement that they signed in Washington, in March 1, 1994. Written primarily by the Americans, a new constitution established a Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸¹

At this point, there was no effort to encourage the Bosnian Serbs to join the Federation. The alliance was meant to fight against the Serbs.⁸² The *Economists* noted,

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 155.

⁷⁷ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 287.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 155.

⁸¹ Ibid. During this period, the United States helped create the Contact Group which joined 5 states together; The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Russia. Formed in 1994, the Contact Group was established in order to undertake mediation efforts.

⁸² Thomas Henriksen, op. cit., 95.

“America had been working quietly to alter the balance of power on the ground by encouraging Muslims and Croats to stop quarrelling and unite against the Serbs.”⁸³ The agreement between the two sides facilitated the unification of their militias into one effective force. In this regard, Gibbs notes that the Clinton administration was interested in making a success of this operation.⁸⁴

The United States helped brokered the Muslim-Croat agreement without any significant input from either the European Union or the United Nations. Albeit the Europeans praised the alliance project “as a step towards peace”, some resented it because the United States was taking the lead.⁸⁵ They understood that their role had become “supportive and complimentary,” Carl Bildt commented.⁸⁶ They complained about the lack of consultation, and were upset at Holbrooke’s decision to hold upcoming foreign ministers meeting, not in a neutral UN site, but in the American mission in Geneva.⁸⁷ Although Holbrooke and his team considered the Contact Group as not important, it was essential to unify the parties. The European powers, Holbrooke wrote “feared that they would be publicly humiliated if the United States took the lead.”⁸⁸ In spite of these criticisms and complaints on the part of the Contact Group countries, the Muslim-Croat Federation was a political victory for the Clinton administration, which sought to recover some of the prestige it had lost from its previous indecision.⁸⁹

Now the Muslim-Croat Federation was created, the second objective of US Bosnia policy was arming the alliance. This augmented US intervention in the Bosnia War. The strategy of US arm shipments was favoured by the hawks within the State Department, including Charles Redman, Talbot, Holbrooke, and National Security Advisor Lake. Initially, the United States played no direct role in delivering the arms, an action that would violate the UN arms embargo. As a result, the prospect of arm shipments was regarded provocative.⁹⁰ Besides, the French and British governments had long objected to any external shipments to

⁸³ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 155.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 155.

⁸⁶ Derek Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft*, 68 as cited in Bildt, *Peace Journey*, 96.

⁸⁷ Ibid. All these complaints accomplished to naught. Holbrooke stated, “Such arguments over the location and ‘hosting’ of meetings may seem comical, but they were constant and time-consuming subplot of the negotiations. In fact, disagreements over substance were rarely as intense as those concerning procedure and protocol.”

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 155.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 156.

UNPROFOR peacekeeping troops, many of whom were French and British nationals, as they threatened their safety.⁹¹ US officials, consequently, approached this issue with a measure of caution.⁹²

Nevertheless, Gibbs postulates that the United States, through the State Department not the CIA, was probably the source of secretive flights that delivered arms into Bosnia.⁹³ He further explains that “whatever the specifics of mysterious black flights, Islamic states were the main source of arms for Bosnia.”⁹⁴ They were not only suppliers of weapons, but personnel as well. In addition, whether the Clinton administration supported the presence of foreign fighters is unclear. However, they certainly added additional manpower to the Bosnian army, which meshed very well with the main point of US policy. Determined not to deploy US ground troops into Bosnia, the Clinton administration had now the best of both worlds; it could have an armed force in Bosnia that would face off the Serbs, and could intervene without any risk of US casualties.⁹⁵

The US policy of arming both Bosnia and Croatia raised the European States’ ire most. Still, the French and British remained concerned about their UNPROFOR peacekeeping troops. They feared that external arms would escalate the fighting, and thus endanger the safety of their troops. This fact was true, particularly of the French who were exposed to the greatest risks. They had already suffered more than 50 casualties.⁹⁶ The French officials were highly critical of US Bosnia policy. They adopted a cynical view of US motives with regard to Bosnia. Fredric Bozo, a researcher within the Institute for International Relations in Paris, stated that US policy was motivated by a desire to “enfeeble...the long-term credibility of European defense plans,” and thus humiliating Europe.⁹⁷

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., 157.

⁹⁴ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 158. The US new policy benefited the Republic of Croatia as the arm supplies usually passed through the country. The Croatian military seized many of the delivered weapons for its own use; in battles against the Serbs. Again, the United States did not object the rearmament of Croatia. What’s more, the Clinton administration licensed Military Professional Resources Incorporated, a private American company, to instruct and train the Croatian army. The training started in October 1994. Thomas Henriksen, *American Power after the Berlin Wall*, 94-95.

⁹⁵ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 156.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 159.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

In tandem with the French criticism of US Bosnia policy, the British “set aside their usual pro-Americanism”.⁹⁸ The anti-American sentiment was also felt within the British soldiers. According to the UN official Philip Corwin, British troops in Bosnia “flaunt their anti-Americanism whenever they can.”⁹⁹ For their part, the Americans expressed their anger on the perceived lack of the British loyalty as well. A senior official in the US State Department claimed, “I learned to treat Britain as a hostile power.... I came to think of the British as like having the Russians around the State Department.”¹⁰⁰

Disagreement between the Contact Group and the United States resulted in a strained US-European unity. It threatened to rupture the Atlantic alliance. An article, in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, stated that the Balkan wars had “brought NATO within measurable distance of disintegration through unity.”¹⁰¹ Besides, the *Economist* revealed that “America's role as leader of the [NATO] was called in question during the transatlantic rows that erupted over the Bosnia War and, at their height, threatened to destroy NATO.”¹⁰² After the war was over, the *Economist* added that “the alliance survived by the skin of its teeth.”¹⁰³ Indeed, such accounts revealed the full extent of this transatlantic crisis; there was a real danger. Not only did danger exist among the Contact Group countries, but it was everywhere in Bosnia. Throughout 1994, human rights violations persisted. It was until this year that President Clinton carried out his past threatening to conduct NATO strikes against Bosnian Serb targets.

III.6.2. The 1994 NATO's “Pinprick” Airstrikes

The United States continued to seek the application of greater military pressure against the Bosnian Serbs. US aircraft acted with NATO in order to conduct airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positions, on five occasions. These air raids were, however, limited. Hendrickson depicted them as “surgical” attacks.¹⁰⁴

Ambassador Albright at the UNSC put the use of force into perspective in February 14, stating that, “the objective of peace cannot be achieved by diplomacy alone.”¹⁰⁵ She argued that, “our diplomacy must be backed by a willingness to use force when that is

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 160.

¹⁰² Ibid., 159.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ryan Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers*, 75.

¹⁰⁵ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 291.

essential in the cause of peace. For it is only force plus diplomacy that can stop the slaughter in Sarajevo and break the stalemate in Geneva.”¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, Albright warned the Bosnian Serbs that “they should not doubt our will, nor that of our NATO partners, to carry out the February 9 decision.”¹⁰⁷ Besides, President Clinton, on a radio address in February 19, reiterated the threat to use power against the Serbs in case the deadline for withdrawal was not met.¹⁰⁸ This signalled the Clinton administration’s readiness to use force.

