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Origins and Impacts of Islamic Revival in Contemporary Britain

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Abstract

Islam, throughout much of its history, continues to be a faith characterized by dynamic change, boundless sweep and vibrant growth. Islam reemerged as a potent global force throughout the later part of the twentieth century, but it has been associated with reformation and revolution. Then, the idea that Islam may re-arise seemed less appealing. In more recent decades, the evidence of the strength of Islamic revival gained much attention worldwide. In the West, it was associated with a new terror and a clash of civilizations. A number of Western writings on Islamic resurgence in the modern Arab world and the West referred to the phenomenon as a matter of renewal of the old pressure of Islam upon Christendom and as a case of fundamentalism, too. Others, however, believed it was the reinterpretation of the Islamic tradition in a creative and unique way with philosophy outside the pale of Islam. On the basis of the most recent newspaper articles and the writings of famous British sociologists and historians, the type and activism of British Islam, the character of British Muslims, and the British attitudes towards Islam and Muslims are examined in this thesis. Drawing from the evident fact that over the centuries, the sway of conversion has moved in Islam's favor while missionary effort has had no appreciable impact on its tenacity along with the reality that Islam has not succumbed to secularism despite its diminution as a geopolitical force, the question that the present research investigates is why Islam, whatever the condition, has vigorously survived. Why is it strong today in Britain which is less likely to buck up an alien faith? If we consider Islam's resurgence in Britain to be problematic theoretically whereas in real life it advances unhampered, this would add bewilderment to the matter. The research, therefore, will explore the very reasons behind and the possible impacts of the Islamic revival in the contemporary British society. To achieve this, the concept 'religious revival' itself is thoroughly discussed because in the Islamic tradition it differs from the Christian one. After contextualizing Islam in Britain, the dynamics of the faith's growth are sought. Its very strength proceeds from demographic, educational, socio- economic, psychological, international and political motives altogether. Still much of that resilience resides within its fundamental characteristics. The renewed force of Islam in Britain resulted in a number of impacts that range from anti-Muslim racism, tensions, economic inequalities, and stereotypes to Islamophobic sentiments. The latter proved to be problematic. If we assume Islam thrives under repression, it would be a factor; if we consider more the British worries about a possible Islamification of their homeland, it is an impact. The rise of Islam in the 21st century Britain and the challenges it created such as the relationship of tradition to modernity or postmodernity, text to context, Islam to democracy, divine revelation and human interpretation, and one Islam or European Islam
– a kind of intellectual revolution – make the research's theme so rich that a chapter which debates the prospects of British Islam is indispensable. Based on scholars' predictions and the scriptures' prophecies, this would feed our human sense of interest in understanding the future. Here again the power of Islam as the religion of the end times is restated.

Résumé

L'Islam, tout au long de son histoire, continue d'être une foi caractérisée par un changement dynamique, un balayage sans limites et une croissance vibrante. L'Islam est réapparu comme une force mondiale puissante tout au long de la dernière partie du XXe siècle, mais il a été associé à la réforme et à la révolution. En suite, l'idée que l'islam pourrait réapparaître semblait moins attrayante. Au cours des dernières décennies, les preuves de la force du renouveau islamique ont attiré beaucoup d'attention dans le monde entier. En Occident, il était associé à une nouvelle terreur et à un choc des civilisations. Un certain nombre d'écrits occidentaux sur la résurgence islamique dans le monde arabe moderne et en Occident ont fait référence au phénomène comme une question de renouvellement de la vieille pression de l'islam sur la chrétienté et comme un cas de fondamentalisme, aussi. D'autres, cependant, croyaient que c'était la réinterprétation de la tradition islamique d'une manière créative et unique avec la philosophie en dehors de l'islam. Sur la base des articles de journaux les plus récents et des écrits de célèbres sociologues et historiens britanniques, le type et l'activisme de l'islam britannique, le caractère des musulmans britanniques et les attitudes britanniques envers l'islam et les musulmans sont examinés dans cette thèse. Puisant dans l'évidence qu'au cours des siècles, l'influence de la conversion s'est déplacée en faveur de l'islam alors que l'effort missionnaire n'a eu aucun impact appréciable sur sa ténacité et la réalité que l'islam n'a pas succombé à la laïcité malgré sa diminution en tant que force géopolitique, la question que la présente recherche étudie est pourquoi l'islam, quelle que soit la condition, a survécu vigoureusement. Pourquoi est-il fort aujourd'hui en Grande-Bretagne qui est moins susceptible d'encourager une foi étrangère? Si nous considérons que la résurgence de l'Islam en Grande-Bretagne est problématique en théorie alors que dans la vie réelle, elle progresse sans entrave, ce qui ajouterait à la confusion. La recherche, par conséquent, explorera les raisons mêmes et les impacts possibles du renouveau islamique dans la société britannique contemporaine. Pour y parvenir, le concept de «renouveau religieux» est lui-même discuté en profondeur car, dans la tradition islamique, il diffère du concept chrétien. Après la contextualisation de l'islam en Grande-Bretagne, la dynamique de la croissance de foi est recherchée. Sa force provient des motifs démographiques, éducatifs, socio-économiques, psychologiques, internationaux et politiques. Une grande partie de cette résilience réside dans ses caractéristiques fondamentales. La force renouvelée de l'islam en Grande-Bretagne a entraîné un certain nombre d'impacts allant du racisme anti-musulman, des tensions, des inégalités économiques et des stéréotypes aux sentiments islamophobes. Ce dernier s'est avéré problématique. Si nous supposons que l'islam prospère sous la répression, ce serait un facteur; si nous considérons plus les inquiétudes britanniques sur une éventuelle islamisation de leur patrie, c'est un impact. La montée de l'islam au 21ème siècle Grande-Bretagne et les défis qu'elle a créés comme le rapport de la tradition à la modernité ou la postmodernité, le texte au contexte, l'islam à la démocratie, la révélation divine et l'interprétation humaine - un type de révolution intellectuelle - rendre le thème de la recherche si riche qu'un chapitre qui débat des perspectives de l'islam britannique est indispensable. Basé sur les prédictions des érudits et les prophéties des Ecritures, cela nourrirait notre sens humain d'intérêt à comprendre le futur. Ici encore, le pouvoir de l'islam en tant que religion de la fin des temps est réaffirmé.

ملخص

لايزال الإسلام، عبرمعظم تاريخه، إيمانا يتميز بالتغيرالديناميكي، والانتشار الذي لاحدود له والنمو النابض بالحياة. ظهر الإسلام كقوة عالمية قوية طوال الجزء الأخير من القرن العشرين، لكنه ارتبط بالإصلاح والثورة. ثم فكرة أن الإسلام قد يعيد الظهور بدت أقل جاذبية. في العقود الأخيرة اكتسبت الأدلة على قوة الانتعاش الإسلامي الكثير من الاهتمام في جميع أنحاء العالم. في الغرب، ارتبطت بالإرهاب والصدام الجديد و صدام الحضارات وقد أشار عدد من الكتابات الغربية حول النهضة الإسلامية في العالم العربي الحديث والغرب إلى هذه الظاهرة باعتباره امسألة تجديد للضغوط القديمة للإسلام على المسيحية وكحالة أصولية أيضًا. غيرأن آخرين اعتقدوا أن إعادة تفسير التقليد الإسلامي بطريقة إبداعية وفريدة من نوعها مع الفلسفة خارج إطار الإسلام. على أساس أحدث المقالات الصحفية و كتابات علماء الاجتماع والمؤرخين البريطانيين المشهورين، تم فحص نوع و نشاط الإسلام البريطاني، وشخصية المسلمين البريطانيين، والمواقف البريطانية تجاه الإسلام و المسلمين في هذه الرسالة. انطلاقا من الحقيقة الواضحة أنه على مر القرون، نفوذ التحول قد تحوّل لصالح الإسلام، في حين أن الجهد التبشيري لم يكن له تأثير ملموس على ثباته إلى جانب حقيقة أن الإسلام لم يستسلم للعلمانية على الرغم من تناقصه كقوة جيوسياسية، السؤال الذي يبحثه البحث الحالي هو لماذا نجا الإسلام، مهما كان حاله، بقوة. لماذا هو قوي اليوم في بريطانيا وهي أقل احتمالا لقبول ديانة أجنبية. إذا اعتبرنا ظهور الإسلام في بريطانيا مشكلة من الناحية النظرية، في حين أنه في الحياة الحقيقية يتقدم دون عوائق، فإن هذا من شأنه أن يضيف الحيرة إلى هذه المسألة. وبالتالي، فإن البحث سوف يستكشف الأسباب الكامنة وراء التأثيرات الإسلامية المحتملة في المجتمع البريطاني المعاصر. و لتحقيق ذلك، فإن مفهوم "النهضة الدينية" نفسه قد تمت مناقشته بشكل شامل لأنه في التقاليد الإسلامية يختلف عن المفهوم المسيحي. بعد التطرق للإسلام في بريطانيا، يتم السعي إلى ديناميكيات نمو الإيمان. وتتحرك قوتها من الاسباب الديموغرافية 'التعليمية ' الاجتماعية' الاقتصادية والنفسية' الدولية والسياسية برمتها. لايزال الكثير من هذه المرونة يكمن في خصائصه الأساسية. أسفرت قوة الإسلام المتجددة في بريطانيا عن عدد من الآثار التي تتراوح بين العنصرية المعادية للمسلمين، والتوترات، وعدم المساواة الاقتصادية، والصور النمطية للمشاعر المعادية للإسلام. أثبتت هذه الأخيرة (الاسلاموفوبيا) أنها إشكالية. إذا افترضنا أن الإسلام يزدهر تحت القمع، فسيكون ذلك عاملاً. إذا اعتبرنا المزيد من المخاوف البريطانية بشأن احتمال قيام إسلمة بوطنهم، فهذا تأثير. صعود الإسلام في ا لقرن الواحد والعشرين في بريطانيا والتحديات التي خلقته مثل العلاقة بين التقليد والحداثة أو ما بعد الحداثة، والنص إلى السياق، والإسلام و الديمقراطية، والوحي الإلهي والتفسير البشري، والإسلام أو الإسلام الأوروبي– وهو نوع من الثورة الثقافية–جعل موضوع البحث غنيا لدرجة أن الفصل الذي يناقش آفاق الإسلام البريطاني لا غنى عنه. استنادًا إلى تنبؤات العلماء ونبوءات الكتب المقدسة، فإن هذا من شأنه أن يغذي حسنا الإنساني في الاهتمام بفهم المستقبل. هنا مرة أخرى يتم إعادة تأكيد قوة الإسلام كدين أوقات النهاية.

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This work is dedicated to all Muslims, and to the Muslims whose revolution of sentiments culminated in the protection of Islam from falling into grosser misconceptions. It is also dedicated to Western people who converted to Islam and to those among them who are fascinated by it and find it extraordinary even when not consciously adhering to it.

This work is in loving memory of Brother Sofiane.

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General Introduction

No doubt faith is a vital factor in the practice and theory of governments, but it is avoided. Foreign affairs, external security, justice and welfare are often favored though faith is the driving power for all these ends to be achieved through human effort. Faith plays a dynamic and evolving role in society. Demographic trends suggest that the people of faith will increase and therefore have impacts on community mobilizing either in the positive sense or the negative one. Faith is able to impact global issues and shape global perspectives. Not only innovations in policy and practice are required to address global and systemic challenges, but also a commitment to certain values that make the needed policy workable, and these are often rooted in faith. Faith and faith communities not only promote values, but they can be part of the solution to each of coercive extremism and prejudice, the corruption that comes with a lack of legal framework, unlimited growth and selfish consumerism, climate change, gender-based violence, traditionalism and conservatism, patriarchal, slow changing structures, and the apocalyptic views of this world's future. Faith communities are also concerned about employment, skills, strong ethics of work, animal rights and how livestock is brought to slaughter, human capital, long-term investing, infrastructure and development, future of the internet, the future of the global financial system, fair-trade, community cohesion and cooperation, and the freedom of religion.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that the aspiration for freedom of religion or belief is more than just an incidental part of the human experience, but it is one that is intrinsic to human nature and a necessary social good for the improvement of everyone's conditions. Owing to the fact that religion is so vital for free people everywhere, policy makers have understood that the only way to get it for oneself is to grant it to all others. Some of the societal benefits of religious freedom include the creation of a context where tensions are negotiated and people live peacefully despite their deepest differences: the promotion of stability in a pluralistic society. By contrast, if limited, it correlates to growing violence and conflicts. Religious freedom goes hand in hand with economic prosperity, better health, lower income inequality, and civil liberties.

This is the essence of democracy. Religious freedom supports free, flourishing societies, impacts the individuals' ability to flourish, and upholds families.

Attention would be directed to the aspect of religious revival rather than the broad discussion of the merits of religiosity in the modern world. Yet, in spite of the spiritual character of the theme, it is not to explore how faith can be revived and how it can grow. It is not about what enfeebles the walk of faith or what leads to the neglect of prayer even if this revival of religion will not come by prayer of words. It is a matter of religious enthusiasm, or the restatement of the emotions of the people to the depths of their beliefs and the components of their faith. It is also about the extent to which religious revivals are dependent upon the personal influence of some outstanding personality for their vitality, and how far this is prerequisite for moral progress. Religion is maintained among people by special occasions, and without these periodical excitements, no revival can take place. Yet, if it happens, a revival will have a contagious effect which spreads it elsewhere.

Religious people may well attribute the rise of any religious fervor to the presence of a divine being or creator to emphasize the meaningfulness of life. For the Christian, it is the outpouring of the Holy Spirit; for the Muslim, it is the strength of Allah and His will to save and elevate His religion. The most obvious reflection to be made upon the subject from the standpoint of the ordinary man is that a revival of religion presupposes a declension. Indeed, unusual states of stagnation of thought and deadness of feelings are often followed by a period of return to God. In the same way converts paint a gloomy picture of the sinfulness of their life before conversion, revivalists do for the world of sin before they make it over once again to the straight way. To bring sinners to a condition of moral responsiveness, their religion must be mainly promoted by means of revivals.

This issue is necessarily bound up with another which is perhaps our very timely matter of Islamic revival in Western Europe in general and in Britain in particular. The self-assertion of Muslims in the modern world has been a case of continuing debate. It has been variously labelled by non-Muslims as Islamic resurgence, Islamic fundamentalism, or Islamic revivalism. These notions generalized the ways in which Islam is depicted, and thus created a great deal of stereotypical images of Islam. One

must however look into the subject a little more closely. It is not that Islam existed in Britain, and then it experienced a cycle of stagnation and the renewal has come about in the contemporary British society. The term revival stands for revitalization to refer to both the institutionalisation of religious practice within the country of migration through for example the construction of mosques and the provision of religious education, and to re-Islamization or the assertion of overarching transnational religious identities often replacing strong ethnic affiliation among the second generation of minorities.

Thousands upon thousands of people around the world –in Western Europe and America – are choosing to become Muslims although far too many media outlets claim that Muslims are behind atrocities like 9/11 and other massacre, and that their violence is also inspired and sanctioned by Islam itself. When anti-Muslim rhetoric flared, and the word 'terrorism' has come to be instinctively associated with Islam; the people who studied other religions but had not thought to learn about Islam, felt a need to begin studying Islam and eventually decided to convert to Islam. With the propaganda campaign still going on against Islam, some prominent people from the Western world have never believed that the religion was to blame. By contrast, they are intrigued to learn about it, and are impressed by its resurgence in their own lands. The faith appears to appeal to a wide section of individuals and attract people from every walk of life. Academic researchers are no exception.

From every point of view, this topic is an exceedingly fruitful subject for investigation in order to show the theoretical inadequacy of the writings on Islamic revival. Though religiosity is a personal experience that must be explained at the intersection of the individual, the local and the global, its analysis also needs to take into account each of the political, historical, and economic contexts. Understanding Islam and the role of Muslims in the contemporary world is increasingly vital owing to the widespread fears of extremism and terrorism. This is also strategic in multicultural societies such as the British one. There, Islamic resurgence is being helped by the usual belief that greater piety in this world secures a happy eternal life in the Hereafter. However, it is often observed through the changing demographic face of the country, the growth in number of conversions to Islam, immigration, refugee arrivals, mosques, Islamic centers, and university departments of Islamic studies, Islamic banks, and the like. Struggles to define

and preserve the Islamic identity will continue since this has been the case since the very beginning of Islamic history. Therefore, the recent and unpredictable nature of Islamic resurgence led to a further trend that limited its study only in terms of its future dimension in Western countries. But there are still other things to focus on such as whether the Muslim communities in the West have been self-consciously Islamic or self-consciously revivalist ; whether there will be increasing discrimination and persecution against Muslims as a religious minority in Britain or their self-assertion will call more consideration and tolerance to them ; whether increased pressures in Muslim-majority communities block any Islamic revival while in Western countries like the UK the necessary conditions for the resurgence of religions, particularly Islam, exist.

It is a significant contribution to the political philosophy of our day to investigate the revival phenomenon. Religious revivals worldwide have had dramatic effects on domestic, regional, and international politics. Some religions are considered conservative, supportive of the state, militant, too unorganized to cause a threat, reformist, extremist, democratic, humanitarian or revolutionary. Their process of revival poses challenges to traditional theories of secularization. International relations theories are also affected by the type of some religious identities, which is the case of Muslims in France, Britain, and Germany and so on. Over time, the military threat has decreased to be replaced by the ideological threat dictated by the new concept of 'political Islam'. Political Islam has always been perceived as a threat to the political stability of current regimes. Religiously orientated groups are believed to be the leaders of the revolutionary movements of political Islam such as the Muslim groups who were behind the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The revival of Islam has undermined the ideological legitimacy of some regimes as a system of life in which politics and religion are inseparable. Religious outbursts, in general, proved to be a normal condition of moral progress even if this represents a fundamental challenge to the values on which many existing regimes are based. Islamic revival, for instance, focused on transforming society rather than immediately capturing control of the state. It was often seen as a cultural revival rather than a purely religious one, too.

The point we wish to settle here stems from the fact that many of us cannot explain why Muslim minorities are persecuted all over the world although Islam has been a

response to corrupt societies whether the host ones or at home. It is a contradiction to see that in the West there is a politically correct multiculturalism, but for Muslims it should be called separatism or self-imposed segregation. Efforts are being made to define it as political Islam, not a real return to religion; and to call it Islamism rather than thinking that it could be an honest adherence to the Muslim faith. It is also apparent that only Muslims are prejudged among other minorities. While it is often said a Muslim but terrorist, thief, disloyal, and so forth; these qualities are not linked to other religions. Muslims are not treated neutrally, which makes the affair looks as if it were a pretext to attack the faith though no basis is there for an open war. Since nothing related to terror is said for a Hindu, a Catholic or a Jew, this may well lead to a state of confusion between whether it is a war on terror or on Islam. It also sounds odd to reduce a system of life, culture of billions of people and a centuries-long civilization, Islam, only to radicalism, fundamentalism, and terror.

The growing importance of religious enthusiasm worldwide is the subject of many academic researches, and was supported by many political scientists. At the same time; it is a profound significance that few today even begin to recognize. Although religion is a sensitive matter that cannot be put under expectations, about Islam many things can be said. In spite of being portrayed as a faith of the old world and one whose beliefs do not exceed the limits of inherited cultural practices, it falsified all that through being realized. An idealized type of Islam could see the light of the day as early as its first adherents stepped into the West, a terra incognita, for them. The moment they stepped onto British shores, Islam prospered and continues to do so. The Muslim Community dating from the 1930's and 50's onwards is now well-established there, and this serves as a strong message to people who claim Muslims do not do enough to display the true image of Islam. But because the truth did not necessarily attract people, and the media showed only one side of the story, post-millennium Islamophobia has risen. The threat of an Islamicrevolution in London specifies the complexities of Islam both as a belief system being transported to an alien land; yet prospering well, and as a new born power of a country whose earlier products – The USA and Israel – are its enemies. Addressing the issue in terms that the British Muslim is the only figure in the intercultural dispute forced to deal with the complexities of Islam as a threat, and that his Islamic identity is based on

free will and poses no economic, ideological or political constraints raises a need to offer an insight into the nature of British Islam and its rise within such volatile context. In other words, both the conditions of the Islamic revival and the cost of being Muslim in Britain identify the problems that form the basis for this research.

There is little precise information about the very roots that led to the revitalization of Islam in Britain as well as about its impacts, let alone its prospects. Deductions were made from social philosophy, political philosophy, history, economic sciences, anthropology, theology, eschatology and so on to explain what the Islamic dynamic resurgence was deeply linked to. One of the assumptions made to explain that stated that people turned to Islamism as a replacement after the failure of Pan-Arabism in the Arab Middle East and secular nationalism in the Muslim world although Islam has never been absent from the scenes of any reaction.Others claimed it was deeply linked to sweeping educational, demographic and social transformations. Some interpretations of this condition said it was due to technological innovation, Islamic revivalist movements, and a number of international issues.Many people have also come to regard Muslims' resurgence in Britain with the impression heightened by misleading press reporting that conversion to Islam will transform the white Christian English identity. It is assumed, without media fabrications, that all Muslim migrants and the British converts are faithful Muslims who work hard to enroot and strengthen their faith within their new communities, which is not necessarily true of all of them. Some Muslim migrants assimilate and become Europeans to the roots and to the core. A number of observers stated that revivalism among Muslims in Britain has only relied on certain generations, not on transplantation. Despite the apparent rise and growth of Islamic culture and belief everywhere in Europe, some people assume it has been revived in Britain because of the existence of the necessary conditions. Indeed, those who feel the West is not a suitable place to revive Islam, and yearn to immigrate to the land of Islam often face the shocking reality that practising Islam in the West was more appropriate. Yet, the Islamophobic sentiment and some socio-political exclusions along with other restrictions are things not to forget. Others claim the revival should be perceived from other angles which are the nature of the Muslim himself, the power of Islam without its people's enthusiasm and pride, or to God's will when it goes very inexplicable.

The phenomenon of Islamic revival is explored via a mixed-methods research that involves qualitative and quantitative approaches, philosophical assumptions, theoretical frameworks, description, analysis, historical backgrounds, sociological dimensions, anthropological worldviews, theological perspectives and so on. Beyond these spheres, the study also approaches the Islamic revival as a self-repair mechanism, a value system, or a self-knowledge process within global cultural diversity.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. In the first one, we go into a lengthy disussion of the concept 'revival'. The second chapter seeks to provide a historical overview in which the arrival of Muslims, their socio-economic profile, their public issues, their education, religious and cultural activism, integration, and policy development on the part of the British state towards them, not as part of the studies of immigrants in the UK, but rather to pave the way for the next to come in the research. Although there could be no revival of Islam without spiritually revived souls of its people, there are issues that may contribute to achieve such rejuvenation. Insights into that would be given in the third chapter which explicitly discusses the possible causal factors responsible for the phenomenon of global Islamic resurgence. The fourth chapter benefits us with several outcomes of this phenomenon, such as the needs of Muslims to the service providers, the tensions between Muslims and others, their fears and prejudices within themselves and other Christians, the media's treatment of Muslims, Islamophobia, anti-Muslim racism and other ideological challenges. In spite of being an investigation carried out mainly for the sake of deeply understanding what led to the revival of Islam in contemporary Britain, how it was clear in the society and what it resulted in, this would be poor without referring to the prospects of Islamic resurgence as part of our intrinsic concern about the future. Eachof the Western, European Muslim, and Muslim visions are brought forward. Predictions of prominent British politicians, theories of scholars, expectations of government circles, promises of progress and solutions to postmodern ills through Islam, and prophecies stated in Biblical and Islamic scriptures are cited, too.

Chapter I: Reviewing, Defining and Theorizing Religious Revivals

Introduction

The contemporary Islamic revival is a puzzling issue. It is often described as the most important social movement of the twentieth century, a modern phenomenon, and a recent surge in religious participation and values in every Muslim country- if not elsewhere. But religious revivals have always existed, and this has been everywhere throughout history. Muslims claim that their holy prophet (blessings and peace be upon him) stated that the claim of prophethood has been completely closed, but « Almighty Allah will send to this Ummah (community), at the beginning of every hundred years, someone who will renew its deen (religion) for it»[1]. In 1415, Jan Hus, a Czech reformer whose surname means "goose," was burned at the stake when he called out: "Today you roast a goose, but in 100 years, a swan will sing!"[2] (Bos.AwesomeStories). Accordingly, revival is the matter of every century, not a brand-new phenomenon. Some thinkers, however, suggest that Islamic revival started, the latest, with the Iranian revolution and limit it to the fact of re-Islamization of political systems. This may be applied only to the states where Muslims constitute the absolute majority, but revival is not just the implementation of *Sharéa*[3] as a law of state. Seemingly, not only are there different attitudes towards the very beginning of the phenomenon, but there are also several debates on what it meant exactly; why and how it began.

The present state of the world confirms the claim that religion has become the increasingly contentious subject in recent years; yet, the latter cannot be promoted to any considerable extent without revivals. Therefore, it is this new life and vigour which is infused into religion from time to time that made religion a hot and constant theme. Undoubtedly, a true revival must start at the level of the individual, with a conviction of

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[1] An authentic hadith of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) reported by Sayyiduna Abu Huraira and Imam Abu Dawood in his Sunan

[2] John Hus (whose name means "goose" in his native Czech. He was burned by the Roman Catholic Council of Constance. He predicted the Protestant Reformation

[3] Sharea or Sharia : moral code and religious law of Islam

sin then a new beginning of obedience. Afterwards, more collections of people can be involved in the process. In Islam, just as in Christianity, revivalist efforts include « … energetic meetings intended to revive religious faith. Common among fundamentalists, these meetings are characterized by impassioned preaching … » (The American Heritage Dictionary). In addition to preaching, the other instances of faith promotion include the widespread reading of the scriptures, spending whole nights in prayer, seeking soul salvation and the attempts of conversion. In fact, there is a tight relation between revivals and missionary activity. Most revivalists excelled in bringing people off from their own ways and had a feeling of obligation to send their religions to the heathen.

Due to the fact that there is an abundance of evidence-almost everywhere- that religion, in particular Islam, has been deliberately attached to many acts of oppression, barbarism, terrorism, animosity, bigotry, and intolerence ; many people are disposed to give up all efforts to produce religious excitements. But this is no reason because excitements are always liable to abuses. Indeed, in many parts of the world, a substantial number of Muslims are being abused, but they would rather die than surrender to abandon their revivals which, in many cases, are basically no more than calls for those who have been led away from the right path to live devoutly.

Several discussions of the topic at hand, revival or revivalism, have been recorded, but perversions have also been noticed. Consequently, the concept should be examined etymologically, historically, ideologically and religiously.

1.   The Concept of Revival

The only fact, under the government of God, which is worthy of universal notice, and of everlasting remembrance is religion. Reawakening faith, interest in and care for religion is an attempt of revival. Yet, the complexity of the concept is not unknown to both theologians and historians. Therefore, a discussion of the place and significance of religion in modern times must surely begin by establishing working definitions of the concepts.

The Etymological Meaning

This concept, in the Western thought, dates back to before the 1660s. Then, it meant « the bringing of an old play back to the stage » (Online Etymology Dictionary). But in general, it refers to a tendancy or desire for inclination to revive what belongs to an earlier time. It takes the form of religious activities which manifest themselves in services for the purpose of religious awakening. It may also be defined as an act of « restoration after a period of obscurity or quiescence, a time of reawakened interest in religion, a meeting or series of meetings for the purpose of reawakening religious faith, often by impassioned preaching and public testimony » (The American Heritage Dictionary). It is « a renewal of faith or renewal of commitment to religion » (Collins English Dictionary), too.

The term can be used in almost every context, but in the spiritual sense, 'revival' is a loaded word. It was used in the English Bibles in the same way it is known to all. In the Old Testament, the Hebrew words related to revival or its effect « are 'chadash' and 'chaya' with the meaning 'renew, restore or repair' in the first instance and 'revive or bring back to life' in the second » (Orr ii). The New Testament applies the item to « times of refreshing from the presence of the Lord » (ii). Nevertheless, as long as revival is associated with divine origin, theologians exclude all links with any renewal. Though included in the scriptures, Christians started to use the term, in language and religious contexts, only at the beginning of the eighteenth century with the appearance of general awakenings in religion. Evangelical christians, however, contributed to the birth of both 'revivalism' and 'revivalist' for each of the state of religion under revival and the promoters of religious revival in 1815 and 1820 respectively. On the whole, the former definitions are common throughout Europe; some American deviations were not accepted by the British churches.

Although the Muslim community is multi-racial, multi-lingual and multi-cultural, many Arabic terms are commonly used, and so is the case with the noun '*ihyaa*' which stands for *'revival'*. It is derived from the verb *'ahya* 'i.e, to revive in the sense of bringing someone or something back to life and giving it vitality. It also means to

ressurect after death, and it was often used in Qur'an to describe the divine ability of Allah to create out of nothing. It may refer to the fact of setting out and getting plants from earth. Ultimately, it cannot be but adding life to someone or something either in reality or metaphorically.

History records that the Puritans in England used 'reform' as the synonym for 'revival', but careful researchers and church historians pointed out that it is only a renewing of conscience, and it may be closer to 'awakening' not reform.'Revival' has also been wrongly attached to 'evangelism', but no proof could mislead anybody. In neither case does the word lose its sense related to 'renewal' for churches and believers, and 'awakening' for communities.

The Historical Meaning

Most cultures have seen a number of religious revivals throughout their history, and all such movements appear to have common features. All of them are actually ritual processes which try to bring about social change. Whenever religion sadly declines and the moral condition of societies worsens revivalists usher sinners into a new epoch blessed with revivals which continue for many years till the enthusiasm fades again. J. G. James shares the view that« there never has been a great revival of religion without a preceding period of unusual stagnation of thought and deadness of feeling, with the loss of the sense of moral responsibility » (James 337)

The anthropological angle sees that religious revival bears a great deal of resemblance to the process of revitalization, or it is « a deliberate, organized conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture » (Wallace 265). Some cultural theorists of the West regard the promotion of faith as a process of culture change that continues for up to centuries and millenia. Others put the possibility within one generation, but the Islamic world limits such transformation within a hundred years.

From a sociological standpoint, revival is a term applied to mass movements based upon intense religious excitement. Of course this occurs periodically at the aim of

restoring commitment and attachment to the group. Besides, revivals are regular sociological features of religious tradition, and they have been common phenomena in both the West and the East and the Arab Islamic world as well.

Not only are religious revivals usual phenomena, but they are also recurrent historical events. They differ only in the circumstances and roots of their rise as well as the goals and practices of their movements. The West offers a wide spectrum of revivalist movements. In fact; the church is the oldest and most original setting of Christian revivals.

Church history can be a very exciting journey. Ever since Jesus ascended into heaven, his followers – the Christians – erected spacious churches in all cities and went on missionary journeys. Much of the spread of the religion of Christ and parts of the New Testament were the result of the efforts of a zealous Jew named Paul. Until the third century, the Christians stood firmly against any wrong interpretation of their religion. And the early fourth century witnessed the Emperor Constantine's conversion. When he embraced the faith, the church enjoyed a considerable amount of power and peace. The increase in the number of Christians contributed to the rapid spread of the faith in Asia Minor, Egypt, North Africa, Germany and elsewhere. Yet, there is a total agreement upon the fact that there is not a church or sect in Christendom which has not its origin in one or other of the great revivals.

For instance, the early British revivals date back to Saint Patrick who preached the Gospel throughout Ireland, and many others who prayed with all their hearts that the things contained in the sacred scriptures would be embraced.Saint Patrick is known as the Patron Saint of Ireland whose piety, humility, simplicity, and devotion christianized thousands of Irish people and made out of Ireland a mission base for much of Europe.

Bearing little resemblance to a swan, a German monk named Martin Luther began to spread his teachings of the new ideas which challenged the aspects of the church quickly througout Germany. To save millions of souls under the Roman Church, longing for reform, not revival, burnt in his heart, resulted in The Reformation and gave birth to Protestantism. Subsequently, other protest movements for reform sprung up in England and Switzerland.

The Moravian revival of the early eighteenth century began in about 1727 in a Moravian community called "Herrnhut" (the Lord's watch) in Saxony, (modern Germany). Later, it spread to Britain and America. It was the first discernible occasion that God's Spirit was outpoured simultaneously across different nations.It was a time when the settlers at Herrnhut promised to bury their disputes for ever after they poured out their souls to God in prayer and singing.They sought the Lord in prayer, weeping and supplication. As mighty believers, they dedicated themselves to God and were destined to influence both the English and American nations.

The spirit of Methodist Evangelism, as a response to the morally decadent country, was also spread by John and Charles Wesley and George Whitefield. Following the Evangelical awakening in England and by the time of the outbreak of Jonathan Edward's revival, nobody in Northampton was left unconcerned about the things related to eternal world and salvation.Some historians have maintained that the revival so altered the course of English history that it probably saved England from the kind of revolution that took place in France. In other words, religious revivals are not '*moments of madness*' (Zolberg) as they were conceived in the French history, but they rather act as shields against uprisings.

American church history is rich in terms of revivalist movements. Its most significant four decades are the 1790s, the 1850s, the period from 1895 to 1905, and the 1950s. The Puritan and Quaker revivals were also important movements. Clearly enough, the colonial era witnessed the first Great Awakening of which Theodore J. Frelinghuysen, William Tennent, George Whitefield and Jonathan Edwards are the most worthy of notice. Then, because of rationalism, deism and unitarianism, piety decreased. The rise of evangelical revival in England was the beginning of the Great Awakening which continued for many years in many American states.This was about 1800 and thanks to the campaigns of Charles G. Finney. An important fact to mention is that religious and humanitarian movements in the United States during the first decades of the nineteenth century owed a great deal to British examples. Once again piety was undermined by industrialization, and the period of spiritual stagnation would allow a third epoch of revival to see the light of the day after the Civil War. Persistence on piety continued up to

the twentieth century, but there is no doubt that it is a century characterised by a decline of revivalism.

In the way that the Protestant Reformation was a return to the Bible, the Muslim world envisioned religiously vital coming societies through a return to Qur'an and a re-awakening of commitment to the basic Islamic principles. In the modern era, revival refers to the attempts by Islamic modernizers and Salafīyah advocates to introduce more Islamic influences into the lives of Muslims who have been subject to Western currents of thought and practice. Yet, a brief examination of the past would help to portray the most notable revival movements in Islamic history.

The contemporary Islamic revival movements may be traced back to the example of the Prophet Muhammad himself, a lasting archetype for all Muslims. Afterwards, the early calls for revival and renewal emanated from multiple origins by virtue of their local, national as well as transnational contexts. From the 9th century onwards Baghdad and Syria witnessed the Hanbali movement which was known for « its strict insistence on literal acceptance of hadith, avoidance of theology, repression of popular sufi practices, and intense criticism of corrupt Muslim states » (Lapidus 455).Then came Ibn Taymia to enlighten the 13th century with his resistance of Christians and Shi'is, and defence of Islamic heritage through his valuable writings which gave the Muslim world important records of renewal. North African Sufism besides the Almoravids and Almohads attempts to revive Islamic Caliphate type of rule was other revivalist movements. Mughal India also was revived by Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, who claimed to be the mujaddid, the designated purifier who, in his century, convinced the Mughal emperors to choose and follow Sunni Islamic policies. He struggled against adding Sufi and Hindu practices into Islam because he believed that the very survival of religion lies in cleansing it from dangerous local bidʿah and alien elements. Later on, India witnessed new Islamic movements such as Deobandi, Tablighi and Barelwi Islam, some of which last to the present. The Ottomans also supported the religious scholars who resisted bid'ah and Sufism.

Islamic revivals in the 18th and 19th centuries were diverse owing to the global political and socio-economic changes in which they arose. They included, among others, The Wahhabīyah in the Arabian Peninsula, Sanūsīyah in North Africa, the Mahdīyah in

Sudan and the tariqa Muhammadiya in India. Some of these leaders are Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb of Arabia (d. 1787), Shah Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī of India (d. 1762), ʿUthmān Ibn Fūdī (a.k.a. Usuman Dan Fodio) of West Africa (d. 1817), and Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī al-Sanūsī of North Africa (d. 1859). They aimed at the rejuvenation of their Islamic communities, carrying an Islamic missionary message to non-Muslims, especially in Africa. Concern with the West at that point was not documented. Commonly, these waves of piety were called tajdid. The cultural stagnation that prevailed in much of the Islamic worldthroughout the 18th century and the decline of the Muslim empires made the relation of the reform movements (tajdid) to global transformations complicated. On the whole, tajdid movements were influential in various contexts namely the teaching of tawhid, restoration of true Islam, resistance of westernization and anti-colonialism.

Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 1897), ʿAbd al-Raḥmān alKawākibī (d. 1902), Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and many others were vibrant Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders of their epochs. They focused on modernizing the Islamic state rather than society in face of modern Western dangers. That is to say they were for the acceptance of borrowing modern knowledge from the West, but within Islamic cultural and religious frameworks.

The 1920s and 1930s were significant decades in the history of contemporary Islamic movements. This new wave's origin dates from the founding of the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egyptby Hasan al-Banna, and the Jama'at-i Islami in India founded by Mawlana Abu'Ala Mawdudi.Lapidus states that:

> With the creation of independent states after World War II and the suppression of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt in the 1950s, these movements were eclipsed by the secular and socialist tendencies of the national states. By the 1970s, however, a new generation again advanced the program of Islamic revival set out in the 1930s. The Muslim Brothers and the Jama'at in Egypt, Al-Nahda in Tunisia, FIS in Algeria, the Jama'at-i Islami in Pakistan and elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia, and Shi'i movements in Lebanon such as Amal and Hizbullah, represent the new generation (445).

The struggle within Muslim societies was that the revivalist movements would fail if Muslim religious scholars continued to preach the virtues of taqlīd. Taqlīd was rejected

because it was seen as a major factor in perpetuating the cultural stagnation of the Muslim world. Islam was seen as flexible and creative enough to adapt to the modern times because its teachings called upon its members to consistently update their temporal and religious lives in accordance with the spirit and practice of the time they were living in. Consequently, the call for continuous ijtihād was required in order to cope with the modern problems, update knowledge and restore the Muslim's dignity.

As for the origin of Islamic revival in the east, many scholars and thinkers referred to the fact that the revival or renewal of religion as well as the religious sciences- jurisprudence in particular- did not originate in the Arab world. It has been the efforts of Persian Muslim pioneers. Indeed, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali was a major figure whose thought was deeply rooted in the Qur'an, jurisprudence, philosophy and mysticism. As early as the twelfth century, he wrote one of the most celebrated works, Ihya' Ulum Al-din (the Revival of Religious Sciences). The late nineteenth century notion of 'revival' also owed much to the efforts of thinkers and critics like Jamel Al-din Al-Afghani, Imam Khomeini, Ali Shariati, and others. The world of the twentieth century was not an exception; it witnessed the contributions of great scholars to establish Islam as the ultimate truth, the religion and the perfect way of life. Abul Ala Maududi used the concept in his book 'Tajdid wa Ihya'i Din' (Religion Renewal and Revival) ; Sir Mohammad Iqbel (famous as Iqbel of Lahore) revived the movement for Islamic theology of modernity in his work 'The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam' ; Morteza Motahhari was devoted to a new Islamic consciousness, and wrote 'Ehyaye Tafakor -el- Islami' (Giving Life to the Islamic Thinking). But a great deal of influential forerunners of Islamic awakening from the Arab world joined the mission to promote Islam as a timeless faith: Muhammad Abduh, Hassan al-Banna, Rachid Reda, Sayed Qutb…etc. Interestingly enough, they have all agreed on the point that the revival of religious thought is not reviving religion- Islam- itself because it is unlikely to lose its soul. It is rather the revival of the way people should think about it. In other words, it is to drain wrong newly introduced religious matters from the minds of the religion's adherents.

Unquestionably, religious progress can be achieved only through religious revivals which explains why so many historians pleaded for a revival of such acts of religious

fervor :"Since religious revivals have played so important and so vital a part in the religious progress which has been achieved in the days that are past and gone, is it not reasonable to suppose that our hopes for the progress of religion in the days that are yet to come will depend to no inconsiderable extent upon like spiritual quickenings inthe future?" (Beardslfy)

The Ideological Meaning

A great deal of people believes that revivals are testing grounds for new ideas. This is, in part, due to the fact that they contribute to the transformation in the world views and beliefs of the societies in which they arose. They also are adjustments in thought and practice in order to cope with the new socio-political conditions. They may bring people together, and may tear them apart as well.

Some people say religious revivals are unusual events, so they deny their reality; some others their impact is not entirely clear. Some people see revivals rooted in the past; others believe they can do nothing for the secular world's disorder. But the different attitudes towards the phenomenon along with the mounting debates about their nature, origin, time and manner of their occurrence as well as their leaders reflect the uniqueness of these outbursts of religious enthusiasm.

The cyclical nature of these waves of piety, happening at interrupted intervals – not constantly – and their striking effects show that they did and still do occur. Therefore, they are real facts not miraculous events. Their intermittent and unpredictable nature also shows that they are special epochs of history. That is why there are different views of their internal nature.

With regard to the origins of revivals in the west, it has been observed that the churches themselves promoted them for institutional ends. A point in case is the second great Awakening which arose for the sake of building congregations among the communities who were without churches. Another illustration is the 1850s revival which attempted to apply Christian principles to the growing new cities. More important to mention is the revival which went on before the eruption of the Civil War, but faded

during this great moment of secession. Hence, revivals are not the result of reaction to an anomic historical period. They are not the community's burden, but rather the denomination's sruggle to extend its influence.

As for their origin in the east, Islamic movements do not envision their activism and renewal through religious authorities. It is no surprise that their ideologies include some political and international themes. However, politics is not as much stressed as the comprehensiveness of Islam is in their primacy of values.

Concerning who begins a revival, it could be a single charismatic leader, which is usually the case, as well as a group. The revivalists together with their converts often challenge the established order; hold on tightly to their mission to revive their societies. That is what explains why they are called rebels and dissenters.

Regarding why revivals attract a lot of people and soon spread in other places, the reason, besides their contagious effect, is their principles of renewal not the strength of their ideas. This is in the west and in accordance with *Weber*'s theory of *elective affinit*ies[4]in which he states that ideas arise charismatically and unpredictably, but only few of them take root because they relate to the prevailing political interests. The Great Awakening's ideas justified independence, and the anti-slavery movement expressed opposition to slavery. Their attraction was attributed to socio-political conditions; not to their religious doctrines. Thus, people's commitment is the outcome of these ideas' link with their own benefits. In this way, the revival's purpose is not much different from an election's campaign. People are brought together not for the religious conviction which they share, but for their similar interests. In the east, ulama say that, the Muslims will not be united except upon correct aqeedah. They see the unifying factor for ummah in the verses:

> And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided. And remember the favor of Allah upon you - when you were enemies and He brought your hearts together and you became, by His favor, brothers. And you were on the edge of a pit of the Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus does Allah make clear to you His verses that you may be guided. (Quran2:103)

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[4]A term used by Max Weber to describe the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism (in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 1905). It is a key word in his sociology, dealing with the relationship of ideas to interests.

In brief review, religious revivals introduce new patterns of belief and behaviour which affect whole communities; that is why western societies call them awakenings. While in most cases in the west « such intensifications are often deliberately fomented by preachers who themselves see a new light and preach a new doctrine » (Hammond 111-115), in all cases Islamic revivalism represents a concerted effort to let religion have a say in public space (Juergensmeye 221). It is not a return to the past but a form of modernity in Islamic terms, and it is not directed to economic accumulation but for the purification of its societies.

Shari'a Meaning

It's a common case that Islamic revivalists are the most active proponents of religion involvement into politics; their ultimate aim is the implementation of shari'a as a law of a state. For this reason, the clash is most visible between Islamic revivalism and Western civilizations headed by the USA. And because Islam is the world's fastest growing religion, worldwide outcomes emerged. A new theory « Islam and the rest » saw the light of the day. But before condemning Islamic revivalists as an international threat, it is advisable to reveal how shariah itself frames the message of revival.

It's true that the mind has the ability to judge the reality of many life conditions, and to conclude certain facts as regards all sorts of human problems. However, it's beyond the scope of our minds to establish pertinent and decisive laws to distinguish between good and evil actions because human judgments are subject to criticism. This is attributed to disparity, differences, contradictions, and environment effect. For instance, we all agree that the revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests across the Arab world in 2011 originated in Tunisia, but we will have billion opinions on how mankind should act; what's legal or illegal; what's to be praised or shunned. Philosophers have long been using their minds, which are in accordance with their own values, to devise theories for societies. Systems of life were built upon them though they might be righteous only for their legislators. By contrast, God-made laws are superior over man-made laws. Hence, religion is the divine legislature which can by no means be subject to any fault. And for

the reason that muslims believe in Allah and the Quran as the final revelation, their Islamic systems depend on the rules of Sharia which are the branches of religion, and cannot be discussed or detached from the beliefs which are the roots. Clearly, beliefs without practice is incomplete Islam. A Muslim who does not submit to this is warned in the following verse, « When Allah and His Messenger have decreed a matter, it is not for any believing man or believing woman to have a choice in their affair. And whosoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger has gone astray into clear error » (Qur'an33: 33-36)

Sharia, accordingly, covers all aspects of life: worships, morals, clothing, transactions, penal code …etc. The most important part of these is action or effort, but unless it « … gains depth through responsibility, it is vain to expect anything of value in consequence » (Gulen 99). Therefore, it all depends on the consciousness of responsibility together with the existence of revivalist heroes upon whose shoulders the revival of religion should fall. Once charged with the duty of revival, muslims aim for self-renewal but remain tightly connectd to their own spiritual roots, seek the reinterpretation of the present without being entangled in the temptations of modernity, and offer a sympathetic patient call-based on Islamic dynamics- for world-wide prosperous routes for all. When collisions and clashes are found within a society, it remains idle; life becomes a torture and righteousness disappears. In view of this, revival determines new policies so as to feed societies with morality and virtue.

In spite of being explicitly precise and definite in meaning, the term 'revival' poses some problems of confusion. It has been considered synonymous with each of rebirth, renaissance, reform, regeneration, resurrection, insurgence, improvement, enlightenment, and reanimation …etc. Such kind of terminological haze in which the meaning of words is so variable urges us to clarify the concept. The Western view is devoid of complexity because revival, in religious usage, is the work of the Holy Spirit restoring God's people to their true nature and purpose ; the return of the church from her backslidings. John Piper adds that

> Revival is the sovereign work of God to awaken His people with fresh intensity to the truth and glory of God, the ugliness of sin, the horror of hell, the preciousness of Christ's atoning work, the wonder of salvation by grace through faith, the

urgency of holiness and witness, and the sweetness of worship with God's

people. (Piper 111)

And in terms of history, religious revival refers to the Reformation, the efforts of Martin Luther, waves of anti-Catholicism, and the birth of Protestantism. Contrastingly, Sharia theory, which is based on the percepts set forth in the Qur'an and the example set by the Islamic prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) in the *Sunnah*[5], protects the concept from any deviation or ambiguous use. First, it rejects the idea that revival means enlightenment; Islam doesn't need light as it has never been dark. The sacred Qur'an states:

Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The example of His light is like a niche within which is a lamp, the lamp is within glass, the glass as if it were a pearly [white] star lit from [the oil of] a blessed olive tree, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil would almost glow even if untouched by fire. Light upon light. Allah guides to His light whom He wills. And Allah presents examples for the people, and Allah is Knowing of all things (Qur'an 24: 35).

The next debate is over the possibility of using 'reform' to label 'revival'. A great number of *Ulama*[6] opposed this because, first, any believing conscience can not alter Islam to adapt it to modern conditions; second, it is a Western approach which causes religion to lose its substance; third, Islam is in no need of any reforms for the simple reason that it is universal and timeless. Besides, the concept 'revival' appeared in Qur'an together with 'islah' which is often understood as 'reform'. But 'islah' in Arabic has no relation whatsoever with 'reform' since the former means betterment and purification whereas the latter stands for forming again, regenerating, and rectifying. The term 'islah' could have been very stimulating had it not been extensively used in the modern Islamic discourse and frequently associated with specific political movements.

The next term 'tajdid' which literally means 'renewal' is also highly frequent in reports of the sayings of prophet Muhammed peace be upon him. Nevertheless, the centurial renewal of religion for the Muslim community, as previously mentioned, doesnot imply change in the fundamentals of Islam. It is rather the renewal of the way

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[5]Sunnah is the way of life prescribed as normative for Muslims on the basis of the teachings and practices of Islamic prophet Muhammad and interpretations of the Qur'an.
[6]Islamic Scholars

religion should be understood and implemented. In fact, Islam has been perfect in all places and times. It is valid to the end of life, or there is no end to its validity.

Indeed, the term has become commonly used in the contemporary Islamic thought. Along with the changes that the Arab scene has witnessed recently, the rise of so many political leaders and parties holding slogans of 'islah' and 'tajdid', Islamic councils have focused on the importance of the term and launched forums to establish a clear definition for it. In spite of this, the term still lacks sufficient academic research, and thus it remains ambivalent though it has first been included in the edicts of the Holy Prophet Muhammad which have validity till the end of mankind. In fact, most of the literature on Islam lacks a historical approach because it tends to shed light on the current Islamic resurgence.

Some of the Sunna enemies deny the very existence of an edict informing about a centurial 'mudjaddid' on the ground that it is a fact which disagrees with both the Qur'an and the mind. First, Islamic religion is unchanged and in no need for any renewal. Second, it is not the function of Islam to suit modernity; and if it happens, we will be obliged to bring changes for every new period and condition of life. In other words, religion will be equaled to a man-made belief and loses divinity. Conversely, the truth of the prophet's hadith is unquestionable as it was reported by a great number of ulama and imams such as Mohammad ibn Chihab al-Zohri, Alhakem, Albayhaqi, Al-Nawawi, Ibn Kathir, Al-Dahabi, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Al-Soyoti, Ibn Hodjr, and so forth. Furthermore, the renewal of the religious matter is the primary aim of Shariah; it means neither the ignorance of its principles nor their alteration. It is rather the revival of what has been abandoned or forgotten through the revitalization of attachment to it. It is the return of Muslims to their Creator, His book, and the Law revealed through the Holy Prophet Muhammad. It is sticking to the Sunnah, and fighting all newly introduced matters (bida'as) is also the way to achieve that. Here are some examples to prove this point.The prophet said,

> …So, follow my sunnah and the sunnah of the rightly guided Khalifas who come after me, hold on tight to it, and beware of the newly introduced matters, as every newly introduced matter is Bida'a". Al-Boukhari, Ibn Maja, Ahmad and Al-Darmie. And he said, "The best of my Ummah is my generation, then the one that

follows, then the one that follows them". (Al-Boukhari, Muslim, Al-Termizie and Al-Nisaey).

On the whole, any attempt to elucidate the concept 'tajdid' will not exceed the limits of three definitions. Initially, it is synonymous to 'ihia' which stands for the revival of what has been weakened or rejected in face of the great worldly challenges. This definition was the first of what was mentioned in and compatible with all explanations of the noble Sunna, and it was according to this that Omar Ibn Abd al-Aziz was often described as the revivalist of the first century and the first leader of the revitalization of Islamic Caliphate. Secondly, it signifies the denial of untrue statements attributed to the prophet peace be upon him. In other words, it is the teaching of Sunna and the rejection of the beliefs of emergent groups and communities except the people of sunna and Jama'a– such as the Sufis. Thirdly, it is innovation or what we call 'ijtihad' in Arabic. Scholars did not mean the larger sense of the word, though. They rather meant the religious knowledge of a 'Madhab' which is the school of thought of a particular mujtahid Imam, such as Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafi'i, and Ahmad. The latter caused the revival of religion to shrink into the revival of madhab, each community of madhab followers considered their imam as the mudjaddid or revivalist of his epoch, and such kind of controversies which began in the third century still prevails in the contemporary times.

Since the argument is still what to call Islamic revival, it is of utmost importance to recognize and eliminate all what is not Islamic Revival. Westerners have coined terms which show no reference to Islam except their unwillingness to see the revival as a return to make Islam vibrant once again. Revival could have retained only the name 'Islamic revival', but many designations have been attributed to it, namely radical Islam, militant Islam, fundamentalist Islam, political Islam, Islamism, al Qaedism, Bin Ladenism, extremism, and fanaticism. Some people tend to think that a revival of Islam is a call to jihad; hence, there must be a war on Islam. The first thought to run through their minds is that Muslims are trying to confuse the infidels, shield Islam from criticism, and establish a worldwide domination. The term Political Islam has also been put in the headlines, was considered to « be an oxymoron, since nowhere in the Muslim world have politics been separated from religion », and the ground was that « …the actions of Muslims will affect

the Western choice of terms … » (Kramer 5). Paradoxically, much talk and debate over terminology might be that the revival of Islam is a preeminent issue. A kid's name can tell us something about his parents — their race, social standing, even their politics. But many given names either spoil the child, or it reflects his richer and exceptional aspects. Similarly, this word-game will either obscure the action of this movement, or it may arouse interest and enthusiasm in it. Moreover, the shift in preferences lay in the reason that it was a challenging task to stop at one appropriate term under the pressure of media coverage, current events, and growing revival. But Muslims have the firm belief that « They want to extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths, but Allah will perfect His light, although the disbelievers dislike it. » (Qur'an 61:8) On the whole, Islam is undergoing a revival; so, the true nature of Islam is peeping out all over.

2. Theories of Religious Revival

Most historians concerned with religious revivals linked their emergence with political, social and economic trends. The European nations, for instance, have understood that a solution to their critical situation lies in their past –either in a return to race or religion. The rise of Nazism in Germany may explain the former while the latter appeared as a type of support to the Western consciousness in its final stage. In other words, religious revival in the west is an attempt to find a new beginning if not a return to the old beginning as it is a reaction to both the end and failure of modern times. Another case is the East when the loss of human rights and liberties along with the beginning of the Soviet Union's collapse resulted in the evolution of nationalism for the persecuted peoples and the Islamic revival in Asia Minor. Eastern Europe can be put under the same rule because the Serbs and Croats clung to race, and the other countries – especially the Balkans – held on tightly to the revival of Islam. Bosnia and Herzegovina were the most noticeable cases. Religious and cultural revival through art, literature and many other lifestyles in order to dignify the Asian personality was the means by which Japanese and Coreans guaranteed their economic development. The revival of Budhism and Hinduism

in countries like Vietnam, Tailand, and India emerged in defence of national independence against Western colonialism and local despotism.

What the prophecies reveal about the time of the end is often cited to comfort the adherents of both Islam and Christianity regardless of what is taking place in their modern world. The ultimate resurgence of Islam, for instance, is believed to lie in the promised advent of Christ, Son of Mary, and in the appearance of the promised reformer and Imam Mahdi. Most sects of Islam insist on a literal fulfillment of these prophecies while some others –the Ahmadia Community in particular – consider them as allegorical expressions. God's answer to the world's twenty-first century problems, according to Christians, lies in the return of Jesus Christ from Jerusalem, "And the nations were angry…" declares Revelation (11:18). The world will seek to destroy Jesus Christ—whom they will regard, falsely, as the antichrist. Instead of fighting each other, the kings of the earth will put aside their differences to "make war with the Lamb" (Rev17:14). But Christ will bring judgement, war against and conquer a power called "*Babylon the Great*".

In view of the current importance of religion as a political and social phenomenon, however, many scholars attempted to give a reasonable explanation to the topic of religiosity. Most of the time political tension contributes to the rise of a religious revival. The outbreak of cholera in 1832 and the debate over its causation proposed the scientific idea of contagion, but it wasconfused and interrelated with religion, piety, and sin. Most New Yorkers believed cholera was some form of righteous consequence which afflicted those who were least likely to be in God's grace.Chartism also reflected that link between politics and religion in the nineteenth century. Chartism used religious language and gained the support of religious leadersdepression.In the early 1840s, Chartist churches, where relevant verses and 'Christian Chartism' was taught began to open. « A religious service was held on Sunday, the Charter Association met on Monday, the Chartist Total Abstinence Society (teetotallers) gathered on Tuesday, and on Wednesday there was chartist singing practice… » (Martin 169) Hence, Chartism was a religious way of life. Revivals can also be born out of a bad economy.The Great Depression is thought of having sparked a religious revival when the bottom fell out in Wall Street. But because the movements of religious vitality challenge dominant social orders and seem to be

natural results of human processes of cultural change, most of the researches were carried from sociological and anthropological perspectives.

The patterns of revival differ from religion to another. European secularism, for example, is explained by the separation of church and state, the establishment of civil legal systems and the freedom of religious beliefs especially within the private spheres. In Islam, by contrast there is neither a distinction between state and religion nor between public and private spheres. As for the public dimensions of revivals, they can range from prayer and meditation to ascetic practices, and physical or military training. But revivalism in general is thought to be a natural outcome of human processes of cultural change. In case the society members do not embrace change relishly, they will burst violently. The dynamics of revivalism are usually tied to internal reasons as well as external factors. Internally, the blame of the discursive group is laid on its own decline. Externally, it is laid on the other who is often described as an oppressor. Although secular concerns may dominate, religious belief, personal piety and righteous society are sought.

During periods of economic, social and political discontent, everyone will seek remedy in religion because it promises happiness for the eternal life and dignity for the one of the time being. The more extreme the tension, the more enthusiastic the people are to join and respond. On several occasions and under pressure of social decay and political weakness, the message of revivalists can be what the prophecies stated: the expectation of the Last Day and of the appearance of the Mahdi in Islam and of the Messiah in Christianity. Waiting for the saviour or the Mahdi will give people comfort. Whoever may take the title of renewer, which is for sure more convenient as it is not imbued with a sense of revelation, his claims will be sound if there grows up around him a great number of men. Bringing his people back to the right path, bringing in justice and equality, the restoration of the true religion of the early days are the very things he stresses. A remark fundamental to this research is that it may be difficult to determine who evokes the other. The coincidence of the availability of religious renewer whenever there is a reason for protest was repeated throughout history, yet it is not clear if conditions called the leaders or leaders are always there to intervene. But the latter is less dependable because we seldom meet a successor who is as charismatic as the renewer. By contrast, very often the leader who follows the founder of a revival movement only continues the regime already

in practice. By doing that he will allow for another cycle that usually starts with stability and ends up in turmoil.

In spite of the great deal of analytical ideas about religion, its manifestations and its leaders, much of the theoretical work on it has made no advances of major importance. But for the understanding of any theory of religion, the analytic themes of Western transcendent figures such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Freud and Malinowski are inevitable. Long before secularism took root, the founders of sociology believed that religion is an illusion. However, « The advocates of different faiths may be wholly persuaded of the validity of the beliefs they hold and the rituals in which they participate. Yet, the very diversity of religions and their obvious connections to different types of society, the three thinkers [Marx, Durkheim, Weber] held, make these claims inherently implausible » (Giddens 441)

Durkheim's definition of religion in his book 'The Elementary Forms of Religious Life' « as a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, set apart and forbidden- beliefs and practices that unite into a single moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them » (Durkheim47*). Religion is seen, therefore, as a critical element within social systems as it provides control. In Durkheimian thought, the sacred is specified to be superior over the profane and of an energetic form. It is also a source of vitality and confidence. His findings were that religion was social, and «religious representations are collective representations which express collective realities ; the rites are a manner of acting which take rise in the midst of assembled groups and which are destined to excite, maintain or recreate certain mental states in these groups » (10)

Durkheim aimed at identifying some religious beliefs, which are common across many cultures such as the sacred objects or behaviours. His sociology of religion begins from the dichotomy – the sacred and the profane behaviours. The sacred can not survive and be of concern without the profane. For instance, the Catholic Church respects the Crucifix while other objects are not. The same can be applied for sacred cows that are allowed to wander wherever they like in Hinduism. Serpents, tigers and dragons are also divine animals. The healing rituals performed by the Shamans do also prove that notion.

He says, « Sacred things are simply collective ideals that have fixed themselves on material objects ». (335)

Marxism had tended to ignore religion assuming that it would eventually disappear while Marx, himself, defined religion as the opium of the people. This is a rich metaphor because more than one meaning can be compressed into its message. He may have thought about it as a pain relief, reality distortion substance, or an element in which people seek solace. And in the context of the middle nineteenth century Europe, several other connotations can be suggested: a medicine, a source of enormous profit, a source of protest and rebellion, a source of utopian visions.

Religion has a central role in the individual's life and one of the cyclical theories which assert this quality in religion is the one articulated by Pitirim A. Sorokin[7]. He believes that civilizations rise after a period of chaos, and a set of spiritual beliefs gives it power. In other words, civilizations flourish simultaneously with the development of a religious tradition. Culture which is related to people's ideas, emotions, images and views of the nature of reality will grow and succeed. Gradually, spiritual ideas will give way to sensual and physical aims. This marks a metamorphosis from a state of being ideational to sensate. Later, sensate civilizations are likely to crash and a new period of intense cultural clash will be born. This transitional phase is more often than not bloody. Probably, civilizations do not rise together; the rise of one paves the way to the decline of the other. European Christian culture, which is seemingly in the sensate level now, is collapsing. The rise of the Islamic tide suggests that it would cause widespread revival and clashes because Muslims are at the search of their *« ideational culture »* (Sorokin)

Max Weber's sociology of religion aimed at building models of religious leadership and organization, and most of his generalizations about religion were related to social strata. In other words, he researched which classes are likely to develop religious culture and which not – from aristocratic warriors, passing by craftsmen and proletaroid intellectuals, down to slaves.

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[7]Pitirim Alexandrovitch Sorokin was (born Jan. 21, 1889, Turya, Russia—died Feb. 10, 1968, Winchester, Mass., U.S.), A Russian-American sociologist who founded the department of sociology at Harvard University in 1930. In the history of sociological theory, he is important for distinguishing two kinds of sociocultural systems: "sensate" (empirical, dependent on and encouraging natural sciences) and "ideational" (mystical, anti-intellectual, dependent on authority and faith).

His thesis of the Protestant Ethic and the spirit of Capitalism explains the birth of modern Western rational capitalism thanks to a motivating Calvinist Puritan spirit or ethos. But it also sees that the Islamic ethos is its opposite. This implies, first, that religion causes a society's development, and; second that Islam is not a religion of modernity. Weber argued that Islam is not a salvation religion, too. His claims that the Islamic institutions were incompatible with capitalism because they had been dominated by a long history of patrimonialism, and that Islam has 'a feudal ethic' are wrong because Islam, at its outset, was urban, commercial and literate. Muhammad's own tribe, the Quraysh, had achieved a dominant political position based on their commercial strength and were strategically situated between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Qur'an itself mentions the two yearly commercial trips of Quraysh. There has also been a constant conflict between Bedouins of the desert and the urban pious people of the town.

The British social anthropologist and a follower of Weber, Ernest Gellner, argued that Christianity had a history of separating religion and state. Therefore, it helped Europe to secularize. By contrast, Islam had a long history of interrelated religion and politics which made it more fundamentalist. Yet, another Weberian and Post Modernist philosopher, Michel Foucault, saw Khomeini's revolution as a religious triumph over modernist secularism

In this way, the Critical theory of religion articulated by Karl Marx, Max Weber and Sigmund Freud provides not only an alternative to mainstream sociological approaches of religion, but also sides with the forces of enlightenment and modernity against traditionalism and fundamentalism.

Secularization theory suggests that as society advances in modernity, it will become secular and religion retreats. Owing to the intellectual and scientific developments, religion is getting more and hollower. In fact, as early as the seventeenth century, expectations of great scholars that religion will be on a steady decline were based on the enlightenment. But the world is not secularizing evenly. The USA still has a very high rate of religiosity, the United Kingdom is in danger of Islamization, the developing world in general is highly religious, some sections of society within secular countries are surprisingly pious, new religious movements are growing, and some Muslim countries are still religiously vital notwithstanding the adoption of modernism in some facets.

Bryan Wilson's definition of secularism as « that process by which religious institutions, actions and consciousness lose their social significance » (Wilson 73) proved wrong.

The attempt to theorize religion or its revival movements are but two faces of the same coin. The theory of revitalization movements by the Canadian American anthropologist specialized in Native American culture shapes much of the understanding of the modern era's processes of change in religious and political organizations. His research was based on the Iroquois revitalization movement led by Seneca, a religious revivalist and said to be prophet popular as Handsome Lake. He saw the leader just like those who contributed to the rise of Christianity, Islam or Buddhism, and considers his biographical study as not less important than his preaching.

In his theory, religious revivals are considered as types of revitalization movements that aspire to set up a more satisfying life system because most of the time revitalization is attributed to distortion which in turn is the consequence of individual stress or loss of identity of all members of the movement preceded by a steady state of hopelessness. As a religious anthropologist, he conceives that these movements appear during times of stress and suffering, a return to Christ is the way to resist evil; or else they occur because of disillusionment and disappointment with the already existing beliefs. In both cases, these movements are processes of stress reduction by means of some other new systems.

Wallace researched the Iroquois Indians in two movements. The first one focused on Hiacuatha, an outsider who was depressed after his wife and family had died. It was said God visited him in a moment of moral rebirth to assign him a mission. He started by the unification of the five tribes of the Iroquois and the prohibition of blood disputes. His prophetic message achieved the tribe's military and economic development during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the late eighteenth century, the second movement happened among the Iroquois who were living a state of cultural demoralization until Handsome Lake came and drew on pre-existing religious traditions. He warned the Iroquois to stop alcohol, witchcraft, love of magic, abortifractants, old maternal lineage and quarrelling. He pushed them to follow white practices without forgetting their own identity.

Wallace's analysis is not very different from Victor Turner's structure of social dramas. Turner studied rituals and social change, and viewed that all rituals contained

religious or spiritual components. In Turner's sense, religious revivals are liminal because their participants undergo special rituals in the transitional phase of a rite of passage. His account is shaped to some extent by the ethnographer Arnold Van Gennep whose work'Les Rites de Passage'was another attempt to theorize that civilizations are arranged on a scale. Their social customs are related to their earlier sacred stage such as Baptism, circumcision, a pilgrim's journey and so forth. For a group to pass from a culture or civilization to another, this requires rituals or rites of passage which are series of three interconnected phases:

In the first phase the individual undergoes a separation from existing social conditions and follows a new path into the world, which in turn leads to a new self-identity in relation to changing social conditions. The second phase is Van Guennep's liminal stage, which is marked by passage into a broader zone. It is in the liminal stage that the most extensive transformation takes place …. The final phase of the rite of passage brings about reintegration, above all as a new group integrates the experiences of the broader zone (Bahman 68).

In another anthropologist approach to religion, Geertz in his theory of religion as a cultural system argues that religion formulates conceptions of *« a general order of existence »* (Geertz 90). Hence, if this order tends to change overtime, the meaning of life will also change, which is not reasonable.

Not only in the West, but through much of Asia and in the Muslim world in general there always exists a religious revival which is nowhere unassociated with outbursts of world protest. However, the several changes in the sphere of religion mainly in the West mean that religion develops and experiences a state of evolution. This is what explains why a lot of people are talking about archaic religious actions and modern religious situations. « The historic religions discovered the self, the early modern religions found a doctrinal basis on which to accept the selfin all its empirical ambiguity ; modern is beginning to understand the laws of the self's own existence and so to help man take responsibility for his own fate » (Kunin 311).

