

MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

UNIVERSITY OF ORAN

FACULTY OF LETTERS, LANGUAGES AND ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF ANGLO-SAXON LANGUAGES
SECTION OF ENGLISH

**The Ideological Trojan Horse in the Pedagogical Realm:
Towards a Recovery of the Intellectual Skeptron
(A study of the role of ideological discourse in the formation of foreign
language students' social and cultural representations of the Other)**

Thesis submitted to the Department of Anglo-Saxon Languages in Candidature for the
Degree of DOCTORAT in the Didactics of Civilisation

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Academic Year : 2005-2006

The Ideological Trojan Horse¹ in the Pedagogical Realm: Towards a Recovery of the Intellectual Skeptron²

**(A study of the role of ideological discourse in the formation of
foreign language students' social and cultural representations
of the Other)**

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¹ The *Trojan Horse* is part of the myth of the Trojan War which marked the confrontation between the Greeks and the Trojans. The legend of a huge hollow wooden horse, built by the Greeks and offered to the Trojans, that was used as a trick to bring the Trojans to open the city gates and thus put an end to the Greek army's ten-year siege of Troy, remained as a metaphor for any apparent advantage which is actually a deceitful, malicious and harmful trick, such as computer viruses. What characterises also the *Trojan Horse* is the fact that it needs the full cooperation of the victim to be effective, just as the success of the Greeks' trick depended greatly on the Trojans' naïve acceptance of the gift.

² Magic wand (see p. 181, fn.9).

DECLARATION

I, hereby, declare that this work has not already been accepted in substance for any degree, and is not concurrently being submitted in candidature for any other degree.

Abdelghani NAIT BRAHIM

The researching, preparation and presentation of the thesis have been undertaken entirely by the author.

Abdelghani NAIT BRAHIM

DEDICATION

For Fadila, Naima, Hammi and Mohamed

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to Professor Mohamed MILIANI whose patience, confidence, wisdom and grace have been central to the making of this work.

His knowledge and most valuable general intellectual comments have lightened my reflection as a researcher and inspired my prospects as a teacher.

I am deeply aware of the great privilege I have to have him as my supervisor, to have met him, and I do wish, one day, to be faithful to the most honourable values that he embodies as an Algerian intellectual.

I am immeasurably indebted to Doctor Sidi Mohamed LAKHDAR BARKA who has been present at every single stage of my reflection in this work, with his advice, invaluable and sound comments, challenging thoughts, and mostly, his infectious enthusiasm. He has been responsible for every moment of intellectual and human elevation since I had the honour, luck and pleasure to meet him fifteen years ago.

I thank him for his contribution to my career as a researcher, a teacher, and to my whole existence.

I have also been exceptionally fortunate in the help offered by Doctor Farida LAKHDAR BARKA with whom I had interesting discussions and brainstorming which provided me with insights that clarified my ideas at some hard moments of my reflection. I am very thankful to her and do owe her great esteem and respect.

ABSTRACT

Foreign culture teaching, as an integral part of foreign language teaching at the Algerian university, has long been subject to a pedagogical context which has strong ties with the social context of both students and teachers. As a matter of fact, students' learning behaviour is determined by some negative attitudes towards foreign cultures, most particularly those underlying the English language. These attitudes, which stand as real obstacles to the learning process according to the objectives set for the foreign language degree, are due to the psychological process of representation that brings students to view the *other*, who holds a different culture to theirs, as an irreconcilable adversary whose culture is incommensurably antithetical to their own.

False representations of the *other* are by no means the outcome of a purely cultural process of denial. They are rather partly constructed and nourished by an ideology of confrontation, an ideology which instrumentalises the most important religious and national symbols in order to maintain power relations that are most favourable to the political status quo. This ideology, referred to here as Occidentalism, impedes the functioning of a central process in a university education: interculturalisation. Against this ideology, there is then a need for an intercultural pedagogy that can reconstruct a suitable pedagogical context for successful cross-cultural encounters in the foreign language and culture classroom.

Chapter One presents the theoretical background upon which this thesis is based. It clarifies the intricacies of the rapport between attitudes, culture and representations.

Chapter Two reviews the concept of ideology and deals with the ways it comes to fashion representations. It also shows the functioning of the ideology of Occidentalism within the Algerian society and the foreign language and culture class, as an ideology that defines identity and otherness.

Chapter Three evinces the strategies of ideological prevalence in the Algerian university as it discloses the means Occidentalism influences students, mostly through one of the most efficient means: discourse.

Chapter Four attempts to reflect on possible solutions and remedies for this pedagogical problem, i.e. how to bring students overcome the false representation of the *other* in order to approach him objectively.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	I
DEDICATION	II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	III
ABSTRACT	IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS	V
GENERAL INTRODUCTION	9
Original Quotations.....	42
CHAPTER ONE: Representations as the Background of Students’ Negative Attitudes	45
1.1. Introduction.....	45
1. 2. Attitude and Motivation.....	48
1.3. Attitude and Otherness.....	53
1.4. Attitude and Culture.....	54
1.5. Representations.....	73
1.6. Conclusion.....	91
1.7. Original Quotations.....	92
CHAPTER TWO: Occidentalism: An Ideology of Alliance Between Religion and Politics	98
2.1. Introduction.....	98
2.2. Debating the Concept of Ideology.....	100
2.3. Occidentalism as a Utilitarian Rationality to Approach Otherness.....	110
2.4. Criteria for the Definition of Occidentalism.....	113

2.5. Characteristics of Occidentalism.....	136
2.6. Occidentalism and Perceptive Effects.....	153
2.6.1.Situational Effects.....	155
2.6.1.1.Effects of Position.....	156
2.6.1.2. Effects of Disposition.....	157
2.6.2. Effects of Perspective.....	158
2.6.3. Epistemological Effects.....	160
2.6.4. Effects of Communication.....	162
2.7. Conclusion.....	166
2.8. Original Quotations.....	167

CHAPTER THREE: Ideology as Discourse:

The Practice of a Speech Genre.....	172
3.1. Introduction.....	172
3.2. Language as Discourse.....	173
3.3. Ideology as a Speech Genre.....	176
3.4. Felicity Conditions.....	179
3.5. Classical Arabic.....	187
3.6. The Right to Speak.....	196
3.7. The Speech Genre.....	202
3.8. Students as the ‘Third’.....	218
3.9. The Intellectual.....	222
3.10. Ideology and Symbolic Power.....	227
3.11. Religion and Politics.....	233
3.11.1. Ideology as a Religious System.....	235
3.11.2. Religion as an Ideological System.....	237
3.12. Conclusion.....	242
3.13. Original Quotations.....	244

CHAPTER FOUR: Developing a New Intercultural	
Pedagogy: The Third Place.....	253
4.1. Introduction.....	253
4.2. Otherness and Authentic Discourse.....	254
4.3. Otherness and Language.....	273
4.4. Facing Ideology.....	278
4.5. Islamist Discourse.....	279
4.6. The Self-mandated Spokesperson vs. the Intellectual....	283
4.7. The Need for a New Counter-culture.....	285
4.8. A New Counter-culture Through Intercultural Pedagogy.	287
4.9. Critical Discourse Analysis in Culture Studies.....	292
4.10. Towards a ‘Third Culture’.....	295
4.11. Conclusion.....	302
4.12. Original Quotations.....	304
GENERAL CONCLUSION.....	310
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	323
APPENDICES:	
1. APPENDIX I: Questionnaire.....	348
2. APPENDIX II : President Bouteflika’s Speeches.....	352
3. APPENDIX III: Mohamed Amara’s Articles.....	384
4. APPENDIX IV: Mohamed Khalil’s Article.....	403
5. APPENDIX V: Mohamed Reda’s Article.....	405

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Only the Arabists and Islamologists still function unrevised. For them there are still such things as an Islamic society, an Arab mind, an Oriental psyche. Even the ones whose specialty is the modern Islamic world anachronistically use texts like the Koran to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian society.

(Said 1995: 301)

The relationship between language and culture has long ceased to be a matter of controversy, and it has become a truism to say that teaching a foreign language is necessarily teaching a foreign culture. The integration of the foreign culture, whether implicitly/incidentally through 'language modules', such as listening or reading comprehension, or overtly/consciously through 'content modules', like literature or 'civilisation', into the curricula of the teaching of English as a foreign language, is today rather a matter of consensus since the works of D. Hymes (1974), M.A.K. Halliday (1978), C. Kramsch (1991; 2000; 2001), M. Byram (1989), G. Zarate (1986), M. Abdallah-Preteille (2004a; 2004b) and others brought a new insight in language encounters.

However, while it is claimed that teaching a foreign culture is the best means to overcome some of the obstacles to learning a foreign language, it is foreign culture teaching itself which is hindered by some psychological barriers. The cure (the foreign culture) for the disease (i.e. the problems of

foreign language learning) is sometimes not efficient and sometimes even rejected as a transplant in a diseased body. This medical analogy informs somehow about what really takes place in this educational setting. Just as the body rejects the transplant because the former is not the original environment of the latter, the Algerian social or cultural context of the foreign culture learning process is not the Western original context of the production process of the target culture. The cultural context of the educational process has then never been neutral, embedded with the collective psychology of its people (the Algerian native cultures) as well as the individual interpretation of these cultures (the idiosyncratic integration and effectuation of those native cultures).

There is no doubt that the foreign language and culture class is sometimes a place for enjoyable, fruitful and cooperative human experiences that result in the best of what cross-cultural¹ encounters can produce. There is certainly an immense pleasure in using a new (somehow exotic) medium to express familiar and new meanings that could not be otherwise (in one's native language) revealed and in "*having the ability and power to manipulate these meanings.*" (Kramsch 2001: 30) These encounters between people of different cultures are the natural lot of all societies, and lead to what is labelled *acculturation*. When acculturation is successful, it contributes to open-mindedness, understanding and tolerance, necessary conditions for the progress of those societies that need it desperately.

Yet, what deserves attention is the other side of the story, the hard, conflicting and confrontational experiences that both teachers and students undergo in the foreign language class, in general, and the foreign culture course in particular. It is high time in Algeria we stopped pretending and

¹ The concept of cross-culturality will be discussed below in comparison to the other concept of interculturality.

acknowledged the disorganising effects of the foreign language and culture classes on students² in order to develop a suitable and efficient pedagogy which could offer solutions to the cultural cancer that gradually develops social metastases. Abdallah-Pretceille rightly claims that conflict is to be seriously taken into account when dealing with cross-cultural encounters.³

An effective and efficient cross-cultural pedagogy is all the more necessary in the light of the wave of globalisation that is invading the whole world. It is up to each country to make globalisation a beneficial experience or a trauma. The gradual introduction of the LMD (Licence-Master-Doctorat) system is but a tiny illustration of the inevitable process of globalisation, and which unfortunately encounters more resistance on the part of teachers, in Algeria, than a suitable strategy of adaptation, while they still have some freedom of decision.

The first rationale behind this work is that the educational case study taken here, i.e. the American Civilisation class, is but a microcosmic representation of the situation occurring in a macrocosm, the Algerian society. The Students' attitudes towards American culture, as a foreign culture, are determined to a great extent by their overall social conditions. They are not individual responses but rather responses of individuals that are culturally situated⁴ in a very particular type of society that induces particular kinds of attitudes, moulded by the cultures within which they grow, and fixed by the institutions that have the function of perpetuating them,

² The cultural conflicts that rise in the foreign language class are by no means peculiar to the Algerian university students as Abou (1981: 198) seems to admit it in the case of France: "... *every contact between cultures is also a conflict of cultures.*" (MOT) (MOT: My Own Translation. Quotations marked with this acronym are translated by the author. Original versions are presented at the end of each section in the whole work).

³ "*The mood of angelism in which encounters flow helps avoid and evacuate a fundamental problem of the education of the relation to the other, and of which conflict is one of the driving forces.*" (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 187) (MOT)

⁴ A whole section on the theory of situational effects that explain the students' attitudes will be developed in Chapter Two.

such as politics, religion, the school and the media. These attitudes do not seem to be temporary, but rather a lasting characteristic of the Algerian society and culture. It will be shown that they are based on what Durkheim and Boudon call *collective beliefs* (Boudon 1991) that are nourished and propagated by ideology, ideology being part of the whole social context that includes culture and the individual's interactions with his people as well.

These *collective beliefs*, present in society, form *collective opinions*, i.e. a distinctive group's shared opinions about another one (Charaudeau 2004: 37). The deviation, and thus the danger, is that these *collective opinions*, which are very particular and stained with value judgements, are often presented by ideologies as *common opinions*, i.e. views that belong to the human patrimony, made up by a long history of human wisdom, and which bear the name universal. This may be the case of some proverbs, for instance, which can be found in many different cultures.

It is not my intention to claim that Algerian students in particular, and Algerians in general, are totally submitted to their society and cultures, incapable of any purely individual attitude or behaviour. I certainly admit part of it that explains some Algerians' rejection of certain Algerian cultural traits. I also acknowledge that, in many cases, some attitudes are adopted for the mere sake of group solidarity or even fear of social sanctions against anti-social behaviour⁵. Yet, my contention is that an important number of students, and Algerians, fall under some kind of social/cultural influence, not to say determinism, that, through the hype of culture and

⁵ Group solidarity and fear of social sanctions do induce in people attitudes and behaviours that they do not necessarily accept. Rose puts forward an interesting illustration in the case of prejudice and discrimination in the United States. He observed that among the people who discriminate, there is a good number of those who do it, not out of prejudice against the victim, but rather out of pragmatism that makes them conform to the majority's behaviour. Rose (1965: 81) calls this type the *unprejudiced discriminator*, whose motto is "*expediency ... and his creed is to 'live and let live'; a man's got to get along.*"

political/religious ideology, tends to induce in them formatted attitudes towards the foreign culture.

Yet, the sociocultural origins of the students' attitudes are not the incentive that motivated this work. What really motivated it is the fact that these students, that develop socioculturally-conditioned attitudes and behaviours, will probably perpetuate and disseminate them as members of the Algerian future elite, especially as teachers in charge of forming generations. Here, it should be admitted that their number does not matter as it will necessarily multiply over time. The sample of students taken here are representative of a wider population, among students and the Algerian society, that is growing in alarming proportions, and that will surely rage with the bulk of negative attitudes developed against all what bears the name *foreign*, in the name of religion, nationalism or pan-arabism/pan-islamism.

What are then these students' attitudes that are responsible for their incapacity to join the cross-cultural adventure? What induces them?