The first attack, indeed, occurred in February 28, 1994 in response to the Serbs’ refusal to withdraw from Sarajevo and their continued offensive on the city.¹⁰⁹ The Clinton administration outlined a constitutional justification for these NATO airstrikes. Before US troops took part in the air raids, President Clinton sent an official notification letter to Congress in February 17, in order to justify NATO actions. He stated:

*To reach peaceful resolution of the conflict in [Bosnia-Herzegovina]..., NATO accepted the U.N. Security General’s request and authorized air operations, as necessary... I have directed the participation by U.S. armed forces in this effort pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief.*¹¹⁰

Second series of NATO bombing took place in April 10 and 11. Concerning these attacks, Madeline Albright noted that the mission was, “according to the UN resolution, to

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 291.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. On February 9, NATO issued an ultimatum. It reflected a compromise between the United States and the French positions in Bosnia. The ultimatum ordered the Serbs to end their offensives against Sarajevo, and to withdraw their heavy weapons. Otherwise they would face NATO air raids. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 287.

¹⁰⁸ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 289.

¹⁰⁹ Ryan Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers*, 75. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 287-290.

¹¹⁰ President Bill Clinton, “Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,” February 17, 1994, U.S. Government Printing Office Document Archive, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book1/pdf/PPP-1994-book1-doc-pg281-2.pdf, 282-283.

protect the UNPROFOR personnel.”¹¹¹ Once more time, President Clinton’s letter, in April 12, to Congress justified this operation for the protection of UN peacekeeping troops, echoing Albright’s theme. In his letter, Clinton emphasized that these NATO airstrikes were because of “a serious threat to the citizens remaining in Gorazde and to UNPROFORC and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) operating there.”¹¹²

The September 22 NATO bombing were in response to the Serbs’ attack on French peacekeepers within the UNPROFOR. In an interview of CNN, President Clinton stated that these airstrikes were in an answer to strident calls from NATO allies for retaliation.¹¹³ Additionally, Clinton now “offered to increase the US contribution to UNPROFOR Macedonia by approximately 200 personnel.”¹¹⁴ However, Clinton’s letters to Congress were rejected by some congressmen and supported by others at the same time.

After suffering significant casualties in Somalia, Congress became skeptical of peacekeeping missions. The Bosnia policy debate was centred, not on questions of constitutional authority, but on whether the Bosnian operations addressed the national security interests of the United States. Besides, “Motions had been made to cut back substantially on U.S. funding for UN peacekeeping.”¹¹⁵ Senator Bob Dole, a key Republican leader, supported this policy. As midterm elections approached, Dole challenged President Clinton for the presidency. In order to politically position himself as well as his party against Clinton’s foreign policy, Dole identified Republicans as stronger defenders of US sovereignty and national security.¹¹⁶ Some members, within the Republican Party, responded apprehensively after the NATO bombings, many felt that the air raids would not achieve long-term peace that the United States sought.¹¹⁷

¹¹¹ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 76.

¹¹² President Bill Clinton, “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” April 12, 1994, U.S. Government Printing Office Document Archive, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book1/pdf/PPP-1994-book1-doc-pg679.pdf, 679.

¹¹³ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 76.

¹¹⁴ President Bill Clinton, “Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Peacekeeping Operations in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia,” April 19, 1994, Government Printing Office Document Archive, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book1/pdf/PPP-1994-book1-doc-pg728.pdf, 728.

¹¹⁵ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 77.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

On the other hand, other key leaders within Congress strongly encouraged NATO attacks, and supported the president to do more. Senator John Biden, together with Representative Frank McClosey, strongly supported NATO airstrikes. They implicitly suggested that the president had authority to order such attacks without congressional approval.¹¹⁸ Additionally, House Majority Whip David Bonior advocated NATO bombing. In the congressional debate, he stated:

*It is time, Mr. Speaker, to use the full weight of the United States and NATO warplanes in Bosnia. If the Bosnian Serbs continue to practice genocide and continue to dishonor the cease-fires, it is time to pound the Bosnian Serbs into submission.*¹¹⁹

Although President Clinton had bipartisan backing from key congressional leaders, many members of Congress did not support resolutions that called for the US to end its participation in the UN arms embargo, and US policy of arming the Bosnian Muslims. In addition, Congress expressed strong opposition to the deployment of ground troops into Bosnia. As a result, President Clinton did not press for deployment of US soldiers. All he resolved to was launching NATO airstrikes. These “pinprick” air attacks remained the pillar of US foreign policy until August 1995, following the Srebrenica massacre.

There were other occasions in 1995 when NATO launched additional airstrikes, even before the slaughter took place in Srebrenica.¹²⁰ For months, the Serbs blocked delivery of food and medicine. Still, they offensively attacked Bosnian towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Bihac, and Sarajevo that were declared safe areas. Eventually, the situation of the Bosnian civilian population and UN peacekeepers had deteriorated so badly that action was required. NATO bombing angered Bosnian Serb leaders who retaliated by stepping up the shelling against

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 78. President Clinton was also supported by the Democrat Senator Dianne Feinstein and Republican Senator Orrin Hatch.

¹²⁰ In May 25-26, NATO planes dropped bombs on Serb positions.

Sarajevo, and taking UN peacekeepers hostages many of whom were chained in exposed positions as human shields so that to deter NATO attacks.¹²¹

Meanwhile, amid a further deterioration of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a debate broke out within the Western alliance over whether or not to stay in Bosnia.¹²² The countries with peacekeeping troops on the ground, including Britain, France, and Holland feared that any retaliation against the Serbs would result in the murder of their peacekeeping troops.¹²³ Britain and Canada began talking openly of withdrawing from the UN forces. The French President Chirac felt that the situation in Bosnia reached a dead end, and that the Western powers either had to strengthen their forces, or withdraw. Holbrooke notes that if the British withdrew, the French task would be impossible. In order to keep the British in Bosnia, “Chirac judged that greater American involvement and support were essential,” Holbrooke writes.¹²⁴ As a result, President Chirac put the Clinton administration in “a tight bind,” which was, according to Holbrooke, important in forcing the United States to no longer stay uninvolved.¹²⁵

Right after, Pentagon and NATO completed OpPlan 40-14, a highly comprehensive planning document that outlined every aspect of NATO’s role in supporting a UN withdrawal.¹²⁶ The OpPlan 40-14 estimated the possible need for as many as 82,000 NATO forces, with the United States accounting for 25,000 of the total troop level.¹²⁷ In December, 1994, President Clinton, thus, promised his NATO allies to deploy 25,000 American troops in order to help the French, the British, the Dutch, and others who had forces on the Bosnian ground extricate their peacekeeping troops.¹²⁸ The risk that the US troops might become involved in an escalation appeared very high. Holbrooke with other US officials viewed that assisting a UN withdrawal made no sense given the complexity of the conflict. For him

¹²¹Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Bosnia and Beyond: The “Quiet” Revolution that wouldn’t go quietly*, 221. In June 1995, the Serbs held 400 hostages, mainly British and French UN peacekeepers. The foreign ministers of the Contact Group called this an “outrageous act. The French suggested an international rapid reaction force in order to reinforce UNPROFOR peacekeeping troops in Bosnia. The British sent another 15,000 troops. President Clinton spoke of dispatching US ground forces to help evacuate or reposition UN troops.