Most of the attempts to define religion and its revitalization movements have their roots in the Western Christian worldview, and for this reason judgement remains narrow. For instance, the attempt of Durkheim to make universal claim about religion was by

focusing on the Western view of religion and building upon sociological typologies. But George Bernard Shaw once stated that « there is only one religion, though there are hundreds of versions of it » (Livingstone, ''Anatomy of the sacred'' 4) annihilating in this way Durkheim's dichotomy. This point of view is shared by the Islamic perspective, too. Most importantly, the idea that religious beliefs fully explain cultural practices is mistaken. Similarly, neither is belief equivalent to total identity, nor is the determination of belief more important than the determination of the object of belief. The Western views of religion as a separate sphere of life and the ritual dimension of religion along with myth as key aspects to understanding religion have become pervasive. Durkheim's sacred – profane distinction is not universal as he claimed and many societies have no conception as such. Furthermore, ritual which refers to worship (ibadah in Islam) is the external manifestation of the individual stimulated by an internal intention and enthusiasm. Hence, if this invisible internal positive energy leads its bearer to act religiously, it is then the sacred, not the profane which represents the interests of the individual in Durkheim's theory. Also the performance of a ritual eliminates the separateness of the divine and the profane because constant dhikr, instead of maintaining the separation, it makes the person who remembers Allah nearer to Him. In this way, religion in Islam is a system which covers all spheres of life and thought where everything is sacred, but Allah is the most divine and uncreated creator.

Modern Christian revival is not the only attraction for analytical schemes of theorists. The Islamic movement is much more important for its diversity. The extreme diversity of Islamic activism challenges theorizing efforts. First, Islamic revival is a subject. Popular Islam is another, and political Islam is something else. Modern Islamic activism was concentrated in three levels – national, local and individual.

Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it became clear that the golden age of the Muslim world was counting its last days. Wealth, independence, piety and military strength were giving way to the industrialized rising Western world. To meet the requirements of modernity, resist Westerners and to guide the umma back to the right path, there had been a man more sensitive to the moral decay of the government in the Middle East and their societies likewise – Jamal Eddine Al-Afghani. His movement was soon widespread and his efforts were threefold: renewal of personal religious piety,

reform and modernization of Islamic law, and resistance of European imperialism and Westernization.

Al-Afghani's Pan Islamism inspired many of his followers to manifest a remarkable variety of revivalist movements. Muhammad Abduh, his Egyptian disciple, was one of his successors who were impelled to render Islam more applicable to modernism. Muhammad Hussayn Haykal, another social reformer from Egypt, and the Indian poet, Sir Muhammad Iqbal warned against blind pursuit of westernization. Hassan Al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic movement which toppled the Shah of Iran in the 1978-9 revolution and the ongoing dialectic between secularism and Islam are testimony of the Islamic upsurge and persistence as a challenging faith in the modern era. For the most part, Islamic revival's purposes have been concentrated « in the nonstate realm, in the religio-civil community, and in personal piety » (Lapidus 23).

3. Islam and the West

'Islam and the West' is an expression we often come across when we debate any historical, political, theological, anthropological, sociological, or geopolitical issue. Though the terms are asymmetrical, their recurrent association made them appear natural. This expression gained much fame after it became title of books, theses, academic articles, lectures and TV programs. The first part is a religion while the second is a geographical or cultural entity, the world of people who are not Muslims and not even Arabs. It might be more appropriate to say Islam and Christendom, or the East and the West. Raising the question of asymmetry allows one to ask why Islam is often the first in position. We never say the west and Islam. So, it is not an order at random. Several interpretations may be given, but none of them will state that Islam is taken for its literal meaning. It is viewed as a complicated abstract concept, a word loaded with an infinite number of connotations, a faith whose context spans not only mere epochs, but the whole world history. The point of departure is to consider where the overwhelming ideological onslaught of the West stems from.

Islam shares a historical and theological background with Christianity, for both are monotheistic faiths deriving from Judaism and Zoroastrianism. Throughout history, it was a peaceful system embracing diversity, unity, inclusion and co-existence. Yet, with respect to the literature on Islam and the Christian world in the West, too much misunderstanding and misconception are revealed. After the end of the Cold War, a hysterical fear of the revivalist movement of Islamic tradition, principles and rituals erupted into the world's political scene. It has drawn a great deal of media coverage; by then, the world underwent its last and current division- Islam and the West. This new antagonism was overestimated to have « many different layers and is overdetermined by a series of binary oppositions: reason vs. dogma, democracy vs. despotism, civilization vs. medievalism, modernity vs. tradition, and so on » (Mutman 165).

Indeed, Islam has been unfairly targeted as a source of global dissonance only by the end of the twentieth century. But for a fair understanding, this new antagonism should be located historically.

The Historical View

In the wake of the Islamic march of expansion beyond the Arabian Peninsula, and despite original Jewish and Christian resistance to Mohammed's claim of prophecy in Macca from 612, many Jewish and Christian communities that came under the rule of Islam were on the whole provided protection,and allowed to live free of any religious persecution. This is to indicate that a remarkable degree of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and tolerance prevailed in the Islamic world at least in the first five centuries of its growth.

However, the examination of Islam-west relations over the centuries should go back at least as earlier as the Crusades which were launched first in 1095. The Crusades were waves of religious fanaticism that swept across Europe during the time of Medieval England, prompted by calls for aid from the crambling Eastern Roman Empire against the Muslims of the Middle East. Under the Chairmanship of Pope Urban II, and with « the twin aims of freing Christians from the yoke of the Islamic rule and liberating the tomb of

Christ, the holy sepulchre in Jerusalem, from Muslim control » (The Oxford History of the Crusades) an assembly of people mostly from the countryside and soldiers were pulled by preaching to take vows and receive indulgences. These campaigns were not only considered holy wars, but also likened to pilgrimage.

The first Crusade was launched when the Byzantine Emperor Alexius Comnesus requested help to win back the territory conquered by the Seljuk Turks. At the council of Clermont, central France, the Pope called out, « whoever for devotion alone, but not to gain honour or money, goes to Jerusalem to liberate the church of God can substitute this journey for all penance » (Somerville 74). At an age of intense religiosity, this armed 'Pilgrimage' achieved its goal with the capture of Jerusalem in 1099, and slaughtered hundreds of men, women, and children in this victorious entrance.

> The Crusaders were spectacularly severe in capturing Jerusalem in 1100. They not only brutalized and humiliated the Arab Muslim citizens of Jerusalem, but also made the Jewish inhabitants of the city suffer to the extent that many of them felt they had more to fear from the Christians than from their traditional Muslim rulers. Although the Muslims eventually dislodged the Crusaders, the whole incident changed the favorable view that Muslims had held so far of Christians, and many Muslims remained wary of them for a long time to come. Even so this still did not lead to any assault by Muslims on Christianity which they continued to respect as a religion of the Book sanctioned by the Qur'an (Saikal 32).

After a period of relative peace in which Christians and Muslims co-existed in the Holy Land, another Crusade was preached by St. Bernard of Clairvaux and led by King Louis VII of France and king Conrad of Germany. Large armies marched to Constantinople to recover the city of Edessa and secure the Pilgrim Pass. Despite some success in the Mediterranean namely the acquisition of Lisbon and other small settlements, this Crusade was a failure and the first real sign of the decay of the crusader states in the Middle East because after their defeat, Jerusalem was weakly protected. In 1187, a very powerful adversary and an excellent military leader recaptured Jerusalem. This resulted in a call for a third Crusade forty years later, preached by Pope Gregory and led by Europe's most important leaders – Philip II of France, Richard I of England and Frederick I, the holy Roman Emperor. None of the kings could defeat Saladin.

Nevertheless, the English proved superior thanks to the Knights Templar[8]and the Hospitallers. Consequently, Richard could make Saladin sign a treaty where Jerusalem would remain under Muslim control, but also unarmed Christian Pilgrims would enter the city. The failure to reconquer the Holy Land led to the fourth Crusade which was a series of conflicts and battles with the primary aim of conquering Jerusalem, but it did not occur. The capture and looting of Constantinople in 1204 marked the end of the fourth Crusade. The remainder of the thirteenth century witnessed a variety of Crusades which aimed not only at recovering Jerusalem for which their hopes had been hurt several times, but also at combating any of those seen as enemies of Christianity. To illustrate, the Albigensian Crusade wanted to remove the heretical Cathari sect of Christianity in France while in the Baltic Crusades, attempts to Christanize the pagans of Transylvania were made. Through the end of the thirteenth century, the Crusades became short-lived raids which would end forever after nearly two centuries.

With President George W. Bush using the word Crusade in addressing the nation on his return to the White House on September 16th, 2001 (See Appendix I), he cast himself a crusader, « This Crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while » (BBC News), and injected a religious element into America's responsibility to history. Many prominent figures have fingered the Crusades as the root cause of the present conflict, so they considered the use of the word 'Crusade' most unfortunate because it recalls brutal and unprovoked attacks against a sophisticate and tolerant Muslim nation. In fact, the great historian of the Crusades, Steven Ranciman, denounced the Crusades and stated that they are « one long act of intolerance in the name of God which is the sin against the Holy Ghost » (Tyerman10).

Furthermore, the sort of language on the president lips generated confusion between politics and religion, could easily sway moderate Muslim opinion against America, and could also undermine support for Washington. All in all, the crusades were initiated by religious fanatics whose presence is real in the west as well as in the Islamic world, but « the continued broad-based support for the Crusades depended far more on the self-image of a society that commanded the loyalties of people than on fanatical zeal »

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[8]Members of the Poor Knights of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon, a religious military order of knighthood established at the time of the Crusades that became a model and inspiration for other military orders. Originally founded to protect Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land.

(Powel. 663-669).Though the Crusades were wars between Christendom and Islam, the Muslims « regarded the Crusaders less as the representatives of Christendom than hordes of barbaric franks who dared to threaten the abode of Islam » (Akhavi 550).

Despite the failure of the Crusades, militant Western Christianity persisted in Spain under the label of « The Reconquista ». This effort purged the territory of Muslims who had arrived there in the beginning of the eighth century. Columbus sailed across the Atlantic to find a new way from Europe to Asia, and discovered America in 1492. In the same year, the last Arab Islamic presence in the West – the Kingdom of Grenada – fell. This defeat along with the treaty of Karlofca in 1699, and later the treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarca in 1774 marked the final retreat of Islam from the West.

The wars between Christian and Muslim empires lasted intermittently from the seventh century until World War I, and, to a degree, continue to the present in the Balkans, East Africa, Caucasus, East Indies, and the Middle East. But Muslim-Western encounters had not always been devastating and antagonistic. For instance, the soldiers who participated in the Crusades had realized one major fact: Eastern civilization was far more advanced than its Western counterpart. Its technology and culture outstripped feudal life west of the Byzantine Empire. Unlike Muslims who were aware of the value of learning since their faith tells them to « seek knowledge, even unto china », their Roman counterparts ignored such matters and persecuted thinkers – particularly the Greek who migrated to parts of the Islamic world where they were welcome. With this in mind, the Islamic scene had witnessed a rich cultural interaction. Philosophy flourished: Al-kindi and Al-Farabi made achievements and influenced Jewish philosophy whereas Ibn Rushd significantly influenced both Christian and Jewish thinkers, and had his works translated into Hebrew and Latin.

> During the high Middle Ages, the works of Aristotle, which represent the ancient foundations of Western scientific development, were made available to European scholars through the translations and commentaries of Arab and Arab-Jewish philosophers such as Avicenna (Ibn Sina / 980–1037), Averroes (Ibn Ruschd / 1126–1198) and Maimonides (Moshe Ben Maimun / 1135–1204) (Hafez 4).

Europeans began to import these concepts into their own native lands. They were able to use their newly found experience and knowledge of the Mediterranean, and the

Chinese technology such as gunpowder, silk, and printing which filtered in from traders, adventurers, and scholars. In the Mediterranean, Europeans encountered writings of the ancient world that had been lost in Europe, and acquired a taste for new foods and flavors as well. During the most prosperous years of the Ottoman Empire, tolerance with merchants and diplomats was reflected in the agreements signed to permit them live in peace. Though Ibn Taymia warned of an Islamic decline as early as the 14th century, his advice went in one ear and out the other. Later on, the age of exploration together with mercantilism deprived the Ottoman Empire of its fiscal and commercial privileges. When it became clear it is no time to idealize the Golden Age and the greatness of the Islamic Empire, European scholars started to criticize Arabic philosophy and Islamic theology – though just like the Renaissance in Europe had been a natural result of the scientific achievements of the Islamic Orient, there came a time when modern Islamic world would be deeply influenced by Western ideas and thoughts. In this respect, Akhavi states that:

> Beginning with the second siege of Vienna in 1683, the Empire entered into a long period of decline and European domination that ended only in 1923. The theoretical and actual separation of church and state in the West, sparked by the Cartesian epistemological revolution, greatly influenced the West's ascendency.Without the triumph of Cartesian radical rationalism; the disembedding of church and state and the scientific and industrial revolutions could probably not have occurred. It is, of course, highly symptomatic that by the time of empiricist and rationalist thinkers such as Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), European scholars had lost their interest in Muslim philosophy (Akhavi 552).

The decline of the Islamic Empire and its continuous period of stagnation facilitated the adoption of new European notions such as *'border'*, 'nation *state'*, and many other political ideas which were occasioned by the French Revolution. After Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, which some historians preferred to call an expedition owing to the process of modernisation that it triggered, the first perceptions that Napoleon and his friends represented a Christian European Crusader threatening Islam were noticed by later generations. By and large, the spread of communications and the subsequent European military and political intrusions into the decaying Ottoman Empire led to a

political transition of the Arab provinces under one political and religious entity to individual states. Initially, Muslim rulers had been persuaded of the advantage of Western patterns of modernization and, most importantly, that their religious and cultural identity would be preserved. However, it soon became clear reforms would cause Muslims to undo the Shari'à, and abandon the execution of some of God's commands. Hence, organised Islamic movements and parties began to call for al-Islam din wa-daula, i.e. the union of religion and state in fear of secularism. Islamic modernism became a real fact but put under control through an open peaceful dialogue with the West led by a great reform movement known as *'Salafyya'*.

From the late eighteenth century, the Western powers (the French, Spanish, Italians and British) partitioned different parts of the weakening Ottoman Empire : North Africa, the Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central, South and Southeast Asia fell one after another to colonial domination and cultural suppression. Thecolonial subjugation of the Arab domain and many other parts of the Muslim world reinforced among the Muslims the residue left by the Crusades.

Overseas rule gave birth to national movements organized in secular terms and soon became the primary engine to liberation. Religious movements, such as Pan-Islamism, attracted a great deal of people, but were more ideological than pragmatic, as pointed out by Bruce Lawrence: "Throughout the twentieth century links among Muslims of different races, regions, and languages remain more rhetorical than pragmatic, signaling a loose affinity of faith, not an actual alliance of forces, whether military or political or both" (24). Furthermore, Islam was no longer considered as the organizational force for any socio-political change. Muslim identity was superceded by national identity, and this is clear in the words of Abduh quoted by Bruce, "What had begun as an attempt to protect Islam by reinterpreting it tended to end as a discussion of the possibility of creating a secular society with nationalism as its animating principle, and with Islam as its inherited culture rather than a guide to social action" (24). Besides the fact that Islam became a symbolic resource during the colonial period because the colonial experience rather than the faith was considered as the force which united Muslims, it also made relevance only in reference to European non-Muslim colonizers. This subordination and victimization of Islam, which in this way appears to be beyond violence, remained until

the increased integration of world societies as a result of enhanced communications, media, travel, and migration makes meaningful the concept of a single Islam practiced everywhere in similar ways, an Islam which transcends national and ethnic customs, and an Islam which is a vital power not a label.

It is depressing that misunderstandings between Islam and the West should persist though it was not the case with any other religion or race. For example, there has been a lot of hostility towards Jews for quite some time, and some events need to be discussed to understand where the hostility stems from. During the Middles Ages (7th-15th centuries) the Christians blamed the Jews for Jesus Christ's death. In the 13th century, England was the first country to expel Jewish people for what many thought they did, kill Jesus. Later, France kicked the Jews out of their country as the English had done. Later during the 15th century, Spain and Portugal grew hostile towards Jews. A lot of the hostility from other countries came from the fact that Jews believed in things different from Christians and Muslims. Jews were, for a majority of the time, forced to pay expensive duties, wear special clothing to be more noticed, and were even abandoned in horrible living conditions such as ghettos. It is still contradictory that « the Jews exemplified a rejection of Jesus, yet they were living in the midst of Christians » (Cohen)*,* and there is no media coverage or prints on Judaism and the West. What is wrong with Islam, then?

All in all, Muslims were first excluded from history leaving the ground to the Christian West to shape the world. But this was not enough; the next step was to exploit and deceive them with the rhetorics of civilizing mission and liberal democracy, and later they determined their destinies by implementing pro-European policies. Current practices and rules are shaped by a process of acculteration through political, economic and even linguistic expansion. Eventually, the antagonism between Islam and the west is by no means supported by history.

The Theological View

Among non-Muslims and among Muslims themselves, very little is known about Islambecause it has become common in the modern world to profess a religion in ways that are not orthodox. Orthodoxy, in fact, stands for religious fundamentalism, and

showing one's complete faith to the tenets of his religion. Though orthodoxy is synonymous to fundamentalism, the latter has come to be a pejorative term, exclusive to Islam. This is mainly generated by the writings of some Christian evangelicalsand orthodox Jews to support their thesis that Islam and the West are on a collision. They associate Islam with acts of violence and terrorism, and they speak about Islam, militance and international threats in the same breath. In effect, Islam is both misunderstood and unrecognized. Muslims have now realized what, centuries ago, their prophet informed them on how « Islam began as a stranger, and will revert again to the condition of being stranger. Blessed are the strangers (aḥīḥ Muslim 145).

This relationship of rivalry shaped by Western policy makers and influential scholars deepens the degree of misunderstanding which remains terribly high. It ignores the fact that both Christianity and Islam are monotheistic faiths which trace their roots to Abraham and embrace a common concept of god and his attributes. In Islam as in Christianity and Judaism, the creator of the universe is God who is sovereign in the lives of his creatures. On the five pillars of Islamic belief: the belief in God, angels, the prophets, the sacred books, and the Day of Judgment, there is no basic disagreement.

Islam represents more than a faith for Muslims; it is their world. The main feature of the universality of Islam is the oneness of Gos (tawhid). Christians, however, define the one God in three persons and take one prophet and one book fewer than in Islam. Nonethless, they share many key values in common: respect for knowledge, peace, compassion towards the poor, mercy and modesty. Justice, which is akin to Christianity, is a Qur'anic precept. « Be just - that is closer to piety » (7:8). To Muslims, respecting all god's apostles and revealed books that came before their prophet and the Qur'an is an obligation. They must treat the followers of these religions who are under their rule equally. But they must embrace Islam as final. In the Qur'an the Prophet of Islam is told to inform *"the people of the Book"* (Jews, Christians, and others with a sacred scripture): "Come to a common principle between us and you: That we worship none but God; that we associate no equals with him; that we erect not, from among ourselves, Lords and patrons other than God."(3:64). Like the other religions, much value is given to human life in Islam. After the first human death and murder in history (the two sons of Adam, one of whom, Qabil, murdered the other, Habil), God prohibited the killing of a human

being. In the Qur`an killing or saving a single person is like killing or saving the whole humankind and not just the tribe or race descending from him as stated in some passages of the Talmud. Now every man knows that who is empowered to give and take life is only God. Both Christianity and Islam believe in the afterlife when people will be judged and sent either to hell or paradise. Still, however, many authors see that Islam is unique in its conception of religion. In respect to this, Waardenburg claims,

> This is what may be called an Islamic 'theological' vision of religion itself, which contains the principal elements of an Islamic 'theology of religions'. There is one God, whom human beings have to become conscious of, to whom they should surrender, and whose will is that they obey the religious prescriptions. There is one fundamental Revelation that is contained in its linguistically pure form in the Qur'ân. And there is one monotheistic Religion that is, beyond empirical Islam, the primordial and eternal Islam, radically opposed to all forms of idolatry or 'associationism' and to all forms of disobedience to the basic rules of religion (165).

To materialize God's commands, many Muslims affirm the unity of God and Muhammad's prophecy, congregational prayer, fasting during the sacred month of Ramadan, pilgrimage to Macca, and paying poor dues. Yet, others add to these points, which remain individual, the interest of the community. Because Islam is both religion and politics, Muslims consider the virtuous good society a prerequisite for Islam to prosper. Christian tenets such as, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21) are rejected by the Muslim community which attaches much importance to its unity rather than privatizing faith. Muslims have generally respected the Jewish and Christian scriptures as foundational texts for Islam and consider Jews and Christians as deserving protection. But they also believe that they turned from God's ordinances, so Judaism and Christian are superseded religions on that ground. Islam is also a legalistic religion, and Muslim clergy are recognized more as jurists whereas their Christian counterparts are theologians.

In Judeo-Christian myth, even before the rise of Islam in the seventh century, the Arabs were known to ancient Israelites and Greeks, and the appearance of a non-Jewish, non-Christian Arab monotheist had been mentioned therein. The first boundaries that

separated the three religions, thus, were theological polemics. Then, public disputations between Muslims, Jews and Eastern Christians took place at the aim of nullifying the validity of the new religion. By that time, Western Europe Christians and its Jews lacked knowledge of this new theological enterprise – Islam. They considered the faith a non-christian enemy that should be defeated on the first encounter, which did not take place till the eleventh century with the beginning of the crusades. Islam, then, started to be perceived as a theological challenge to Christendom. Medieval Europe viewed Islam as heresy and its prophet as an imposter. Accordingly, the idea of Islam as an adversary which survives up to now began in religious terms and gained a new non-religious dimension only after the attack on the twin towers of the USA. Common views of Islam as the religion of the sword preached by a violent prophet and a book of gibberish stem from this early medieval dismissive perception of Islam. Despite the refutation of certain Judaic and Christian beliefs, Islam was not rejected for its difference. It is for its unexpected pace of expansion with which it reached North Africa and parts of Europe within the first century of its advent that alarms were sent to the leaders of Christendom. This alert to Islam's march continued throughout the Crusades, the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates and under the Ottomans.

By the time Europe witnesssed the Renaissance, the image of Islam came to possess a cultural perspective: a rich civilization and an extravagant world immersed in luxuries. Even in the modern period, the Western inferior view of Islam as a heretic and pagan faith did not change in spite of the possibilities of co-existence on the ground of the appreciation of the Islamic thought, culture and intellectual heroes. Asserting voices of Carlyle, Goethe, Emerson and Thoreau did not hide their admiration of things Islamic. In fact, thirst for the Orient was an interest in the worldly features of Islamdom disguised in an elegant rationale for colonialism – mission civilisatrice.

Yet, Orientalism reached its peak years in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century and offered the Western world a massive body of books, journals, translations, and academic articles for the study of Islam, but could do very little to ameliorate the West's dark image of Islam. The monolithic images and endless stereotypes attached to Islam seem to become inherited and they prevail to the present century, presumed and revitalized by Huntington's thesis of clash of civilizations.

The dawn of the twenty first century condemned Islam and Muslims. In the minds of many Americans after 9/11, Islam was identified with extremism and violence. Almost all political commentary programmes discussed the impact of Islam on the West and searched the roots of misconceptions as well as its repercussions. However, the demonization of Islam and its umma swept across all regions of the world and it is continuous over time. Whatever the degree of hatred, it is odd in many ways that Islam remains a theological challenge and medieval closet misunderstandings between Islam and the West should persist.

4. Islam in the West

The large number of Muslims living in Western Europe and the USA continue to attract the attention of the authorities as well as the non-Muslim public. The historic fear and mistrust of Islam is not different from the one expressed towards the Muslim population of the West. Despite the myriad divisions among the Muslims of the West, and Islam's decentralized structure, Western policies consider them as a bloc which will soon be able to dominate the foreign and domestic policies of some European states. However, this Muslim community never happened to hold power or have the potential for mass mobilization in any of these host countries, nor were they able to unify under the banner of Islam even when they neede to do so defensively in fear of *a clash of civilizations.* The European soil is still organized by Catholicism and Protestantism while Islam still ranks behind these two religions.

It was not until the 1980s that any interest in studying the Muslim communities of Western Europe, the USA, and Canada took place although Muslims were not new comers. The first encounter of Islam with the southern tip of Western Europe can be traced back to the beginning of the eighth century when Muslims entered Spain in 711 and set up a splendid empire in the Iberian Peninsula. The second centre of Islamic civilization was established in Sicily in 1831. The historical experience of Convivencia has an important Islamic legacy. Besides tolerance and peaceful coexistence, the Islamic Civilization's contribution in the realm of knowledge and science speaks volumes. The

Islamic penetration of Europe was not bound to the Western part. Eastern Europe has a long history of Muslim presence dating back to « the eleventh century when Muslim Saints and Scholars came [to Eastern Europe] and won large populations over to Islam » (Khurshid 6) under no political domination. Until the fourteenth century the era of Ottoman rule began with the seizure of Canstantinople (renamed Istanbul), gaining control of the black sea and the main routes to the Balkans. And at the height of its expansion, it spanned areas from Greece to the gates of Vienna and as far as Southern Russia. After the Muslim rulers left Europe, the effect of Islamic thought had already been in operation and this is what keeps Europe's contact with Islam perpetual. The hegemonic Islamic presence in Europe was not dependent on the militancy; it rather has to do with the character of the visitors:

> Strong Muslim communities were developing in different parts of Europe. Present day Spain, Portugal and Sicily once had Muslim majorities. In Eastern Europe, large Muslim communities have existed over the last nine centuries. Cyprus had a Muslim majority till he first quarter of the nineteenth century; so had Bosnia – Hercegovina in Yoguslavia till the beginning of the twentieth century (Khurshid 7).

After the two devastating world wars, a new phase of Islam in Europe or the West in general was marked by the waves of immigrants to the region. This growing Muslim community made Islam in the West a compelling field of research as new challenges and attitudes surfaced, notably the issue of the integration of Muslims. The increase in number of books, reports and articleson the subject was remarkable, and kept increasing steadily after the Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the Danish cartoons, and so forth. Though there had been a gap between European and American attention on Islam in the West, this was bridged in the after math of 9/11

Indeed since the attacks on the world trade centres, the focus of public policy debates over the political accomodation of ethnic minorities of migrant origin in Europe is on Muslims. With regard to Islam in the West, there has been a shift from multicultural issues towards « an internal discourse about Western society, politics and security – a discourse that overlooks what Western Muslims have done and thought over several generations… » (Bassiri 171).

An effective examination of the sizable Muslim communities of France, Germany and the UK would show them in wretched living conditions, excluded from economic benefits, and exaggerated misgivings exhibited towards them, which means full integration is certainly a long-term project – if not unattainable. To illustrate, Robert J. Pauly Jr claimed, "Unfortunately, Muslims are largely excluded from the benefits that would likely accompany acceptance by if not full incorporation within the societal mainstream. Their communities are clustered predominantly in urban districts on the peripheries of large cities where jobs are scarce and prosperity rare if not nonexistent". (87)

The huge Muslim population in Europe is also expected to have long term consequences. There is still some debate about their statistics because they are, from the Western perspective, either strictly Muslims, moderate Muslims, and Muslims only by ethnic background or Muslims by conversion and so forth. Yet, the real issue is not the demographic aspect. In terms of shared culture and values, and as long as Islam is taking hold in Europe, should we call it an Islam in the West, or a Western Islam? Will Europe take into consideration its own identity, or uptil now European identity has had the lion's share while the bulk of Muslim population were exposed to multiculturalist and assimilationist models of integration which proved useless. Many thinkers see that « today government leaders concern is not how to outsource Muslim spiritual leadership so as to maintain allegiance to their native lands, but how to fashion loyal Muslim citizens that share European values »(Haddad and Golson 488). Some second generation scholars living in Europe like Tariq Ramadan raised the question of the status of religion in modern societies of Europe, particularly the spiritual needs of second, third, and fourth generation Muslims born and raised on the continent. With regard to the need for a European brand of Islam so as to avoid the permanent exclusion of Muslims, he stated, « we need to separate Islamic principles from their cultures of origin and anchor them in the cultural reality of Western Europe. I can incorporate everything that is not opposed to my religion into my identity and that is a revolution ». (qtd. in Pauly Jr. 2016). Although among Europeans themselves, there are many scholars who consider the attempt to compel Muslims to embrace their liberal principles as an act from which liberal tenets

offer no convincing justification. But it seems that the European antipathy with Islam persists whether Muslims are in their homelands or in the West.

5. Literature Review

Contemporary Islam and its resurgence throughout the world have generated a growing industry in books, articles and dissertations to establish a conceptual framework for the Islamic revival movements in general. Revivalist literature is characterized by a number of themes. Most of them reflect the tension which Muslims perceive vis-à-vis their culture and religion which are in conflict with the West. From the media perspective Islam is always present in dialogue with the Western culture. This faith does not speak on behalf of itself, but has met all the challenges set by Christians. Nevertheless, Muslims feel the need to respond in words.

The contemporary revivalist literature developed in the 1970s and 1980s to address new challenges and problems. The aim of its authors is to engender *al-sahwa al-Islamia* which stands for Islamic awakening. Most importantly, they want to preserve the Islamic identity and heritage. They are committed writers who are constantly at the search of an Islamic solution to the present day issues.

Owing to a change of international context, another literature emerged, which is the literature on Islam and Western its revival, in order to clarify fundamental aspects of Muslim politics both in Western and Islamic academia. Unfortunately, much of the researches may lack originality and objectivity because of the widespread prejudices that Islamic revivalism is an international threat.

Despite the peaceful reality of revivals which bring a new religious culture shaped both by the past and the present, the West remains skeptical. With the present discourse in mind and given the circumstances of this time in history, « The theoretical and practical reflections of the cultural revival of non-Western civilization should not be used to legitimize rhetoric of threat. Rather, they should be seen as natural consequences of the plurality of human culture » (Dallmayr 112).

As part of this study, the reading of two books : Al- Moqaddima by Ibn Khaldoun and the Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. Huntington is indispensable for the sake of establishing common sense of any civilisational analytics. The Clash of Civilizations was initially an article written in 1993 on Foreign Affairs Journal, and later it was developed into a comrehensive book published in 1996. In the thesis, the Clash of Civilizations is considered as the principal issue in world politics after the end of the Cold War, which should shape the relationship between the West and Islam. The theory was given wide media coverage, and the possibility of the clash between the Western and the Islamic Civilization was the topic of hot debates between world leaders. The most controversial proposition is the one about '*Islam's bloody borders'*. In his perspective, « the fault line conflicts are particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims » (Huntington 208).

Samuel Huntington in the 1990s only popularised his Clash of Civilizations thesis because it had already been formulated by Bernard Lewis. The latter is a British American scholar in Oriental studies who specialised in the history of Islam and the interaction between Islam and the West. He is still the reigning monarch of orientalism. Lewis's work on Islam can be summarized in the words of Edward Said, « the core of Lewis's ideology about Islam is that it never changes, and his whole mission is to inform conservative segments of the Jewish reading public, and anyone else who cares to listen, that any political, historical and scholarly account of Muslims must begin and end with the fact that Muslims are Muslims » (Said 317-318). His objective is to reduce world history to a contest between two historical adversaries: the West and Middle Eastern Islam. Many thinkers see his attitudes as historiographic and crusading.

Along with Huntington and Lewis, Francis Fukuyama was another influential author of the West who not only tried to establish prophecies on the inevitability of a clash between civilizations or the inferiority and failure of Islamic civilization, but he claimed the evidence of the triumph of the Western ideas and assumed the end of history is « the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government » (Fukuyama) as well. The theory of endism hypothesized by Fukuyama and included in his book *'The End of History and the Last*

Man', which is recommended to critics of liberal democracy, and all followers of growing global politics.

Huntington's categorization of the world's civilizations sparked worldwide controversies and inflamed the general opinion, notably the Islamic world which was described as having 'bloody borders'. His thesis was rejected by towering thinkers. Gaining an understanding of the reasons behind the refutation of Huntington's thesis would not be complete without reading Edward Said's *'The Clash of Ignorance'.* If Huntington is seen as an advocate of one civilization of all the others, and a crisis manager rather than a thinker in search of resolu*t*ion, the commonalities that can unite cultures and the ideals of coexistence will be sought. There is an important lecture delivered at the University of Massachusetts by Edward Said, *'The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations',* offered an insight into the growing influence of those who advocate tensions and hatred, and falsified the existence of insulated cultures and civilizations.

Robert Spencer, Islam expert and author of more than a dozen books and hundreds of articles about the faith, and its prophet, Jihad and terrorism has provided great understanding of the West's views on the religion's ongoing quest for global conquest through his work entitled, *'The politically Incorrect Guide to Islam and the Crusades'.* In his book *'Islam unveiled: Disturbing Questions about the World's Fastest-Growing Faith'*, he enquires Islam's ability to coexist peacefully with the West's multicultural mosaic.

Another of the most influential authors John L. Esposito is professor of Religion and International Affairs, and of Islamic Studies, and a writer of more than 45 books on Islam and Muslims. Of all the books which have recently appeared on modern Islamic revival and resurgence, Esposito's *'Voices of Resurgent Islam'* should be of interest to readers concerned with Islamic culture as well as its modern trends.

Along with Esposito, Karen Armstrong is another popularizer and proponent of the perspective that believes in that the true message of Islam is being distorted. Her *Short History of Islam* provides a captivating corrective to the haunted Western imagination. A comprehensive understanding of the scope of Islamic movements was the attempt of both Malise Ruthven and Gilles Kepel, particularly the idea of jihad in their books *'The Trail of Political Islam'* and *'Islamic Attack on America'* respectively. The premise of another

most acknowledgeable French scholar of Islam, Olivier Roy, was to offer insight into the possible deterritorialization of Islam whose third of members live as members of minorities in Western countries. He portrayed the expected failure of political Islam in his work *'Globalized Islam'*.

In response to modern constant endeavor of the opponents of Islam through the Western electronic media and print, aspirations of a number of thinkers strove to stimulate a reinvigoration of Islam, from Muhammad Rachid Rida, Al-Kawakibi and Shakib Arslan to the new thinkers like Fethullah Gülen, Muhammad Shahrur, and others. Al-Quaradawi is another Islamic scholar who always contends with the Qur'an and the Sunna, following the path of Rida. They may differ only over the *Khilafa* issue, « Rida spoke in strong tones that the Islamic umma needed the true Caliphate as a necessary condition of its revival, and that the Muslims had an obligation to rebuild it. He spelled out in detail the conditions of the Khilafa in the contemporary context. In 2004, Al-Qaradawi was very explicit that the union does not seek to restore the khilafa » (Dudoignon et al. 29).

In Sayyid Qutb's view, Islam is an emancipatory method against atheism and oppression. To identify genuine Muslims, he stated: « Those who consider themselves Muslims, but do not struggle against different kinds of oppression or defend the rights of the oppressed, or cry out in the face of dictators are either wrong or hypocritical, or ignorant of the precepts of Islam » (qtd. in Abou-Rabi 131). He also accused America for the Americanization of Islam and Muslims in a way that does not resist imperialism.

Out of the borders of the Arab world, the first of the Islamic revivalists worthy of notice is Abou Al-Aala Maududi or Maulana Maududi as he is often called. He wished to establish a true Islamic society as Sayyid Qutb did. The list of Muslim scholars is multi-ethnic including : Muhammad Nassiruddin Al-Albani, Abdelkader Arnaout, Mustafa Ceric, Abdul Aleem Siddiqi, Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, Wahiduddin Khan, Dr. Sheikh Muhammad Iqbal, Mirza Abul Fazl, Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, Imam Ahmad Raza Khan, Anwar Shah Kashmiri, Tariq Ramadan, Muhammad Assad, Abu Sayed Ansary, martin Lings, Khaled Abul Fadl … etc.

Chapter II: Islam in Britain

Introduction

By critically engaging with relevant debates on the complex background of the British anti-Islamic polemic, especially in theological and literary writing along with the nature of the early forms of contact which emerged and brought the first substantial numbers of Muslims to the British Isles, the focus of this chapter is to analyse the Muslim presence in Britain – historical, demographic, cultural, political and spatial contours.

Despite internal difference, some argue that there emerges something that furnishes Muslims in Europe with a collective sense of self. At least three prevailing interpretations have emerged. The first maintains that Europe's Muslims are redefining Islam in the context of their identities as European Muslims and that the result is a 'Euro-Islam', illustrated by how Muslims view Europe as their home while being guided by a renewed Islamic doctrine. The 'Eurabia' trajectory is the second interpretation, and it predicts the numerical and cultural domination of Europe by Muslims and their faith. The third reports that Muslims in Europe are exceptional in not following path dependent institutional opportunity structures of minority integration. Though these formulations place the burden of adaptation upon Muslim minorities and misrecognize the most natural and compelling evidence that 'Muslim consciousness' is behind their political claims-making, often from contexts in which they face profound social and political adversity.

Religious practice of Britain's Muslims, their socio-economic profile, educational aspirations, their social networks; their generational, ethnic or class differences, and the strategies developed and pursued by them in response to changing social and political conditions in Britain are examined to demonstrate how the homogeneity of Islamic identity and faith was kept and Islamic revival was possible.

1. Islam in the British Isles : Historical Overview

Although England was the least expected place in the world to encounter Islam, Muslim presence in parts of the British Isles dates back perhaps to the seventh or eighth centuries AD. This impreciseness is attributed to the destruction of documentary records and, thus most traces are found by inference. The British Museum in London, for instance, contains an eighth century gold coin minted by king Offa of Mercia (fig.1). The coin is inscribed with Arabic text called Shahada, which proves earlier connections between Islam and Britain. For trade matters and through sea travels, the Celts of the West of Britain had contacts with the Muslims in Egypt and Jerusalem and carried news of the Orient to their people. In fact, Celtic Christianity owed no adherence to St. Martin and the Isle de Levent as it did to the Ancient Egyptian Lauras and no recognition of Rome as it did to Jerusalem, Antiach, and Alexandria.

Figure 1: Offa Dinar

The British Museum (online collection)

In the course of speaking about spirituality, the thing that should be borne in mind about Britain is that it was a continual source of heresies. A case in point is Pelagianism which began as a traditionalist movement named after the man who is thought of being

the instigator, Pelagius. This doctrine developed in the first two decades of the fifth century in reaction to Augustine's doctrine of grace.

The views and writings of Pelagius and his followers were vigorously opposed by Augustine, who not only wrote against them, but manoeuvered to bring about their condemnation. The Pelagian doctrine, so commendable in many particulars, by denying grace as God's beneficient intervention in human history, and substituting the law for grace is there for a church? Moreover, Pelagian teachings empowered the individual to read and understand the law for him or herself, thereby reducing the role of the religious teacher (Herren and Brown 76).

It was not until the fourteenth century that real beginnings of Protestantism took root in England when John Wycliffe, the leading theologian and philosopher of Oxford University started questioning the doctrines of the church and criticizing the corruption of the clergy. His influence on the Bohemians influenced the great Protestant Reformation of the early sixteenth century. Meanwile, the great ports on the east coast of Britain witnessed dealings between English merchants and Muslims. In fact, the Middle Ages were famous for the Fairs of England at Winchester and London where Muslims and Christians met and traded in silk, cotton, spices, and herbs. Hence, the Medieval British people had a direct person-to-person contact with Muslims. Some of the first Muslims on the British Islands were also captured pirates who had practised their trade off the shores. Besides Fairs, the Middle Ages were also noteworthy for their guilds which are a Muslim tradition meaning brotherhoods (akhawyyah). If we think about them as part of today's Tariqah Movement, we will identify as Sufism which are Mystic Dhikr Meetings. By means of inference and as early as the thirteenth century, Spanish Muslims were wandering around Britain, but they soon disappeared. Pilgrimage and the Crusades could have kept contacts, but the English contributions to the Crusades were minimal with Richard I as the only king of England to participate. Morris, a common surname in Wales and the West Country, seems to derive from Moorish, which means the Muslims of Spain or the Moors mixed with the British. And there are references to Islamic Scholars in the prologue to Chaucer's Canterbury Tales' written in 1386.

By the time the Tudor Monarch, Henry VIII, broke with the Roman Catholic Church, England was already a Protestant country and Scotland well-advanced in that under John

Knox, the Calvinist teacher. In Spain, the fall of Granada in 1492 ended the eight hundred years of Muslim rule, and started a new policy of mass extermination by burning the Moors, Jews, heretics, and apostates. Under the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, however, Britain became friendly with some Islamic countries and requested the Ottoman Sultan Murad for naval assistance against the Spanish Armada. It became known that if Protestants could escape to parts of the Ottoman Empire, they were safe from the persecution of the Roman Catholics. Elizabeth I was the first monarch to welcome Muslim ambassadors. She also granted Royal Charter to many companies: Levant Company, 1581; Barbary Company, 1585; and East India Company, 1600, which took Britons to the Islamic regions. In the seventeenth century, the universities of Cambridge and Oxford established chairs in Arabic. Thanks to the decline of Spain as a naval rival, the end of the Anglo-Dutch wars, the establishment of trading posts on the Coast of India, and the fragmentation of the Mughal Empire after the death of Emperor Aurangzeb, England combined commerce with rule and controlled the seas. Montesquieu described it as 'mistress of the seas'.

Though a sect of Mahomatens who lived in London was discovered in a 1641 document, only few conversions to Islam happened. John Nelson, however, was recorded as the first Englishman to become a Muslim in the sixteenth century. Around 1649, Alexander Ross completed the first English version of the Qur'an. John Locke was the first writer to articulate a theory of toleration of non-Christians in Britain and inquire philosophically the political status of non-Christians in Britain. He called Muslims 'The Turbanned Nations' and his premise was not to consider them 'others'. Nabil Matar sees that:

> Locke treated Muslims chiefly as tropes to discredit the inconsistency of his opponent: his argument was aimed at integrating non-Anglicans in the body Politic, and Muslims, Jews and Pagans were simply part of the logical conclusion that he could not help but reach. Still, and unlike other proponents of naturalization and endenization who specified that only rich and skillful foreigners should be welcomed, Locke did not limit the inclusion of Muslims to a particular group or class…Muslims (and Jews and Pagans) could become part of the body Politic only through a royal, not a parliamentary decision, revealed Locke's cautiousness in keeping integration of non-

Christians in the executive rather than legislative branch of government… such admission was always to remain an act of exception rather than the rule. (299)

The period from 1689 to 1750 was critical in the history of contact between Muslims and Britons and the perception of Islam because it was the first time since the Crusades the British began to re-examine their understanding of Islam which was not studied innovatively since the thirteenth century. In respect of this, he also claimed that,

> These changes were brought about by trade, cultural and commercial rivalry, and fascination with foreign and exotic goods and ways of life that, in turn, generated needs for export markets and for the importation of natural resources from countries as near as Morocco – gold and saltpetre – and as far as Bengal. From Safi to Mocha, and from Izmir to Surat and Madras, Britons imported horses and coffee, gold and sugar, silk and spices, carpets and manuscripts, ivory, calico, and indigo, all of which changed the course of their cultural history (Mac Lean and Matar 2).

As the British Empire grew through the nineteenth century, Britain shifted from fascination about the 400 year old Ottoman Empire to challenging it and producing violent attitudes to its members. Colonization seemed inevitable and Islam had to be purged. As a result, Muslims in these hostile countries were considered 'the heathens in their midst'.

Chauvinistic views against Islam multiplied when it became clear it is the only challenge for colonialism. The assimilation of Muslims was required. For instance, Macaulay, in his 1835 Minute on education in British India, attempted to « form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern, a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect » (Zastoupil and Moir 171). Another example is the liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone who called the Qur'an *'that accursed book'* and Muslims as '*anti-human specimens of humanity'*. Muslims in Britain were regarded with distrust particularly after Turkey sided with Germany in World War I. David Lloyd George (Prime Minister 1916-1922) considered his government's operations in Palestine as *'the British Crusade'*, and described the conquest of Turkey as '*the burden of civilization'* and « the emancipation of vast territory… from the blighting influence of the Turks as one of the finest tasks for civilization upon which Britain had ever embarked » (Ansari 90).

During the British Raj, members of the Indian upper class entered Britain in hope of pursuing education and enterprise, but « the current South Asian Muslim population possesses similar educational and entrepreneurial ambitions, but it is drawn from the more impoverished areas in the region of Azad Kashmir in north-west Pakistan, the Sylhet region of north-west Bangladesh, and the Punjab region of India » (Abbas. 'Islam and Muslims in the UK')

A new phase in the history of the development of Muslim communities in Britain started with waves of significant immigration marked by the opening of Suez Canal in 1869. Subsequently, very large number of Muslims started to settle in Britain. It happened even that « Lord Salisbury, the Victorian Prime Minister, once commented that Britain was the greatest Muslim power on earth » (Masood 1). First, European shipowners began to employ groups of migrants from Yemen and northern Somalia as unskilled workers in the Port of Aden. And by the end of the nineteenth century, small communities of Muslims, Indians, West Africans, and West Indians were establishing themselves along the sea-ports of France and Britain. To service the Muslim sailors in the dockside areas of Cardiff and South Shields in particular, boarding houses, cafés, and prayer rooms were set up. The seamen who married local women, often converted them to Islam, and Qur'anic schools were necessary for their children. Muslim festivals and feasts were declared publicly and attracted all Muslims of Britain to take part in preserving their devotion to their creed.

The Muslim community of the East of London dates back to the eighteenth century, but the end of the nineteenth century is a well-documented period. Most references identify Muslims as sailors (lascars) who docked in the ports of Cardiff (Tiger Bay), Bristol, London, Swansea, Southshield, Leith, Glasgow, and Liverpool. Mostly, they came from Bengal, Yemen, the Malay Lands, Aden and Somalia. However, most studies have been carried out on the two noteworthy communities of Cardiff and Liverpool. The former was mostly groups of Yemenis who married Welsh girls. They are followers of the Sunni Shafi'ite Mad'hab and the Shadhili Sufi order (Alawiyyah branch). The latter could convert a significant number of British people and was led by Abdullah William Quilliam, a solicitor of Maux origin and the man who was appointed Shaykhu-l-Islam of the British Isles by the Caliph, Sultan Abdul Hamid II for his great activities such as the

establishment of the English Islamic Association. Another prominent figure among the British converts is Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall who translated the Qur'an.

The phrase 'immigrant communities in Britain' is complex in meaning. It indicates the groups of Muslims who worked, resided, had similar activities or communal organizations and showed internal cohesion. It does not mean that all Arab immigrants were Muslims because it is true that most Arabs are adherent of Islam, but there were Arab Jews and Arab Christians among them. Moreover,

> There are Muslims and Christians from Arab countries whose first language is not Arabic: the Kurds of Iraq are mainly Muslim, the Assyrians mainly Christian. There have been numerous Kurdish emigrants to Britain, mainly professional people, and there is a community of a few hundred Assyrians concentrated in the Ealing area of West London. But their first language is not Arabic, and they are therefore not classifiable as Arabs (Halliday 3).

Nevertheless, if Arab emigration is noticed, four principal types will figure out: Lebanese (1860s), Yemenis (1900s), Palestinians (1948), and North Africans emigration mainly for socio-political reasons such as Civil wars, oil booms and unemployment.

The flow of Muslim immigrants to Britain faced religious and racial prejudices that were the direct result of the European growing sense of cultural superiority based on their influence over Muslim territories. In the ports, they often met sharp antagonism of the local community and racist policies of the government in case of job scarcity or with colour bar in getting it. The situation of blacks and Arabs did not change till the outbreak of the First World War which caused an increase in need of seamen in the merchant navy. After the war came to an end, pre-war sentiment and practices erupted again – beatings, fire bombings and murders. The 1919 mob violence was a historic act of savagery against peaceful immigrants. Yet, it reclassified them as problematic aliens who should be repatriated or put in concentration camps. The seamen's response was the formation of movements and alliances with anti-racist organizations, welfare, association and religious groupings. But the attempts to unite themselves across national, ethnic, and religious divides were parts of a broad multi-cultural process of coexistence, not a religious activism at all.

After the Second World War, the need for manpower in some industrial sectors of Britain renewed the attraction of an immigrant workforce from former colonies. As it was stated by Richard Lawless: « In the 1950s and 1960s a new influx of Yemenis into Britain found employment not in shipping, but in heavy industry, especially in the steal and metal – working plants in Sheffield and Birmingham… » (Lawless) But the beginning of Britain's immigration history is signalled by the « arrival of 492 Jamaican men at Tilbury Docks in London on board the Empire Windrush on 22 June 1948 » (Hackett 4). Racism in the ports persisted and new hostilities were developed towards the South Asian Muslims who were in the older industrial towns and cities. In fact, the majority of the Muslims who have migrated to Britain since the Second World War came from South Asia (primary Pakistan and Bangladesh). According to Tahir Abbas, « South Asian Muslim immigrants were placed at bottom of the labour market, disdained by the host society, and systematically ethnicized and racialized in the sphere of Capitalist accumulation. These workers were recruited into those industrial sectors most in decline and accordingly their positions in society were located below the white working class…. ». (Abbas. 'Muslim Britain' 9)

As a result of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, the number of Muslim South Asians entering Britain increased between 1962 and 1968 because it assembled the Muslim Immigrants with their wives and children. This Act, however, was soon amended in 1968 to be more restrictive. In fact, most legislation changes came as a consequence of the politicization of ethnic minorities in Britain. South Asian Muslims who went to Britain were supported by a « *myth of return* ». They wanted to collect as much wealth as possible and expected to return home, but they remained and put down roots.

The Africanisation of former British colonies pushed a number of Muslim East African Asians to immigrate to Britain in the 1960s and 1970s. Some Ugandan Asians who were forced out of Uganda in 1973 were accepted by Britain. In addition to these ethnic groups, the Bangladeshis who were affected by the economic crisis chose their asylum in Britain in the early 1980s. Over the next decade, Muslim Eastern Europeans and refugees from the Middle East also sought refuge in Britain.

In short, the Muslim other is often negatively treated as a result of the racism of empire and left with minimal contributory role in socio-economic and socio-political

ladder as a result of the British laissez-faire mercantilism and later capitalism. This Muslim who fled to Britain as an asylum seeker, a trader, a spice merchant, a medical student or someone with his family seeking reunification is by no means a Muslim missionary, and is least expected to be a terrorist.

Since the Iranian Revolution (1979), Muslims in general have become a focus of attention. British Muslims, in particular, have attracted public opinion after their demonstration against The Satanic Verses Publication (1989). However, after the 9/11 attacks of 2001, and reinforced by the London bombings in 2005, security became the central theme in relations between the state and Muslim Britons. The far right groups started to portray Muslims as unwanted foreigners. Although Bush was explicit, Blair argued it was not a war on Islam. But Blair's dilemma was how to stand between being keen on blaming Muslim Bombings abroad and not wanting to do so for a religion followed by millions of his own citizens. To solve this, « The state rather looked for political ideology within the Islamic tradition as the cause of the terrorism. Islamism is the political ideology that sees the religion of Islam as providing the constitution and political structures for forming a modern state » (Kepel 333). And after bombers struck in London on July 11, 2005, Tony Blair addressed this question again when he talked about an 'evil ideology' and about the necessity to wage « a battle of ideas, hearts and minds, both within Islam and outside it. This is the battle that must be won, a battle not just about the terrorist methods, but their views. Not just about their barbaric acts, but their barbaric ideas. Not only what they do, but what they think and the thinking they would impose on others » (Blair. BBC News) (See Appendix II).

On the whole, the exploration of the different waves of Muslim arrival to Britain indicates that Muslim immigrants form a kind of mosaic as a result of their different origins, ethnicities, languages, races, social layers, educational levels, and even the pattern of immigration by which they were accepted. Therefore, there is no such thing as a single homogenous British Muslim community. But in spite of this immense diversity, the British government continues to perceive Muslim immigrants living in their country as members of a single community as long as they are adherents of the same religion – Islam and not for their subordinate position in the socio-economic milieu which is also possible.

2. Islam and the Muslim World in the British Thought

More than three decades ago, it became clear that Islam and the West represent highly contested concepts whenever the right condition surfaces. But the examination of Christian-Muslim relations is older than that. According to Norman Daniel[1], *the Western images of Islam* had been distorted since medieval times as a result of political and religious contexts. In agreement with Daniel, Edward Said published his fascinating work 'Orientalism' to show how it is Western discourse about Islam which designed its shape in derogatory ways. Infact, information about Islam and Muslims come from numerous literary records such as travel diaries, literary fiction, captivity narratives, stage plays and stage plays which, no doubt, have inherent biases. Moreover, if misunderstanding were present in a genre this would be reproduced in the other. The Anglo-Saxon world also relied on Christian theological ideas to give information about Islam and Muslims within a set of assumptions though Christian texts predated Islam and assumptions can never be thought of as accurate perceptions.

Over time, politics has always been present in and intruded most academic scholarship. But has not there been any interest in Islam, its prophet and scripture designed to understand them as an end in themselves, not as a response to some irresistible challenge or in search of some ideologies in justification ?

When Islam spread from its initial base in the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East to more distant areas in Africa, Asia and Europe, it was a rival to Eastern Christendom, « the most far-reaching problem in medieval Christendom … It made the West profoundly uneasy», stated R.W. Southern in Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages (3-4). The very idea that Christianity should not be the last and final religion and that there should be another prophet after Jesus who would lure Christians away from their faith aroused fear and hatred in the Christian world. Hence, the rise of this unexpected threat to Christendom needed an explanation – if not a strategy of mental defence to save one's

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[1]An eminent historian on the Middle Ages and intercultural relations. Educated at Queen's College, Oxford, and Edinburgh University, his other books include The Arabs and Medieval Europe; The Cultural Barrier; Heroes and Saracens and Islam: Past Influence and Future Challenges.

faith (Hofmann 90). Also, the view that Islam formed a problem to Western Christendom was held by the British historian Albert Hourani though the French scholar Maxime Rodinson maintained that it was considered a real problem only after it was perceived a menace long before that. (3)

Islam's spread was gradual but amazingly rapid. Although it tolerated other beliefs and did not force any kind of conversion, its expansion owed much to military conquest. The success of Muslim armies restricted the Western media to a body of literature to attack Islam, « a repertoire of Christian legends rather than hard historical evidence about Islam and Muslims, nourished by imaginative fantasies » (Ansari) (See Appendix III). Initially, the attempt was to equate Islam's expansion with imposition at the point of the sword. This belief prevails even today though history stores cases of Christian populations who sought refuge under Islamic rule which was more benevolent than their own, and closer contacts with Muslims, on the whole, revealed a superior civilization with a stronger claim to universal truth. Then, the plot was to denigrate the prophet. Infact, most Christians could not accept Muhammad as a genuine prophet nor could they acknowledge the authenticity of the revelation given to him.

The early seventh century saw Islam taking root in the Arabian Peninsula through Muhammad's message at the same time as Christianity through Augustine's mission to Kent. Both religions gained support and were well-established though Islam with much more speed and victories. The first decade of Arab conquests was depicted in the Christian records as lacking hostility, and Christians referred to their defeat as being a consequence of their sins. However, this view was to change because of the continuous military success of Islam and its persistence. Christian writers began writing polemic histories as a sophisticated method to overcome the challenge of Islam. An influential example is:

> The Apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodius, a Syric work from the last quarter of the seventh century. Like earlier writings, it described the rise of Islam as a punishment by God. The novelty of the apocalypse was to present the conquests as a sign of the impending Day of Judgement, thereby promising an end to Islamic and the ultimate triumph of Christianity. So widely copied was this work that by

the end of the Anglo-Saxon period at least two Latin versions had found their way as far west as England (Beckett 40-41).

Other envious Orthodox Byzantine writers, who lost part of their territories to Islamic rule, had madly denounced Islam. To illustrate, John of Damascus in his De haeresibus portrayed Islam as a superstition of the Ismaelites and its prophet as a false diviner who plagiarised from the Bible. Furthermore, « John of Damascus, living in a Muslim milieu, does not go that far, but he still seems to believe that Muslim exclamation Allahu Akbar ("God is the greatest") is a hidden praise of a Pagan goddess with some connection to the Black Stone in the Ka'ba » (Heilo 117).

In the eighth century, Bede, the English monk and writer (673-735), introduced some information about Islamic religion to Anglo-Saxon England, but it was too vague and less valuable than the detailed accounts coming from Muslim histories. Bede's ideas about the Orient derived from St. Jerome who saw the Saracens in connection with all that was dark and having shadows. Bede never actually met a Muslim, yet he wrote vividly to describe their hatred to Christians. He described them as 'enemies of the church', 'companions of the devil' and heretics (qtd. in Arjana 37). He only reproduced some of the early pre-Islamic theories to shape the first medieval understandings of Arabia's Saracens. As a result of both men's prejudices, Anglo-Saxon views were antipathic towards Islam, which remains evident in the contemporary times. By and large, apprehensions about Islam did not stem from its nature; they were rather based on folktales, mythical narratives about the East, as well as individual opinions.

Islam, being the subject of misunderstanding, is no surprise as long as we believe this could be ascribed to the ignorance of the religion. As mentioned by Karen Armstrong, « The Song of Roland, which was composed at the time of the First Crusade, shows a revealing ignorance of the essential nature of the Islamic faith. The Muslims enemies of Charlemagne and Roland are depicted as idol-worshippers, bowing down before a trinity of the "gods" Apollo, Tervagant, and Mahomet » (Armstrong 25). Paradoxically, the dogma of trinity is related to Christianity; not to Islam whose followers bear witness that there is no god except Allah and that Muhammad is his slave and messenger. Yet, however, misunderstanding cannot be a matter of carelessness because these fantasized images, as pointed out earlier, were deep-rooted and held faithfully. According to

Southern, « … these legends and fantasies were taken to represent a more or less truthful account of what they purported to describe. But as soon as they were produced they took on a literary life of their own » (29).

The Crusaders' mentality also contributed to the negative European attitude towards Islam along with the keenness on maintaining it. The two hundred years of the Crusades are traditionaIly seen in the west as a series of heroic battles in which the kings of Europe tried to wrest Jerusalem from the wicked Muslim infidels. These religious wars resulted in massacres – of Muslims by Christians – on the largest scales and left deep scars in the West, not the East because they were associated with the belief that the Muslim world should disappear whereas it did not. The conquest of the Byzantine metropolis Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in May 1453 strengthened the negative image of Muslims that had prevailed in Europe since the Crusades and shaped the perception of a 'Turkish menace'. From the mid-15th century, it became customary to equate Muslims with Turks. When early modern texts speak of someone having "turned Turk", it means that he has converted to Islam. In addition to the bitter legacy left by the Crusades and the descriptions of the Turkish atrocities, anti-Arabism is another prejudice against Arabs since Islam, for all Europeans is an Arab religion. Ironically, churchmen were the most interested people in the sponsorship of Arabic studies, and so strong was the desire to learn from the Arabs in general. In fact, « until the Renaissance and Reformation … Arabic was probably the most widely translated language in the world » (Lewis 61). At Cambridge, the chair of Arabic was created in 1632, and few years later, professorship in Arabic was established at Oxford. Missionaries engaged in debates with Muslims, « but the latter were not convinced by Christian arguments. Worse, conversions of pagans and Christians to Islam continued apace, as did losses on the battlefield. Optimism soured into pessimism » (O'Brien 67). The discourse of the "Turkish menace" continued to characterize the image of Islam as an anti-Christ force and reinforced ethnic prejudices about the Turks throughout the age of the Renaissance and the Reformation. During the Reformation, Protestants were likened to Muslims in terms of deviation from their earlier faiths. This means the medieval duality of Christians vs. pagan or heretical Saracens persisted.

In the course of speaking about the literature that dealt with Islam in the 16th and 17th centuries, the study of Islam and England cannot begin without Samuel Chew's massive 1937 work 'The Crescent and the Rose', which started by informing that Muslims were never absent from the anxious thoughts of Elizabethan travelers (vii). The beginning of modern British historical writing was in the early seventeenth century. Writings on Islam repeated the former prejudices more rigorously thanks to reason, empirical evidence and the linguistic potential. From the reign of Queen Elizabeth I to that of Queen Ann, Islam and its world were represented by the Ottoman Empire and the North African pirates. To Europe and Early Modern England, Islam remained referred to as the religion of the Turks and Arabians were synonymous with Turks. In England there existed misconceptions of Islam, and after 1649 one of the primary sources that shaped and perpetuated misconceptions was the first English translation of the Koran – The 1649 Alcoran of Mahomet. No further than the title page, it was stated the purpose was to provide the Early Modern English audience an insight into Turkish vanities. Britons, despite their encounters of the Moors, Turks, Persians and Indians continued to imagine Muslims in the theatres and churches, as « a tribe of warring anti-Christians intent on establishing the universal monarchy of their long-dead leader known as 'Mahomet' » (Mac Lean and Matar 26). English writers such as Richard Knolles, Edward Pococke and Paul Raycant drew pictures of the Ottoman Empire as a great terror and described its torture and despotism, but they also recounted positive details of the religious, political and military organization of Muslim society as well as their courage, determination and tolerance. Towards the end of the 17th century, however, the perception of the Turks as enemies was substituted by a more positive attitude. Descriptions of gallant Moors and Muslim heroes shattered the earlier accounts of dreadful Turks. Everything Oriental became exotic.

Then the assumption was that the Enlightenment emerged out of what is usually called the "Judeo-Christian tradition". The implication of course is that Islam along with fanaticism towards the faith have been unable to allow the same process to take place. Enlightenment scholars and orientalists such as Edward Gibbon and William Jones were both fond of Islamic Civilization and believed in its superiority, but saw Europe in the light of reason and command of science as far advanced. When the Orient became less

threatening with the growing British power over Muslims and a feeling of being militarily superior, it remained exotic under the impact of Romanticism in historical accounts.

The late eighteenth century English views of Islam and Muslims were mostly affected by the British developed hegemony; for instance, the rising British empire in Mughal India while the latter was stagnating. Therefore, Muslim societies lost respect for their cultural heritage and demonstrations of their barbarism took root in order to justify colonialism. The focus of the nineteenth century English thought, thus, was to figure out the disparities between the east and the west. The new stereotypes which circulated stated that Islam and modernity were incompatible, Islam oppresses women, and it is the reason of the Muslim Orient's inferiority. In this age of European Imperialism academic knowledge was used to legitimize European rule over Muslim societies. Leading Scottish intellectuals, notably John Malcolm and Mountstuart Elphinstone were archetypes of imperial historians. « They were supported by a growing evangelical public sentiment, which viewed empire as the work of Providence » (Ansari. The Muslim World) Western missionary movement in general, and its literature demeaned Muslims in an effort to convert them to Christianity. James Mill in his History of British India also believed in the benefits of colonialism on the ground that it improves persecuted societies. Orientalist writing in general became a tool to justify imperialism. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, racist theories were added to the stereotypes of Islam. Race replaced the precedent contempt for both language and religion. In fact, the British writer Charles Pearson « saw in the Turkish decline an opportunity for European powers such as Austria or Russia to annex territories for a higher race as part of its natural habitat in Europe » (Rich 435-51). Orientalism, as the new structure of thought, represented the British and French Oriental studies of the 19th century as being forerunners of a hegemonic discourse on the Orient and thereby supporters of western rule in the Middle East. An example of a political figure that supported and contributed to the European discourse on Islam was Evelyn Baring, the First Earl of Cromer who held office from 1883 to 1907 as the British Consul-General in Cairo and advised in this capacity the Khedive of Egypt, whose country was occupied by Britain in 1882. For Cromer, Arabic is not worth learning, the Oriental Egyptian is entirely irrational and in every way the complete opposite of the

European Englishman, and Islam is a failure. On the whole, Western scholarship of Islam, under Orientalism, portrayed Muslims as archetypal others. Bernard Lewis, often called 'the doyen of Middle Eastern studies,' is one of the reigning monarchs of Orientalism. His counterpart, Edward Said, in his Orientalism, dissected the imperialist connections of this ideological enterprise. He claims that the Orient can not be a creation of imagination:

Ideas, cultures and histories can not seriously be understood or studied without their force, or more precisely their configuration of power also being studied. To believe that Orient was created – or as I call it, 'orientalized' – and to believe that such things happen simply as a necessity of the imagination is to be disingenuous.... The Orient was orientalized not only because it was discovered to be oriental in all those ways considered commonplace by an average 19th century European, but also because it could be – that is, submitted to being – made oriental (5-6)

While many British scholars attempted to emphasize the superiority of the Occident, little room was left to a few who kept their earlier fascination with the Islamic world. Edward Lane's excitement about Egypt, in his Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians along with Carlyle's famous lecture on Muhammad 'Hero as prophet' stand as sympathetic attempts against many Victorian products shaped by paternalism and utilitarianism to sustain British colonial hegemony. Nevertheless, the Christian missionaries and the Orientalists continued to strongly contribute to paint a mediocre image of the Orient, Islam as irrational, and Muhammad as an imposter. The reinforcement of the picture of the decadent Orient in the minds of the builders and administrators of Empire was the function of English writers, but « was exaggerated and often wildly inaccurate. It sometimes reflected the urges and instincts of its creator more than the reality » (Ahmad 119).

Twentieth century Britain was not less fortunate than before. The decadence of the Ottoman Empire – the sickman of Europe – and the backwardness of Islam were views widely held among many writers and thinkers, but not persuasive into European powers politics which remained anxious about the rise of an Islamic Nationalism. Eventually, « the crisis indicated that the great powers in Western Europe were now faced less with a threat from Islam but from a Pan Slavism » (Rich 448). The defeat of the Ottoman

Empire during World War I resulted in the colonization of Arab Muslim nations. Britain gained dominance in the Middle East. Historians like Reginald Coupland argued that only the British Empire was able to shape the destiny of people in need of protection. Muslim political activism and pan-Islamism which have their roots in the double assault of imperialism and decentralization on the Ottomans in the late nineteenth century, raised European anxiety and were reflected in the English literature of the twentieth century. When the Caliphate (khilafa) disappeared as an institution giving way to its replacement in the form of pan-Islam, T.W. Arnold wrote in hope of its reconstitution.

Europe before World War II and the USA after the war preserved their view of the Orient as unviable for development, mainly because of its connection with Islam and the Arabs. The anti-imperialist resistance of Muslims reinforced the view of Islam as a demonic religion that produces fanatic movements. The instability generated by the process of decolonization and the beginning of the Cold War, made scholars such as Richard Southern and Norman Daniel observe that to achieve influence on policy makers, inaccurate images of Islam and Muhammad in more refined works were necessary. The two noteworthy figures of this period were Hamilton Gibb and Bernard Lewis. Gibb assumed that there was an unchanging Arab or Muslim mind in his Modern Trends in Islam. Lewis went further than this by claiming that Islam does not develop people in touch with reality. He nourished the West with ideas that Muslims are hostile, warlike, and addicted to false history. For Lewis, Islam appeals to communism for its autocratic nature.

From the 1950s to the 1970s, the failure of Muslim societies to modernize according to Western models was the time's issue. Lewis linked Muslims lack of interest in discovering the secrets of European advances to their hostility towards the West. But Nabil Matar and others argued that many Muslims travelled voluntarily for study and work. Curiosity about the European growing strength attracted thousands of men and women whose colonial education rendered their bond through religion at best fragmentary. In fact, national movements of independence in most Muslim states were led by the Westernized elite whose commitment at that time was not based on Islam for the most part, even when Islam was used as a rallying slogan. This means that the goal of those independence movements was merely to achieve freedom from the colonizing state

and although stray ideas about the nature of post-independence state and its institutions exist, there is very little concrete evidence to suggest that that generation was able to work out any clear and solid plan of the post-independence era as far as Islam and its world view are concerned (Iqbal 603).

During the post-independence period, British historical writing continued to rationalise Western tutelage and insisted that Western political theories and institutions were carried over as part of the colonial legacy. Just like former Mill and Macaulay, Niall Ferguson offered provocative histories of the British Empire in hope that the modern world in general, and the Islamic world in particular would believe it is the best force of order and justice. He argued that many of Britain's wars, mainly that on Iraq, were justifiable.