Throughout a nine-year experience in teaching American Civilisation at the Section of English (University of Oran), I have observed in students a number of negative attitudes, exasperated since September 11, 2001, towards American culture in particular, and 'western cultures in general'⁶, and which range from stigmatisation to total rejection. The problem, here, does not lie in the fact that the American Civilisation class has become a place for struggle and conflict; the school is partly the place for such symbolic struggles (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004b: 3). The problematic issue, as

⁶ Although the American Civilisation module aims to teach about American culture, substantial reference is of course made to European cultures (English, Irish, French, etc.), non-Muslim African cultures and the Judeo-Christian heritage and patrimony that Europe, Africa and the United States share. Consequently, we can clearly observe students' attitudes towards all of these cultures as foreign and different to theirs. I will then use the terms American culture and foreign culture almost interchangeably as they often share the same referent, in terms of attitude, in the students' representations.

far as the pedagogical objective of this class is concerned, is the fact that learning has become secondary, and the class stands as an opportunity for settling scores with Americans, a group therapy to exorcise frustrations, and a pulpit to voice ready-made value judgements.

While the class is supposed to be a place to approach reality through rational knowledge, it is rather through a different mode of learning – representations, those mental structures of perception necessary to define oneself and the other, that students apprehend the reality of American culture. Moreover and most importantly, as it will be shown in Chapter One, these negative attitudes do not completely hinder successful learning of the target language and of the limited classroom content of the programme. Negative attitudes may accompany certain types of motivation that induce the student to learn. Yet, while learning may well take place, education does certainly not occur, for, though the former is part of the latter, there exists a substantial difference between them. For *“learning to be truly educative it must give a broader value and meaning to the learner’s life. It must be concerned with educating the whole person.”* (Williams and Burden 2001: 6)

The aim of a university education goes beyond the mere learning of items in a designed syllabus. University education in a language degree, beside the primary aim of learning a means of communication, engages students in cultural expeditions whose basic goals are to learn about different visions of life and free themselves from ethnocentrism and stereotyped narrow-minded visions of foreign cultures. Learning English, for instance, in an academic frame – a four-year degree – is a four-year exploration of the cultures that fashion this language and their contributions to world civilisations. It is an invaluable opportunity for students to get rid of opinions frequently driven by prejudice, ignorance or bias towards foreign sociocultural systems. It is also an alternative for narcissistic ideological self-images that may be spread by

foreign media. This contact with foreign cultures is aimed to offer students new perspectives and ways of looking at their own culture and society too. It provides them with new tools for undertaking self-criticism and a reflexive approach to their own culture, something which may disclose aberrations which otherwise cannot be revealed. It is, in a way, undermining cultural and political inhibitions that prevent students from questioning their learned values and conceptions and carrying out political and cultural critique.

University education is part of the university's enterprise of producing an intelligentsia capable of thinking outside politically self-interested, rationalised ideas, capable of having a relational rather than hierarchical view of cultures including theirs, capable of engaging, critically, political and cultural issues to identify their society's contradictions and resist prevailing practices. Giroux points at the danger of the absence of such intellectuals, a state in which the dominant culture faces no resistance, and thus prevails over all opposing elements of civil society.⁷

University education is expected to produce intellectuals who can be "*mediators, legitimators, and producers of ideas and practices,*" or to use Gramsci's words *radical intellectuals*, rather than mere agents of the status quo, "*propagators of its ideologies and values.*" (ibid.: 4). The university is not a locus of domination but rather a political and cultural project that develops critique and social transformation through the provision, in such degrees as English, of oppositional discourses and practices (foreign cultures).

It is on the basis of this conception of educative learning that underpins this work and its significant social and societal role that I consider these

⁷ "*In the absence of intellectuals who can critically analyse a society's contradictions,*" writes Giroux, "*the dominant culture continues to reproduce its worst effects all the more efficaciously. And, without a sphere for cultural critique, the resisting intellectual has no voice in public affairs.*" (Giroux et al.1984: 1)

negative attitudes, despite the possible completion of the short-term and immediate objective of learning, as counterproductive in terms of the long-term and strategic objective of education. The teacher, when he/she is not under the influence of the same representations or when he/she is not complacent about the mere exposition of facts in his/her culture class, is supposed to provide this type of education, and thus strives to find a balance between these two modes of learning, rational knowledge and representations.

Students tend to confuse two systems: the system of knowledge and the system of belief. While the former is about establishing truth about the real world (this is being the function of a university education), the latter is characterised by “*a mental activity focused on ... behaviours (thus its affective nature) and by taking a stance (thus its subjective aspect)*” (Charaudeau 2004: 34)⁸. The first is made up of scientific theories and methodical practices; the second consists of doctrines that lead to dogmas. It is precisely these doctrines and dogmas that political and religious ideologies nourish.

What is peculiar to the subject of American Civilisation, as compared to other cultural studies modules⁹ in the English degree curriculum, and which adds to the difficulties encountered, is that students come to the very first class with prior knowledge, acquired outside the educational setting because of the overexposure of the United States in the media¹⁰, and

⁸ MOT

⁹ I would not like to indulge into the controversy over the appellation of this module. This has changed with time and from one country to another. While in Germany it has the name of *Landeskunde*, meaning literally ‘knowledge of the country’, in France the term *civilisation* is well established. In Britain the appellation changes from *background studies* to *cultural studies* through *area studies*. In the United States, the term *culture studies* is today a commonplace.

¹⁰ Fukuyama (2001) rightly observes that the United States has become part and parcel of the process of globalisation: “*America is the most advanced capitalist society in the world*

because of the fact that this country has become a household subject since American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. The students' reality becomes an insurmountable obstacle to the learning process. Particularly, students tend to share with Americans, at a distance, a past and a present of conflict. They are filled with paradoxical feelings, such as injustice, that they rarely bear for other peoples. This feeling-at-distance is responsible for most of the negative responses to American culture, responses which are often extended to the rest of the 'West' (Doise 1989: 232). This is what Zarate labels the *nearness of the far*, when she comments about the context of teaching culture in which two things are essential: the institutional context of teaching and the media environment.¹¹

These feelings are paradoxical in the sense that they are often mixed with appreciation of, or admiration for, many of the expressions of this same American culture that the students despise in class. They clearly express their liking of such an American singer, actor, writer, or great contemporary or historical personality. While the America of Bush is regarded with suspicion, the America of Brad Pitt, Britney Spears, William Faulkner and Abraham Lincoln is embraced. What prevents them from being aware of the fact that these people they like are as American as those they dislike is the international character of American culture that often masks its Americanness as well as their a priorities.

The principal characteristic of the American Civilisation class is then that students are unable to approach foreign cultures and realities but through mediation, i.e. the prisms of their representations they come up with to the course. Plato's idea of illusory world has never been as true as it is for them.

today ... [so] if market forces are what drives globalization in some sense, it is inevitable that Americanization will accompany globalization."

¹¹ "[the] nature of the geopolitical relation between the student's native culture and the target culture, measure of the effects induced by the institutional context of teaching and the local media environment." (Zarate 2004: 73) (MOT)

Negative attitudes, such as rejection, are observable symptoms of these representations held by students on the American people and culture in particular, and 'western' peoples and cultures in general.

Thus, the main thesis in this work is that the students' negative attitudes towards foreign cultures are due to their representations of these cultures¹². Given that these representations are basically sociocultural¹³, and that culture can only be retrieved from the attitudes and behaviours of its people¹⁴, I will depart from the students' attitudes in the American Civilisation class to find out about the origins of these representations.

The work is an upstream study of these representations to reveal those sociocultural phenomena that hinder the foreign culture praxis¹⁵, phenomena to which teachers need to turn their attention to overcome them. It is also a reflection on the ideological and *clientéliste* drifts of politics and religion in an educational setting in particular, and society in general, and a re-reading of the Algerian educational and social realities in the light of power practice and relations that take place outside the university, and which have a direct impact inside it. The ideologies in question are not well

¹² "People represent ideologically their actions before they actually act." (Capdevila 2004: 68) (MOT)

¹³ I use the epithet socio-cultural because of the fact that, as it will be exposed in the first and second chapters, these representations are cultural in the sense that they are part and parcel of the students' culture, and social in the sense that they are disseminated in society by religious and political ideologies.

¹⁴ There is no such a thing as encounter or dialogue between cultures, but rather encounter and dialogue between individuals having different cultures. Culture, then, can only be captured through the way it is expressed by individuals. Linton (1967: 321) writes that: "*Culture is essentially a sociopsychological phenomenon. It is carried by individual understandings and can only be expressed through individuals.*" (MOT) This implies that the same culture may be expressed differently by different people, and it is just a matter of convenience if we speak of culture instead of cultures.

¹⁵ It is probably not appropriate to use the word learning when we refer to that pedagogical activity that takes place in a culture studies class. The traditional learning process that applies to language, for example, does not take place here, as what students experience in this type of course is a practice and an encounter with a different world, rather a body of knowledge that they are supposed to learn, at least in my view. I will then use the terms 'study', 'experience' and 'praxis' to refer to the activity that takes place in culture studies classes.

and definitely constituted, i.e. they are *in statu nascendi*, something which allows seeing their connections to the students' daily preoccupations.

Culture and ideology are addressed here as hotbeds, *nutrient broths* for the students' representations. "*Every representation*," write Banbion-Broye et al. (1977: 51), "*grows on the basis of an ideology*."¹⁶ The importance of these representations, in this work, lies in the fact that they influence, not to say condition, behaviour in general¹⁷, and the pedagogical behaviour –or learning – in particular, to a great extent. Whether false or true (though very often false), positive or negative (usually negative), they are used by the students, on the one hand, as tools to approach foreign, and sometimes their own, reality, and to provide oversimplified and erroneous answers that prevent them from apprehending the true nature of the foreign culture, on the other. Besides, they, at times, determine the student's motivation to get involved in or stay out of this cross-cultural experience.

For, the American Civilisation class is basically cross-cultural communication as it is the place of "*verbal and non-verbal processes of interaction between members of different cultural groups*" (Porter and Samovar, quoted in Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 102-103)¹⁸. This communication is of course not live, but at a distance. It is still communication inasmuch as it brings students to interact with texts and ideas produced by other people of a different culture, where the teacher often plays the role of a mediator, and sometimes a substitute for this absent interlocutor. Kramsch (2001: 29) observes that "*The [foreign] language classroom should therefore be viewed as the privileged site of cross-cultural fieldwork, in which participants are both informants and*

¹⁶ MOT

¹⁷ "*Representations*," writes Doise (1961: 206), "*play a particular role in the interaction between groups, a space that they structure in a precise way according to certain cognitive rules*." (MOT)

¹⁸ MOT

ethnographers.”

To see culture studies modules as cross-cultural experiences, one needs to be aware of the new approaches to communication studies. Jakobson's traditional model¹⁹ of participants in a communicative event has to be replaced by the new model put forward by discourse analysts. While Jakobson considered addresser and addressee as the main and only actors in discourse, Charaudeau et al. (2004) speak of the *third (tiers)*, who may be present or absent, to or about whom we speak, and who may sometimes be one of the most, if not the most, important participant in discourse. In a foreign culture class, the other (or foreigner) holds this position of the *third*, just as students are the *third* for the political ideological discourse.

Any cross-cultural experience is bound to be intertwined with the social/cultural, philosophical, economic and political contexts of the people involved, and this justifies the necessity to have a look at the functioning of culture, religious and political ideologies in Algeria to fathom this educational case. Cross-culturality is a social fact (Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 1), and as such, cross-culturality in education has to be linked to the society within which it evolves. Moreover, my recourse to ideology to examine this case is due to the fact that culture, religion and politics are often subject to manipulation, and in this sense they are basically ideological.

It is then the double objective of this work, a contribution to the cross-cultural discourse, to better understand the formation and growth of these representations, whether in Algerian education or society, and shed some light on their connections with the cognitive and psychological processes of approaching a foreign culture. Thus, notions such as cultural identity, ethnocentrism, enculturation, acculturation, interculturalization, ideology (each

¹⁹ Addresser (addressee) → Context/message/contact/code → addressee (addresser)
(The components of a communicative event) (Jakobson 1990: 73)

one contributing to the formation, alteration and perpetuation of representations) are the important *variables* that influence the students' attitudes in class and in their daily social lives, and the ones to be at the centre of the study.

As products of the mind, representations are fashioned by all the constraints which the mind is subjected to, such as culture and political and religious ideologies which construct people's value-systems (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 6). What adds to the importance of ideology in the study of representations is the fact that they both are, with language and religion, symbolic systems. They, therefore, interplay within the same sphere, each one pushing the society towards the direction chosen by those who manipulate them, whether politicians, preachers, pseudo-intellectuals or communication professionals. Ideologies themselves are sometimes defined as systems of representations (see Chapter Two), with specific historical roles in society (Althusser 1965: 238-239), roles that legitimise their persistence and acceptance by people. These roles vary from being the instrument of cultural, religious, or national unity, the preservation of *our* Islamic or Arabic authenticity, to being the supposed weapon to fight foreign cultural aggression and colonisation.

The presence of ideology in a language class, as opposed to other types classes, and apart from the fact that ideology is always connected to knowledge (Poirier 1983: 161), is due to the fact that language representations do not only determine students' attitudes towards these languages but also towards their native speakers (Moore 2001: 9). It is exactly this space between the student and the *other* that ideology occupies and manipulates. As such, any study of the problems in this type of relations

is to take into account ideology²⁰. Moreover, any study of representations and ideology has to consider the types and functions of discourse available in society. As this will be discussed in Chapter Three, language, as a social practice, i.e. as discourse, is the ideal channel through which representations are constructed and diffused. “*Discourse,*” claims Py (2004: 6), “*is specifically the place where social representations are constituted, fashioned, modified or disintegrate.*”²¹

* * *

This work will, therefore, attempt to discuss the following research questions:

1. What is the genesis of the students’ exclusive and negative responses towards foreign cultures and peoples?
2. Are the students’ representations responsible for their negative attitudes towards foreign cultures and peoples?
3. What is the relationship between these representations and the students’ culture (s)?
4. Which cultural manifestations fashion these representations?
5. Are social practices, such as religious and political ideological discourses, hotbeds for the students’ negative representations?
6. Is this discourse a particular ideology to the Arab-Islamic world?

²⁰ Much research on bilingualism has related attitudes, representations, social practices (such as discourse), motivation, success and failure (see Ervin 1954; Lambert and Gardner 1972; Labov 1976; Ryan and Giles 1982).

²¹ MOT

7. What are the motives that underlie the stigmatisation of foreign cultures by these discourses?
8. Why do students believe in these discourses?
9. Where do students' credulity and the credibility of these ideas come from?
10. How do they subscribe to these ideas?
11. How can we set, as teachers and intellectuals, some common ground between the students' culture (s) and the foreign ones to overcome difference without evacuating it?

To these questions a number of hypotheses will be advanced and developed throughout the work.

1. Students' negative attitudes towards foreign cultures originate from the influence of an extremely ideologically-loaded social and educational context that establishes an antithetical relationship between native culture and the *other's* one.
2. Out of this context, representations of the *other* are formed and bring students to develop negative attitudes towards all what does not conform to their native view of the world.
3. These representations are deeply connected to the students' native cultures as they are exposed to them since their early age.