¹²² Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 65.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 64.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 66.

¹²⁷ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 313.

¹²⁸ Samantha Power, *“A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide*, 431.

something else had to be done. He suggested the conduct of airstrikes. However, there was opposition to this within the Clinton administration as well as throughout Europe.¹²⁹

At the same time, events in Bosnia-Herzegovina deteriorated so badly leading to a terrible massacre in Srebrenica. There were major political ramifications in the aftermath of the massacre. A new international consensus on the Bosnian War, one that favoured military intervention, was generated. The Srebrenica massacre, then, proved to be a turning point in the war.

III.7. The Srebrenica Massacre: A Watershed in US Bosnia Policy

By the spring of 1995, three Muslim towns, that had been declared safe areas by the United Nations, were full of refugees from the surrounding town. Zepa, Gorazde, and Srebrenica were presumably protected by a crew of Dutch soldiers who were surrounded by well-armed Serb troops.¹³⁰ Each safe area had given up its weaponry in return for “protection” under the UNPROFOR. They were, however, shelled and starved by the Bosnian Serbs.

In July 6, 1995, Serb forces assaulted Srebrenica and quickly overrun it despite UN “protection”. The origins of the Srebrenica massacre went back to a series of Muslim attacks that were launched from the UN safe areas in spring 1995.¹³¹ According to the Dutch investigation, “the UN headquarters in Zagreb...concluded that the Bosnian Muslims continually misused the safe areas to maintain their armed forces, while in some cases it looked as if they intended to provoke shelling by the Bosnian Serbs.”¹³² Gibbs notes that such actions invited Serb reprisals which contributed to the fall of Srebrenica.¹³³

Furthermore, “the Bosnian government made no serious efforts to defend the town and appeared unconcerned that it might be captured,” Gibbs writes quoting the EU negotiator Carl Bildt who notes that Bosnian military forces, assigned to protect Srebrenica, were “not putting up any resistance. Later it was revealed that they had been ordered by the Sarajevo commanders not to defend Srebrenica.”¹³⁴ The Izetbegovic government might possibly

¹²⁹ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 66.

¹³⁰ Jeane Kirkpatrick, *Bosnia and Beyond: The “Quiet” Revolution that wouldn’t go quietly*, 222-223.

¹³¹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 160.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

welcome the Serb takeover of Srebrenica in order to increase international sympathy drawing in NATO military intervention in support of the Bosnian cause.¹³⁵

Whatever the Bosnian government's intention, the conquest of Srebrenica led to horrendous atrocities which were far large in scale than anything that happened during more than three years of fighting. The Serbs began by expelling women and children, producing another act of ethnic cleansing. They proceeded to murder about 8,000 Muslim males.¹³⁶ According to the Dutch investigation "Muslims were slaughtered like beasts."¹³⁷ Dutch troops, who served in the UNPROFOR, proved incapable of protecting the civilian population.

The Srebrenica massacre was the worst of war crimes in Europe since the Second World War while the West did nothing.¹³⁸ It was defined by international courts as a case of genocide.¹³⁹ There were waves of international revulsion against mass murder in the safe area of Srebrenica. The revulsion increased when new rounds of atrocities spread to other safe areas of Zepa and Gorazde.¹⁴⁰

The Srebrenica massacre coupled with Zepa and Gorazde's takeover transformed the international politics of the Bosnian War. Demands for the UN withdrawal on the part of countries whose troops served in the UNPROFOR were very increasing. President Chirac publicly complained that France was "alone." He added, "We can't imagine that the UN force will remain only to observe, and to be, in a way, accomplices in the situation. If that is the case, it is better to withdraw."¹⁴¹ Additionally, after Srebrenica, Holbrooke asserted that the withdrawal of UN troops was "inevitable." The withdrawal of UN troops meant the failure of UN mission. Indeed, Power notes that "by the spring 1995, it was already clear that the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia would not survive."¹⁴² The Bosnian crisis remained unsolved, and the Serb brutality remained unimpeded.

Albeit the Clinton administration was divided, the events of July 1995 strengthened the position of Albright, Galbraith, and other US officials who supported direct military

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 161.

¹³⁷ Ibid. Srebrenica massacre was directed by Gen. Ratko Mladic who was the commander of the Bosnian Serb armies and the Serb officer Gen. Radislav Krstic.

¹³⁸ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 69.

¹³⁹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 161.

¹⁴⁰ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 71.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*, 427.

intervention in the Bosnian War.¹⁴³ Besides, congressional criticism on President Clinton to do more increased substantially. With Bob Dole's leadership, a Senate majority leader and the Republican Party nominee for presidency, it culminated in a decisive congressional vote for a unilateral lift of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims.¹⁴⁴ Dole introduced a bill to the US Senate calling for the lifting of the arms embargo. Having won the support of many Democrats who were dissatisfied with Clinton's Bosnia policy, he was determined to bring it up for a vote after the Srebrenica massacre. However, President Clinton was against Dole's initiative because if it passed, it would force Clinton to send US troops to Bosnia.¹⁴⁵

European governments declared that they would withdraw if the US Congress ever lifted the arms embargo. If Dole's bill passed, it would entail Clinton to keep his commitment he had made to his NATO allies; to help with US forces in the extraction of their peacekeeping troops from Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, President Clinton had been avoiding sending US ground forces from his first day in office.¹⁴⁶

Not only did Dole's bid for the arms embargo lifting represent a clash between the executive and the legislature over foreign policy, but another clash between candidate Dole for presidential elections and his incumbent Clinton. This presented President Clinton with a problem. Clinton did not like to look weak in front of American voters.¹⁴⁷ However, with the UN mission in Bosnia collapsing, the images of starving refugees, killings and US inaction contributed heavily to low public perceptions of Clinton's performance as president.¹⁴⁸ As a consequence, President Clinton had to do all he could so that to avoid a humiliating situation on the eve of his bid for re-election.¹⁴⁹

Furthermore, with the fall of Srebrenica, op-ed writers, human rights activists, former diplomats, and journalists spoke quite forcefully in opposition to Clinton's Bosnia policy. The determined press corps was merciless with US policymakers urging the United States to do right with bombing the Serbs.¹⁵⁰ The news media strongly influenced public perceptions of

¹⁴³ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 162.

¹⁴⁴ Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*, 427.

¹⁴⁵ Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*, 427- 428.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 427-429.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 428.

¹⁴⁸ Henry Carey, "U.S. Domestic Politics and Emerging Humanitarian Intervention Policy: Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo," 75.