While up to the present Islam is criticized for having not been secularized like Christianity throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and as claimed by Lewis, Islam was both God and Caesar, many other scholars reject the portrayal of Islam and the West as adversaries. Medieval Islam was a religion of remarkablet olerancef or its time, allowing Jews and Christians the right to practise their beliefs, the contribution of Muslim Spain to the preservation of classical learning during the Dark Ages, and the impact of Muslim societies on the rise of European Renaissance have been highlighted in order to prove there were not only conflicts, but also the exchange of ideas and technologies. Indeed, the September 11 events shook the USA and its allies – Britain in particular. The Western and Muslim worlds are now more distrustful of one another than at any other epoch of their interaction. Huntington's popular dichotomous notion of the clash of civilizations is influential only in policy making circles because the Islamic historical and present associations with the West display much more belonging and tolerance in terms of trade, knowledge and migration. Edward Said criticized Huntington for this notion defining the Islamic civilization as self-contained, and the ignorance involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilization (Said).

In a word, Western images of Islam have long been based as much on imagination and presumption as on knowledge. Medieval Britain represented Islam as a force of political chaos. During the Crusades, it was chronicled as a process of idolatry. The Protestant Reformation viewed Muslims as heretics. The rational faith of Enlightenment condemned

the Muslim other to obscurity and backwardness. Up to the present, portrayal of Islam's images remains constantly related to ideas of fundamentalism and terrorism. Although Islam, since time immemorial, is the same faith, growing ideas and views of it varied according to the issue of the day. The impact of colonialism rendered nearly all Arab countries utterly dependent and obliged Turkey and Iran to recognize and resist European hegemony. Since the apparent end of colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s, however, new intellectual forces from everywhere started to respond to the complex transformations their world underwent since the advent of Western capitalism into many a Muslim country. The common 20th century history of Europe and its neighbours remain obscure. The political writing of England after World War Two seemed imprecise and vague to many towering authors such as George Orwell. This is also applicable to the literature on Islam which often confused the concepts of Islam, Muslim world, Islamic history, and Islamic revivalism. Most importantly, the English thought and writing vis-à-vis the Muslim world did not escape the limitations of their scholars who could not refuse to place their knowledge for the interest of the Empire even when they succeeded to escape the impacts of their cultures, methods and concerns. Judgment of Islam has been grossly distorted

3. Being a Muslim in Britain

With the historic ghost of the Crusades having been revived, especially since 9/11, intolerance of Islam and Muslims way of life has been on the rise in various European countries. In Britain, even before September 11 and its aftermath, it was generally becoming acknowledged that, of all ethnic groups, Asians are the object of written, verbal and even physical assault, and many Asians themselves believe this is due to the hostility directed specifically at Muslims especially after they lived the experience of division between good law-abiding Asians and Asian Muslims. And regardless of how many Muslims are loyal and law-abiding, Islam, from the European experience, still appears resilient to political adaption and maintaining a difficult relationship with liberal democracy. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see other positive developments such as the

growth of the Muslim population of Britain and the rise of Islam there along with the spread of Islamic shari'a law whose spiritual improvements are leading to an Islamic revival. It is often assumed that Britain's green and pleasant land has contributed to this prosperity. Some scholars went further when they said that Britain's Muslims « appear as, and perhaps see themselves as members of a different kingdom resident in the UK, and their rhetoric may suggest that they plan to annex the UK to the House of Islam » (Glaser 26). By way of investigation, thus, a detailed picture of the circumstances of Muslims in contemporary Britain needs to be recognized.

Population and Geographic Distribution

The number of Muslims in Britain is said to have no precise figure because, from a demographic perspective, it is imprecise to define who is a Muslim; and depending on who is doing the statistics, estimates vary. Nonetheless, comprehensive data do exist and they vary between 1.6 million in 2001 UK census, to 2.7 million in 2011 census to 3.4 million in 2014 according to Gatestone Institute statistics. This growth in number seems great compared with 21000 in 1951.

The vast majority of Britain's Muslims originate from South Asia coming from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. They came in significant numbers over the latter half of the 20th century. Initially, they were recruited as seamen in the 1920s and remained in the UK after World War Two. Then, a mass migration took place during the 1950s and 1960s to fill the labour shortage in the industrial cities of London, the Midlands and the former textile towns of Yorkshire and Lancashire. The genesis of this substantial Islamic presence is attributed to geopolitical, economic and social reasons. The decolonization process of the British Empire was marked by the independence for India and the partition of the Indian sub-continent into India and Pakistan in August 1947 which did not happen peacefully. Disorder at home, and the demands of the post-war British economy for cheap labour attracted much larger numbers of South Asians. Disputes over Kashmir pushed many Pakistanis and Indians living on borders to flee away to Britain and work as textile manufacturers. Furthermore, the first wave of migrants helped their relatives to

join them in the northern English factories. This blue colour job opportunity raised « the number of Muslims in the United Kingdom [which] increased from 23.000 at the end of World War Two to 82.000 in 1961 and 360.000 in 1971 » (Pauly. Jr. 98). Then, towards the 1970s, a new wave of East Africans headed to the UK seeking refuge from persecution against ethnic minorities in Kenya and Somalia. They « included 50.000 Muslims with origins in the Gujarati and Punjab states of north-central India » (99). In the decade after 1971, another influx South Asians arrived in Britain from Bangladesh – the new born independent state from the east of Pakistan. During the 1980s and 1990s, the immigration of Arabs from the Middle East – Palestinians, Syrians, Jordanians, Iraqis and Lebanese – and an intake of Muslim groups from Eastern Europe – Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania – through additional nationalities of Yemenis, Iranians, Turks, Algerians, Egyptians, Tunisians, Moroccans, Afghans, Somalians, Kurds, Sudanese, Nigerians, Mauritanians, Nationals of the Gulf Emirates and soforth have all contributed to the ethnic diversity of the Muslim population in Britain. This is without forgetting the significant numbers of British converts to Islam.

Most of the Muslim migrants live in England, but there are also sizable groups of Muslims living in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. As for the characteristics of the British Muslim population, they are predominantly those of the Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian Muslims. Most importantly, « they are young, rural in origin … poor, badly housed and poorly educated, suffer high levels of male unemployment and have a very low female participation in the labour market » (Peach 23). They are concentrated into small number of large urban areas such as – Greater London, the industrial West Midlands (Birmingham), and the mill towns of Lancashire, Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire (the Bradford-Leeds urban area). London boroughs are the most crowded areas with Muslim immigrants. High proportions of Bangladeshis live in just one borough which is Tower Hamlets in the East End of London which is the centre of the Bangladeshi population in Britain. The next map illustrates the most and least crowded districts with Muslims in England.

Figure 2: Distribution of Muslim population of England, 2001, by district authority.

British Religion in Numbers. Census 2001 Maps of Religious Affiliation

Although South Asian Muslims in Britain are very religious, they have shown high rates of segregation. The Pakistani / Indian degree of segregation was lower than that of the Pakistani / Bangladeshi in spite of the once shared nationality and the shared religion. They hold strong ethnic values. Even marriage is a within ethnic group affair. With respect to Scotland and Wales, « small numbers of Arabs, Turks, and Iranians reside in the larger Scottish cities, as well as in Newport and Cardiff in South Wales » (Ansari, Muslims in Britain Report 7).

The 1950s and 1960s immigrant communities were mainly working age males primarily defined as guest workers. They had little contact – if any – with the British authorities that did not shoulder any responsibility for their recruitment or accomodation. These Muslim men were also defined in terms of their colour or nationality. In fact, they « resided in homogenuous enclaves of workers who shared common ethnic, linguistic and

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religious backgrounds and sent much of what they earned back home to their wives and children in India and Pakistan » (Pauly Jr.99). With the restriction of economic migration requirements through the Immigration Act of 1971, however, a process of family reunification met the demand of showing proof of personal connection in order to enter the UK. The latter altered many features regarding the Islamic communities of Britain. The attention which was first paid to deep connections with homelands turned now to a sense of permanence and the development of community infrastructure along with greater emphasis on Islam. Despite the halting of migration for Commonwealth citizens, new intakes of Muslim refugees increased in the 1980s and 1990s. Later on, the growth of second and third generations in the midst of hot international issues precipitated government engagement and much public attention to Islam and Muslims.

There is no doubt that the present UK Muslim population is diverse as it encompasses groups from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. Questions on the religious affiliation of UK population, however, were posed in the 2001 UK census for the first time since 1851. Ofcourse, this resulted from the British fears of terrorism in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 and the attacks in London. Growing xenophobic trends have been directed against British Muslim communities over the last 15 years. Therefore, new situations of the contemporary period gave rise to new ways of thinking about Muslims, and developed new interpretations about Islam. It was often claimed that « most governments in Western Europe have initiated bold and controversial new policies aimed at the institutionalisation of a moderate, Euro-friendly Islam » (Haddad and Golson 487). But what type of Islam has already evolved in Europe and led to such an intensification of state involvement?

The Institutionalization of Islam in the UK

An old belief among most of the Western nations is that it is grave to be in close contact with the Muslim world because for them « Islam alone of all the great religions of human race was born sword in hand. » (Chirol 48) The position of Islam and Muslims in

Western societies has remained a subject of intense study and debate ever since. Of course the institutionalization of religious practice within the countries of migration would enhance the worries which range between the considerations of Islam as an obstacle to the view of its centres as palaces of hatred[2]. The 21st century has been, therefore, marked by the politicization of the discourse surrounding Islam in many secular societies.

Muslims visited or lived in Britain long before the nineteenth century, but their emergence as communities began from 1800 to 1945. This was certainly linked to Britain's colonial expansion in Asia and Africa. The first settlers were mainly from India, Iran and Yemen. As these people settled in Britain, they gradually set up places of spiritual needs, « Yemeni and Somali Muslim seamen set up makeshift prayer rooms in their dockyard communities in Cardiff and Southshields in the second half of the 19th century. An interesting example was the complex developed by an indigenous convert, Abdullah Quilliam. The Liverpool Muslim Institute – containing a prayer room, an orphanage, a press and a school… » (Ansari, 'the Muslim Presence' 3). Shahjehan mosque built in 1889 was a landmark of the Muslim country in Britain. It even attracted prominent converts such as Lord al-Farooq Headley who wrote *'Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an',* Marmaduke Pickthall and Lady Evelyn Zaineb Cabbold, the first English woman who went on pilgrimage to Macca in 1934. A colourful tapestry is formed by the diversity of the people who arrived in Britain. So no big common denomination is to be noticed. Indeed, the vast majority of Muslims residing in the United Kingdom are Sunni Muslims and followers of the Hanafi Law school, but organizations of minority Muslim traditions such as the Shi'a of the Ithna Ashari and Ismaili variety, mystical Sufi groups, the Ahmadis and the more recent movement brought from the USA, 'The Nation of Islam' are also to be found. The examination of the UK Muslims, however, would classify them into two general groups – modernists and Islamic activists. The former seeks the improvement of Muslims' status in the British society through engagement with politics and religious life under government institutions. The latter rejects Western secularism, supports religious life under share'a laws, and is affiliated with Islamic organizations. Some observers think that four trends unfold in the course of discussing

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[2]A Dutch politician Geert Wildens spoke of mosques in this way.

the Muslims of Britain : one who favors secularism, a second who is a proponent of interaction and assimilation, a third is following religion with a puritanical approach and a fourth who represents a small fraction advocating jihad (Ansari 2004). Hence, in light of the ethnic and sectarian differences, it seems difficult for British Muslims to work together for common social purposes. It is true that Islamic identity played a cohesive role in the early 1960s among Muslim workers of different ethnic, social, linguistic, and political fabric. They set up mosques and organizations, and were concerned most with the revitalization of religious life. Yet, to the end of the 1970s, particular national, ethnic, linguistic and doctrinal interests emerged. A decade later, new organizations and agendas saw the light of the day. Humayun Ansari states that « by the mid-1990s, there were at least 839 mosques and a further 950 Muslim organizations, ranging from local self-help groups to nationwide 'umbrella' organizations. The latter embracing divergent ideological strands and interests, have sought to function as national symbols of Britain's Muslim communities with varying degrees of success » (Muslims in Britain (Report) 6).

With the appearance of second and third generations of South Asians born and raised in the UK, a new attitude towards Islam was articulated. Although they share the religion of their parents and grandparents, they seek to define themselves as British Muslims rather than Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Indians, Yemenis and soforth. This Anglo-Islamic identity encourages inter-faith dialogue, and attempts to make Islam more appealing and intelligible because they believe it is a universal religion. Tariq Ramadan, in his book 'Western Muslims and the Future of Islam', discusses the possibilities of mutual understanding between Christians and Muslims. He is part of « a reformist tradition within Islam, one that aims to protect Muslim identity and religious practice, to recognize the Western constitutional structure, to become involved as citizens at the social level, and to live with true loyalty to the country to which one belongs » (O'Hanlon 422).

Practically, however, things are not as simple as they are planned. Europeans dominant understanding of the Crusades as 'good' battles with Saracens – the Turks, the Muslims, and their memories of South Eastern Europe Muslims and of Ottoman rule are still controlling their attitude towards Islam as a threat to Europe and not as a possible part of its modern history. This leaves the Muslim communities living there today feeling regret that the roles they played as loyal immigrants in both the Second World War and in

the post-war reconstruction of Northern European states should be denied. In public discussions, Islam is still seen as largely monolithic and rigid, and Muslims as a danger to society. Although second and third generation Muslims suggest that Muslims can no longer be considered as temporary migrants, but rather as a permanent part, members of the host country feel they are a threat to multiculturalism, to law and order, oppressive towards women, untrustworthy, and even as conspirators trying to take over European countries. In response, Muslims believe that participation in inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue is useful for countering misunderstandings and prejudices about Muslims and Islam. Muslim attempts to be more open to wider society are numerous ranging from open days at mosques to weeks of dialogue. In the UK, Muslims recognize the importance of the annual Islam Awareness Week, during which, Muslim organizations, as well as public and local authorities and educational establishments work together to increase the understanding of the Muslim community in wider Western society through talks, exhibition and other events of reviving the religion and showing its merits and blessings. To a certain extent, this is beneficial, but at issue it is not simply a revival of Islamic tenets or the explanation of how Muslims have been victimized. The real matter is that the 21st century is a time of competition over the world order. According to Bassam Tibi, « our present world time is determined by a new age of politicization of religion, of religionization of politics and of the culturalization of conflict. This is the overall context in which secular Europe is challenged by the revival of Islam and becoming a battlefield of an international conflict ignited by Islamism » (Tibi 163).

Accordingly, the institutionalization of Islam in Britain – coupled with global changes – is growing to demonstrate the promotive nature of Islamic presence and the revitalizing quality of Islam. Muslims engagement in a range of projects, their mosques and community centres as well as the formation of a number of organizations and initiatives along with the provision of religious education to their offspring are markers of the positive religious behaviour of Muslims. The British, however, look upon this as a leap from simpler requirements – the provision of halal meat for instance – to more political issues. They believe they are steps toward turning Britain into an Islamic state.

Mosques

Most public discussions on Islam are concerned by the role and functioning of mosques in Britain. They are looked at as obscure sites where anti-Western discourse is nourished. In the wake of any brutal act of violence, they either gain a stereotype or a new policy proposal will deprive their functioning, style or membership.

Newspaper reports, institute studies, and the various polls results have recently shared stories of the same theme which is fear of Islamic Britain. More often than not reference is made to the increasing number of practising Muslims and Mosques. Urgent calls to ban the building of any new mosques were framed because worshippers frequent the mat the expense of churches and Cathedrals. Islam is thus viewed as if it is in competition with Christianity and challenging its status as the national religion of the UK. Exaggerations of the press reveal that churches seem to become someday vestiges of times past if the present rate of Muslim assertiveness continues.

The focus on mosques is not an attempt to understand the identity of Muslim worshippers and their religious culture. Stories like 'the mosques beat churches' and the restricted freedom in 'the Muslim no-go areas' in general suggest that there is an intention to represent Islam as if it were a rival to Christianity. The markers of Muslims identity are resisted and seem to matter more than the understanding of their identities and how they are formed through experience. The state's discourse on Muslims and their mosques is abundant when compared with the discourses on minorities, their sacred places and even the immigrant no-go zones. It only ignores that among the immigrants who go to the same mosque there are immigrants of different migration biographies, diverse Islamic practices, and various cultural expressions.

Before thinking about mosques as sources of public unease and intensifying opposition, it should be noted that mosques reflect the strength of Muslim communities and their participation and assimilation in the host society. Building a mosque is an achievement that cannot materialize without organization, good leadership and resource accumulation. Mosques are one of the best illustrations that a contribution to the

consolidation and reproduction of communities took place. Yet, opposition to or support of mosque construction point to the fact that decision with regard to religious building are often politicized and problematized by the ideas of multiculturalism and nationalism.

Despite barriers such as the struggle for resources, fund raising, and lack of staffing, the involvement of British Muslims in a range of initiatives centered on mosques and community centre in general are indicative of how peaceful, tolerant and green is the institutionalization of Islam in Britain. In a research project between 2009 and 2010 to examine Muslims' engagement in the promotion of environmental conservation, it was noticed that

> The South Woodford Islamic Centre in London claims to be the first Carbon-neutral place of Islamic worship in Britain, citing as evidence that it installed energy-saving light bulbs, reduced the thermostat on the heating system, and installed solar-powered heating panels for hot water. Additionally, the ablution area in the mosque reminds worshippers of the Islamic injunction to use water sparingly. The Imam also makes conspicuous use of a bicycle rather than a car within the local community, and Friday sermons encourage the congregation to walk rather than drive to the mosque… (Gilliat-Ray and Bryant 298).

No doubt mosques continue to be at the heart of many Muslim communities in Britain, but what is even much more attractive is the enthusiasm of the religious personnel, their self-direction, ability to influence their members to use their traditions to shape urban spaces, be environmentally friendly and take part in sustainable direct hands-on gardening projects. Unfortunately, the extent of this Muslim provision to the British green spaces has not been studied in detail. Muslim environmentalists want to reflect the Qur'an and Hadith in their actual behaviours in the UK. Hence, the institutionalization of Islam in Britain signals how faith-based initiatives can be more successful than activities guided by state policies.

Yet, however, symbols of Islam such as the Islamic veil, or the establishment of new mosque buildings continue to arouse contentious struggles. As early as the first half of the 1980s, studies in Western Europe focused on daily practices of Muslim migrants such as mosque attendance, prayer, Ramadan and dietary prescriptions. It was observed that Islam was no more than a transplanted migrant home religion in a new secular setting.

Mosques were first exclusively prayer rooms, but afforded support for fragmented migrant communities who found them like places of their own. Later on, with the process of family reunification and the expansion of welfare states, and for fear that their families may neglect their cultural roots and Islamic values, male family heads returned to a more religious life. Mosques, therefore, started to accomodate a range of activities; particularly religious instruction and language lessons. Increasingly, the mosque became a kind of centre for networks of organizations, learning and worship. Furthermore, it was evident that they also functioned as refuges to maintain the spiritual identity and well being of new comers which did not please many municipal policy makers who prefered to hold these functions in public community centres.

Toward the end of the 1980s and the beginnings of the 1990s young Muslims became the focal point of many studies. Islam of the young was expected to be different because it was essentially a non-ethnic Islam in that it was modern and formed in the setting of the UK. Contrastingly, many younger Muslims succeeded to set up their own organizations and tried to widen the functions of mosques. In fact, «This emancipation of second and third generation Muslims led to all kinds of inter-generational negotiations on the future of Islam, touching upon issues such as gender relations, marriages, the role of religious instructors (imams) or the wearing of the Islamic veil » (Maussen. 11). Therefore, the dynamics of Islamic practicein the UK can not be interpreted in terms of first or second generation members. Islamic practice proved to be nothing of a modernized lifestyle; it remained a faith fertile for other academic studies. The prediction that younger generations would abandon the mosques was wrong because mosques in the UK kept their original holiness. This is no surprise to Muslims who often refer to the Qur'anic verse saying: « Indeed, it is We who sent down the Qur'an and indeed, We will be its guardian » (15:9).

Objections to mosques continued, and adherents to Islam continue to strive for the recognition of their Islamic institutions in general. Recognition, no doubt, means the right to public funding. But the government's attitudes and actions are bound by certain guidelines, or just rule against these institutions. Consequently, the scope of Islamic practice is the product of political decisions not a natural progression. The 1990s brought new arguments and refocused on Islamic centres of worship as Muslim enclaves within

Western societies and their development shouldn't be allowed for. And the beginning of the 21st century also reproduced other interpretations of the functions of mosques, their dangers and the role of religious instructors who preach traditional Islam as well. The new frame was to establish training centres for Imams in Europe, avoid the obscure shelter mosques by supporting the establishment of middle-sized neighbourhood mosques, and to set up more cultural resources for the sole aim of enhancing dialogue and confronting radical ideas. Nevertheless, the host society remains perplexed in the search of why young Muslims were more radical than their fathers whose religiosity was less than moderate being a mixture of customs, superstitions and wrong traditions.

The British Muslim community which is mainly composed of Muslims of South Asian descent has had a tendency to get Imams from India and Pakistan, as the community felt more confident and comfortable about their credentials and their traditional education. Gradually, the blame started to be laid at the door of mosques. Baseless charges like the Imams' lack of experience about local culture and condition, or the possibility of venting extremist views led to the eventual decision of restricting the position of Imam to local persons, trained in the UK according to the Western model of chaplaincy but in conformity with Islamic principles. In response to the need for the presence of Muslim chaplains in schools, higher and further educational institutions, health services, social welfare, prisons, the police, the armed forces and industry ; the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE), Leicester, UK has taken the lead in devising and awarding Certificates in Chaplaincy to Imams and other Muslim students.

Also in this respect, The Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) is a community conceived, community driven and community led initiative, mainly to facilitate good governance in mosques and work to improve the standards of the training of Imams and mosque management. It is an independent body, non-sectarian in its outlook and represents the diversity of Islam through its four leading Muslim organisations – the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), the British Muslim Forum (BMF) and the al-Khoei Foundation (KF).

Whilst in 1964 there were only nine officially registered mosques in England and Wales, by 1998, the number had increased to 614 (Peach, 2000). Many of them seem to be as symbols of obscure or alien cultural presence for the locals. Obscurity is related to

their being situated in converted buildings such as houses, warehouses and factories. A mosque, therefore, « is not a consecrated building; it is a small area of the earth that has been walled for convenience so that the faithful can pray there without distraction » (Eaton 206). Unlike the Christian who steps out of the profane world into a sacred enclosure upon his entrance to the church, for the Muslim the whole earth is his 'place of prayer'. In fact, the first mosque of Islam was simply the courtyard into which the Prophet's apartment and the apartments of his family opened out. Over time, however, mosque architecture developed as a result of ethnic genius. The dome, minarets jutted upwards, embellishment of the place of prostration, light, and the decorative tiling are all symbols of Muslim art. Traditional Islamic architecture, despite its variety among the Islamic world itself, like all other traditional lifestyles, only matches to the lives of Muslims and entirely fits the atmosphere of spiritual things, and thus facilitates the performance of their activities. The westerner, unfortunately, has often objected to such designs without paying attention to the fact that neither taste nor freedom of religion right are applicable to this contestation over sites of worship. To illustrate, the planning process of the Dar ul-Uloom Islamia in Small Heath, Birmingham, provides that one letter of the neighbouring residents « inquired of planners when they were 'going to stop allowing Birmingham being turned into England's own version of Baghdad?', exhorting that mosques should be 'built in modern style so that they fit in with other buildings, instead of sticking out like a sore thumb' » (Gale 41). Their opposition did not unduly influence the building of the mosque because, being at the stop for members of the City Council when diplomats visit Birmingham from other countries, the perception that the building could form a landmark for Birmingham as a multicultural city surprisingly defended ethnic architecture in face of what they conceived to be integrated urban regeneration.

There has been a proliferation of mosques and Muslim organizations in recent decades – according to the latest information contained in the report, Mosques Made in Britain (Quilliam 2009) there are between 1200 and 1600 mosques in Britain – despite the problems that have arisen with regard to their delivery system and infrastructure. That is often the result of sectarian affiliation and transnational links to Muslim States, not an indication of planned project of mission and revitalization. And even Muslims who were

not strongly religious went regularly for their congregational prayers because they saw religion in terms of public policy and not just private life (Modood 122).

Religious Education

Education can also lead to greater understanding and intellectual commitment to one's religion. Therefore, geographers of religion have not trained their gaze only on mosques but on schools as well because they are key institutions through which the value of Islam in a society can be assessed.

In their concern about contemporary social and educational conditions in the West in general, many Muslim and non-Muslim scholars share the discourse on Islam and education. Within the discourse on Islamic education, many other issues surface: the conception of Islam in education, the Islamic concept of knowledge, and the means and extent of religious transmission. Most of the studies point out that the transmission of Islam and other religions is significantly more prevalent than the transmission of Christianity. So, schools have become another site of contention for the reason that many policy makers argued that Islamic schools detract from integration as they will be populated largely by immigrant children. And most of them see the support of Islamic education as an act of Islamisation of knowledge and a step towards whole Islamisation of the society. Yet, the advocates of the Islamic approach to education differ among themselves on their own arguments for their Islamic view of education. This suggests that no careful planning underlies any of the Muslim educational decisions.

First and foremost, the discussion of Islamic education on the whole is inextricably linked to the critique of western educational systems on the ground that the latter promotes a secularist approach to life. Professor Ashar Ali claimed that education in Britain « can, perhaps unintentionally, too easily breed scepticism and relativism and leads to the loss of the sense of sacredness of life, with all the impoverishment of the human spirit which this entails » (The Islamic Academy 2). In this way, the need for

an Islamic education should be perceived as a solution scholars wish to offer – a solution that lies in a divinely-guided system.

The phrase 'Islamic education' means no more than education related to Islam, and it is an original conception that belongs to the past when Muslim scholars excelled both in scientific and religious fields. Their scholarship relied on Islam's ideals as much as it did on the scientific knowledge. Over time and despite the different schools of thought and ideas in Islam, different approaches and interpretations of both education and Islam, religious education remains specific, efficient and reliable. It is thus no surprise that Muslims have always retained their Islamic ideals even when they worked or lived with people of their faiths. In fact, the continuation of membership in religious communities tends to be associated with the prevalence of religious transmission. Muslims demonstrate this perfectly and this is thanks to successful religious transmission.

The implementation of Islamic education is another matter. What approach to design to actualize educational equality for students from diverse racial, ethnic, cultural, social, and linguistic groups raised a lot of debates. Multicultural education was the initial phase in response to their demands of equal opportunities to learn. Later on and so as to silence ethnic protest and discontent, structural changes were brought within schooling systems such as the insertion of ethnic courses, ethnic studies branches, the recognition of ethnic holidays, and bilingual education programs. When the achievement gap persisted, it became clear that the educational issue needs broader and deeper changes. Thus, anti-racist education emerged primarily in Britain as a critique of multi-cultural education (Bonnet and Carrington)

The majority of Muslim families seem to rely on cultural traditions of previous generations for their religious education and daily practice of Islam although Islam is known as a 'religion of the book'. They are very few those who consult Qur'an and Hadith intimately. To combat the influence of Western schooling and social life, mosques started offering in the intention of keeping Muslims' children within the culture of their ancestors. Many mosques in the UK operate as associated madrasahs or maktabs attended by children from as young as five years old, in theevenings, or at weekends. This idea of religious upbringing should also be of interest to non-Muslims

according to a number of British experts who state that « there is a risk that any idea of a child being socialized into a monotheistic worldview from birth and then, when old enough, attending classes several times a week to learn to read the Qur'an in classical Arabic is certainly outside the mainstream of secular Western childhood » (Scourfield et al. 1).

Broadly speaking, education or, just as it is referred to by some, the three Rs (race, relations and arithmetic) has always been the most complex and most discussed topic regarding Muslim immigrants and their descendants in Britain. It has always secured a place at the centre of political and academic debate, and has also often been perceived as having the power to determine young ethnic minorities' long term integration. Initially, it was argued that educational disadvantage was present among immigrants, with many being less educationally qualified than their white counterparts. It was also argued that Britain's educational system was unprepared for the arrival of post war immigrant youths and thus didn't effectively cater for them. If we assume that Britain lacked a clear notion of how to integrate migrant youths, why have the post war education policies too often been influenced by the society's xenophobic and racist sentiments? Why did the policy makers make pessimistic statements about Islamic education though not all people who learn religion do that to get engaged in issues of theology, but it is to practise it?

As the 1970s progressed, it was increasingly recognized that changes needed to be made within the education system to prepare children for a multicultural society and that ethnic minority children could no longer be perceived simply in terms of disadvantage. If Britain were a multi-racial society, it should have an education system that reflects this. It should fight racism and combat underachievement amongst ethnic minority youth and advocate cultural tolerance. It should draw upon and teach about an array of different cultures, thus offering children a multicultural education. This was best documented in the 1985 Swann Report which stressed that the learning needs of youths of all ethnicities should be met.

The 1990s education policies were said to have permitted the gradual abandonment of a multicultural anti-racist education, with English language support, decline in effective systems for monitoring ethnic minority pupils, teachers no longer being given adequate

preparation to teach in a multicultural society …etc. Later on, Islam started to be perceived as an influential factor. Indeed, many studies have focused on pupils' academic performances, arguing that Muslims educated in the British state system are hindered academically and culturally, and that too many are failing to attain high-level grades and qualifications. This has particularly been stressed for those of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Turkish and Somali backgrounds (Hackett 156).

Other researches highlighted racism was the result of religious differences; the manner in which Islam was associated with negative images has impacted Muslim youths' educational engagement, motivation and success. Muslim parents also disapproved of a Christian-orientated education system.

Despite the difficulties encountered by Muslim learners such as language problems, the concentration of ethnic minority pupils in certain schools, and also low levels of inter-ethnic friendship across all Britain, Taylor's study of all Indian and Pakistani boys who reached learning age in schools between 1962 and 1967 revealed that his respondents performed better educationally than their white Eglish counterparts. This continued to the early 1970s. Attention granted to education increased during the 1980s again as a result of the 1976 Race Relations Act which required authorities to eliminate discrimination and promote positive race relations and equality of opportunity in education. The subsequent publication in 1985 of education for all (the Swann Report), which continued and extended the work of Rampton Report (Interim report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups 1981), was considered as a landmark in the British multicultural education. The report showed that the assimilationist and integrationist approaches to education had failed ethnic minority children and stressed the importance of a multicultural education which would educate all children irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds. The 1990s also witnessed some progress and development. In 1992 the National Union of Teachers published anti-racist curriculum guidelines, and the publication of the Fourth Policy Studies Institute survey in 1997 revealed the vast disparities that existed between the educational performances and qualifications of different ethnic groups.

While Islam played a limited role in other social patterns and indicators of integration, it has not done so in education, at least not within mainstream schools. There

has been a call for Islam to be further recognized in the country's education system, whether in the form of state-funded Muslim schools or the incorporation of Islamic religious education into school curriculum. For Muslims in Britain, the source of Islamic religious and cultural education has not been confined to mosques and official organization, but rather such education has also undoubtedly taken place in Muslim migrant-run businesses and neighbourhoods.

Muslims have increasingly become integrated into their respective education system. They have resisted the underachievement and limitations that have often afflicted Muslim migrants in Britain and have achieved integration whilst simultaneously preserving their own Muslim identities.

The Socio-Economic Status of British Muslims

Following paths of immigration similar to that of Christian and Jewish immigrants, growing Muslim groups fled to the West in Quest of a better life that would be brief. Being a diasporic population, they met the same problems as many other immigrants. The general tendency in most Western societies is that immigrants have a range of difficulties with regards to housing, education, and employment. The involvement in these matters reflects much disagreement, ignorance at best, and racism at worst. When it comes to Muslims of Britain, Zebiri asserts that they « are among the most disadvantaged groups in Britain, with neglect and racism undoubtedly playing a part in this » (Zebiri 20).

The majority of Muslim immigrants entered Britain at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. They were recruited to do mostly low paid jobs, and settled in the most deprived parts of Britain's industrial towns and cities. As a result of many studies, white neighbourhoods offered more economic advantages than the more ethnically mixed areas. And of all ethnic minorities in Britain, the Pakistanis who originate from peasant regions of Punjab and Azad Kashmir represent the poorest minority, but the Bangladeshis coming from Sylhet of the north-east are worse than the Pakistanis. As far as economy is concerned, they are the most marginalised ethnic groups. Looking at employment, being an indicator of integration, they are either unemployed which means 'never worked', or

'long term unemplyed'. If it happens that they are employed in higher managerial professions, the rate is the lowest of all the population. Another point about Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups is their women who share the same status as their men. They are often discriminated against for wearing headscarves in the workplace. Very few are economically active, leaving a huge gap between themselves and their Indian counterparts.

The British 2001 census data confirms that Muslims of England and Wales occupy an underprivileged position. Their proportion of economic integration in the white colour classes is only half that of the total population. The Hindu and the Sikh are basically much higher in terms of employment proportion in the same occupations. To illustrate, « the Muslim figure for 'never worked' or 'long-term unemployed' was five times higher than that for the population as a whole (16 percent compared to the average of 3 percent) » (Abbas. 'Muslim Britain'30). This should be the outcome of some good racial and gender reasons. The absence of Muslim women from the labour force scene and the racial discrimination practised against south Asians are reliable motives. But the evidence that Hindu and Sikh percentages remain more often than not higher than that of Muslims proves there has been a shift from a racial discrimination to religious or cultural ones. The following graph highlights the fact that Muslims (Bangladeshis and Pakistanis) are the least recruited among other ethnic groups, the reson why they became the most self-employed.

Figure3: Socio-Economic Classification by Ethnic Groups, 2001 UK Census, Men Aged 20–59

Online Data Drawn from the 2001 UK Census.

There is an increasing recognition of the economic disadvantage experienced by Muslims in many European countries and the UK in particular. Above their ethnic disadvantages in the labour market, being Muslim, they experience much more disadvantages. After investigating the patterns of Muslim migrants' employment, it appeared that religion emerged as a source of discrimination. Indeed, some migrants' type of business may often be determined by their religious affiliation; halal butchers, Pakistani corner shops, Bangladeshi clothing stores are clear evidences. But did they not add vitality and diversity to the coutry's economy?

Furthermore, self-employment was a widespread choice among many Muslim ethnic minorities across Britain. This achievement of some economic independence is sometimes attributed to the country's reputation in welcoming foreigners, but this is part of the traditional British working-class work patterns. It also was the case with Jewish immigrants who arrived there at the end of the nineteenth century. Some post-war South Asian Muslims achieved successful entrepreneurship moving from smaller forms of door to door peddlers and market stalls to a much more important shops and restaurants. In essence, this ever-increasing entrepreneurialism and success in introducing new ideas,

products and businesses that serve both the migrants and their white host populations are the result of their own self-determination, understanding and good contact with their local host societies. Some may think that their preference for self-sufficiency is the direct result of a failure to integrate. This is not true because many of their businesses have served the British population. Self-employment played an important role in the economic progress of some Muslim migrants. But unlike what is dominant in historiography, the emergence of entrepreneurship is often explained as a consequence of their host country's economic structural change. In other words, it is as a result of the declining manufacturing sector and the difficulties encountered finding work. The reality, then, is that these Muslims possessed the inherent aims of entrepreneurialism and economic independence. The search for independence can also be witnessed in the manner they established their businesses: they rarely seek assistance or advice. According to Sarah Hackett, « only around one-fifth did and, of these, 75 percent approached family and friends. Infact, only 7 percent of the business owners took advantage of the professional advice available … » (Hackett 76).

A further illustration is the British 2011 census data which demonstrate that there is 1 in 5 of the Muslim population in full-time employment, compared to more than 1 in 3 of the general population. The census in general tells us that people with no religion had the highest proportion of people who were economically active, Christians and Muslims the lowest. Jewish people had the highest level of employment and Muslim people the highest level of unemployment.

Whether Islam has also had an impact on shaping migrant employment traits or not, we can say no, despite its weight. Muslim businessmen, even if Muslims worked in a manner that will maximize profits and Islam were not a barrier to trade and integration. Across Britain, Muslim businesses acted as epicentres of migrant communities. Adults meet there to gossip and talk about politics, children go after school, and Muslim migrants can expose their religious, ethnic and cultural identities. These independent businesses are the result of hard work and commitment to local societies. They also resulted in positive race relations by defying the restraints that most of the time plagues Muslim migrants in the West in general.

The main attraction for immigration remains economic opportunities, and housing is another sector for the assessment of multiculturalism. It refuelled the debate with regard to ethnic segregation. In the housing market, struggle for shelter was the destiny of many immigrants who went independently to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. They suffered overcrowding and low access to public authority housing. To illustrate, many Pakistanis and Bangladeshis settled in the inner-city areas of northern textile towns, such as Oldham and Bradford and others in areas of London. Pakistanis preferred owner occupation; many of them became concentrated in 19th century inner city terraces, yet they moved later into housing of higher quality in better neighbourhoods. Bangladeshis, on the other hand, suffer high rates of unemployment; sot hey tended to live in inner city areas, depended on council housing and had low rates of owner-occupation.

The literature on housing of ethnic minorities in Britain since the 1960s concluded that ethnic minorities, and especially minorities in Britain, suffered high levels of discrimination in the housing sector and were consequently forced into low quality housing. Though in recent years religion was incorporated in the debate over housing, there is not a sufficient amount of literature on the influence of religion on the housing careers of ethnic minorities in Britain. But the shift in focus from ethnicity to religion was further encouraged by the September 11th events, the 2005 London Bombings, and the increasingly widespread perception of Islam as a threat. The results of research on Muslims' housing patterns in Britain showed that Muslims are victims of harassment, and experience a concentration in both poor-quality housing and areas of deprivation. Indeed, for social and cultural reasons Muslims tend to cluster together, but still the notions of 'self-segregation' and 'parallel lives' which emerged after the 2001 can not be approved of. First, they just failed to access to certain neighbourhoods; second, the choice argument of Muslims was often explained that it was with the aim of saving money to send home, so shared accomodation was to economize. Another theme which shuld be awarded a substantial amount of attention is that among South Asian communities, the Indian community has been the most successful in achieving residential mobility. In New Castle, for instance, they left the West End for more prestigious areas like Jesmond and Gosforth. By contrast, about 75% of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis remained in the West End.

On the whole, residential behaviour in Britain was shaped by the country's post-war immigration framework. Muslim ethnic minorities found themselves' just as they did with regard to employment, looking for independence and self-sufficiency on the open local housing market. Therefore, they placed their ethnic and religious identities in neighbourhoods, succeeded in making their own conscious housing decisions, and became owner-occupiers with many purchasing multiple properties and renting them out as part of their entrepreneurial projects. Persistent clustering over the generations is seen as indicative of their unwillingness to assimilate. In fact, the political discourse in twenty first century Britain represents them as a threat to cohesion in a multicultural state. Drawing on research conducted in the cities of Leeds and Bradford between 20000 and 2003, the geographies of British Asian settlement began to change from segregation towards more residential mixing (Phillips et al. 218). Residential segregation took place in neighbourhoods where Muslim migrants lived alongside the local white working class, but in many cases they have been willing to endure racial harassment over crowding and housing of a poorer quality if it has meant being able to live in their preferred properties and neighbourhoods.

With regard to the extent to which Islam has influenced Britain's housing patterns and experiences, it does not appear to have more than a small role in that. Muslims choice of residence was the result of either affordable housing or proximity to the work place, which is everybody's choice everywhere. When Islam did become more of an influential, properties were chosen for no more than being near the region's migrant community and its accompanying amenities including mosques, Islamic community centre and ethnic minority businesses.

4. Conversion to Islam

The revival of Islam was often attributed to the efforts of Islamic institutions to advertise their religious practice, causing a change in affiliation from a certain religion or belief to Islam. The frequency of conversion to Islam in the UK is not unknown, and the growth of Muslims as a result of conversion from outside is estimated to be high. But is

Islam surging in the heart of Christianity thanks to organized mission? Or is it the result of the missionary nature of Islam itself to suit anybody's inborn nature and satisfy his requirements?

To begin with, conversion has been « one of the most sensitive religious practices in history and, both religiously and politically, a principal cause of religious revival, competition and violence » (Seo 8).Undoubtedly, it has long been understood as a life-changing transition and a metaphysical experience between God and the individual. Nevertheless, social science has sought to identify the concept of conversion, its types, motivations, and consequences. It can be a leap from one religion or a godless state of mind to another religion. It has a double face[3] and comprises many types: active, marital, forced, and deathbed

With particular interest in Britain and Islam therein, converts to Islam present a paradox. This is mainly when we consider that the process developed through free choice, without doubt or ambiguity to join a disadvantaged minority seen to be inferior to the majority. This acceptance of becoming a minority within another minority, which does not imply earning economic profits or attaining social advantages, induces us to consider the secrets that led converts to adopt Islam for their guide in life. Most conversions demand a high degree of courage to pull through. In fact, most converts have discovered the faith for themselves. In respect of this, Walker H. Williams, one of the British converts claimed:

> I would like to say that I feel confident, that if only people in this and other western countries can be brought to appreciate the full meaning of Islam, and what it stands for, the ranks of Islam will be daily-swelled, only unfortunately there is a vast amount of misapprehension in the minds of many free thinkers and others who still cling to their old creed simply because they require the moral courage to abandon a faith, with the principles of which they are at variance, and to embrace Islam (Shahid 44).

Of course, it is often within a religious problem-solving perspective that conversion finds the way to take place. This occurs without social pressure, yet with a high degree of intellectual engagement with the religion, search for the truth and direction of right

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[3]Double face means the perspective of the receiving and of the departed religious group.

thinking. Researchers classify this type of condition for conversion as intellectual converts or 'converts of conviction' (Brice 44). The other types of converts are exemplified by the persons who admit to having converted to Islam for mystical, experimental, emotional, inspired and forced motives. All of these would come under the heading of the conversion by convenience. Most of the time the illustration of this type is the female convert who, for emotional reason, converts to facilitate marriage to a Muslim partner without showing interest in Islam as a result of conscience.

Most recent scholarly contributions to the phenomenon of religious conversion share the view that it is not all of a sudden, but takes time and progresses over an unprecise period of time. It is a matter of choice not brainwashing. In fact, many Muslim converts reported having observed a number of religions before eventually settling on Islam. Some of them, in order to feel more complete with the faith, choose a Muslim name though this is not obligatory. The same can be said about male circumcision which is not required of adult converts who desire to undergo it as an act of earnestness.

From an Islamic perspective, the rituals of conversion consist of the declaration of faith in Islam at the mosque and through the utterance of the two testimonies. Adopting Islamic practices would come next and grow with the convert's faith. However, the piety of converts often seem heightened and more realistic than that of someone who has grown up with the religion – Islam – as part of his everyday life. Converts are more likely to have a high level of religious involvement, exert efforts to educate themselves in Islam, and also tend to be more active for da'wah because they are well-equipped to be cultural mediators. White converts in particular are less defensive and more confident, freer for open criticism of the host society and outspoken on political issues, and more vocal in standing against oppression. Kate Zebiri, with regard to conversion to Islam, claims that elements such as the freedom of speech and conscience, encountering immigrant Muslims and their descendants without a need to travel to their countries, and the popularity of Islam through the internet and publications help to facilitate the way for conversion to occur (Zebiri 49-50). But most of the time conversion happens at the level of the individual, takes much time before it happens, and no matter how much Islam is recognized in their society, they get more serious towards their conversion. Consequently, this desire to join the Muslim community is indeed a matter of real

conversion not only commitment to a different culture or a case of new choice of belonging.

Diverse motifs influence the phenomenon of religious conversion: social, cultural, ethical, academic, and even financial. The current upsurge in conversions, however, needs more scientific explanations. Most researchers found that people who converted were in search of meaningfulness for their lives, spiritual knowledge, a way out from their unstoppable development, and a religious guidance. The converts are different people from different social classes, and with different intellectual levels and different stories in regard to their conversion, but all of them share the same search for emotional and psychological stability, religious conviction, a faith of reason and rationality, a moral and ethical refuge, which they found only in Islam.

Today, Islam is the second most popular religion in the UK and is continuously growing through British born Muslims and conversions to the faith. The latter had occurred as early as the seventh century when Prophet Muhammad was requested to spread the message in the Arabian Peninsula. And from the beginning non-Arabs were among the first who converted out of personal conviction; not under pressure. For instance, there is Bilal ibn Rabah who was of Ethiopian origin. Islam freed him, and he became a companion to the prophet and the first official muezzin (caller to prayer). But at that time, conversion of non-Arabs was considered as a way to gain a better social status, and the main reason of the spread of Islam. It was also a thought to be a way to evade the jiziah and discrimination. But it is much more a matter of conviction. The fact itself is so simple: pronouncing the Shahadah. Moreover, conversion happened after encounter; so, it is a matter of cultural effect not force or mission. Early cultural exchanges in Spain are evidence of that. And whoever wanted to keep and practise his faith had greater freedom even when under Muslim reign. Under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire, for instance, Jews and Christians were tolerated and could regulate their affairs autonomously. And after the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Islam ceased to be considered a threat. The Age of Enlightenment and the rise of Romanticism in art introduced the beaty and riches of Eastern culture and civilisation to non-Muslim Europeans. This interest in orientalism led to conversion to Islam in many instances. But converts to Islam were often stereotyped

either as becoming new enemies within a Muslim society or as disloyal citizens within a non-Muslim society. They had to encounter distrust and scepticism on both sides.

In the course of talking about early evidence of Islam in Britain, one has to state that in its classical period it did not reach the country. As far as conversion is concerned, King Offa's coin with the shahadah embossed on its reverse side allowed historians to deduce the possibility of his conversion. Another illustration is the marriage of Robert of St. Albans, the cousin of Richard the Lionheart[4], in the year 1185 C.E. It is impossible to assume that Robert changed his faith because a Muslim lady cannot marry a Christian or Jewish man. Another landmark is King John's secret delegation to the Moroccan ruler, Mohammad al-Nasser in 1213(Morgan). The message of the King's emissaries was that if military support were given to England, he would become Muslim with all his subjects in recognition of that. Though this was reported in more than one source, some historians' doubts about it prevail especially when we consider how the ruler of Morocco turned down that chance of England becoming Islamic (Stewart).

British Muslim converts were not numerous, yet reports of their conversions trace back to the late 19th century. Both this late Victorian era and the subsequent Edwardian period were known for their attempts to build bridges between Christianity and Islam to make Islam seem more acceptable and present it as a system which is compatible with the British way of life. A play on words making Islam more acceptable became part of the Muslim converts' communication methods. For example, the Woking Mission was often referred to as the 'Muslim Church,' and the Qur'an was often titled the 'Muslim Bible'.

Although the actual presence of Muslim lascars goes back to the Middle of the 19th century, it was with the arrival of students and professionals who mastered English and came from high classes in their own societies that the first conversions of Englishmen started. This means it is not always a matter of loss when emulating foreigners in language and some cultural features as long as religion is kept safe. On the contrary, this might have been a facilitator for a new phase of Islam in non-Islamic lands. In Britain, this began when a Liverpudlian nobleman and lawyer, William Henry Quilliam, embraced Islam in 1887 after a visit to Moroccoand independent study of Islam. Then, he

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[4]A chivalrous English king who was famous for battling Saladin during The Crusades, and known for rebelling against his father, Henry II. King John is his younger brother.

went on to become the founder of the Liverpool Mosque and Muslim Institute. Quilliam's converts have mostly been devout Christians prior to their conversion. This along with the man's enthusiasm and devotion to defend Islam through books and pamphlets demonstrate the success of Islam in Liverpool under the leadership of an Englishman and with the means of conviction not effort of poor lascars. Had these been more literate than and as aware of their religion as Shaykh Abdullah Quilliam, conversion of the British could have taken place about forty years earlier.

It is no wonder then to consider conversion to Islam as a spiritual journey of the convert throughout which Islam seems to answer all his questions. It became evident for converts that living Islam depends much on understanding it rather than by birth right, living within Islamic environments or being beside Muslims. By defense of itself, Islam reached the hearts of many British people. Indeed, the presence of Cosmopolitan Muslim communities such as the Nawab Nazir of Bengal and his two sons, Mohamad Ali Jinnah, an Indian Muslim as the personal physician of Queen Victoria led to the construction of the first mosque in Britain in 1889 at Woking, West of London. But Quilliam travelled around Britain, lectured on Islam and built up international Islamic contacts as well. Well-knowledged Muslims such as Muhammad Abduh and Ahmad Sayyid Khan supported him in establishing a British Islam suitable for the English, following the traditional path and standing against anysectarian movement such as Wahhabism.

Quilliam's Liverpool Mosque and Institute (LMI) was the best mission site of his time, promoting Islam and offering religious services that conform to Islamic belief and at the same time adopted the form of rituals English speaking Muslims or converts were accustomed to (Ally 58). The Imam of LMI, Barakatullah stated that « true Islam would revive from the West simply because the Muslims in the West are Muslims by reason, not by birth » (Bonney et al. 299). But Quilliam's success in attracting a significant number of converts was faced with antagonism. Continuous pressure forced him to leave Liverpool to go and live in the East. Although Quilliam's followers were Englishmen already Musli mat heart and he only facilitated the way for them to convert, antipathic British policy towards his activities led to the decline and closure of his Mosque and Institute.

While the LMI movement was in decline, another mission was growing up in Woking. The Woking Mosque was responsible for meeting the needs of many converts to Islam and offering necessary religious activities. It owed much of its vitality to Khawaja Kamal-ud-Din, a Lahore Barrister who came to England in 1912 and within few months he established the Woking mission whose first influential achievement was the conversion of an English lord – Lord Headley – (al-Haj al-Farooq) in 1913.

Parallel to the effort of Quilliam in Liverpool, Lord Headley revived Islam in Britain and silenced many Christian critics. He attracted a group of potential British converts with whom he developped the Woking mission through an autonomous body called the British Muslim Society set up in 1914 and headed by him. The purpose of the BMS was to present Islam in a very modernist way to suggest that Islam could be relevant to people living in Britain. For this reason, it managed to provoke many conversions, and according to the Islamic Review[5] « in 1924 the number of Muslims was estimated at 10.000 and the estimated figure of British converts was about 1000 » (De Kose 17). The activities of the BMS also consisted of organizing Public literary events. It collaborated with other Muslim organizations such as the Muslim Literary Society (MLS) under the presidence of Abdullah Yusuf Ali, the Quranic translator with the active support of Marmaduke Pickthall who also famed in Qur'an translation, and the celebrated Syyid Ameer Ali.

The Englishman to Englishman message lies within much of the Woking mission's success. In addition, converts had always been presented as being 'better Christians'. However, because of the mission being an Ahmadyiah Movement and with the development of the Central Mosque and East London Mosque in London for the increasing Muslim Population there, the mission's activism weakened.

Lord Headley, being a prominent Muslim convert, believed in the idea of submitting to Islam through compromise. He, himself, fought with personal challenges his western way of life. It was also said he went to India to convince the Nizam of Hyderabad to contribute for the mosque project. Lady Eveline Cobbold was another Muslim Convert who fell in love with the Arab culture and Islam. She was the first English woman to set foot in Mecca and wrote a book titled 'Pilgrimage to Mecca'. According to many others,

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[5]A monthly started by khawaja Kamal Ud Din of India. First, it was called Muslim India and Islamic Review, then iit became Islamic Review and Modern India and finally it became The Islamic Review in 1921

it has become evident that « Islam is the natural religion that a child left to itself would develop » (MacLean 165).

Although many Muslim converts exist, only few of them stand out from the crowd to present Islam strongly and make effort to influence those who may be in search for an alternative faith to their common religious belonging. Though many believe most converts are local women who have adopted Islam upon marrying Muslims, there are British intellectuals, who, through personal curiosity and contact, came to know Islam. These prominent Muslim converts contributed to early 20th century intellectual Islam by highlighting its teachings and principles accurately and professionally. Most of them reported that it was thaie answer to their search of spiritual enlightenment. From the bottom of their hearts, they assumed influential positions within the Muslim community.

While in Muslim countries Islam is mixed with local culture and traditions, converts believe that Islam has no national and ethnic boundaries. Some converts even attempted to start their own religious movements. Ian Dallas from Scotland, for instance, became Abd al-Qàdir as-sufi after his conversion in Morocco in 1967 and started his Sufic Movement in the seventies under the name of the Darqàwiyyah, but it became later the Muràbitun European Muslim Movement. In fact, the second half of the 20th century seemed to be a period of Sufism's emergence and embrace – a fact that was believed to have been the major foslam in Britain. Sufism is popular among elite and professional middle classes in Britain, but not among every Muslim group. Yet, it is thought to be the key point for conversion of non-Muslims to Islam and the spread of Islam on the whole. Sufi tariqas (orders) were meant to develop spirituality against modernism and extremism.

The Naqshbandi Movement was also attractive to a number of converts who admired its charismatic Turkish Cypriot and leader pir, Shaykh Nazim, and everything about his lifestyle and spiritual behaviour. Since it was founded in 1973, the act of performing rituals publicly has consolidated the concrete show of Muslimness in Britain. Sheikh Nazim has made efforts in supporting the building of Sufi centres to make the order spread in every part of the world. The establishment of the tariqa in London was facilitated by the existence of people following the teachings of a certain John G. Bennett, disciple of Georgii Gurdjieff (Kabbani 495) who became influenced by different

Sufi sheikhsteachings throughout his extensive travels inCentral Asia and the Middle East.The number of Sheikh Nazim's followers in Britain gradually grew as a result of his order's devotion to Islamic spirituality, removing Muslims and converts's depression, regular prayers and dhikr. There are Naqshbandi-Haqqani centres or activity sites of varying size in many other cities in the UK; Sheffield, Birmingham, Slough, Rochdale, Leicester and Glastonbury.

Amongst the British Muslims, converts to Islam represent a small group. Yet, they are significant members who work hard to present the faith. In other words, these converts view Islam as the religion of rationality despite their being more rooted in British society than in foreign cultural environments. They assumed responsibility for the reconfiguration of Islam in the British society, and made efforts to balance their British identity with their new Muslim religious identity. Combining Britishness with Islam has always been the duty of Muslims in Britain on the whole, but many researchers believe the best bridge builders in this communication are the British converts. They seemed more confident to even challenge the understanding of both 'Westophobia' and 'Islamophobia.

Statistically speaking, the number of British Muslim converts has no precise figures. But there are different suggestions which range from 20 to 50 thousand[6]. A lot of them come from Catholic rather than other denominations. The churches in general have largely lost their once-automatic role as society's conscience. This role will continue to decline as long as they will have fewer attendees. The former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey, has warned that unless urgent action is taken the Anglican Church is "just one generation away from extinction." Most Christians' relief from worries was found in the belief that while no revival is permanent, neither has been any decline. However, the revival of Islam seems to be steady, and the converts claimed that their decision to embrace Islam was based on its nature not encounter.

Earlier conversions to Islam among British people were the result of visiting the Muslim world or meeting and living with a prominent Muslim in Britain, but the recent years show that both the rate and reasons of conversions have changed radically. Conversin to Islam is increasing day after day and it is frequent particularly among rich

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[6]See the works of Muslim Britons : Timothy Winter and Yahia Birt

and educated British people of the middle class without missionary interferences. It was rather for spiritual and intellectual reasons, which explained their subsequent and lasting loyalty and attempts to face the media's negative portrayal of Islam especially after the 9/11 attacks. The aims of the converts seem to be bridging the gap between the Muslim community and the mainstream British society. If so, the revival of Islam does not rely on the British converts as it does on its very nature and principles. At least at this stage of progression of universal events, converts only help Muslims to integrate. In fact, most converts in the UK did not seem to have changed culturally even after they adopted the religion of Islam. More than that, they seek to free Islam from its dominant cultural chains such as being closely tied to Arab origins. This would assert the superiority of religion over culture. Most Muslim converts could resist the different cultural aspects associated with the Muslim communities, but were not able to behave similarly towards Islam. Besides, they emphasize its universality and contribute to its image in Britain. Ron Geaves, a professor of the Comparative Study of Religion, stated that « Muslim countries may have been dominated by Western technology and concomitant military might, but Islam as a religion could still reach the hearts and minds of the 'infidels' » (Geaves 294).

5. The Question of Integration

Western research on race relations in the 1940s and 1950s considered that ethnic groups will both be desirable and inevitable. Robert E. Park[7], for instance, believed that ethnic groups experience the process of contact, conflict and accomodation just before they assimilate. More than that, most of them worked hard to attain cultural assimilation and integration into their host societies. Yet, the rise of ethnic protest movements during the 1960s and 1970s revealed that the liberal ideology that dominated Western social science and national policies was limited in that it failed to explain and portend the course of events related to ethnic groups in modern democratic societies.

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[7]A noted sociologist at the university of Chicago. He was famous for his work on ethnic minority groups, particularly African Americans, race relations, human ecology, migration and social movements.

The Western view of non-white groups began to consider them as separatists and to think that the assimilationist ideology has worked much less well for them. This was often attributed to their nature of self-segregation. But this could also have been interpreted as a failure from the part of Western state to close the gap between their societies and the ethnic minorities living amongst them. This gap has been left between the theoretical assimilationist conception and the needs to materialize it. It happened that even when ethnic groups are highly culturally assimilated, they experienced high levels of exclusion, no quality education, no right to vote and participate in political processes. It is this sense of marginalization and disillusionment which led them to revitalize their cultures and demand structural inclusion and opportunity to uphold the most important aspects of their identity – language and religion.

The fear of difference is a source of hate. However, difference is supposed to be a source of enrichment. And trust across groups requires a respect of difference as well as a sense of commonalities (Modood). Consequently, the support of integration is incomplete without multiculturalism. The latter is related to the immigrant communities' demands of recognition for their racial, cultural and religious differences because it stands for the policy of granting them rights. Practically, the politics of multiculturalism had started and proved to be unique as early as the arrival of non-white immigrants from former colonies. First, the 1948 British Nationality Act granted the 1950s and 1960s waves of migrants the British citizenship upon arrival. Special treatment, exemptions, legal protection and permission to make claims in the name of minority group rights showed that British multiculturalism conceives the nation as a community of communities (Modood).

However, "otherness" embodied by the Muslim population in the member states of the European Union has sparked movements of transnational panic mainly driven by the fear of the collapse of "national cohesion". The social cohesion of British society seems not evident for some policy makers who think continuous emphasis upon integration in most official discourses addressed to immigrants would be the solution. They also think that multiculturalism has encouraged exclusion rather than inclusion by siphoning minority communities away from the mainstream and condemning them to live parallel lives ; by living parallel lives, these minorities preserve their ethnic behaviours and values that run counter to broader society ; besides, these separate communities may

provide fertile soil for extremism and radicalisation. Although the minorities' rejection of the British values and integration into the British society could be ascribed to some white British people support of ethnic exclusionism, it is multiculturalism as both policy and concept which has received much criticism. Most of the debates are particularly about Muslims and associated with assumptions that Muslim beliefs and practices undergo an active transnational continuity. Thus, the focus of most politicians is the consideration of Muslim religiosity by investigating their regular attendance at mosques and religious meetings. Unhampered by the fact that many researchers have noted the obstacles that apathy, ignorance, and socio-economic deprivation pose to raising awareness of conservation among Muslims, opponents of multiculturalism prefer to politicize the 21st century discourse on Islam. The term 'multiculturalism' itself is no longer used; it has been replaced with the word diversity.

Religiosity is not a crime, and it is apparent because of the ongoing secularisation in Britain which is evident in statistical data. Various studies have recently described declining numbers of people affiliated to religion, church members and goers, Sunday schools attendance, and so forth. Then while the majority of the British have been secularised and indifferent to institutionalised religion, an active performing minority will do that on behalf of the rest. The secularisation process also made religion depend on voluntary social welfare. And Muslim immigrants showed great religious adherence in building their own mosques and establish national bodies.

Indeed, Muslim immigrants in Britain have enjoyed sufficient space and opportunity to pursue their ethno-religious traditions and set up socio-religious institutions, which are important steps in their integration especially when we consider the fact that they did not challenge the nature of the British nation state. On the contrary, they made positive contributions to the British society without forgetting about their religious identity. Britain had given opportunities for its Muslims when it adopted the politics of multiculturalism, without regard to possible challenges from secularism or the Christian culture of the society. But this gave Britain a new religious landscape where secularisation seems to be threatened by the religious minorities revitalizing and asserting their religions. Then it was advisable not to let multiculturalism stand alone. It had to be supported by the integration policy which calls upon the different groups of the society to

have common sense of belonging. This means the Muslims reproduction of their ethno-religious tradition will be allowed only partially. But the institutionalisation of a different religion is an act of integration even if this will have a certain impact on the pluralisation of the religious life of Britain. This also demonstrates the essential features of Islam which travels, spreads, and move wherever its adherents settle for its flexibility.

The social and religious complexity is not exclusively a British feature. The more Muslims increase in number, the more they disassemble (Vertovec 265). Gilliat-Ray[8] points out that within British Muslims the strong influence and revival of Islam can be seen in Muslim associations linked to the Middle East such as the Muslim Association of Britain (the MAB). Of course Sunni-Hanafi South Asian Islamic form is more dominant since two thirds of them came from that region. This includes both Deobandi and Barelwi Maslaqs (sub-schools) and their affiliates such as Tablighi Jamaat and Ahl Sunnah wal Jamaa. The Shia Muslim groups (Ithna Ashari and Ismaili) consisting of immigrants from Iran, Iraq, South Asia and East Africa have also established sectarian religious communities in Britain. In addition to this, some Turkish and Somalian Muslims have also set up their own sectarian groupings because of the difference of their ethno-religious traditions. On the whole, the Muslim diaspora is forged by historical and theological divisions.

The British policy is pragmatic. It allows minority religious members freedom to exercise their religious rights and build religious social institutions protected by law. Though the secular world view is predominant, it has an important anti-blasphemy law protecting the sacredness of the Christian faith upon which it had been founded. The Race Relations Act protected immigrant minorities in terms of race. Then, it was extended to include ethno-religious groups like the Jews and Sikhs but not Muslims. Surprisingly, this does not match at all with the principles of multiculturalism. It was not before 2006 that a Racial and Religious Hatred Act was introduced to protect Muslims from discrimination against their religion. No matter what the Government's reaction was, Muslims marginal position would persist without discouraging them. Despite their

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[8]Sophie Gilliat-Ray traced the major points of encounter between Muslims and the British, and explored Muslim migration to Britain in recent times. Drawing upon sociology, anthropology, politics, and geography, her 2010 book, « Muslims in Britain » provides an analysis of the daily lives of British Muslims. It portrays the dynamic of their institutions: families, mosques, religious leadership, civic engagements, and so on.

ongoing internal diversity and fragmentation along with the need to confront the state's wave of suspicion and securitisation (Cesari 10), they succeeded to establish institutions and associations which served, represented, and united them to negotiate their political demands; such as, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) through which they could articulate their voices in the larger context of the British society.

Conclusion

The Muslim diaspora in the UK is a new modern phenomenon for Muslims who came from diverse religious or non-religious cultural traditions, national backgrounds, and had different motives for immigration. They lived side by side as a minority religious community in foreign lands. Far from the sword legend and without brainwashing, conversion to Islam increased and was a matter of choice and conviction. The British constant negative statements about mosque building, Muslims regular practice there, and the religious upbringing through Islamic education could not stop the growth of Muslims or the spread of Islam and its Shar'ia law. For some people it was a socio-religious miracle, or the birth of a slow but steady spiritual revolution in Britain.In spite of Muslims socio-economic disadvantage, their search for independence led to self-employment, and consequently to both financial self-sufficiency and good service to the Britiish society. Talks about assimilation and the integration ideologiesn, however, were the new challenges to the British Muslims self-made stability.

The politicization of religion led to the Muslim immigrants' need of being represented by socio-religious institutions and organizations to both the British state and public. Shaped by their shared marginal positions or mobilized by Muslim religious community leaders, and sharing the same sense of victimhood ; this scared some British policy makers who forgot that the internal fragmentation of Muslims is rooted in that already existing in their home countries, particularly the Middle East and South Asia. In fact, Islamic sects including the two main branches of Islam, Sunni and Shi'a and their sub-groups have taken root in the UK, too.

Chapter III: The Roots of Islamic Revival in Britain

Introduction

The contemporary Islamic revival seems to have been unexpected or at least underestimated by the non-Islamic world which was preoccupied by economic issues and security problems. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to examine the nature of Islam's regenerative capacity, and further the understanding of the outlook of its action – modes and forms – and the possible causal factors responsible for greater and lesser degrees of Islamic religiosity.

Just as much intellectual diversity experienced around giving exact definitions to terms like revival and its variants, the debate over its causes also varies according to the socio-economic and political background of the setting. Therefore, the vagueness around the Islamic resurgence persists whether in the Islamic world itself or in the West.

Though the contemporary wave of religious activism is stimulated by various faiths – Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, Hinduism and others – which differ in belief but are all opposed to some of the values of modernity, it seems that only Islam requires tight control and also needs to be kept at distance from the Christian Secular West. Seeing Islam sweeping across Europe to be the second largest religion made observers claim that Christianity's stronghold on the European Continent is giving way to the ambitious and assertive religion of Islam, and that a new Muslim transnational culture will surpass the national cultures of the French, Germans, and the English. Several political and intellectual debates are taking place in the UK on the growth of the Muslim community and the assertiveness of their faith. With regard to the secrets of this expansive religion, worries, doubts, theories, and expectations have usually intermixed with real motives.

More often than not reference is made to the multiplication of Muslim communities, the Islamic mosques – and how worshippers frequent them at the expense of churches and Cathedrals which, for them, seem to become some day vestiges of times past if the present rate of Muslim assertiveness continues – the immigration policies as well as conversions. Public discussions and scholarly debates have also focused on some deep ideological, historical and global issues. The Iranian revolution, the public burning of the

Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait along with the tectonic events of September 11th and Operation Enduring Freedom, the global war on terrorism, and the war in Iraq and its aftermath have all combined to dramatically affect the religio-political landscape of the Muslim world.

From a European perspective, the literature on Islamic religiosity is mainly the literature on Fundamentalism. For example, the French Scholar of Isalm Maxime Rodinson's[1] reflections on Islamism, according to Dumas[2], sees that it means to take control of power or to plant religious dogmas as resolutions to future crises. Dumas also does not distinguish between fundamentalists and any other practising Muslim. Yet, he observes two degrees of fundamentalism: integrism which could be violent in its willingness to establish Islamic government, and radical Islam which is non-violent. Olivier Roy does not give varieties but speaks thoroughly of the concept of political Islam. And much like Dumas, Esposito notes that any Muslim who advocates a strict Islamic policy, calls for the Qur'an as the ultimate guide, and follows the Sunnah are fundamentalists; nevertheless, he finds the concept loaded with the Protestant heritage and thus prefers to call it Islamic activism. The literature on Islamic religiosity seems full of labels, and this would cloud the issue of its comprehension as well as the examination of its attributes. Still problematic is the fact of considering the difference between formal and informal Islam, the reality that Islam takes on diferent characteristics in different countries, and the degrees of religiousness even vary from a person to another, and according to their age, sex, education, and affiliation with a religious group.

Before investigating the factors shaping religiosity, one has to bear in mind that they can be highly context specific, and vary according to the national settings within which

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[1] A French Marxist historian, sociologist, and orientalist. He was a renowned specialist on Islam and the Arab world. He spoke more about Muslims than about Islam. His famous books included: the biography Mohammed 1961, Israel Et Le Refus Arabe 1968, and Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? 1973.