4. Among the cultural manifestations that fashion these representations are the religious practices that consider the relation to the *other*, who does not share the same religion, central to the completion of a *right* religious practice.
5. Religious, as well as political, discourses, as constructed by Occidentalists, provide favourable hotbeds for the formation and maintenance of negative representations of the *other*.
6. Although discourse of denial is not peculiar to the Arab-Islamic world, there has developed a specific type of such a discourse that functions as an ideology in its own right, and that bears the name Occidentalism.
7. Among the reasons that underlie this discourse is the preservation of the social and political status quo which is absolutely favourable to the power elite.
8. Students are grown within social conditions that allow them very few opportunities to question this ideology; mainly because it is firmly connected to their most cherished spiritual symbols such as Islam.
9. Students express their adherence to the ideology of Occidentalism by responding negatively to the cultures transmitted through the foreign language they learn.
10. To overcome such intellectual and pedagogical difficulties of bringing students to cross cultural boundaries, there is a need to develop a specific pedagogy, an intercultural pedagogy, which

can take into account the students' immediate social, cultural and ideological contexts within which they indulge into cross-cultural encounters.

The university receives a population of students who have spent part of their lives – along years of family upbringing, of political and media (local and Arab) bludgeoning, of religious instruction and sermons in mosques, and of school education where foreign languages, devoid of their cultures, are taught – in a system oriented towards the stigmatisation of foreign cultures and the promotion of the native one. As the foreign language is taught as a mere medium to access science and technology, emptied from its cultural and ideological content²², nothing can question their acquired assumptions that ultimately induce negative attitudes. As early as 1961, The anthropologist Ruth Benedict drew attention to the ravages of this type of distinction between local and foreign, where the familiar is enshrined into the norm and the foreign stigmatised and demonised as a permanent threat to that familiar.²³

The students' negative response is symptomatic of a symbolic struggle taking place in society and reproduced in the classroom. The students are victims of this struggle between those who strive to preserve the status quo and those who call for a different social project. Deprived from the right to speak, and grown in a system that has never equipped them with the means to develop personal views, the students, as a great number of the Algerian youth, become the unconscious voices of their masters, of the political and

²² Zarate (2004: 16), in her study of foreign language teaching, has noticed that this approach to foreign languages is often a system of defence, whose function is to 'protect' learners from the encroachments of foreign cultures on the local value-systems which could be put into question: "...the discrepancies between the foreign culture and the native culture are rubbed out to maintain the description of the foreign culture in conformity with local values." (MOT)

²³ "So modern man," writes Benedict (1989: 7-8), "differentiating into Chosen People and dangerous aliens, groups within his own civilisation genetically and culturally related to one another... has the justification of a vast historical continuity behind his attitude."

religious ideologues who subject them to this intellectual alienation and dispossession. They are trapped in a conception of *otherness* which is synonymous only with the need to reaffirm and exasperate cultural and religious identity, or with “*the fanatic desire ... to search, in appearances, only differences and oppositions to maintain distances intact.*” (Castro 1976: 357)²⁴

The students have often not been given the opportunity to develop the capacity to construct by themselves a contradictory discourse to the official ones lest they dare push the society towards change. The only discourses they have been served, instead of the rational and scientific one, are those of:

- the situational space (Charaudeau 2004), or cultural, to preserve common identity;
- the interdiscursive space (Bakhtin 1981), or the religious, to protect common beliefs and values;
- and the interlocutory (Chabrol 2004), or political, to perpetuate hegemony and control.

The only tool the students then have, when they are in a situation of *otherness*, is their luggage of representations as constructed by the three types of discourse they have grown in. They are imprisoned in a bilingualism where classical Arabic is completely managed by *reasons of state* (la raison d'état) and the faith in an official religion, on one hand, and a native language dominated by tradition and permeated by extremist Islamism, on the other.

Their credulity and the credibility of these discourses are based on the

²⁴ MOT

fact that they fall under various effects of situation, effects of perspective and effects of epistemology (as this will be advanced in Chapter Two) that mask their own reality and the *other's*. The *other* is always the one to be blamed for their society's tragedies and misfortunes; the *other* who may be the 'West', the Jew, the American, a scapegoat in any case.

Religious and political discourses take advantage of the flaws, rifts, and dysfunctions of Algerian culture which does not take in charge the intellectual formation of the youth, left to the winds of manipulation and indoctrination. The social role of culture is then left to a particular form of ideology, specific to the Arab-Islamic world. This ideology takes in charge the definition of *otherness* as well as the proper way to deal with it. I will refer to this ideology as *Occidentalism* (see Chapter Two), an Arabist-Islamist conception of the West and Westerner, as the anti-thesis of the Arab-Muslim that induces a fundamentally negative attitude towards anything Western, be it language or culture.

This work puts forward the idea that an important part of foreign language students are under the influence of Occidentalism that functions as their mediating channel in their approach to foreign languages and cultures, and which consequently *neutralises* and *anaesthetises* all possible effects of acculturation, interculturalisation, and thus the whole process of education.

* * *

This work is pluridisciplinary as it makes use of concepts and theories drawn from different disciplines in its investigation and analysis. Besides educational sciences, with contributions of such people as J. Arnold, H. Stern, M. Williams, R. Burden in educational psychology (through concepts such as attitude and motivation), and C. Kramsch, G. Zarate, M. Abdallah-

Pretceille, and M. Byram in cross-cultural education, and since cross-cultural issues are fundamentally social, sociological tools are called into play through concepts developed by P. Bourdieu, in his approach to the concepts of discourse and ideology. Working on a cultural subject, that is a subject involving such concepts as cultural identity, ethnocentrism and stereotypes, the contributions of the sociologist R. Boudon, with his explanation of situational effects, and of Edward Said, with his cross-cultural theory of Orientalism, stand as essential. Anthropological insights, with M. Saville-Troike on the ethnography of communication, serve the purpose of this work, which is meant to be a critical anthropology whose aim is mainly emancipation. Social psychology, with S. Moscovici on the concept of representation, guides the research as this concept, borrowed by educational sciences, is central to the work. Discourse analysts, such as P. Charaudeau and C. Chabrol, bring as well their expertise to deconstruct the functioning of discourse in its different formulations according to various channels. All of these concepts and theories will certainly be adapted to the particular Algerian, and Arab-Islamic, sociocultural and educational reality.

My position, as a participant-observer-intellectual-researcher, is also particular. Being a member of the culture in question, a teacher in the class described, working on a cultural issue, and investigating a personal experience in which I may be involved emotionally, I run the risks of being autobiographical, as Weston La Barre (1980: 7) warned. Yet, does any scientific culture not start, as expressed by Bachelard (1971: 162), by “*an intellectual and affective catharsis* [?].” Personal inflection and private sensibility are what gives meaning to what is written (Said 1994). This is empathy, necessary for research, which, as a cognitive approach, is “*a cognitive intention, a participative will, an imaginative effort, a tentative of prediction and anticipation*” (Maucorps and Bassoul 1960: 8)²⁵, yet distinct

²⁵ MOT

from sympathy, which is driven by a purely affective dynamic.

As a researcher, I may also be tempted by what Van Der Maren (1996: 472) labels “*the roundabout way effect*”, i.e. the influence of the research results by the researcher’s discriminatory selection of conceptions and tools of analysis. It behoves me then to explicitly say that I am aware of this status for which I have tried to put some methodological safeguards of objectivity, objectivity which is vital to any research work.

Among these are the cross-examination of my statements drawn from my introspection and observation with the implementation of two other self-report methods, the questionnaire and the exams papers (see below), in order to allow the observed people’s voices to emerge.

As an intellectual, I may be carrying and defending, consciously or not, some ideology, as reminded by Saville-Troike who ideology and political considerations always underlie linguistic issues.²⁶ I admit then that I do challenge these interests and that I am, however, the vassal of no social class or power sphere. I am only deeply committed to that humanism that “*has to do with,*” as Said put it, “*knowledge, rigor, commitment to pedagogy,*” (quoted in Bayoumi and Rubin 2000: 435). A humanism in which the humanist is not isolated, but rather “*cherishes a feeling of community with other researchers, other societies and other epochs.*” (Said 2003) I also do subscribe to *oppositional criticism*, which is, according to Said, the best bulwark against autocratic regimes ad policies.²⁷

²⁶ “*Issues regarding language in the public sphere*” she admits, “*are always politically embedded and potentially charged, and by conducting research affecting these issues, linguists will ineluctably be supporting or challenging the interests maintaining the status quo.*” (Saville-Troike 2003: 280)

²⁷ “*Oppositional criticism,*” asserts Said (1983: 29), “*is... life-enhancing and constitutively opposed to every form of tyranny, domination, and abuse; its social goals are non-coercive knowledge produced in the interests of human freedom.*”

As a member of the culture observed, I am also struggling to reach some *cultural neutrality* (Devereux 1977: 339) which could allow me to avoid uncritical solidarity. Moreover, as a native Berber speaker, i.e. a member of an Algerian 'sub-culture' that has sometimes been in conflict with the Arab and Middle-East-oriented one, this may also help distance myself from some of the discourses studied in this work. For intellectual hospitality, i.e. keeping a place in research for the *other*, is a "*creative action of openness to the Other... [which] is the most important dimension in a researcher's mission.*" (Said 2003)

The fact that I refer to representations available in my culture does not necessarily mean I hold the same. Moreover, belonging to the culture I have studied has certainly freed me from the representations, stereotypes and ethnocentrism an outsider may possibly have, and has allowed me to have introspective knowledge that the outsider may not possess. Saville-Troike points to this when she writes about the ethnographer investigating his own culture, performing a dual function as observer and informant, allowing objectivity and subjectivity to intrude into the same piece of reasoning.²⁸

This work is principally a case of ethnographic research as my purpose is to retrieve insights from the culture studies class as a cultural system through *uncontrolled observation* (Nunan 1992: 3). My hypotheses are not prior to the research, but they have rather emerged during the course of my introspection and observation phases, and then probed by the questionnaire and analysis of the students' exam papers. The ethnographic character of this research makes it very dependent on anthropology and sociology, as

²⁸ "*The extension of this perspective to the study of culture,*" she writes, "*acknowledges the member of the society as the repository of cultural knowledge, and recognizes that the ethnographer who already possesses this knowledge can tap it introspectively to validate, enrich, and expedite the task of ethnographic description.... In the same way then, with the ethnographer able to function as both observer and informant, some of the problems of verification can be overcome, and a corrective to unbridled speculation provided.*" (Saville-Troike 2003: 89-90)

one of its tenets is that behaviour is greatly influenced by the context within which it occurs, as observed above. I will then confirm that this work contains the main characteristics attributed to any ethnographic research (ibid.: 56):

- *Contextual* (The students have not been displaced as the research is undertaken in the native context, where they live and study);
- *unobtrusive* (There is no conscious manipulation of the investigation on my part);
- *longitudinal* (The introspection and observation phases having taken years, this made the research long-term);
- *interpretive* (I will interpret the data collected to confirm the hypotheses);
- *organic* (I admit that there has been interaction between the questions/hypotheses and data collection/interpretation, as each one induced changes in the other in the course of the investigation).

I also take the risk of admitting that this work enjoys external validity, i.e. the observations and results found in the culture studies class (American Civilisation class) are not unique and peculiar, and can thus be extended to the Algerian society and generalised. As assumed previously, this class is but a microcosmic representation of the Algerian society, and its investigation is a case study, limited to a number of individuals, yet very informative about the rest of the population and a revealing pointer to the Algerian sociocultural situation.

This research is also an action research as I mainly conduct it as a teacher, i.e. a practitioner, facing a pedagogical and didactic problem which I attempt to resolve, and hope the solutions proposed might produce the expected changes in the students' representations. However, I am deeply aware that as action research, the questions and tentative answers

suggested can constantly be reformulated and re-evaluated.

* * *

I should now give some methodological indications as to the tools of analysis I have made use of. I should speak of discourse rather than method as I have clearly stated the cultural and ideological context of the production of this work. This discourse is intercultural and cross-cultural, applied to a pedagogical situation in general (teaching about culture), and a didactic case in particular (teaching about American culture).

I have to put forward, though, some warnings for mere methodological reasons and which will stand as precautions on my part to avoid any misunderstandings due to any possible lack of clarity in my statements.

1. Cross-cultural vs. intercultural: It is worth noting from the outset of this work that the concepts *cross-cultural* and *intercultural* are very polemical notions, characterised by what Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a: 9) calls “*semantic elasticity*”. They are sometimes taken as synonyms, following the conceptions of scholars such as Devereux (1977), Saville-Troike (2003) and Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a; 2004b). Saville-Troike (2003: 168) defines the two concepts as: “*interaction (spoken or written) between participants who have significantly different linguistic and cultural backgrounds.*” Kramsch (2000: 81), though, while she admits that they do share a shade of meaning: “*‘cross-cultural’ or intercultural usually refers to the meeting of two cultures or two languages across political boundaries of nation-state.*” She adds that the concept *intercultural* may also stand for the meeting of two cultures or languages within the same country. It is then Kramsch’s understanding of the terms that will be

used in this work, i.e. *cross-cultural* will refer to encounters across political boundaries (the case of Algerian students learning English as a foreign language); and *intercultural* will describe situations of contact between languages or cultures within the same country (the case of Berber and Arabic in Algeria).

2. Although culture teaching here takes place in a foreign language curriculum, I will not discuss language representations, even if they are closely linked to the social representations that come into play in foreign culture experiences. For, it must be admitted that language learning theory, though it may inform about aspects of culture learning, is different from culture learning theory, in terms of both pedagogical and didactic demands and implications.

Actually, the language that plays a substantial role in the Algerian students' foreign culture study is rather classical Arabic, not English, though the latter is the medium used in culture studies classes. Religious and political ideologues have always used classical Arabic as the vehicle of their ideologies which nurture students' representations. This language has always been used as a tool of *euphemisation* (Bourdieu 2001) of these ideologies, for the sake of obtaining support and, more importantly, consent, i.e. an instrument of hegemony²⁹. Fairclough expresses the relation between language, ideology and power claiming that ideology instrumentalises language to gain power.³⁰

Language and ideology in Algeria have always been interconnected, or to use Poirier and Rosselin's (1982: 177) word, *consubstantial*.

²⁹ See Chapter Two for Gramsci's concept of hegemony.

³⁰ "Ideologies," observes Fairclough (2001: 2), "are closely linked to language, because using language is the commonest form of social behaviour, and the form of social behaviour where we rely most on 'commonsense' assumptions. ... the exercise of power, in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language."