¹⁴⁹ Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*, 429.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 434-439.

the situation and contributed to a public consensus for action.¹⁵¹ Although the percentages varied with slight shifts in the questions asked, a majority in the American public supported US involvement.¹⁵² Sobel notes that 58 percent of Americans agreed that the US had an obligation to use military force if there were no other solutions to deliver humanitarian aid to the Bosnians, and prevent the practice of atrocities.¹⁵³ Besides, 78 percent of Americans approved of possible US troops deployment to rescue UN peacekeepers, and 64 percent approved of sending US forces to stop more killing.¹⁵⁴ When the US Senate voted to lift the arms embargo, American support reached 61 percent.¹⁵⁵ On the whole, horrifying accounts of atrocious brutalities that occurred in the summer of 1995 served to mobilize the American public behind action.

Even before the Srebrenica massacre, it appears that President Clinton had already sought a military solution to the war. However, following the destruction of Srebrenica, pressure on the Clinton administration to do more came from domestic and foreign sources. The Srebrenica massacre, then, made it easier for the United States to justify a hawkish stance. Supported by the United States, an international campaign was regenerated to defeat the Serbs.

III.8. The Move towards Engagement and Military Intervention

Finally, the Clinton administration opted for an offensive strategy, which played out during August-October 1995. US Bosnia policy covered three phases: US indirect support of Croatia's Operation Storm and Operation Mistral, US-led NATO bombings, and the brokerage of the Dayton Accords.

III.8.1. US Offensive Strategy

An important factor in US offensive strategy was, once again, the Republic of Croatia. The role played by Croatia was to team with the Bosnian army in order to defeat the Serbs both in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the Bosnian army could not beat

¹⁵¹ Henry Carey, "U.S. Domestic Politics and Emerging Humanitarian Intervention Policy: Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo," 73-74.

¹⁵² Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*, 318.

¹⁵³ Richard Sobel, "Trends: United States Intervention in Bosnia," 252.

¹⁵⁴ Richard Sobel, "Trends: United States Intervention in Bosnia," 252.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 256.

Mladic's forces, the addition of Croatian military power would lead to one victory after another.¹⁵⁶

The first phase of the offensive began with the Republic of Croatia itself. The Croats launched Operation Storm in August 4, 1995. This attack aimed to gain back their Krajina region which was captured by the Serbs. From the Croatian standpoint, Operation Storm was a major success. The Croat army captured most of the region in four days, with very little resistance.¹⁵⁷

Heavy bombardments, however, resulted in a humanitarian crisis. The attack forced more 105,000 to 200,000 Serbs to flee, producing what was probably the largest act of ethnic cleansing of the entire war.¹⁵⁸ Besides, several hundreds of Serbs were killed either during the shelling of towns, or at close range by infantry. With Operation Storm, President Tudjman, along with Croat nationalists, attained their long-sought objective of ridding the republic of undesirable ethnic groups.¹⁵⁹

Nonetheless, the Croat atrocities committed against the Serbs embarrassed the United States. Some figures, therefore, sought to distance themselves from the whole operation, at least in public.¹⁶⁰ In spite of this official distancing, Gibbs notes that the United States did support Operation Storm.¹⁶¹ US support was, then, a decisive factor in Tudjman's decision to launch the offensive in the first place. Gen. Charles Boyd, who served as deputy commander of the US-European Command stated, "Croatia would have not taken the military offensive...without the explicit approval of the US government."¹⁶² The Croatian foreign minister Mate Granic, claimed that Operation Storm received "tacit approval" from US officials.¹⁶³ According to a *New York Times* article, Storm "was carried out with the tacit blessing of the United States."¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, President Clinton himself later acknowledged that, during the offensive, "I was rooting for the Croats."¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁶ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 163.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 163.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 164.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

After the Croat offensive had ended, US officials expressed satisfaction at the outcome of Operation Storm. Robert Frasure, US State Department official, wrote to a colleague:

*We 'hired' these guys [the Croatian military] to be our junkyard dogs because we were desperate. We need to try to 'control' them. But this is no time to get squeamish about things. This is the first time the Serb wave has been reversed. That is essential for us to get stability, so we can get out.*¹⁶⁶

Accordingly, it is clear that the United States did approve the Croat offensive, including its unsavoury aspects of horrific atrocities and ethnic cleansing against the Serbs. Gibbs concludes that the United States “had a measure of complicity in Operation Storm.”¹⁶⁷

When the Operation Storm was complete, Croat forces crossed the Bosnian borders, to join up with the Izetbegovic government’s best unit, the Fifth Corps. These combined forces launched a new offensive code-named Operation Mistral.¹⁶⁸ Again, the Clinton administration was “encouraging the offensive,” Holbrooke notes¹⁶⁹ During September through October, the Croat and Muslim forces together attacked Serb positions through western Bosnia.¹⁷⁰

The offensive of August-October 1995 produced substantial atrocities. A correspondent for *Jane’s Defense Weekly* estimates that several thousand Serb civilians were killed in the Krajina region of Croatia as well as in western Bosnia.¹⁷¹ Besides, the combined offensive generated hundreds of thousands of Serb refugees, many of whom were ethnically cleansed from areas that belonged to the Serb long before the war broke out.¹⁷²

Viewed from a military stance, Gibbs holds that both Storm and Mistral Operation were “highly effective.”¹⁷³ After the offensive ended, the Izetbegovic government controlled close to half of Bosnia’s territory. The Serbs lost most of the land that they had gained

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 164.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 160.

¹⁷⁰ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 164.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 165.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

through conquest during the war. Thereby, the balance of power was fundamentally altered, resulting in a considerable achievement for both Presidents, Tudjman and Izetbegovic.¹⁷⁴

In addition, the Clinton administration viewed the outcome of Storm and Mistral Operation positively. Gibbs writes that the Croat and Bosnian ground forces had functioned as America's ground troops. He postulates that this strategy was a key aspect of US Bosnia policy to ensure its success.¹⁷⁵

Both Operation Storm and Operation Mistral were the first phase of the American offensive strategy. The second objective of the second phase of US offensive strategy was the mobilisation of NATO airstrikes under the leadership of the United States.

III.8.2. The 1995 US-Led NATO Airstrikes: A Showcase for US Hegemony

Not only did Croat and Muslim ground operations constitute success for Bosnia, but they also produced an achievement for the Clinton administration. Now, the United States was able to intervene decisively in the Bosnian War. During the first phase of US offensive strategy, US power was being projected for the most part indirectly; through proxy armies. What was needed, however, was a direct display of US strength. This would be undertaken through NATO's large-scale air raids.

In support of the Croat-Muslim ground offensives, a major NATO air campaign against Serb-controlled areas, named Operation Deliberate Force, took place during August and September, 1995. Although it was technically a multinational NATO campaign, Operation Deliberate Force was conceived and largely conducted by the United States (see map n^o5).¹⁷⁶

Before NATO bombardments were launched, US officials met with their European allies and demanded their support. They were determined to make their plan on the conduct of NATO air raids successful even if the Europeans would not cooperate. Chollet writes that "The Americans would go to explain what they were doing, not ask for permission. The message would be 'part invitation, part ultimatum.'"¹⁷⁷


¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 164-165.