[2] Thomas-Alexandre Dumas was the son of Alexandre-Antoine Davy de la Pailleterie and a slave, Louise-Céssette Dumas, on the Caribbean island colony of Saint Domingue (now called Haiti). He was a great novelist. His little known piece, Charles VII in his great vassals, written in 1831 narrates the turbulent relationship of Charles de Savoisy, Lord Burgundy early fifteenth century, and Yaqoub, a buckwheat slave whom he had brought back from a crusade. By a remarkable work of erudition, Maxime Rodinson reconstructed the authentic facts of which Dumas had freely inspired himself. This research allows him to draw a surprising parallel between the perceptions of the Islamic world in the Middle Ages - where the Saracen was the "service enemy", but respected - and in the Romantic era, thus showing how a present fascination finds to feed on the fascinations of the past: a history lesson that was in Rodinson's preface to his 1980 novel: La Fascination de L'Islam.

Muslims practise, their own histories and origins, as well as the determinants of religious practice themselves. It should also be noted that Islamic surge cannot be reduced to political or popular Islam, nor ca nit be concentrated in a specific person or community. It is also the Islamic activism which aspires to piety not political order.

III. 1. The Nature of Islamic Revival

In the history of Muslim societies, it existed as a tradition of renewal. This was often known in the well-known Hadith of the prophet about sending a mujaddid – the person who guides the regeneration process – at the head of each century. The aim is the creation of a truly Islamic society. It is also a socio-religious movement, and movements continuously engage in a process of ideological framing. Ideology construction is a process of justification whose discourse relies on the synthesis of many dimensions. Most of the time, it is based on fiqh principles (Share'a) which continue to reign because they are the sure path toward the ideal society (Abou El Fadl 2001 a). But dealing with Share'a diverged in two orientations: the didactic/ Mathhabi and the literalist/Salafi. Throughout history, four religio-legal schools within the Sunni traditions have risen: the Hanifi, the Maliki, the Shafii and the Hanbali, and within the Shii tradition the Jaafari school was born. The Mathhabi orientation is built upon an Islamic thinking which is scholastic, legalistic, and non-interpretive (Hashem 26). The Mathhabis trust the work of previous ulama who think Islamic historical treasure has answers to any complex question of modernity and thus cannot be devalued. Sufis, beng followers of a certain Islamic historical corpus and its icons whom they consider legitimate arbitrators of Islam, can also be classified as Mathhabis. On the other hand, the Salafi orientation came to existence as a reaction to Mathhabis. The ulama-Sufi alliance was looked upon as incapable of confronting modernity. An alternative way to present Islam with certain approach to its sacred texts: the Qur'an and Sunnah, was scripturalism. While the Mathhabis put their trust into the understandings of past generations of scholars, the Salafis' confidence was in the letter of the text and that reform can be achieved through the return to the original sources. A Wahhabi factor, which originated in Saudi Arabia, slowly influenced the fiqhi thinking of the field of Islamic activism. The Eclectic

orientation is another position towards fiqh seeking solutions to modern dilemmas. Eclectics use their common sense and trust to validate that from fiqh. So, their views lack formal representation.

III. 2. Dimensions of Islamic Activism

Muslim activists of the contemporary times see that their past was prosperous and should be renewed, but do not have the same attitude towards the bearers of revered knowledge – ulamas. These forces' reputation experiences much depreciation; for example, they were labeled religious mercenaries. They gradually lost their privileges as Islamic action became increasingly independent from them. Little by little, a new type of speakers of Islam replaced them. They were young and college-educated men such as Mawdudi, Qutb and Shari'ati. There were not only new representatives of Islam, but a new learned class of religious speakers, political activists, and social thinkers emerged. It produced literature of higher claims and of greater influence on Islamic movements. Furthermore, it is more familiar with social movement tactics and methods. Specifically, young Islamic resurgence took three main orientations: local, global and individual. Firstly, local revival focuses on specific social illnesses to provide a remedy to them and thus recreate the Muslim community. It asserts traditional Islamic practices through mosques and other Islamic service institutions (ISIs). The former is devoted to both knowledge and behaviour to show the relevance of Islamic teachings in modern times. The latter also reflect the rationality and benevolence of Islam as well as its superiority to non religious ways and compatibility with modern conditions of life. Local activism is not complicated as long as it is not linked to other major Islamic social movements because its leaders do not usually aim at political ends. Recently, it was seen as an effort to rectify the image of violence associated with any type of Islamic revival. Secondly, most global Islamic movements were formed in the context of decolonization and state formation. In illustration,

> The Muslim brotherhood was formally created in 1928 when Egypt was still under British control ; the Jamaat-Islami was formed in British India in 1941 ; and the Pan Malayan Islamic Party formed in 1951, six years after the end of the

Japanese occupation of the region. Similarly, the Shii ulama's oscillation between quietism and activism was accentuated by national crises. (Hashem 32)

As a consequence, these movements rest on ideologies which are both political and international but connected with the primary ideas of piety and righteous rule. The revival of Islam at the global level in the form of Islamic movements came as a response to the frustration which resulted from the limited action of local activism. In terms of ideology, global revival stresses the comprehensiveness of Islam and its necessity in Muslims' social practices. It holds political features, but it is not based upon specific political programs. In the contemporary, it is impossible to imagine Muslim religiousness which is 100% religious without politics. Thirdly, the efforts of individualistic religiousness focus on single issues ; for instance, the production of audiotapes of Qur'anic commentaries, the printed or audio-tapped Islamic sermons, the modern preaching style of Amr Khaled who attracted millions of TV viewers, the distribution of Islamic books and pamphlets, the growth of internet sites on Islamic subjects, songs with Islamic messages. So, without involving politics, individualistic activism serves to reclaim the legitimacy of Islam as culture. In the analysis of the scheme of Muslim activism, it becomes clear that there is competition among the different fiqhi approaches since some of them develop largely in reaction to each other. Even the dimensions of revival interrelate. The local outlook, for instance, develops global concerns under the pressure of national and international changes. The same happens to global movements which start focusing on their national proprieties when they are unable to struggle for international issues. Individual religiosity often occurs after it leaves global or local trends. It may appear very complicated when the literalist goes global because this approach and dimension seem to combine contradictory elements and can bring about huge changes (37)

III. 3. International Issues

The discussion of the factors shaping religiosity anywhere can be highly context specific and say as much about the national settings within which its actors practise and their own histories and origins as about the determinants of religious practice themselves.

The contemporary revival of Islam has first been more significant in response to some global issues which began in the sixties of the previous century, but became more evident in the seventies and eighties.

III. 3.1. Iran's Islamic Revolution

Later in the 20th century, colonized Muslim societies except Palestine achieved political independence and built new states. Most of these postcolonial states, led by modern elites, chose the more secular path. In the wake of 1967 Arab defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War, a deep sense of disillusionment and humiliation made many Muslim societies ponder on the greatest weakness of their conflict with Israel. The disastrous failure of the war which was fought under the banner of Arab Nationalism and Socialism demonstrated the emptiness of these imported ideologies and shattered the myth of Pan-Arab union. In spite of being politically independent and ideologically following Western models, the Arab world was incapable of managing its crises in the international arena. This insecurity led to piety. The influence of Western-inspired alternatives in general gave way to alienation and a return to Islam. The governments of Libya, Sudan, Egypt and Pakistan all appealed to Islam. In Tunisia and Iran, however, more secular paths were pursued.

Despite the careful control of religion under the rule of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the creation of modern secular school systems and the replacement of the ulama by modern-educated judges; the critics of the progressive westernization of Iran like Jalal Al-e-Ahmad, Mahdi Bazargan, Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini opposed the Shah's regime which strongly promoted secularization in the name of modernization. These revivalists' hopes and grievances were given concrete shape through the 1979 Iranian Revolution. More than that, the revolution gave hope to many Islamist movements by confirming that the potential of Islam for resistance is great. When the clergy joined the Islamic reformers, opposition within Iran mounted. Thus, the quiet Shii Islam moved to a revolutionary state. The parameters within which the Shah operated in both domestic and foreign policy arenas, namely his full dependence on the USA, the evils of corruption and social injustice, insensitivity to Iran's Islamic identity and traditions, Western-style

celebrations, and the repressive measures of political protests all made his rule unpopular and precipitated a holy war to restore Islamic law and justice (Esposito 'The Islamic Threat' 106-15). On January, 1979, the world was amazed when the Shah was overthrown with an apparent ease. This world is filled with conspiratorial forces which seemed greater in making predictions; yet, in the Iranian case, the US intelligence failed to predict and might have held unshakable belief in the strength and decisiveness of the Shah and thought that the opposition would fragment.

A new Islamic Republic of Iran replaced the Pahlavi despotism in February 1979. It was based on the alliance of clerical and lay voices all committed to the Imam as Guardian and to the revolution. In the West, fears of the promotion of revolutionary activities and the export of the revolution to other countries of the Middle East disturbed their stability and were reflected in their denunciation of Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic as being a threat of worldwide terrorism because major revolutions have a resonance far beyond the countries in which they happen. Indeed, Khomeini believed in the global nature of Islam, and the duty of its people to show the world its transnational character. His ministry of religion served as a source of inspiration, more often than not indirectly, for the Gulf monarchies and the broader Muslim world. Media coverage, like usual, overestimated the Iranian revolutionary activism as a menace to the rest of the world, and went further to say that Khomeini speeches silenced the world.

Since the death of Khomeini in June 1989, Iran's Islamic rule started to take a new outlook. Its growing social discontent, faltering economy, and risks of foreign intervention on the ground of promoting terrorism brought dynamic change and more moderate policies within the 1990s Iran's Islamic foreign policy. Former restrictions of alternative viewpoints gave way to more liberal and open dialogues on issues such as Islam's view of democracy, women status, and the relationship of religion to politics. Cleric Muhammad khatami was one of the leaders who held the vision which symblized the new era of political liberalization and civilizational dialogue. If this has to tell something about Islam, it would say that in most cases, specific leaders, circumstances, and national interests are what determine Muslim nations' attitudes internationally. Western perceptions, by contrast, ever since the Islamic revolution in Iraq continue to

distort the image of Islam associating it with fanaticism and militant aggressiveness whenever it manifests itself in the contemporary world.

Seemingly, the Iranian mass revolution of 1978-79 was the embodiment of Islamic threat to the West and was often referred to as the event that secured for Islamic resurgence a permanent place at the forefront of international concern. However, it represents an act of seisure of power and an attempt of the imposition of Islam from above and this was simply left to rulers. Essentially, this tells too little about the nature of real Islamic renewal and reawakening. Taking into account that the year 1979 coincided with the beginning of the 15th century of the Islamic Calendar, many Islamists thought that the revolution was destined to happen (Dessouki). This reference to the periodic renewal of the faith remains inaccurate because the revolution focused on the political dimension of the reaffirmation of the Islamic belonging more than its religious aspect.

III.3.2. The Palestinian Question

The way Muslims view themselves one united nation is often mirrored in the Middle East war and its repercussions. Many Muslims can easily be involved intellectually and emotionally with the Palestinians in whom they see the most vivid example of the duplicity of European colonialism and its desire to both divide and weaken the Arabs. The creation of Israel in 1948 was initially a promise that took the form of a letter – later known as the Balfour Declaration[3] – issued in 1917 by the British government in order to allow the Jewish people to establish in Palestine a national home for them. Though at that time the number of Jews living in that area was between 80.000 and 90.000 living under a de facto Jewish National Home, without the assistance of Britain (Dershowitz 161). In fact, it was as early as 1902 that the British Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, met with the founder of Zionism Theodor Herzel to discuss the plan of a Jewish homeland. Herzel preferred the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, but the British government rejected it. A

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[3] Balfour Declaration, (November 2, 1917), statement of British support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." It was made in a letter from Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign secretary, to Lionel Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild (of Tring), a leader of British Jewry.

year later, the Uganda Plan[4] proposed to offer the Jews a British protectorate in Kenya. For matters of suitability, the offer was turned down by the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann who made a proposal in favor of Palestine. During World War I, the British politician and secular Jew, Herbert Samuel, renewed the question of Britain creating a Jewish homeland in case Palestine was conquered. After signing the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, Palestine was placed under the British rule. A year later, Balfour wrote his infamous letter, via Baron Rotchild, to the Zionist Federation offering Palestine to Jews, without any regard of the presence and wishes of the native majority resident in that territory as legitimate owners and inhabitants. More importantly, the Declaration stated that it will be a Jewish National Home not State ; yet, most Western powers and the Soviet Union agreed on the support of the Jewish State of Israel under moral and humanitarian veil until the eventual creation of Israel in 1948 (Saikal 89).

Attempts to legitimize this crime in an Arab populated Palestine often referred to the historical persecution of the Jews in Europe, with particular focus on the Holocaust[5]. No wonder then to consider Israel a European-American colony planted in the midst of the Arabs. Neither time nor any other reason would make Muslims cease identification with the plight of the Palestinians. Palestine is a no-lose, common cause, a source to revive the sense of unity among Muslims, and its liberation is the project of every Muslim. Young Muslims in Britain have been gripped by a connection to the Middle East. Surprisingly, key events such as the military camps in Pakistan, its return to democracy, the assasination of leader Benazir Bhutto did not interest them as much as the Israeli incursions into Lebanon, the occupation of Palestine, and the war on Iraq.

Although Palestine is an Islamic holy site and the third holiest city in Islam after Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, an Islamic platform was not utilized by Palestinian leaders in the early days of the conflict. Islam became resurgent and called upon as an ideological alternative soon after Israel's victory in the 1967 war, and its annexation of East Jerusalem to form with west Jerusalem the « united capital of Israel forever ». Then,

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[4] In 1903, Herzl brought to the Sixth Zionist Congress an offer from the British for Jewish settlement of Uganda. The plan was met with stiff opposition.

[5] It was historically used to describe a sacrificial offering burned on an altar. Since 1945, the word has taken on a new and horrible meaning: the mass murder of some 6 million European Jews (as well as members of some other persecuted groups, such as Gypsies and homosexuals) by the German Nazi regime during the Second World War.

it became a duty to take over Palestine from Israeli occupation. The West, on the other hand, considered the question of Palestine as the main thing which permitted the Jihad to thrive in the Middle East. By the same token, Israel's illegitimate occupation, settlement, intolerance, and brutality are explained by the Arabs' inability to live peacefully with others because of the undemocratic nature of Islam (Fisk. ''Fear and Learning in America''). This Western adoption of a double standard on the question of democracy in Muslim countries is what provided the necessary ground to the reassertion of their Islamic principles.

Considering the perpetuation of the Palestinian problem and Arab Israeli-conflict, it seems that the political theory failed. All of the Oslo Accords, the Camp David Accords and the direct talks of the 2000s to negotiate peace were inaffective. Many Muslims stress the fact that the USA's persistent support and assistance of Israel is what made out of it a political and territorial power and, most importantly, this is what makes a barrier to peace. Furthermore, the lack of support from the international community made the west in general paint Palestinians as inherently different, which is another greatest domestic threat to peace (Mearsheimer). Another factor that may have blocked the process of peace for many observers is that both sides see themselves as victims of the injustice caused exclusively by the other side. Unlike the Palestinians who grew resentful for decades at the Israeli injustices without the confines of religious dogma, Israel's sense of victimization has shifted significantly from blaming them for resistance to terrorism practised by Hamas – the Islamic organization that intends to liberate the whole of Palestine, implement an Islamic government, and guarantee a lasting peace. Along with Israel, a number of other international bodies continued to brand Hamas as a terrorism organization and, thus, an obstacle to peace. And at the heart of that apathy toward Hamas lied the new Islamic nature of Palestinian Nationalism. In light of this, the insistence that Hamas must disappear started to be echoed in the thoughts and statements of many sides (Gunning). Disposing Hamas was highly recommended to supress all possibilities of a foundation of an Islamic stronger Palestinian government.

III. 3. 3. The Afghan Conflict

Afghanistan provides a rich field of study for its extensive Islamic revival that took root towards the end of the 1990s as a debatable and influential force. This is not to deny the existence of the religious sentiment in this poor and isolated central Asian country for several centuries. In fact, 80% of Afghans are Sunni Muslims, and the only aspect that they share is Islam (Roy 'Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan' 30). Though Islam was a key element of the Afghan identity for centuries – inclusive and reflective in Afghanistan (Ashraf Ghani. Afghan President) – and it was a tolerant system promoting social justice, and based on adherence to the principle of neutrality in foreign affairs; the world came to discover Afghanistan as the main subject of the global fight against terrorism after September, 11th (Meher 126). Islam in Afghanistan was in danger for several times, but the Afghans have proudly defended their country and the faith which bacame accused as extremist by the world powers who seem ignorant of the regional and extra-regional players that shaped that Islam in Afghanistan. It was in the context of the resurgence of the Taliban and the anti-Western Jihad that Aafghanistan had its lasting notoreity.

During the 19th century, Afghanistan served as a buffer state between the British Indian Empire and the Czarist Russian Empire, and was involved in what came to be called the Great Game (Haqqani70). With the Afghan people blood and fierce resistance, both the British and the Russian lost too much in their effort to control Afghanistan directly. But treaties to borders necessitated some British interference and assistance. Backed by the British economic and military support, the monarchy in Afghanistan competed with the Islamic identity to create the Afghan national identity as emphasis was put on ethnicity. The birth of the independent state of Pakistan in 1947 faced new threats posed by conflicting ethnic allegiances (Afghan claims on Pakistan territory inhabited by Pashtun tribes), and the only solution lied in increasing conservative Islamic principles among the border tribes in hope of making peace and stability. For the Afghan, the withrawal of the British meant the absence of aid, and the American neglect led to the Soviet rapprochement in 1950.

With the gradual establishment of secular laws in the 1960s, two of the active influential political parties which began to emerge were the Communist People's

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), and the anti-Communist opposition led by Islamic groups. By the same period and in the name of Islam, Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami, inspired by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, included Afghanistan in its broader plan to combat communism. By arousing religious passions, Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan was formed in 1972 but faced hardships that reached exile in Pakistan. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, however, is considered as the first factor to frame the next events in Afghanistan. Not only did it deprive the USA of a strong ally, but it also precipitated the Soviet military intervention. For this reason, the militant ideology of Islam saw the light of the day with the Jamiat-e-Islami Afghan becoming a band of holy warriors or mujahidin. The majority of the mujahidin were Afghans living in Pakistan's refugee camps and trained in Pakistan, primarily with American, Pakistani, and to a lesser extent Iranian backing. The United States and its allies, in contrast to their attitudes in the Iranian case, welcomed the deployment of Islam to resist the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and limited that religious orientation of its counter-interventionist strategy to the Sunni groups of Afghans based in Pakistan, excluding by that any Sh'ite Mujahidin groups (Saikal 95-96). Therefore, the Afghan jihad was the product of the American political game against the Soviets and joined an international network of activists who came from all parts of the world – notably Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Uzbekistan – in order to fight the USSR.

Following the Communist regime's collapse in April 1992, the question that was raised concerned the direction which the fighters still in Pakistan would take in the subsequent years. As early as 1988 the writings of the Palestinian teacher and mujahid Abdullah Azzam who also founded the Palestinian group Hamas and the Pakistani organization Lashkar-e-Taiba laid out the case for global jihad in order to defend the Islamic lands, and inspired Muslims from all over the world to fight alongside the Afghans and to continue to fight non-Muslims but not the civilians especially women and children since that was against Islam (Wright qtd. in 'How the Afghan Jihad Went Global'). For Washington, the fall of the Communist regime was an achievement; so, it turned its back on the post-Soviet Afghanistan where the struggle for power led to a bitter civil war. One of the Islamic groups' rivals to take over power in Afghanistan was an extremist Islamic Sunni Pashtun militia – the Taliban movement of madrasa students –

who attracted Islamist militants from all parts of the world. Little by little, the coalescence of these veterans of the war against the USSR and leaders of jihadist movements in their countries and abroad has become known as al-Qaeda organization[6] and was led by Azzam's student Ossama Bin Laden. It was under al-Qaeda that Afghan jihad went global to target the enemies of Islam in their own countries, and in countries where Muslims are under attack. Bin Laden and his partner, Zawahiri[7], chose to begin a new war which should be fought against the West – America and its allies – and that consisted of launching violent attacks. Facing the American and other Western armies in the Iraqi battlefield enticed Al-Qaeda militants to launch a new organization in Iraq and Syria, which coalesced to become the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) The recent Arab Spring has also brought opportunities for the creation of new offshoots of Al-Qaeda.

In the UK, the British intelligence services often warn of a domestic insurgency because a large number of British Muslims came from Afghanistan which is a completely militarised region of the world. These Muslims know how to use military explosives and other arms. It was noticed that London Imam Omar Bakri Mohammed notoriously praised the subway bombers as the fantastic four. (Jenkins 520)

III. 3. 4.   The Iraq Wars

Much of the climate of anger and disillusion throughout the Islamic world has been generated by the Persian Gulf War (1990-91). It was a conflict triggered by Iraq's invasion of neighbouring Kuwait on August2nd, 1990. It was often said it was a matter of power expansion, debt cancelling, and objectives such as exploiting Kuwait's large oil reserves (Encyclopedia Britannica. ''Persian Gulf War'') When the Iraqi president defied the United Nations Secutity Council's demands to withdraw from Kuwait, the United

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[6]Many people and academics believe the ideas of Hassan al-Banna formed the basis of al-Qaeda, but Tarik Ramadan, his grandson, rejected this because he believes the revolutionary Islam's spiritual father is Sayyid Qutb

[7]The man who assumed the leadership of al-Qaeda terror network after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011.

States and its Western European NATO allies sent troops to Saudi Arabia which was also threatened by Iraq's expansive aims and the war began.

Britain played a major role in shaping inter-Arab and international relations in the Middle East, and in Iraq it was not a different case. Yet, Britain's contribution to Operation Desert Storm – the removal of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces and the restoration of Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah as Emir – was less prominent than usual. Britain was one of 33 other participants in a grand coalition – a pimple on the backside of the Americans. More significant than the role Britain played in the Gulf War was the public interest in the war which led to the country's first rolling new service: BBC Radio 4 News FM. (Farr. ''The Conversation'')

In the course of talking about news coverage of the war, the violence and real facts that took place were minimized in the UK although post-war studies and polls findings during the conflict reflected the conscience of minorities whose attitudes to mass media were not positive due to its giving too much glory and praise to the war. Indeed, there was a belief in the Western world that the media tend to weaken war effect, and this comes from the myth that the American defeat in the Vietnam War was the result of television coverage which undermined television support for it in the USA and elsewhere. Conformably, information on the losses was blocked and criticism of the coalition policy was considered illegitimate. Series with military themes, Vietnamese films, and even Museum's exhibition with a death theme were all banned (Shaw and Carr).

By the time the media dynamic was taken into consideration, the religious factor was forgotten. It was only after the public unrest caused by Muslims' strong opposition to the Gulf War in the early 1990s that the UK came to recognize a new Islamic awareness within its Muslim community. The internal turmoil signified by the Gulf War was not felt only within the Gulf region Muslims, but it was within the worldwide Muslim society. Well-organized protests against the Gulf War were launched in Bradford by Muslims who decry the hypocrisy and selective morality of the Western powers. Yusuf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens) was among those leading the Bradford protests. Radicals demanded the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Gulf. The British Western liberal democracy was confronted with the strong religiously-based identity of its Muslim

community. Despite the recognition of the religious dimension of Muslim communities, secularism in Britain continued to take it for granted until the horrific events of 9/11 and 7/7 when full recognition of Muslims attitudes in matters of religious pride and meaningful coexistence became more acknowledged and animated. (Sahin 2013).

On March 2003, a combined force of American, British and Australian troops under US leadership invaded Iraq in what was termed 'The Second Gulf War'. The object of the war was to depose the Baathist ruler of Iraq Saddam Hussein for his alleged possession of illegal weapons of mass destruction and suspected ties to terrorism. Whether this was the real reason, or it is a war against Islam and Muslims, a new crusade, a war of liberation for the oppressed Iraqi people by a self-proclaimed liberator, an attempt to heal the woundsof September 11, a war of blood for oil, or an American imperial experience, one can recognize there is no limit to the imagination. With respect to the consequences, however, there are exact truths. Iraq, which never attacked the USA, was defeated and destroyed by Bush and Blair. President Seddam Hussein was sentenced to death by hanging and on the holy day of Aid-ul-Adha. The world watched in horror at his barbaric lynching allegedly for his crimes against humanity. And it is hard to imagine how much more can be added if one considers the war damages including deaths, injuries, scandals, environmental damage, economic collapse, societal losses (sectarian divisions and refuge crises).

Now and 14 years after the war, Britain looked back on its decision to go to war in Iraq. The inquiry into the UK's involvement in the Iraq war, chaired by Sir John Chilcat, took seven years before its exhaustive report finally appeared in 12 volumes running to 2.6 million words on July 6th, 2016 – the holy day of Aid-ul-Fitr, too. Tony Blair's decision to join the invasion came under critique in the Chilcot report. The aftermath of the report was complicated and bloody than it had been anticipated, and Blair who repeatedly judged the world would be a better place without Saddam Hussein, admitted that going to war in Iraq turned out to be wrong and expressed « sorrow, regret and apology » (Mason et al. The Guardian) for some mistakes he made in planning the conflict. For instance, he used to claim the 2003 invasion would undermine Jihadis. Yet, the 14 years since have proved how wrong he was. In spite of his partial acknowledgement that without the Iraq war there would be no Islamic State (ISIS) in a

CNN interview in 2015, until then Blair had refused to link the two (Chulov.The Guardian). Ahead of Chilcot report, he had already made a qualified apology for Iraq War, but he defended armed intervention on the ground that if it had not taken place, the country could have degenerated into civil war as Syria did. But if one result of Iraq War was ISIS, the second was Syria due as much to the wide wave of uprisings against their despots as to the sectarian parameters which were set by Iraq.

In light of the inquiry's findings, the most important one along with the fact that it created ISIS is that it radicalised thousands of British Muslims. Groups like Al Muhajiroun considered the Iraq War as a war on Islam, and this mobilised the British Pakistanis more than the war itself. Accordingly, radicalism which is often blamed on Islam is also the product of Western rulers' failures to draw strategies. In addition to the human and material losses, the UK and USA's intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq has done little to assist the understanding of Islam.

September 11th Events

The September 11th events should be viewed in the context of a widespread Muslim mood of disillusionment within their own socio-political conditions and within the USA and its allies for their insensitive treatment of the world of Islam. Just to mention a few examples, the USA was responsible for imposing the Shah's rule on the Iranian people simply because he was a promoter of secularization and a proponent to Westernization. It cannot equally disclaim its protection of theocracy in Saudi Arabia, authoritarian regime in Egypt, the demise of Sukarno, assistance of dictatorship in Pakistan, and the growth of sectarian violence (Saikal 130).

The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, and the war on terrorism launched by the American government and its coalition allies have further polarized relations between Muslims in Asia and Western nations. Juxtaposing Islam against Christianity and associations between Islam and terrorism have resulted in the predominance of a 'cultural clash' as Muslims became the focus of anxieties, the fact which reinforced anti-Islamic sentiment. In Britain, a lax liberal immigration policy that had permitted the foreign other to contribute to global terrorism on the British soil and

elsewhere was blamed on the British government to whom appeals were made to ravage the minority population status within and favour repressive measures to be implemented. The far-right groups in Britain seized the opportunity of the September attacks to paint Muslims as criminals who should be fought. To give an idea about how violence against Muslims was excused as a natural reaction, Abbas writes,

> …In the days following the attack, an Afghan taxi driver was attacked and left paralysed in London. A Sikh petrol station owner was shot dead in Arizona, USA. To the murderers, the beard and attire resembled Ossama Bin Laden– the man thought to be behind the September attacks. Since then, books and television programmes about Islam, Qur'an, jihad, international security, political Islam, radical Islam, and Islamic militancy have been published, and debates on Muslims and Islam have proliferated. The study of Islam and Muslims has become more vigorous too, with a greater emphasis on trying to understand the nature and orientation of British Muslims in anthropological, sociological, theological, and political science perspectives (Abbas. ''Muslim Britain''14)

The coverage of the attack of September 11th is another revealing fact about the British action and reaction. The British media have been reporting to their people views on jihad in Islam and accusing Islam and Muslims for what an individual does though this is an aspect of unfairness. A follower of a religion is not necessarily a true representative of that religion. However, Christians would find it wrong to ascribe terror and violence to Christianity, but not equally wrong to do so to Islam. A process of othering was found by some researchers, and this process sought to distance the British Muslims from the circle of accusation. In fact, the initial coverage post-9/11 concentrated on Muslims in Britain rather than on British Muslims. (Poole ''Change and Continuity''55)

Since September 11th there has been a massive expansion of British and American military activity in the Muslim world. Tony Blair sought to reassure the American Congress and the world that their activity of imposing democracy, freedom and the rule of law was not another type of imperialism. Using terms such as liberation or invasion remained a puzzle as long as the term 'freedom' itself was used inaccurately. Also the idea that people's values are universal poses serious problems because thes values, in

which so much faith is placed, should be negotiated in specific historical and cultural contexts. No doubt, there is variation in the way people conceive particular values and the same conception changes over time.

Tensions between whites and Asians in Britain existed before the horrific events of September 11th, but the incident made the questions of multiculturalism more urgent. The British people who embraced the idea of living in a multicultural Britain have gone to avoid it on the ground that it helped religious extremism to arise. This pushed Muslims in Britain to intensify their adherence to Islamic creed. Examples of a growing trend in the revival of Islam in the post-9/11 period in Britain are numerous. Parveen Akhtar cited two major cases in order to explain Islamic regeneration as a response to certain constrictions. The first one is the conference organized by Hizb al-Tahrir in 2003 and entitled *« Are you British or are you Muslim? »* in which the British identity was rejected. The second illustration was the 2002 rally organized by Al-Muhajirun[8] in London in which the riot's posters glorified the 19 hijackers.

Furthermore, across all of Britain a hightened awareness of the Islamic identity was experienced by most of its Muslims. The oppression also made them tighten their cultural bonds which, naturally, lead to disassociation from the host society. Drawing in on oneself and hardening their cultural aspects and Islamic basis were the attitudes expressed by younger generations whereas the older and original migrants favoured playing down all of that to approach the crisis cautiously. The same responses were expressed by the various generations of Muslims in Britain again with regard to the subsequent decision of starting the war on terror.

In sum, the ties that Muslims felt to Britain proved fragile following September11th though this weakness in sense of belonging varied from a town to another and according to the degree of tension they experienced. Identity re-examination, issues around belonging, fears of repatriation, and changes in cultural and religious practices have all been the result of the 9/11 incident and its aftermath. Most importantly, Islam, which was one of the important aspects of a South Asian's identity, but not the only aspect; after

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[8]The Emigrants is the English word for this banned jihadist organisation that is based in the United Kingdom and which has been linked to international terrorism, homophobia, and antisemitism. The group in its original incarnation operated in the United Kingdom from 14 January 1986 until the British Government announced an intended ban in August 2005. See the 2014 book "Islamic Movements of Europe" by Frank Peter and Rafael Ortega.

September11th and the war on terror, it became their entire identity. Islam became more vital, open and public. Its adherents will to reach a renewed spirit of their Islamic identity in principle and practice was beyond description.

The Danish Cartoons

For a large number of Muslims, the Danish cartoons incident caused a moral and emotional injury. They reflect the conflict between the contemporary liberal commitment to free speech and the long standing religious obligation to combat blasphemy. They also portray a type of emotional violation grounded in empathy and humility. Slanderous speech about the Prophet in Islamic juridical tradition is a crime. In fact the very term jurists use when referring to the violation of people's religious sentiments 'blasphemy' is derived from the Greek language for 'harmful speech'. Thus, punishment is required because the blasphemer who attacks the honor of the prophet is trying to corrupt his mission and people's religion by means of that profane talk. The attempt to defame Islam and remove its glory through mocking speech about the prophet is nothing other than blasphemy.

The drawings originally appeared in the best-selling Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten under the headline 'The Face of Muhhamad' on September 30th, 2005. After that, some media outlets republished the pictures, while others – including the BBC – have refrained from doing that to avoid causing offence to their people. The issue was said to be a response to the Danish writer Kare Bluitgen's complaints on the unavailability of illustrations for his children's book about the Muslims' prophet though he was conscious that no one dared break the ban against depicting the Prophet Muhammad and corrupt the Glory of Allah in his creatures. Although nothing in the Qur'an strictly bans portrayals of Muhammad, it has long been discouraged by their faith to avoid the temptation toward idol worship. Besides, the Muslims disapproval of depicting prophets extends to Jesus, Moses and others.

As its central image, the paper chose a notorious caricature of turban-wearing figures in a police line-up and the witness saying, « I don't know which one he is ». Around the edge of the page, eleven other cartoons are printed. These include images of Prophet

Muhammad as a crazed, knife-wielding Bedouin, another of him wearing a turban in the shape of a bomb with a lit fuse attached, and another of Prophet Muhammad greeting suicide bomber at the gates of heaven saying, "Stp, stop ! We have run out of virgins!" The intention was to show him in a variety of satirical situations in order to be hostile and provocative towards Muslims, reject their religious sensitivities and assert the right of free speech. (See fig. 4 below)

Figure 4: The Original Jyllands-Posten Page

Mohammed Image Archive. www.zombietime.com/mohammed_image_archive/jyllands-posten_cartoons/

Cartoons of prophet triggered outrage among Muslims across the Middle East, sparking violent protests in Muslim countries and economic boycotts of Danish products. The foreign ministries of eleven Islamic nations formally demanded action from the Danish government which refused to impose any sanctions. Saudi Arabia has recalled its ambassador from Denmark, and libya close dits embassy in Copenhagen. Kuwait and Iran criticized the cartoons as insulting, racist and revolting. Dozens of lives were lost and threats against European media were issued. From Indonesia to India to Iraq, Protest in the Muslim world grew wider and violence escalated over the stories about the cartoons and their circulation. While it may be true that militants could threaten material media to stop the republication of the images, the electronic word and image were not easily suppressed especially when users chose to remain anonymous.(Ruthven.''The NY Review'')

In Britain, where newspapers did not publish the cartoons, it was believed the press has the right to publish them, but it was not the right thing to do. This opinion was shared by 72% of Britons according to a poll conducted on Feb 3-5, 52% of them agreed that the Cartoons should be banned because they are offensive to Muslims, and 67% agreed that newspapers should not publish the Cartoons out of respect for the British Muslims even though they had the right to do so (World Public Opinion 2006). Another poll of Muslims in February 18th, 2006 found evidence of growing alienation with 4 in 10 calling for religious Shari'a law to be imposed in parts of the UK with a mainly Muslim population. The cartoons which were originally published in Denmark in September triggered protests and marches only when they were re-published around Europe earlier in February. In London, thousands of Muslims took to the streets, organized by the Muslim Action Committee led by the imams who usually avoid such rallies.

In diverse societies, clashes are inevitable particularly when the freedom of expression and freedom of religion confront each other. But commitment to the freedom of speech should be no less than the belief in anti-racism. In fact, the twelve cartoons are all unfriendly to Islam and Muslims. The most notorious of them does not depict the prophet; it says he was a terrorist. In Britain and in recognition of the necessity of legal intervention when there is a serious risk of public disorder because prejudice is being reinforced by acts of victimization in the right of an already-marginalized minority, the

British Parliament passed a bill on 31 January 2006 to protect against incitement to religious hatred (Modood. ''The Danish Cartoon Affair'' 4)

Behind the Muslim reaction to the Muhammad caricatures, there is a complex image of the West that stems from a web of symbols that range from Western imperialism, the war crimes in Iraq (Abou Ghrib scandals), and the suffering of Palestinians. The Danish cartoons only specified the hatred to Denmark as a country which is part of a larger European and Western injurious space. And what the cartoons were stating was another controversy. Many Muslims took the caricatures as suggesting that Muhammad was a terrorist, which besides the cartoons themselves is a fact that deserves to be responded to. Others claimed they were a satire on jihadis, not on Islam at large and that they are regarded as political speech.

Another troubling matter as regards the cartoons was the subjective idea that only some pious Muslims were hurt by them, not all Muslims. This very idea seems to neglect that religious pain knows no degree of piety as a confinement if ever race, gender, ethnicity and class could not stand in its way. It is also as wrong as the idea of restricting the affair to being only freely expressed by extreme right wing-groups. The cartoons affair also tells things about the future of Muslim minorities in Europe and the need to create a friendly environment if their intention is to maintain coexistence and peace; not a hostile milieu where religion is insulted under the free speech mask and secular license. The Muslims reaction was a call for Europeans to purify themselves of racist attitudes towards the citizens of Muslim background who never caused their Christian counterparts any offence. Muslims respect for other religions flow from Islam which offers the necessary protection for the sacred. The challenge then is for the secular host societies to provide their long-term Muslim citizens with a safer and equal public space where their religious sensibility is taken into consideration and their religiosity is not misunderstood as being practised at the expense of Europeans' freedom.

III. 3. 7. The Oil Bonanza

One of the main factors that permitted the revival of Islam to happen was the oil boom. Arab and Muslim countries were said to be prevented from economic development by their Inshallah fatalism[9], and this could have led them to poverty had not they been blessed by God with big sums of money from the sale of oil and gas. It was by the accident of geology that the Arabs and other Muslim-dominated oil states found themselves owners of the largest oil reserves and controllers of the flow of oil supplies to oil-consuming nations of the developed world. The oil wealth was an instrument that transformed some European political attitudes and assisted the cause of Islamic revival.

The Yom Kippur War [10](Oct.6, 1973) that was between Israel against Egypt and Syria created a crisis that allowed the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, to announce that they would no longer supply oil to nations that supported Israel. The oil embargo of 1973 resulted in a flood of petrodollars into the Arab nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, and this money weapon, estimated at about 10 trillion dollars in 2007(Fitzgerald), was used to fund a worldwide Islamic activism. Not only did the oil crisis serve as the Arab big stick sending shivers down the spine of every European authority with sympathies for Israel, but it also guaranteed the European accomodation of Arabic demands for respect and acceptance. The Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), newly created in 1974, fitted into the former plans of Charles De Gaule to cooperate with the Arab Muslim world in 1967, or it recreated hope for the earlier 19th century dream of the creation and government of a French-Arab Empire. The EAD's role was to ensure an understanding and the integration between Europeans and Arabs. It provided Muslims with the right conditions for the beginning of Islamic revival in Europe – if not Eurabia. It also established a system of cultural and educational cooperation, inter-faith dialogues, and more importantly a strong network of associations for the replacement of European prejudices against Arabs and Muslims with appreciation. It

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[9]the Arabic phrase "Inshallah" means "God willing". And fatalism is the belief that the events of one's life are largely beyond one's control. The belief that at any moment Allah can come in, and exercise his will, andthat all things are decided by him.

[10] Hoping to win back territory lost to Israel during the third Arab-Israeli war, in 1967, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a coordinated attack against Israel on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar.

recommended the acceptance of an open influx of Arabs and other Muslim immigrants into Europe along with the dissemination of Islamic culture there. The latter consisted of the building of mosques and the creation of joint Euro-Arab cultural centres to spread the Arabic language and culture in European capitals ; the making of policies to ensure cooperation between the Arab and European media, television, radio, press, academia and education curricula ; and the control of everything informing about Islam in Europe. Eurabians and their supporters set up the foundation for the dialogue of civilizations against the dangers of clashes coming from the USA and Israel. The formation of Eurabia as a policy suited Charles De Gaule's dreams of France's leadership to guide Europe as the counterbalancing force to America and Russia by including Arab Muslims into his coalition was assisted by the pre-existing currents of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism, and was coordinated and appraised as benign by the whole of the European Union (EU). It was perceived, nevertheless, as though there was some invisible divine order for the acquiescence and appeasement of Arabs and Muslims.

If singing the Islamic tune by the encouragement of the Euro-Arab Dialogue and with the total compliance of the EU which opened the flood gates for the unregulated immigration of millions of Muslims was seen as the result of the oil wealth for some politicians, it proved instrumental for others as the single most critical factor leading to the Islamic revival through generous donations to extend Dawah in the West, and through changing the mood among Muslims by creating new ties between countries with ideological differences such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran, all of which had the oil boom as a reason to turn to Islam (Pipes 330). Ever since the 1970s, it was believed that Islam's resurgence comes out of a banel of oil (Ayoub 22). Yet it was not a matter of faith reassertion as much as it was an affair of state ideology and a foreign policy objective. If we assume that the oil boom of the 1970s ushered in a wave of new development and infrastructure expansion in the oil-rich countries, it should be noted that to meet their demand for labor, the expatriate community in the Gulf which was once less than 1.2 million workers and dependents has now reached more than 15 million people. And if we assume that 3.5 million of them are Christians – two thirds of whom live in Saudi Arabia – shall we then forsee Christianity's potential revival there? Even if this

were the case, a religious revival remains a socio-religious process, based on piety and deep faith; not on finding work or some new allies.

The debate about the oil wealth is not just a local story, however. Where that money is going and how it is affecting the global economy are crucial questions. Whereas oil remains the life blood of most gainful economic activity, it is also the poison of global economy. As a basic energy source, there is no chance of its need to be changing in the forseeable future for importing nations, more money spent on oil means less for spending on everything else. Also the oil prices drive not just economics, but geopolitics because it causes alliances to either rise or fall over its value. It has often been criticized as a fortune for extremist groups. In 2008, it was stated in the New York Times that the way the rising revenues were being spent would worsen matters because problems of the Middle East had a bad habit of becoming big problems for the rest of the world (Pollack. NY Times) It also was said that oil revenues were used to fund a militant minority who perverted some aspects of Islam and this perversion has spread as far as Nigeria and Northern England. (The Economist ''The Tragedy of the Arabs'') But the same fortune has also been the means to provide stability by keeping the Middle East's countries together. Projects of modernization and political structures were based on oil wealth, but buying weapons and building armies might have been dependent on that as well.

But modern reinterpretations of Islam put all the blame on this faith claiming it is at the core of some of the Arabs' deep troubles and antipathy to democracy. The blame game, though it does not suggest that the Arabs lack talent by being susceptible to tyrants and fanatics, ignores the fact that part of the malevolence and cruelty is played by the oil wealth which has often been used to cushion Arab leaders and strengthen them with iron-fisted security apparatuses. One can go further than that and suggest that the mistake of the Ummah division into a Middle East core and a non-Middle East periphery has been reinforced by oil possession because Muslims in the periphery look upon Muslims in the Core as not only the earliest bearers of Islamic faith and heritage, but also as primary possessors of oil.

Oil revenues were the means at hand for the Saudi State to concretize its ambition to assume the religious leadership of the Muslim world and increase its influence among the Muslim minorities in the West. That was possible in the 1960s and 1970s, but in the

1980s it was rivalled by the Islamic Republic of Iran under Khomeini's regime. The Wahhabi movement, being the ideology of the Saudi State, played a central role in keeping Al-Sa'ud at the top, controlled internal affairs, and was even exported abroad. To diffuse Wahhabism and counteract dissidence, Britain, which is the destination of Islamic activists, gained immeasurable importance; and its religious institutions and Arab Press were funded and directly controlled by the Saudi petrodollars. Its first British-born Muslims who graduated from the Islamic university of Medina, the Faculty of Da'awah in the 1980s collaborated with other Sectarian groupings to revive Islam. The Wahhabi D'awah, in fact, had a great impact on British Muslims between 1989 and 1995 for a number of arguments in the British context; but without being involved in the politics of the country (Birth168-174).

III. 3. 8. The Redefinition of Piety

Despite the well-established Islamic tradition of revival and reform (Maududi 'A Short History') to safeguard the Muslim Ummah from deviating from the principles and practices of the Islamic faith (Esposito. ''Revival and Reform''), Islam's internal call for self-purification has often been analysed as a 20th century achievement. In seeking causal explanations for Islam's growth and expansion in Europe, one can only expect a number of key events affecting the process by which Muslims appeal to the Islamic message as well as the scope and quality of that message. Within this perspective, thinkers have pointed to dynamics that range from imperialism, marginalization, globalization and petrodollars to an increase in immigration and birth rates. Others preferred to treat the phenomenon deeper than that. Islamic revival was examined within the perspective of ethical significance in which it is a gain to morality and an increase in piety. In Western circles, the Islamic revival was associated with a shift in the balance of Muslim piety from an otherworldly towards a this-worldly emphasis (Robinson47)

Islam, in its earliest history, was this-worldly. The creation of the most successful Islamic society was their actof presence. From its outset, the Muslim community was devoted to develop the earth by means of agriculture and manufacturing. It advanced in medicine, physics and mathematics. It could rule a huge part of the world in its first

century, and until the 18th century the authority of Allah through the guidance of Mohammad was successfully supported. Muslims were at the front in worldly affairs because their religion motivated them to advance. And it was when they were obedient to Allah and adhering to their religion that they understood how to advance. However, when they fell away from Islam, they fell behind in all matters.

The words 'this-worldly' and 'otherworldly' in their application to the various religions of mankind are so versatile that the dichotomy set up to apply for Islam arouses ambiguity when compared to other religious cases. The case of Christianity would present a problem. Unlike Muslims, the Christians were backward in worldly affairs when they adhered to their religion. But when they burned their churches, killed their monks, and separated church from state, they achieved advancement. If we do not assume the fact that their religion has been distorted by people, it appears that when they left their religion behind, they progressed. Then, the worldly dimension is not working for the otherworldly which is contrary to Islam in which the worldly and heavenly dimensions are interrelated.

After the death of the prophet Muhammad, different forms of Muslim world views emerged, represented mostly in those of the Sunnis and the Shi'a, and continue to exist until now. These were not the only world views that came to define their own strands of piety and interpretation of Islam. From early on, another religious practice developing an otherworldly dimension for adherence to Islam was undertaken. Although there is one Islam, and this Islam emphasizes balance and moderation; this extreme form of piety adorned by asceticism and monastecism grew among an activist community of Muslims. More than an account is possible to explain the evolution of this type of piety. One tells that as Islam expanded and became the authority of many states and larger administrations, its purity was gradually lost. Asceticism, thus, was the early response to the this-worldliness of the golden ages of Islam. Otherworldliness was embodied in Sufism (Hughes159). Another theory says that it was imported through contact with the Christian and other mystical traditions of the regions conquered by Muslims (Robinson 48).

Millions of Muslims who are caught by the mysticism of Sufism do not pay attention to the fact that some Sufis glorify poverty and rely on charity for survival ; they avoid

family life and most social responsibilities and they love ease and underestimate worldly success. This Islam, under the banner of Sufism, has pejoratively been referred to as popular Islam. In spite of the great mystical discourse led by the great Sufi thinkers such as Ibn Arabi or Rumi, critics and theologians deemed it heretical and deviant. It remained slow in effect and could not revive the religion the way Islam in its pure nature did. The 18th century Arabia scholars such as Muhammad abd-al-wahhab, Ibn Taymiyya and others confronted Sufism. Then, the arrival and domination of Western powers throughout the Islamic world stood as an opponent for the advent of Sufism and a new dynamic to renew the emphasis on the this-worldly piety.

As early as Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, the ground was set for demands to take the material conditions of life seriously. As a result of the cultural shock of Western modernity, self-questioning Muslims' intellectual stagnation continued to pave the way for a period of awakening. It made it clear that incarnate reality must substitute the otherworldly piety. Circumstances such as the Western imperialism in Muslim societies, the Cold War rivalries, the Iranian Revolution, the Anglo-American wars in Iraq and so forth have all contributed to the spread of Islamic revivalism with varying degrees of intensity. Soon after Islamic piety swang in a this-worldly direction[11], the contention of many Western peoples was advocating for reformation in Islam, on a parallel to the Protestant Reformation. But is it possible to equalize a process of religious and social change that took place in late 15th and 16th centuries in Europe with that which the 19th and 20th centuries saw in the Muslim world without forgetting that the latter was expressed differently in different Muslim societies? Although a kind of Islamic reformation is well on its way, and along the same lines of the Protestant Reformation with a focus on scripture and a disregard from tradition, and it is for similar historical reasons, optimists in the West who assume it will lead to the same results of their Protestant Reformation must be conscious of the difference between the teachings of the scriptures of both religions. In their call for an Islamic Reformation, they hope for the secularization of Islam which is far from their feeling of personal responsibility before Allah to defend their religion and emphasize the caliphate of man.

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[11]Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali's own life, as told in his autobiography 'The Deliverance from Error', illustrates well the shift in piety.

The shift towards individual responsibility directed Muslims' concentration on the creation of an Islamic society that would serve Islamic ends. The men who would lead this society need not create private relationship with God; their piety is not wrongly perceived as detachment of the world. They are pious through opposing seclusion, irresponsibility to social evils, and indifference to the current events. It is the significant role of these pious Muslims in calling for reform and revival; not change and re-Islamization that underpinned the growth of Islam from the mid-19th century onwards.

Islam is moderate in its views and does not accord with the monastic life. Worldly successes are advocated and earning one's livelihood itself is a type of worship. Islam also does not accord with extremism, and its leaders who are developing an all-embracing ideology for the rest of mankind to understand Islam are correctly obseving their religious duties. They are devout, not orthodox – regardless of their connection with or dissociation from any social network or religious organization (Saleh 97).

III. 3. 9. Globalization

If migration had first caused the deterritorialization of religious values from their traditional local contexts and their adaptation to the Diasporas' new contexts, globalization dissolved the territorial boundaries of Christendom. Western Europe, for instance, is no longer the centre of global Christianity (Gugler 121). Today only about one quarter of the world's Christians are in Europe (Walker 2011), and part of the drop is the consequence of rising secularism, demographic decline, and advance in abstract philosophy, and multiculturalism. In contrast, the contemporary Muslim and Arab revival returns the sacred to politics and contest the overemphasized cultural globalization. In step with Muslim awakening and growth, there is a current rise of nationalism and a growing religious conservatism. For example, despite the European Union's denial of the fact (Henley 2016), many observers attribute Brexit to the UK's Christian roots.

In the Islamic world, the idea of corruption, occupations and oppression as an outcome of external forces was publicized through a revolutionary rhetoric, proclaiming to defend the rights of the impoverished in the third world who have been undermined by the forces of Western globalization – including exploitative capitalism, advancement of

technologies, world trade, modernity and cosmopolitan ideas. The latter is viewed as a conspiracy carried out by new crusaders joined by the Jews. The revival of the Islamic identity is opposed to this Jewish-Christian conspiracy ministering to Western globalization.

Broadly speaking, the process of globalization has truly made the world a smaller place in which political, social and economic events elsewhere affect individuals anywhere. Consequently, people are seeking refuge in faith. The insecurity of a world changing day by day would lead to individuals return to religion. However, the relationship between religion and globalization is complex. Whereas religion takes advantage of communication and transportation technology, it serves as haven for the opponents of globalization's threat. In the case of Islam and with technological advancement, the stage was all set for a new tide of the Islamic awakening. Through the miracle of electronics, Muslims all over the world are constantly reminded of their obligations to Allah. The call to prayer can be sent to remind Muslims anywhere of their duties attheir exact time. MP3s of famous teachers and imams' lectures are available onlineas well as the digital copies of the Qur'an which can be downloaded readers everywhere. The motivation of a networked community of Muslims with a global reach through new media enabled the creation of a new ummah – 'the digital ummah'. (Campbell 31) Meanwhile, Islam is seen as the natural enemy of globalization. While the latter brings religious identities in direct daily contact, it also reinforces specificities, self-consciousness and competition.

By all means, Muslims are active participants in globalization. But do they manage to revitalize their religion because the act of Islamization is part of globalization, or does it happen as a response to its challenges? Globalization stands for the processes by which the World Capitalist System relates to local systems, and in this way it can affect technology, economics, politics, culture and religion. But it is, first and foremost, economics and only secondarily involves the other aspects (Giddens 1990). It is frequently associated with the liberal classical economic theory, and since the mid-1970s with neo-liberalism which promotes an open economic system and free trade. As such, one would perceive globalization as deriving from Western practices and a term of fairly recent currency. But globalization is an aspect of human life that has always been there

since the beginning of humanity. Islam embraces globalization in its original form, and Muslims have long been part of a globalization by virtue of participating in trade relationships, building empires, spreading their faith, and moving around the world. Muslim Arabs have given the world the so-called Arabic numerals which were used to computerize the human experience. The Qur'an is the sacred book the most widely read in its original language in human history. And the Arabic alphabet is imparted to other languages. Evidently, the demographic presence of Islam within the Western world indicates that Islamization is a global force. As a manifestation of this vibrant Muslim presence, there are thousands of mosques and Islamic centres. In Britain, some Muslims are even experimenting with an Islamic parliament of their own.

Islamic globalization, often known as simply Islamization, leads Muslims to uneasy relationship with Western globalization. They are placed in a reactive relationship to the process, which means it is depicted as a change that happens to Muslims. Some scholars in the West characterize Islam as unable of adapting to a globalized society because it instinctively rejects globalization and its secular values. Islamic revival, though part of a world-wide religious resurgence facing the secularist bias of European modernity, is viewed as a critical aspect of globalization. The Western point of view, by and large, continues to portray globalization as a challenge to Islam whose only recourse is fighting it. This is owing to, as maintained by Antonio L. Rappa, the experience of « Judaism and Christianity gaining ground through globalization. For them, globalization=Westernization=Americanization=the erosion of Islamic values » (268). Yet, in evidence, the subject of globalization has both intensely positive and negative connotations in the Muslim world. Access to greater knowledge and increased communication, foreign aids, improvements in health, and benefitting from the welfare state advantages were all most appreciated by Muslims.

Indeed, the Islamic perspective may appear critical vis-à-vis globalization when contradicting some essential tenets of Islam. Culturally, it is discredited for the promotion of drug use, violence, youth and women liberation through Hollywood movies and the internet. Economically, it is despised for contradicting the principle of social justice as it encourages the cumulation of excessive wealth. Globalization goes hand in hand with consumerism which is greed in Islam – worship of one's own wealth. The result from this

was a stressing of the concept of humanity in Islam, and this entails the revival of Islam's principles to curb corruption, individualism and injustice. In the Muslim world, globalization certainly comes under attack to the extent that it is equated with Western cultural domination. Nevertheless, it managed to diffuse certain values such as the patronage of a cultural renovation, the call for the promotion of human rights, and yielding to an enlightened interpretation of the Shari'a (Mohammadi 106). In the case of Muslim minorities in the West, globalization has led to a renewed vitality to the meaning of ethnic identity and broadened the appeal of Islamic revivalism. This may sound paradoxical without concentrating on the triangle of globalization, migration and religion (Islam) whose results changed the world. Since the early history, there has been a connection between globalization and migration. The point they share most is that both are economic movements aimed at the improvement of the standard of living. Large periods of migration always brought about potential changes in the socio-economic and religious domains. The conditions of host societies when mixed with the ethical and religious elements of migrants produce some kind of dynamism. In illustration, in Britain during the 1970s and 1980s, street brawlers made a habit of launching assaults on immigrants from the Carribean and South Asia. Racism characterised the British scene. However towards the end of the 1980s, this trend underwent a weird change due to the appearance of a new other of an ever-stronger Islamic quality. Transported religions often have a more intense and assertive character abroad than at home. Part of the reason might be the competitive situation religion is put into, and which is at the same time one of the factors globalization is driven by.

Undoubtedly, globalization has increasingly been a driving force to the resurgence of Islam in that it engages Islam rather than denying its relevance. With the new public spaces created by globalization, religious identities interact with modern ideas and technologies. Olivier Roy considers globalized Islam to be the result of increasingly important phenomenon of Muslims living as minorities in Europe and the USA while globalization is in service. In that context, religious expression and guidance have lost their authority, which allowed Muslims to engage their faith. Roy terms 'neofundamentalism' as the most important aspect of globalized Islam, and he defines it as a response to the failure of political Islam to establish an Islamic state. It is new for

Roy in terms of its positive attitude towards globalization – an opportunity not a loss (Book Review 581). Damian Thompson, an associate editor of the Spectator believes that increasinglynot to understand faith is not to understand the world. In an article published on June 28, 2014 under the title 'Religion is the New Politics – but Britain's Secular Politicians Just Don't Get it', he expressed worries over Britain as it has, by some measures, become the least religious country in the developed world. On the rapid spread of extreme religion in the 21st century, it came in his words that:

> … In Syria and Iraq, the shadow caliphate of ISIS makes expert use of social media – attracting, as we have seen, the attention of young Welsh students who are persuaded to give their lives for a djihad against shi'ites. When the Syrian volunteers come back to Britain, i twill not be long before some of them find domestic application for their new found skills.
>
> Boko Haram is using the internet to recruit members in Cameroon, Chad and Niger … we are witnessing a very modern phenomenon: religious extremism made possible by globalisation and by technology.

III. 4. The Country-Specific Attributes

Bearing in mind the consideration that under the Western-dominated post-1945 international order, Islamic resurgence has been a prominent theme in international affairs, one should regard the process of seeking causal explanations for this theme as similarly important. Causal factors can also be either international events whose impact reverberates on parochial scale or they can be country-specific events whose impact reverberates on a global scale.

III. 4. 1. A Response to Imperialism

Broadly speaking, the present Islamic resurgence can be seen as a response to Western imperialism. This is a long-term process that manifests itself internationally. Yet, it can also be specific to Britain that had colonies almost in every spot of the world. The British

colonial legacy has left deep scars in the Muslim world. It threatened Muslim identity and history in Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, the Arabian Gulf, the Indian Subcontinent and parts of Southeast Asia. Because European armies came with their Christian missionaries, it was a double threat of both the crown and the cross. Given the union of the government, the clergy and the superior military, Muslim response in form of a holy war was doomed to defeat in the minds of many Muslim thinkers. Within such a perspective, Muslim responses varied. Some religious leaders preached rejection and refusal of any kind of cooperation with the colonial masters and their proxies. Others were eager to imitate the West and learn from its strength to develop their military, economic, and political modernization programs. However, this blind emulation was initiated by the state and implemented by an elite minority to be the only beneficiaries of the imported Western models. The other result of this process of modernization was a gradual shift towards secularism, a state with an Islamic majority condemned. Continued subservience, pressing economic hardships, the chaotic state of the Muslim masses, and reasons of dignity have all been catalysts for a return towards Islam (Sardan and Davies 50-59). While the blame was laid on colonialism, Westernization and secularism, the alternative lied in Islamic revival in search of social justice, full independence and remedies to release the frustrations of the abortive pro-Western policies.

Despite the failure of the Muslim nation-states to achieve the desired economic benefits associated with the Western model, optimists were still there influenced by the vibrant success of the West. These were the leaders of another reaction of the challenge of Western imperialism which is Islamic modernism (Esposito ''Contemporary Islam''52-3). The European technological strength and political ideals of equality and justice were praised, but the imperialist spirit of the West and its corruption were denounced. A call to stop decadence in Muslim societies and to revive the Islamic identity in a way which is neither conservative traditionalist nor secularist found a middle-of-the road position linking the ideals of Islam with modern Western thought. To revitalize the Islamic community and prove the compatibility of Islam with modern science, the pioneers of Islamic modernism as an intellectual movement, like Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in Egypt, Abd –al-Hamid Ibn Badis in Algeria, Allal al-Fasi in Morocco and Abd al-Aziz al-Thalabi in Tunisia along with others in the

Indian Sub-Continent sought to reinterpret Islam in response to modern conditions. These modernists admitted that much of the Muslim world's decline and stagnation is due to Western imperialism, but still they saw rejection and withdrawal from engagement with the West a wrong choice. Learning from the West's science, technology and political ideas was their priority for renewal and reform. The solution for them was inthe synthesis of the best of the East and the West. Although many of them were leading nationalists and fought for political independence from their colonizers, some were criticized for their excessive admiration of the West's accomplishments that sometimes led to secular reforms.

Many issues might still be disputed, particularly as regards the origin of the national movements whether they were the product of a century of Westernization impact under which the elite received their training, or it was the consequence of the appeal to Islam; and whether the return to Islam would have become a reality had the liberal regimes of Muslim rulers been a success. Under all conditions, nevertheless, the anti-colonialist attitude of Muslims had the defense of Islam as its primary goal. Islam was a factor to varying degrees – according to the country, the local context, and the nationalist leader. In the Arab East, Iran and South Asia, nationalism owed much of its first anti-British stirrings to Islam. Pan-Islamic movement also developed in response to British colonialismand grew more powerful in the wake of the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate, contrary to some who doubted its ability, and thanks to its capacity to consider itself a universal ummah, not a particular nation or community (Abou-Rabi. 'Islamic Resurgence' 45)

The failure of Islamic modernism was reflected in the widespread dissatisfaction with its borrowed constitutional and liberal governments, and the disillusionment with its democratic ideals. In face of the Western bloc, led by England and America, Muslims of the thirties and the forties of the twentieth century deemed it necessary to follow a new Islamic response through activists' Islamic organizations – the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan. Both organizations were significant at the level of their homelands and beyond them. Islam was conceived as the complete solution for both state and society. No middle ground was allowed for any possibe kind of

accommodation. With the diminishment of colonialism, the new conflict became the Cold War, and the new ills became Capitalism, Marxism and socialism.

III. 4. 2. The Rushdie Affair

The Rushdie Affair (1988) is the most momentous political event in the history of the novel. More than a quarter of a century ago, Salman Rushdie, an Indian British-author who hailed from a Muslim family, published his novel « The Satanic Verses ». As a bitter religious satire and a challenge to Islamic tradition in questioning established religious and political authority, the novel could set off a chain of events in Britain – the home of freedom of speech. It included bookstore bombings, book bans and burnings, and blasphemy accusations.

Muslims who had read the book were left with no point in denying that his Arabian scenes were the stage of a serious blasphemy, not just a spirit of amiable satire. As far as the religious theme is concerned, the novel is Rushdie's word against Muhammad's. In the name of secularism and Marxism, he allowed himself to go back to the medieval Mahound conception of Mohammad to portray the prophet ; that is the name that Christians assigned to Mohammad to picture him as the devil incarnate. He gave the names of Mohammad's wives to twelve prostitutes in a brothel. With a background from Hindu legends of metamorphosis, a highly significant illustration is Ayesha who is fantasized as Mohammad's youngest wife – the youngest whore. Yet, she is the empress of progress and a holy woman who leads devoted Muslims to drown in the Arabian Sea (Al-Raheb 332-3). Gibreel, the angel who brought revelation to Prophet Mohammad, is portrayed as only human who in the end falls down the rabbit-hole. Although he is alluding to Lewis Carroll's'Alice in Wonderland' (Meraay), the rabbit-hole in Rushdie's nove lis 'Coney' the cave. Most controversially, the novel invokes idolatry which Islam opposes strongly on the basis of the saga known as Hadith al-Gharaniq al-Ula. But Rushdie abused that Hadith in which Satan inspired Muhammad to compromise with the people of Mecca and to permit them to continue to worship the three deities of Al-lat, al-Uzza and Manat if he wanted them to embrace Islam. He suggested that the verses of Qur'an are the work of the devil. To be clear, Rushdie did not originate the satanic

verses, nor did he fashion the expression 'Satanic Verses'. Some sources say it was an English missionary, the belligerent Sir William Muir who coined the term (Saifullah et al.)

To go deeper into Rushdie's mockery is not as worth as asking what one has in mind when blasphemy comes up for discussion. First, the Qur'an is different from any greatest and most valuable work of literature. Besides being the word of God, it is the ultimate fundamental law of Muslims. And like in the case of constitutions, the 'Satanic Verses' is purposefully an act of sacrilege. Then, if the scandal of the novel is reduced to a political morality dilemma, this would require defense. Surprisingly, the same patriotism which would penalize an offender under Western law refused to ban the novel in Britain though it destroyed the most cherished values of its Muslim citizens. Second, Britain is known for its little protection under the laws against blasphemy; not its total absence. This is in form of censorship and it moved even to the electronic media. The Thatcher government made elaborate efforts to ban Peter Wright's book skycatcher and to stop publicizing the voice or the image of interviewed Northern Ireland terrorists because the iron lady understood that publicity was the oxygen of terrorism. Under these British criteria of censorship, the Rushdie affair was supported as a freedom of speech matter (Mazrui 105-6).

Shortly after the publication of the novel, Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa sentencing Rushdie to death, along with all those involved in its publication who were aware of its content. The call for murder in absentia has been seen as inciting violence against a citizen of another country by many in the West. While Rushdie was still alive following the universal condemnation of that murderous expression, more than a dozen people died in his country of birth, India, without lifting the ban on the novel's publication. The New Statesman stated that it was an issue in India thanks to a campaign organized by Jamaat-i-Islami, an Islamic group already targeted in his previous novel 'Shame' (Malik. A Marketplace of Outrage). The book also caused deaths in Pakistan. Bangladesh, Sudan, South Africa and Sri Lanka forbade the book's publication. Other countries with sizeable Muslim populations such as Kenya, Thailand, Tanzania, Indonesia, Singapore and even Venezuela shared the same feelings of indignation at the affair.

When the Muslim world was thrown into uproar ignited by the 'Satanic Verses', the Muslim community in Britain took the streets to make unprecedented scenes there. Bradford became famous for its demonstrations organized by the Bradford Council of Mosques in January 1989. Sayed Abdul Quddus, the secretary of the Bradford Council claimed that Rushdie deserved the penalty, and he was eager to carry out the Ayatollah's wishes. The relationship between the local council and the mosques resulted in more plausibility to the conservative religious leadership whereas secular Muslims were seen as betraying their culture. The British government which refused to forbid the book did not also prosecute any of the protesters. Such a policy was explained as a matter of appeasement of religious and cultural sensibilities, as an avoidance of violence and as a care for the international reputation.

The Rushdie affair can indeed be contemptuous in several respects. The other issue it presents is that of treason to the ummah and the faith. The Western world's sense of bewilderment when the edict was broadcast divided its attitude into one which rallied to the cause of Rushdie and another which joined British Muslims in their fight to defend Islam. Holders of the latter attitude might have been those who know that Islam does not distinguish between church and state, or they had felt responsible in the same way they do if it had been an issue about the British state and the royal family which are one entity under British law, too. Rushdie was guilty of cultural treason because he rejected Islam (apostasy), and he betrayed his ummah by writing a blasphemous novel against its faith, ancestry and rules. Unfortunately, blasphemy in Britain is only applicable to Christianity; and the defamation of dead (the twelve innocent women and wives of the prophet) is not an offense at all. At least there were people who recognized Rushdie was turning his back on his own roots and did not produce a work of art simply because fame can not be at the expense of pain. Eminent historian Lord Dacre said he « would not shed a tear if some British Muslims, deploring Mr Rushdie's manners, were to waylay him in a dark street and seek to improve them ». In Leicester, Labour MP Keith Vaz led a 3000-strong demonstration (Phillips. 'After the Rushdie Affair').

Although the novel contained themes like negrophobia and anti-Semitism along with blasphemy; Rushdie was awarded knighthood in the Queen's Birthday Honours List in 2008, Denmark's Top Literature Prize in 2014, and the prestigious 2015 Mailer Prize for

Lifetime Achievement, and most importantly, he survived the fatwa which is still in place[12]. The Satanic Verses apparently did not affect his literary career though less than satisfactory, obscure in many respects, aggressive in tone and filled with dirty words. Surely, then, the novel's concern was other than literary. If he wanted to be critical of the Islamic heritagefor the sake of reform, he should have known that it was not through abuse. If his intentions were to amuse Westerners by making fun of immigration experience in Islam: « What kind of idea does 'submission' [Islam] seem today? One full of fear. An idea that runs away » (Rushdie. ''The Satanic Verses'' 126), or to enrich himself through intellectual prostitution in the service of his Western paymasters (Piscatory 780) ; he had lived enough and suffered the experience of a fugitive, and many other things went contrary to his intentions. His affair demonstrated how an ex-Muslim, inadvertently, manipulated Britain's as well as the Islamic world's popular opinions of Islam much more than all of Britain's Muslims combined. It seems that at each episode, a non-Muslim in a position of power is engaged in attacking Islam; he serves as a dynamic of evolution in Islamic resurgence.