As it will be shown in Chapter Two, classical Arabic has accompanied the anchoring of the political and religious ideologies in Algeria. The attempts of purification of the Algerian linguistic environment, at the expense of the Algerians' native languages³¹, through the systematic exclusion of the other languages from power spheres (political, religious or media) and imposition of classical Arabic, have always aimed at the purification of Algerians' thoughts from possible 'dangerous' residues of those languages, considered as threats to the political status quo that resulted from the Algerian Revolution³². This created, in addition to bilingualism and diglossia, a situation of *colingualism* (Balibar 1993) where classical Arabic is used by power holders to exclude part of the society which used and understood the native languages, along with French. Classical Arabic has been attributed a privileged status by the political and religious institutions. It is precisely for the preservation of this status quo that any destabilisation of representations, which may be induced by exposition to foreign cultures and their value-systems, is deemed by the Algerian ideologues as a *clear and present* danger that may weaken or question their power organisation.

3. I should also affirm that my criticism of the religious/ideological discourse and classical Arabic is by no means a censure of religion, Islam in this case, or the language. Although, this may well be a

³¹ It should be noted that classical Arabic, in Algeria, has never been a mother tongue, for the very simple linguistic reason that there are no Algerian speakers who use it as their first language. Although it is presented as such by politicians, religious representatives, lay people, and – strangely! – by some intellectuals and language experts, Algerians, in their majority, have either 'Algerian Arabic' (or Maghrebi) or Berber (in its different varieties) as their native language.

³² It is quite interesting to draw an analogy with the French case of standardisation. Bourdieu (2001: 74) advances: "*It would be naïve to attribute the linguistic unification policy to the sole technical needs of communication between the different parts of the [French] territory and, notably, between Paris and the provinces The conflict between the French of the revolutionary intelligentsia and the idioms or patois is a conflict over the symbolic power whose stake is the formation and re-formation of mental structures.*" (MOT)

subject matter of a thesis, it is not that of this one. The criticism concerns the ideologues, the spokespeople, who instrumentalise Islam and Arabic for sheer political purposes, and their interpretation of the sacred text, just as Nietzsche's *Antichrist* was anything but a criticism of Christianity. Most ideologies and doctrines, even when they are originally designed for the good of humanity, are perverted by some people's interpretations and implementations. This has been the case for revealed religions, Marxism and many other social theories and projects.

The alliance between religion and politics in the construction of the same ideological discourse is not new. Human history is full of illustrations of this unnatural union, ranging from Arab-Islamic history to Europe of the Middle Ages, through African primitive and modern social organisations. The genesis of political ideology, as a symbolic system, needs the assistance of a symbolic authority which could guarantee its credibility, legitimacy, and thus full acceptance among people. Any social institution needs to have a role to subsist in society. Political ideology has never found a better ally than religion, an ideology itself, to provide sense to its social role and thus facilitate its penetration into the minds and hearts of people. While in Europe, for instance, ideology has often been the product of intellectuals, whether rightwing or leftwing, in Algeria, it is precisely the absence of these intellectuals, or more accurately, their *muzzling*, that gives a free hand to politicians and preachers to form and diffuse their ideologies with the complicity of a certain type of media, consciously or unconsciously, as it will be shown below.

4. It should as well be noted that the use of the phrase Algerian culture does not, by any means, suggest that an Algerian individual partakes of only one culture. I am totally aware that Algerian culture

is not monolithic, and is rather a common denominator of various, sometimes conflicting, cultures carried by every individual. The phrase Algerian culture is then used for mere convenience. I completely subscribe to Kramsch's view, who admits the fact that delimitations between cultures and the fact of claiming one's belonging to one instead of the other is more a work of the mind, i.e. a representation, than a reality.³³

This work is by no means purely descriptive, but rather an attempt to construct a critical discourse of the Algerian sociocultural facts that form the student's learning environment. Departing from a personal experience, it is partly empirical and pragmatic since cultural facts are, by essence, practices.

However, to overcome simple intuitive introspection, I make use of the following concepts and theories to carry out my investigation:

- The students' negative response is taken as an *attitude*, i.e. as a disposition to react in a cross-cultural situation. This concept of *attitude* will be handled as defined by G. Lüdi (1986), B. Py (1986) and J. Arnold (1999), and implemented in the light of the theory of *situational effects* as put forward by R. Boudon (1991).
- *Attitudes*, as a dependent variable in the learning process, will be put in perspective as related to S. Moscovici's (1972) concept of *representation*, which is taken as an independent variable influencing *attitudes*. This will be undertaken according to the theory of *social representation* as advanced by G. Zarate (1986; 2004) and

³³ "Thus we have to view the boundary [between cultures] not as an actual event but, rather, as a state of mind, as a positioning of the learner at the intersection of multiple social roles and individual choices." (Kramsch 2001: 234)

M. Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a).

- Close reference will be made to *discourse* as the main vehicle of *representations*, on the basis of the theory of *critical discourse analysis* (CDA), constructed by discourse analysts such as N. Fairclough (1992; 2001), and the theory of the *third*, made by P. Charaudeau (2004).
- *Discourse*, as a social practice, will be presented as being the outgrowth of political and religious *ideologies*, as conceptualised by P. Bourdieu (2001) in his theory of *symbolic power* and *symbolic violence*. M. Saville-Troike's (2003) theory of the *ethnography of communication* will also be called upon to probe into the role of classical Arabic in the religious and political discourse.
- E. Said's (1995) theory of *Orientalism* will guide one of the analyses of one of the main theses in this work, i.e. *Occidentalism*. On the basis of the criteria that brought Said to conceptualise Western conceptions of the Orient as Orientalism, I will construct the concept of *Occidentalism*.
- The form of discourse, taken here as an essential feature that constructs the ideal conditions for the success of ideology, is tackled through Bakhtin's (2002) theory of speech genres. This approach will provide the tool to evince the channel that enables ideologies such as Occidentalism to enjoy large and lasting penetration in the Algerian society.
- C. Kramsch's theory of *the third culture* (2001), M. Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a; 2004b) theory of *intercultural pedagogy*, and H.

Janks and R. Ivanič's (1992) *emancipatory discourse* will provide directions towards suggestions of possible remedies.

It is then the aim of this work, by using this complex and varied conceptual apparatus, to comprehend and explain, in Sperber's (1996) sense, a practical sociocultural/educational situation on the basis of a theoretical conceptualisation:

- Comprehension, in this particular sociocultural case, necessarily goes through the understanding of the human being in general, i.e. through an *intellectualist* approach which is part of "*the effort to explain the world*" (ibid.: 59), in order to identify the general mechanisms that are at work in the students' process of representation.
- Explanation of the process of representation will be:
 - a. *epidemiological*, i.e. how representations are acquired by students and transmitted as an epidemic;
 - b. *functionalist*, i.e. how representations are instrumentalised by political and religious ideologues.

* * *

The corpora that underlie this work are formed of data collected from four fields of exploration:

1. Introspection: my own perceptions as a member of the culture and society under study.
2. Participant-observation: my observation as a teacher in my

American Civilisation class.

3. Exam papers: the students' answers in exams provide a bulk of data that inform about their attitudes, since a great number of students tackle the questions, either through a very conformist perspective, stuck to their notes taken in class, or, when they attempt to be personal, through their representations, instead of pertinent knowledge of a rational nature. The exams papers used are of exams that were taken at different moments of the year (first term exam in February, final term exam in May, first resit in June, and second resit in September). This data collection method is then administered at different moments so as to check whether any changes in attitudes and opinions have occurred or not, and to what extent in case they did.

4. Questionnaire: it is used as a means to check and cross-examine my observations and interpretations of the students' answers in exams. It was handed to:
 - Two hundred and fifty second year students of English at the English Section, University of Oran. Out of these, a hundred and eighty responded.
 - Two hundred third year students of English at the English Section, University of Oran. Out of these, a hundred and fifty responded.
 - A hundred and eighty second year students of English at the English Department, University of Chlef. Out of these, two hundred responded.
 - A hundred third year students of English at the English Department, University of Chlef. Out of these, eighty-three responded.

While the English language is the sole vehicle of the students' attitudes and representations in my participant observation, which is based on their questions, answers and comments made in the classroom, and in their exams papers, I asked them to answer the questionnaire in any language they feel comfortable in, and add any comment they feel necessary, so as to allow the maximum of spontaneity, and thus get some relative sincerity in their statements.

The detection of the trace of the sociocultural origins of the students' representations is carried out through the analysis of various authentic and pedagogical documents. Data will then be retrieved from:

- Algerian newspaper articles,
- Algerian and Arab television channels programmes,
- Religious sermons in mosques or the media,
- Algerian political speeches,
- Algerian school textbooks.

The population of the case study, that sustains the hypotheses which I extend to a part of the Algerian society, consists of second and third year students of English, at the Section of English, Faculty of Letters, Languages and Arts, Es-Sénia University, Oran and at the English Department, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, Hassiba Ben Bouali University, Chlef. The questionnaire was filled in by this academic year's second and third year students (2005-2006). Close observation has really started three years ago (2002), though my experience with such students, as a teacher of American Civilisation, dates back to 1996, i.e. a nine-year experience.

These students come from different parts of Algeria (urban and rural; north and south; mostly from the western part of the country), from various social milieus, and of both sexes. This provide a wide coverage of the Algerian society and varied expressions of Algerian culture, a characteristic

that can allow drawing conclusions that have some validity, i.e. representativity, as far as diversity in the Algerian society is concerned.

* * *

Chapter One deals with some theoretical debates relating to key concepts such as attitude, representation, acculturation and interculturalisation. It also explains how students' negative attitudes towards *otherness* are based on their representations of foreign cultures, and the fact that these representations stand as symptoms of a dysfunction in their process of acculturation, posed in an oppositional relationship with their process of enculturation.

Chapter Two examines Algerian political and religious ideologies as hotbeds for these representations. An attempt to establish a theory about the practice of the main ideology of Occidentalism, developed out of the politicisation and instrumentalisation of Islam, and the way its propagation in all spheres of society, including education, has given birth to a culture of confrontation with the *other*, a culture that induces inhibitory obstacles in the process of foreign language and culture learning.

Chapter Three evinces the most efficacious tools, language (classical Arabic) and discourse (religious sermon), that Occidentalism is making use of in order to insure its persistence in Algerian society. It also explains how students come to develop negative attitudes towards foreign cultures due to the great influence of those ideological tools.

Chapter Four provides more vivid illustrations of the working of these ideologies in their production of representations, and suggests a few directions towards finding a suitable cross-cultural liberating pedagogy.

Original Quotations

Page 11

(Footnote 2)

Tout contact de cultures est aussi un conflit de cultures.

(Abou 1981: 198)

(Footnote 3)

Le climat d'angélisme dans lequel baignent les rencontres permet d'éviter et d'évacuer un problème de fond qui est celui de l'éducation de la relation à l'autre, et dont le conflit est un des éléments moteurs.

(Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 187)

Page 16

Une activité mentale polarisée sur ces comportements (d'où son aspect affectif) et par une prise de position (d'où son aspect subjectivant)

(Charaudeau 2004: 34)

Page 17

(Footnote 11)

La nature de la relation géopolitique entre la culture nationale de l'élève et la culture enseignée, mesure des effets induits par le contexte institutionnel d'enseignement et par l'environnement médiatique local.

(Zarate 2004: 73)

Page 18

(Footnote 12)

Les individus ne peuvent agir matériellement qu'en se représentant idéologiquement leur propre pratique.

(Capdevila 2004: 68)

(Footnote 14)

La culture est essentiellement un phénomène sociopsychologique. Elle est véhiculée par les entendements individuels et ne peut s'exprimer que par l'intermédiaire des individus.

(Linton 1967: 321)

Page 19

Toute représentation se développe sur le fondement d'une idéologie ...

(Banbion-Broye et al. 1977: 51)

La communication interculturelle peut être définie comme les processus d'interaction tant verbaux que non-verbaux, qui existent entre membres appartenant à des groupes culturels différents.

(Porter and Samovar, quoted in Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 102-103)

(Footnote 17)

Les représentations jouent un rôle particulier dans l'interaction des groupes, domaine qu'elles structurent de façon précise en obéissant à certaines lois de nature cognitive.

(Doise 1961: 206)

Page 22

... le discours est plus spécifiquement le lieu où les représentations sociales se constituent, se façonnent, se modifient ou se désagrègent.

(Py 2004: 6)

Page 26

... au désir fanatique ... de ne chercher, sous les apparences, que les seules différences et oppositions, afin de maintenir intactes ses distances.

(Castro 1976: 357)

Page 28

... une intention cognitive , une volonté participatrice, un effort imaginatif, une tentative de prévision ou d'anticipation.

(Maucorps and Bassoul 1960: 8)

Page 34

(Footnote 32)

Il serait naïf d'imputer la politique d'unification linguistique aux seuls besoins techniques de la communication entre les différentes parties du territoire et, notamment, entre Paris et la province le conflit entre le français de l'intelligentsia révolutionnaire et les idiomes ou les patois est un conflit pour le pouvoir symbolique qui a pour enjeu la formation et la ré-formation des structures mentales.

(Bourdieu 2001: 74)

CHAPTER ONE

Representations as the Background of Students' Negative Attitudes

1.1. Introduction.....	45
1. 2. Attitude and Motivation.....	48
1.3. Attitude and Otherness.....	53
1.4. Attitude and Culture.....	54
1.5. Representations.....	73
1.6. Conclusion.....	91
1.7. Original Quotations.....	92

CHAPTER ONE

Representations¹ as the Background of Students' Negative Attitudes

L'enfer, c'est les autres. (J.P. Sartre, Huis-Clos)
J'ai besoin de la médiation d'Autrui pour être ce que je suis. (J.P. Sartre, L'Etre et le Néant)
L'autre est indispensable à mon existence, aussi bien d'ailleurs qu'à la connaissance que j'ai de moi. (J.P. Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme)

(Quoted in Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 39)

1.1. Introduction

Since the writings of the social and clinical psychologist Uri Bronfenbrenner (1979), researchers in education have come to consider the importance of environment in determining the success or failure of learning. His work emphasised the effects of the environmental systems of the individual, i.e. his *ecology*, on his development. Whether the *microsystem*

¹ The concept of *representation*, first coined by the French school of social psychology in the 1970s, as it will be shown below, has been fully integrated into the Anglo-Saxon epistemology, notably with the works of Edward Said as early as 1978. Although the concept of *perception* is sometimes used, in English, to refer to what *representation* is used for, I have made a clear option for the latter, in this work, as it seems to better convey the depths of my reflection and to go beyond the limitations of the first concept. As a matter of fact, while *perception* is quite limited to an individualised and passive view of reality, *representation* involves, not only a collective depiction of reality but also the whole process of self-identification and the corresponding behaviour. *Representation* is then to be taken here as it has been conceptualised by E. Said, i.e. as a *subjective restructure* (Said 1995: 129) of reality, which is “*embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer.*” (ibid.: 272)

(e.g. family and peers), the *mesosystem* (home-school relationships), the *ecosystem* (e.g. the school, the teacher's behaviour), or the *macrosystem* (the culture of the whole society) (Williams 2001: 189), these categories of environment concur to develop in the individual a personality and a behaviour that would certainly differ if he happened to grow within a different environment.