¹⁷⁶ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 166.

¹⁷⁷ Derek Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft*, 68 as cited in Bildt, *Peace Journey*, 41.

Map N°5: The Western Offensive, August-September, 1995



Source: Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 161.

Indeed, from the outset the European powers resented the conduct of NATO airstrikes because the United States was taking the lead.¹⁷⁸ However, Following the Srebrenica massacre and full media coverage of the event, they were under pressure and “did not wish to appear obstructionists.”¹⁷⁹ Thus, NATO member states reluctantly accepted US plan, and supported Operation Deliberate Force.¹⁸⁰

At this point, the United States made no effort to bring the matter to the UNSC. Albeit Secretary General Boutros-Ghali made a statement endorsing the NATO airstrikes, the United States sought to marginalize the United Nations as much as possible. Boutros-Ghali later noted that America “wanted no UN role whatsoever.”¹⁸¹

On August 30, Operation Deliberate Force was launched and continued for more than two weeks. In contrast to previous NATO airstrikes, Deliberate Force was far large in scale. More than 3,500 separate sorties were flown. Serb military positions were attacked, not in limited areas, but throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁸² Eight countries officially participated in the sorties and US aircraft flew 65 percent of them nevertheless.¹⁸³ Besides, Gibbs notes that the NATO air campaign demonstrated the relevance of the capacity of the United States to exercise leadership. In this regard, a Swiss publication stated, “One thing is clear: The US still makes the law in the Old Continent.”¹⁸⁴ Thus, US-led NATO airstrikes achieved a military success for the United States.

Not only was the effect of Operation Deliberate Force military, but political as well. US mobilisation NATO bombing demonstrated the capacity of the United States’ military intervention in the Bosnian War as well as its ability for leadership, not only on the battlefield, but also in the conference room where US official Holbrooke brokered the Dayton Peace Accords.

III.8.3. The Dayton Accords and US Motives behind the Endgame

Having gained the upper hand through NATO airstrikes, the United States proceeded to arrange for a peace conference, which took place in November 1995, at the Wright-Patterson

¹⁷⁸ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 166.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 166.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 167.

Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.¹⁸⁵ A team of US diplomats, led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, directed the peace talks. Key figures in the Bosnian conflict, including Milosevic, Izetbegovic and Tadjman, were present, in addition to several European representatives. US officials made clear that they alone would be running the talks. UN personnel were, however, excluded. Bildt noted, “During the days of Dayton, the UN was a word that could not be uttered.”¹⁸⁶

Furthermore, the American direct control over the peace process was felt by the Europeans whose attitude towards the United States soured. “The Contact Group had never been entirely happy with a US-led peace process,”¹⁸⁷ Chollet notes. Besides, the leader of the British delegation at Dayton, stated that “the US negotiator, supported by a very large team,...organise[d] the agenda and [ran] the negotiation as he wished, with the acquiescence of the rest. They were informed, but not consulted, and their primary role was to assist so far as needed, witness and ratify the outcome. But they were not to interfere.”¹⁸⁸ In support of the same opinion, the London *Independent* noted that Dayton was “so much an American show that they [did not] even make a pretense of keeping European capitals informed. Europe [remained] a beholden to American power as it was in 1941.”¹⁸⁹ Hence, US officials were determined to manage the conference and bring the Bosnian War into a halt, without any help from either the European Union, or the United Nations.

By the end, the conference was successful in achieving a peace settlement of the war. The outcome was the Dayton Accords, which were officially signed in December 15, 1995.¹⁹⁰ They entailed the creation of the Serb Republic which would join the pre-existing Muslim-Croat Federation. These two units would constitute a new Bosnian State, where power would be decentralized; giving the ethnic groups a high level of self-government. However, the authorities in Sarajevo, still led by Izetbegovic, were to hold only limited power.¹⁹¹

Concerning the issue of territory, the Serb Republic was granted 49 percent of the total area. The Muslim-Croat Federation received 52 percent. The allocation of territory

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Derek Chollet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft*, 68 as cited in Bildt, *Peace Journey*, 41.

¹⁸⁸ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, 361.

¹⁸⁹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 167.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 168.

between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic agreed at Dayton is depicted in Map n°6. In addition, a Multinational Implementation Force was set up. With 60,000 troops to serve as peacekeepers, IFOR was established to run Bosnia-Herzegovina for a period of time. The United States had seen to it that IFOR was placed under NATO direction, not the United Nations'.¹⁹² Again, the idea of US display of power was emphasized by *Foreign Report* stating that IFOR was “dominated by the Americans.”¹⁹³ The United States manifestation of power was, thus, a theme that ran through every aspect of the Dayton peace settlement.

The Dayton Accords, overall, produced a mixed legacy. Although the Bosnian War was dragged for more than three years of fighting, the Western powers succeeded in ending the war. There was no recurrence of active combat.¹⁹⁴ On the other hand, the Accords were less effective for reconciling the parties and unifying Bosnia. Another round of atrocities was undertaken against the Serbs in 1996. The attacks took place in areas transferred from Serb to Muslim-Croat authority.¹⁹⁵ Violence as well as intimidation forced 100,000 Bosnian Serbs to flee areas that came under the Federation’s control.¹⁹⁶ Again, the world watched without doing anything. Neither IFOR nor the Izetbegovic government made any sustained effort to protect the Bosnian Serbs. “Like all previous acts of ethnic cleansing that targeted Serbs, these attacks once again attracted no significant international condemnation and little notice,” Gibbs writes.¹⁹⁷

With the Dayton Accords, the United States advanced a set of three key interests set forth by the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance document. Drafted under the direction of the undersecretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, with the support of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, the DPG presented the new strategic logic of the United States foreign policy.¹⁹⁸ The document argued that the United States of America should establish permanent global dominance; all potential challengers must be restrained even if they emerged from US allies, and a new function for NATO must be established.¹⁹⁹ In demonstrating the objectives of the United States for the post-Cold-War era, the DPG states:

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 167.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. The transference of lands was required under the Dayton Accords.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 30.

¹⁹⁹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 33.

Map N°6: Key Territorial Issues at Dayton



Source: Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 282.

Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere....This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy....There are three additional aspects to this objective: First, the US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or purpose a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interest. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership.... Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.²⁰⁰

The American humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War reaffirmed its status as the world's sole superpower. According to Holbrooke, "After Dayton, American foreign policy seemed more assertive, more muscular."²⁰¹ Warren Christopher added that the Accords "reaffirmed the imperative of American leadership."²⁰² Thus, the Dayton Accords were a triumph for US hegemony reasserting American predominance and leadership in the world.