The Rushdie affair became a rallying cause for Muslim consciousness. British Muslims, perplexed by the privileges that can be given to an anti-Islamic affair, began questioning why the Qur'an is the book most people plot against and the Prophet Muhammad the most targeted man. A spokesman for the Council of Mosques said that they were talking about the Islamic revival. Indeed, Britain became an arena in which competitive da'wa emerged. The promotion of Islam first took the form of a Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The Union of Muslim organizations and the Islamic Cultural Centre, which were under Saudi patronage in London, were able to bring Muslim objections to the attention of the government and public. The purpose of Islamic groups was not proselytization or a political agenda. One may distrust the authenticity of the Islamic revivalin Britain on the ground that Saudi Arabia and Iran were competing over the leadership of the Muslim world, and that Saudi Arabia was not sincere enough on the book ban or punishment of the author. But response to 'The Satanic Verses' was emotional even before the fatwa and protests were led by the vast majority of South Asian British Muslims who were less educated, with peasant origins in the Subcontinent

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[12]Khomeini's fatwa has been repeatedly confirmed since his death by his successors.

and very sensitive to matters of dignity and tradition. The Jamaat-i-Islami played a significant role in Leicester. Each and every was awake to the obligation of returning to the true path of Islam. Of course, Britain believed that it was the rise of Islamism. British Muslims were being politicized and transformed into radicals who were ready to use violence. To support its argument, reference was made to the Afghan Arab warriors who made their way to Britain after they had fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The protest against 'The Satanic Verses' was a global crisis. It proved the three dimensions of Islam in world politics: national, international and transnational. On the British soil, it widened the opportunities for faith-based public engagement. Ever since and following the 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, Guantanamo Bay and the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the West's war with Islam has become indivisable from the situation of Muslims in Britain.

III. 4.3. The Demographic Factor

Although Islamic revival or resurgence, and similarly used terms to describe the recent reassertion of Islam as a belief and practice covering all aspects of a Muslim's life entail the evident growth of Islamic consciousness among Muslims worldwide, it is the rapidly growing Muslim community which is the subject of most recent discussions of European religion that endeavour to understand the roots of Islamic progress. Most European researchers have noticed that if Islam is growing, that means Christianity is shrinking. And the phenomenon is explained but in terms of statistics.

The British public, for the sake of argument, rarely miss a chance to condemn the Muslim majority and show pity for the dwindling Christian remnants. They are often worried if the UK go Muslim and often investigate the real motives behind the multiplication of the Muslim community. The expansion of other religions' adherents has never caught their attention as Islam's followers have done. Writers had the same views

and believed they are witnessing the death of Christian Britain[13]. Indeed, changing demographic trends mean that Europe will be transformed someday in the near future especially if we consider the estimates that in Europe the Muslim communities' birth rates are three times larger than their non-Muslim counterparts. The analysts who estimated that the number of Muslims will continue to steadily rise have also expected the UK to have the largest increase in Europe's Muslims in the next twenty years. This, nevertheless, pays little serious attention to the fact that if we assume Muslim people's increase, we can equally assume their decrease. This is affirmed by another group of analysts who demonstrated that neither the UK nor Europe are in danger of a Muslim takeover whatever the American Right may believe. The demographic data are unreliable to explain the growth of European Islam. At first glance, it is difficult to ignore the force of a growing Muslim community as the most obvious indicator of the rise of Islam. However, the growth of a faith must be seen in a larger religious context. Analysts should not fail to take notice of matters such as 'believing and practising' as contrasted with 'believing without belonging'[14]. For most pious Muslims, a non-practising Muslim is not a figure to be taken into account. On the other hand, some Christians who do not belong or attend regularly their churches still show high levels of belief, which means Islam is not expanding into a European religious vacuum as many have predicted. Also, if we assume Islam's spread as a threat to Christian Europe, why do not we assume then Europe to bring a total transformation to Islam?

Beyond any doubt, religion is a social phenomenon whose rise or decline depends upon the individuals' conscience. However, even when declines or revivals of a religion are absent in any society, fluctuations with regard to the degree of religiosity can be recorded. And in this case the chief mechanism is demography (Kaufmann et al. 5). If we disregard demographic analysis, that means we assume that people's religious preferences are unrelated to their birth contexts. Therefore, the most important of the demographic factors are religious fertility and religious immigration. The fertility rate has historically been significantly higher among Muslims in comparison to their secular

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[13]See for example, Collum G. Brown's book 'The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800-2000'. Routledge, 2001.

[14]See Grace Davie, 1994. An important book describes as accurately as possible the religious situation of Great Britain at the end of the twentieth century, and evaluates this evidence within a sociological framework.

counterparts. Current patterns of immigration, differences in age structure and losses through conversion have also contributed to change the face of Britain. Many studies suggested that immigrants become more religious the longer they reside in the host society. Data from some UK studies of ethnic minorities revealed strong religious retention in the second generation Muslim groups although they were likely to leave religion or intermarry with whites.

The demographic rivalry in Europe in general is between Christianity and Islam – two of today's most notable religious revitalizations. Growing pessimism in Britain led to the rumors that Christianity was dying and giving way to more assertive faiths mainly Islam. The inclusion of another question on religious affiliation for the first time in the 2001 census of England and Wales reflected both awareness and recognition of the British Muslim community. The decennial census found that in 2011, 2.71 million Muslims lived in England and Wales compared with 1.55 million in 2001. Around 77.000 Muslims also lived in Scotland and 3.800 in Northern Ireland (Gani. ''Muslim Population in England and Wales Nearly Doubles in 10 Years''). The Muslim community in the UK remains a religious minority population no matter what the large number of myths around it. Looking at Muslims in Britain from a data perspective, the picture of Muslim demographics should not be worrying for the British public. According to the observations of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the Muslim population is larger than all other non-Christian faith groups put together (MCB ''Census Report 2015''); and this is what might have prompted alarmist discussions among Britons. Although Muslims comprise less than 1 in 20 of the overall population, being a youthful community would add to demographic alarmism because they are of the age to start families. The tradition of larger families and the higher fertility continue to shape the European criticism of Muslims saying they breed like locusts.

The demographic gap whether imagined or overstated was made possible by the lack of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant violence in the past decades. The demographic data remain unreliable unless they are split by age and sex, and the popular perceptions of Muslim takeover of the UK could have been the worries of those who count Muslim voters not only Muslim citizens. It is also equally hard to rely on some traditional indicators. For instance, the higher fertility rate among female Muslims is now dropping

down owing to the crippling taxation, intermarriage and having carriers outside home which made them wait later in life to have children. Besides that, family size is no longer a Muslim feature as material factors fade and contraception becomes more readily available.

If birth rates are so critical in religious change and revival in Britain, so is immigration. Indeed, most immigrants to the UK are estimated to be Muslims because they largely emigrate from its former colonial states specifically Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. The following table confirmsthis evidece.

Figure 5- Percentage Change in Ethnic Population 2001-2011

Source: Office for National Statistics, 2011 BME Estimate and 2001 S101

Prime Ministers have been criticized for failing to reduce Muslim influx, and for their non-engagement policies which threaten to draw in domestic violence. Immigration, as a driver of the demographic growth of Islam in Britain, also can not be worrying if we consider that it is not a constant fact and that some governmental measure can be passed at any moment to ethnically control the flow of Muslims and show down their movement. Moreover, the willingness of respondents who claim Muslim identity to identify

themselves as Muslims while supplying answers to religion and nationality questions in the censuses has been clouded since the war on terror.

The Islamic resurgence, though it has been pointed out that its leadership is educated and middle class who reject radicalism, is « sometimes mistakenly equated with radical Islamism », says Farhadian, « it is not first of all radical but piety-minded. Unlike its militant offshoots, which have a strong presence only in select portions of the world, the resurgence in Islamic observance and sociability has been felt in virtually all corners of the globe, wherever the world's 1.8 billion Muslims reside » (ix). Inother words, the religiosity of Muslims is transnational and the constant reference to number means that the demographic force remains an attribute of Islamic growth and expansion.

III. 4. 4. The Notion of Exclusion

The rise of religiosity and demotic theology among British Muslims is undoutedly also the product of the religious self-consciousness that the minority status reinforces. It is evident that it takes time for an immigrant group to establish itself and this is due to their numbers which impose a gap between the status they aspire and the one the host society accords them. This is not to suggest that Muslim immigrants need to be submissive and stagnant since they are naturally predestined to fill such a position. In fact, 'hijra' in Islam is associated with better life. Before departure, the attraction was economic. Rather than facing unemployment and poverty in homelands, most of those who went to Britain were seeking work and better life standards.

Earlier immigrants to Britain experienced difficulties such as lack of practical knowledge, necessary resourcesto invest their savings, travel and gift expenses for their relatives and difficult split family arrangements (Walraven 162). Therefore, they were joined by their families to lessen their hardships. Coupled with the context of origin and immigration, the process of regroupment; hence settlement, formed the beginning of self-construction in an immigrant community with ethnic identity. This is also not to imply that only ethnicity served as a bond. Islam stresses the importance of family and community as the basis of any Islamic social structure. Islam is by nature supra-national,

and in this way it cannot be limited by geopolitical boundaries. Consequently, Muslims' sense of membership and belonging is confirmed by convictions, too.

Immigrant communities are also re-positioned and created by the state as part of their management. While Islam served to suppress the boundaries of the new context, the host state contributed to inventing others. The latter was divided into two distinct types – cultural and economic – though separating these exclusions is not possible as long as they do not happen independently (Abbas.'Muslim Britain' 167) what draws these boundaries are the governmental policies. For instance, for the sake of administrative efficacy, preferences would create divisions. Misunderstandings while dealing with the people in public services also worsen the already perceived exclusion coming from the top. As a result, members of the immigrant community will strengthen their sense of group belonging around a shared comforting concept – often Islam. Unlike their British counterparts, they should have known well that it is not only faith but a system of life.

While the political indicators of alienation showed a mixed picture of disengagement and satisfaction, a lot of attention is often turned to the social and economic aspects of exclusion. The data of the 2001 census reinforced the already widespread perception that Muslims experience marginalization on a number of socio-economic measures. Researchers have closely analysed that and it has been attributed to Muslims strong religious commitment and vigourous social networks to their economic inactivity, poor job prospects and social exclusion at the national level and even when compared to other minority faith communities. Racial prejudice, being an aspect of minority exclusion added to religious prejudice, in the case of Muslims; contribute to employment and education inequalities. This is perceived by Muslims to be widespread in Britain (Eatwell and Goodwin 37). On the basis of their awareness of the possibility of both racial and religious exclusion, many regard Muslims at risk from alienation.

Rioting in the summer of 2001 in the north of England, and the subsequent London bombings of July 2005 heightened vigilance around Muslims who, for British authorities, might be deemed to represent a terrorist threat in particular and violence in general. Though much of the violence in the former event was stirred up by right wing extremists, and for the latter event the perpetrators of 7/7 were all British citizens, born and brought up in England. The Muslim is always the oriental other who is permanently subjected to

political violence. Inquiries that followed the events of violence in the UK often pointed out that the Muslim communities were often deprived and affected by high unemployment, lacking a strong cultural identity and disenfranchisement of young people. Yet, the discourse instead of encouraging improvements and combatting underachievements continue to promote a tone of accusation under the veil of self-segregation, extremism, war on terror and so on. The claim that some Muslims who are victims of socio-economic exclusion are providing moral oxygen to Islamic terrorism has been rejected by a great deal of research. It is much more likely that it drives young British Muslims to poverty or crime as it does with any other citizen in the UK. Demonisation of Muslims has always been associated with extremism, though this ideology has no singular defined enemy. This attitude put Muslims in Britain under severe test which pushes them to seek solace in spiritual engagement. Nevertheless, it is thought to be causing only a symbolic exclusion of a minority. If we assume this is exact, then by the same token the young Muslims' religiosity could also be minimized to only a psychological return to Islam. But explanations for the return to religion among Muslims in the West in general have rarely been focused on the degree of sincereness and questioning whether it was heart-felt or rather affected by external factors.

There has been a change in the immigration community with younger and better educated Muslim members since 2001. Data of 2011, however, showed that Muslims still faced discrimination and disadvantage (Muslim Population in England and Wales (The Guardian). The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) study of data from the 2011 census stressed Muslims' needs for equal social chance. Health and homelessness issues were discussed as the most evident indicators of inequality. Economic activity among Muslims remained lower than the overall population as a whole (19.8% of Muslims were in full time employment compared with 34.9% of the overall population). There is a clear lack of integration, noticed in neighbourhoods, jobs, schools and social media platforms. But in what way is that connected with the return to Islam? From a Western perspective, the return is extremist for some analysts who are not supported with any proof while it is not for others who believe there are millions of good and law-abiding Muslims living in parallel communities. The Western world has long been conscious that Islam throughout history served as a vehicle for mobilisation. And it is a law of life that Muslims, like all

religious communities members, are perceived as Muslims more at certain moments (moments of intensity) than at others. But when we consider the battles that Muslims have fought over halal food, women's veil, mosque building and call for prayer, religious education in schools, training for imams and Islamic societies, we need to reconsider again the validity of alienation and the doubts about Muslims' commitment to their faith.

III. 4. 5. The Religious Seeds of British Muslim Communities

Because Islam exists principally in the third world, the Muslim people have generally been oppressed by colonialism and imperialism for centuries. The presence of colonial regimes in the Muslim lands assisted in the formulation and articulation of an anti-colonial discourse which, with national self-consciousness awakened gave birth to national movements to resist colonial rule. Among these, those with Islamic character were much feared by colonialists. That is why the French colonizers destroyed Muslim schools in the Middle East as early as the 1800s, and the British governors in India replaced the indigenous system of education with English education. They understood that Islam was the most efficient source of national unity for resistance and national liberation. The Islamic dimension proved strong in the Iranian revolution. It also identified much better than anything else with the Palestinian struggle and OPEC. Islamic revivalist responses had been produced wherever there was European domination of Muslim land. A case in point is the Muslims of India who formed Islamic movements against the British imperialism. Many British Muslims inherited the Islamic aspect from these earlier networks and exported it to Britain. Though their ideas of revival are now shaped by the British context, it is important to understand their process of reform as it first originated in their homelands.

Most British Muslims follow the Deobandi reformist movement which developed in India in the 19th century. The movement's name comes from Deoband, a small town a hundred miles north of Delhi and site of the first college-level madrasah, Dar al-ulum. It was organized as a revivalist movement with the twin aims of propagating pure teachings of the Qur'an and Hadith among Muslims and keeping alive the spirit of jihad against

colonists. Whereas the aim of the Aligarh Movement[15]was the welfare of Muslims through Western education and support of the British government, the aim of the Deobandi Movements was reassertion of Islamic principles to regenerate the morals of the Muslim community. Since before the end of Mughal rule, the Muslim identity had been gradually disintegrating because Muslims had become influenced over time by the Hindu customs and culture. The British interference only worsened and perpetuated the Hindu influence. Aside from its avowed objective to overthrow the British rule in the Indian sub-continent and restore the Islamic rule, it also sought to eliminate some pagan and Hindu elements from Islam.

The founders of the Deobandi institution – Hazrat Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanautawi and his close friend and scholar, Rachid Ahmad Gangohi, along with the ulama and everyone committed to preserving Islam – gathered at Deoband in order to devise a plan for the spread of Islam in the Indian subcontinent. The first decision concerned the organization of Islamic education. The Dar ul-ulum was initiated in 1867 and the Dars-Nizaami curriculum was adopted. Strict adherence to Hanafi fiqh was encouraged to create religious discipline and suppress their centuries-long corruption. Furthermore, in treating jihad, strategies were made to educate the Muslim masses in the tradition of the prophet era and to prepare them to expand their life if they gave priority to Allah's just order. It was for this reason that the British media considered Deobandism as fundamentalism (BBC.Radio4.The Deobandis).

Deobandism is the doctrine that inspired Islamic teachings in Pakistan, and shares the Taliban's restrictive views in both Pakistan and Afghanistan especially as regards women. Most of the imams of Taliban were trained in Deobandi schools and most of their leadership attended Deobandi seminaries. In fact, Deobandi madrassas flourished across South Asia thanks to the official support of Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq who assumed control of Pakistan in1977. Originally, Deobandism was operating out of an anti-imperialistic rubric ; however, it gradually hardened its interpretation of Islam till it became described as a conservative Islamic orthodoxy. Deobandi clerics hold that a

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[15]Sir Syed Khan launched the Aligarh Movement of which Aligarh was the center. He had two immediate objectives in mind: to remove the state of misunderstanding and tension between the Muslims and the new British government, and to induce them to go after the opportunities available under the new regime without deviating in any way from the fundamentals of their faith.

Muslim's first loyalty is to Islam and only then to the country of which he is a citizen or a resident. Moreover, they insist that Muslims separate from others in the West – an ideology similar to the Wahhabis of the Saudi State. Precisely, it was also stated that they advised Muslims to befriend non-Muslims without allowing that relationship to touch the heart.

The impact of Deobandi teaching on Islamic learning in Britain is ambivalent. Owing to family loyalties and class structures, the Deobandi schools made steady progress (Ahmedand Sonn 119). As the Deobandis are the largest single group that gives Islam in Britain much of its Character and controls a significant portion of UK mosques and nearly all of the UK-based training of Islamic Scholars, sensational stories about Muslim takeovers in British schools and the illiberal and extremist nature of Deobandi Islam painted a gloomy picture of all Muslims. What added fuel to the fire was the problematic access to Deobandi Dar-ul-Ulum (Islamic seminaries) in the UK for some researchers (Gilliat-Ray. 'Closed worlds' 7-33) Scholars like Philip Lewis described Deobandi education as a closed system. However, this issue confronting the Deobandi madrasa, network and, on a comparable scale, the international Islamic universities that they are closed and relevant only for the Muslim community reflected a one-sided attitude towards Muslims. Professor Gilliat-Ray conducted a research that demonstrated the positive effect of involving Muslim religious professionals in providing Muslim religious and pastoral care in public institutions in Britain, especially in prisons and hospitals. Her study followed on from a project entitled 'The Training and Development of Muslim Religious Professionals in Britain' which showed that at the forefront of the developing role of Muslim chaplains were graduates of Deobandi seminaries.

Not only were the Deobandis controlling a large number of mosques in Britain, but they were also the pioneers of mosque building there. Their system of education is well-organized and carefully selected for young Muslims in order to provide a barrier against the impact of radical groups, and to combat the evils of deviant sects and erroneous thoughts (Gilliat-Ray. 'Muslims in Britain' 88) Thus, the claim that Deobandism was behind pushing Pakistan towards Islamic Radicalism for decades and that it was at the origin of the Taliban seems inaccurate because it was believed these took their inspiration from Saudi Hanbali theologians and initiators of the Wahhabi worldview. With regard to

terrorism, scholars at Deoband have taken a hard line and issued a fatwa condemning all acts of terrorism in the name of Islam.

The other main religious movement that has many followers in Britain is the Sufi Barelwis. It is a movement established in the North Indian town of Bareilly in the 19th century. It derives its inspiration from Sufi reformer and scholar Ahmed Reza Khan (1856-1921) who taught his followers to consider themselves as the Ahla-Sunnah wal-Jamaah (people of the Sunni majority consensus) rather than Barelwis. He also taught them to defend the Sufi practices which the Deobandis disapproved of including: celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad as a festival, religious meditation (Zikr) weekly meetings, extolling the miraculous qualities of pious deceased Muslims or spiritual leaders, making their graves into places of pilgrimage, regular grave visitation for spiritual intercession, death anniversaries and so forth (Hamid 73-74; Bowen 116).

Barelwi Sufism is also the majority Muslim sect in Pakistan. The stronghold of Barelwi remains Punjab, the largest province of the country. It originated in Mirpur district, the hometown of most Britain's Pakistani Muslims. Their pirs (spiritual leaders or sheikhs) started visiting Britain regularly to pursue their tariqa there. Their earlier migration to Britain was the result of their displacement caused by the construction of a huge hydro-electric dam on the Jhelum River in the 1960s. When joined by their families in the 1970s, they began to build their own mosques and madrassas. In Britain, Barelwis were not able to have one united organization like the formerly established Qadri Shadili and Naqshbandi tariqas. Instead, they showed loyalty to individual pirs where they resided. Not only did they suffer from a lack of centralisation, Barelwis were losing the youth of the second and third generations who began to disapprove of the emphasis on rote-learning rather than understanding and on rituals and mysticism rather than on faith and knowledge.

Like Deobandism, it is another mainstream Sunni movement but they express their religious devotion differently. The difference between these sects can be difficult to understand. For instance, the Barelwis believe in intercession between humans and Divine Grace, which is criticized as superstition by others. They see the Prophet Muhammad as more than a man, a part of the divine light of Allah, a superhuman figure whose presence is all around us at all times. The Deobandis reject these views and revere

the prophet, but they argue he was a perfect mortal man. He was flesh and blood; not light.

With respect to the Barelwis' failure to compete for allegiance among the British born Sufis, Sadek Hamid claimed,

> Due to the influential interventions of a group of convert scholars and the shifting dynamic within rival Islamic trends, the mid-1990s proved to be the turning point in the fortunes of Sufism among younger Muslims in Britain. … Sufi orders had a limited appeal to the second generation who saw them as a folkloric legacy of their parents' generation (75).

Even with the establishment of the tariqas (orders), wherever Muslim populations have settled in Western Europe, Sufism remains invisible, less appealing and subject to criticism and accusations of introducing bida (innovation) into Islam. In response, Sufi adherents took advantage of the strong empathy with the teachings of traditional Islam and the four madhabs among British Muslims. And outside the Muslim migrant community, Sufism made very little impact. To re-emerge stronger than before, Sufism needed to escape te confines of ethnicity, locality, language, and techniques. Therefore, Sufism has functioned via the web and addressed non-Muslims in the lingua franca under the label of traditional Islam to operate on a global scale and attract as many followers as possible. Undoubtedly, there is an effort to promote the revivalist message of a universal Islam in their network. However, they were also seen as elements of fragmentation and division within the Ummah owing to their overstated claim of allegiance to the Ahl-as-Sunnah wa- Jamaat.

The other main revivalist Islamic organization is Tablighi Jama'at (Missionary Group) which originated in India under the British rule has its headquarters in Dewsbury, Yorkshire. This movement was the offspring of the Deobandi School and came to existence in 1926. The Da'wa methodology of the Tablighi Jamaat is directed inwardly towards Muslims not outwardly towards infidels. It is a closed system that accepted no change in its preaching which was first introduced by Maulana Ilyas. The absence of formal organization and strict discipline gives it strength (Martyand Appleby 516). The doctrine of jihad was totally absent in this movement for it was defined as spreading the Kalima of Allah and the enforcing of Allah's commandments. Both under British rule in

past colonized India and now in the European countries and now in the European countries, it was allowed to flourish. With respect to the revival of Islam, Tablighi Jamaat stressed individual renewal of the faith and moral piety to cultivate a strong Islamic identity in the face of the Western way of life. It abstains from non-Islamic societal activities and from addressing the non-Muslim populations among whom they move, and who actually are the people to whom the message of Islam should be given (Pieri). As such, Tablighi Jamaat is only a small group trying to hold the message of Islam but it is active only at the margins – older generations and lower classes (Gugler 13).

Shortly after the London7/7 bombings and about sixty years since the Tablighi Jamaat sent its first missionaries to the UK in 1945, the movement which barely any non-Muslims were aware of underwent changes. The project of building the Mega Mosque in Newham, East London was a controversial issue. The Mega Mosque plan was strongly opposed and blocked by the UK government. The seven-hectare site located south of the Olympic Park, was acquired in 1996 (Wainwright.The Guardian) and would have been large enough to hold over 11.000 worshippers with three times the space of London's St.Paul's Cathedral. On the ground that the dozens of British-born Muslims charged with terrorist offences spent time in the Tablighi Jamaat. After a 17 years battle, a firmer line against mosque project was taken by the Secretary of State.

The Sunni Islamic groups transplanted to the UK were both traditionalist and reformist. The former could be Deobandis and Barelwis from the Indian Subcontinent whereas the latter consists of the movements from the Middle East such as Salafi, Wahhabi, and Muslim brotherhood. As for the Salafis in Britain, they abide by the common features of Salafism[16] everywhere like imitating the practices of the Prophet and his early followers, avoiding music, television and photographs of living things ; niqab for women, short thawbs and big beards for men. Though supposed to be the most able Islamic group to provide an accurate portrayal of the Prophetic model, they did not abide by his intention that the community should be a single community.

'They also can be split into three broad and sometimes overlapping categories',

claims Innes Bowen, 'pietistic Salafis who believe that salvation will come

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[16]Salafi derives from the Salaf which signifies followers of the prophetic model as understood by the companions.

through faith, religious ritual and strict adherence to the principles laid down in the Qur'an and Hadiths; political Salafis who believe that Muslims should also strive to establish Islamic states in Muslim-majority countries ; and jihadi Salafis who advocate the taking up of arms to overthrow un-Islamic regimes in Muslim lands' (59).

Whether in the context of Britain or in their native countries, these groups' different agendas entail the impossibility of their making any unity.

Not all the Islamic movements which were exported to Britain by the Muslim diaspora were indigenous. It is in history that we understand how Wahhabism came to be in the first place, and under whose aegis it sparked into life. The Wahhabi movement was innovated by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab in 1744 in the Arabian Peninsula which they dominated by the middle of the 18th century with the political support of the Al Saud family. It emerged as a reformist trend against religious deviations and invites its followers to emulate Salaf Saleh (righteous ancestors) for their purity. Little by little, it became increasingly influential, partly because of Saudi money and partly because of Saudi Arabia's central role as protector of Mecca (Telegraph Reporters 2016). And today, it is said to be the main source of global terrorism. This narrative that juxtaposes Islam with violence often blames Muslims for not combating evil which started within their lands. The West forgot that, nearly 200 years ago, Muslims defeated Wahhabism while the British revived it and supported its extremism[17]. It was when Muslims also forgot that Western powers would play with anything – be it an Islamic movement or a ruling family – for their own interests. Accordingly, the British colonialism then was hoping to expand, and for that to happen they needed to weaken the Ottoman Empire from within through Wahhabis and under the guise of jihad. Muslims seem to have missed the lesson several times. The West allied themselves with Muslims again when Bin Laden was trained to fight Russia and once again when Saddam was favored as he attacked Iran.

By means of contemplation, one would inquire about the reasons that led to an Anglo-Wahhabi alliance against Turkish Muslims. And by means of investigation, 'Confessions of a British spy and British enmity against Islam' would provide evidence. It was said

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[17]See the Treaty of Darin with which the British made the Al-Saud family and the Wahhabi ideology a British protectorate and supported their killing of Muslims.

that Ibn Abdul Wahhab, in Basra, came into contact with certain Englishmen who encouraged him to develop a critical attitude about Islam (qtd. in Livingstone)[18]. Ayyub Sabri Pasha in his Turkish work 'Mir'at al-Harramin' reported the same and specified that the Englishman was a spy named Mr Hempher, who « inspired in him [Abdul Wahhab] the tricks and lies that he had learned from the British Ministry of the Commonwealth » (Livingstone). Hempher was sent to Egypt, Iraq, Arabia and Istanbul where he learned Arabic, Turkish, the Qur'an and the Shari'a. That was in hope of preparing a report revealing the weak aspects of the Ottoman Empire which in turn will facilitate sowing discord among Muslims (Gumus 16-7).

Wahhabi Muslims prefer to be called Salafis rather than Wahhabis, but Salafis, who do not like to be idolists, do not like to be called Wahhabis and prefer to call themselves Ahl al-Sunnah. Salafism is more often than not associated with Wahhabism though it is not completely correct. Saudi leaders are funding and promoting Salafism for it is the current movement they favour most. Conversely, Wahhabism is their official religious state ideology which came to be called as such mainly by non-Muslims: its fabricators.

The other Middle Eastern originated movement operating in Britain is the Muslim brotherhood. This reformist movement also claims that its thought is Salafi or its aim is to return to pristine Islam. Therefore, the term Salafi is confusing in the revivalist discourse: it could be broader than we might expect, and it could at the same time refer to a specific movement. But it becomes evident that the intention of most reformers is to return to the practices of their ancestors or the first three generations of Muslims (Salaf u Salihin); not to plan for something else. Muslim Brotherhood, as Gilliat-Ray (2010) has pointed out, does not officially exist in the UK. It works through some organizations inspired by its ideology such as the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) set up for the political representation and claiming religious authority for British Muslims. Reformist movements in Britain are far better organized and effective than the traditional ones despite internal divisions and the absence of some.

The formerly discussed list of movements does not include any devotees whose interest is the establishment of an Islamic state and whose orientation is radical. Yet, it was pointed out that Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and Al-Muhajirun are radical political

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[18]The quoted words belong to Stephen Schwartz, the author of 'The Two Faces of Islam'.

organizations in Britain. The former is a transnational Islamist Movement founded in Palestine in the early 1950s. Its architect, Taqiuddine al-Nabahani advocated re-establishing a modern khilafah by adopting new modes of reform and reinterpreting Islam into new worldviews (Abbas. 'Islamic Political Radicalism' 146) Today, it is banned from most European countries. The latter group was founded by Omar Bakri Muhammad in 1996 and infiltrated university Islamic societies in Britain, but dissolved in less than a decade.

Broadly speaking, Islamic movements and organizations in Britain filled a void for the frustrated youth and offered them attractive ideological alternative to their insecurity in the British society. Cultural Islam provision for religiously serious second or third generation British-born Muslims proved a failure. Some form of authentic Islam seemed suitable for them, and this was guaranteed under reformist movements that were considered a threat to traditional movements. The use of English as a medium of Islamic instruction replaced the earlier lack of communication and attracted potential converts. Critics still believe that much concentration on religious identity would disunite Muslims not produce one single ummah.

Conclusion

The formerly discussed roots and explanations offered for the Islamic revival vary widely and seem sometimes contradictory. Once it is referred to increased confidence as a result of the oil boom of the 1970s, and once it is attributed to the mood of despair and humiliation that spread among Arabs after a long time of exploitation under the umbrella of colonialism. Emigration is either a matter of attraction for socio-economic reasons, or heralding the Islamization of the whole world. The Iranian Revolution had less effect in the Muslim countries than in the West because the mainstream is Sunni Islam while Iran is predominantly Shi'a Muslims. This is in addition to the lack of common ethnic roots and linguistic ties. The oil wealth in Saudi Arabia, if it financially assisted the cause of Islamic activism and offered publicity to it in the West, it did as much to significantly modernize the country.

One is also told that the decline of religion in Britain has coincided with the arrival of three million migrants who are more religious than their British Christian counterparts. But if migration has brought a religious revival to Britain, why could not the huge flow of Christian immigrants from Africa and Eastern Europe spur a similar revitalization in public Christianity there? The spectrum of resurgent Islam is wider than to be attributed an exact reason. Once it is the symptom of a period of increased Sectarian division, and once it is owing to solidarity and unity of the members of the Muslim community.

Islamic resurgence, by and large, seems to be a movement against external challenges such as Western hegemony and tyranny as well as their decadent societies. Yet, it is also against Muslims for deserting their religion by following fallacious secular nationalism, socialism and secularism all of which are un-Islamic. A generation of young Muslims, particularly third and fourth generation Muslims in Britain is growing up in a time of challenge to their Islamic identity. In spite of the dense family organization and the parents' guided religious education, the British Pakistanis who are uninterested by their identification with either Pakistan or Britain reject their parents understanding of Islam and are losing patience with the Pakistani practice of the religion through Sufi traditions.

Chapter IV: Impacts of Islamic Revival in Contemporary Britain

Introduction

The 1990s – if not before – witnessed the emergence of a new concept which is the discourse of 'Islamophobia' that alarmed the secular public of Britain to the everyday reality of prejudice against Muslims. Although this discourse created sufficient awareness of the importance of religion among Muslim communities, it did not exceed the level of criticism of these prejudices. Research, therefore, instead of investigating how Islam is being experienced, focused on how it is used as an incitement. Yet, it is the experience and the quality of being self-sufficient which tells much about Islam's vitality and the need to keep it.

Contrary to the expectation of possible gradual secularization, Britain witnessed the emergence of British-born and educated Muslims eager to maintain a transnational Islamic identity. Hence, Islam's revitalization differentiates itself from the evangelical and neo-orthodox revivals which ended in Christianity and Judaism being domesticated into their wider secular social politics. The consequences of the establishment of modern Islamic state in Iran in 1979, the war on terror after 9/11, the Arab Spring coupled with the public unrest caused by Muslims strong reaction to the Rushdie Affair and the Gulf War have exerted a continuous influence on the assertion of a global Islamic character among the diverse Muslim communities of Britain.

Many people including politicians and world leaders have been busy looking for motives behind the process of Islamic resurgence which is manifesting itself all over the globe. Some compared it to dynamic historical movements like the Crusades, Nazism or Communism and continue to forget to give the phenomenon attention to better understand its potential consequences. Currently, the discourse which is much in everyone's mind is whether Islam is the crisis or the solution; a threat or a challenge; and whether it will be aggressive or peaceful. While the evident discourse among Muslims is that accusing the West of Islamophobia, Islamists are criticized for being in themselves

developing an acute 'Westophobia'. One of the Muslim writers qualifies the sentiment as cultural schizophrenia. (Shayegan)

IV. 1. The Cost of Resurgent Islam in Britain

Marmaduke Pickthall's statement that « in the eyes of history, religious toleration is the highest evidence of culture in a people » (Dixon) seems contrary to the current wave of hate created by stereotyping Muslims living in the UK. Across Britain, Muslims are caught up in a battle over the very nature of their faith. This battle made the country turn a 'Stasi state'[1] for them. In spite of their significant developments in making Britain their home and their contributions to the British economy and civil society, they face huge abuse and accusations.

IV. 1. 1. Anti-Muslim Racism

The mutiplicity of terms related to describing the demonization of Muslims in Britain reflect differences of understanding and focus. Internationally, there is not an agreement on which phrase to use in which context. But the negative attitude towards Islam is often refereed to inaccurately as 'Islamophobia'. Coupled with it, there are several other terms such as: 'intolerance against Muslims', 'Anti-Muslim prejudice', 'anti-Islamism', and others. Within the differences in terminology lies another imprecision as regards the usage of the terms Muslim and Islam. Hostility and fear are two contrasting terms just as it is the case with Islam and Muslims. Besides, 'Islam' could be conceived as a culture, civilization or religion; and 'Muslims' can refer to ethno-religious groups or communities. If we consider the politics of language usage, the diversity of the people subject of this usage, the different agendas and approaches of the users themselves, and the context in which it is used, we do not have the least doubt that the Western attitude is ambiguous and intricate though vagueness is not a Brirish feature.

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[1]A reference to the East German secret police that would spy on, and harass the country's citizens. A term used in Sara Ann Harris's article in the Huffington Post. UK (12/11/2015).

Public opinion research concluded that anti-Muslim feelings are more widespread than general anti-foreigner feelings toward subjects living in European host societies (Bleich 379-400). Opinions on the beginnings of this hostility are threefold: a response to 9/11, a wave that started since the last decade of the 20th century, or an attitude that existed for a long time. As for the reasons that made anti-Muslim feelings a very accessibe type of prejudice, this could be attributed to the continuous critique of Muslims based on the defence of individual rights, democracy, security and so on; the perception of Muslims as acultural minority already identified with a number of prejudices; and the documented differences in norms and ways of life in everyday context. In fact, Islam is more publicly confessional than the other faiths and refuses to be privatized. But where is the problem in living side by side with a community which is being conscious to their religion and identity? Why are the adversaries of this Muslim consciousness often less exposed and investigated than the Muslim minorities? Ironically, it is in the contexts of social and political adversity that Muslims identify their consciousness and its renewal at each time they are misrecognized.

Contrary to popular belief, the advance of Islam and its community in Britain is misunderstood as a threat which the mainstream and left-wing politicians failed to confront; hence, nationalists think terrorist attacks are the soundest message to persuade policy makers to change their approaches. The emergence of extremist, nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe in general is gaining supporters and perpetrators who not only seek the disempowerment of Muslims, but to trigger a racial war. The police are warning that hate crimes seem to be growing, but in response it is as if these crimes never happened and are often virtually ignored and unmentioned. Contrastingly, attacks planned by jihadis would dominate the headlines of all news programmes.

Anti-Muslim racism stands for the hate crimes committed against Muslims, but also refers to harassment, rudeness and verbal abuse in public places, acts of violence against properties, and the desecration of Muslim cemetries, cultural centres, and religious buildings, unlawful discrimination in employment practices and the provision of services, the non-recognition of Muslim identities and concerns as well as the removal of Muslim symbols (Richardson 2). Anti-Islamic racism could always be perceived in areas of economic hardship, job market competition, housing and political positions. This,

however, has not been always the manifestation of racism in Britain. Industrial Britain was racist through labour: exploitation, slavery, colonialism, indenture and immigration. In post-industrial Britain, the economic dimension of racism gave way to political and cultural perspectives. Add to that the role of golbalization which made the role of the welfare state shift to market state. The latter is guided by individualism and fragmentation; not by social cohesion and equality. The politics of fear created hostility. In the United Kingdom, political discourse has designated Muslims as the new 'enemy within'. The Muslim community has become the 'suspect community'[2], and has replaced the Irish as the main focus of the government's security agenda. Anti-Muslim racist incidents reported to and recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service occur as victims go about their daily lives. The focus groups with Muslim communities concluded that the everyday and spontaneous nature of the incidents normalized the acts to the extent of not reporting them, and this means the loss of a great deal of reality (Kielinger and Paterson 9).

Much anti-Muslim bigotry and violence in the UK is predicated on the rhetoric and practice of 'the war on terror' that George Bush and Tony Blair launched. When people had barely given Islam a second thought before the 9/11 attacks, a spotlight has suddenly shone on this faith. The rhetoric of the war on terror has found greatest resonance among Europe's far-right milieu. Shifting away from historical and moral traditional ideologies focusing on Jews and Judaism; and being transformed from an anti-Asian and anti-Arab racism, Europe's far-right increasingly deploys the rhetoric of invasion and Islamification to nowadays Muslims and Islam as the new threats. The British National Party (BNP) was established in 1982 from the remains of the 'whites only' National Front. Its activism was marginal until it came under the leadership of Nick Griffin in 1999 who encouraged a series of anti-Islam campaigns across the North of England. Soon after the 9/11 and 7/7 suicide bomb attacks on the London public transport system in 2005, it went national under the slogan 'Islam out of Britain' (Allen ''The Rise of Europe's Far Right''). TheBNP succeeded to bring the issue of Islam as a threat into the political mainstream, but was not the only way in which the far-right manifested. The English Defence League

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[2]This notion was introduced by Hillyard 1993 in his study of Irish people's experience of the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act to capture the devastating impact of legislation.

(EDL), a street-level movement that emerged in 2009, shaped much of the populist opinion to stop Britain being transformed into an Islamic state, and attacked the building of mosques. Muslims, in the British context, are not harassed and rendered invisible only by the far-right, but also liberals who have not supported Muslims demands for recognition as a racial group on equal terms with Jews and Sikhs. They consider the ridiculing of Muslims as a sign of good intellectual debate. John E. Richardson's examination of the ways that British Muslims were presented in British national newspapers, both broadsheet and tabloid, during the general elections of 1997, 2001, and 2005 revealed negative representations using diverse negative collocate for Islam and Muslims:

> 'agressive Islamic fundamentalists', 'vociferous and belligerent Islam', 'brainwashed young British Muslims', 'fundamentalist Muslims', 'homegrown Islamic extremists', 'Islamic loonies', 'Islamic extremists', 'Islamic militants', 'Islamic fundamentalists', 'militant anti-Semitic Muslim groups', 'Muslim extremists', 'Muslim fanatics', 'Muslim maniacs', 'The Muslim lunatic fringe',
>
> … (Malik 154)

There are hundreds of cases, only in London, that show how Muslims have become the prime target for serious hate crimes by nativist racists : Neil Lewington, a violent extremist nationalist convicted in July 2009 of a bomb plot ; Terence Gavan, a violent extremist nationalist convicted in January 2010 of manufacturing nail bombs and other explosives, firearms and weapons ; a gang attack in November 2009 on Muslim students at City University ; a gang assault in June 2004 on PhD student Yassir Abdelmouttalib ; the murder in September 2009 of Muslim pensioner, Ikram Syed ul-Haq ; a serious assault in August 2007 on the Imam at London Central Mosque ; and an arson attack in June 2009 on Greenwich Islamic Centre (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 20). The geography of hate is not confined to London as it shifted to small towns and rural regions. But London remains Britain's capital of hate crime with 333 anti-Muslim incidents in 2010/11 and 337 in 2012 according to the figures recorded by the Metropolitan police (Capsey et al. 9). The online dimension of hate crimes has become significant in the organizational structure of most assailants; yet, it is either ignored or under-researched. Spitting at Muslim women wearing the Islamic veil, punching them,

and calling them Osama Bin Laden's wives are typical incidents that often because of a lack of confidence in the police or because it appears a minor assault to the victim go unreported. In spite of these conditions, the 2014 statistics of the Metropolitan Police showed that anti-Muslim hate crimes in Britain have risen by 70% (Sanghani, The Telegraph). And in 2015, Tell Mama[3] issued a report that painted a picture of explosion of anti-Muslim abuse and attacks whose rise was estimated by 32.6%; the victims, mostly women, were targeted by teenage perpetrators in educational establishments and public transport (Sherwood, The Guardian).

Anti-Muslim racism is based on processes of racialization that operate on the religious and the cultural as opposed to biological. In other words, Muslim communities experience racism not because they represent racial difference. This can be confirmed by the Bosnian Muslims case. Their massacre by people who shared the same physical traits, language and culture (Serbian atrocities) was attributed to their racialized identity that represented an ethnic other – a Muslim other who must be removed through ethnic cleansing. This debate of identity and race also calls into question the claim of many people who want to deny the reality of racism against Muslims by saying that Muslims are not a race, so nobody can be accused of being racist towards them. Indeed, Muslims cannot be a race since they are a diverse religious grouping. The Ummah is a global community that consists of many races and more are to join by means of conversion. But the same applies to Asians, whites, and blacks. Therefore, race is not a biological reality but an imaginary association based on common features, especially skin colour, for each racial group. Currently, racism is not about race but culture. This cultural racism stands for the idea of 'the hierarchy of cultures'which classifies certain cultures as superior than others. This can be dangerous since it would lead to clashes and wars. In illustration, the war in Iraq was driven by this cultural racism which boasted of its democracy and women's rights and stressed the need to export them to the people who are unable to develop such superior principles.

In the UK, cultural racism created an environment of hate where phone calls and emails from Muslims started to grow in number – complaints about a ban on hijab,

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[3]Tell Mama is a British monitoring group and public service which measures and monitors anti-Muslim incidents and allows Muslims to report their experiences of hostility. Reports can be made over the phone, via e-mail or online.

rejections in job interviews and study condidacies, sending kids to madrassas, and street assaults. According to recent studies, the role of governmental and political discourse, instead of alleviating the huge pressures of Muslims, deteriorated their situation. While the myth of a post-racial society continues through laws that discriminate[4], incidents have worsened at the national level as well as in response to incidents taking place in countries of the European Union. The Evening Standard informed that there were 24 anti-Islamic incidents in the seven days up to November 10, three days before the Paris attacks took place, whereas 76 were recorded between November 17 and 24 on ITV London (Al-Othman).

The Brexit debate has normalized British racism and fuelled antagonism towards foreigners. Before the Brexit, campaigning activities played on racist themes including getting England back, no more Polish Vermin, against the multinationals, shutting down Muslim black and brown immigration by leaving the European Union, making Britain great again or white again and so forth. In the wake of the Brexit vote, reports of hate crime have soared by 57% as long as some got the courage to target predominantly Muslim women. People with bigoted views seized the opportunity of the Brexit as if it were an open season for racism, to invade mosques and call for the repatriation of Muslims. 57% calls back the proportion of the vote which allowed an elected Muslim Mayor for London. Sadik Khan's victory in May 2016 represents a second failure of anti-Islamic racism in the West, after Stephen Harper's failure in 2015. Furthermore, it is an opportunity to reassure and empower Muslims, to revive self-confidence, and to prove that Muslims' faith incites them to maintain coexistence and cooperation. And it matters equally when we consider how it refuted the belief that started to take root in Britain that politicians resorted to anti-Muslim language as a ticket to victory. Khan's victory in the London mayoral elections sends a strong message to anti-Muslim bigots that say the ability of bigotry is limited. It will not end anti-Islamic racism, but it challenge dit, revived hope, and confirmed the loyalty of British Muslims as well as their visibility.

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[4]See the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

IV. 1.2. Allegations

Tackling anti-Islamic racism in the UK cannot be dissociated from tackling extremism, terrorism, fundamentalism, and fanaticism. Such ideas were developed into ideologies justifying discrimination and formenting racial violence. The evidence of this can be seen in media representations, governmental policies, laws taking children away from Muslim parents suspected of being extremists and spying on educators for signs of radicalization. Although it appears contradictory that a Muslim who publicly asserts himself as a peaceful, tolerant, and self-confident British subject in a Western liberal democracy is accused of being violent, radical and extremist; this propaganda continues amidst some collective silence.

Anti-Islamic racism is the Western reaction to a sound existence of a Muslim presence, not its crisis. Assertive Muslim community and vital Islam reflect the failure of liberal values since their presence prevents the full closure of the Western society around its liberal values. Therefore, anti-Muslimness could be interpreted as the crisis of Western liberal thought. It is the misfortune of the working class, as it has always been the case, and instead of being justified on racial superiority; it is Islamic barbarity which is put forward this time as an excuse, and the means is scapegoating Muslims. A case in point is what this British Muslim student says, « My parents are doctors, and Iam an A – grade predicted an A – level student, but my head of year stated in my UCCA form that iam not a suitable candidate for medicine as Iam likely to marry young and leave the profession … » (Merali). By the time Britain is institutionalising anti-Muslim racism using anti-terror laws; it is breeding a culture of terror and fear through the BNP and EDL action. And by the time it is despising the Islamic culture and value, it is working on the elevation of its own British values as opposed to universal values.

In reflecting the British landscape, anti-Islamic racism was justified not only through presenting the issue as otherness and inferiority as opposed to the norms of British society. There is also the idea of identifying Muslims as terrorists. The climate of fear and threat posed by 9/11 characterized all Muslims as terrorists, having the capability to be terrorists, or being supportive of terrorism. Besides, the public debate which focuses on cultural incompatibility, religious extremism and violence continue to heighten the

bias against Muslims and make attitudes more negative than those to Jews, Buddhists, and Hindus. Given that Muslims are the largest minority faith group in Britain, and taking into consideration their multi-ethnicity, their ability not to be incorporated within, their growing commitment to their faith amidst threats and instability ; it would be problematic for Britain to gneralize its allegations.

The markers of danger that are seen challenging the British security are fraught with ambiguity. Just like the US who cultivated Islamists during the Cold War to fight against secular nationalism and the left, but these allies suddenly became enemies, Britain also allowed some individuals advancing extremist Islamist agenda to enter its landscape long before one would hear about any of the global movements of al-Qaeda and the subsequent Islamic state. When London was a safe heaven for fundamentalist preachers in exile, a number of mosques were set up such as Finsbury Park Mosque, London Central Mosque, and East London Mosque. The propagation of global jihad was nothing threatening or challenging. In fact, a covenant of security was established between the British security apparatus and those fundamentalist preachers including Omar Bakri Muhammad, Abu Hamza al-Masri, and AbuQatada al-filistini. Of course, at that time, Britain's culture of tolerating radicalism on its shores was not barbaric, inciting violence, and breeding terrorism. Britain's covenant of security stated that there would be high levels of toleration in exchange for British streets left free of blood. Few years later, the deal failed to prevent bomb attacks on London's transportation system. The arrangement was criticized as being naive, and Britain was blamed of breeding its own terrorists. Still, however, the high concentration of Islamic activists in the UK puts into question the UK's commitment to the fight against Islamic terrorism.

There is no doubt that some Islamic leaders in the UK have been given more credence there than by parts of their own communities. In August 2005, Michael Clarke told the Guardian that Britain's culture of tolerating radicalism is in the national interest and should not be swept away by the urge to get tough. ('Clarke, 'The Contract with Muslims must not be torn up''). Whether he wanted to answer critics who claimed Britain's tolerance was so naive that it was made with wrong people, or he wanted to convince Tony Blair not to change the rules of the game, there is only one interpretation which is jihadi terrorism was given the green light by Britain's hospitality to foreigners, escaping

terror and persecution. It came in the words of Clarke that « the more we learn about the two bomb plots in London, the less they fit any of our previous understandings of terrorism. The two jihadi terrorist cells emerge as typically British: full of anomalies, eccentric in their behaviour, gentlemen-amateurs alternating between ruthless homicide and comical in competence … » (Clarke). But how could the glorification of terrorism on the British soil be in the national interest and fails to prevent bomb attacks on the same soil?

The British laissez-faire approach towards immigration and asylum goes back at least to the beginning of the 20th century as evidenced by Syed Jameluddine al-Afghani, the major source of inspiration for religiously oriented nationalism in Iran and celebrated founder of modern political Islam. Recently, al-Afghani was reidentified as not a religious person by orthodox standards (Chehabi 45), and he was said to be 'a free mason' and a British agent (Rusi Org.) The same was reported about Ayatollah Khomeini being an agent of British intelligence and that his father was William Richard Williamson, born in Bristol, England in 1872, of British parents and lineage [5](Peters. 'Root of Islamist Fascism') The presence of Islamic opposition groups in Britain is then rooted in the British security culture which sees the act as beneficial in terms of self-policing and gaining some leverage over their governments. A lot can be learned by monitoring these Islamic organizations and networks as revealed by the British intelligence which adds surprise to July bombings occurrence.

Anti-extremism and counter-terrorism prevent strategies, however, became the British government's key policies to combat the threat of Islamists. Prevent, in practice, meant constant surveillance: individuals stopped in the streets and supermarkets, singled out for airport checks, and questionned because of some visual identifiers of Islam. Resentment and disappointment was the result of the British intensive securitization especially among the British Muslims who reported positive integration and satisfaction within the British host society. More than that, Muslim communities in this way were being alienated because of the state's mistrust. Alienation will not lead to cooperation as long as it is reinforced by the state and normalized through laws. An instance about how young Briish Muslims are struggling with the implementation of Prevent policywas a post graduate

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[5] See also April 2004 edition of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

student Mohammad Umar Farooq who was enrolled in the terrorism, crime, and global security master's programme. Farooq was accused of being a terrorist after an official at Staffordshire University had spotted him reading a textbook entitled 'Terrorism Studies' in the college library. Although the University subsequently apologized to Farooq, he was so unsettled and frustrated by the accusation, being questioned about his views on Islam, al-Qaeda and ISIS, and his attitudes to homosexuality that he chose not to return to the course (Ramesh andHalliday 'Student Accused''). Earlier than that, the British counter-terrorism strategy depended on British citizenship removal from suspected terrorists even if these individuals have been born in the UK and lived there for a long time. The measure for these British subjects is not only a security practice; it is a pattern that externalizes the threat and erases their Britishness to replace it by foreign otherness which for some did not exceed geographic connections (Jarvis and Lister 57). The same measure was described as a secret war on the enemy within in the British newspaper 'The Independent' (Woods et al. ''British Terror Suspects'')

In its focus on Muslim communities, and without being cautious towards the vast majority of Muslims who reject violence and who share core British values, PREVENT was criticized for causing an identity crisis and creating extreme identities due to the manner in which being Muslim was differentiated from being British on the ground that violence is a quality which is Un-British. Although it operated under the guise of community cohesion, it served much more the disintegration. Renewed as Prevent II in 2011 after much criticism, it only sought to lessen mentioning Muslims and Islam in its discourse of terrorism but remained understood through its predecessor. Dissatisfaction culminated in the 2011 English summer riots which were mainly about race although David Cameron denied. Protesters accused the police of institutional racism. The death of Mark Duggan, which triggered the riots across London, symbolized the death of Britain for many rioters who dreamt of post-racial just and equal society ; not a society where racism was still creeping in. David Cameron's analysis relied on notions of social deviance, immorality and extremism; yet, it was an act of resistance, of surveillance, refusal, and of community empowerment (Blakemore 103-113).

Counter-terrorism could also be flawed with regard to discrimination according to the identity of the suspect in a terrorist attack. Every time an act of terror occurs, people

expect the terrorist to be a Muslim; not because Muslims are terrorists. There has usually been extensive media coverage when the terrorist happens to be a Muslim. Everyone, at least who watches the news regularly, would also notice that Muslims are being terrorized, too. Everyone would also notice the word terrorist is not being used when the suspect is a non-Muslim. In this case, the suspect must be mentally disabled instead. Following the death of Lee Rigby, David Cameron surprised the Muslim community by setting up a 'Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism' in order to confront Islamic extremism. Chris Allen, an expert on Islamophobia at Birmingham University, stated that « the more the lens is turned on Muslim community, the more society begins to think, 'there is no smoke without fire' » (U of Birmingham). Many others believed it would paint the Muslim community as having a problem with extremism. Yet, it is impossible to find any media outlet calling the murderer of Jo Cox, the British Labour MP, a terrorist. The difference is obvious: Jo Cox's killer was not a Muslim. The suspect was a white male called Thomas Mair, motivated by political ideology and having affiliations with neo-Nazi groups. In spite of this, there are suggestions that Mair was an unbalanced individual or a deranged loner. In The Guardian, a short description of the suspect says, « They [his neighbours] said he was quiet and polite, volunteering to do their gardens and offering horticultural tips as he passed downLowood Lane on his regular strolls into Birstall to use the computers at the library. It is believed he had mental health problems and was quoted as praising a particular passage of care he had undertaken in the past … » (Pidd. ''Suspect in Jo Cox's killing'').

Allegations that British Muslims who are reviving their commitment to their faith are extremists and terrorists are more often than not supported with arguments, stories and proofs which are unsubstantiated. Strictly speaking, this matter is beyond the scope of this point, though. What it means to be a Muslim living in Britain has already proven problematic given that life is under pressure of constant accusation of terrorism. The complexity of the situation grows much more when we consider what it means to be a Muslim living in Britain and whose religion is resurgent day after day. British liberalism has already understood the case as rejection of British society in the form of Islamic fundamentalism which encourages a personal return to the true tenets of Islam. Is it then a

problem with fundamentalist Islam? Were all the stories of terrorism and extremism only a preparation for the next stage which is the indictment of the venerable faith of Islam?

At least fundamentalist Islam, if not perceived as a British crisis, is considered a challenge and threat to Britain's social fabric and to its security. A restatement of the British values became needed to alienate Muslims from the path of fundamentalism. The necessity for the radical narrative to disappear is being studied, and David Cameron's policy on 'British values' is a step in the process of curbing fundamentalism. Building positive relationships with the Muslim community, rather than demonising them, is thought to reinvent an Islam which is not radical – a British Islam. Before judging Cameron's initiative as either a shield that protects the British interests or an instrument that would endanger more British lives and stability, it would be better to further understand Islamic radicalism or fundamentalism since both are used interchangeably.

Fundamentalism is a term Christian in origin and synonymous for orthodoxy. It stands for faithfulness to the tenets of one's religion. It has erupted in every single major faith worldwide; so, we have fundamentalist Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism[6] (Armstrong). Currently, it carries negative connotations. However, it need not be. When applied to Islam, fundamentalism is often used in the west as a synonym for radicalism although the former does not necessarily imply the latter. Add to that the fact that the term should not be applied to Islam at all (Espin and Nickoloff 654). Had it been an Islamic quality, why would the West then popularize the term Islamic fundamentalism in both everyday language and scholarly literature only since the late 20th century? In fact, the subject of Islamic fundamentalism attracted the West's attention only after the Iranian revolution which established an Islamic republic. And since the September 11 attacks, Islam and Islamic fundamentalism became mistakenly connected. Accordingly, Islam's resurgence and revival are also wrongly held for the same concept. There is also an attempt to link the birth of fundamentalism with the goal to establish an Islamic state based on the principles of Shari'a law. As for the origin of the term, the West's common use came in the early 20th century to refer to very conservative American Protestant Christians return to the fundamentals of Biblical religion by absolute adherence to the

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[6] See also Fouad Ajani. The Summer of Arab Discontent. Foreign Affairs 1990/1 Winter Issue. Vol 69 N°5. PP 1-20

scriptures. While many researchers traced its origin in the USA, others believed it could go further back in history to the Industrial Revolution or even the 15th century European colonialism[7]. The recognition of the terms origin is so important that it may divert us from trying to understand why there is not evidence of calling the American Protestants 'radical' though not all Americans returned to this religious trend. Paradoxically, all Muslims believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God in which the socio-religious fundamentals of Islam are revealed, and would say that the best model of righteous life is that of the Prophet Muhammad; so, it would be fair to call them all fundamentalists but this cannot identify them all as radicals.

Muslims' conscience to revive and restate the tenets of Islam may offer a philosophical basis for Islamic fundamentalism, but it cannot shrink to only mean this religious thought or movement. Fundamentalist Islam is simply the conservative wing of Islam. Yet, the two words have become intimately linked in the Western mind, and this link has been hotly debated along with the nature of fundamentalist Islam itself. Most Western analysts find it enigmatic to distinguish between revivalist Islam whose activists are nearly all Muslims who take the practice of their religion devoutly, and fundamentalist Islam whose activists are fanatics who use the same devotion for political ends. Fundamentalist Islam, like revivalism, manifests itself as a new awakening and reaffirmed religiosity. The idea, that when Islam is revived and this revival will not be restrained by temporal and spacial characterizationit could become a world power once again since this has always been the ultimate truth about Islam, makes certain people generalize that any return to original Islam, in form of fundamentalism or revivalism in its natural origin would lead to Muslims' power restoration. Logically, the idea of Islam becoming powerful appeals to every Muslim. Can we then say all Muslims are revivalists, and all revivalists are fundamentalists? All revivalists are righteous and pious Muslims who share the common pursuit of power for Islam with fundamentalists. But it seems that the idea of power for Islam that could no doubt entail the establishment of an Islamic world order under an Islamic state is what arouses fear and makes revivalists become fundamentalists and vice versa.

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[7] A point of view shared by Karen Armstrong and other religious scholars. Her book 'Battle for God' (2000) tackled the subject.

The Western view of fundamentalism portrays it as an ideology that defied definition, hence a kind of puzzle. But fundamentalists are followers of the same movement, and the fact that they share adherence means they gather around the same ideas, which is contrary to being an inexpliquable occurrence. Thus, there is a problem either of terminology or conception which persists. Although the word fundamentalism obscures the broader attempt to revive Islam, partly because it brings back 'Christian presuppositions' (Esposito. ''Islamic Fundamentalism'') including Biblical literalism and anti-empiricism, the West prefer to use it to refer to contemporary Islamic resurgence. Leaving terminology aside, the conception is not less problematic. Islamic fundamentalism – if not Islam itself – is seen as a strict religiosity that insists on a return to the eternal rules as they came in their scriptures and unchangeable past, and that these rules are binding for all believers and must have priority over secular laws. It is also defined as a militant ideology and a set of ideas that encourage radicalization. It is political Islam which aspires to power and authority, and the strongest correlate of out-group hostility. According to recent studies, however, it does not necessarily include or justify violence especially among Muslims living in Europe, which means Islam is not the problem[8]. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism has always been the result of political turmoil. The most evident example is the Iranian Revolution which rejected the secularisation of Pahlavi monarchy and promoted once again the Iranian Islamic culture through Ayatullah Khomeini and his Islamic revolutionaries. Even if the revolution was fabricated as some thinkers claim fundamentalism was used by the United States of America which managed to take advantage of radical Shiite community in France to overthrow the Shah (Sahrasad and Chaidar 90), there is an indirect acknowledgement is powerful and persuasive to act as a counter-reaction to Western made policies. Equally, Islam was revived in Turkey as a reaction to Kamel Ataturk's policies of Westernization. Despite this neutrality of the term 'fundamentalism', the West works on giving it a negative impression allowing people to hear about it only through the media during a bombing.

For all the efforts to contain it, fundamentalism appears likely to threaten the Western absolutism of the Post-Enlightenment time. James Piscatori confirms this as he sees Islam

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[8]Ruud Kaapmans (director of the WZB Berlin Social Sciences Centre (Germany)) conducted a new study : Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-groups : A Comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe.

as an expression of opposition and effective political framework (89). While the critics of fundamentalism consider it a dirty 14 letter word, or a term of abuse against any group (Ruthven ''Fundamentalism'' 5), others believe that it should be limited to its original meaning and confined to the Protestant context in which it originated. In the West, however, much confusion exists about Islamic fundamentalism. Its extraordinary growth poses a problem for those who are looking for ways to combat it. Most of them are checking this Islamic revival as a phenomenon of the last half century, yet there have been many reformers throughout Islamic history who challenged the authorities of the then time – the ulama – and this took place as a result of their readings of the sources of Islam. Ibn Taymiyya (d.1326) often called father of Islamic fundamentalism, as early as the 14th century, adhered to the Qur'an, the Sunnah and the Salaf (i.e. the pious early Muslims) to nurture with his voluminous writings a broad movement of optimism in modern Islamic discourse. Today, he is well known as a major inspiration for contemporary Islamic resurgence.

Other attempts to understand the driving force that led large numbers of people in the Islamic world to be more pious and observant to get their religion at any price undertook to break this wide phenomenon into more manageable components. A fellow of the British academy stated that the components of the Islamic revival that need to be kept in mind were: getting religious, political Islam which includes the politics of Muslim identity, Islamic values and the Islamic state, and jihadism (Cook ''The Appeal of Islamic Fundamentalism''). His research identified parallels for each of the Islamic revival components somewhere else, which means there is nothing unique about it. However, it also admitted that the process could be unique because it would have no parallel when taken as an entire complex. In the case of jihadism, the word itself is a misunderstood concept translated as 'holy war' though in a purely linguistic sense it means struggling or striving, and in a religious sense, it has many levels and meanings ranging from improvement of oneself to fighting back to defend it. Nevertheless, the Western view believes that it is revived to justify terrorism in the defense of Islam. Reference is usually made to the violence of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, Taliban in Pakistan, the Muslim brotherhood in various localities; even Hamas in Palestine. Conversely, Europe's Muslim minorities are less inclined to associate negative attributes

to Westerners. The survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project pointed out that the views of Europe's Muslims were distinct from those of both Western publics and Muslims in the Middle East and Asia. They expressed favorable opinions of their Christian counterparts. British Muslims, however, were the most critical in the 4 minority publics studies (Pew Research Centre. ''The Great Divide'') Few months later, another survey published in the Telegraph stated that young British Muslims were adopting more fundamentalist beliefs than their parents or grandparents by virtue of 40% of Muslims who said they would prefer to live under Shari'a law in Britain (Wilson''Young, British Muslims'').

The battle against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the UK has usually been ignited by certain incidents that made Muslims do battle for the fundamentals of their religion. Although there has been no unanimity about what it meant to be fundamentalist, nor was there any agreement on what the fundamentals of Islam were, Britain fought tooth and nail to navigate Muslims away from the path of fundamentalism. With the help of a London-based imam, Dr. Tahir al-Qadri from Minhaj al-Qur'an International, a 600-page edict against Islamic terrorists was issued in 2010. That fatwa mounted a direct challenge to al-Qaeda's ideology and reminded people that terrorism and suicide bombings were against the Qur'an and Sunnah. Yet, the same Sufi imam, on the occasion of Christmas 2010, congratulated and wished his Christian brethren in the UK and around the world a happy Christmas on behalf of all British Muslims. His followers of Minhaj al-Qur'an in the UK promoted the idea of integration through extremism prevention. Yet, it is not an act of extremism to consider the date of 25th December erroneous and the celebration to do with pagan tradition. There is a sound consensus among Islamic scholars that Muslims are not allowed to participate in the festivals of non-believers. Fears that Islamic fundamentalism was being cultivated in Birmingham's schools inflamed public opinion in Britain. The response of David Cameron was calling on schools to promote British values. This meant the religion-based culture of British Muslims was incompatible with the British culture. Islam or Islamic revival was reduced in this way to a single culture, and this reflects a state of confusion or a baseless fight against Islamic resurgence in general, let alone the biased opposition between British and Islamic values. Despite the efforts of most spokesmen and politicians imploring their

people not to blame Islam for terrorism since the beginning of the 21st century, the latter has been used to explain all modern terrorist acts, and now Islam is labeled as a terrorist religion in most Western societies. Can religion be a problem, or is it a victim of corrupt people – and architects of world orders – who expoited its holiness?

Religious leaders of all faiths when accused of violence, support the innocence of their religions with arguments that distance such acts from the principles of their faiths rather than explain the roots of violent activism. Similarly, scholars also use the term fundamentalism to excuse 'normal' religion and isolate its problems to a deviant form that derives from it (Juergensmeyer 3). With regard to Islam, however, fundamentalism has often represented the entire Islamic revival; not only some deviant branch of it. All massive increase in Islamic piety is fundamentalism, terrorism and radicalisation. Is Islam not exempt from violence like the other religions? Or is it the only religion that is the problem while all the rest can be innocent?

Muslim fundamentalists, being people and groups wishing to have Islam practised purely, found themselves guilty of politicizing religion. As the severity of attacks increase, the why of the situation is more examined and the focus on proper precautions becomes the focal point of authorities. In Britain, the movement has been led by British Muslims who undertook activities that helped establish support for an Islamic Caliphate. Since the mid 1990s, they became known for their support of Shari'a, criticism of British and American foreign policies, and confrontational preaching. Now the rise of the UK Islamic fundamentalism movement is considered responsible for the growing number of British Muslims migrating to the Islamic State (ISIS). Fundamentalist preachers describing the Islamic Caliphate as heaven on earth are said to be facilitating the recruitment of many Britons who flocked to Syria after recognition of the value of Jihad. There is a widespread speculation that the jihadist shown on a propaganda video mocking Prime Minister David Cameron for his daring to challenge ISIS is a British-born Siddhartha Dhar (also called Abu Rumaysah) assigned to the position of Chief Executioner for the Islamic State (Herrington.News Blog). David Cameron suggested that young Muslims are drawn to fundamentalist Islam in the same way young Germans were attracted to Faschism in the 20th century. In a speech in Birmingham in 2015, Mr Cameron juxtaposed the intolerant ideas of fundamentalism to the same ones which led to

the rise of Hitler, and announced devoting the next 5 years to tackle the root causes of Islamic extremism in Britain (Wright. ''David Cameron Launches 5 Year-Plan''). Surprisingly, there are no similar announcements and specific proposals to counter terrorist acts against Muslims. Like his faith, the Muslim remains an undefined problem.