In education, the learner's readiness to learn languages and be open to discover their cultures is also quite related to his ecology inasmuch as it develops in him positive or negative attitudes towards these languages and cultures and which influence greatly his involvement in the learning process. The concept of *attitude* is central to understand the situation of foreign language learning in Algeria in the sense that it explains the learning behaviour of the foreign language student, especially in his relationship to the culture or cultures he is exposed to in the classroom.

Generally defined as "*an acquired, latent, psychological predisposition to react in a certain manner towards an object*" (Lüdi & Py 1986: 97)², attitude, as a sociopsychological factor, is also viewed as a visible tendency to react positively or negatively towards a set of things or a group of individuals (Cooper & Fishman 1974; Agheyisi & Fishman 1979; Moore 2001). Doise (1989: 222-223) considers it as a specific position from which an individual evaluates a "*given social entity*" and which determines his readiness to maintain or break relationships with the members of the group evaluated. This view is shared by the sociologist Boudon (1991) who prefers to speak of *situational effects*, as this will be exposed in Chapter Two.

In foreign language and culture learning at university level in Algeria, attitudes towards the target language and culture play a major role in the

² (MOT)

student's readiness and subsequent achievement of the objectives of the curriculum of the degree he intends to obtain. Emphasis is put here on university level as, in this particular case and as put forward in the Introduction, the objectives of a university education go beyond the mere fact of accumulating knowledge in a specific field for a future job after graduation. University education is part and parcel of the great social enterprise of producing citizens capable of taking in charge the country's management, including its relationships with the rest of the world. As such success and failure of a university education is to be assessed not only in terms of how much knowledge the graduate has or has not accumulated, but also how much *savoir-être* he has been able or not to integrate to live up to the hopes and expectations his society has invested in him.

Attitude is all the more important inasmuch as it is associated with deep-rooted emotional responses, as a psychological process very much relevant to the cognitive process of learning, in which the contact with the foreign language and culture are based on feelings, stereotypes, and prejudices about the people who speak that language or hold that culture. A conflicting or amicable relation to a people influences a student's interest in their language and culture, i.e. their attitude to approach them³. Beacco (2000: 55), in this matter, observed that cultures in the pedagogical context have always been caught in rapports of domination and resistance, adherence or rejection.

It is observed that considerable numbers of foreign language students in Algerian universities, students of English as a foreign language, do show negative attitudes towards the cultures of the native peoples of this

³ Works on the strong relationship between attitude and learning were produced as early as the 1950's with Adorno and others through their *Authoritarian Personality* (1950), which explored the relations between prejudice, personality and learning. Other consistent works also continued this type of investigation with people like d'Anglejan and Tucker (1973), or later Gardner and Lambert (1972), Gardner (1979), Gardner and Smythe (1981).

language, most particularly Americans. These attitudes seem often surprising to teachers and somehow not taken into account by syllabus designers and language teaching methods. This is partly due to the fact that these attitudes have coped quite well with the learning of the language, instead of being a definite deterrent or a psychological inhibitor, though they are sometimes so. Foreign language learning in Algeria, as far as English is concerned, takes place in a non-supportive, and at times even hostile, environment of resentment, suspicion and rejection of the culture of the target language. This hostile ecology brings many Algerian foreign language students to miss a great part of the objectives of the foreign language curriculum as they view the foreign culture as a *subtractive* (Gardner 1979) threat that could take the place of their own culture, while the foreign culture is meant to be *additive* to their own, i.e. approached in a positive give-and-take relationship that can be profitable to them in terms of widening their scope, vista and comprehension of the world.

1. 2. Attitude and Motivation

It is in this sense that attitudes towards foreign languages and cultures among Algerian students stand as prerequisites to the real effectuation of the university curriculum objectives. This is all the more true as these attitudes determine the student's motivation to engage body and soul into achieving these objectives. Defined as:

... a state of cognitive and emotional arousal, which leads to a conscious decision to act, and which gives rise to a period of sustained intellectual and/or physical effort in order to attain a previously set goal (or goals)

(Williams & Burden 2001: 120)

motivation, as a crucial affective variable in the learning process, which

comprises psychological factors that “*energize behaviour and give it direction*” (Hilgard, Atkinson & Atkinson 1979: 281), determines the student’s interest in the subject studied and the amount of time and effort he is ready and willing to invest in it.

Yet, because there is a clear distinction between language and culture as far as attitude is concerned in the sense that a negative attitude towards a culture does not necessarily induce a negative attitude towards the language that conveys it, motivation to learn the language may vary from the motivation to really know the people who speak it, i.e. the motivation to discover in an unbiased manner their culture or cultures. Although attitude towards the language may well coincide with attitude towards the culture, in which case it would induce or not the motivation to learn both, attitudes towards language and culture may well not operate on the same wavelength, and produce a situation whereby the student develops a motivation to learn the language, and at the same time remains completely impermeable to and turns away from its culture.

Contrary to Schumann's (1986) theory of the 'acculturation model', which states that rejection of a group's culture is likely to lead to inhibiting the learning of the group's language, many students in Algerian universities manage to be quite good users of English in spite of their negative attitudes towards the English or the Americans. This is mainly due to the type of motivation they activate in their approach to this language. Probably, a positive attitude towards the culture is likely to correlate with higher achievement in the language, a situation in which it is the *integrative motivation* that directs the learning process. This type of motivation refers to the student's "*desire to learn the language in order to relate to and even become part of the target language culture*" (Arnold & Brown 1999: 13), to identify with the culture of speakers of the target language, or to discover

the *other* out of a humanistic curiosity. Integrative motivation is then one of the main positive results of the personality variable referred to as empathy.

Since the works of Gardner (1985) and until recently, integrative motivation held a privileged position in foreign language learning as it stood as the best booster for the language learning process. Yet, Gardner (1995) himself, and many researchers before him, such as Lukmani (1972) or Ellis (1994), have come to mitigate this statement and reconsider this theory, more applicable to second language learning, and admit that other types of motivation could induce successful learning, especially in the case of foreign languages.

In the case of Algerian university students, other types of motivation play an important role to overcome the culture inhibition and achieve successful learning of the foreign language. Despite the fact that the other, not less important, objectives of university education are not achieved, these types of motivation bring the students to spend the necessary time and effort to attain a decent, if not a good, mastery of the language. These types can be grouped under the general name of *instrumental motivation*, in which practical factors external to the individual come to induce the desire to learn. Among these factors, Williams and Burden (2001: 116) mention “*passing exams, financial rewards, furthering a career or gaining a promotion.*” This type of motivation is labelled by Atkinson (1964) as *achievement motivation* in the sense that the student’s desire to learn is induced and sustained by his need to achieve a success in a given subject. Achievement motivation is then necessary for students who struggle against the fear of failure.

However, with the works of the Canadian psychologist Donald Hebb, the distinction between instrumental and integrative motivations seems unsatisfactory. Hebb (1966) spoke of *optimal arousal*, a motivation which

induces learning without having to meet other needs than novelty, curiosity and pleasure. The psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990) uses the concept of *flow* to describe this psychological state in which learning becomes an optimal experience of effortless movement of energy. *Flow* is defined by Goleman as:

*... the ultimate in harnessing the emotions in the service of performance and learning. In flow the emotions are not just contained and channeled, but positive, energized and aligned with the task at hand.
Because flow feels so good, it is intrinsically rewarding. It is a state in which people become utterly absorbed in what they are doing ...*

(Goleman 1995: 90-91)

Williams and Burden (2001) prefer to define motivation in terms of a combination of either internal or external influences. Internal influences range from a mere interest in an activity to a wish to succeed. External influences refer to the impact of other people in determining the desire to learn. Deci and Ryan (1985) express the same idea using the concepts of *intrinsic and extrinsic motivation*. With intrinsic motivation, according to the authors, the reward is the learning experience itself, instead of an external reward like success⁴.

In the case of some Algerian students that learn a foreign language despite their negative attitudes towards its culture, it is a special type of motivation that prompts learning. It is a motivation that combines internal and external factors. This combination operates in a special way in the sense that internal factors are the result of the external ones, and gives birth to a type of motivation that can be called *oppositional motivation*. It is a

⁴ Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura (1989) share this approach to motivation. They consider that an activity which induces interest and a feeling of enjoyment is performed thanks to an intrinsic motivation, while when an activity is undertaken in search for, for instance, financial rewards, it is external motivation that sustains the effort made.

psychological state of defiance and challenge, in which the student learns the language of a people whose culture he despises and considers as the antithesis of his. It is a motivation of confrontation in which language becomes an arm that can lead to defeat the *other*. *Otherness* is viewed, in the eyes of such students, not as an opportunity for enrichment, but rather as adversity, enmity and conflict.

On the basis of a social view of motivation, as opposed to the cognitive perspective which affirms the individual choice in making decisions, it is then suggested here that the learning of foreign languages among some Algerian university students is, sometimes, successful, despite negative attitudes towards their culture, because it is underlain by an oppositional motivation. This motivation is based on the internal factor of self-satisfaction induced by the external factor of their religious-dominated culture that makes up the social context of their upbringing and education. Students are motivated to learn the language by their response to a religious prescription, an Islamic one, which establishes foreign language learning as a moral duty. Their learning is viewed by them as an act of piety as they put into practice the words Prophet Mohammed is supposed to have said: "*He who learns a people's language is safe from their harm.*"⁵

Their oppositional motivation includes an instrumental one as they learn the language as an act of self-defence. It also comprises an extrinsic one as they are influenced by their religious-cultural environment. It integrates an intrinsic motivation as well in the sense that it relies on a belief and a moral conformity to this belief. It is not meant here that all students are motivated in this way, nor is it assumed that oppositional motivation is the only motivation that brings a category of Algerian students to learn the foreign language. Oppositional motivation is rather what allows these students to

⁵ (MOT)

overcome the cultural obstacle and engage in the language learning process despite their negative attitudes towards the foreign culture.

It appears here that the student's views of the foreign language and the foreign culture play a substantial role in determining his attitudes towards both of them and his motivation to approach them. These views are nothing but his *representation* of the *other* and the relationship he is supposed to have with him, i.e. his conception of *otherness*⁶.

1.3. Attitude and Otherness

The notion of *otherness*, or the relation to the *other*, underlies attitude, and consequently the whole intercultural process experience, whether in or out of class. In his analysis of this notion, Todorov (1982: 1982) observed the multiplicity of dimension of *otherness*. According to him, it involves:

1. An axiological dimension: a manichean value judgement of the *other*; good/bad, like/dislike.
2. A praxeological dimension: the decision to get close to or turn away from the *other* ranges from the identification to him to his domination, through submission or total ignorance.
3. An epistemic dimension: the extent to which one knows or is familiar with the *other*.

⁶ Although the question of *otherness* is central to the study conducted in this work, no reference will be made to the complex theories on the construction and evolution of personality in relation to environment, including humans and objects. First, because this needs great expertise in these psychological theories. Second, suffice it here to rely on the results available on the functioning of *otherness* to answer the question of how the view of the *other* influences the effectuation of pedagogical objectives. A close look at these theories necessitates a consideration of such works as Lacroze (1956) and Levy Schoen (1964) which suggested visions like:

- Awareness of the *other* being a transposition of self-awareness;
- awareness of the *other* preceding self-awareness;
- the self and the *other* being both the same and different.

Negative attitudes are to be seen as a reaction to a culture shock and culture stress. The former, described by Stern (2001: 382) as "*the state of anxiety to which the learner is exposed upon entering a new and totally unfamiliar culture*", is, in the case of Algerian students, rather a state of anxiety due to the negative representation⁷ they have of the foreign culture, because they are only familiar with its distorted image made, for instance, by Occidentalism (see Chapter II). Culture stress, "*the more prolonged discomfort resulting from discrepancies between the self-image and the expectations of the new culture*" (ibidem), is induced, in this case, by the discrepancies of their representation of the foreign culture as constructed by Occidentalism and the contradictory views presented by teachers and the various teaching materials in class.

Culture holds a quite special position in education in general in the sense that it possesses a double status as opposed to other university subjects. In foreign language learning, culture is not only a subject among many others, such as grammar or linguistics, but it is also a concrete environment, a foreign macrosystem, within which the people of the target language evolve, which is in competition with the student's own macrosystem, i.e. his culture.

1.4. Attitude and Culture

The understanding of the concept of culture is to be clarified here in order to objectivise the implications of such a competition. Aware of what Leslie White calls a *conceptual jungle of definitions* (Bénéton 1992: 124) where this concept may be lost in, partly because it has a long history fashioned in multiple ways, as observed by Beacco (2000: 22), by western philosophical and sociological traditions, one then needs to lay some conceptual

⁷ Doise (1989: 224) admits that when dealing with attitudes in social relations, they are to be considered as social representations themselves.

foundation to allow a methodological analysis of what follows. Far from exposing over one hundred and fifty definitions of culture that Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1963) have compiled, and the proliferating meanings that have been developed after them, a short overview of the directions taken by various scholars is certainly to evince the wide scope of human life this concept covers, and whose definition has always been, according to Beacco (2000: 22), beyond the lexicographical dimension, an intellectual and social stake. Exhaustivity in the definition of this concept is neither achievable nor purposed as what is really desired is to single out in Algerian culture what induces negative attitudes towards the *other* and foreign cultures.

In the French intellectual tradition, culture has at times been defined, with such people as Durkheim (1914), as the moral and intellectual products of a given society (Bénéton 1992: 128). The British anthropologist, E.B. Tylor (1924), uses the same concept to cover all human activity, such as science, beliefs, art, morals and customs. This view is shared by McLver (1931) who admits that culture is the *expressions of life*, i.e. ideologies, religions and arts, or what Marxists call the superstructure. O. Spenler rather limits culture to the highest phase of human development and that ends when mankind starts to fall into moral decadence (see Marcuse 1970: 110).

In the United States, culture has often been used to refer to distinctive life styles (Sowell 1991). Conversely, Wald equates culture with what other scholars label subcultures⁸:

The members of a congregation may share regular social interaction, a common status, and a distinctive way of life. Out of

⁸ Wallace and Wallace (1989: 42) define subculture as follows: “*Large, complex societies often contain smaller social groups with distinctive cultural features not shared with the dominant culture. A subculture is the culture of a subgroup of society which adopts norms that set them apart from the dominant group.*” Other scholars equate between culture and subculture which are viewed as “*the characteristic behaviours of some particular group.*” (Beals et al. 1977: 27)

these experiences, a common culture may emerge.

(Wald1992: 28)

Another view of culture is put forward by Sykes who admits that it is what allows predicting a particular individual's behaviour which is determined by his position in society, or what he terms the *public role*. People are expected, in a particular culture, to behave, according to their sex, age, occupation and social status, in ways which are different from the ways other people who belong to a different culture would behave. Culture is then those beliefs about how people react in their environment and, as observed by Sykes:

... when one examines any culture ... one possible approach is through the role expectations of that culture, through the beliefs that people have about how individuals perform or should perform.