Furthermore, the United States sought to undercut challenges to American hegemony that emanated from the European Union. In doing so, The DPG aimed to strengthen NATO as an institutional alternative to the WEU.²⁰³ US policymakers in the DPG document stated, "We must seek to prevent the emergence of Europe-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance's integrated command structure."²⁰⁴ American efforts to domesticate the WEU were successful so long as US officials could undermine European initiatives to find a peace settlement to the Bosnian conflict. Consequently, during

²⁰⁰ US Department of Defense, "Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999," February 18, 1992, www.gwu.edu/%7Eensarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_full.pdf.

²⁰¹ Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 361.

²⁰² David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 169.

²⁰³ David Gibbs, op. cit., 33.

²⁰⁴ US Department of Defense, "Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999," February 18, 1992, www.gwu.edu/%7Eensarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_full.pdf.

the period 1994-1999, the European leaders began to emphasize that the WEU “was intended to compliment and not compete NATO.”²⁰⁵ The new strategy was formalized at the January 1994 NATO summit, where NATO and WEU were to be integrated through Combined Joint Forces. Hence, the United States actively restrained European efforts to adopt military independence. It asserted its hegemony on its European allies through NATO airstrikes in the Bosnian War.

Moreover, the Dayton Accords relegated the Europeans to subordinate roles. According to a headline from the *World Press Review*, the signing of the Dayton Accords marked “Europe’s utter failure.”²⁰⁶ As stated in the *Sunday Times* of Sri Lanka, the Bosnian affair had cast “shame on European powers.”²⁰⁷ This shameful image offered a sharp contrast with the United States. *Le Monde* claimed that the Yugoslav conflict had entailed “a long series of frustrations and humiliations for the Europeans, dealt by the Americans, who wanted to be seen as running the show.”²⁰⁸ The United States, thus, undermined European challenges to its predominance in the European Continent.

Another strategy broached in the 1992 DPG has been to find new, additional functions for NATO so that to grant the alliance a new lease on life. The most important idea has been to expand NATO to incorporate portions of Eastern Europe under the US military umbrella.²⁰⁹ The older role of preventing a Soviet expansion was dead with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Eastward expansion would, then, serve as a partial replacement. It gave NATO a new purpose, to preserve order in Eastern Europe. The Bosnian War was an opportunity for NATO to end and reestablish order in Europe.²¹⁰

The three key interests established by the DPG were, thus, achieved by the United States. US humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War affirmed America’s position as the European Continent as well as the world’s only superpower. The United States undercut challenges to its hegemony that stemmed from the European Union, and established a new function for NATO, which was to serve as the key instrument of US power in Europe.

²⁰⁵ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 33.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.* David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 33.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 34. In 1999, expansion was implemented. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO as full member states.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

Furthermore, another factor that led the United States to take the lead in the Bosnian War was the consideration of protecting US national security. At the start of 1994, there was a possibility of a UN withdrawal which had substantially increased by May, 1995. The hostage situation of European troops within the UNPROFOR, the escalation of brutal violence, and as the conflict continued to increase with no end in sight enforced the Europeans' desire to get out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The risk that the US troops might become involved in an escalation appeared very high. Therefore, the Clinton administration reconsidered the perception of a threat to US troops' security posed by the impending UN withdrawal. In order to secure the US troops' security, the Clinton administration had to head off UN withdrawal.²¹¹ For that reason the United States chose to support a military intervention.

In addition, the Clinton administration militarily intervened in the Bosnian War in order to protect US credibility. The inability of the administration to end the war challenged US credibility in the Atlantic alliance. This conceptualization was a consistent theme within the Clinton administration during the Bosnian War. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that "our credibility as leader of the alliance" would be undermined if the United States had failed to intervene.²¹²

US motive for asserting its political hegemony on its allies, as well as its conceptualization of a threat to its national security were combined with economic motives. International economic relations during the 1990s were characterized by a high level of multilateral trade and investments, mediated by international institutions. The United States dominance of these international economic institutions benefited the US economy. Tension among the advanced industrialized countries, however, might result in a more protectionist system. Gibbs notes that, "the United States intended to preserve the globalized world economy and parry possible threats to its existence."²¹³

One worrying scenario was the growth of regional free trade areas, the most famous of which is the European Union. Major European states' initiatives, incarnated in the Maastricht Treaty in the field of financial policy, were looked upon as another threat to US economic interests in Europe. The would-be unified European currency, the euro, would pose a danger to the status of the US dollar as the international anchor currency. The dollar had long been considered a major source of US power in world affairs. However, the euro

²¹¹ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 65.

²¹² David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 155.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 38.

threatened US seigniorage benefits that would maintain the dollar as world's key currency.²¹⁴ C. Fred Bergsten, an American economist and political advisor, noted that "the euro is likely to challenge the international financial dominance of the dollar."²¹⁵ The advent of the euro would, thereof, constitute a peril to the United States predominant position. As a result, US economic interests would be damaged by the challenges posed by the developments brokered in the Maastricht Treaty.

In order to contain Europe's move towards a "fortress Europe," the United States once again turned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The preservation of the globalized world economy as well as US determination of the course of globalization meant the presence of US troops in Europe.²¹⁶ Over four years after then-Secretary of State James Baker had proclaimed that the United States "did not have a dog" in the Yugoslav fighting, 20,000 American troops were on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of NATO forces.²¹⁷ Besides, Robert Hutchings, a former member of the National Security Council Staff during the Bush administration, stated that a permanent military presence in Europe "had an economic as well a security dimension."²¹⁸ By the same token, former NATO commander Alexander Haig stated, "A lot of people forget that [the US troop's presence in Europe]...keeps European markets open to us. If those troops weren't, those markets would be more difficult to access."²¹⁹ Therefore, US humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War was an opportunity for the United States to preserve an open economic market.

With the Dayton Accords, the United States advanced a set of key interests: to affirm America's hegemony over Europe and its position as the world's sole superpower, to restore the credibility and effectiveness of NATO, to establish a new function for the Atlantic alliance, and to secure its economic interests in Europe.

In essence, despite President Clinton's promises during his presidential campaign in addition to his concerns after the inauguration, the administration's first year produced little changes. The new President's Bosnia policy was initially similar to Bush's. The Clinton administration, then, moved into a more active role. The United States engineered the

²¹⁴ Ibid., 29.

²¹⁵ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 29.

²¹⁶ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 29.

²¹⁷ Derek Challet, *The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft*, 68 as cited in Bildt, *Peace Journey*, 181.

²¹⁸ David Gibbs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 41.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

turnaround in Bosnia by brokering a Muslim-Croat federation without any significant input from either the European Union or the United Nations. The second objective of US Bosnia policy was arming the alliance, which augmented US intervention in the Bosnian War. However, following the Srebrenica massacre, which was a turning point in the war, the Clinton administration shifted its Bosnia policy from disengagement into military intervention. This shift in US policy on the Bosnian War was motivated by political as well as economic interests.

General Conclusion

This dissertation has journeyed across the phenomenon of American humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War, in an effort to explain its conduct and necessity. It has also attempted to explain US military intervention in the Bosnian War from various perspectives. More formally, this study has addressed the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The United States' humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War was a way to achieve political interests.