IV. 2. Islamophobia

Islamophobia is a term, a concept, an attitude, an ideology, a discourse, and mindsets in the media, including broadsheets as well as the tabloids. 'Phobia' sounds more suitable than fear, suspicion, worry, or anxiety; and views about its first use in print differed. Some researchers argued that it appeared in 1910 in a French book[9]in the context of criticism of the ways the French colonial administrators viewed the cultures of some African countries. Later on, Edward Said used the term in 1981[10]in the context of criticism of the authors who do not recognize that hostility to Islam was also anti-Semitism. The third reference appeared in the American journal 'Insight' on February 1991 to describe the Soviet Union Government's enmity towards its Muslim citizens and its activities in Afghanistan. And in the context of the UK, 'Islamophobia' was documented in a book review in the Independent on December 1991 according to Modood who, a year later, commented on that and stated that 'The Satanic Verses' was an Islamophobic act (Richardson 3). With the publication of the Runnymede Trust's report in 1997, however, the term became commonly used, denoted by the fact that the United Nations made Islamophobia a theme at the 2001 conference against racism in Durban and once more in 2004. The Trust defined Islamophobia as 'a shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims (Runnymede Trust 1). Inspite of the invaluable nature of the report's contribution to the study of Islamophobia, it is subject of criticism on the ground that it failed to distinguish between race and religion. Today the attempt to define this phenomenon is founded upon various ideological justifications, in numerous and to various degrees by too many thinkers whose critics still express the need for clarity of

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[9]The book was entitled La Politique Musulmane dans l'Afrique Occidentale Française by Alain Quellien
[10]See Edward Said's article 'Orientalism Reconsidered'.

definition. If there is something to say about the issue's challenge of getting a definition, it would be that it is an unfounded and baseless attitude.

Islamophobia has been presented as nothing as dirty as racism. Salman 'Bobby' Sayyid defined it as a problem which is denied whereas in practice it is defended. It was minimized to being only a response to real threats to Western universal values (''Racism and Islamophobia'' 3). Islamophobia, however, has increasingly evolved as an accepted form of racism in Europe. It is the changing face of racism which was nourished by public racist talk. Indeed, we cannot equate Islamophobia with anti-Islamic racism, but we can say that it is implicated in it. While anti-Muslim racism is the acting out of Western antipathy and prejudice, Islamophobia is related to the set of ideas and feelings which indicate that antipathy to Islam and its adherents allowing by that the act to take place. It is of utmost importance to distinguish between these two phenomena because they reside in two different realms and each has to be treated apart and fought on its own merits. Islamophobia is the rationale to anti-Muslim racism; not its cause.

Throughout history, particular groups are identified as threats to social values producing a period of social deviancy that necessitate a legal response from the relevant authorities of that society. The fact that this response repeated itself and failed to come to terms with the problem that it faces either entails the problem is a myth or the nature of reaction is faulty. This argument has its original area of concern in the works of Stan Cohen whose studies were attempts to offer sociological interpretations for some delinquent social behaviour. The idea of moral panic is central to his model of a morality play between a good side represented by the police and courts and an evil side represented by the delinquent members (Cohen vii). The latter has been viewed as 'folk devils', a word coined by Cohen, too. The moral panic theory refers to an exaggerated response to a type of behaviour that appears as a social problem. This over-reaction could be on the part of media reporting or some other social institutions or individuals who transpose the matter onto national and international fear. The increasingly complex phenomenon of Islamophobia in the wake of the resurgence of Islam and its critique of Western values is nothing more than a state of moral panic. Cohen's first and most quoted paragraph of his study provides a sociological definition:

Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests ; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media ; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people ; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions ; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to ; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-standing repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself (9).

The moral panic surrounding Islam in Britain accorded the role of folk devils to Muslims. The role of scapegoats was previously held by Britain's African-Caribbean communities who were accused of disrupting the peaceful order of the British way of life. At that time, the Asians were upheld as a model minority in terms of traditional working class values and positive contributions. Little by little, they became cursed, not for the disorganization of their Afro-Caribbean counterparts, but rather for meticulosity in cultural transmission. When they posed no external threat to the moral values of Middle England, their control of their younger members was depicted as internal oppression. Then, it became the Asian Islamic culture which is inherently contradictory to the British culture. The divisions which were occuring in Britain along ethnic lines gave way to new religious divisions: the Asian Indian remained an achiever whereas the Asian Muslim looked only as a believer. The Indians became the white peoples' favourites, but the Pakistani and Bangladeshi became the new black, alienated, deprived, and marginalized. The context in which the panic surrounding young Bangladeshi and Pakistani men was based on two issues: the first centres around disorder and violence, and this in turn is

based on the disturbances witnessed in Bradford in 1995[11] and Oldham in 2001[12]. The second issue is Islam, and is clear in the fact that younger generations in Britain are prone to fundamentalism. In the wake of the city's rioting, the Bradford Commission report into Manningham riots stated that:

> In Bradford, there is racial hatred ; there is fear ; there is ignorance ; there is dire unemployment ; there is poverty and deprivation ; there is religious fundamentalism ; there is political extremism ; there is petty politics ; there is ineptitude and incompetence ; there is misplaced optimism ; there is damaging pessimism and apathy ; there are good intentions, and there are evil ones (The Telegraph and Argus)

Local and national responses affirmed that a minority of Muslim activists and thugs whose hatred of white people and authority were the source of evil and criminality which cannot be excused by deprivation and unemployment.

There is a clear evidence of racism in the British society, but this is not the only reason implicated in their disadvantage. Muslims in Britain are observed through their religious practices. Their Islamic identity is viewed through the stereotypical lens of media representations, too. At the forefront of the British moral panic; thus there is Islam but presented as extremism, fundamentalism and militance. These anxieties centred first on popular Islamic movements involving Asian youth have been allowed after the events of September 11, 2001 in New York, and July 7, 2005 in London to construct Muslims within a more negative framework. This growing hostility and intolerance against Islam and Muslims – Islamophobia – looks like a 'modern epidemic' (Sheridan and Gillet 192), but it might represent the age old prejudice toward Islam. This is not to simplify the problematic relationship between Muslim minorities and national majorities in the UK. It

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[11] These were known as the first Manningham riots and took place in Bradford on 10-12th June 1995, involving South Asians. While the official reports blamed them on anti-social individuals, the popular view blamed that on heavy policing.

[12] The riots of 2001 were more complex and shocking. The disturbance broke out in response to a perceived provocation from the national front (NF), and the British National Party (BNP), the police and minorities. It was violenc on the streets, but it started as a peaceful rally of Asian Muslim youth reacting to an Asian youth beaten up by skinheads drinking in a pub. Most comments stated that it was not an Asian or a race relations problem; it was a Muslim problem. See the book 'Islam, Crime and Criminal Justice' by Basia Spalek. See also Allen and Barrat 1996.

is rather to show that little – if any – has changed about the earliest Christian reactions since the eleventh century.

The contemporary phobia in European societies in general does not stem from Islam as a faith, or at least it does not manifest itself in ways that question the prophethood of Muhammad and the revelation of the Qur'an, or react to a pressure on Europeans to be converted to Islam. It is a fear that emanates from a resurgence of Islam, a rapid growth of the faith and its community, and this is evident in constant preoccupations with the demographics of Muslim communities along with the statistics of conversion. Islamophobic sentiments emerge as prejudice against Muslims, their open assertion of their faith in the public sphere, the change in approach to Islam from a traditional mystical type that is simple and accomodating to a revivalist kind emphasizing the fundamentals of Islam. This led some scholars[13] to suggest that since Islam is not the cause of fear, the term Islamophobia is misleading to identify the phenomenon which is mostly societal in dimension, and can be replaced by Muslimophobia. Prejudice against their non-European descent, not being white, and their perceived culture is mucha form of anti-Semitism (Modood andWerbner 4). And because fear is generally an exaggeration and unconscious state, European phobia from Islam or Muslims can be considered as an irrational behaviour.

Instead of being treated and cured of their prejudices – if not blamed and punished – supporters of the Islamophobic discourse continue to be fed by the scaremongering representation of Islam and Muslims by the British media. In fact, a large number of observers claim that Muslims are more extreme and dissatisfied in Britain than anywhere else in Europe. In Britain and the United States, about one-in-four voice unfavourable views of Muslims (23% each) (Pew Research Centre 'Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims') Throughout the 2000s, suspicion, fears and critical attitudes heightened as a result of the multiple terrorist attacks by British Muslims. However, terrorism is both violence and propaganda. The demonisation of Islam and the biased coverage of Muslims has been occuring for the reason of creating an atmosphere of hate fuelled by

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[13]Among these are Halliday, 1999 – Cesari, 2006 – and Mausen, 2006.

Islamophobia. A number of academics[14]in Britain embarked on the analysis of more than 200.000 articles, and concluded that for every positive article of the British Press, there were 21 negative articles; words such as extremist, radical, terrorist, fundamentalist and cleric have become synonymous to Muslims in the media whereas 'moderate Muslim' is positively is positively used since it meant, according to context, not being 'fully Muslim' (Hussain ''The Muslim Media'') After the murder of British soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich in May 2013, a pattern of the necessity to refer to a Muslim's religion even when the context has no relevance emerged. In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, Britain's Muslims have become targets of an abuse encouraged by the media. Given that there is a huge under-representation of Muslims in the media with less than 0.5% of UK journalists being Muslims, this would further magnify misreporting (Versi.The Independent).

After being popularised, the word 'Islamophobia' has become synonymous with any criticism – legitimate or not – of Islam and Muslims. It has been propelled into the everyday common parlance and discourses of both the public and political spaces. This was achieved through the several media outlets which cover Muslims and Islamic topics in a negative light. But people tend to believe in media, which is an impressive art of manipulation. The words of the American civil rights leader Malcolm x can be relevant for the misrepresentations of British Muslims through the lens of the British biased media as much as they were in his age : « if you are not careful, the newspapers will have you hating the people who are being oppressed, and loving the people who are doing the oppressing » (Yildiz 351). When Britain's leading newspapers publish stories about Muslims that they would not dare publish about any other minority group, this means the UK Press has been allowed to target the Islamic faith and its 2.7 million adherents by encouraging Islamophobia. Mehdi Hasan, one of the UK's leading Muslim journalists, reiterated « I get pretty exhausted of having to constantly endure a barrage of lazy stereotypes, inflammatory headlines, disparaging generalizations and often inaccurate and baseless stories » (Meredith. The Huffington Post)

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[14]Professor Paul Baker of Lancaster University, along with three other academics, carried out a research entitled 'The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the UK Press 1998-2009'. The use of Corpus linguistic methods..

We have seen in recent years a 'hailstorm' of press stories that are « unbelievably negative about, hostile towards, and distrustful of Islam and Muslims. (Meredith). Here are some of the inflammatory front page newspaper headlines and some false stories titles concerning Muslims in Britain : 'One in five Brit Muslims sympathy for jihadis', 'Muslims send death threats to teachers', 'Muslim thugs aged just 12 in knife attack on Brit school boy', 'Muslims tell us how to run our schools', 'taught to hate', 'Christmas is Banned : it offends Muslims', 'Muslim man murders pregnant prostitute because she was working near a mosque', 'Get off my bus, I need to pray', 'the crescent and the canteen' and 'Muslim convert beheads woman in garden'.

Choosing negative and frightening labels for Muslims is a part of media tricks. Bearing in mind the role of the media in shaping public opinion, one can say it is a media war against Islam and Muslims. In order to justify the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Muslims are represented as terrorists. Viewers are strongly shocked by the TV news and documentaries, followed by the newspaper articles, which are dominated by coverage of terrorist acts and hostage images. Drawing upon the findings of a study based on 68 news items on domestic issues concerning Muslims, generated from a three month monitoring period of the British press (October 2011 – December 2011), specifically ; The Sun, Daily Mail, The Independent and the Guardian. Muslims were almost always constructed as belonging outside the nation, represented in a way that develops fear and hysteria through exaggerating terror especially by the tabloid press, and aggressively portrayed as global enemies (Sian et al. 229). The consuming public who is unable to escape the media's influence continue to have an unrealistic view of Islam and Muslims. As a result, many believe and worry that all Muslims are barbaric, sexist, violent, supporting terrorism, and have political and military projects intent on world domination. Indeed, whenever Islam is reported in the media, the number of Islamophobic attacks increase. But can one affirm that the British panic is only the media's creation? The already existing preconceptions that Islam is a violent religion are not created by propaganda, but the volume and type of media coverage served to aggravate the British attitude toward the Muslims and their faith. Taking the facts that modern-day media is a very appealing and most competitive of industries into account, focus on sensational stories will continue,

and Islamophobia will probably remain for the forseeable future, only without a possible change or defense from the part of Muslims or all seekers of truth.

Despite the largely negative portrayal in the media, Islam is rapidly growing in Britain. Among the Muslim activists are native people who converted to the Muslim faith. They often feel more confident than Muslims of immigrant origin, and this is apparent in the way criticize government policies and defend Islam. The British MP, George Galloway, for instance, condemned Islamophobia. Most converts confirm that they were conscious of the Muslims suffering in the Middle East and elsewhere, especially what was happening in Palestine. As a result, non-Muslims look suspiciously at the converts. The latter have been politicized and suffered the double burden of being a visible minority within a visible minority (Walters and Monaghan 41). The current environment of general suspicions and fear of Islam and Muslims questioned their reliability in a number of ways: they were associated with radical Islam and terrorism, and they were seen as people who were robbed of their British identity. Fiyaz Mughal, director of faith matters, said: « conversion to Islam has been stigmatised by the media and wrongly associated with extremist ideologies and discriminatory cultural practices » (Dayle. Mail Online). Although converts are white people of British origin, of both genders, and of various ethnicities, they could not escape the us/them dichotomy inherent in Islamophobia. But most converts continue to assert their Muslim identity and Britishness despite the stereotypes inherent in Islamophobia which is distorting not only the image of Islam but the British society's conception of conversion as well. Among the media tricks followed to discredit the British converts embrace of Islam and hinder them from bridging the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims are the claims that they are radical Muslims, they are mostly backward females, and that their aim was to marry ; not to follow the truth of a faith. Along with the media's oddity in neglecting the whole convert community and putting emphasis in coverage on well-educated, white British women, there is another anomaly which is that how come these liberated women embrace Islam and reject feminism, if Islam oppressed them and was a backward religion. Although they are a very small and marginalised group, converts remain presented as untrustworthy by the media and public discourse as a result of an Islamophobic – not a Muslimophobic – British sentiment. The recognition of the perpetrators of 7/7 being

homegrown bombers has resulted in further attack of the possibility for someone to be both British and Muslim.

To suggest that media are influentially causal in the case of Islamophobia towards British converts to Islam is less problematic than in the case of all Muslims in Britain. The latter is equally problematic to be definite and precise about whether terror acts initiate or promote Islamophobia. And it is also complex to check if British Muslims activism or extremismis a response to Islamophobia, or Islamophobia is the outcome of the fact that Muslims in Britain are particularly extremists. In Britain, the backlash against Muslims was played out clearly and manifested itself, as affirmed by Chris Allen, in such ways that ordinary British people are spat upon, shaved, verbally abused, discriminated against in the workplace, beaten upon, have their houses graffitied and firebombed or even worse, are left paralysed or dead just because they are – or areseen to be – Muslim. Islamophobia does not restrict or constrain criticism or condemnation – but it does make the everyday experience of some Muslims in this country – and elsewhere untenable (Islamophobia and anti-Muslim Hate Crime57)

The consequences of this backlash, however, are alarming. Religious prejudice is a real fact in Britain and keeps rising. This has been revealed, according to Eric Bleich and Rahsaam Maxwell, by the Pew surveys from 2004, 2005 and 2006 and the subsequent citizenship surveys of 2007 and 2009 which suggested that Islamophobia was a rapidly growing problem within the country. Similtaneously, the Muslim identity was growing but most Britons viewed this to be a bad thing (Helbling 43)

Informed by Islamophobia, the media spotlight on Muslims and Islam increased their visibility, and « the increasing visibility of Muslims to non-Muslims in the UK in a global mediated world, in which Muslims are homogenized, has resulted in their construction as a threat to non-Muslims. This ideological threat (in the UK) allows Muslims to be suppressed » (Poole ''Reporting Islam'' 22). Besides growing visibility, Islamophobia has had the effect of encouraging more people, particularly the youth, to learn about Muhammad and Islam. The benefit of a revival of interest in Islam is that Muslim youth organizations have experienced more interest in their activities as attractive alternatives to involvement in violence or drugs. The increasing suspicions and hatred against

Muslims necessitate a fight, and the fight also would unite the community in a common purpose. Added to this, the new interest in Islam is an initial step for a large number of British natives to the faith. In reaction to heightened Islamophobic representations, many have found their religion to be a source of empowerment. Furthermore, it is a source of renewed enthusiasm on which some organizations such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Al-Muhajiroun and Hizbut-Tahrir are capitalizing.

Islamophobia activism has done more to unite Muslims under a common crisis than any other social issue. The cause of confronting Islamophobia is a strong stimulus to be educated and educate others about Islam. In this way Islamophobes find themselves lacking in persuasion techniques since they would be presenting ideas about Islam to a public who does not lack in knowledge about it. Today under the banner of combating Islamophobia, disconnected British Muslim communities stand together. At the same time Islamophobia is fuelled by a set of right-wing bloggers and few intellectuals who have become unable to legitimize their tactics and set Islamophobic fires. Muslim organizations grew in number to deploy Islamophobic strategies. Before the demon of Islamophobia took root in Britain, the level of radicalization among Muslims was very limited – if not non-existent at all – but with the latter's potential to feed radicalization, some British Muslims could be driven towards it. Furthermore, Islamophobia breeds suspicion in the minds of Muslims about their status in the British society which in turn discourages attempts to integrate and generate radicalization as a result of disrespect.

Islamophobia is simply another reincarnation of the former trends of bigotry which Jews and African-Americans faced. It is the dehumanization of an entire community through their constant depiction as problematic individuals. Nevertheless, Islam continues to be revived as if no obstacle is on its way. Instead of looking for deeper analysis of the roots of resurgence in the very nature of Islam, some thinkers stated that it thrives on repression (Kramer 217). Others admitted Islam is bloodthirsty and violent. While the West's effort to link Islam with fear – Islamophobia – which is neither coincidental nor due to ignorance, sought to paralyse Islam; it is also the moral blind spot of 21st century Britain (Fraser. The Guardian) Indeed, some British intellectuals have given themselves permission to be racist Islamophobes and were proud of that (Toynbee. The Guardian columnist) The question of Islamophobia, thus, becomes a moral one.

It is inarguable that the continued proliferation of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment and expressionis immoral. It is also indisputable that it is not moral to be responsible for a moral panic especially at the door of hostility to religion. The attempt to defend this darker side of the British attitude towards Islam raised awareness of the existence of a Christianophobia – an equivalent to Islamophobia. At a very early stage, the Runnymede Report (1997), which provided a fuller explanation of Islamophobia and sought to influence the British ways of thinking about this prejudice against Muslims, was despised by the London Bible College (LBC) whose criticism produced a similar short document, the Westophobia Report : anti-Western and anti-Christian Stereotyping in British Muslim publications (1990). Although the document was withdrawn shortly after its publication, it circulated again in recent years but the idea could not grow since it was considered such a total nonsense. For instance, opposition to Iraq War and silence on Israeli aggression were deemed Westophobic. Even if we assume the West is also confronting a wave of hatred, it should be clear that it is not a reactionary attitude facing a resurgent Christianity. The West is most hated for its plan to destroy Islam. According to the former global leader of the Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir, Abdul Qadeem Zalloom : « …when the discerning and sincere people say that the British are the head of kufr [unbelief] among all the other Kufr states, they mean exactly that, for they are indeed the head of kufr and they are the arch-enemies of Islam. The Muslims should indeed harbour hatred for the British and a yearning for revenge over them… » (''How the Khilafa Was Destroyed''186)

The British authorities, politicians, and the media must face their conscience and consider the climate of anti-Muslim bigotry as equally repellent as anti-Semitism, anti-black racism and homophobia. Elite voices, however, saw Islamophobia across Britain and much of Europe to be fair and justified. As a result, Islamophobia in the UK is no longer confined to neo-faschist groups because it gradually became part of the establishment. Muslim people are victimized by the regular racist abuse at the hands of Islamophobes. Policies such as Prevent in which Muslims are spied on and controlled by colleagues has increased their misfortune and widened the culture of Islamophobia that exists in in the UK. What is moral then in making people live in a state of fear? Is it fair to allow draconian policies to be implemented domestically and a war on terror globally

just to take attention away from Britain's illegal foreign policy in the Middle East? If the issue of terror were a serious matter, why did Britain keep dealing with Saudi Arabia – its strategic Gulf ally? Why was it involved in training Bahrin's forces though that instruction was met with criticism that it threatens commitment to human rights[15] (Doward ''Role of UK Police'') Why was it active in supporting dictatorial Arab regimes such as Hosni Mubarak's? A former intelligence chief[16], Iraqi government sources, and a retired career US diplomat[17] revealed US complicity in the rise of ISIS. Why then is Britain up to its neck in US dirty wars?

Muslims are currently a convenient enemy in the public imagination, and the existence of an enemy help rally people around in many cases when atention needs to be diverted. This urges many to think seriously about how to root out this image. These people are committed to outlawing its scourge by making it an aggravated hate crime. But as long as resurgence in Islamophobia is going in parallel with a resurgence in Islam, episodes of harassment, spying on mosques, and anti-Islam protests will continue to take place. In fact, the former head of Britain's Equality's and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), Trevor Phillips, admitted he was wrong and should have known better before thinking that Britain's Muslims would abandon their ancestral ways and wear 'their religions and cultural baggage lightly' (Kassam. ''Breitbart.UK Equalities Chief'')[18].Like many others, he blamed the liberal, metropolitan elite, media classes for their ways of addressing the growth of undesirable behaviours, but in terms of solutions, he laid the blame at the feet of the growth of Shari'a courts and suggested putting them under regulations, mosques dependency on Wahhabi patronage and suggested its reduction, and school governance and the necessity not to let it fall into the hands of single-minority groups (kassam).

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[15]See also The Guardian's article''Sending Troops to Protect Dictators Threatens All of us''. Seumas Milne.10/12/2014.

[16]Michael T.Flynn, tha retired head of the Pentagon's Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), confirming that White House officials, despite DIA warnings, made willful decisions to support al-Quaeda affiliated jihadists in Syria.

[17]J. Michael Springmann, a retired career US diplomat whose lost government post was in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

[18]The complete title of the article is : ''Breitbart.UK Equalities Chief who popularised the term Islamophobia admits : « I thought Muslims would blend into Britain … I should have known better »''

IV.3. Other Ideological Challenges to Global Islam

The moral panics which have swept across the Western scene since the end of the Cold War were also the result of contestations raised through questioning Islam's compatibility and Muslims adaptability with Western values such as national loyalties, gender equality, and freedom of expression along with ideologies such as secularism, democracy and modernity. The British media, in conjunction with its Islamophobic campaign, perpetuated the culture of hatred through the promotion of the 'clash of civilizations' narrative.

However, Islam was destined to remain the second largest religion in Britain. With its advent and rapid spread, Islam was firstly put amidst the debates on Capitalism, Communism, and political development in general. Secondly, the emphasis was on democracy, economic development and human rights. The challenges were not less harmful than Islamophobia. In fact the hatred of Islam and Muslims that fabricates false stories and distorts historical facts has also contributed to the need to belittle the debt the West in general owes to Islam, and to leave out the achievements of the Muslims in order to avoid any reminder that might restore confidence to the Muslim Ummah.

Islamic revival and modernity have been engaged in a constant conversation. The encounter between them produced significant contributions to both modernism and the Islamic thought. Yet, Western scholars do not appreciate that and refuse to admit that Islamic revival is a development program that covers political, economic and social arenas. Indeed, most Muslims would stand helpless opposite the seduction of the power of modernism, but the lack of principles which characterise the modern world meets its remedies in the folds of religion. The mainstream of Islamic thought believes in the power of reason which is not divorced from revelation and intuition. Revelation is both the means to learn morality and the primary source of knowledge, and intuition is the Muslim intellectuals' quest after the active and changing life but was made subordinate to revelation. Conversely, the modern Western thought rejects both revelation and intellectual intuition as means of knowledge. Modernity emphasizes reason, acquired knowledge, human rights, and representative politics. Modern science seeks the

reinterpretation of some preceding religious dogma. Tthe theory and understanding of evolution – the conception of the man in general – have already raised hot debates.

Efforts to harmonize Islam and modernity have been utile. The rhetoric on Islam's need of reform entails that it is the problem. This submits to the Westerners whose constant talk is about the need to modernize Islam. An alternative to this consists of Islamizing modernity from an Islamic perspective. The West's criminal character whose features included ignorance, violence, racism, exploitation and colonialism has become obscured under the pretense of tolerance and the mask of modernity which has on its highways posting signs such as progress, scientific discoveries, the French Reolution, Enlightenment philosophy and human rights. When Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the end of history in his essay and book, his argument declared liberal democracy, another sign of modernity, as the only exit (the End of History and the Last Man). Soon after that, the emergence of illiberal democracies or the regimes that combine both democratic and authoritarian elements together with the rise of ethno-religious movements proved he was wrong. The Islamic revival is an instance of that and is often described as an irrational and anti-modern movement. Islam is depicted in direct confrontation with modern secular thought which is most evident in the conception of man as God's vice gerent and in bringing god to every aspect of human life because without divine help, reason would not create any order or development. The modern thought is devoid of the sense of the sacred; however, the Islamic tradition can never accept its absence.

The word modern does not signify only what is contemporary or up-to-date. It denotes all that is good and desirable because it is new and cut off from the past. Modernism is thus contrasted with tradition which in turn refers to all things that are of divine origin. Divinity is inherent in religion; so, modernity is the opposite of some religious criteria if not religion altogether. Little by little, modernity became signified by industrialism, Capitalism, secularisation, tha nation state and the importance of the individual freedom. The classic works of Karl Marx and Max Weber clarified how modernity relies much on rationality and rationalism, too. Fukuyama was one of the modernists who relied on reason to foretell that history would end united under the banner of liberal democracy, which was not right. Indeed the tools of modernity did not change the world into a plural one but neither modernisation nor could westernization unite its communities. On the

contrary, the ethnic and national groupings preferred to find their own ways and kept their identities with and into modernity.

The resurgent Islam of the time being can be understood as a modern phenomenon whose aims are the provision of Islamic answers to the challenges posed by the Western paradigm of secular modernity. Muslims are part of the modern world and are grappling with the challenges of modernity in countless ways. For instance, they are following its tide with creativity and imagination while their scholars and thinkers are initiating revivalist projects to negotiate modernity including the rereading of religious texts for guidance. Islam does not perceive modernization with mistrust. However, European modernization which saw the light of the day through revolutions against religious institutions since the 16th century has a deep seated hatred for religion. This explains the current attitude of European states to Islam as being opposed to modernity. But it should be noticed that while Christianity fought tooth and nail to suppress scientific thinking, Islam and science were never in conflict. On the contrary, until now Quranic revelations continue to surprise leaders of modern science with the existence of certain statements of scientific nature that have only been discovered recently. Profound faith in man is what characterizes secular modernity, but this threatened the bases of society – family life and social life – and removed all signs of humanity and respect for truth. Islam opposes this modern man who is short of spirituality.

In an era of mutation and newness and in Britain in particular, Islam is criticised for its practices of true worship and limits to embrace hybridity. These allegations have also been nurtured by the British media which reinforces the idea that the Western and Islamic civilization has long been rejecting each other. It shed light only on two facts: Islam is against modernity by nature, butr for this nature to prove to be flexible, it needs to be modernised in sense of Westernized. In both judgements, the true Islamic identity is betrayed and Muslims are stereotyped although they have the means to respond to contemporary challenges without betraying their identity (Ramadan ''Islam, the West and Challenges'') It was affirmed by Tariq Ramadan that « nothing in Islam is opposed to modernity and we can firmly state that the Muslim thinkers and 'ulama' (savants) who are opposed to this notion and to the idea of change and evolution that it covers often confuse it with the model which is current in the West. Clearly, they confuse modernity

with Westernization … » (Ramadan 307). This confusion is in part attributed to Muslims fear from Western ideas, but in a larger part due to a paradoxical status posed by the Western style of modernity.

Much of what makes the debate ove Islam and modernity controversial is that it tends to be approached from a Eurocentric perspective which considers the Western values the norms that lead to progress for every man. Furthermore, the reconfiguration of Islam within the conditions of modernity tends to be imagined and judged from a European perspective. However, the Islamic revival's connection to modernity goes beyond these distortions. The later part of the 19th century also witnessed some basic changes in the Islamic thought especially with regard to the nature and focus on issues such as identity, the state, tradition and renewal, text and reason, and so forth (Taji-Farouki and Nafi 28). Across the 20th century, modern Islamic thought reflected the Western impact in the appropriation of ideas on nationalism and sovereignty, feminity and gender, attitudes towards democracy and the science of Islamic economics, notions of family, aspects of thinking on the Christians and Jews and so on, both in the Muslim world and in the West. But modernization is not represented only by urbanization and indusrialization, literacy and mass communication, economic well-being and education. It is also characterised by Capitalism, secularization and democratization against which Islam is revived to challenge the Western understanding of development and freedom. As a result, Islamic revival is positioned as an alternative to Western model of modernity. In the Muslim mind, Capitalism is an imperfect ideology much like communism and democracy conflicts with the nature of man and his needs. Islam recognizes individuality and seeking material goods, but it also advises to share the acquired material. Therefore, it stands between the two economic and developmental Western ideologies. Islam is anti-dictatorial and anti-absolutist, which means it has some democratic characteristics, but it still provides a different conception of life and social justice including both spiritual salvation and material well-being. Nontheless, the interaction of Islam and modernity seems to be hard to understand as long as modernity is not recognized as being originating from the history and culture of the West and drawn from the Western experience not the global experience, and Islam is not recognized for its ethical virtues that are believed to be essential to the whole mankind's well-being.

However, with tolerance and understanding, the Western and Islamic-style modernity can coexist side by side with each one retaining its own characteristics, or with the best for mankind to impose its values and let them flow naturally into the global society. Islam has long been critical of the qualities of global Capitalism, but this does not mean that religion and business are incompatible. In fact, Islamic finance can be a great example of Islam's success in Britain.British businesses can not afford to lose their position as the world's leaders in commerce and first class destination for foreign investment and training. As a result, Britain is striving to utilize the golden opportunity embodied in the engagement with the growing markets in Muslim-majority countries. After the financial crash, the value of the Islamic finance became more significant. The absence of riba, or interest, appeals to many more people. The archbishops of Canterbury and Westminster have spoken of the need to adopt a different set of values in British business. Many British economic experts have understood that a lasting economy is not that which is obssessed with wealth and hegemony, but it is that which places ethics at the heart of its practices. The revival of Islamic finance is part of a larger Islamic revival in all Europe, and a modern feature in itself since it is one option being taken in a changing global economic landscape.

Islam also evades secularism, and has proven to be the most resistant to it out of the three religions (Gellner 5-7). But why does Islam present an anti-thesis to the secularization theory? And why while it is being revived and its ethics rejuvenated, Islam is more criticised for being an obstacle to modernity instead of admitting that Islam does not lose its social base? The Islamic experience proved that there is no need to succumb to cultural or political secularism for a culture to modernise and achieve progress. Secularism[19] contradicts Islam in every aspect since it makes lawful what Allah has made unlawful and it is clear unbelief owing to being based on separating religion from all the affairs of man's life and claiming Allah's laws to be outdated at anything other than that in which they were revealed. However some optimists in the West suggested that Islam

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[19]Sociologists and philosophers like Emile Durkheim and Max Weber believed that secularism as a gradual shift towards atheism and disbelieving in God. Eminent sociologists such as Robert Bellah, Charles Taylor, Jurgen Habermas and José Casanova believed it is impossible to limit religion to the private domain which is another meaning of secularism. Secularism can also be something other than atheism or elimination of religion from the public domain. It also means the separation of church and state, or religio from government.

and secularism can be compatible and there is a possibility for a secular Islam to exist as antidote for Islamic terrorism. This ides seeks to suppress even the idea of moderate Islam and aims at reducing the mission of an Islamic government or state formation to be the responsibility of terrorists not sincere Muslims and revivalists. Islam's opposition to secularism made others believe its resurgence fits well into a new theorization about the paradigm of multiple modernities[20] which implies that forms of modernity are so varied and contingent on culture and historical circumstances that modernity should be multiple. Whether multiple modernities or the other concept which was suggested as an alternative – varieties of modernity – just to permit critics to speak of modernity in the singular, modernity, as follows from many sociological researches, is not universal in principle but a hallmark of changes in social systems. Modernity cannot be singular or pural, nor can it be universal or particular. Social and religious movements have always been responses against its process of modernization. Indeed, modernity has influenced most institutional domains of societies, but not to religion. The contemporary Islamic revival is controlling its relevance.

Integral to the vision of Islam's revival as a threat to the Western culture and an obstacle to international progress and peace is the belief that it is a faith which is inherently anti-democratic. Democracy has long been considered either absent or slow in coming to the Arab and Muslim countries in spite of the Western influence in the field of politics. In some Muslim states, the domination of some monarchies, authoritarianism and one-party system persisted, and the fact that few Muslim societies turned to the ballot box and pressed for political reform has been pointed out to the undemocratic character of Islam. Many in Europe think that the newly found Muslim presence in Western democracies hates modernity and eventually cannot be good citizens. The concrete case of Britain is typical of much of Europe for its Muslim population which is relatively young and its democratic culture. Muslims of Britain have been believed to present challenges to the country's democracy in matters related to socio-cultural practices, moral values and the necessities of civic engagement. In illustration, Muslims are provided with

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[20]Multiple modernities is a reevaluation and critical reflection on modernization theory. Sociologist Shmuel Einsenstadt rejected the assumption that the Euro-American modernity is the standard model with the fixed components : individualization, the rule of law, technologisation, social differentiation, and secularization. If a country in the world falls short of thisenstadt, 'Multiple Modernities' (2002)/ Varieties of Multiple Modernities: New Research Design. Brill 2015. Gerhard Preyer, Michael Sussmann.

halal meat in schools; allowed to slaughter animals according to their Islamic method, dress as they like, have time off for prayer and public funding for their religious school; in addition to permitting girls to wear hijab in schools and withdraw to pay long visits to their homelands with their families. Although British Muslims show respect to some basic democratic values such as equality, tolerance, respect for majority decision and freedom of speech, they are noticed for their opposition to equality of the sexes, restrictions of the freedom of speech in religious matters, protests and formation of vigilant groups to drive away drug peddlers and other suspects from their social space. The question of citizenship forms another subject of debate in which the Muslim community in Britain are involved since they are participants in the democratic politics. Instead of showing that they constitute a challenge to democracy, there has been much evidence that British Muslims owe unreserved loyalty to the state, willingly participate in public affairs, respect the parliamentary institutions, and are committed to Britain and proud of belonging to it.

Those who insult Islam and Shari'a for Britain are the people who think Islam challenges democracy as one of the most significant component of modernity. But do Muslims and leaders of Islamic movements speak out against British democracy out of fear that Islam would be democratised or (westernised)? Muslims defense of Islam is against dependence on the West. They believe Islam is a self-sufficient life system that can generate its own form of democracy which is not flawed as that of its Western counterparts. It has always been the case that societies accept new forms of politics critically to adjust them to their local conditions.ancient Greece, for instance gave much to modern Britain's system of government; yet, the latter took its final form in consistence with the British context and its requirements. The democratisation of Islam would also meet its limits. The revival of Islamic traditions and principles among the current generation of British Muslims is considered as the problem of fundamentalism. A case in point of this is the British objection to the face veil (niqab) and gender segregation on university campuses. Restrictions of the face veil in certain British settings challenge the religious rationale behind the choice of wearing it while Muslims consider the ban on niqab as an attempt to denigrate Islam and reduce religious freedom; many in Britain today see the fact as helping citizens to live peaceably with others whose creed is

different than their own. With the increase of faith schools, religious tensions and expression, and the introduction of elements of Shari'a law into Britain, its liberal democracy is also being challenged as long as it is making limits to the freedom of expression, individual speech and religion.

IV. 4. The Idea of Islam in Crisis

Many in the West believe there is a problem with Islam which is not simply a problem with religion. Their worries do not relate to Catholic extremists, Buddhists, Mormon or Hindu extremists. They usually express a need to understand the place of Islam in the modern world. Some contend that Islam is no more than a barbaric religion that should be destroyed. Others belittle the problem and stress the need for Islam to adapt to the modern world instead of criticizing it. Still another group of observers state that for Muslims to be considered mature and peaceful critics of modernity, it needs much more than mere words spoken out by Islamic activists. But can Muslims remain faithful adherents to Islam while also being peaceful citizens of free and democratic European society? Bernard Lewis addressed September 11th and its aftermath in « What Went Wrong »[21] in which he charted the decline of Islam in the modern world. Is Islam in decline? Is a religion's lack of political dominance an evidence of its weakness? More criticism of the Islamic world went as far as predicting its collapse within thirty years![22]

Indeed the absence of significant social order and a creative economy contributed to the increase of emigration from the Arab Muslim world to the West, especially Europe. But there is no evidence of Islam's decline, whether in its homelands or in the non-Islamic world. By contrast, the Islamic revival as a movement aimed at implementing Islamic laws faithfully and restoring Islam to its earlier glory and success triggered sound and positive reaction especially among Muslims of Europe and resulted in a rise in

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[21]The book deals with the history of the late Ottoman Empire, and the attempts of the Ottoman state to stave off collapse, Lewis insists that connections, however indirect, can be drawn between these events and the September 11 attacks. For Lewis, the conflict between Islam and modernity is a conflict between cultures, Islamic and Western, and within a culture, Muslim modernists versus those who would drag the Muslim world back to the Middle Ages. The latter two options are represented by the modern states of Turkey and Iran, respectively.

[22] See the book written by an Egyptian-born German academic Hamed Abdel-Samad in 2010: 'The Fall of the Islamic World'.

devotion to Islam reflected in growing conversions and a firm belief that Islam is a solution not a crisis. Internally, Islam proved that it has no spiritual problems and externally it could reach the most distant spots of the world. One cannot blame Islam for failure of its leaders and their regimes. Their inability to solve the problems of living well in the world of Islam, although Islam drew a theoretical scheme of a utopia, is due to corrupt systems not an inefficient faith.

The integration and normalization of Islam in European public spaces has gone through a number of crises which renewed the realization that Europeans still needed more knowledge on Islam. In Britain this need, however, is not the result of Muslims passivity and disengagement. It is rather the outcome of an existence in Britain of a category of people whose ai mis to put forward the Islam they would prefer to deal with – which is less threatening or confusing to understand. But is there a specifically contemporary British Muslim crisis at all? There is a crisis of leadership concerning the current situation for British Muslims. There is a lack of protection for the rights of committed Muslim conservatives from being called 'extremists'. The fragmentation of the Muslim community in Britain and the absence of a common authority to lead them may lead to the crisis that one group would claim to understand Islam better than the other, and has the priority to speak on behalf of Islam and to represent the rest of Muslims in Britain. More than that, with the import from different parts of the world one would expect the problem of British Muslims to get worse. Paradoxically, the community continues to coexist positively; mosques and Muslim organizations continue to grow in number and the propagation of Islam continues to bring new followers on a daily basis.

The crisis of Islam is a crisis of its resurgence since the attempts at renewal are the attempts at restoring a civilization which is unlikely to reincarnate at peace whether with itself or with the outside world. Islam's crisis of authority in the Middle East and in some British contexts is what some British scholars deem an Islamic crisis that needs to be resolved through a definitive reform program. But the revival of Islamic civilization is not an act of reformation. It is rather the revival of Islamic spirit through restoring the notion of the sacred which is contained in Shari'a. And much like the troubling cases which made the word madrasa politicized not to mean school but an intitution teaching guerilla warfare, shari'a is at the heart of European anxieties and is deemed an obstacle to

modern Islam as well. In terms of the rise of extremism and terrorism, Islam is supposed to be in crisis for the rise of groups like the Islamic state claiming to speak for Islam.

If worries of shari'a implementation are put apart, the crisis of modern Islam is that Muslim migrants in Britain are confronted either with the negative view of Europeans that their continent on the whole is not designed for migration (Al Sayyad and Castells 48), or with the view that their culture is preindustrial; hence, it cannot integrate easily in a secular civil society of a scientific age[23]. Nevertheless, British Muslims still have a sense of being quite privileged especially if compared to Muslims in other parts of Europe, and this owes much to the mainstream politics which remained relatively immune in many events that were supposed to generate some backlash. Many Muslim thinkers and activists acknowledge the fact that Muslims practise and enjoy practising their religion in liberal democracies like Britain than in many of their undemocratic Islamic countries[24]. This again confirms the fact that the crisis of Islam lies in leadership and systems not in itself as a faith. Muslims of different sects, backgrounds, schools of thought and mentalities praise the West for their order and laws that protect religion, life, family, goods and intellect. This is by no means recognition of the liberal democratic nature of Britain in all its principles, but a proof that Islam endorses some of the laws made by the West. In effect, Islam is not the anti-thesis of the West.

The significant number of Muslim immigrants to Britain along with the long time they spent in this host country continue to push politicians to raise the question concerning the improbable emergence of some Islamic reform movements. The West seems to make a recurrent mistake and fail to draw or understand the line between reform and revival in the Islamic tradition. If Islam is a complete system of valid and eternal laws, what need for a new law or a set of laws? Muslim need only to renew their devotion from time to time just in the same way they wash their clothes repeatedly. Sins are like dirt.

True love for another is the anti-thesis of the desire to control that person's life. Equally, true engagement and respect of Muslims for the British culture is the antithesis of the desire of its people to impose their ideologies and control the belief of these

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[23]See B. Tibi. 'The Crisis of Modern Islam: a Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific Technological Age. Salt Lake City : University of Utah Press.1988
[24]See some of Tariq Ramadan's lectures, and his interview in Prospect Magazine (24 Jully 2006). A confident modern Islam must challenge the victim mentality of Western Muslims and a crisis of authority across the faith, say Tariq Ramadan. But can you be a gay Muslim? Web.

communities. British Muslims are active participants in the civic British society, and they need not show a victim mentality. The antipathy toward their religiosity reflects the robustness of Islam not the lack of quality in their citizenship or loyalty. A good British Muslim citizen cannot be a gay Muslim to be considered a Muslim who has well integrated and embraced modernity in Britain. Without intention, however, the very sound Muslim presence in the Western countries is challenging some of their laws and making them to (re)examine their validity. These cases should encourage more self-confidence among Muslims not a sense of victimization. There is no crisis whatsoever.

Conclusion

The religious make-up of the UK is diverse, but those who do profess their religions are largely inactive. Census results and polls findings poited out that Muslims were the most religious people in Britain while Britons are mostly non-religious if not ignorant of religion at all. Briain is said to be losing its Christianity because its public do not know even the basic facts surrounding their religion. Comprehensive reviews and official reports stated that the problem lied in teachers' insufficient knowledge, too. With the increase in Muslim population and an aging Christian demographic, worries that Islam will be the dominant religion in the UK multiplied. The contemporary surge in the British Muslim population and their practice of Islam has been alarming the British authorities. Islam and Muslims have occupied a central role in the British media after the Rushdie Affair, the 2001 riots, conflicts in the Middle East, and the global war on terror. They also have been the focus of numerous public discourses due to issues related to multiculturalism, crime, education, faith schools, immigration and oppressed women linked to the Burqa debate. Their stereotyped portrayal has been mainly Islamophobic in origin and contributed to the persistence of this nature of perception.

Islamic revival was not a static phenomenon that rejected all what modernity brought. By contrast, it developed when it engaged in conversation with multiple identities and ideologies. By and large, the account of Islamic resurgence in Britain was optimistic and empowering in spite of the internal authoritarism in which it evolved and the external forces of imperialism, anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia.

Chapter V: Prospects of Islamic Revival in Contemporary Britain

Introduction

Muslims have long been considered a source of trouble and a community that challenged the British way of life whether in matters related to practices, values, or the nature and demands of citizenship; and this consideration was on religious grounds. Therefore, Muslims are fighting for a ban on such discrimination along the same lines as race and sex discrimination. Although most Muslims in Britain participate willingly and adjust themselves to British democracy, their presence continue to be considered a threat to the British democratic institutions. It is often Isalm and its revival across the seas which are blamed; not the feudal nature of Muslim societies, their corrupt rulers, the colonial past, and the long imperial exploitation they suffered from. Not only are Muslims devoted to Islam in terms of belief, worship and duties, but they are convinced of its superiority, progressive nature, past glory and much growth potentiality at the expense of other religions. Owing to these features, Islam in Europe or British Islam is not growing in the land of the short-sighted. By contrast, everyone is prudent and thoughtful of its prospects.

Most Britons are worried that an increase in the Muslim population would weaken the national identity of Britain. They are also fret about Muslims' failure to integrate. Additionally, they are displeased that Christianity would gradually decline and give way to assertive Islam. The Muslims' desire to revive the Islamic culture reflects both their commitment and the religion's central role in the life of its adherents wherever they might be living. The pride in being Muslim is the source of most Britons anxiety that a minority religion is taking root in their country and their claim that they are witnessing the Islamification of Britain. The fact that the Muslim population is noticeable and not declining makes the British think it is going to grow in the future, too. This encourages them to think about their immigration laws, integration, representation as well as the legislation and provision made for them. They are afraid they would meet the same surprise they had before when they disbelieved London could become majority non-white

when they have the disbelief that their country could become majority Muslim. The socially transforming British landscape amidst silence from the politicians has increased speculations on the future of Islam in Britain and Britain's future with Islam.

Speaking about the future of the British Muslims can be hopeless if we consider the challenges they are facing namely Islamophobia, integration, terrorism, radicalisation and media. Listening to views on being wrong on multiculturalism and immigration, and others being alarmed by demographic predictions, one would feel the projection of a majority Muslim Britain could be a fact. Still, however, the question that needs to be raised is whether Islam is a threat to Britain's long-established Christian identity or the whole story is but a myth. In addition to this, one needs to know if the pessimistic state of relations between Muslim and non-Muslim communities can change: violence and prejudice stop, and suspicion disappears. Different thinkers outlined multiple visions about the future of Islam in the West in general. It depends on Islam first, and then on time to tell whose approach or proposal was right.

VI. 1. The Western Vision

Religion on the whole has been of domineering nature in that it was at the origin of humanitarian principles, the human rights laws, and religious minorities' treaties[1]. It has also been the reason behind intolerance, persecution, conflicts and even wars. Loss of human life because of religion made the issue complicated, and areas related to the protection of religious rights for minorities remained problematic. By the same token, the affair of the role and impact of Islam within Europe caught the attention of many thinkers and politicians. The rise and spread of Islam in Britain tend to offer an exception to the considerations along which the principles of European and international law were formulated. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that « Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his

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[1]Treaty of Vienna 1607 to protect the Protestant minority in Transylvania, the Peace of Westphalia 1648, and others to protect minorities in the Ottoman territories. See Wolfgang Heinz, Indigenous Populations, Ethnic Minorities and Human Rights (Berlin 1988) ; S. J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (New York, 1996).

choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observances, practice and teaching… » (United Nations Human Rights Office). However, this freedom of religion contributed to the expansion of Islam at a pace that seems to threaten to subordinate Christianity to Islam in its homelands. Therefore, in practice, the promise of religious tolerance is being violated. Although the rapidity with which Islam is expanding is less than that of its early advancement of the 7th century, the current revival of Islamic spirit is generating much astonishment. The seventh century historical and phenomenal growth with which Islam reached the most distant parts of the world did not result in any rivers of blood, fields of corpses, burnt towns, property confiscation, prison scandals, massacre and rapes. Yet, many Europeans predicted and still predict waves of clashes to come from our time's Islamic resurgence and rivers of blood to flow.

VI. 1.1. Enoch Powell

Whoever hears the name 'Enoch Powell' would think of the famous speech 'Rivers of Blood' which he delivered to a Conservative Association meeting in Birmingham on April 20, 1968. He was born a tory which means a man who admires the British institutions, mainly the constitution. Yet, he fought that party through his own vision of a tory. He criticized the British policies as regards immigration, the waste of public money, and warned separate parliament for Scotland. Almost half a century ago, his predictions on how Britain's joining the then-called Common Market would strip her of its economic sovereignty (Heffer. The Daily Mail) His moral reputation was reflected in his voidness of any taint of racial, but culminated in many politicians attacking him as a racist because of his many speeches on immigration. His arguments were so powerful that Mrs Thatcher developed her economic policy directly from his critique of the Heath government.

Powell was believed to have a gift denied to most politicians, which was of making prophecies that proved exact long afterwards. With respect of this, Simmon Heffer (Powell's biographer) said : « he was right about Europe ; right about the single currency ; right about economic management ; right about Lords reform ; right about devolution ; right about American imperialism ; and, with even Trevor Phillips, the

figurehead of the Equalities Commission, now arguing that multiculturalism has failed, right about that, too » (Heffer). Why then was he dismissed from the Shadow Cabinet if he were such a shrewd politician (MP)? He warned Britain, through a meeting talk in his Wolverthampton Constituency not to 'be mad' and allow 50.000 commonwealth immigrants to settle every year there. If not, Britain will be like a nation « busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre ». His warning that an influx of immigrants, as witnessed by his constituency, caused a breakdown in community relations outraged Ted Heath and led to his political career's ruin. Not only was he marginalized because his speech was delivered without his prior warning to his fellow shadow Cabinet member, but because he was right and talking about some unpleasant truths as well.

Powell's Birmingham speech was replete with Biblical and classical imagery and quotations. With a reference to the Roman Poet Virgil, he warned « like the Roman, I seem to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood » (The Telegraph). This was interpreted as a prophecy that immigration was a threat to the British social harmony, and as a right prediction owing to the race riots that came and went from time to time. However, neither did the Tiber foam nord id Powell himself use the phrase 'Rivers of blood' with which he has become linked. Based on Biblical strategy, can Powell be denounced as a racialist while he was a devout Christian? It was believed by many thinkers that he was simply setting out conservative policy, but his language to present that caused an outrage. For others, he was Britain's very own Samuel Huntington. A third view, Philosopher Roger Scruton, sees Powell as someone interested in truth and its logical conclusions (qtd. in Scafield 320).

The current Islamic revival in Britain alongside the English Summer riots of 2011 and the urban riots of 2012 are often referred to to indicate Powell was right in his predictions as regards Britain's apocalyptic future. In the Spectator, it was stated he « knew full well what England was getting into by opening her borders to Muslims and foreign Afro-Caribbean races » (Taki). If we assume most demographers agreed with his predictions, why then did the political establishment reject him and remain in denial? The situation did not change for the time being since the British politics is always split into two sides: one that supports truth-denying, and the other is for truth-telling. There is also George Walden who raised the issue of the British silence on the Islamic problem in his 'Time to

Emigrate ?' which is written as a loving letter to a son thinking of leaving his country which has become a jungle overrun by immigrant barbarians and ceased to be the cultivated peaceful land it used to be. Yet, the rest would say this is an inevitable consequence of democratic politics in the West in general. Wherever someone else suffers, as in France, the authority will claim they could not have done more. For fear of accusation of racism, or for something else, minority growth and the spread of its attitude are expected to continue to be tolerated (Enoch Powell's'Rivers of Blood' speech. The Telegraph) Although a lot of people in Britain think immigration was causing serious problems, and communalism will have dangers, the fact that Powell was denounced and became an infamous British political figure made the discussion of multiculturalism fearful if not impossible while the latter seems to be imposed on Britain, the fear seems inherited by the subsequent generations of politicians, too. In the Telegraph and in an attempt to prove Enoch Powell was right about mass immigration threats after the Paris attacks of November 2015, his biographer denied that it was Powell or fear of generation, and stated it was the existence of a « group within Britain's community of predominantly decent, law-abiding and highly civilised Muslims who were determined to impose primitivism and savagery first on their co-religionists and then if they could, on the rest of society » (Heffer)

Powell was certain that the increasing proportion of British-born children of immigrants cannot be a solution for the process of integration, but the case is the opposite. He predicted the problem to be deeper, and his repatriation agenda was meant to avoid that bad reality. Enoch's name was associated with the 'send them back' slogans then and now, but this was impossible. The proof is that in 1968 Powell spoke with urgency because he felt it was too late to send immigrants back. Moreover, immigration control for him would be less important to offer a solution. What about nearly half a century later? Is it much too late, too? Powell's point proved right, and this is what he is remembered for nowadays. Nevertheless, some still see his fragmented British nation prediction as valid for certain time while invalid in the twenty first century Britain.

V. 1. 2. The British Dream

Although Britain is multicultural, multi-religious, and multi-ethnic, the 'British Dream' is missing. Britain is not a land of opportunity for all like America, and there is not much talk about a British dream in that country. Perhaps the only context in which this is discussed is when politicians debate assimilation, Britishness and multiculturalism. But why there is no lure of the British dream that can fuel immigrants to talk about their achievements of a better, richer, and happier life in a land where their origin does not matter? Such thing as the British dream can better unite people of different cultures and ethnicities, and can also increase their contributions. Indeed, the American dream is more possible since America has been founded by immigrants. But the bulk of people who went to Britain do also have close ties within the Commonwealth. This is a good reason that can lead to the realization of a British dream, yet it seems nobody wants to seize this opportunity. Instead there is a constant call for the protection of Britishness.

Despite the barriers put up by the British mentality, and the odds of British policy, some immigrants succeeded in Britain. However, their success is confronted with the envy of extremists who accuse them of cheating on state benefits. To be sure, the British extremists' problem is mostly with Muslims. Their earlier assumptions about immigration were that people from other religions would gradually start to believe as much as Anglicans do, or just leave their faith. If the ideal for British social cohesion were to become atheists or secularists, lots of Muslims who remained devoted Muslims cannot thus be both British and Muslims. Eventually, they have no chance to embrace the British dream if it emerges. Does not the British state have to protect minority faiths? Will the British dream be born even if Muslims are not playing fuller roles in citizenship, and politicians do not believe in the principles of equality and freedom?

Views were different. On the one hand, the British dream was regarded as a distant dream because Muslimness was associated with radicalism and terror. On the other hand, the dream was viewed very possible and soon especially after the election of Sadiq Khan – the son of a Pakistani bus-driver – by the people of London to be their first Muslim mayor. Whatever may be said about the reality of the British dream, it remains unexamined for its controversial nature. Growing arguments for less immigration and

more nationalism were given expression in David Goodhhart's 'The British Dream' through which he argues that some immigrants have taken jobs from natives. According to Goodhart, the contemporary British society has socio-economic problems caused by immigration, but it is not obvious from his work why immigration is responsible for that. Although he is careful not to demonize immigrants, the book still has a scapegoating tone. He also charts a course for the future of post-war immigration in Britain by examining the progress of ethnic minorities to be around 25% of the population by the early 2020s. By the time immigrants' standard of increase is high, Islam's revitalization is also growing in Britain. Many Britons, accordingly, believe the ranks of violent Islamic radicals will be growing as well. They are wondering whether the British dream will be born whithin an Islamic environment and bred only for Muslims.

Muslim success in multi-ethnic Britain is no doubt part of the evidence of the British dream's realization. In part, it is also a matter of their own contribution to its achievement. From a British perspective, it all depends on whether the story of 'them and us' stops or remains. Even the positive reference to them on the ground that they are good for the British economy since they participate in paying taxes with natives is another version of that. Therefore, the evidence of a British dream must be perceived in literature, policy making, and policy debates along with everyday life experience. Like taxes, the future will also be shared; so, they should be good for the future too. How comes then the British anxieties about the Muslims will to integrate, their Islamic revival's impact on their cultural and religious heritage and the terrorist profile they identify them with are not felt in the same way in economic terms ? Immigration was not planned and its consequences were unintended, Islamic revival in Britain was least expected to grow so miraculously; but the British policy can be more accurate and calculated.

The British Dream should speak on behalf of a new equal 'us', not on belhalf of an indigenous majority with special right and a diverse ethnic minority with many forgotten rights ; or else, it is but a myth. British Muslims believe they have a greater sense of claim towards their British identity. Their rich heritage can be used to develop a shared identity and work on the omission of the others' fears to replace them with hopes. British Islam also needs to feel at home; not restricted and treated as alien. This also can get inspiration from the belief that Britain is more sympathetic and tolerant towards Islam

than other European countries, and which should be preserved. Statements like Trevor Phillips', the Race Equality Chief, when he told a meeting at the policy exchange think tank that « continuously pretending that a group is somehow eventually going to become like the rest of us is perhaps the deepest form of disrespect » (Ford et al. ''Muslims are not like us'') imply guilt, entail harm, and should not be adopted by the rest of them. The BNP leaders' criticism of Islam's rise in the UK as a vicious and wicked faith reflects some British extremist views that have to be fought.

V. 1. 3.   The Clash of Civilizations

Much was made about Islam conquering by the sword, and much is still being made about Islam taking over much of Europe. Equally, some might scaremonger and tell their people that the future of Britain will be the rise of a Muslim majority state within. Fears of mass conversion, high birth rates, the issue of immigration, and the imposition of the Shari'a law are what make regular headlines about Muslims wanting the flag of Islam to fly over Buckingham Palace. Although there is no evidence whatsoever for any form of religion being imposed in Britain, warriers predicted a rise in the number of conflicts and clashes that will happen because « the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future » more than twenty years ago (Huntington, ''The Clash of Civilizations ?'').

Samuel P. Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilizations is still generating debates over current affairs. This was originally published in the influential journal Foreign Affairs in 1993 to suggest that the next pattern of conflicts would be the return of traditional rivalries between nation states. Later, the article was developed into a separate book entitled, the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. Huntington's view of the world political realm as a set of eight distinct civilizations of which the Islamic and Western civilizations would be in continuous conflict because of the negative nature of the former has been much criticized by the people who do not think a clash is possible between Islamic and Western civilizations and reject the negative picture he painted for Islam and the binary opposition he reinforced in his reference to

Islam versus the West. Now, that Islam has gone everywhere and by taking into consideration the fact that Muslims are the believers of Islam anywhere, the oppositin in Europe will be between European Muslims and Europeans. The West is no longer a separate sphere on its own since Muslims living there are part of it as well, and in this way Islam merges into the West to change the dichotomy (Klausen VIII). This opposition is most apparent in the battle of thoughts that seems to coin conradictory words and phrases to identify the different people. In Great Britain, for instance, we find British Muslims but not British Christians; we find a British Pakistani, but not a British Welsh.

It is within Huntington's indirect suggestion that Muslims mixing of religious matters with political and social issues blocks all possible developments of freedom that many of the current British extremist views are drawn. This theory is more often than not referred to in connection with any type of disagreement between Muslims in the West and its natives. It portrays the Islamic culture not able to accommodate democracy (29). Although he believed that one needs new sources of identity to face the challenges of urbanization and modernization which are found only in religion whose revival is a reaction against secularism, moral decadence and individualism, he found Muslims unable to adapt to their new European environments (264). This is due to their revival of Islam which stands as a demonstration of their anti-Westernism. William H. Mc. Neill agrees with Huntington in his assault on the American assumptions that their national version of human conception is the universal and most valid type. In his 'Decline of the West?' he criticized Huntington for his inefficient recipe for adjusting relation between large blocs of nations (The New York Review of Books). He attributed that to his inability to show why the decline of the West, and the weakness of his suggestion that identity reaffirmation by repudiating multiculturalism would protect the Western values. This sounds strange because civilizations need to interact with one another, and this has historically been the common case even across very long distances.

Concerning the revival of a certain culture, Huntington was right in his view that when modernization functions, a foreign culture makes slow progress to absorb elements of the Western culture, but when the effect of modernization increases, Westernization decreases and the non-Western culture goes through revival. This is the same case with Islam in Britain. The renewed confidence of British Muslims continues to attract the

media which perpetually feeds the public opinion with anecdotes reported as facts. The distortion in media coverage and books like the one by Samuel Huntington is what conrtibutes to the prevailing lack of knowledge about Islam and associating it with extremism. Clearly enough, further modernization, cultural misunderstanding, and attempted universal imposition of Western decadent values is causing resentment not dangerous deviance among Muslims, and it is strengthening their commitment to their indigenous cultures. Huntington, thus, was not exact in his findings about the potential for Islam to succeed in the European context. Though after five years, the terrorist attacks in the USA (2001) stopped all doubts about his proposals; the more visible presence of Muslims in the West, and the revitalization of their Islamic culture opposes the foundation of his views on possible religious clashes. In fact, religious leaders from both Christian and Islamic circles share the same opinion on issues such as Secularism, homosexualism, and corruption.

The general expectation that the gospel would spread across the world thanks to the Christian missions and in no more than a century is not so prevalent today as it was in the optimistic years of the 19th century. It is evident that some of the territory where Christianity had once taken root has not remained Christian. Islam, in contrast, « can point to a steady geographical progression from its birthplace and from its earliest years … wheras the Jerusalem of the apostles has fallen, the Mecca of the prophet remains inviolate … Islamic expansion is progressive ; Christian expansion is serial » (Walls13). Some analysts attribute Christianity's consistent wane to its reliance only on conversion whereas Islam's resiliency is related to its dependence on both conversion and reproduction. Although the West is at the apex of its power, non-Western cultures are returning to their roots and this woud lead to ethnic conflicts according to Huntington who assumes the most violent of which would be involving Muslim societies and concerned mostly by political values. Indeed, long-standing differences in political values are based on religious cultures, but why he argues this would lead to conflict between and within nation-states remains unclear. The forseeable cleavage might be between Western democratic values and the developing world, the West in general and Islam, the non-Islamic societies of the West and their Muslim communities, or a single Muslim community among these.

Chapter V: Prospects of Islamic Revival in Contemporary Britain

Some of the most important non-Muslim arguments against Huntington's clash theory is its overgeneralization in reference to all European Muslims as being supporters of violence and terrorism. His controversial thesis is considered by many to be a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' and a totalizing approach to Islam that fuels ignorance. In the context of European Muslims, Klausen denied the fact that Muslims tend to be terrorists and claimed that there is very little support for the Muslim terrorist movement in European Muslim communities. Although Huntington speculated at length about what was then the future – that cultural revivalism would dominate the international scene – there is still no evidence for his claim after more than twenty years. In spite of the accelerated process of globalization, the re-Islamization and retraditionalization are taking place in the 21st century peacefully. And if they generated conflicts, this has historically been the case and there is nothing new if they continue to happen. British Muslims, for instance, master the skills of democracy and succeed to attract thousands of British natives to their faith. If Islam had bloody borders, not single men in Britainwould have interest in it.

Huntington's generalizations have also invited criticism for their failure to realize the importance of global economic and political factors in addition to the impact of globalization's effect. His predictions about deep disputes between the West and Islam contradict the most challenging model relationship that exists between the west's most democratic and secular republic of the USA and the kingdom of Saudi Arabia which is the world's most fundamental Islamic country. To both countries, weapon importation and oil exportation seem to defeat any religious disparity or cultural difference. Similarly, his report of a possible clash between China and the West has not occured until now. On the contrary, economic relations continue to disregard cultural beliefs. Another illustration could be within the borders of the UK where no inter-cultural quarrels, proposed by the thesis of Huntington have happened though the 2011 UK census showed that about 55% of London residents would be non-white British people. To be sure, he would not have been wrong if he only supposed there would be more emphasis on identity: ancestry, language, traditions and religion. Escalating globalization has indeed put a limit to some new political ideologies and there seems to be a decline in focus on civic belonging giving way to cultural and religious assemblage of peoples. Yet, his belief in future clashes as a result of these gatherings has not been evident. A good case

in point that refutes the supposed conflict between Islam and the West is Indonesia where the largest population of Muslims lives harmoniously with the rest of the population.

Terrorism has been the sole issue used to strongly uphold Huntington thesis. Though not enough to justify that, the instance of September 11th , 2001 has been referred to countlessly. Attacks such as the Madrid train bombings (2004), the London underground bombings (2005), Mumbai events (2008), and Paris attacks (2015) are considered as obvious examples of the foreseen civilizational clash and the violent interaction between Islam and the West. Britain, in particular, is believed to be the birthplace of most Islamic terrorists. Recent research reports (Centre for Social Cohesion.2010) showed Britain's terrorists as Muslim, young, educated and likely to flee to the Middle East or pledge allegiance to ISIS. This is often pointed out to support the significance of the clash theory in the multicultural societies of Europe in general, but it still fails to recognize the fact that Muslims involved in terrorist organizations constitute an extremist minority. The theory, then, cannot be violated when it ignores the different sects of Islam and their internal conflicts, the various groups of Muslims, and looks at Islam from a confrontational view. In fact, it is in Britain that animosity as a result of sectarian divides of Islam is most evident. Tension mounts to consider Shi'a as not Muslims by their Sunni counterparts, and there are also tensions caused by a particular strand of Sunni Islam (Wyatt. ''Sunni-Shi'a Divide in the UK''). Of course, this would also lead to clashes if sectarian divide worsens but this will victimize Muslims themselves not their host societies.

There is a firm belief among many scholars that a silent revolution is going on among Western Muslims, and Islam is being revitalized throughout that. The evolution in the ways Islam is adapted and devotion to its principles is kept substantial is so unique that Islam is being purified for the first time in the West in spite of being bound both by the specific laws of the Western country and its own laws of Shari'a at the same time (Ramadan 4, 97 ; Klausen 9). Klausen agreed that there is a revival movement of Islam in Europe (9), but there is still a lack of intra-communal dialogue. This is what Ramadan wanted to change by persuading Muslims to become full participants in the Western societies and forget about the bi-polar Islamic stance towards the West – abode of Islam vs abode of war. He also considered the West as Muslims' home since the five

fundamental rights are guaranteed there (the right to practise Islam, the right to knowledge, the right to establish organizations, the right to autonomous representation, and the right to appeal to law) (70). Consequently, the West should be the abode of invitation instead. However, the proof that implicitly the West has long been considered as such is that conversion to Islam has been going on vibrantly ever since Muslims stepped into Europe. Ramadan's requirements for Muslims are to study and reinterpret the textual sources of Islam according to the contemporary context of the world (37), but this reformist approach is criticized by both Muslims and Westerners. The former category disfavors the rereading of the sacred texts while the latter fears it would a tactic of gradual Islamization[2]. The current state of affairs shows that there are both a strongly traditional version of Islam, and a series of proposals to develop an English brand of Islam[3]. It is a kind of intellectual revolution taking root in the UK, but the clash theory is still not a reality. The contributors to this conflict of thoughts are too many: secularists, conservative Europeans, Muslims, extremists on sides, democrats and so forth. What is undeniable amidst the multiple attitudes of these participants in the British scene is that Islam continues to challenge the European frameworks. Klausen believes that the European political system must change for this new interest group of Muslims (108). With the emergence of Muslim political elite, it is possible to facilitate the accommodation of Muslims, the unification of their political dialogue, and the introduction of suitable policies. Irrespective of their ethnic background, British Muslim citizens, for instance, have been the subject of debates on a meaningful plan for their cohabitation from multiculturalism to new Britishness.

Indeed, there are still some painful issues that result from the combination of factors such as the nature of Islamic civilization in the West and their relation, its diversity, the representative Muslim voice, Islamophobia, media coverage, the British government approach to british Muslims and their integration along with lesser aspects such as debates over faith schools, the headscarf, full veil, arranged marriages, some Shari'a laws and other Islam-related controversies. While these cannot cause a national clash in Britain, it is still required to settle all of them, to acknowledge British Muslims as

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[2]See Melanine Phillips, Londonistan : How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within
[3]See John Bingham, The Telegraph 12/09/2016. How Church Choirs could hold secret to reinventing Islam as 'English Faith'.

ordinary people and to look at them through the lens of British citizens with complete rights. Islam has become an inseparable element of the lives of British Muslims, and a social reality as well. This has always been true of the faith. Hamilton Gibb stated that « Islam presents a classical example of an entirely self-sufficient, self-enclosed and inbred culture. Of course, it is a universal trait to divide mankind into the 'we-group' and the they-group', but Islam has from the beginning, and to a degree far beyond other Mediterranean societies, institutionalized its sense of difference and of superiority » (''The Heritage of Islam in the Modern World'' 4). However, the role and influence of Islam within Britain has become a complicated affair amidst the issues of the 'war on terror' and the 'clash of civilisations'. Meanwhile, Islam continues to challenge the myths and stereotypes about it. Its domineering nature is clear in its modern manifestations along with the optimism of its adherents.