(Sykes 1963: 264)

A quite different conception is advanced by the anthropologist A. Wallace who specialises in the relationship between culture and personality, and who views culture as "*a set of standardised models of such contractual relationships*" (quoted in Coben & Ratner 1983: 5). The dichotomy culture/personality is, according to Cuhe, a whole current of thought in anthropology led by E. Sapir, R. Benedict and M. Mead, as compared to the other currents such as the functionalist approach championed by Malinowski and cultural history led by Boas (Cuhe 1998: 30-50). Yet, Coben and Ratner assert that many American scholars, in their study of American culture, conceived of culture as "*the dominant ideas and values that exercised decisive influence over the development of American institutions.*" (ibid.: 6)

Shalhope claims that culture is born when people start to develop common ways of assessing and responding to their environment (1990:

XIII). Stewart and Bennett distinguish between two types of culture: subjective culture and objective culture. The first refers to the common assumptions, values and thoughts, while the second stands for the group's artefacts ranging from institutions to arts and crafts (1991: 2).

However, many scholars claim that the existence of culture does by no means mean the existence of a uniform set of thoughts and behaviours to which all members of society conform. Culture is rather a host of patterns which are subject to individual interpretation, something which induces various applications of the same cultural value. Ideal patterns that make a culture do not oust idiosyncratic and individualised thinking and behaviour which, in general, fall within the limits set by that culture. Culture, in this sense, is a set of ideal patterns observed through quite modified and diversified actual patterns of thought and behaviour among individuals (Stewart & Bennett 1991: 35). Commenting on the difference between ideal and actual patterns, Stewart and Bennett write:

The difference ... was originally thought to be ... a result of cultural change... . A cultural tradition is not a folk description of what happens; it is much more often a folk description of what ought to happen... . Cultural systems are composed of individuals who generally find it convenient to do what they are supposed to do, but who are quite willing to do something else if it is more convenient.

(ibid.: 36)

This view applies quite well to the case of Algerian students who are often trapped within ideal patterns of behaviour which they feel compelled to conform to. Beals et al. (1977: 36) categorise five distinct patterns of behaviour that are variously adopted by members of the same culture and which are responsible for the variety of behaviours in the same situation:

- Compulsory patterns where the general culture provides a particular behaviour in a particular situation.
- Restricted patterns where the general culture allows some specific behaviour for particular members of society and not for society as a whole.
- Preferred patterns where various patterns are acceptable in a particular situation but “*one is more highly valued than the rest*”.
- Typical patterns where various behaviours are acceptable in a particular situation but the members of society tend to adopt one more than the others.
- Alternative patterns where various behaviours are acceptable in a particular situation and are equally valued and expressed.

These patterns are observed in the relationship people are expected to have with the *other*. Obviously society has implicit and explicit cultural and social safeguards, not often consciously established, against *black sheep* who behave outside the dictated patterns. These safeguards take the form of social sanctions which can have different expressions according to the degree of gravity of the pattern breaking and the degree of *closedness* of the culture where it takes place. Maunier lists four major sanctions that are commonly exercised by society on individuals who do not conform to its rules of thought and behaviour:

- mystical (excommunication, curse, penance, blacklisting);
- legal (sentence, compensation);
- moral (disapproval, criticism);
- satirical (bullying, laughter, mockery) (see Cuvillier 1967: 91)

In cultures, such as the Algerian one, where religion and morality exercise a great influence, the first and third types are more commonly applied.

Yet, despite the influence that culture exercises on the individual, there is considerable room for individualised behaviour that can result either from the person's own and personalised reading and realisation of some cultural pattern, or from his blatant rejection of the pattern and his recourse to another one which, in its turn, may either be his own creation or belong to another culture. This view of cultural behaviours is opposed to that approach of cultural determinism, often labelled by some scholars *culturalism*, a theory that developed with the works of M. Mead, R. Benedict and A. Kardiner in the 1930s. The latter spoke of "*the personal configuration which is adopted by all the members of society because it is the outcome of an early common experience*" (quoted in Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 86)⁹. *Culturalism* is by all means questioned by the very existence of cultural pluralism, referred to in the Introduction, which proves that individuals are not, to use Bidney's words, "*passive vehicles and instruments*" of culture (quoted in *ibid.*: 87).

Culturalism, with its generalising assumptions, is often a basis for false representations as it takes all the members of a cultural group as a homogeneous entity sharing the same opinions and behaviours since they have all grown within the same culture. As it will be evinced in Chapter Two, the ideology of Occidentalism in Algeria, and the Arab world in general, has subscribed wholly to this theory of culture as it considers that all those who belong to the 'West' bear the same feelings towards the non-westerners, feelings of enmity and stigmatisation since, according to Occidentalists, they carry the same 'Western' culture which is the antithesis of Arab-Islamic culture.

A less common conception of culture is put forward by people like Marcuse who, in his analysis of advanced industrial societies, viewed it as

⁹ (MOT)

the *spiritual world* where men try to find the psychological solace for their life hardships and sufferings. He establishes an antithetical relationship between culture and civilisation as he assumes that the former is purely idealistic and metaphysical and the latter socially real. What men, according to Marcuse, are actually unable to achieve or attain is realised or, at least, longed for in fancy. This helps men accept the rugged reality they live in through the various outlets, such as religion, sport and art, which provide hope and aspiration and soothe worries and disturbance. Mauk and Oakland have thus noted that certain values in American culture, associated with symbols such as individualism, egalitarianism, liberty, self-reliance, form layers of idealism and abstraction which often conflict with American reality (1998: 5) This is what Marcuse calls the *culture of affirmation* which disguises, and even justifies, the hard conditions of life. As he writes:

[This] *conception of culture...takes the part of the spiritual world against the material world, opposing culture, as the embodiment of real valuations and the end itself, to the social world of utility. ... This conception separates culture from civilisation and puts a distance between them sociologically...*¹⁰

(Marcuse 1970: 109)

The very essence of this culture, found in advanced industrial societies, is that, while culture is by essence particular to a given group, it boasts to be universal, transcending the limits of ethnicity, religion and nationhood. It is thus professed as a sermon to the entire humanity advocating equality in rights and duties as well as opportunities. Marcuse (ibid.: 115) rejects this culture and claims that the sole universal thing about it is the necessity to abolish it. He promptly states that “*satisfaction is not possible without a struggle against the idealistic culture, and it is only in opposition to this culture that it may appear as a universal exigency.*”¹¹

¹⁰ (MOT)

¹¹ (MOT)

Closer to the conception of culture which best serves and justifies the purposes of this work is the following understanding. Clarke, Hall, Jefferson and Roberts hold culture, not for the human group's product and way of existence, i.e. not as a possession, but rather for the sense this group makes of this existence (Giroux et al. 1994: 7), or what Wald (1992: 28) labels the group's *common consciousness*. This consciousness has historical, social as well as political bases that allow a particular group to assert what is intrinsic or extrinsic to their own culture. Culture is that collective power that society acquires to “*authorize, to dominate, to legitimate, demote, interdict, and validate*” (Said 2000a: 227) through a saturating system of values and representations that creates an environment where people feel they belong to. This feeling of belonging develops a sense of identity, a national identity, that is threatened by anything that puts into question the system's values.

In this Saidian sense, culture can only be hegemonic and exclusive by means of “*its vindicated power as a victor over everything not itself*” (ibid.: 228). It is the hegemonic character of culture which induces individual resistance of those community members, such as intellectuals, who do not agree with the values imposed by their national culture. These *renegades* are then demoted and face social hostility and opposition. Commenting on this resistance of individual consciousness to culture, as a collective consciousness, Said writes:

Often it has come from individuals or groups declared out of bounds or inferior by the culture (here of course the range is vast, from the ritual scapegoat to the lonely prophet, from the social pariah to the visionary artist, from the working class to the alienated intellectual).

(Ibid.: 229)

On the basis of this conception of culture, it can be stated that the students' negative attitudes are the logical outcome of the society's, or at least part of it, understanding and evaluation of the process of acculturation in its relationship to the first process of enculturation. Acculturation, as a set of phenomena that bring changes in the cultures that are in contact over a period of time (Basdide 1971: 98; Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 45), is viewed as a threat to enculturation as a collective consciousness and the individual's process of socialisation in his native community. Acculturation is understood then, as expressed by Abdallah-Pretceille (ibid.: 47), as *acculturation*, i.e. the deprivation of culture, or rather the deprivation of the original culture, to be replaced by the foreign culture, a phenomenon that some scholars in culture studies rather label *deculturation*¹². In this sense, acculturation is judged as a gradual extinction of the native culture by means of a chain reaction of substitution (Bastide 1971: 54) which is triggered off by the first contact with the foreign culture, as the case may be in a foreign language classroom. Acculturation is also seen as being destructive of group membership which is expressed by the group members' common attitudes, which are mainly acquired, according to Saville-Troike (2003: 183), during the process of enculturation.

This threat is all the more accentuated as acculturation actually and necessarily operates alterations in the set of schemata of the native culture¹³. These alterations are viewed by mainstream culture, and by those for whom the status quo is advantageous, as a favourable environment for the development of what Durkheim called *anomie*, i.e. "a feeling of

¹² This question of the relationship between acculturation and deculturation was the subject of a UNESCO conference as early as 1980: "Phenomenon of acculturation and of deculturation in contemporary world", Paris, November 3-5.

¹³ This view of acculturation is confirmed by Byram (1989: 109) who claims that, while culture study is the study of its schemata, the study of acculturation is the study of the gradual changes that occur in these schemata. Actually, the study of acculturation is also the study of the changes that take place in the representations held by the members of both the native culture and the target one.

dissatisfaction with one's role in society" (Stern 2001: 380), a state which induces the questioning and eventually the rejection of some of the most cherished principles of the culture. To counteract anomie, society and the dominant group in society often activate mechanisms to curb it, among which *machiavellianism*, or "*the tendency to manipulate*" (ibidem.), is used by ideology, as the case of Occidentalism in Algeria (see Chapter Two).

This negative view of acculturation places then foreign culture learning or experience in foreign language classes in a suspicious position. Actually, this view is reductive as it singles out one process of acculturation only, called by many scholars *assimilation*, in which "*members of the receiving group eliminate radically their ethno-cultural-identity to embrace another one, ceasing to be themselves in order to be others.*" (Abou 1981: 59)¹⁴ This process is now considered as almost unrealistic as groups never reach this state of deculturation. Besides, acculturation is almost unavoidable as it occurs in various forms and situations such as immigration, slavery, colonisation, wars, as well as the foreign language classroom. Distance has long ceased to be an obstacle to acculturation thanks to the devastating development of media and information technology in the last thirty years, something which rendered cultural isolationism as unrealistic as deculturation.

Actually, acculturation is a natural continual process that is initiated since childhood in the individual's interaction with his ever-expanding environment or ecology. As rightly expressed by Byram:

As the child grows, its social space expands and with it its knowledge. The advantage of linking the concept of social space with that of knowledge schemata is that a link can be made from the analysis of the psychological process of acculturation to the analysis of cultural meanings as they are embodied in the adult

¹⁴ (MOT)

world, in their 'finished' shape.

(Byram 1989: 107)

Abou (1981: 57-59) describes other processes of acculturation which cannot be categorised as deculturation as they rather add up to the original native culture. He states:

- The process of reinterpretation: only the material life is influenced; thoughts and feelings remain intact. This is the case, for instance, of Japan which, in the second half of the nineteenth century according to Demorgon (2000: 28), adapted western industrialisation without a perceptible impact on the Japanese traditional culture.
- The process of synthesis: a state whereby both thoughts and feelings are influenced in both cultures in contact, something which often induces the emergence of innovations in both of them.
- The process of syncretism: a state in which the material and moral lives are totally altered, something which results in the development of a new culture.

The observation of the reality of cultures in the world shows that all these processes combine and integrate the natural evolution of cultures in contact, even in states of domination as both the dominant and the dominated cultures are altered. Actually, it is rather the concept of acculturation which seems to be no longer operative to describe the intercultural experiences that take place at the meeting of two cultures, whether peacefully or violently, closely or from a distance, within or out of a pedagogical context. Devereux (1972) has suggested the concept of *antagonistic acculturation* to refer to that situation where cultural alterations occur even when the members of the host culture attempt to prevent it, or precisely because they do so.

Demorgon (2000: 39) rather prefers to speak of *interculturalisation*, a state of cultural exchange as an outcome of borrowings, influence, opposition and resistance. According to him, opposition and resistance to a foreign culture offer more opportunities for *interculturalisation* than the passive reception and submission of the host culture. The main implication in the use of the concept of *interculturalisation* is the fact that the two cultures in contact have both the status of host and provider, even in a rapport of domination. “*Interculturalisation*,” writes Demorgon (ibidem), “*is primary: it is its basis that cultures perform together while isolating themselves and fighting each other.*”¹⁵

With the concept of *interculturalisation*, *otherness*, i.e. the relation to the *other*, is redefined in terms of what Demorgon calls *interness* (intérité) instead of cultural purity. *Interness* implies continual transfer of cultural content between cultures that necessarily plays havoc with the so-called cultural homogeneity. This transfer may take various forms according to the conditions within which contact is established. These forms range, according to Demorgon, from *osmosis* to *crisis*, with intermediate forms such as *transplant* and *hybridisation*. These variations are determined by the degree of violence that underlies the transfer.

Osmosis is a smooth, sometimes unconscious, process of *interculturalisation*. It often takes place through immigration as second generation immigrants tend to go astray from their parents' culture to come closer to the mainstream one, something which develops a new one. First generation immigrants rather undergo the process of *transplant* as they get slowly influenced by mainstream culture that replaces part of their native one.

¹⁵ (MOT)

Intercultural *hybridisation* is a very common process of interculturalisation where contact between cultures brings a practice from one culture to merge into one from the second culture to produce a brand new one. The example of styles of music often hybridise to give a different style is a case in point. On the contrary, *Interculturalisation by crisis* can be violent in two ways. First, a cultural practice can be imposed because of the domination of one culture over the other, whether by sheer force or by controlling the means of diffusion such as the media. Second, it is violent as the introduction of a new cultural practice may occur at the expense of the native culture practice, viewed, at least by the members of the host culture, as a sign of decadence. The use of the cell phone and internet, which invaded slow-developing societies like Algeria, has probably induced damages in the native cultures which used to favour more interpersonal relationships.