Hypothesis 2: The United States' humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War was a way to protect its national security.

Hypothesis 3: The United States' humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War was a way to achieve economic interests.

The dissertation has also attempted to provide an answer to the research question addressed in the introduction: Why did the United States of America remain disengaged and wait so long before mobilizing NATO to impose airstrikes? And why did the Clinton administration opt for military intervention in the Bosnian War? This section summarizes the answer to the work's problematic.

By the time of the Bosnia's independence, the Bush administration was already involved in the conflict. It had encouraged the Izetbegovic government to secede from the Yugoslav Federation, and then hampered European efforts to resolve ethnic tensions through diplomatic negotiations. Once war actually erupted, nevertheless, the United States stepped away from the Bosnian cauldron.

When the Bosnian War broke out in the spring of 1992, the United States decided to remain disengaged. There was a set of three determining factors that dictated the Bush administration's policy of disengagement in the Bosnian War: the conceptualization of US national interests, the US military's opposition to intervention in the war, and the overall perception of the efficacy of military intervention.

The strategic reasoning that kept the Bush administration from military intervention was based on US policymakers' conceptualization of US national interests. During the Cold War, Yugoslavia's strategic geographical importance and its independence from the USSR were seen as valuable assets by the United States. It was strategically significant as both a

geographical divide between the NATO and Warsaw power complexes, and as a regional model for other communist countries of Eastern Europe.

However, once the Soviet bloc collapsed, Yugoslavia's geographically strategic location and independence became expendable, with no value to the United States. Ultimately, by the end of the Cold War, the motivating force driving the United States into intervening in the war crumbled since the United States had lost reason for its strategic interest in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina within it.

The complete lack of conceptualized national interests in Bosnia was coupled with the Army's opposition to any US military intervention in the Bosnian War. The US Army believed that US military intervention in the war would inevitably degenerate Vietnam-like quagmires. It viewed the intervention from a Vietnam era perspective, reflecting the lessons of anti-war demonstrations and the power of public opinion.

The third factor that explains the US policy of detachment was the efficacy of the military intervention. US policymakers perceived that the Bosnian War was the result of ancient ethnic hatreds dating back hundreds of years. Many officers in the Bush administration believed that the Bosnian War was fueled by ancient tribal and ethnic hatreds about which the United States could do little and could not stop fighting. Besides, they argued that the prospect of success while fighting in Bosnia's mountainous terrain was very slim. Thus, the prudent policy was to avoid any US entanglement in Bosnia-Herzegovina given the overall perception of the efficacy of military intervention.

As a result of the Pentagon's opposition to any US military intervention in the Bosnian War, the Bush administration willingly allowed the European nations to take the lead in resolving the crisis in Bosnia. The administration argued that Europe had primary responsibility for managing the crisis. It viewed the war as a European problem, but not American. Indeed, the European Community relished the prospect of assuming a larger role and welcomed the chance of taking responsibility for handling the crisis in Bosnia.

Given European enthusiasm for leadership and US hesitation to get involved, the Bush administration chose to only act as a part of UNPROFOR and collaborate with the EC. It supported measures such as UNSC resolutions, the imposition of arms embargo, economic sanctions, as well as humanitarian relief supplies.

In fact, the reluctance of the United States to be drawn into the conflict was matched by the reluctance of the great powers as well. Their efforts to resolve the Bosnian War were palliative and went for naught. The presence of UN peacekeeping was weak. So to speak, there was peace to keep. The peacekeepers were hardly a solution to the Bosnian crisis. The United States under the Bush presidency, the European Community as well as the United Nations, thus, failed in bringing an end to the Bosnian War.

Throughout 1993, the Clinton administration pursued a similar policy of disengagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina despite Clinton's rhetoric during the presidential campaign demanding that the United States act to halt fighting in Bosnia. Even if the Clinton administration promoted a new policy as a strong stand against the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was a gap between the rhetoric and when the policy's content became public. Its review contained no mention of air strikes or lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, both of which were issues Clinton had campaigned on.

For all its talk of taking the lead, the Clinton administration refused to commit ground troops to Bosnia until after all parties accepted a peace settlement. Exactly as the Bush administration blocked EU peace negotiations by rejecting the Lisbon Plan, the Clinton administration thwarted yet other peace efforts: the Vance-Owen peace plan, and the 1993-1995 peace plans negotiated by the European powers and the United Nations for ending the Bosnian War.

At this point, the Clinton administration chose not to intervene in the Bosnian War for the same two reasons as with the Bush administration: First was US policymakers' strategic reasoning that there were no conceptualized interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Clinton himself openly expressed that the Bosnian War "involves our humanitarian concerns, but it does not involve our vital interests."¹ Second was US policymakers' perception of the efficacy of military intervention. President Clinton believed that this was a war of ancient ethnic hatreds that could not be resolved by a third party. The Clinton administration thus maintained a policy of disengagement during its first years based on national concerns rather than humanitarian motivations.

However, the Clinton administration realized the need for a more aggressive approach towards negotiation including the use of air power throughout 1994 until the end of

¹ Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *op. cit.*, 265.

1995. This shift in US foreign policy from disengagement into military intervention stemmed from four main motivating factors: to affirm America's hegemony over Europe and its position as the world's sole superpower, to restore effectiveness of NATO and the credibility of America as its leader, to establish a new function for the Atlantic alliance, to protect its national security, and to secure its economic interests in Europe.

The Dayton Accords were a triumph for the United States. Through which the United States advanced a set of key interests. The United States humiliated the European powers and blocked their efforts to establish an independent foreign policy. The Clinton administration undercut challenges to US hegemony that issued from the European Union. The United States sought to strengthen NATO as an institutional alternative to the WEU, and thus reasserting the effectiveness of the Atlantic alliance.

Besides, the inability of the Clinton administration to end the Bosnian War challenged America's credibility as a leader of the Atlantic alliance. Therefore, the United States reaffirmed its leadership through conducting NATO airstrikes in the Bosnian War. Simultaneously, it established itself as the dominant power in Europe and affirmed its status as the world's only superpower.

This was coupled with another strategy of finding additional functions for NATO so that to grant the alliance a new lease on life. The older role of NATO to prevent the Soviet expansion was dead with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Bosnian conflict was an opportunity for NATO to bring the war into an end on humanitarian grounds. Hence, the Bosnian War gave NATO a new role of conducting a humanitarian intervention.

The third factor that led the United States to take the lead in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the re-conceptualization of US security interest in resolving the Bosnian War. The fear that the UN would withdraw its peacekeeping forces from the country, which would necessitate the Clinton administration to deploy US troops, pushed the United States to intervene. Given the complexities and level of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was a risk that US troops would become enmeshed as the UN forces withdrew and thus would suffer casualties. As a result, the possibility of a UN withdrawal threatened US troops' security.