V. 2. The European Muslims' Perspective

Among Europeans themselves there are a lot of people who dismissed the idea that Europe is heading toward a future of chaos and bloodshed. As the threat from ISIS extremists grows, the European Union's Head of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini asserted that it would unite Europeans with their Muslims since Islam belonged in Europe and 'political Islam' was a firm part of Europe's future[4]. The British Prime Minister David Cameron insisted that ISIS instead be referred to as 'Da'esh' because Islamic state was offensive to Muslims. It seems, then, unavoidable that Islam will continue to build a political presence where the millions of its members flowed. Most Europeans think Islam is only an ideology that needs force to be suppressed in the way they had behaved with Communism and Nazism, and that it grew amongst them because they did not pay attention or they were doomed to inactions by their own democratic practices and governmental policies. Muslims, however, see the growth of their religion as a result of progress, power and perfectness.

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[4]See the full text of Federica Mogherini at 'Call to Europe V : Islam in Europe' (June 24th,2015)

V.2.1. A Liberal Version for Islam

Not only are the British concerned about the growth of Islam, but the British Muslims amongst them are more concerned about the right sort of Islam they should embrace. The development of Islam in the West in general and in Britain in particular has called governmental involvement. Under the pretext of fighting Islamic extremism and Islamic-inspired terrorism, official interference came in form of government-sponsored attempts to promote a liberal version for British Islam. There were various strategies such as arranged partnerships with community leaders and faith-based organizations. Accordingly, the British government guaranteed a constant link with its Muslims especially the conservative forces amongst them in order not to allow other alternative groups to grow and challenge the national order. Faith communities, on their part, were given prominent role in government thinking through the interfaith networks, and faith schools were promoted. Secular bodies started to fund Islamic institutions in hope of promoting moderate Islamic communities. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is one of the bodies that satisfied the British approach to moderate Islam promotion. However, it attracted critical media soon after it boycotted the Holocaust Memorial Day commemoration and became unfavoured as a partner.

Tony Blair's government intervention to promote moderate Islam in Britain has unintentionally contributed to the promotion of Islam itself and consolidated the power of religious identity. Though planned as a regime to control religious rise and social organization through the divide and rule practice by neoliberals, it brought them opposition. Defining the terms moderate and liberal itself seemed problematic, the provision of counter attraction did not seem successful for liberal Islam, and the possibility for it to offer an alternative to the decadent Capitalist and secular life seemed weak. Neoliberal Islam was believed to offer no hope for the future; yet, more Islamic religiosity was much more attractive for the Islaiculturmic ideological solution it supports. For many researchers, the suppression of Left opposition left space for the rise of Islamic radical forces.

Chapter V: Prospects of Islamic Revival in Contemporary Britain

In the past, liberals tended to advocate multicultural policies while conservatives saw multiculturalism as a threat to Western values. The London bombings, however, made liberals join the conservatives in thinking that multiculturalism promoted Islamic extremism and gave rise to Muslim political leadership (MCB). The Policy Exchange (PX) thinktank started to publish major reports on Islamism and Muslims[5] ; the Sufi Muslim Council was supported as an alternative Muslim representative body, and Britain's mosques were believed to distribute radical values that should have been subject of greater regulation to be replaced by moderate Islamic values. Gordon Brown believed that not only the promotion of moderate Islam would resolve his nation's most important challenges, but it was to renew the sense of patriotic purpose (Brown.''We Need''). He gave directions to the British citizen to revive his Britishness into a new one based on six essential pillars including institutional reform, renewed local government, rebuilt civic society, citizenship seriously taken, better integration of minorities, and being always internationalist (Brown, ''The Future of Britishness''). The perception that little 'third world colonies'[6]had appeared in Britain to damage its quality of life along with the shift in emphasis from concern about third world immigration to focus on Muslims in Britain go back to 2002 when many writers expressed that there would be an unprecedented rise of Muslims in Britain. For a case in point, Anthony Browne wrote for The Times on how 'Britain is losing Britain', and following 7/7 he paid attention to Islamic groups in Britain arguing they were planting the seeds of Islamic fascism[7]. Worries that Islamism would impose a theocratic version of Islam over society persisted. Multiculturalism, then, arose among mainstream liberals to mean diversity among, not between groups. However, only a minority of Muslims: feminist Muslims, gay Muslims, ex-Muslims, and secular Muslims advocated for liberal values. Of course this would lead to more anxiety to tame some of the members of the Muslim community in Britain. For the first time, the English attempts to promote greater integration seemed complicated and made it clear that Islam was different from the other faiths in matters of assimilation. To be clear, around more than a century ago, East European Jewish immigrants did not pose the same problem. By

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[5]Examples of these are: When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries (2006), and 'Living Apart Together' (2007).
[6]Small ethnic communities transforming Britain through mass migration
[7]This idea was based on facts like Adolf Hitler being a best selling author in muslim countriesand that Muslim brigades fought for the Nazis, in the Balkans and in the middle-east.

contrast, they became the required sort of English men and their faith did not arouse any type of resistance to change. The result that liberal multiculturalism reinforced religious identity within faith groups brought it much criticism. Political thinking,in the name of defending diversity,can be seen as a means of empoweringreligious identities. Therefore, policies had to be carefully made in fearof causing any possible change for the British society.

British Islam seems to be strong because it is being built by a confident generation of home grown Islam proponents. The stereotype that authentic Islam cannot be born in non-Islamic states because it can only be brought from Muslim states like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia will be broken down. The other stereotype that, apart from Islam, all Muslim population share the destiny of belonging to the third world ; hence, Islamic revival is often interpreted as being only a third world predicament can only be a mere accusation. Furthermore, most people today think it is impossible to mould Muslims in their homelands according to European principles of modern times so as to compete European Muslims, but it would be possible from European Muslims – particularly the British born ones.

The marriage of Islam with the West is nothing more than the union of spirituality and a civilization different from that where spirituality originated. Theologians and intellectuals, however, went deeper into the character of this union to speak about the secularization of Islam, a new form of occidental religiosity, the beginning of spiritual modernity, Euro-Islam and European Islam[8]. The debate was also approached from different perspectives – political science and philosophical, jurisprudence and theological ones. As to theology, Tareq Oubrou[9] argued that the divine scriptures should be interpreted nationally, transnationally and globally; hence, his new term geotheology. He advocated the use of hermeneutics as a device and made his note that it is not a direct readingof the divine texts but their interpretation and translation. Against what some secular liberals want, the hermeneutics he is supporting does not cut links with the sacred

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[8]There are many versions of the idea of European Islam. These are Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan's respectively.

[9]The French imam-theologian Tareq Oubrou is a prominent voice of the emerging "European Islamic thought". He uses Islamic classical jurisprudential devices (such as fatwas), contemporary hermeneutics and critical thought, and personal communion with the divine (spirituality) to renew the understanding of God, Man, and the Qura'n in the European context

and make breaks with the past. Nonetheless, he aspires to put an end to the burden of European believers who are divided between secular and religious laws; so, he aims at fusing the two laws to see a theological secularization of Islam in the future of modern liberal societies of Europe. Bassam Tibi is another advocate of the idea of secularization of Islam, but he adopted a direct approach based on the rigid dichotomy (private vs public) which was softened by Tariq Ramadan who claimed it is a set of basic guiding ethical principles of the revealed book vs complementary man-made ones. Still another path in the European Islamic thought was founded by Abdennour Bidarwho challenged this entire dichotomy, the Islamic thought in its classical forms and the European secular thought. Instead, he suggested a rational theology approach which consists of three stages of intellectual development: self Islam as a personal experience in a secular context, the reading of sacred texts in light of modernity values, and opening new paths of thinking not only for Islamic thought but for the Western thought as well because the opposition between modernity and Islamic thought will not be the way for the future civilization of man.

Just as the renewal of Islamic spirit in a Muslim's soul gives it more vitality and power, renewing the conception of religion in general in the secular societies is far better than trying to liberalize Islam. Taha Abdurrahmane suggested a framework of three steps: humanization, historicization and rationalization. His European Islam version defends man's inheritance of the world, emphasizes the need of working well for the world even if the matter starts privately, and calls for re-reading the Qur'an in light of German legal theory hermeneutics in spite of his support of the separation of religion from politics. It's necessary to renew European view of Islam to make them re-visit its universality since the well being of the world is a shared responsibility; not only a religionist's or Muslim's affair. Most of the Muslim scholars living in Europe invoked this principle along with the revival of the prophetic example that shows the beauty of the faith. For many reformists, for the success of European Islam, it should also be rationalized and allowed visibility in the public sphere. The idea of European Islam is not necessarily the idea of liberal Islam. Its conceptualization according to Muslim European scholars, who are part of the Western vision, justifies that it embraces modernity values without cutting ties with the divine. That is to say European Islam does not negate the values of liberty, equality and

fraternity. Most important about it is that its support of modernity is neither Eurocentrist nor Islamo-centrist. It is both traditional and reformist. The former means it preserves the sacred and the latter means that it embraces modern values but re-interprets them according to the divine. If this were the common vision of European Islam in the West, it would prosper furthermore. Without this, the faith is on increase but with it the age of terror would be recalled as a hysterical epoch.

The topic of liberalizing Islam is still problematic for most Muslims, but greatly important for those who wish to see Islam have as little conflict as possible with secular liberal ideals. The difficult project of reforming Islam can be attributed to the vision of non-Muslims to Islam as being like Christianity and in need of its Martin Luther[10]. Yet, Islam has never had a Catholic-style clerical class with a pope at its top and against whom an Islamic reformation be targeted. Islam has already been reformed and the reforming movements have only made it much more rigid and insecure than beforehand. More cognitive rigidity towards religion cannot lead to a future with less clashes and violence. Non-Muslims who want to find out more about Islam or are about to convert may be introduced to a wrong version of the Islamic faith or may be frustrated to find their worst fears confirmed. Whereas the Christian reformation involved a revolt against the papacy, encouraged individualism and made modern science possible, Islamic reformation or the attempt to modernize or moderate Islam would challenge beliefs rather than institutions and would question equitable Islamic rulings that have never aroused extremism or radicalism to be replaced by others leading to irrelevance and chaos. Indeed modernity has brought about some significant changes in Islam, but the contemporary Islamism is not the required modern ideology for Islam. This continues to be at odd with traditional Islam. Hence, the adherence to Islamic principles is what has helped Islam remain visible and dynamic both in Europe and the Islamic world. The revival of classical Islam is what will guarantee the continuation of that. The call to modernize Islam seems ironical to many people in the West. A blog about Catholic, Muslim and secular interaction in the modern world issued an article entitled 'Does Islam Need to Be Modernized?' in November 13, 2010 in which it was stated that « it is also ironic that

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[10]Martin Luther (1483-1546) was a German professor of theology, composer, priest, monk, and a seminal figure in the Protestant Reformation.Luther came to reject several teachings and practices of the Roman Catholic Church. He strongly disputed the Catholic view on indulgences.

Muslims are being called to become modern at the very time when modernity with all its premises and promises is increasingly called into question in the West that gave birth to it. We believe we have seen through the pretensions of modernity's optimism and its grand narratives. And yet here we are wishing it, even wanting to impose it, on others » (Madigan)

V.3. The Future of Anti-Muslim Protest

Like all protest movements, the British anti-Muslim protest groups campaigned about some issues that tended to divide their opinion. The main issue was the differentiation between Islam and militant Islam. Most activists were confused and failed to make a distinction. In fact, some of them had only a limited level of ideological proficiency and a limited sense of the cause when they got involved with the groups. Instead of expressing concern about serious issues such as denouncing radical branches of Islam or opposing their hate conferences organized by groups like Hizb ut-tahrir, they diverted their attention to mobilise against many Muslim events which made them lose their way (Busher 125-26). Wholesale opposition to issues of multiculturalism and immigration would lead politicians to ignore their concerns and disapprove of them. Another focal point for differences of opinion among anti-Muslim protest groups in the UK is the prominence they gave to issues relating to Israel, in particular within the EDL demonstrations in which the Israeli flags were a common feature. Most EDL activists were both pro-Israel campaigners and opponents of the Islamification of Britain. A fourth focus of difference of opinion was the extent was the extent to which their cause was framed. In other words, some emphasized the issue as a national cause while others believed it is international and attended demonstrations elsewhere inEurope.

Differences of opinion within the movements of opposition to the Islamification of Britain were often referred to as a symbol of free speech within their groups as well as a sign of open-mindedness. However, their discussion increasingly became complicated. Firstly, they began to enquire about the dimensions of their demonstrations and their possible opportunities. Secondly, they had intra-movement rivalries concerning who

should lead and which town should host protests. Thirdly, they started to criticize one another using labels of Fascists and Nazis especially those who were critical of pro-Israelis.

What made it increasingly difficult to anti-Muslim protest groups were these tensions among their members. In addition to the constraints of being single-issue groups, violence and physical confrontation lied at the heart of their activism. Mobilising via social media had its downsides, too. Despite being an effective way to communicate the message and facilitate access to the groups, it led to the deterioration of relations within the activist community. Facebook, in particular, is an open space where conversations are visible toeverybody. This facebook status, though it did not contribute to the entire collapse of organized anti-Muslim activism, it started to attract less and less people and led to its fragmentation.

Anti-Muslim activism persists to the time-being in form of short-lived protests after big events like what happened in 2013 when Drummer Lee Rigby was murdered, and against the child sexual exploitation which was said to have involved networks of Muslim men in towns such as Rachdale, Rotherdam and Oxford. New groups came to life to operate independently; not under the support of central structures. Some of these self identifying patriotic protest groups are listed by Joel Busher:

> The Northwest Infidels (NWI), the Northeast Infidels (NEI), the Southeast Alliance (SEA), March for England (MFE), Combined Ex-Forces (CXF), English Nationalist Alliance (ENA), the British Patriot Society (BPS), The English Volunteer Force (EVF), The New Patriot Alliance (NPA), The British Patriotic Alliance (BPA), The United British Patriots (UBP), The North West Fontline Firm (NWFF), Infidels of Britain (IOB), and no doubt several others. More recently, Britain First, a group established by former BNP activists, has gained considerable public profile through a number of direct action campaigns including their 'Christian Patrols' and their harassment of anti-UKIP activists in the run up to the 2015 general election… (158).

Participation and commitment to activism are characterized by a different set of emotions: hate, anger, outrage, nationalistic pride and dignity. But beyond the politics of hate, activists enjoyed feelings of self-realization and the sacrifices they made along with

experiences of duty and solidarity. By contrast, they never recharged their emotional batteries for resentment against Muslims with faith matters as their counterparts did. They usually claim that they want Islam to be banned in the UK, and they do not miss current events such as terrorist attacks, Brexit, Donald Trump's election to make their views seem more mainstream. Members of Britain First, for instance, believed the UK is headed for holy war. Most anti-Muslim protesters use speeches filled with anti-Islam rhetoric in which they paused only briefly for the Lord's Prayer whereas their Muslim counterparts condemn their hostility with a language filled with the rhetoric of faith and minority grievances.

Accordingly, it seems as if Britain is on the verge of an anti-Muslim backlash that would make life difficult for law-abiding Muslims and representatives of mainstream British Islam. However, the Pew's 2014 Global Attitudes survey findings showed that the British public opinion is not really against Muslims since only 26% of Britons had unfavorable attitudes towards Muslims. So, either the hate mongers are not listened to or Muslims are demonised only by the media while national tolerance is real. Indeed, domestic terrorism and political opposition dangers are able to destroy multicultural citizenship. Contrastingly, many British Muslims are responding to the crisis with dual loyalty for their community without giving up on both their Muslim and British identity. In this way, one might anticipate that British Muslims' dynamism will be more attractive than the activism of British Christian groups (Nyers and Turner119). But since revivalist Islam is the last of the great world religions to face modernity and its forces (Mc Faul 180-81), it remains to wait for later Muslims going to britain whether they would challenge the secularization forces like their earlier generations or they would accept the Secular State. In the former case, anti-Islamic protest and violence would continue while in the latter case it would fade away.

The right's anxieties towards Britain's cultural diversity and resurgent Islam stem from their view of Christianity as being on decline, and their secularism as being valueless, and a no match against Islam which seems crusading. They believe Jihad attacks are horrific Islamic acts led by Muslim suicide bombers who attend mosques. Their worries go further to the belief in an existent vacuum in the spiritual realm which is going to get filled one way or another. But the vacuum is alarmed by the steady growth of

Islam; not something else. The right wing is also motivated by the shocking facts related to terror attacks. For instance, the 2017 Manchester attack was said to be planned by a bomber who attended the Didsbury mosque which is a former Methodist Church (The Telegraph, BBC News). Figures given by Intelligence officers and ministers continue to illustrate the magnitude of the terrorist threat at least in the eyes of the right's activists. UK Security Minister[11] told the Times about the existence of 23.000 jihadist attackers in Britain (MacEoin. Gatestone Institute).

If we assume that the Islamic resurgence would continue, the right's anxieties would continue to be signalled. Sympathizers among Britons would see that as the return of faith while religious Britons would believe it is the revenge of God. And if we assume that Christian Britain would fight crusading Islam through its right wing and other agents, these national strategies might or might not be effective ways. Since the matter, except its terror side, does not need only military strategies, the task would be hard. Its earlier wars against the threats of al-Qaeda and its strategic reaction to 9/11 were flawed and said tobe failures as long as Britain did not pay enough attention to the necessary conditions of success (Chin17). Hence, these problems would be possible and understandable in its fight against resurgent Islam, too.

V. 4. The Muslim Vision of the Future of Islam in Britain

While discussing the future of Islam in Britain, we must examine that through the parameters of a good future of which the number of Muslims or their mosques is no reference. Most Muslims know that their number is over a billion; nevertheless, they hardly have any strengthbased on their quantity. They rather believe in piety and unity.Their best example to confirm this is the minority of Muslims who fought against the majority of disbelievers of Quraych in the battle of Badr but they won thanks to the

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[11]Ben Wallace, Minister of State for Security at the Home Office, told The Times that the existence of a database of thousands of potential attackers clearly indicates the scale of the challenge from terrorism in the 21st century.

quality of Islam they had and the firm conviction they had that they were the best nation created for mankind.

Positively judging the future of Islam by looking at the birth rates or the number of Muslims praying on earth each Friday are not deeper indicators of prosperity and strength. The negative judgement based on the rise of the far-right parties in Europe in general and the UK in particular along with the continuous hatred and association of Islam with terror would also be misleading. So how do Muslims regard their future under either the culturally unfit elements in European societies or the threat images held by their European counterparts?

First and foremost there is not an agreement on this issue neither among Muslims living in Europe nor among Muslims in the Islamic world. European Muslims themselves have different views and varying degrees of worry about their future. The French Muslims, for instance, are less concerned about their future than British Muslims who are more troubled about their religiosity's future (Sinno152). Yet, however, there are still lots of far-right British men and women who, in a depressing amount, think the UK is on its way to become a Shari'a State. Surprisingly, their worries are still pronounced even after Brexit which is very likely going to strengthen their forces. There is no clear union between Europe's Muslims that may put the continent's future in jeopardy, and if there is any plan of that the domino effect that Brexit may cause will not be helpful to let it go on successfully.

Muslims are very much part of the British society, but they are often seen as a nation being created within another nation and who will have its own very separate future (Phillips[12] qtd in Dolan). Although they feel a strong sense of belonging, the media in Britain obssesses over them as "the others" who are living within their society while there is a real public debate and a starting point for each proposal of cohesion and better future for Britain's multicultural society that Muslims are a problem. Muslims are in denial and they voice loyalty, commitment and remedy instead. They think their badly needed principles would lead to progress, peace and equality.

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[12]Trevor Philips, Former head of Britain's Equality and Human Rights Commission

V.4.1. Islam as a Remedy for Postmodern Ills

Perhaps the only viable alternative to the hegemonic modern West is Islam. The encounter of Islam with the claims of modernity is producing problematic issues and calling many to realize that the future of the Western world and that of Islam are directly interconnected. The present worldwide revival of Islam is the clearest reason that pushes anybody to be interested in understanding the world's present and future change especially when one considers how this is going on at ever increasing speed.

It was assumed at a time that the Western model of development and modernization was multifaceted and involving deep changes in intellectual, political, socio-economic, and psychological levels (Huntington. ''Political order in Changing societies'' 32-33) towards which Islam was defenseless since many Muslim leaders adopted the Western conception of the modernization process. But Islamic revivalists emerged to challenge that and position Islam as the only alternative to the Western ideologies. Little by little, the idea of 'Islam is the solution'[13] began to spread as a saying used by Islamic reformist groups, a slogan taken by Islamic organizations, a motto coined to attract the people to Islam, and mostly as a belief pronounced to identify Islam as the best value system that can remedy many moral crises and help out with some deteriorating economic, political, and social realities.

Clearly speaking, religion was rejected as something irrational by modernists throughout the nineteenth century Europe when reason was hegemonic and looked down upon African and Asian nations because they were deemed to be anti-modern and this lasted till the early 1950s and 1960s when a new trend started to emerge – post-modernism. Under this new movement, reason lost hegemony and pluralism came to be accepted; thus, religion also came to be re-appropriated. Owing to the migration of people from the former colonies of the Western powers and post-modernism's tolerance of other cultures and religions, Islam found its respectable place in Europe. But from the time Islam came in touch with the Western world, the real struggle started. The faith has

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[13]A concept, belief, and saying that one of the Islamic reformist groups is taking as its slogan.Since this motto was coined, a lot of controversy has been made around it. Some think that it is rather an idealistic emotional motto that has nothing to do with reality.Others think that it is an inapplicable principle based on an abstract spiritual idea which does not conform to the materialistic nature of the existing problems

long been juxtaposed against the materialist Western ideologies of capitalism, socialism, democracy and liberalism.

In the course of discussing the role of Islam in the modern world and the extent of its validity, mentioning Sayyid Qutb cannot be neglected. The Qutbian active discourse of dissent, his theory of man, society and knowledge; his strategies for change and reform, and his conception of the Islamic solution is still relevant. Qutb's writings articulate a life-conception of Islam[14] that maintains a balance between the material and the spiritual. In other words, he introduced Islam as a way of life that offers both spiritual salvation and material well being[15]. Through his ideologies that combine the values of authenticity and those of modernity, he established himself as a revivalist thinker. Long before Samuel Huntington, Qutb positioned Islam in opposition to communism and capitalism for the reason that it favored spirituality over animal materialism. He was such an anti-imperialist who criticized colonialism, denied the authority and advantages of foreign conceptions of life and claimed for Islam's universal validity. In Qutb's writings, there is a clear attack on Islam in form of doctrinal violations on which the social sciences and humanities are based. Man for instance cannot be reduced to an animal or a matter, and neither can the real Islamic God be replaced by an idea or something in form of nature. So only on this ground, these sciences should be rejected in order to keep the incorruptibility of Islam. He argued that Islam is different from Judaism and Christianity in that it has never suffered the perversion of its fundamental principles. The principles of the Islamic conception of life have so far survived in spite of the deviation of some Muslims or their being ruled by un-Islamic governments. The Islamic conception, thus, would be kept integral for the next generations and would in this way secure the future of Islam. It came in his words that Islam « had come originally to rescue mankind from … [the] deviations » (Qutb 4).

In addition to the problem of how should Muslims reject foreign philosophical conceptions that may debase Islam's principles, the issue of how should they reconcile between emphasis on modern laws of constitution and on Islam laws of Sharia began to

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[14]This is echoed mostly through his works : Social Justice in Islam and Sign Posts.
[15]See also Alija Izetbegovich, Islam between East and West. Petaling Jaya : Islamic Book Trust, 2010.

be discussed by other thinkers. Sayyid Abul'Ala Maududi's[16] writings had a great influence on many Islamic leaders at the time when the notion of the Islamic State was debated. He believed that an Islamic State should be « the very anti-thesis of secular Western democracy … in such a state no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and private » (Qtd. in Giunchi 348), and he also thought of the modern Muslim state as a constitutional state in which the application of the tenets of Islam (Islamic laws) is put at the core of constitutionalism (Sinanovic 13). In general, the Islamic state was depicted as not necessarily a state inhabited predominantly by Muslims, and this raised enthusiasm for Islamic activism in the West. Today's Muslim leaders and activists trust his words that « Muslim nations are very special because they have a command from Allah to rule the entire world and to be over every nation in the world. Islam is a revolutionary, totalitarian ideologythat comes to destroy any government made by man. The goal of Islam is to rule the entire world and submit all of mankind to the ideology of Islam ». This is often quoted in their speeches along with the fact that the Western nations have long been post-Christian, then anti-Christian and almost pagan societies whose interest lies in egoism and hedonism.

The West has long been famous for its hegemony over theories be they political, socio-economic, philosophical or technological. However, the Islamic revivalists have also suggested alternative Islamic models of development and treatment that challenged their Western counterparts' own practices. To illustrate, we can note Sayyid Qutb, Muhamad Baqir al-Sadr and Sayyid Muhammad Naquib al-Attas as the best and earlier Islamic revivalists. After the Iranian revolution, new ideologies emerged. The Western academic prophecy produced works of self-congratulation. Francis Fukuyama's The End of History was an over-optimistic theory which within few years proved wrong. The fall of the Berlin Wall, Bosnia's bloody civil war, and the still existing resistance to the West's ideologies in the Islamic world pushed Samuel Huntington to publish his seminal essay 'The Clash of Civilizations' in which he predicted that the world's future will be dominated by the clashof civilizations, and that the most earthshaking of such clashes would be between the Western civilization on the one hand, and Islam and Chinese

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[16]A major Sunni thinker of India, then Pakistan, who lived 1903-1979. The founder of the Indian-Pakistani Jamaate-Islami and one of the greatest Islamic scholars of the 20th century.

civilizations on the other. The real problem with his vision of the future is that he reasserted there would be more frequent and violent clashes between groups in different civilizations than conflicts between groups in the same civilization. However, most of the recent wars have been civil or local fought at the level of the same civilization. In Huntington's theory, the context is a world in which multiple modernities cannot coexist because the West must be the victorious and predominant one, and the others must follow its model of development. In fact, the new language of development by them was defined in terms of democratisation instead of modernisation. Muslim scholars, in response to this, started publishing and debating extensively on the topics democracy, human rights, political pluralism, participation of Islamists in non-Islamic governments, and women's rights in Islam. Islamic revivalists did not share the same discourse on democracy, so their movements were not politically and theoretically unified. Democratic reforms led to disputes in several areas, mainly the quality of sovereignty, whether it should be for God or the people, the Qur'an or the Sharia, and so forth. Issues of the Islamization of knowledge, Islamic banking and financing were focused on inaddition to many new questions which led to pluralism with Islamic revival itself (Sinanovic18). Islamic democracy seemed nonsense for some and a dream whose way was long and arduous for others. Assumptions were made that democracy is possible only in one form, and that Islam can be expressed and practised in only one way. Unity of God (tawhid) is the first of the principles upon which Islam is based. God is unique and His will is the guide of all men's lives. Therefore, there is only one sovereign that is god and this contradicts the sovereignty of the people dictated by the democratic process. Nevertheless, contemporary Muslims attempt to accept democracy on condition that it be framed within tawhid. Several Islamic concepts prove the existence or possibility for development of an Islamic democracy: consultation (shura), consensus (ijmaa), and independent interpretive judgement (ijtihad). These terms are in sharp contrast with the European vision of the Islamic unity of God as a kind of theocracy. Muslims feel rather qualified to give sound opinions on matters of Islamic law and no executive is made without their general will.

The new Muslim presence in Europe through migration has been growing thanks to the forces of globalization, but the 9/11 changed everything. A lot of criticism has been expressed about the role of Islam in the world and about its status in the West as well as

about the failure of multiculturalism and the rise of terrorism. But the postmodern society also featured ambiguity, denied oppositional approaches, signified nothing, and went nowhere further, marked the end of philosophy, subverted the power of language to shape the world, and ignored the power of consciousness to shape the self. Postmodernism as the contemporary dominant philosophy of Western civilization is a movement of hyper-specialization, instrumentalization, and desensitization. Everything good is ironized and transformed into something bureaucratic under postmodernism which is also a great catalyst for division and polarization.

Postmodernists rarely explain themselves clearly and this is due to the inherent contradictions of their thoughts. Although many people would argue that postmodernism is a continuation of modern thinking, the Encyclopedia Britannica defines it as « largely a reaction against the philosophical assumptions and values of the modern period of Western history ». In fact, variations in what postmodernism means can be detected in various works of various thinkers. But in the context of social problems, most of the analysis of this movement along with globalization was the product of the French philosophers Michel Foucault and Jean-François Lyotard as well as the British leading exponent David Harvey. Society for postmodernists in general was « more complex than belief in a rational singular truth, and social problems have more causes than any formalized list » (Parillo 695). They reject the scientific way of analysing society and assert that owing to the amazing improvement of information technology, the tremendous impact of mass media, and the growth of multiculturalism society is getting more multidimensional and difficult to control. Social problems such as poverty, drug addiction, pessimism, excessive consumption, alcoholism and violence; and social movements like feminism, fundamentalism, gay rights, terrorism, and environmental conservation are more widespread. With regard to postmodernism's ills, its scholars remain theoretical in that they highlight the problem without suggesting any solution.

Contrastingly, Islam provides interesting remedies for almost all postmodern problems fromthe onset its teachings were disseminated as if it anticipated what would come at later stages of life. Among the Muslim countries, these cures are not very visible because the issues are less perceived than they are among the Muslim communities in the West. Muslims in the West and particularly Britain, because they are participants in the

democratic politics are pushed by the practicality of these social crises to discuss them well. The Western societies made laws to guarantee order and overcome problems; yet, these laws need to be applied and respected. Laws sometimes are not enough, notably when the crisis is of a moral nature. With respect of this, Islam offers a strong value system that gives assistance to laws because values are not easy to challenge as it is the case with laws. Thatis why Islam reminds non-Muslim individuals that stealing, hurting neighbours, treating parents with no respect, preventing children from being educated, dishonesty, violence, and disloyalty are prohibited. Indeed, there are Muslis who do not abide by Islam's commands. Still, the majority conforms to the Qur'an and the Sunnah which forbid these ill acts. Islam prioritises the moral side rather than the constitutional system of order. Poverty, for instance, has been combatted through a taxation system and state projects of relief. Either the rich people are scheming to evade taxes or these projects are fraudulently managed. Islamic sources, however, solve that with obligatory alms-giving (zakah) and byproviding cgarities for the needy voluntarily. The latter is emphasized repeatedly no matter how muc it is. The Prophet said: « A charity is due for every joint in each person on every day the sun comes up: to act justly between two people is a charity; to help a man with his mount, lifting him onto it or hoisting up his belongings onto it, is a charity; a good word is a charity; and removing a harmful thing from the road is a charity » (Al-Bukhari; Muslim). Islam appraises good deeds that come from the individual's conscience. Another illustration is related to the ethics of wars which are governed by the UN conventions and violated by superpowers from time to time. Islam favours peace to conflicts and commands people not to resort to going into wars unless all peaceful means are exausted. If the war is unavoidable, the Muslim combatant is warned against the destruction of the properties, the demolishment of lands, burning harvests, slaughtering animals, hurting women and children, and even cutting trees.

Islam is the faith mostly depicted as culpable and liable to extremism as well as in need of repair. Its members are also described as fanatics, unsmiling, down right, and dangerous. Inorder to satisfy international opinion about these people and their faith, proposals from both Muslim and secular circles revolved around the option of moderate Islam and moderate Muslims. The word moderate has crept into the lexicon and became

highly appreciated for the benefits it might reap in the future. While the promotion of moderate Muslim especially in the Western world has become the broad philosophy, key voices of Islam believed that behind every Muslim fundamentalist, there is a secular autocrat. That is to say, racism and Western foreign policy are the roots of Islamic grievances. The threat of Muslim extremists seems meaningless when one notices no mention of peaceful Catholic clergymen or moderate Anglican bishops. As for the option of moderate Islam, many religionists and even ordinary middling Muslims find the focus on the kind of Islam too far down the causal chain. The solution to extremism is not moderate Islam at least according to the most prominent thinkers of world politics. Samuel Huntington asserted that « the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture » (Huntington, ''The Clash of Civilizations''217). For Muslims, what is often praised as moderate Islam could equally be called useless Islam that would fail to satisfy its adherents. It would become the new enemy and the principal threat would always be the West as a despotic suppressorof their faith. A Muslim majority retreating into despair and a bleaker future would be more realistic.

While many policy makers and scholars are exuberantly preaching the virtues of moderate Islam and its potentials, much less effort is devoted to the identification of moderation as one of the salient features of the Islamic world-view. Islam's outlook on life is moderate in that it prescribes to human beings to enjoy their natural desires without being controlled by these desires. This is dictated for both individuals and communities. The Qur'an states « O.children of Adam! Wear your beautiful apparel at every time and place of prayer. Eat and drink. But waste not by excess, for Allah loveth not the wasters » (7:31)

There is also addiction which is not very different in type and effect from extremism and excess. It is ultimately the triumph of the soul commanding to evil. Long before many of these self-destructive behaviours became widespread, Islam had recognized their perils and prohibited each of alcohol and drug consumption, gambling and overeating. The Qur'an says: « O ye who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, (dedication of) stones, and (pination by) arrows, are an abomination, - of Satan's handwork: eschew such (abomination), that you may prosper » (5:90)

The challenges with which most members of postmodern societies are faced today are not other than those confronting Muslims to be good Muslims. However, Islam has hardly left any aspect of human existence and matters without a thing to say. Followers of Islam are not bewitched by its commands; it provided them with the visions for which they yearned. It extends beyond the individual to cover political, socio-economic and criminal spheres. When it comes to women, Islam with reference to consent in marriage, freedom to work and control over economic livelihood, protection from violence can be considered as the most 'feminist religion'[17]. In the face of critics of Islam and Shari'a, the latter does not allow the enslavement of women and children, the early and forced marriage, and female genital cutting. Many secular laws are just similar to Shari'a law. A case in point could be the principles we read in the Declaration of Independence and which are not far from the rights to protect one's life, his liberty and properties as governed by the Islamic legal system.

The extent of one's Islam is not always his beard, hijab, the kind of dress and the length of garments. It is not about the ruling of praying in the masjid, or the right madhab or tariqa to be followed. Islam is firstly and lastly about man, and how he becomes a better member. Islam has regulated the relationship between rulers and citizens with much more influence than laws. Islam warns rulers against forcing themselves against the will of people. It equally encourages citizens to revolt against oppressors and not to be mocked for cowardice. In Muslim democracies of Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia now the questions of civic engagement and citizenship are in the mainstream discussion on Islam and society. The recent Arab Spring can be the best example of what happens when some Islamic virtues are put into effect. Additionally, Islam provides the broken postmodern family with a set of values, too. The Qur'an stressed duties towards elderly parents and the obligation of showing kindness to them. The prophet advised the believers to love their daughters and not to discriminate against them. More than that, a place in the paradise is gained when a man cares for his daughters. Miraculously, Islam did not neglect environmental ethics which could solve problems that range from

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[17]See Q&A : Jacqui Lambie and Yassmin Abdel-Magied exchange barbs over Shari'a law (video. ABC News.Feb, 14th.2017.

pollution to drought through valuable acts such as the prohibition of urinating in stagnant waters as well as the need to stop wasting water even if one is at a running stream.

The dominance of Islamic values over secular values and the Islamic revival in the West are evident and more visible among people with Western-style education. History does rhyme with Islamic resurgence just as it occuredwith nationalism which rose among Western-style educated elites who brought independence. Islamic resurgence grows more in big Western modern cities which confirms Huntington's testimony that Islam and modernisation do not clash. The suppression of Islam by force took place and is stilltaking place through various means, but the more it is controlled and attacked, the more it prospers. Short-lived schemes to suppress Islam failed because it exists in the hearts, minds and attitudes not simply in rules. It is a complex and complete system of life.

Most importantly, Islam has been a unifying force of order with common principles and deeply rooted culture, a sense of justice, of ultimate truth and immeasurable peace, a vehicle of resistance, a faith admired by non-believers as much as by its adherents, a guide for responsibilities, a unique guarantee of salvation and an exceptional message of promise to eternity in paradise. In contrast to the beliefs that the roots of some world conflicts lay in Islamic ideologies, more recent theories focus on regional and territorial power struggles as the reason behind that. Some expressed their conviction that even if the prophet Muhammad had never started Islam in the seventh century, there would still be conflicts between East and West caused by the Christian churches of the East and their adversaries in the West. Inother words, a world without Islam would not be much different from he world today (Fuller ''A world Without Islam'') Certainly, many experts continue to approve of the fact that religion has long been used to arouse the masses and target enemies while it is not; yet, it is likely to remain so. If we point to the attraction of the advance in communication technologies to Muslims, other experts suggest that « a new generation of politically active, socialy conscious, and globalized Muslim youth » (Aslan 288) will be carrying out the Islamic resurgence in way that religious struggles and wars of ideas would not end till one side is victorious over the other.

V. 4. 2.   Islamic Resurgence and the Idea of Progress

Islamic predominance and a relative lack of economic progress appear to go together. Western observers blame the perceived backwardness of the Islamic countries on Islam. However, Muslims claim their religion seeks both spiritual and material gains. The Golden Age of Islamic Civilization provided the worlds with a number of scholars who, in addition to excellence in religious sciences, they also excelled in scientific realms such as Ibn-Sina, Al-Khawarizmi and Al-Biruni in mathematics, geography, astronomy, physics, chemistry and medicine. The Muslims' belief that man had been placed on earth as God's representative forbids them from causing harm to mankind and nature. In the same way Islam lays stress on justice, helping the poor, wisdom, forgiveness and compassion to achieve peace, it also highly appreciates the attainments of material gains through hard work. This is seldom discussed because the combination religion and work itself does not seem to attract a lot of research since religion's role with work is understated. Among the very few studies that tried to integrate the two notions there is Weber (1905) and Siedenburg's (1922) work on Protestant Work Ethic (PWE). There is Schooler (1996), Super and Sverko (1995), and Parbateeah and Cullen (2003) whose argument revolved around the fact that cultural behaviours have influence on work. Maxime Rodinson's[18] famous book 'Islam and Capitalism' asserted that Muslim tradition and the Qur'an favor economic activity and the search for profits.

Islam as a universal worldview has its own attitude towards work. One of the Prophet's most quoted sayings refers to work as a sort of worship. Al-Qur'an has revealed the value of work with different terminology that emphasizes work and employment through many derivatives, each according to its own connotation. The great role of labor to achieve prosperity and progress has been proved in the word of God that « there is nothing for man but what he strives for » (Al- Qur'an 53:39), and by the example of the prophet who began his life as a young herdsman pasturing sheep and strived little by little, through devotion and hard work to become a rich trader. In Islam,

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[18]A French historian and sociologist, a renowned specialist on Islam and the Arab world, and a researcher on Islam in terms of economic and social history.He is one of the few historians who distanced themselvesfrom the tradition of studying Islam in terms of belief and its comparison with Christianity.

thus, no work is considered as inferior or below dignity; physical and intellectual labors are equal in value; andall types of work deserve honour and grace as long as they are controlled by religious piety. Islam told the people not to beg, and that is why the Prophet claimed that the purest earning was that of a man with his own hand, and every honest transaction. The contemporary notion of progress is often attributed to the West while it can be referred to when talking about any case with regard to any culture. The other mistake concerns the meaning. Progress is not always economic growth along with the advancement of science and technology. Progress could be stability, freedom, literacy, absence of superstitions and brotherhood. In multiracial societies, progress is overcoming ethnic and religious clashes, hostilities, rethinking approaches to peace when environment is unhospitable, standing for one's own religion, and challenging postmodernity by imposing issues that should be solved. An instance of these cases is legal monism which signifies whether one common law for th whole nation state is valid in spite of the growing Muslim presence or not. Likewise, the new contexts which lead to progress within minorities in Western liberal societies also encourage them to investigate their religious sources at the aim of finding solutions. Consequently, the dialogue of investigation is but an initial stage for a religious revival. This is how Islamic revival took root in Britain. It has become proactive through posing questions of equal citizenship rights, Muslim women's right to free practice of religion especially with regard to the choice of Islamic dress, and the dissemination of religious education among children of Muslim communities.

In the Western sense of the term 'progress', science and reason is what constitutes the basis for real progress. Their ideas that religion is a conservative ideology and that Islam is no exception prevail. The fact that the Islamic culture reveres traditions and heritage; and it is guided by a sacred book which is not scientific makes it stagnant in the Western mind. In contrast to this perspective, Islam is a call to rational thinking. The problem is that many people are either unacquainted with the truths of Islam, or are unable to understand the Qur'an correctly. The misinterpretation of Qur'an has had its impact on science thanks to which we can know things about our bodies, the earth, and the entire universe we inhabit. Without science, the benefits of the internet or medical science could have been taken for granted. Science as a blessing on mankind cannot be ignored by

Islam which advocates people's use of reason and intelligence to think about the formation and magnitude of the universe. In these verses: « … those deeply rooted in knowledge », « … only people of intelligence pay heed », and « … reflect on the creation of the heavens and the earth … », the Islamic advice to carry out scientific investigation is explicit. Islam's support of scientific progress was assured by scholars who thought it was an ideology « committed to the service of science, progress, and a dynamic conception of society » (qtd. in Azadpur 16).Owingto that, it embraced Greek rationalism.

Islam encourages and urges its followers to learn, read, write, and do research. In fact, the first divine word revealed to the Prophet of Islam was a command to him to « read in the name of the Lord, who created man from congealed blood » (96 : 1-2). Thiscommand to an illiterate man reflects the importance of reading in particular and knowledge in general in the Islamic life. Knowledge is light for Muslims whose Prophet advised everyone to seek it anywhere eve if that needs them to travel as far as China. Their Qur'an gives proofs to its statements and requires that from the disbelievers for any claim they make – all features of scientific approach. Indeed knowledge is power, science and technology have facilitated our lives but we have also been giveninstruments of destruction through science. Therefore, the latter should not be devoid of spiritualism since like that it can not do much with human behavior. However, if science is associated with the guidance of the true religion, it will serve man far better.

Among those who believe that Islam is hostile to and incompatible with the values of the Western world, Max Weber is most notable for his explicit views. Without any first hand knowledge based on field research or direct experience with the Islamic societies, he wrote some of his most famous books in which he regarded that contrary to Calvinism, Islam and Asian religions killed the spirit of intellectual research and adventurism. He praised Protestantism for the role it played in the formation of Capitalism although he believed in the inability of religious beliefs to bring social changes or economic progress. But the fact that he viewed Protestantism as a determining factor in the appearance of Capitalism contradicts with his general claims that religions and particularly Islam cannot play decisive roles in bringing socio-economic progress. The Asian communities, whom he criticized, despite their adherence to traditional stagnant religious beliefs, have already

achieved economic and scientific progress. Weber's assertion that the superior ideals which move them most of all, always express themselves only through struggle with other ideals which are as sacred for others as theirs are for them. This applies to the idea of progress, too. For Muslims, progress is not only economic growth and social reforms but rather social solidarity, mutual acknowledgement and recognition, charity, unity, fairness, and lawfulness. Islam puts stress on the moral and spiritual side of human life in the same way or better than that on the material aspects of life. Islam is often blamed for the backwardness of some of its societies whereas this is due to the absence of favourable conditions, the interference of foreigners, wars, and dirty hands; not to Islam as a way of life that openly invites its adherents to progress.

As long as the idea of progress is inherent in Islam, the contributions of Muslims to the world by and large are immense. In Britain, there is a growing discourse on what is meant to be British and at the same time Muslim – if not a loyal Muslim contributing to progress in the British society. In his Ramadan well-wishes to Britain's Muslims, David Cameron once claimed that Britain's Muslim communities were making « an immensely positive contribution in so many ways ». Much of the popular narrative about British Islam is based on ignorance and has been heightened by misleading press. Official sources, however, have brought a clear-headed representation. A 2011 Demos survey, for instance, showed that Muslims are more patriotic than other Britons[19] (Bennett. The Telegraph). Fraser Nelson[20] considered the integration of Islam into the British mainstream as one of their greatest success stories. Many of the recent books on the nature of British Islam have successfully examined the absence of any contradiction between Muslim identity and loyalty to the British state. They also have corrected ugly attitudes to British Islam and dispelled many myths about British Muslims[21].

Muslims can be found participating in all walks of British life. A case in point is Islamic finance in Britain which is run currently through six banks along with another twenty lenders offering Islamic financial products. The latter comply with religious rulings to pool risk and prohibit traditional interest payments.this is why Shari'a-

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[19] 83% said the were proud to be British as opposed to 79% of the general population.

[20] TheScottish political journalistand editor of The Spectator, and a columnist for The Daily Telegraph. He is also a member of the advisory board of the Centre for Social Justice and the Centre for Policy Studies

[21] See 'The Muslims Are Coming!' and 'Inside British Islam'

compliant investments are celebrated all over Britain – the first country outside the Islamic world to issue an Islamic bond, known as sukuk in 2014. London has decided to become the world centre for the Islamic finance or « the undisputed centre of the global financial system » (Mair and Khan. The Telegraph), as it came in the words of Chancellor George Osborne. In addition to the steady progress of Islamic finance in the UK, applying Islamic principles in the British legal system have recently been thought to provide a guidance that would promote good practice in the British society (Nicholas Fluek, President of the Law Society). Official legal bodies have recognised the legitimacy of some Shari'a principles which opened the way for non-Muslim lawyers in High Street firms to offer Shari'à will drafting services. These wills would deny widows an equal share of inheritances and exclude unbelievers altogether, which brought criticism from secular legal bodies. However, how these special exclusions seem to have convinced the Law Society to advocate the mis a matter of deep concern.

The rise and growth of Islamic banking and finance in the UK, and the awareness of non-Muslims towards the value of Shari'a legal verdicts contribute as much as the significant number of Muslims serving the different British fields. Inspite of tensions around terrorism, the representation of Muslims within the British police forceshas been slow-growing but progress has been made. Muslims officers have been recruited and staffed all over the country. The fact that more Muslims have joined the police, the basic police uniform was adapted to take into account diversity and religious affiliation. Female officers were allowed to wear headscarves. A big number of Muslim doctors are serving in the NHS and are progressing to consultancy levels in leading hospitals around the UK. The better position of many Muslims contributing to the country's primary field is the reward of the growing number of Muslim schools and their successful pass rates. Britain's Muslims have also become more politically active – from the activist grassroots levels to higher political ones. The number of Muslim councillors, lord mayors, journalists, campaigners, and community leaders is set to increase. Additionally, there are thousands of Muslim millionaires living in the UK. Their fortunes come from their substantial small businesses and their excellent entreprennial skills. Not only do they generate employment to the British citizen, but they also benefit the economy in the form of business taxes as well as bringing valuable foreign exchange. As for food, progress has

been made through the existence of a new British way of eating. This started as soon as trade with the Muslims was possible. Today, Britain's most popular dishes come from the Indian and Pakistani restaurants of most UK high streets. The Muslim presence in Britain is also strong in terms of interfaith work. Muslims are very active in interfaith dialogue sharing reflections with others on conflict resolutions, peace-building, unity and respect. Their positive vision and engagement have grown in form of interfaith organizations such as the Cordoba Foundation, the Three Faiths Forum, and the Cambridge Inter-Faith Programme. To serve their local societies across Britain, Muslims have also worked tirelessly for many charitable reasons. There are around hundred or less charitable organizations that cover aspects of relief work, health, education and the environment. They also maintain social security and social justice and welfare. They deal with local issues of the poor and needy in Britain as well as the international issue of Muslims (Syria's civil war victims). With regard to teaching, Muslim Teachers Association has made a number of achievements that range from giving advice about the importance of education in Islam to knowledge production. In 2012 there were only eleven state funded Muslim schools, but three years later they increased to twenty one. The number for Independent Muslim Schools has also risen. It is in these schools that children are taughtabout respect for differences in ethnicity, religion, culture and race, as well as citizenship and human rights – according to Islamic principles.

V. 5. Biblical and Islamic Eschatology

No other ideological movement in the world today seems to have world domination and attraction as the Islamic revival does. In spite of the civil wars and clashes within many Islamic societies, the media war on Islam, the denigration of Muslims especially in host societies, Islam has so much momentum now that it is unlikely to be stopped. Although Islam, when it first reached Europe and elsewhere, it only travelled with the people who believed in it and who adopted a hijratic attitude to improve and upgrade their life continuously, it prospered and gained an international fame. Therefore, the future of the entire world and that of Islam can be directly interconnected. The growth and spread of Islam has become a powerful wake up call to all Christians or people who

believe Islam will by pass Christianity for the title of the world's fastest growing religion. David Pawson's[22] book '*Islam's Challenge to Christians*' is a strong warning not only to England but also to the Western church in general. He believed Islam is better than the Church to fill in the spiritual vacuum of the United Kingdom and it will not be long before it becomes the country's dominant religion. Pawson's predictions were followed by a plan of response which includes three issues: reality, relationship and righteousness (11).The real question however, is will the church of England implement his plan?

If we assume that much of the reason for the faster growth of Islam is simply higher birth rates not higher numbers of conversions, we should also bear in mind that Muslims are just having more children than Christians, and every day many Muslims are being killed somewhere in the world. Nevertheless Islam is spreading faster than Christianity and this worldwide significance of Islam cannot be underestimated or denied. The resurgence of Islam has come about despite the decline of Muslims of which the Holy Prophet was not uninformed. Through divine revelation the Prophet gave his people detailed description of their description of their distress at the end of times but informed about glorious events to take place on the last days.

Muslim theology asserts that Islam contains all that mankind will ever require until the day of judgement, and that no further revelation can or will occur. The Qur'an indicates that Islam is perfect and complete : « He it is who sent His Apostle with Guidance and a religion of the truth, that He may make it victorious over every other religion » (9 :33). For a man to be a Muslim, he must believe in five things: Allah, the Last Day, angels, scripture, and the prophets. Therefore, Islam will play a key role in the end time events. It is even considered as one of the 'great end time mysteries' (Jones 2017.Lamp & Lion Ministries). The end time refers to 'the Last Age' when the true Messiah (Jesus), the son of Mary (not son of God), would return to rule the world from Jerusalem with justice. After that, he dies a human death and is buried in Madinah next to Prophet Muhammad. It also stands for issues such as the coming of Ad-Dajjal (the Muslim Anti-Christ) and the appearance of the Muslim Savior, Al-Mahdi. But the ten major signs of the Last Day as prophesied by Prophet Mohammed are: Dajjal (the fase Messiah), Gog and Magog,

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[22]A prominent Bible teacher from England / 'The Challenge of Islam to Christians' Hadder and Stoughton, 2003.

smoke, the beast of the earth or land, the sun rise from the west, the three sinkings of the earth (in the east, west and in Arabia), a fire out of Yemen and the decent of Jesus (son of Mary). These major signs are so important to Muslims because, with regard to their legitimacy, they are undebatable, and because these prophecies say the events will be either preceded by or accompanied with minor signs including the collapse of morals and the human status, the fulfillment of which is not only close but clear as well.

Many more signs of the Last Hour were prophesied by Prophet Muhammad. Among these, we have the fact that the people of Islam would follow a way of life other than theirs, the most wicked people would be rulers and lead men astray, respect will be through fear of evil, the existence of great liars, women would arange their hair to look like the hump of a camel and would dress like men or dress and yet be naked, donkey-like sex would be in public display, homosexuality would become commonplace, which means marriage would become obsolete, the disappearance of religious knowledge, and the rightly-guided scholars of Islam would be banned on the ground that they cannot maintain peace and security like those whom they chose to preach their revised version of Islam, the perception of a swiftly moving time, random killing and violence, mosques would be devoid of guidance and Islam would keep only its name, Riba is universally prevalent, slave women would give birth to their mistresses thanks to modern feminist revolutions and wealth would be wasted in expensive high-rise buildings. Add to this, which has already happened, the Last Hour would come when we witness a fire from Saudi Arabia that would reach as far as Busra.

There is a lot of interest these days in the role of Islam in the end times. Today many people appear convinced that Islam will be the Biblically predicted one world religion at the end of time. Yet, the Bible is quite silent about Islam even though its prophecies speak enough about the Arabs. Of course most Muslims are in the Arab world, but there are the Muslims of the West and Muslims of large non-Arab countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Turkey. The Arabs i prophecy are strongly depicted when telling how they will come against Israel in the end times. Many Christians, thus, constantly refer to the Muslims' hatred to Jexs which is included in the Hadith that says « the Last Hour would not come unless the Muslims will gight against the Jews and the Muslims would kill them until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone or a tree,

and a stone or a tree would say ; 'Muslim, or the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me ; come and kill him' » (Hadith, Sahih of al-Bukhari : Book 041, number 6985). That is why the Christians think the persecution of the Jews would increase as the nations of the world become more Islamic. Islamization then is a threat to both Jews and Christians.

From a Christian perspective, they believe the future holds a call for a strong man to take the lead on Europe and answer the problem of terrorism, wars and religious clashes. He will be the emperor to whom all nations will give their power and support. The Bible prophecies show that the Holy Roman Empire will be restored at the end of times and would consist of ten natios (vs.12). This resurrected empire will be the world's savior. In fact, it will conquer each of the US and Britain and solve this century's problems. This new European power will dominate the globe through a number of false miracles and religion (Rev. 13: 13-14). Biblical eschatology says a lot about the difficult times that will face the earth, the plagues, disasters, and the eventual apocalyptic battles in which the forces of God encounter the forces of Satan. The final battles will take place north of Israel in the land of Magog (Rev. 20: 7) during the reign of the final Caliph, the Mahdi. The latter, with the help of the Muslim Jesus – Isa Al-Maseeh – will defeat the Dajjal (the Muslim Anti-Christ) and lead to a world where Islam is the final and only religion.

Islam and Christianity share some similar views of the end times like the return of Jesus Christ, the coming of an Anti-Christ, the resurrection, the final judgement; an eternal dwelling of man is either Hell or Heaven. However, the final matter is still approached differently. What is the Antichrist or the Beast in Christianity is called Dajjal by Muslims. In the Muslim perspective, not only the second coming of Jesus will play a central part in the struggle against the enemies of Islam, there is another person who is the Mahdi (the guided one). He is described as « a Messianic deliverer who will fill the earth with justice and equity, restore true religion, and usher in a short golden age lasting seven, eight, or nine years before the end of the world » (Encyclopedia Britannica). He is not mentioned in the Qur'an, but he is spoken about in the Islamic tradition and great emphasis is put on him by the Shi'a sect of Islam. While only in Islamic eschatology two characters are coming to rescue the world, the Biblical narrative speaks about two figures possessed by Satan and partners in crime, destruction and deception – the Antichrist and the False Prophet (Richardson 69).

As for the Muslim Jesus, it is not the same version of the Biblical Jesus who is portrayed as the son of God or God incarnate. To Christians, the Muslim view of Jesus is blasphemous although the Muslim Jesus's picture is not dissimilar to that found in the Gospels. He is « the patron saint of asceticism, the lord of nature, a miracle worker, a healer, a moral, spiritual and social role model » (Hasan. New Statesman) And both Jesus and his mother are revered by Islam. However, owing to the formulation of the concept of the Trinity, Christianity deliberately made Jesus a controversial prophet, but Islam corrected that in the form of an interrogation of Jesus by God in these Quranic verses: « And when God will say: 'O Jesus, son of Mary, did you say to the people, 'take me and my mother as gods besides God?' ». Jesus distanced himself from what his community held of him: « he will say 'Glory be to you, it was not for me to say what I had no right [to say] ! If I had said it, you would have known it » (5:116)

With regard to the fate of Islam, some Bible teachers confirm Islam will serve as the end time world religion of the Antichrist. This supposition seems unvalid for many theologians because most Muslims are well-informed about the features of the Antichrist from the Hadiths of their Prophet, sot hey cannot be confused and think he is the Mahdi they are waiting for. Even the appearance of the Mahdi is held by a small number of Muslims most of whom are Shiites. In the Bible, he is of Roman descent; so, it is unlikely for a European leader to rule the Muslim world. The other reason that proves Islam cannot be the religion utilized by the Antichrist is that the Bible referred to Catholicism when citing the Antichrist. The teachings of Revelation 17 also refer to a religion presented by a whore pictured seating on seven mountains, possibly Rome but not Islam.

Conclusion

Throughout the Western world today, it's no longer simply the traditional Left/Right questions of economics that divide people. Today, the question of a Muslim threat to Europe's historical identity as a Christian/secular culture is much more fundamental to the European political landscape. Tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims are clearly on the rise, and not only due to some more or less racist or anti-immigrant feelings. The behavior of some refugees from Muslim countries (assaults, rapes,

hooliganism), and even some Muslim communities in Europe (advocacy for terrorism, attempts to impose Sharia law) led to the dire predictions that the situation will most likely get worse, much worse. Enoch Powell predicted irrational inter-racial violence on Britain's streets, but Samuel Huntington foretold a deliberate civilizational destruction. With the continuous revival of the spirit of Islam in Europe under all conditions and contexts, the great liberal dream of a secularised "Western Islam" has not worked out as the liberals hoped. Those who understood Islam and its assertiveness always knew it never would. The blame is put on Muslim immigration and Islamic terrorism whenever the topic of Islam's future in Western Europe is discussed. The future of religion in Britain is in black majority churches and Islam, according to a leading expert in religious trends (Gledhill. ''Christian Today'') Because of militant Islam, many European cities are now in a security lockdown. The European leaders who accepted the transformation of parts of their countries into enemy territories see that a demographic disaster is taking place, and are worried that, in two or three decades, Europe will be ruled by Islam. While some think that radicalization is the bitter fruit of the exclusion of certain communities, others believe it is inherent in Islam. While many said that terrorists are not really Muslims, and that the attacks had nothing to do with Islam, others continue to see Islam as the real threat. Despite increasing threats, Europeans think their leaders want them to get used to Islamic terrorism as a fact of life. And despite increasing threats, Islam persists and imposes itself in unwelcoming regions.

Many solutions were suggested to avoid an Islamic future for Europe, but were so simple that none of them seemed able to change the current crisis. Europeans who think that they will simply expel all Muslims from Europe or manage to eliminate Islam from Europe are deluded. Neither Muslim immigrants nor Islam itself will ever leave Europe. At least, Muslims holding European citizenships or local/native converts to Islam are simply not possible to expel. Those immigrants are in Europe to stay, and will inevitably climb the social ladder even if right now they are at the bottom. Owing to their social drive which is much stronger and their family, tribal, ethnic and religious ties which are much dynamic, the social power of the Muslim community will inevitably grow. Those who are trying to artificially create a clash of civilization will not succeed because European Muslims proved to be the most loyal and peaceful citizens. Muslims or

rumours about Muslims who want to create some kind of Caliphate in Europe do not exist for the sole reason that many of them fled their own country precisely to avoid living in a Takfiri "Caliphate". While the European political class is split into two equally misguided political camps: those who think that any criticism of Muslims is "Islamophobic" and those who think that all Muslims and Islam are bad; eschatology is definite about the victory of Islam as the last religion for the whole world, and reality shows there is one "Islam" or a single type of "Muslim" who will always attract lovers of truth and justice even if the world of Islam is extremely diverse.

General Conclusion

The Islamic demands for the recognition of their religious rights, equality, representation in government institutions, and the acknowledgement of Islamic Sharia Laws, and Islamic customs are said to gradually be imposed and implemented in the European states which have hosted a considerable number of Muslims with the passage of time. This is happening in most European nations today, notably amongst the members of the British society. This resurgence of Islam overseas is arousing worries about the step-by-step Islamization of Britain. The slow but steady infiltration of Islam into the British culture has generated a great deal of perplexity among the academic and public circles, the policy makers, the media, sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and politicians. For some, it seemed sudden; for others it appeared anticipated. It was so tempting that it was given a number of names that ranged from the return to religion, fundamentalism, the beginning for the battle of God, Islamic revival, Islamification, political Islam, Islamism and so on. By and large, this recent phenomenon of Islamic revitalization in Western Europe is also regarded as an omen of a different future for Humankind. What has changed to rekindle this Islamic fervour ; in other words, what are the driving forces which have aided the advancement of Islam, and what are its effects both on Muslims and worldwide are the problematics addressed by this research.

The theme of Islam viewed as the faith and ideology which had defined Europe culturally, by showing Europe's very identity through what it was against must be aimful. Islam, which did much to geographically define Europe, is now helping to undo that. To counter the threat from the civilization it once dominated, Europe cannot close its gates for the waves of Muslims migrating as refugees of wars or escaping their states' collapse and poverty. The idea of keeping the Muslim influx under control seemed possible, but it is simply impractical in a world of increasing human interactions. Thinking about the swift advance of Islam in most Western Europe and the challenge whether the West does have a meaning beyond geography along with the possible response of the West toward that make the theme a topical, timely and tempting one.

The objective is not to paint Islam as a rosy religion, but the return to the Islamic roots and clinging to them among the Muslim community of contemporary Britain – which makes Islam on the rise – remains the controlling question. The purpose of this study is to draw up the possible reasons for the recent resurgence of Islam in Britain. As Islam will possibly continue to pose problems to the West, the aim of this study is also to analyse the impacts of the spread of Islam and of the demands of Muslim revivalists. How Islamic revivalism is viewed and what it may lead to are investigated, too.

The approach is descriptive and eclectic in order to capture the reality of this recent phenomenon that serves as an attraction to billions of people all over the world. To paint a vivid picture of the range of reasons why some British people choose Islam; reports and studies of universities and religious centres, personal blogs, newspaper articles, and the individuals' own stories are used. In all manner of ways, the universalist spirit and racial egalitarianism of Islam as well as its moral values and specific social behaviour are presented. In spite of the bewildering variety of the ideological and cultural choices contained in the faith's different strains and referred to in the research paper as part of the attempt to prove whether these Islamic movements and organizations do contribute to the resurgence of Islam in Britain, some British people keep impressed by the general quality of Islam and say their interest was a self-conscious move most of the time - a chance encounter, an end point of a search for truth, or a result of the irresistible appeal of the divine principles of Islam.

Very few works have addressed the issues of revival though both Islam and Christianity have their own understanding of the concept « revival ». The Christian perspective says that it is a time of repentance and reuniting with God, a re-encounter with God, an extraordinary movement of the Holy Spirit, and when a community of the faithful responds to God's message. While in the minds of many Christians, the word revival is used simply to refer to evangelistic meetings, the revival prayer, a product of the Holy Spirit's work, and an event that may lead to reform; in Islam, despite the fact that Allah would assuredly guard this faith which would rise with or without the help of its adherents, certain individuals from the umma, especially towards the end of each century, would be selected by Allah to revive the religion. It also concerns the necessity to purify aspects of it that have become corrupt so as to keep it firm till the Day of

Judgement. The first chapter of the present paper sought to deeply define and theorize the concept in the Islamic tradition in order to avoid possible confusion with the Christian church's meaning for the term.

Before discussing the roots and perceptions of Islamic revival in contemporary Britain, it was necessary to first look at the reasons and conditions of the penetration of Islam in Britain. The second chapter aimed at drawing a picture for that. The first Muslims of Britain were referred to as "a sect of Mahomatens" who may have gone there as early as the seventh century, and who inhabited London in the sixteenth century. The following century witnessed a few conversions to Islam and the first English version of the Qur'an. Britain's Muslim population were mainly immigrants pushed by conditions such as recruitement to work for the East India Company, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the division of British India into Pakistan and India, the construction of the Mangla Dam and others; yet, the aim was the same – search of a better material life. When some of the most privileged British people in the late Victorian era embraced Islam, this was met with curiosity rather than hostility. Britain's Muslims were not missionaries, but the lure of Islam represented by their simplicity, peace and spirituality appealed to the British. Although a high percentage of Muslims choose their national identity as British, the increase in the Muslim population is alarming to many policy makers who are afraid of the rapid spread of Islam in their country. Almost half of the Muslim population lives in the most deprived areas of Britain; they are more loyal and feel more British than some Britons. British Muslims also appreciate their ability to practise their religion in Britain, but the non-Muslim British citizens view them as a threat, potential enemies, suicide bombers, outsiders, extremists and continue to give them negative depictions. The marginalization of Muslims led to talks about the failure of multiculturalism, but this could by no means lead to Islam retreating to the margins. The increasing influence of Islam is reflected in the highly educated and professionally successful British men and women converting to the faith with many converting to Islam even in prison. Viewed as a moral religion, Islam has attracted many people from Christianity. Many politicians, by contrast, view Islam's growth in the context of becoming a challenge to Christian Britain.

Although much of the growth has initially occurred through immigration, it turned to be the result of other factors including the higher birth rate, increasing conversion, and emphasis on Islamic education for the British born generations. The third chapter of this research sheds light on the possible inducements that made the British Muslim community revive Islam. It revealed that the root causes have contributed equally to the revitalization of the faith in the UK, and ranged from the country specific motives such as the publication of The Satanic Verses, the Islamophobic sentiments, discrimination, and Britain's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan along with its alliance with Israel against Palestine. Muslims of Britain were also unified to make Islam advance in response to some international issues notably imperialism, secularism, globalization, the 9/11 events, the Danish cartoons and the worldwide decadent societies of non-Muslims. The resurgence of Islam was also because of its religious content and values, its tolerance, and its power of appeal and capacity to meet the spiritual and material needs of the people of whatever religion and culture.

In the fourth chapter, the challenges that are facing Islam from within and from the wider world in addition to the critical problems and tensions within the British Muslim community were discussed. Many British people believed that Muslims have failed to integrate in Britain, prefer to live in isolated communities, and they were not beneficial to their country. In the aftermath of attacks in Britain, Islamophobia was worsening in the UK. Policies and statements by politicians, commentators and public figures were increasing the risk of hate crime. Many British Muslims were identified as terrorists; therefore, British people support Britain's policies in the Middle East and its continued military involvement against Isis. Views that Islam is inherently violent, and that through the aspects of Shari'a law which will be in force in Britain, the faith will make a negative force there made most of the worries of British citizens. The need to defend their values more than ever pushed some British people to begin a wave of attacks and draw a wider circle of anti-Muslim prejudice on Muslims who; in spite of the enormous social mobility barriers, harsh counterterror measures and depressing political reactions, asserted both their Muslim and British identities, and expressed a strong sense of work ethic, high resilience and mostly a desire to succeed. The growing presence of Islam within the British society went on, unhampered by all of that.

The growing Muslim population is indicative of Britain's troubling future for some Britons. The statement that there will be a clash of civilizations between Muslims and native white Britons has not yet proved right. There is a generational struggle that is taking place in modern Britain. In contrast to old Britons, a slow movement of change in levels of racial prejudice is expressed by younger citizens. And among Muslims, more confidence and defence of religious identity is expressed by younger members of the community than the rest of the older ones. The fifth chapter of the paper discussed the prospects of Islam's resurgence in contemporary Britain. The possibility of a clash of civilization, both the British and Muslim visions of their future with faith in Britain, and what the scriptures said about the last day's religion are re-examined. None of the predictions that Britain will be a bloody Islamified region, that Islam will be westernized, or that Muslims will surpass Britons demographically have seen the light of day.

In light of the ongoing curiosity about Muslim life in British society and beyond the usual concerns around integration, particularly the very high priority the faith gives to the sanctity of life, Muslim charity, the good understanding of the Islamic traditions from public practice, returning a deposit to its owner and keeping a promise; the resurgence of Islam is the undoubtable follow-up. While the battle for British Islam seems to be gained naturally, other sides work hard to hinder it from its very possible triumph: the right wing press, some opinion polls, some politicians' claims and their policies, talks about Islamist extremists and Jihadist groups' attacks and so forth.