Despite the variety in types of *interculturalisation*, it is observed that these forms may well coexist within the same community or society that is a context for intense and active intercultural experiences. Yet, what brings societies to adopt a positive or negative approach to acculturation or interculturalisation is the degree of their members' acceptance of new and confusing situations, i.e. the degree of what Chapelle and Roberts (1986) label *ambiguity tolerance*¹⁶. Originally applied to language, this concept that refers to a personality variable is implemented here to express the extent to which individuals and societies are ready to cope with the confusion and questioning in their own culture when exposed to a foreign one, and their

¹⁶ Ehrman (1999: 75) distinguishes three levels of ambiguity tolerance, which we can adapt to the intercultural situation:

1. Intake: the penetration of the foreign culture information into the individual's conceptual schema constructed by his native culture.
2. Tolerance of ambiguity proper: successful accomplishment of intake by dealing with contradictions.
3. Accommodation: the making of discriminations between the input of each culture, the native and the foreign, and the setting of priorities, hierarchies and the final options and integration which induce the restructuring of the individual's schemata, i.e. the mergence of what Kramsch (2001) calls the *third culture*.

capacity to moderate the cultural shock and clash and turn it into a positive experience of give-and-take between their native culture and the foreign one.

In the case of Algerian students, their negative attitudes stems precisely from the low degree of ambiguity tolerance in the intercultural situation of the foreign language and culture class. This phenomenon is due to the influence of their ecology, mainly the political-religious ideologies such as Occidentalism, which favours the strengthening of the *ego boundary*, and consequently the weakening of ambiguity tolerance.

Borrowed from psychoanalytic theory (Hartmann 1991), ego boundary is defined as "*the degree to which individuals compartmentalize their experience*" (Ehrman 1999: 68). It is the psychological line that delineate the 'self', with all its declensions such as one's own culture, from the *other*, with all its declensions like the *other's* culture. It influences then the receptivity of individuals to outside input, and in the case of foreign cultures, to the extent to which they are open to discourses contrary to that of their native culture and environment. Thus thickness and thinness of ego boundary affects the degree of *tolerance of ambiguity*, the capacity to cope with confusing situations that may induce temporary frustrations. Tolerance of ambiguity, in its turn, determines the learning of foreign languages and cultures as it makes the learner patient to learn by perceiving "*such situations as acceptable*" (Stern 2001: 382).

Thickness in ego boundary results in resistance to learning, questioning, and reconsideration of native culture schemata and representations, while thinness allows room for the integration of new and different cultural traits and visions. In this sense, Ehrman writes:

Flexible ego boundaries are related to disinhibition and potentially to openness to unconscious process, they tend to promote empathy and the ability to take in another language and culture.

(Ehrman 1999: 76)

Although ego boundary is in a large measure a personality characteristic that may differ from one individual to another within the same culture, it can be said that ecology, through native culture and the dominant ideology, contributes substantially in thickening or thinning it, to the point that it may become common to a great number of the members of one community or society. In the case of Algerian students, and as this will be clarified in the next two chapters, the dominant discourse of Occidentalism has helped reinforcing ego boundary in relation to foreign cultures, something which has induced the negative attitudes observed among some students. Reinforcement of the cultural ego boundary, by Occidentalism, has been achieved mainly through cultural self-congratulation, i.e. the overestimation of one's native culture, coupled with hostility and aggression towards the *other's* culture. Occidentalism has attributed more importance to differences based on culture, religion and race than to those based on socio-economic or politico-historical categories. These negative attitudes inhibit the intercultural experience by neutralising the process of empathy, a necessary mechanism to the optimisation of intercultural encounters.

Ideology in the pedagogical context, mainly as one of the main creators and feeders of representations, plays sometimes a negative role as it stands between the student and the other sources of knowledge, representing itself as the most reliable and truthful source, especially in its discourse about morality, *otherness*, and cultures. Whether through the textbook, television or the press, ideology enjoys various channels of accessibility to students' self-representations or representations of the *other*, and has thus a substantial capacity to fashion them and divert them from opposing sources of knowledge that can threaten the status quo. Bourdieu (1977: 15) rightly

observed that: “*We do not buy a newspaper but rather a generating principle of stands*”¹⁷ or of opinions, a view shared by Doise (1989: 228) who admits that representations are symbolic stands, organised in various manners such as “*opinions, attitudes or stereotypes*”. These opinions, when they are taken for granted and fully adhered to by students, prevent efficient learning in class as they relegate all the other sources, be it the teacher, the book, or any other document, to the position of a dangerous, false discourse.

By permeating the process of representation, ideology permeates one of the main socially elaborated and shared processes of knowledge which has, to quote Candelier (1997: 46), the “*practical objective of constructing a reality shared by the whole society*”¹⁸. Moreover, this process of knowledge, described by Py (2004: 8) as a ready-for-use micro-theory, is viable especially in the absence of argumentation, and legitimised by the fact that it is wide diffusion. As such, ideology in the educational context, by constructing false representations about the *other*, becomes an insurmountable obstacle to one of the main criteria of effective cross-cultural encounters: empathy.

Empathy, as the capacity of “*appreciation, possibly in a detached manner, of the identity of another individual or culture*” (Arnold & Brown 1999: 19), and as an important component of intercultural competence¹⁹, is essential to intercultural encounters as it brings the individual to understand

¹⁷ (MOT)

¹⁸ (MOT)

¹⁹ Lustig and Koester (1999: 66-73) list the major components of intercultural competence, something which suggests that foreign language learning involves more than communicative competence along with the importance of affective factors:

Respect, orientation to knowledge, empathy, interaction management, task role behaviour, ambiguity tolerance, and interaction posture.

Zarate (2004: 43) defines cultural competence as the ability “*to read the significant gaps and the places where they get full sense*” (MOT), as opposed to the apparent differences that are not faithful to the real nature of the cultures in contact, and which people often stick to, thus avoiding to seize their real essence.

the *other*, identify with him, by mitigating the certainty of his cultural norms and admitting the right of the *other* to have different ones, and even 'right' ones, a phenomenon labelled *cultural relativity* (see Chapter Four).

It is then the lack of empathy, due to a lack of *cultural relativity*, which is partly responsible for the students' negative attitudes towards the foreign culture. The weaker empathy is, the stronger is then the ethnocentric view of the world and the relation to the *other*. Defined as “*centrality of culture*” (Stewart & Bennett 1991: 161), ethnocentrism neutralises empathy as it is the tendency to take one’s particular values, assumptions, customs and social norms as the ‘absolute truth’, thus becoming closed and impermeable to any other discourse produced by a foreign culture²⁰. When ethnocentrism is pushed to its utmost logic, or more accurately its utmost illogic, the individual views his “*own community as superior and other groups inferior*” (Stern 2001: 379). What inhibits positive cross-cultural experiences is the fact that an ethnocentric personality is often uncritical of one’s culture, prone to prejudice, and more importantly, approaches the *other* in terms of stereotypes.

Ethnocentrism, as a matter of fact, is not expressed in the same way, nor does it induce the same consequences in different cultures and contexts. European ethnocentrism, by claiming the superiority of its values, did also claim their universality, and this formed the basis for the whole European colonial campaigns in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As stated by Abdallah-Preteille, universality advocated by European

²⁰ From a psychological point of view, ethnocentrism is viewed as the ego’s tendency to construct a referential norm that is never objectivised (Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 118). This means that the ethnocentric personality never confronts its norms to the reality of events which can put them into question. From another perspective, ethnocentrism is also the human obsessive worry to find a place in the vast world. In an anthropological sense, ethnocentrism is “*a group’s attitude of attributing to itself a central place in relation to the others, of positively valuing its achievements and particularities, and of having a projective behaviour towards those who do not belong to it, and who are viewed through its mode of thought.*” (ibid.: 119) (MOT)

ethnocentrism:

is all the more negative that it is politically expressed through expansionism. Western ethnocentrism is doubled, actually, with the attribution of values and the making of a hierarchical system of cultures, something which gives it an ideological nature, or at least, induced ideological manipulations.²¹

(Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 120)

This type of ethnocentrism, despite its negative character, brought peoples into contact, whether through colonialism, or through imperialism as it is still the case with American imperialism. However, ethnocentrism in Arab-Islamic countries, under the influence of such ideologies as Islamism and Occidentalism, rather claims distinction and divine election, and favours separation between categories which are established on the basis of their confessional specificities: Muslims versus non-Muslims.

This chain reaction that induces the thickening of ego boundary, which reduces ambiguity tolerance and blocks empathy, which, in their turn, prevent cultural relativity, and finally develops in the students negative attitudes, is based on a particular conception of identity. The relevance of identity to intercultural experiences lies in the fact that it is, according to Erik H. Erikson, the individual's awareness and conception of his distinction from others and the others' recognition of this distinction (quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 38). Said also defines identity in terms of the relationship one establishes with the *other*:

The construction of identity – for identity, whether of Orient or Occident, France or Britain, while obviously a repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction - involves establishing opposites and 'others' whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from 'us'. Each age and society re-creates its 'Others'.

(Said 1995: 332)

²¹ (MOT)

Socialisation within a particular community brings the individual to be aware, beyond his personal identity, of a cultural identity that he shares, or thinks he shares, with the other members of his community. Bekombo (1980: 13) admits that cultural identity is but a person's idea about himself as a member of a group, a view shared by Levi-Strauss (1964: 10) who considers that cultural identity, as well as culture, functions like myths.

Whether mythic or real, cultural identity becomes central to intercultural experiences inasmuch as the individual's attitude and behaviour are determined by the degree to which he feels his cultural identity is threatened by his contact with the *other*, mainly because, as explained by Devereux (1972: 39), confrontation with and differentiation from the *other* is the dynamic to the development of an ethnic identity²². This threat is measured by the capacity of the *other's* culture to break what the group has in common. Part of this commonness is the group's shared representation of the *other* and of his own culture, mainly in relation to that group and its culture. As Zarate put it:

*Because sharing representations is expressing one's adherence to the group, affirming a social link and contributing to its reinforcement, representations are part of the process of defining social identity.*²³

(Zarate 2004: 30)

The relationship between culture and representations is established by the process of reification of culture. As seen with Said's definition of culture, it is a human-made abstract phenomenon that is objectivised and comes to exercise a major influence on its creator, i.e. the human being. Culture can then only be subjective, that is, people view themselves and the others on

²² Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a: 38) states that the relationship between the Self and the *other* is an integral part of identity, be it ethnic, psychosocial, collective, cultural or personal.

²³ (MOT)

the basis of their own conception of things, not as they really are. The view of the *other* is thus a representation, which has little chance to correspond to reality. On the basis of these representations, opinions are formed and attitudes are expressed (Doise 1989: 228; Jodelet 1994: 36)

1.5. Representations

The concept of representation²⁴, borrowed from social psychology where it was first tackled by S. Moscovici (1976), has become central to understanding educational issues such as the one dealt with here. It is mainly epitomised in Sartre's (1966: 62)²⁵ statement: "*The world that we know is the one we make.*" Representations, as the outcome of an individual's interaction with his immediate social environment or ecology at large (Abdallah-Preteuille 2004a: 30), are mental constructions used to perceive and evaluate reality, something that had long been rejected by behaviourists such as Bloomfield or Skinner (Nuchèze & Colletta 2002: 171). They go beyond cultural schemata which are *structures of expectation* (Kramsch 2000: 27) drawn from previous experience and used to interpret situations, expect behaviour, and react accordingly, within one's culture or outside it.

Although schemata and representations both "*point,*" as put forward by Byram (1989: 110), "*in the same direction and offer a reasonable basis for discussing the nature of exposure to experience of a foreign culture*", yet, schemata are rather cognitive structures, acquired and/or learned, while representations are mostly psychological/emotional categories acquired

²⁴ The concept of representation is cross-disciplinary, as shown by Porcher (1997), as it has been used in philosophy, sociology, psychology, social psychology and educational sciences, since the early days of Aristotle and later Schopenhauer, Durkheim, Freud, Lévy-Bruhl, Piaget and Weber.

²⁵ (MOT)

and/or constructed unconsciously. One way to distinguish between these two mental categories may be the fact that when views of oneself or the *other* are confirmed by reality, they are then schemata, while when they divert from it, they remain representations which are expressed through stereotypes or prejudices.

Representations do not necessarily have this utilitarian function as they may be held, yet remain dormant as long as they are not called upon, a view quite upheld by people like Mondada and Pekarek (2000). The peculiarity of representations lies, though, mainly in the fact that, while they grow out of the interaction between individuals, once they are well-constructed, they organise and direct this interaction since they become almost the sole mediators between individuals and between the individual and his environment.

The main concern here is social representations, i.e. the group's imagination of one's position in the world and its relationships with the other groups which are believed to possess different cultures. As opposed to individual representations, which are the individual's imagination of his own position as a member of his community or society and personal perceptions and projections, social representations are collective conceptions that are shared by a cultural group. They are social as they involve social rapports, and they are collective in the sense that they become the group's mode of knowing the world, i.e. "*processes of mediation between concept and perception*" (Moscovici 1976: 302)²⁶ that result from the very interrelations and contacts between members of the same group and across different groups.

They are approximations (Moore 2001: 10) that compartmentalise reality

²⁶ (MOT)

according to the pertinence of a particular element. For instance, some Algerians' representation of a particular group, such as the Americans, may have a negative representation, while another one, such as the Swedish, may have a positive one, despite the fact they are generally viewed as belonging to the same general category referred to as the 'West'. In this sense, representations retain only elements that may justify prejudiced behaviours or favourable ones. As a "*form of practical knowledge*" (Nuchèze & Colletta 2002: 172), they are inescapably part of the individual's database that helps him decide on the most appropriate and suitable actions in various situations. They are, to use Maisonneuve's words, "*spaces of opinions*" (quoted in *ibid.*: 16) which determine not only general behaviour, but also learning behaviours²⁷. As observed by Py:

*Social representations take their initial form through stereotyped primitive formulas and are then reformulated by attenuation, modalisation, reduction, or transfer to other fields of application...*²⁸

(Py 2000: 8)

In certain instances, representations acquire a greater importance as far as opinion and behaviour are concerned as they are the only sources of knowledge, as this will be advanced, about some students' views of the 'West'. In this case, negative attitudes can only be explained by the kind of representations they hold, representations which become the central "*mental schemata*" (Zarate 2004: 29), not only in the relation to the *other*, but also in defining one's identity, individual or ethnic.

Culture, as observed above, being the group's common consciousness,

²⁷ W. Doise (1979: 184), working on the linguistic behaviours of categories of the Swiss population speaking different regional dialects, has observed that the nature of the relationships between these groups, whether in a situation of competition or cooperation, affects to a great extent, not only their readiness to learn each other's language, but also each group's tendency to accentuate its regional accent so as to distinguish themselves from the others.

²⁸ (MOT)

and representations being part of the shared cultural patrimony, the latter functions as the mechanism that gives the impression or the illusion²⁹ of a common identity³⁰. “*We are alike because we represent people and things in the same way*” would be the underlying principle of a common cultural/national identity. Here lies the role of ideology whose function is to provide myths to sustain the national illusion (see Chapter Two), and this explains also the fact that variety and proliferation of subcultures questions even the existence of a real national culture.