US quest for asserting its political hegemony on its allies, coupled with its national security concern, was combined with economic motives. The initiatives in financial policy of major European states incarnated in the Maastricht Treaty were looked upon as another threat

to American economic interests in Europe. The advent of euro would pose a danger to the status of the US dollar as the international anchor currency. Additionally, the deployment of US troops into Bosnia would keep European markets open to the United States and facilitate access to those markets. US humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War was an opportunity for the United States to preserve an open economic market. Therefore, US motivations were also, if not humanitarian, economic.

Furthermore, not only was the Clinton administration under international pressure that shifted US considerations of national interest, but domestic pressure was another source for the re-conceptualization of President Clinton's personal reasons. President Clinton decided for the United States to lead the conduct of NATO airstrikes in Bosnia less than a year before the 1996 presidential elections. The images of brutal atrocities and starving refugees, coupled with US inaction contributed heavily to low public perceptions of Clinton's performance as president. President Clinton had to do all he could so that to avoid a humiliating situation on the eve of his bid for re-election. Therefore, Clinton set his reluctance aside and moved the United States towards humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War.

The United States and its allies succeeded in ending the Bosnian War in 1995. However, fighting between the Bosnian Croats, Muslims and Serbs was quenched only after most of Bosnia was destroyed, and thousands of its inhabitants were slaughtered. The United States of America waited so long before mobilizing NATO to impose airstrikes because both the Bush and Clinton administrations did not perceive any conceptualized interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the shift towards an aggressive policy of military intervention occurred only after motivating factors came to the forefront of US foreign policy consideration. These factors were not based on primarily humanitarian concerns, but on realistic assumptions. The United States opted for military intervention in the Bosnian War because their national interests were at stake. Given that terrible human rights violation in Bosnia had been documented prior to the Srebrenica massacre, one may assume that the United States required much more compelling interests than the protection of human rights. Therefore, US humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War was not an act of idealism, but on the contrary, a classic act of power politics.

Glossary

Glossary

Anchor currency: A currency to which other countries' currencies are pegged. It tends to be the international pricing currency for products traded on a global market, and commodities such as oil and gold.

Balance of power: This concept of international relations originated in Europe in mid-1600s. It asserted that hegemonic ambitions of nations will lead inevitably to war in the absence of power balancing, whereby weaker powers either strive to increase their own military power or to counter the superior military capacity of neighboring nations. In other words, balance of power expresses the doctrine intended to prevent any nation from becoming sufficiently strong so as to enable it to enforce its will upon the rest. It is the capacity of the members of the world community to hold each other in check.

Doves: Are those who take a conciliatory attitude and advocate negotiations and compromise. They are opponents of wars.

Hawks: Are those who take a militant attitude and advocate immediate, vigorous actions. They are supporters of wars or warlike policies.

Hegemony: The structure of power relations in which one nation, a hegemon, assumes leadership and responsibility over the world or regional systems primarily by virtue of its superior financial, commercial, and productive power and secondarily by its military power.

Human rights: The rights people have simply because they are human beings, regardless of their ability, citizenship, ethnicity, religion, language, nationality, race, or sexuality.

Intervention: Interference usually by force or threat of force in another nation to compel or prevent an action. It is also the deliberate act of a nation to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy.

Massive retaliation: US President Eisenhower assigned a greater priority to nuclear weapons. The strategy that emerged from these considerations became known as "massive retaliation", a strategy which was interpreted as threatening nuclear attacks against targets in the Soviet Union and China in reprisal for conventional aggressions anywhere in the world.

Op-ed writing: Op-ed is short for opinion editorial. Op-ed writing carries a range of opinions on major issues within political or social spectrums.

Peacekeeping mission: A mission that involves military efforts to maintain peace that has just been established. It entails the deployment of military force into the zone of war.

Pentagon: A large five-sided building near Washington, DC, that serves as the headquarters of the US Department of Defence.

Power politics: International diplomacy in which each nation uses or threatens to use military or economic power in order to further its own national interests.

Realpolitik: Is an approach to international affairs by which policymakers adhere to what benefits and furthers their country's national interests. Realpolitik rejects the idealistic, value-based foreign policy. Instead, it defines goals in practical and material forms.

Seigniorage: is the difference between the value of money and the cost of its production within a given country's economy.

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Résumé

Cette thèse sert à étudier la politique extérieure des Etats-Unies durant la période de l'après Guerre Froide. Elle traite surtout sur l'intervention militaire et humanitaire américaine dans la Guerre de la Bosnie, et plus précisément examine la politique de l'Administration américaine lors du mandat du président Bush et Clinton vis-à-vis de la Guerre de la Bosnie.

Le but de cette thèse est de prouver que l'intervention humanitaire américaine dans la guerre était manipulée par des motivations politiques du pouvoir et non pas par des propos humanitaires brutes.

Cette étude estime que les Etats-Unies sous la présidence de Bush ont choisi la politique de non implication car il n'y avait pas d'intérêts nationaux conceptualisés en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Cependant, le président Clinton qui s'était basé dans sa campagne électorale sur des perspectives idéalistes. Son discours était compatible avec une approche des relations internationales fondée sur les hypothèses idéalistes de la morale et des droits de l'homme. Pourtant une fois au pouvoir, l'Administration de Clinton a utilisé des hypothèses de la *realpolitik*.

A ce regard, cette thèse explique pourquoi les Etats-Unies sont restés désengagés de puis plus de trois ans d'horreur et l'absurdité, et attendu si longtemps avant de prendre la responsabilité de la mobilisation de l'OTAN contre des positions serbes. En même temps, cette étude met en évidence les motivations de l'évolution de la politique étrangère américaine de désengagement envers l'intervention humanitaire dans la Guerre de la Bosnie.

Les mots clés : les Etats-Unies, la politique étrangère des Etats-Unies, la Bosnie, la Guerre de la Bosnie, désengagement, l'intervention humanitaire, idéalisme, *realpolitik*, perspective idéalistes, préoccupations réalistes.

Summary

This dissertation is a study of US foreign policy in the context of international relations in the post-Cold War era. It deals with the issue of US humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War as a case in point. More specifically, the study examines both the Bush and Clinton administration's policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The intent of this dissertation is to prove that US humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War was driven by power-political motivations, rather than primarily humanitarian concerns.

This study argues that the United States, under the Bush administration, chose to remain disengaged for there were no conceptualized national interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Clinton, however, campaigned on the Bosnian War from an idealistic perspective. His rhetoric was very much consistent with an approach to international relations based on the idealistic assumptions of morality and human rights. Yet, once in office, the Clinton administration operated on the realistic assumptions of realpolitik.

In this regard, this dissertation explains why, for more than three years of horror and absurdity, brutal atrocities and genocide, the United States remained disengaged and waited so long before taking the lead in mobilizing NATO airstrikes against the Serb positions. Simultaneously, this study highlights the motives behind the shift in US foreign policy from disengagement towards humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War.

Key words: the United States, US foreign policy, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian War, military disengagement, humanitarian intervention, idealism, realism, idealistic perspectives, realistic assumptions of realpolitik.