In face of a resurgent Islam there is always a resurgent Islamophobia following some atrocities carried out across the world in the name of Islam, leading to the questioning of Muslims' loyalty to the UK even if it is three centuries since they first arrived on that island. Paradoxically, these Islamophobic sentiments offered insights about how it is necessary for the people to know Islam, why it could be a danger, what its values and teachings are about, what it forbids and what for and other related issues. In other words, they also served as a fascinating window into the Islamic culture and values.

Initially comments on the slow rise of the Muslim community were usually couched in the language of immigration policies, multiculturalism and birth rates which failed to convince observers of the Islamic revival issue; but today they are often centred on the idea of "British values". This shift in emphasis on the British values becomes clear only

when it concentrates on counter-radicalization and the control of education through alienating religion from schooling which are assumed to reduce the incompatibility with the Islamic values. However, the Islamic character of the British Muslim community did not clash with any of these values despite the ambiguity of their Britishness and their specific content. British Muslims believe there is always common ground between Islamic principles and other man-made ones as long as they serve the community where they live together.

Islam's steady rise in the UK, which is slowly becoming Sharia related, is considered as problematic or threatening for many Britons, notably those concerned by the future of church. The financial security and comfortable life British Muslims supposedly enjoy are watched with envy by some British citizens dissatisfied by austerity. Nevertheless, younger generations agree that Islam threatens to change the British way of life, but think that is what makes it such a positive thing about Islam. Other faiths could have done the same, but it seems that Islam is greater. Although Islam suffers from critical problems such as the fundamental tensions within it, there is only one public Islam and one simple Islamic message that attract the rest of non-Muslim members of the society. Britain is in the midst of not only a generational but also an intellectual revolution in terms of coexistence with Islam.

The landscape of research about British Muslims has seen an increasing number of British Muslims conducting qualitative fieldwork. The subjective experience of some of these individuals cannot be reliable, nor could it be generalized to other areas in Britain where the result could be different. Another limitation of detailed generalization is that the participants in these surveys are members of the same ethnic group or the same Islamic trend whose views and experiences are not necessarily the same. Research on a topic where one has a personal stake is equally limited when participants are outsiders expected to map the impact of their identity upon the field. Thematic analysis is most appropriate when dealing with issues related to faith, inter-faith dialogue, ideologies, foreign policies, ethnicities and identity politics. Qualitative methodologies fit best the research on Islamophobia, counter-extremism, interfaith marriage, attitudes towards Islam, citizenship issues, cultural ethnocentrism, Islam's challenges in the UK, evaluation of media portrayals and so on; but these are mainly conducted through quantitative

methods. Future research can therefore look at the topic from psychological or philosophical perspectives with more emphasis on the quality of findings. It can also be a kind of comparative studies checking the experiences of other religious groups living in the UK and their coexistence with its Muslims.

Glossary of Arabic and Islamic Terms

- Allah: Arabic name for the One God. Also used by Arab Christians and Jews. Allah is the sameGod for Muslims, Jews, and Christians

- AllahuAkbar : means "God is greater" in Arabic, should be known as a celebration of life, not death and destruction. It is the first sentence of Muslim call for prayer

- Aqeedah : creed and belief. It is the foundation of the religion. As Aqeedah is most important part of Islam and of a muslim life, it has been dealt very clearly in quranicAyats and ahadith. There are six basic Aqeeda or article of faith (Iman) and these are to believe in Allah, His angels, His Books, His Messengers, in coming to life after death (resurrection) the Day of Judgment, and in that the fate good and bad is predetermined by Allah.

- Bid'ah: innovations in Islam. In comparison to the English understanding, the Arabic phrase carries primarily negative connotations since traditionalists see no need for Islam to be reformed or innovated. There are, however, positive connotations to the term as well if it fits with the respective situation and time

- Da'wah: Call or invitation to Islam. It is sometimes translated as 'missionary activity'.

- Dhikr: Remembrance of God, making mention of God. Spiritual method of invocation.

- Dua: Individual prayers to God, supplications.

- Emir: Commander or leader. Also known as high-ranking religious authority/ shaykh.

- Fatwā: (fatāwā (plural) – is a juristic ruling of an Islamic scholar which is based on the Qur'an and Sunnah which adopts particular fiqh methods in order to establish this ruling. In Sunni-Islam, fatāwā are not binding, whereas in Shia-Islam, some rulings could be seen as binding depending on the relationship between the candidate and the scholar.

- Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence.

- Fitnah: It can have several different definitions: Situations in chaos, negative deeds of people, upheaval, spreading doubts towards one's faith

- Hadith: A narration, primarily contributed to the saying and actions of the prophet Muhammad, however, it also refers to sayings of his companions and his wives.

- Hajj: Pilgrimage. Fifth pillar of Islam.

- Ḥalāl: Anything permissible under Islamic guidelines which includes behaviour, speech, dress, conduct, manners, dietary laws. Ḥalāl foods are, for example, foods which are permitted under Islamic dietary laws.

- Hijab: A hijab is a head- and neck covering for the Muslim woman, but also known as "curtain" which could be interpreted as separation of something or someone.

- Hijra: The Prophet's exodus with some of his companions to Medina. Alsoknown as the Islamiccalendaringstart.

- Ihyaa : revival

- Ijtihād : in Arabic means effort. In Islamic law, the independent or original interpretation of problems not precisely covered by the Qurʾān, Hadith (traditions concerning the Prophet Muhammad's life and utterances), and ijmāʿ (scholarly consensus). In the early Muslim community every adequately qualified jurist had the right to exercise such original thinking, mainly in the form of raʾy (personal judgment) and qiyās (analogical reasoning), and those who did so were termed mujtahids.

- Imam: Leader in public prayer.

- Iman: translates from Arabic into English as 'faith.' The Iman is the inner conviction which is connected to one's external actions. Translating Iman with faith remains difficult since Iman does not entail an assumption of something but a certainty which is based on knowledge. Consequently, in Islam one testifies that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger. It is a central organizingprinciple in Islam.

- Insha'Allah: Commonly used expression, meaning 'God willing'.

- Islah : reform

- Jamaat: Group of people, community.

- Jihad: Literally, exerting or striving. The individual striving to perfection in control of him-/ herself, doing good deeds and abstaining from evil ones.

- Jiziah :a per capita yearly tax historically levied by Islamic states on certain non-Muslim subjects—dhimmis—permanently residing in Muslim lands under Islamic law. Muslim jurists required adult, free, sane males among the dhimma community to pay the jizya, while exempting women, children, elders, handicapped, the ill, the insane, monks, hermits, slaves, and musta'mins—non-Muslim foreigners who only temporarily reside in Muslim lands.

- Kafir/ kuffar: Unbeliever(s).

- Khalifa : (Caliph) is the chosen one or elected one to lead or to guide people to the righteous path for the sake of Allah. There were four (4) caliphs of Prophet Mohammed pbuh: Abu Bakrpbuh (Father in law of prophet Mohammed pbuh), Umar Farooqpbuh (Father in law of prophet Mohammed pbuh), Uthmanpbuh (son in law of prophet Mohammed pbuh), and Ali pbuh (first Cousin and also son in law of prophet Mohammed pbuh)

- Khawaja : an honorific title used across the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia, particularly towards Sufi teachers. The word comes from the Iranian word khwāja and translates as master, or lord.

- Kufr: Reference to the rejection of the Muslim belief in One God, the denial of the prophecy of Muhammad and the Qur'an as God's revelation.

- Madhab : is a school of thought within fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). In the first 150 years of Islam, there were numerous madhahib, most of which have become extinct or merged with other schools.

- Maslaq : Order or tariqa. It is a synonym for the term madhab or way or school of thought. Thus if someone claims to follow the teachings or ways of Imam Abu Hanifa, his maslak or madhab would be termed Hanafi.

- Mujaddid : revivalist or renewer

- Muezzin : Muslim caller for the prayer

- Niqab: A veil that covers the face which some women wear as part of their jilbab/ abaya.

- Quraysh : were a mercantile Arab tribe that historically inhabited and controlled Mecca and its Ka'aba. The Islamic prophet Muhammad was born into the BanuHashim clan of the Quraysh tribe.

- Ramadan: The obligatory month of fasting for Muslims, fourth pillar of Islam.

- Revert: Muslim convert, a person who has returned to his/ her faith.

- Sadaqa: means voluntary charity or doing a good deed. It differs from the zakāt which is obligatory to every Muslim as long as he/ she can afford to give.

- Salafyah : Ascription to the SalafiManhaj which is considered as the correct Islam and saved sect following the Companions [Sahaabah] and those who followed after them [At-Taabi3een] and the Virtuous Generations [QuroonulMufadilah] in Aqeedah and Understanding [Fahm] and Etiquettes [Sulook].

- Shahada: The Islamic creed of faith in the Oneness of God and in Muhammad as His final messenger. First pillar of Islam.

- Shi'ite: The second largest branch in Islam, also known as Shia, meaning 'follower of Ali', 'faction or party of Ali'.

- Shari'ah: literally, path. Divine law derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah.

- Sufi: A Muslim mystic, considering the inner, mystical dimensions of Islam.

- Sunnah: Literally habit, path, manner. The Sunnah includes the actions and sayings of the prophet Muhammad, his companions and his wives as well as certain scholarly opinions and fatawa (a matter of Islamic jurisprudence).

- Sunni: The largest branch in Islam.

- Surah: Chapter of the Qur'an.

- Tajdid : renewal

- Takfir: Accusation of heresy. Often also used as a label for those deemed incorrectly practising Islam.

- Taqlīd : Imitation. Conformity to legal precedent, traditional behavior, and doctrines. Often juxtaposed by reformers with ijtihad, and independent reasoning.

- Tawhid : is the defining doctrine of Islam. It declares absolute monotheism—the unity and uniqueness of God as creator and sustainer of the universe.

- Ummah: Group, nation, used particularly in the Qur'an to refer to the universal Muslim community.

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Appendices

Appendix I

Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001.

CNN.Com. September 21, 2001 Posted: 2:27 AM EDT (0627 GMT)

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President Pro Tempore, members of Congress, and fellow Americans, in the normal course of events, presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the union. Tonight, no such report is needed; it has already been delivered by the American people.

We have seen it in the courage of passengers who rushed terrorists to save others on the ground. Passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. And would you please help me welcome his wife Lisa Beamer here tonight

We have seen the state of our union in the endurance of rescuers working past exhaustion.

We've seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers in English, Hebrew and Arabic.

We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own.

My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of union, and it is strong.

Tonight, we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.

I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time.

All of America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of this Capitol singing "God Bless America."

And you did more than sing. You acted, by delivering $40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military. Speaker Hastert, Minority Leader Gephardt, Majority Leader Daschle and Senator Lott, I thank you for your friendship, for your leadership and for your service to our country.

And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of support.

America will never forget the sounds of our national anthem playing at Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate.

We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo.

We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America.

Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own. Dozens of Pakistanis, more than 130 Israelis, more than 250 citizens of India, men and women from El Salvador, Iran, Mexico and Japan, and hundreds of British citizens.

America has no truer friend than Great Britain. (APPLAUSE) Once again, we are joined together in a great cause.

I'm so honored the British prime minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity with America.

Thank you for coming, friend.

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning.

Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking, "Who attacked our country?"

The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are some of the murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS Cole.

Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money, its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.

The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.

The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children. This group and its leader, a person named Osama bin Laden, are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

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There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries.

They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction. The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan we see al Qaeda's vision for the world. Afghanistan's people have been brutalized, many are starving and many have fled.

Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough. The United States respects the people of Afghanistan -- after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid -- but we condemn the Taliban regime.

It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists.

By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder. And tonight the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban:

-- Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land.

-- Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned.

-- Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country.

-- Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities.

-- Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.

These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion.

The Taliban must act and act immediately.

They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate. I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah.

The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself.

The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them.

Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.

It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and efeated.

Americans are asking "Why do they hate us?"

They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.

They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us because we stand in their way.

We're not deceived by their pretenses to piety.

We have seen their kind before. They're the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies. Americans are asking, "How will we fight and win this war?"

We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.

Now, this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert operations secret even in success.

We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest.

And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.

From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. Our nation has been put on notice, we're not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security.

These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight, I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me, the Office of Homeland Security. And tonight,

I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend, Pennsylvania's Tom Ridge.

He will lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism and respond to any attacks that may come. These measures are essential. The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it and destroy it where it grows.

Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents, to intelligence operatives, to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our prayers. And tonight a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I have called the armed forces to alert, and there is a reason.

The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud.

This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.

We ask every nation to join us.

We will ask and we will need the help of police forces, intelligence service and banking systems around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded with sympathy and with support -- nations from Latin America to Asia to Africa to Europe to the Islamic world.

Perhaps the NATO charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America's side.

They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror unanswered can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments.

And you know what? We're not going to allow it.

Americans are asking, "What is expected of us?"

I ask you to live your lives and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat.

I ask you to uphold the values of America and remember why so many have come here.

We're in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith.

I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your contributions. Those who want to give can go to a central source of information, Libertyunites.org, to find the

names of groups providing direct help in New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia. The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it. I ask for your patience with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security and for your patience in what will be a long struggle.

I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity; they did not touch its source.

America is successful because of the hard work and creativity and enterprise of our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11, and they are our strengths today.

And finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families, for those in uniform and for our great country. Prayer has comforted us in sorrow and will help strengthen us for the journey ahead. Tonight I thank my fellow Americans for what you have already done and for what you will do.

And ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, I thank you, their representatives, for what you have already done and for what we will do together.

Tonight we face new and sudden national challenges. We will come together to improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights and take new measures to prevent hijacking.

We will come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying with direct assistance during this emergency

We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home.

We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act and to find them before they strike.

We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's economy and put our people back to work.

Tonight, we welcome two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers, Governor George Pataki and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.

As a symbol of America's resolve, my administration will work with Congress and these two leaders to show the world that we will rebuild New York City.

After all that has just passed, all the lives taken and all the possibilities and hopes that died with them, it is natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear.

Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead and dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by them.

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As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror. This will be an age of liberty here and across the world.

Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment.

Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom, the great achievement of our time and the great hope of every time, now depends on us.

Our nation, this generation, will lift the dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail.

It is my hope that in the months and years ahead life will return almost to normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines and that is good.

Even grief recedes with time and grace.

But our resolve must not pass. Each of us will remember what happened that day and to whom it happened. We will remember the moment the news came, where we were and what we were doing.

Some will remember an image of a fire or story or rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever.

And I will carry this. It is the police shield of a man named George Howard who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others.

It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. It is my reminder of lives that ended and a task that does not end.

I will not forget the wound to our country and those who inflicted it. I will not yield, I will not rest, I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people. The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.

Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice, assured of the rightness of our cause and confident of the victories to come.

In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom and may he watch over the United States of America. Thank you.

Appendix II

The full text of Prime Minister Tony Blair's speech on the London bombings, delivered at the Labour Party national conference on Saturday, 16 July 2005

BBC News. Page last updated at 14:53 GMT, Saturday, 16 July 2005 15:53 UK

"The greatest danger is that we fail to face up to the nature of the threat we are dealing with. What we witnessed in London last Thursday week was not an aberrant act.

It was not random. It was not a product of particular local circumstances in West Yorkshire.

Senseless though any such horrible murder is, it was not without sense for its organisers. It had a purpose. It was done according to a plan. It was meant.

What we are confronting here is an evil ideology.

It is not a clash of civilisations - all civilised people, Muslim or other, feel revulsion at it. But it is a global struggle and it is a battle of ideas, hearts and minds, both within Islam and outside it.

This is the battle that must be won, a battle not just about the terrorist methods but their views. Not just their barbaric acts, but their barbaric ideas. Not only what they do but what they think and the thinking they would impose on others.

Religious ideology

This ideology and the violence that is inherent in it did not start a few years ago in response to a particular policy. Over the past 12 years, Al-Qaeda and its associates have attacked 26 countries, killed thousands of people, many of them Muslims.

They have networks in virtually every major country and thousands of fellow travellers. They are well-financed. Look at their websites.

They aren't unsophisticated in their propaganda. They recruit however and whoever they can and with success.

Neither is it true that they have no demands. They do. It is just that no sane person would negotiate on them.

They demand the elimination of Israel; the withdrawal of all Westerners from Muslim countries, irrespective of the wishes of people and government; the establishment of effectively Taleban states and Sharia law in the Arab world en route to one caliphate of all Muslim nations.

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We don't have to wonder what type of country those states would be. Afghanistan was such a state. Girls put out of school.

Women denied even rudimentary rights. People living in abject poverty and oppression. All of it justified by reference to religious faith.

The 20th century showed how powerful political ideologies could be. This is a religious ideology, a strain within the world-wide religion of Islam, as far removed from its essential decency and truth as Protestant gunmen who kill Catholics or vice versa, are from Christianity. But do not let us underestimate it or dismiss it.

Those who kill in its name believe genuinely that in doing it, they do God's work; they go to paradise.

'Legitimate targets'

From the mid 1990s onwards, statements from Al-Qaeda, gave very clear expression to this ideology: "Every Muslim, the minute he can start differentiating, carries hatred towards the Americans, Jews and Christians. This is part of our ideology. The creation of Israel is a crime and it has to be erased.

"You should know that targeting Americans and Jews and killing them anywhere you find them on the earth is one of the greatest duties and one of the best acts of piety you can offer to God Almighty. Just as great is their hatred for so-called apostate governments in Muslim countries. This is why mainstream Muslims are also regarded as legitimate targets".

At last year's (Labour) party conference, I talked about this ideology in these terms.

Its roots are not superficial, but deep, in the madrassas of Pakistan, in the extreme forms of Wahabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia, in the former training camps of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; in the cauldron of Chechnya; in parts of the politics of most countries of the Middle East and many in Asia; in the extremist minority that now in every European city preach hatred of the West and our way of life.

This is what we are up against. It cannot be beaten except by confronting it, symptoms and causes, head-on. Without compromise and without delusion.

The extremist propaganda is cleverly aimed at their target audience. It plays on our tolerance and good nature.

It exploits the tendency to guilt of the developed world, as if it is our behaviour that should change, that if we only tried to work out and act on their grievances, we could lift this evil, that if we changed our behaviour, they would change theirs. This is a misunderstanding of a catastrophic order.

Their cause is not founded on an injustice. It is founded on a belief, one whose fanaticism is such it can't be moderated. It can't be remedied. It has to be stood up to.

And, of course, they will use any issue that is a matter of dissent within our democracy. But we should lay bare the almost-devilish logic behind such manipulation.

'Callous indifference'

If it is the plight of the Palestinians that drives them, why, every time it looks as if Israel and Palestine are making progress, does the same ideology perpetrate an outrage that turns hope back into despair?

If it is Afghanistan that motivates them, why blow up innocent Afghans on their way to their first ever election? If it is Iraq that motivates them, why is the same ideology killing Iraqis by terror in defiance of an elected Iraqi government?

What was September 11, 2001 the reprisal for? Why even after the first Madrid bomb (in March 2004) and the election of a new Spanish government, were they planning another atrocity when caught?

Why if it is the cause of Muslims that concerns them, do they kill so many with such callous indifference?

We must pull this up by its roots. Within Britain, we must join up with our Muslims community to take on the extremists. Worldwide, we should confront it everywhere it exists.

Next week I and other party leaders will meet key members of the Muslim community. Out of it I hope we can get agreed action to take this common fight forward. I want also to work with other nations to promote the true face of Islam worldwide.

Round the world, there are conferences already being held, numerous inter-faith dialogues in place but we need to bring all of these activities together and give them focus.

Defeating the threat

We must be clear about how we win this struggle. We should take what security measures we can. But let us not kid ourselves.

In the end, it is by the power of argument, debate, true religious faith and true legitimate politics that we will defeat this threat.

That means not just arguing against their terrorism, but their politics and their perversion of religious faith. It means exposing as the rubbish it is, the propaganda about America and its allies wanting to punish Muslims or eradicate Islam.

It means championing our values of freedom, tolerance and respect for others. It means explaining why the suppression of women and the disdain for democracy are wrong.

The idea that elected governments are the preserve of those of any other faith or culture is insulting and wrong. Muslims believe in democracy just as much as any other faith and, given the chance, show it.

We must step up the urgency of our efforts. Here and abroad, the times the terrorists have succeeded are all too well known.

Less known are the times they have been foiled. The human life destroyed we can see. The billions of dollars every nation now spends is huge and growing. And they kill without limit.

They murdered over 50 innocent people (in London) last week. But it could have been over 500. And had it been, they would have rejoiced.

The spirit of our age is one in which the prejudices of the past are put behind us, where our diversity is our strength. It is this which is under attack. Moderates are not moderate through weakness but through strength. Now is the time to show it in defence of our common values."

APPENDIX III

Prof. Humayun Ansari. The 'Muslim World' in British Historical Imaginations.Inaugural Lecture, Royal Holloway University of London. 8th February 2010.

When I came to Royal Holloway thirty years ago to begin my doctoral research, I could not possibly have predicted that the then well-established and widely-accepted concepts of the 'Muslim world' and the 'West' would become such highly contested notions. The 'Muslim world' was generally taken for granted, albeit as something that was geographically bounded, inferior and essentially different from the West. Arguably, British historical writing – or at least the majority of it, particularly during Britain's imperial phase – reflected the power relations with Muslim societies. Now, three decades later, it is 'Islamophobia' (reflecting the existing climate of widespread fear and hostility towards Islam and Muslims) and 'a clash of civilisations' (in which the current war against terror – and by extension Islam – has come to occupy such prominence lately) that both interrogate the dynamics between knowledge and power in today's rapidly globalising context.

Norman Daniel, the widely-respected historian of Islam and Muslims, who published his Western Images of Islam as long ago as 1960, highlighted the political and religious considerations behind distorted western views of Islam, examining Christian-Muslim interaction from medieval times to the modern world. According to him, hostile attitudes and hatreds had become deeply embedded, surfacing from time to time given the right context or conditions. We may or may not go along with all that Daniel proposed, but Edward Said – while agreeing with Daniel – gave his thesis a timely post-modern twist in what became his controversial study, Orientalism, published in 1978 not long before I reinvented myself as a PhD student. And since its publication, Said's many protagonists have argued that a new more sophisticated kind of 'Orientalism' has emerged and continues to shape attitudes in the so-called West.

But, despite the impact of Said's ideas, much of the debate generated by his work has been conducted by non-historians; few of the latter have engaged with Said's argument. Indeed, many of them have dismissed him as being not only confused but also plainly ahistorical. It is this lack of engagement that has prompted me in my lecture this evening to explore how – over time – British historical imaginations have processed or handled Islam and the so-called Muslim world.

* * * * *

As I have just mentioned, since Orientalism's publication in 1978 there has been a great deal of debate about Said's thesis and propositions. His study has provoked much controversy but it has also generated an immense amount of positive intellectual development across many humanities and social sciences disciplines. Said, as is well-known, sought to explore the relationship between power and knowledge; between imperialism and scholarship. He saw

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'Orientalism' as a Western discourse that essentialises the Muslim world in pejorative ways, one that was intimately entwined with imposition of imperial power, offering ideological justifications for it While a wide range of academics have developed or refined Said's framework, others have challenged and, indeed, denounced it, as Robert Irwin puts it, as a perverted muddle of 'malignant charlatanry'. In terms of the production of historical knowledge about the peoples, politics and cultures of the so-called Orient, disagreements have been to do with approaches, sources, and interpretive paradigms. An increasing number of scholars have come to accept that knowledge is socially-constructed and that complex developments contribute towards shaping our understandings of the world. Hence, social and political interests play a significant role in the adoption of one way of construing reality rather than another. Others claim that they tell it like it is; they allow facts to speak for themselves, and have no interest in the social utility of the historical knowledge that they produce. Intellectual curiosity, 'lust for knowing', is apparently their only drive. Bernard Lewis, thus, defended Orientalism as 'pure scholarship', a discipline that strove towards objectivity. On the other hand, A.J. Arberry (who was a government censor during the Second World War) in his compilation, Oriental Essays (1960), while denying that he himself had any political agendas, accepted that politics nonetheless intruded academic scholarship. Indeed, it could be argued that politics is always present, but not necessarily where people claim to locate it since politics has less to do with interactions than actions and results, which are always unpredictable. It is, thus, difficult to put intentions on trial.

Absolute claims such as these demand closer inspection, and so what I want to explore this evening is how far there were scholars who were genuinely 'purely' interested in Islam and Muslim societies and so studied them for their own sake. I want to do this by looking at the places that Islam and Muslims have occupied in British historical imaginations from the outset of the early modern period to the present.

One of the key reasons for examining the past is to uncover the shape of human experience: can we discern any patterns in it, and how can we make sense of it through time? For many centuries, in the context of Britain, 'the march of history' was understood in sacred terms. For Christian writers historical knowledge bore witness to the grand theme of Creation and the Last Judgement. But as Islam spread through the Mediterranean, posing a theological and political threat as it conquered the bastions of Eastern Christendom, the mysterious rise of this 'falsehood' against the truth of Christianity compelled an explanation. How to stem its rising tide and protect Christians and Christendom (and convert Muslims) from this scourge?

The response of medieval and early modern Christian scholars was to create 'a body of literature concerning the faith, its Prophet, and his book, polemic in purpose and scurrilous in tone, designed to protect and discourage rather than to inform'. Attacks on Islam were in part a way of propping up ideological conformity among various Christian denominations, in

Britain as elsewhere. With military power unable to withstand Islamic expansion, refutation through argument and missionary work was considered the best option for overcoming the challenge, for which knowledge of the Muslim adversaries, their beliefs and practices, was considered crucial. In much of this scholarship, a repertoire of Christian legends rather than hard historical evidence about Islam and Muslims, nourished by imaginative fantasies, served the purpose. While the explanations provided were never fully satisfying, writers such as William Bedwell – the so-called father of Islamic studies in England – succeeded in creating a portrait of an exotic, and deluded, 'other' – and hence a negative perception became deeply embedded in the 'British' social imaginary, something that possesses considerable emotional resonance even to this day.

That said, when we look at the early modern period, we find that, in the British Isles at large, there was little awareness of, let alone curiosity about, Muslims – even less so in serious literature. Most of those who had sufficient resources and interest to sponsor Arabic studies were either churchmen (as was the case with most forms of learning, not just this field) or closely aligned with their causes who aimed primarily at producing materials to achieve their own salvation as well as that of wayward Middle Eastern Christians and Muslims. Thomas Adams, a wealthy draper and sometime Lord Mayor of London, created the Chair of Arabic at Cambridge in 1632 in the hope that he might, through his patronage, contribute to converting Muslims. Four years later, William Laud Archbishop of Canterbury and Chancellor of the University of Oxford, established its Professorship in Arabic, primarily as part of the struggle against Catholicism.

It is important to note, however, that in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, those in Europe who studied Islam tended to do so not out of interest in that faith per se, but primarily to pursue intra-confessional polemic. During the Reformation, Islam was frequently used by one group of Christians to criticise another. Protestants were likened to Muslims for deviating from and perverting the true faith. Such developments, of course, need to be located in the context of Ottoman expansion in competition with other European states. It is noticeable though that, while there was considerable conflict between the states, it did not take the form of 'Islamdom' versus 'Christendom'.

The 1600s are credited with having marked the beginning of 'modern' British historical writing. The confident authority of the Christian world view began to crumble as secularised interpretations of history, centred on human rather than divine activity, gained ground. Reason combined with empirical evidence was coming to be accepted as the final authority for deciding what was historically credible. Scholars now increasingly possessed the resources and linguistic potential to investigate more rigorously than before the nature of Muslim beliefs, history, traditions and practices. Hence, writings on Islam became contradictory, reflecting the fragmented views held by Europeans on the subject, influenced

by political thinkers such as Descartes and Spinoza. The old stereotypes were repeated by most writers, but now alongside newer observations that found favourable things in Islam. For example, there was The General Historie of the Turkes (1603) by Richard Knolles. A fear-inducing chronicle, it was filled with accounts of Ottoman atrocities, cruelties and torture. Knolles, like earlier English writers, called the Ottoman Empire the "great terror of the world", Islam the work of Satan and Muhammad a false prophet. But – here is the difference – Knolle also acknowledged Turkish determination, courage, and frugality and the massive 1,200 page account contained much positive information about Muslims, until then considered mortal enemies. Likewise, Edward Pococke's 1649 Specimen Historae Arabum while casting Islam as the religion of the false prophet, managed by deploying Arabic sources and historians to avoid many of the distortions of medieval polemic and presented what was, for its time, a more balanced view of Muslim society. A little later Paul Rycaut, in his The Present State of the Ottoman Empire, drew a picture of Ottoman despotism, unequivocally corrupt and backward, straight out of the old stock of ignorance and fear. But it also recounted accurate, knowledgeable and insightful details of Turkish life and history, of Ottoman political, military, and religious organisation, of the diversity of Islamic beliefs and traditions. In it there was also acknowledgement of mutuality of commercial interests and benefits and admiration of many aspects of Islamic culture. But importantly, having been written by British men, these histories lacked the breadth of understanding of Muslim societies that eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century women observers, such as Lady Mary Wortley Montague and Sophie Lane-Poole, would contribute thanks to what they wrote about spheres of life to which they, as females, had exclusive access.

By the end of the seventeenth century, while the intellectual climate had changed significantly in favour of 'freethinking', both orthodox Christians and so-called 'deviants' continued to critique each other. Humphery Prideaux's 1697 Life of Mahomet aimed to uncover '[t]he true nature of imposture fully displa'd in the life of Mahomet, with a discourse annex'd for the vindication of Christianity from this charge', while Henry Stubbe's anti-Trinitarian tract, Account of the rise and progress of Mahometenism (written in 1671 but not actually published until 1911), trenchantly challenged 'the fabulous inventions of the Christians' in the light of reason, contrasting this with his positive assessment of the life of Muhammad and Islam's rationality. What is particularly interesting is that both these authors used Pococke's work and sources extensively but interpreted them in radically different ways to arrive at opposite poles in their conclusions – one hostile (thanks, it should be added, largely in response to the challenge of Deism rather than Islam), the other sympathetic, to Islam and Muslims. What we see emerging out of these controversies by the eighteenth century are rather more balanced understandings of Islam, for instance Simon Ockley's The History of the Saracens in 1718. Nevertheless, given the religious context in which they were operating, their authors could hardly be expected to write wholly positively of a religion that had proved 'the first ruin of the eastern church'. Ultimately, even Ockley condemned Muhammad as the 'great imposter'.

The late eighteenth century was also a period of transition in British imperial history, and, not surprisingly, this too had an impact on how Islam and Muslims were viewed by contemporaries. The East India Company from the mid-eighteenth century had been steadily establishing dominance in India, often taking power from Muslim rulers in the process, but it was still navigating its way towards finding the right strategies in order to establish firm control. Many who ran the early Company in India admired and appreciated indigenous cultures, saw merit in their history and assimilated. William Robertson was one Enlightenment historian who expressed an early willingness to value Indian culture and society as the development of an equivalent and equally valid civilisation to that of Europe. However, whereas Europe was seen to have 'progressed', India during the Mughal period was perceived to have 'stagnated' in relative terms. Hence, Robertson believed that India should be facilitated but not coerced in its socio-economic and cultural development by a form of imperial rule and commerce that demonstrated respect for India's cultural heritage. This 'development approach' to history associated particularly with the Scottish Enlightenment from the 1750s to the 1790s, concluded that the human record was one of material and moral improvement, of cultural development from 'savagery' and 'barbarism' to 'civilisation', and that their own society stood at the pinnacle of achievement. Since Muslim societies were judged as, at best, semi-barbaric, colonialism – Empire in other words – was justified.

As British imperial expansion progressed, there was a further shift in attitudes to Islam. There was perhaps less prejudice alongside a greater sense of curiosity; so while history continued to be written as a moral tale, critical enquiry gave birth to new historical values. Yet stereotyping persisted. Edward Gibbon while exploring how Christianity ended European classical civilisation in his 1788 History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, imbued Islam with several positive attributes, but his final moral judgement on Muhammad was that the Prophet ended up an ambitious impostor. And whatever its virtues, Gibbon did not want Europe to be over-run by Islam nor the Quran 'taught in the schools of Oxford, her pulpits [demonstrating] to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.' While Gibbon along with another of Britain's most eminent Enlightenment scholars, William Jones were both admirers of Muslim civilisations, they both firmly believed in the superiority of the European, because, for them, Europe had forged ahead in gathering useful knowledge, in its command of 'Reason' and its application of the scientific method – in all these fields, they believed, other peoples lagged far behind. Those who judge Jones's scholarly work as entirely motivated by aesthetic and academic interest really need to look at his life and career more closely, as this reveals him to be not only complex, inconsistent and contradictory but also someone who possessed undoubted utilitarian propensities. Far from being a disinterested Orientalist, in Mukherjee's assessment, Jones was a late eighteenth-century 'liberal imperialist', who had no doubt in his mind about 'the excellence of our constitution, and the character of a perfect king of England' – after all, he served for many years as a judge in British-controlled Calcutta.

Thus, the ways in which British historians of this period analysed, imagined and depicted the so-called 'Orient' were often intertwined in complex ways with growing British power, often

over Muslim peoples. In time, these realities began to shape historical accounts. The Romanticist influence on historical writing was also felt. The 'Orient' attracted interest as it became less threatening while remaining exotic. One key (though not uncontested) element of nineteenth-century thought on the 'Orient' was a particular concentration on the difference between East and West. Islam constituted a distinct type in terms of civilisation, cultural essence and core values – these, many Orientalists of the time believed, shaped a different Muslim consciousness, mind-set and behaviour.

Scottish Enlightenment thinking continued to be the leading intellectual influence. John Malcolm and Mountstuart Elphinstone, both highly instrumental in the extension of British power in India and West Asia, would have seen themselves as no more than subscribing to the forces that drove societies from one stage to another. Both belonged to a broad band of historians comprising conservatives as well as many liberals and radicals, among whom imperial expansion, born out of human enlightenment and effort, and underpinned by utilitarian ideas, became a dominant vision. They were supported by a growing evangelical public sentiment, which viewed Empire as the work of Providence. Notwithstanding their kinship with different schools of thought, all British historians during this period assumed the intellectual and moral superiority of contemporary Great Britain over the Muslim world.

Let us take probably the single most influential work in the early nineteenth century – James Mill's 1817 The History of British India. For Mill, knowledge was nothing if it was not a source of power – a tool of change. Understanding the past was good 'only for the improvement of the future'. Since Indo-Muslim society, a product of despotism, superstition and poverty, given to insecurity and lacking in progress, measured 'lower' in his scale of civilisation, British rule was justified. Similarly, Macaulay, a great admirer of Mill's History, also believed in the benevolent impact of British rule in India and elsewhere. Macaulay's dismissal of, and contempt for, the natives epitomised Saidian 'Orientalism'.

But, while it might be argued that this kind of 'Orientalist' history writing had become hegemonic by the nineteenth century, Said's argument leaves little room for the kind of contestation and contrasting approaches to Islam that were evidently emerging in this period. Take, for instance, the works of Edward Lane, a scholar who was to have an enormous influence on Middle Eastern studies. From Lane's life, it is immediately clear that, in the context of the early nineteenth-century excitement about Egypt, while he remained committed to his own cultural heritage, he became genuinely interested in Egyptian society – its traditions, customs and people – to the point where he adopted an Egyptian lifestyle, dress and language.

While many scholars have levelled charges of 'Orientalism' against Lane – his awareness of his difference from an essentially alien culture, the coded sense of superiority in his major

works, his views regarding the unchanging character of Middle Eastern societies – his biographer, Leila Ahmad, has shown that Lane possessed a relatively accurate and sympathetic understanding of Islam. It is true that he comes across, occasionally, as condescending, patronising, even admonishing, in his best-known An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (first published in 1836), but, when read in the context of his personal interaction, it could be argued that for the most part he strove for and largely succeeded in presenting an account of Egyptian society and its people that was respectful, and one that someone belonging to that culture could broadly accept as authentic and accurate. More usefully, it created a space for British scholars within which emotively-charged and hostile traditions could be more effectively challenged.

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, new perceptions of Muhammad, accompanied by new attitudes to his religion were also emerging. This period was particularly crucial in British historical understanding of Islam, for it was a time when the enduring images of Muhammad as a heretic were juxtaposed with new images of Muhammad a noble figure. In contrast to Said's methodological emphasis on the unity of the Orientalist discourse, what we witness is a considerable plurality of approaches to Islam. Thus, discourse about Islam, at times contradictory, became richer, more diverse and more complex than Said's arguments suggested.

The reasons for this shift were many. Burgeoning knowledge about Islam and increased information made earlier stereotypes less tenable. The demise of Christian apocalypticism and the rise of secular historical method created the Muhammad of history, relegating to the shadows the Muhammad of Christian legend. The Victorian proclivity for great men coupled with their fascination for an exotic East engendered a sympathetic environment for a partial rehabilitation of Muhammad and Islam. And the rise of British power over Muslim lands made for a context in which the Prophet and his religion could be treated more benevolently, even while it continued to encourage and support criticism of its modern expressions.

This juxtaposition is clearly visible in Carlyle's famous lecture on Muhammad, 'Hero as Prophet'. In 1840, after centuries during which Muhammad had been called an imposter, a seducer or worse, he made the 'first strong affirmation in the whole of European literature, medieval or modern of a belief in the sincerity of Muhammad'. And yet, he too, it might be argued, was prone uncritically to deploy 'Orientalist' tropes and attitudes in his rhetoric. Islam for Carlyle remained 'a confused form of Christianity', fit for semi-barbaric Arabs.

So the main assumptions of historical writing at this time remained paternalism and utilitarianism. Both contributed to the British assumption of superiority over the East and to the justification of colonial rule. Hence, William Muir, scholar and colonial administrator around the time of the so-called Indian Mutiny of 1857-58, in his historical works,

consistently denigrated Muhammad and the Qur'an, misrepresented Muslims and undervalued Islam, often through a conscious manipulation of, at times, questionable sources, in order to demonstrate the superiority of Christianity and British culture in justification of colonial dominance. In his Life of Mahomet he concluded, 'the sword of Mahomet, and the Coran are the most fatal enemies of Civilization, Liberty and the Truth which the world has yet known'. In line with Whig interpretations of history, Victorians believed that they were positioned at the pinnacle of human development. Historians did not dispense knowledge of the past for its own sake, or simply to inculcate practical lessons – that is, to sustain British rule. Above all they strove to preach a moral sermon, to hold up the virtues that they believed had won empire in the East and which alone could preserve it.

By the later decades of the nineteenth century, biology, anthropology and other sciences had combined with Maine's demonstration of the historicity of ideas and Darwin's law of natural selection to produce a relative ranking of world civilisations along racial lines. According to these criteria, Muslim societies did not fare well. Britain had developed the highest ideal of social happiness and devised the scientific instrument of law to enforce it. Writing at the zenith of the Imperialist phase in England, William Hunter stressed the importance of national character of the British race – 'adventurous, masterful, patient in defeat and persistent in executing its designs' – as the key to its imperial success. J.R. Seeley's Expansion of England, published in 1883, stated that the study of history could offer lessons for those serving the Empire. Lord Acton, Seeley's successor at Cambridge at the beginning of the twentieth century, likewise considered the making of moral judgements to be the mark of true historical writing. For him, the British Empire possessed an essentially noble purpose – it was a benevolent and progressive force in human history. While Seeley believed in the necessity and moral justification of the continuance of British rule, a question that troubled him was how the British could reconcile the despotism of the Indian Empire with the democracy enjoyed by the colonies of white settlers (and indeed, the British themselves): how Britain could 'be in the East at once the greatest Mussulman Power in the world … and at the same time in the West be the foremost champion of free thought and spiritual religions?'. Well, for such historians, Indian society being un-progressive and perhaps decadent, the important thing was to do Indians good in spite of themselves; to lead India (and the rest of the Empire) with a paternal authoritarian hand. The histories of the period up to 1914 broadly reflected these assumptions.

It is true that this was not invariably the attitude in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – drawing inspiration from Cobbett, Bright and Cobden, scholars such as J.A. Hobson challenged the justifications for imperial rule. Nevertheless, it undoubtedly remained the hegemonic view. The majority of British historians agreed with Seeley's analysis. Re-evaluative trends in British Islamic scholarship were still at an embryonic stage, and thinly veiled disparagement of Islam and Muhammad such as that of David Margoliouth, Professor of Arabic at Oxford, continued to inform influential historical analysis.

However, while Islamic history offered scope to Orientalist scholars to draw favourable comparisons regarding the virtues and truth of Christianity, there had also emerged considerable questioning of the Christian faith and this led to the re-evaluation of both academic and popular attitudes towards other belief-systems. T.W. Arnold, who spent much time in scholarly pursuits in northern India, was part of a small group of historians who presented interpretations of Christian and Muslim cultural history and interaction that challenged the arguments of the orthodox Orientalist paradigm. Both in conception and construction, his 1896 The Preaching of Islam represented a radical departure in British Islamic scholarship. In contrast to reductionist constructions of Islam as monolithic, having only one authentic expression, Arnold affirmed the validity of all the varying and sometimes contradictory currents within it, and concluded in his The Islamic Faith that, since religion was defined by individual understanding and practice of faith, 'no single formula—beyond the brief simple words of the creed—can sum up [Islam's] many diversities'. E.G. Browne too exuded enthusiasm for and empathy with Arab, Persian and Turkish cultures and peoples. A scholar of enormous erudition, he travelled in Persia and his A Year Among the Persians, published in 1893, represented a sympathetic portrayal of Persian society. His monumental Literary History of Persia, which came out in 1902, further valorised its refinements. An adherent of the liberal view of progress in historical development, he became passionately interested in the politics of contemporary Persia, supported the Constitutional Movement and resistance to European imperialist encroachments. Browne's positive analysis in his The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, published in 1910, not only countered the imperialist notions of Persian capriciousness and corruption as essential contributors of lack of progress; of their incapacity for democratic self-government, but also, by means of a 'nationalist [counter] Orientalism', announced the revival of an eastern people whose national character had empowered past historical achievements and might well do so again.

The climate of opinion in early twentieth-century Britain was, thus, simultaneously sympathetic towards and highly suspicious of Muslims. Muslim political activism imposed new demands on British authority, and pan-Islamism became a cause of increasing political concern as conflict with the Ottoman Empire intensified. Muslim aspirations seemed in sharp conflict with British imperial ambitions and political strategic security. These priorities were reflected in literature of the period. Cromer's Modern Egypt (1908), for instance, effectively ignored Egypt's achievements, highlighted its deficiencies through selective use of empirical materials, and offered an unbalanced rationalisation of British imperial rule. What was needed, he suggested, was a system that would 'enable the mass of the population to be governed according to the code of Christian morality'.

The aftermath of the First World War witnessed the revival of the idea of British colonial mission and imperial obligation. The Empire's history as the unfolding of the story of liberty re-emerged as the dominant mode of interpretation. With the break up of the Ottoman Empire,

Britain became much more strategically dominant in the Middle East, responsible for lands that were perceived to be inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. Representing a main trend in British historical writing, historians such as Reginald Coupland still believed in the moral qualities of the British to shape a better world and saw the history and purpose of the Empire as the gradual unfolding of liberty. While not an officer of the Empire he spent much time in its service and he made influential historically rigorous contributions to the debates on the direction of the Empire and imperial policy making.

The post-Second World War years witnessed rapid change and much instability as the pace of decolonisation quickened and the Cold War began. In this context, Asia and Africa increasingly became the battlegrounds. Western governments felt the urgent need for reliable knowledge about critical areas to inform policy-making. But, in the late 1950s and 1960s, scholars such as Richard Southern and the afore-mentioned Norman Daniel showed that it was not so much new positive knowledge that was being produced by disinterested scholars, but rather the diffusion in more refined and complex forms of greatly distorted existing elaborations, creating inaccurate images of Islam and Muhammad, based on dubious sources and distorted readings of texts and scriptures, leading to crude and derogatory assertions.

Take Hamilton Gibb and Bernard Lewis, two towering figures in the field in this period. Their interest in Islam and Muslim peoples' current affairs undoubtedly emanated from their desire to influence policy-makers. Gibb, for instance, was concerned that Western governments were acting largely out of ignorance and it was his belief that understanding of Muslim peoples' beliefs and cultures by careful study of their specific past was essential for effective policy-making. However, the categories he used to organise the knowledge and to interpret Islam and the history of the Muslim peoples are illustrative of what many critics would eventually argue were the grave shortcomings of the Orientalist tradition. For instance, in Modern Trends in Islam (1945), Gibb started from the assumption that there was an unchanging and distinctive Arab or Muslim 'mind' whose nature he could infer from his knowledge of the traditional texts of Islam and which could be implicitly or explicitly contrasted with an equally singular and essentialised 'Western mind'. On this basis Gibb was able to offer sweeping generalisations about the innate deficiencies of Muslims' thought-processes, imagination and ethics that had caused them to stagnate and fail to modernise. According to Irwin, 'As a Christian moralist, [Gibb] was inclined to blame Islam's decline on carnality, greed and mysticism'. Gibb explained Ottoman decline by locating it in its specifically Islamic despotic character. Yet, as Roger Owen has pointed out, Gibb's analysis was largely flawed as his data in fact suggested that in the groups and activities of the Ottoman Empire there was little that could be considered as specifically Islamic – indeed, developments under the Ottomans had close parallels in non-Muslim Europe and Asia. More recently Caroline Finkel has challenged even more convincingly such 'myths' of Ottoman decay.

Bernard Lewis was the other 'big gun' in the field of British scholarship on Islam, and like Gibb, he believed that the Orientalists' deep understanding of Islamic civilisation rendered them uniquely capable of shedding light on policy matters. In 1953, Lewis, in a lecture on "Communism and Islam" at Chatham House, ignoring local contexts and histories, elaborated his conception of Islam, similar to that of Gibb, as a civilisation with a distinct, unique and basically unchanging essence. For Lewis, Islam's core features included an essentially autocratic and totalitarian political tradition that made Communism appealing to Muslims. Lewis accepted that, while Muslims were obliged to resist impious government, their subservience to authority took precedence. This contrasted sharply with 'the spirit of resistance to tyranny and misrule … inherent in the core values of Western civilisation'. This line of argument ignored what Muslims had actually done over the centuries when confronted with impious or tyrannical rule. But such overarching, monolithic, delineations of the 'Islamic civilisation', underpinned by apparently timeless and uniform 'Islamic concepts', became very attractive towards the end of the twentieth century, with Lewis, for instance, pointing to 'a clash of civilisations', in his words, 'the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both'. In such writing, one can indeed see many of the key features of Said's 'Orientalism'.

Gibb and Lewis's ideas, like 'Orientalism' in the Saidian sense more generally, dovetailed modernisation theory, the dominant paradigm from the 1950s to the 1970s. A common set of assumptions about the character and trajectory of historical change, it denoted the process of transition from traditional to modern society as universal, linear and initiated by the West. Why Muslim societies had not modernised according to the Western model, it was argued, had little to do with social, political and economic forces – their legacies of colonialism, continuing foreign domination or economic under development – rather, they had become disoriented because of their essentially static nature, psychological deficiencies and cultural pathologies. Unlike the early modern Europe's insatiable thirst for discovering the 'secrets' of Muslim advances, Muslims seemed uninterested in learning about the sources of Europe's growing strength. Their societies were, therefore, unable to develop the institutions and internal dynamics that might lead to fundamental social transformation from within. Lewis, in his From Babel to Dragomans and The Muslim Discovery of Europe, linked the failure of Muslim societies to modernise with their lack of the spirit of enquiry, their misplaced sense of superiority, and their insularity and hostility towards the West. According to Lewis 'Few Muslims travelled voluntarily to the land of the infidels …The question of travel for study did not arise, since clearly there was nothing to be learned from the benighted infidels of the outer wilderness'. And so, Lewis argued, change had to come from outside. New historical findings, however, challenge such analyses, and show that Muslims were, actually, intensely curious about and fascinated by European societies and peoples in the early modern period. Nabil Matar's work, among others, has demonstrated that Arabic-speaking Muslims were deeply inquisitive about scientific, literary and political developments in 'bilad al-nasara' (the

lands of the Christians) and, like their European counterparts, wrote 'detailed and empirically based' accounts of Europe in the seventeenth century.

Already beginning to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s, this challenging of the framework of interpretation, which had hitherto both shaped historical analyses and conclusions and their perceived complicity with Western power in the Muslim world, brings me to reflect on the current state of play! I would argue that there is still an influential strand in historical writing, buttressed by those who hold reins of power, which links in with 'Orientalist' paradigms and rationalises Western superiority, tutelage and domination. It insists that the modern West remains at the pinnacle of a new hierarchy of human evolution; and that Muslim lands need to follow suit through the enfeeblement of Islam.

Niall Ferguson, for one, offering refurbished Whiggish wisdom, has furnished an historical basis for the current Anglophone liberal imperial project. His writings argue that the British Empire was a powerful force of order, justice and development for much of its existence and built much of the modern world; its paternalistic authoritarian practice of government, through a properly trained and knowledgeable administrative corps competent to dispense fairness and justice, ushered in 'civilisation'/modernisation setting the natives on the path to progress. Alternatives to empire would have involved despotism, endemic disorder and economic decay, and resulted in dangerous instability.

In Ferguson's writing, it would seem, we have come full circle – he offers canards once championed by old imperialists such as Mill and Macaulay. While he agrees with Marx's deterministic approach to the evolution of human history, he, unlike Marx, is much more positively disposed to British rule and argues that the Empire was forced to make painful decisions in pursuit of 'liberal' objectives. Systematically ignoring sources that analyse or present the perspectives of the colonised, there emerges, in Gopal's words, a 'poisonous fairytale' of 'a benign developmental mission' – a pattern that tends to reinforce the prejudices of those whom he seeks to influence. Highly provocative, Ferguson's histories of the British Empire construct the 'lessons' that we are to learn from the 'rise and demise of the British world order'. What are they? As part of the building of a similar empire, the war on Iraq was the right thing to do. For him, ruthlessness in its prosecution was justified: he says, 'what happened at Abu Ghraib prison was no worse than the initiatory "hazing" routine in many army camps and even student fraternities'.

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So what conclusions can we draw from all of these developments? It is very clear that dichotomous notion of the 'clash of civilisations', 'the end of history' and 'liberal international interventionism', while still popular and influential in policy-making circles, are now being challenged from both the contemporary and historical perspectives. On the theoretical level, the category of 'civilisation', while tangible in geopolitical, cultural and

material terms, seems diffuse. In terms of cultures, values or systems of belief, they can be shown to be ever changing and adaptable to new conditions. Hence, unlike conflicts between states, it is difficult to know in what ways civilisations could be construed to 'clash'. Moreover, it is being increasingly argued that 'Islamic civilisation', with distinctly recognisable features, like its Roman and Greek counterparts, has disappeared. Equally, with the globalisation of modernity, 'Western civilisation' also appears to have lost its specifically European character. This line of argument makes the 'clash of civilisations' thesis seem untenable.

Historically too, many scholars today reject the portrayal of the relations and interaction between the so-called Muslim world and the West (both contentious terms because of their homogenising, reductionist and essentialist undertones) as a simple story of perpetual opposition and conflict. They seek to demonstrate historically that civilisations have never been hermetically-sealed separate entities – the shared story of Asia, Africa and Europe, for one, is replete with uninterrupted mutual exchange.

More specifically, Christian and Islamic 'civilisations' are being shown to have interacted fruitfully and to have borrowed from one other with mutually formative effects. The idea of 'multiple modernities' challenges the classical theory of modernisation as a uniquely and specifically European project. 'Oriental globalisation' literature, with its longer time frame, contests this thesis, demonstrating historically that many of the characteristics that are associated with the eighteenth-century British industrial revolution had emerged earlier in China, and that Middle East was ahead of Europe in this period. Thanks to Jardine and Brotton, we are now much more aware of the highly symbiotic relationship between Muslim and other European cultures and the profound influence of developments in Muslim societies on the emergence of European Renaissance and Enlightenment thinking – especially the role of the Ottoman Empire in generating mechanisms that lay behind 'modernisation'. There was, in reality, no monolithic and unitary Europe confronting the Ottoman enemy. Nor was 'Islam' unremittingly ranged against the 'West'. Yes, there were conflicts but there was also trade and the exchange and mingling of ideas, technologies and institutions.

This brings us to the question of how this challenging of the 'Western-centric' paradigm has emerged. Surely much of the answer lies in the changed context and the changing relations and balance of power in today's world and the impact of this on the character of the historical knowledge being produced. Shifts in history writing reflect shifts in world politics, as the West itself is gradually de-centred by multi-centric global processes. Analysis of history writing about the Muslim world in Britain, as I have suggested this evening, reveals that it has always been produced in complex, diverse and non-monolithic ways. Nor, as Said contended more generally in his Orientalism, has it been entirely systematically constructed; there has not been one totalising vision of the West's Islamic 'Other'. British historians could write about the Muslim world 'as often consumed by admiration and reverence as by denigration and depreciation'. But as British power expanded, some came to think of Islam and the

Muslim world as ontologically different from, and inferior to, the 'West'; and many such scholars placed their knowledge at the disposal of the Empire. Others, albeit more commonly at the margins, opposed imperialism or wrote more sympathetically about Islamic cultures and societies, though not necessarily deploying a different interpretive frame from mainstream Orientalists. Yet, individual historians are always products of their pasts as well as their presents. They cannot escape, to quote Bernard Lewis (rather ironically since he seems to exclude himself from this comment), 'the prejudices of their culture and age…Even when writing of the past historians are captive of their own times – in their materials and their methods, their concepts and their concerns.'

Having acknowledged the limitations of British historical writing about the Muslim world, what alternatives are there? Said's critique has undoubtedly helped us to become more acutely and self-critically conscious of the existence of multiple perspectives and the need to consider them in any historical analysis. The empowered, and much more articulate and confidently vocal, Muslim subaltern has contributed to the shifts in historical thinking and approaches. Moving away from global generalities, due attention is now being given to local and regional social and political dynamics, hierarchies of power and historical contexts. Likewise, factoring in the history of women living in Muslim societies into the wider story is being pursued with much more vigour, undermining stereotypes about their past lives (and present realities too).

But, all the same, it appears impossible to escape completely the essentialism that continues to inhere even in current historical epistemologies – a cultural essentialism that, for Said, was the hallmark of 'Orientalism'. For someone in my position, there remains the nagging question as to whether or not I might have become, or at least be regarded as, a native informant? Have I become one of 'us', a product of British academia, part of the crop of new 'Orientalists' who, many argue, has emerged since the publication of Said's Orientalism – someone who (whether they mean to do so or not) ends up applying a Eurocentric gaze that results in the sustaining of old hegemonies and dominances; one who uncovers the supposed mysteries of the 'Muslim world' for the benefit and in the interest of the 'West' – what Spivak calls the 'European discursive production' that continues to influence and shape our knowledge, culture and histories. Or is it possible, I wonder, to be a free-floating, cross-pollinated, historian. In other words, do we remain complicit in the 'Western' project or is it possible to develop instead a transnationally oscillating subjectivity. Taking such questions into account, perhaps all one can do is recognise the existence of discoursive tension within oneself, realise that all one is doing is fashioning one of many stories from one's own relatively narrow perspective and seek to minimise the limits of the essentialism that inheres therein. I leave you with this thought!

APPENDIX IV

The full text of Enoch Powell's so-called 'Rivers of Blood' speech, which was delivered to a Conservative Association meeting in Birmingham on April 20 1968.

The Telegraph, 06 Nov 2007. Web

The supreme function of statesmanship is to provide against preventable evils. In seeking to do so, it encounters obstacles which are deeply rooted in human nature.

One is that by the very order of things such evils are not demonstrable until they have occurred: at each stage in their onset there is room for doubt and for dispute whether they be real or imaginary. By the same token, they attract little attention in comparison with current troubles, which are both indisputable and pressing: whence the besetting temptation of all politics to concern itself with the immediate present at the expense of the future.

Above all, people are disposed to mistake predicting troubles for causing troubles and even for desiring troubles: "If only," they love to think, "if only people wouldn't talk about it, it probably wouldn't happen."

Perhaps this habit goes back to the primitive belief that the word and the thing, the name and the object, are identical.

At all events, the discussion of future grave but, with effort now, avoidable evils is the most unpopular and at the same time the most necessary occupation for the politician. Those who knowingly shirk it deserve, and not infrequently receive, the curses of those who come after.

A week or two ago I fell into conversation with a constituent, a middle-aged, quite ordinary working man employed in one of our nationalised industries.

After a sentence or two about the weather, he suddenly said: "If I had the money to go, I wouldn't stay in this country." I made some deprecatory reply to the effect that even this government wouldn't last for ever; but he took no notice, and continued: "I have three children, all of them been through grammar school and two of them married now, with

family. I shan't be satisfied till I have seen them all settled overseas. In this country in 15 or 20 years' time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man."

I can already hear the chorus of execration. How dare I say such a horrible thing? How dare I stir up trouble and inflame feelings by repeating such a conversation?

The answer is that I do not have the right not to do so. Here is a decent, ordinary fellow Englishman, who in broad daylight in my own town says to me, his Member of Parliament, that his country will not be worth living in for his children.

I simply do not have the right to shrug my shoulders and think about something else. What he is saying, thousands and hundreds of thousands are saying and thinking - not throughout Great Britain, perhaps, but in the areas that are already undergoing the total transformation to which there is no parallel in a thousand years of English history.

In 15 or 20 years, on present trends, there will be in this country three and a half million Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants. That is not my figure. That is the official figure given to parliament by the spokesman of the Registrar General's Office.

There is no comparable official figure for the year 2000, but it must be in the region of five to seven million, approximately one-tenth of the whole population, and approaching that of Greater London. Of course, it will not be evenly distributed from Margate to Aberystwyth and from Penzance to Aberdeen. Whole areas, towns and parts of towns across England will be occupied by sections of the immigrant and immigrant-descended population.

As time goes on, the proportion of this total who are immigrant descendants, those born in England, who arrived here by exactly the same route as the rest of us, will rapidly increase. Already by 1985 the native-born would constitute the majority. It is this fact which creates the extreme urgency of action now, of just that kind of action which is hardest for politicians to take, action where the difficulties lie in the present but the evils to be prevented or minimised lie several parliaments ahead.

The natural and rational first question with a nation confronted by such a prospect is to ask: "How can its dimensions be reduced?" Granted it be not wholly preventable, can it be limited, bearing in mind that numbers are of the essence: the significance and consequences of an

alien element introduced into a country or population are profoundly different according to whether that element is 1 per cent or 10 per cent.

The answers to the simple and rational question are equally simple and rational: by stopping, or virtually stopping, further inflow, and by promoting the maximum outflow. Both answers are part of the official policy of the Conservative Party.

It almost passes belief that at this moment 20 or 30 additional immigrant children are arriving from overseas in Wolverhampton alone every week - and that means 15 or 20 additional families a decade or two hence. Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad. We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre. So insane are we that we actually permit unmarried persons to immigrate for the purpose of founding a family with spouses and fiancés whom they have never seen.

Let no one suppose that the flow of dependants will automatically tail off. On the contrary, even at the present admission rate of only 5,000 a year by voucher, there is sufficient for a further 25,000 dependants per annum ad infinitum, without taking into account the huge reservoir of existing relations in this country - and I am making no allowance at all for fraudulent entry. In these circumstances nothing will suffice but that the total inflow for settlement should be reduced at once to negligible proportions, and that the necessary legislative and administrative measures be taken without delay.

I stress the words "for settlement." This has nothing to do with the entry of Commonwealth citizens, any more than of aliens, into this country, for the purposes of study or of improving their qualifications, like (for instance) the Commonwealth doctors who, to the advantage of their own countries, have enabled our hospital service to be expanded faster than would otherwise have been possible. They are not, and never have been, immigrants.

I turn to re-emigration. If all immigration ended tomorrow, the rate of growth of the immigrant and immigrant-descended population would be substantially reduced, but the prospective size of this element in the population would still leave the basic character of the national danger unaffected. This can only be tackled while a considerable proportion of the total still comprises persons who entered this country during the last ten years or so.

Hence the urgency of implementing now the second element of the Conservative Party's policy: the encouragement of re-emigration.

Nobody can make an estimate of the numbers which, with generous assistance, would choose either to return to their countries of origin or to go to other countries anxious to receive the manpower and the skills they represent.

Nobody knows, because no such policy has yet been attempted. I can only say that, even at present, immigrants in my own constituency from time to time come to me, asking if I can find them assistance to return home. If such a policy were adopted and pursued with the determination which the gravity of the alternative justifies, the resultant outflow could appreciably alter the prospects.

The third element of the Conservative Party's policy is that all who are in this country as citizens should be equal before the law and that there shall be no discrimination or difference made between them by public authority. As Mr Heath has put it we will have no "first-class citizens" and "second-class citizens." This does not mean that the immigrant and his descendent should be elevated into a privileged or special class or that the citizen should be denied his right to discriminate in the management of his own affairs between one fellow-citizen and another or that he should be subjected to imposition as to his reasons and motive for behaving in one lawful manner rather than another.

There could be no grosser misconception of the realities than is entertained by those who vociferously demand legislation as they call it "against discrimination", whether they be leader-writers of the same kidney and sometimes on the same newspapers which year after year in the 1930s tried to blind this country to the rising peril which confronted it, or archbishops who live in palaces, faring delicately with the bedclothes pulled right up over their heads. They have got it exactly and diametrically wrong.

The discrimination and the deprivation, the sense of alarm and of resentment, lies not with the immigrant population but with those among whom they have come and are still coming.

This is why to enact legislation of the kind before parliament at this moment is to risk throwing a match on to gunpowder. The kindest thing that can be said about those who propose and support it is that they know not what they do.

Nothing is more misleading than comparison between the Commonwealth immigrant in Britain and the American Negro. The Negro population of the United States, which was already in existence before the United States became a nation, started literally as slaves and were later given the franchise and other rights of citizenship, to the exercise of which they have only gradually and still incompletely come. The Commonwealth immigrant came to Britain as a full citizen, to a country which knew no discrimination between one citizen and another, and he entered instantly into the possession of the rights of every citizen, from the vote to free treatment under the National Health Service.

Whatever drawbacks attended the immigrants arose not from the law or from public policy or from administration, but from those personal circumstances and accidents which cause, and always will cause, the fortunes and experience of one man to be different from another's.

But while, to the immigrant, entry to this country was admission to privileges and opportunities eagerly sought, the impact upon the existing population was very different. For reasons which they could not comprehend, and in pursuance of a decision by default, on which they were never consulted, they found themselves made strangers in their own country.

They found their wives unable to obtain hospital beds in childbirth, their children unable to obtain school places, their homes and neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition, their plans and prospects for the future defeated; at work they found that employers hesitated to apply to the immigrant worker the standards of discipline and competence required of the native-born worker; they began to hear, as time went by, more and more voices which told them that they were now the unwanted. They now learn that a one-way privilege is to be established by act of parliament; a law which cannot, and is not intended to, operate to protect them or redress their grievances is to be enacted to give the stranger, the disgruntled and the agent-provocateur the power to pillory them for their private actions.

In the hundreds upon hundreds of letters I received when I last spoke on this subject two or three months ago, there was one striking feature which was largely new and which I find ominous. All Members of Parliament are used to the typical anonymous correspondent; but what surprised and alarmed me was the high proportion of ordinary, decent, sensible people, writing a rational and often well-educated letter, who believed that they had to omit their address because it was dangerous to have committed themselves to paper to a Member of Parliament agreeing with the views I had expressed, and that they would risk penalties or reprisals if they were known to have done so. The sense of being a persecuted minority which is growing among ordinary English people in the areas of the country which are affected is something that those without direct experience can hardly imagine.

I am going to allow just one of those hundreds of people to speak for me:

"Eight years ago in a respectable street in Wolverhampton a house was sold to a Negro. Now only one white (a woman old-age pensioner) lives there. This is her story. She lost her husband and both her sons in the war. So she turned her seven-roomed house, her only asset, into a boarding house. She worked hard and did well, paid off her mortgage and began to put something by for her old age. Then the immigrants moved in. With growing fear, she saw one house after another taken over. The quiet street became a place of noise and confusion. Regretfully, her white tenants moved out.

"The day after the last one left, she was awakened at 7am by two Negroes who wanted to use her 'phone to contact their employer. When she refused, as she would have refused any stranger at such an hour, she was abused and feared she would have been attacked but for the chain on her door. Immigrant families have tried to rent rooms in her house, but she always refused. Her little store of money went, and after paying rates, she has less than £2 per week. "She went to apply for a rate reduction and was seen by a young girl, who on hearing she had a seven-roomed house, suggested she should let part of it. When she said the only people she could get were Negroes, the girl said, "Racial prejudice won't get you anywhere in this country." So she went home.

"The telephone is her lifeline. Her family pay the bill, and help her out as best they can. Immigrants have offered to buy her house - at a price which the prospective landlord would be able to recover from his tenants in weeks, or at most a few months. She is becoming afraid to go out. Windows are broken. She finds excreta pushed through her letter box. When she goes to the shops, she is followed by children, charming, wide-grinning piccaninnies. They cannot speak English, but one word they know. "Racialist," they chant. When the new Race Relations Bill is passed, this woman is convinced she will go to prison. And is she so wrong? I begin to wonder."

The other dangerous delusion from which those who are wilfully or otherwise blind to realities suffer, is summed up in the word "integration." To be integrated into a population means to become for all practical purposes indistinguishable from its other members.

Now, at all times, where there are marked physical differences, especially of colour, integration is difficult though, over a period, not impossible. There are among the Commonwealth immigrants who have come to live here in the last fifteen years or so, many thousands whose wish and purpose is to be integrated and whose every thought and endeavour is bent in that direction.

But to imagine that such a thing enters the heads of a great and growing majority of immigrants and their descendants is a ludicrous misconception, and a dangerous one.

We are on the verge here of a change. Hitherto it has been force of circumstance and of background which has rendered the very idea of integration inaccessible to the greater part of the immigrant population - that they never conceived or intended such a thing, and that their numbers and physical concentration meant the pressures towards integration which normally bear upon any small minority did not operate.

Now we are seeing the growth of positive forces acting against integration, of vested interests in the preservation and sharpening of racial and religious differences, with a view to the exercise of actual domination, first over fellow-immigrants and then over the rest of the population. The cloud no bigger than a man's hand, that can so rapidly overcast the sky, has been visible recently in Wolverhampton and has shown signs of spreading quickly. The words I am about to use, verbatim as they appeared in the local press on 17 February, are not mine, but those of a Labour Member of Parliament who is a minister in the present government:

'The Sikh communities' campaign to maintain customs inappropriate in Britain is much to be regretted. Working in Britain, particularly in the public services, they should be prepared to accept the terms and conditions of their employment. To claim special communal rights (or should one say rites?) leads to a dangerous fragmentation within society. This communalism is a canker; whether practised by one colour or another it is to be strongly condemned.'

All credit to John Stonehouse for having had the insight to perceive that, and the courage to say it.

For these dangerous and divisive elements the legislation proposed in the Race Relations Bill is the very pabulum they need to flourish. Here is the means of showing that the immigrant communities can organise to consolidate their members, to agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with the legal weapons which the ignorant and the ill-informed have provided. As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see "the River Tiber foaming with much blood."

That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come. In numerical terms, it will be of American proportions long before the end of the century.

Only resolute and urgent action will avert it even now. Whether there will be the public will to demand and obtain that action, I do not know. All I know is that to see, and not to speak, would be the great betrayal.