The relation between representation and culture can probably explain the availability of a great many behaviours and views within the same cultural group where we expect certain homogeneity. This is due to the fact that representations, as psychological phenomena, are at the crossroads of a strictly individual domain and the social one. As stated by Bonardi and Roussiau (1999: 18): “*social representations are generated by individuals, but also acquired from society; thus reproducing the social ... as well as the new.*”³¹.

Moreover, representations, not only across communities but also within the same community, are not peacefully juxtaposed. They are often in competition, depending on the types of discourse they emerge from and the people who produce this discourse. As it will explicitly be demonstrated in

²⁹ The illusion of culture is equivalent to that of the truth of language which Nietzsche (1954: 46-47) describes as “*a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are.*”

³⁰ Beacco (2000: 30) advances a quite interesting view of culture. He admits that, beyond the fact of sharing a common patrimony, culture expresses a group’s will to remain together. This brings certain cultures to show more and more tolerance, and less and less prescription in order to achieve this goal and avoid to push its members to bear the status of black sheep.

³¹ (MOT). For some scholars, such as Grize (1998), social representations are exclusively individual phenomena as they refer to individual beliefs used to approach and interpret reality for the sake of taking appropriate action.

the next chapters, ideology, and most particularly, Occidentalism in Algeria, does a lot in producing a particular type of discourse which fashions and sustains some representations of the *other* (the 'West'), in a logic of conflict and opposition to other types of discourses and representations that are available in the Algerian society. Those who are likely to hold power and exercise domination, socially and politically, are those who are capable of imposing, by force or consent, their discourse and their representations. As Zarate wrote it:

*Representations do not coexist in a mere relation of juxtaposition, but in a competing space where the stakes are those of a symbolic struggle for a social, and sometimes political, recognition.*³²

(Zarate 2004: 31)

The transfer of social representations to other fields of application occurs in education in the case of foreign language and culture learning, mainly because they affect the individual learning behaviour. Here, they intervene in this pedagogical context and play a substantial role in directing learners' attitudes towards the subjects studied. In language learning, two types of representations interfere: language representations and social representations. As observed in the Introduction, there is a clear-cut distinction between these two types as one can be negative while the second is positive. The representation of the English language is positive among many Algerian students, while some of the cultures underlying this language, such as American culture, may have a negative representation among the same students.

The distinction between language representations and social representations is probably not natural, since "*there is no language,*" as put by Poirier (1989: 2), "*without a message, there is no message without the*

³² (MOT)

*intention to signify, and there is no signification without a reference system*³³ This distinction is often the result of a deliberate action, much like a nuclear fission, undertaken by ideologies that purpose to split language from culture. As it will be made clear in the next chapters, this split, in Algeria and most of the Arab-Islamic countries, is operated by some currents of thought for the sake of preserving younger generations from any 'negative' influence that foreign cultures may induce.

What is peculiar with social representations, as compared to language representations, as far as foreign language learning is concerned, is the fact that when they are negative about a particular culture, they do not prevent from learning language, since language learning is sustained by positive language representations. In the case of Algerian students, the negative representations of American culture, though they induce negative attitudes towards this culture and thus prevent students from fully experiencing it and taking advantage of its benefits, yet, they do not deter English language learning.

In this matter, Py (2004: 13) advanced a distinction between representation of reference and representation of use. The first are abstract and collective, and generally expressed through, for instance, maxims and proverbs, without necessarily being effectuated through the behaviour of members of a cultural group. Negative representations about an ethnic group³⁴ do not always induce negative behaviours towards that group.

³³ (MOT). J.-C. Abric defines social representations as a system of interpretation of reality: "*Social representations*," he writes, "*are the product and process of a mental activity by which an individual reconstitutes and attributes a specific signification to the reality he faces.*" (Quoted in Nuchèze & Colletta 2002: 171) (MOT) These representations, according to Moscovici (1976: 39), are expressed and observed through "*a speech, a gesture, an encounter, in a daily environment.*"

³⁴ F. Barth suggests four features found in a population designated by the concept ethnic group:

1. *is biologically self-perpetuating;*
2. *shares fundamental cultural values, realised in overt unity in cultural forms;*

Representations of use, however, are often unconscious as they determine the behaviours of some individuals who are not always capable of explaining them. Representations of use about women, in certain societies, induce discriminatory treatment by individuals who cannot explain why they adopt such attitudes towards this category of society.

These two types of representation coexist together and form social representations in general. Social representations involve imagination of various aspects of life. Charaudeau (2003: 376) enumerates some of these aspects, out of which four can be considered as the main ramifications of social representations. These representations, which differ from one culture to another, show the inextricable link between culture and representations as imagination:

- Imagination of space: it is the way a cultural group views its geographical territory and the relationship they think they should have with it. It often determines people's opinion about exile and immigration.

- Imagination of time: it is the way a cultural group views its past, present and future, and the importance each has for the life of the group. For many Algerians, especially under the influence of Occidentalism (see Chapter Two), the past holds a higher position which relegates the present and future to the status life auxiliaries.

- Imagination of social relations: it is the way a cultural group views the relations between its members and the behaviours they should adopt in society. This determines the group's self-representation

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3. *makes up a field of communication and interaction;*
 4. *has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order. (Quoted in Byram 1989: 52)*

and, thus, the identification of its interests that are considered as vital to its survival as a distinct group. This induces in parallel the next ramification, the imagination of the *other*, as self-representation is often enshrined as a reference model³⁵ according to which all other representations outside the self are formed (Cain 1995: 6).

- Imagination of the *other*: it is the way a cultural group views the people who are outside the group because they have a different culture, and thinks about the kind of relations they should have with them. It induces rapports of cooperation, competition, adversity, hostility, or enmity.

The relationship of representations to education lies in the very fact that they are related to everything about Man as a social being. The way people represent themselves and the others exercises an influence on their daily life including the way and what they learn. Foucault seized the importance of representations when writing:

*... there will not be a science of Man unless we tackle the way individuals and groups represent their partners, in production and exchange, the mode in which they lighten, ignore or mask this functioning and the position they hold, the way they represent society where it takes place, the way they feel integrated to or isolated from it, dependent, submitted or free.*³⁶

(Foucault 1966: 364)

Moscovici (1976: 310) concurs to say that representations are symptomatic of the state of society as their change signals a change in

³⁵ The status of self-representations as models of reference, especially in people's approach to foreign cultures, can well be observed in class through students' reactions to the lesson and their comments. In a lesson on American Puritan heritage in my American civilisation seminar, I singled out the similarities between Puritan theology and Islam. One of my second year students made a quite revealing comment about Puritans: "So, *they are good, since they are like us.*" His positive self-representation brought to have a positive evaluation of the Puritans since their religion shares common points with his.

³⁶ (MOT)

society and its culture. In this sense, representations are by no means static, and are rather subject to alteration and modification over time depending on the influences society undergoes, such as ideologies. As it will clearly be stated in the Second Chapter, representations of the *other* in Algeria, mainly among students, are greatly affected by the propagandist work of ideologies such as Occidentalism, and the degree of *misrepresentation* in these representations is directly proportional to the degree to which a student adheres to such an ideology.

The pertinence of representation in the study of Man in his various life activities is also due to its three-dimensional permeation:

- Individual belief: the personal representation of the immediate environment determines the beliefs one holds, and consequently his attitudes towards whatever goes against them;
- Cultural identity: the representation of the native community underlies the individual's sense of identity and belonging, and subsequently his relations to other cultural communities;
- Political and religious identity: the representation of political and religious symbols establishes the individual's loyalty to political and religious organisations, and this influences his view and behaviour towards the ideas and organisations that differ from or contradict his own.

These three dimensions are essential when individuals are exposed to foreign discourses and cultures as they are the determinant criteria in what Guimelli (1994) labels *ancrage* (anchoring), which allows the

interpretation³⁷, adaptation, or rejection of a new cultural fact or trait on the basis of a familiar one.

When social representations concern intercultural experiences they are often designated by the term cultural representations. As advanced by Kramsch (1991), they correspond to the outcome of all what society produces in terms of imagination, such as myths, beliefs and knowledge based on generation-long experiences, which serves to define the *other*, i.e. those who do not belong to the same cultural group, and the relation to them. They are also cultural because they are collective and lasting, and their change marks and signals the change in the group's culture, whether smoothly, over time, or abruptly, after a crisis.

Whether it is considered as a defect or as a quality, the main characteristic of cultural representations is that they are, to use Sperber's (1996: 71) word, *contagious*. In this sense, negative cultural representations are to be considered as an epidemic, i.e. the small number of those who hold them in a society should not be a deterrent to their study and the search for solutions to correct them since the number of those people grows gradually. This is what Sperber labels an *epidemiology of representations* (ibidem.). In this matter, Said, as early as the 1970s, expressed the necessity of a field of study on representations as they are embedded in the culture, institutions and political environment of the *representer*.

... we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is eo ipso implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the 'truth,' which is itself a

³⁷ Sperber (1996: 52) defines the process representation as a continual cyclic process of interpretation of public and mental/individual representations, both of which make up the process of communication. As he writes: "*An interpretation is the representation of a representation by another one by virtue of content similarity. In this sense, a public representation, whose content resembles the mental representation which it transmits, is an interpretation, and vice versa.*" (MOT)

representation. What this must lead us to methodologically is to view representations ... as inhabiting a common field of play defined for them ... by some common history, tradition, universe of discourse.

(Said 1995: 272)

Teaching culture, and more specifically foreign culture, is also taking into consideration the two types of representation, of use and reference, found in the foreign culture, as they underlie what J.L. Martinand call *social practices of reference* (see Raisky & Caillot 1996: 22-23) that direct, not only social choices, but also didactic ones. These practices, based on the economic and social situation of society, they are what society has fixed as the representative and most appropriate behaviours that all its members ought to adopt. In a cross-cultural situation, it is the confrontation between the social practices of reference the representations of use and reference of the native culture and the target one that is the dynamic of the cross-cultural experience. It is the balance in this confrontation that determines the success or failure of this experience.

In the absence of an epidemiology of representations, whether in the native or target culture, cultural representations are pushed to their utmost logic and give birth to the most rigid views of and approaches to the *other*, prejudices and stereotypes, considered as “*the grotesque form of social representations*” (Preiswerk & Perrot 1975: 239)³⁸. The degree of adherence to prejudices and stereotypes, mainly due to the degree of ethnocentrism, is the most responsible for the discrepancy between the behaviours, and learning behaviour in particular, from one individual to another, and in this case, from one student to another. Probably, the most problematic characteristic of prejudices and stereotypes is their tendency to

³⁸ The development of representations into stereotypes is not automatic. Actually, the more representations depart from reality and acquire rigidity and stability, the more they have probability to induce stereotypes (see Cain 1995: 6). This implies that when representations are closer to reality, the appearance of stereotypes is less likely to happen.

accommodate reality to the representation, instead of the opposite³⁹.

There is a need first to distinguish between prejudice and stereotype, though they are both unfounded generalisations based on quite stubborn and automatic value judgements (Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 111). While the prejudice is rather an opinion or view that may be subject to alteration and change, depending on individual experience, stereotype is a picture that seems to resist empirical experience. This resistance makes stereotypes far more spread within a community than prejudices which may vary according to the different experiences its members may have of the subject of prejudice.

The stereotype, as defined by Gordon, refers to “*images, concepts and attitudes which are shared by the same social group and which are considered by them as being right*” (quoted in *ibid.*: 112-113)⁴⁰. The stereotype is the outcome of an erroneous oversimplification of reality which is not directly experienced. Basing one’s opinion about an ethnic group on the way it is depicted in the media, by a particular ideology or historical experience induces the development of stereotypes about that group which do not necessarily correspond to facts as they tend to be overgeneralisations, transferable and inconsiderate of circumstances. They reveal, in this sense, “*the relations of tensions between groups in contact*” (Moore 2001: 14)⁴¹.

Views of the Jews in Algeria, for instance, are typical stereotypes as they are by no means based on direct experience Algerians have with this group,

³⁹ In Algeria, there is a popular saying that illustrates the resistance of representation despite the contradiction that reality provides. To express this, Algerians say: “*maaza walaw taref*” (it’s a goat even if it flies), meaning that a person is so stuck to and blinded by his representation that he doesn’t change his mind even when reality disproves him.

⁴⁰ (MOT)

⁴¹ (MOT)

but rather mediated by various types of media. Opinions about them are overgeneralisations as they do not take into account any particularity and apply negative features to all members of this group, which cannot actually be considered as a uniform group. They are transferable since they remain static over time and are sometimes drawn from historical experiences of past generations, and usually from religious descriptions (such as in the Koran). They are inconsiderate of circumstances as they do not admit any possible change despite the change in the political and social conditions of the relationships between this group and Algerians as part of the Arab-Islamic world.

These characteristics of the stereotype are mainly due to the fact that they are generally collective, i.e. held by the whole group or society. They often become identity markers, not only for those who hold them, but also of its subject group. Moore (ibidem) speaks here of *self-stereotypes* and *hetero-stereotypes*. On the one hand, self-stereotypes tend to be an integral part of the national identity to the point that rejecting them by a member of the group may expose him to the denial of his national identity by the rest of the group as it is seen as a threat to the group's cohesion. When you are Algerian, for example, you ought to have the general opinion about the Jews. On the other hand, hetero-stereotypes are markers of the subject group identity in the sense that it is the stereotype which defines the identity of an individual. For instance, the existence in Algeria of the stereotype which assumes that a Jew is malicious brings Algerians to designate any malicious person with the term Jew. This view is shared by Oesch-Serra and Py (1997) who claim that stereotypes can be criteria even for the definition of a speech community.

It is by no means here to claim that stereotypes are to be totally eradicated, something which would of course be impossible. Human beings

need stereotypes as a simple manner to approach the world (see Poirier 1988). *Stereotypisation*, as a process of categorisation, is an indispensable cognitive mechanism necessary for the processing of data for any human being (Moore 2001: 15). It gives sense by offering keys of interpretation of events. As Oesch-Serra and Py put it:

[Stereotypes are] *ready-made formulas, prefabricated semiotic elements, verbal catch-alls which circulate in a given community, and play the role of practical evidences, useful in a great number of situations.*⁴²

(Oesch-Serra and Py 1997: 31)

Yet, what is claimed here is the fact that stereotypes become obstacles to learning and truth when they are the only source of knowledge that supplants and discards all other sources. In an educational context, the resistance of stereotypes and prejudices is symptomatic of the failure of the acts of teaching and learning, both of which are supposed to enhance knowledge and mitigate stereotypes and prejudices. As explained by Marandon, stereotypes and prejudices “*appear when knowledge decreases and affect increases*” (quoted in *ibid.*: 111). The failure of educational institutions, like the university, to bring students to rely more on knowledge, as a mediator and maker of sense, in their approach to foreign cultures is a sign of a terrible dysfunction in the social institutions which allow much more room for other types of discourse-producers, like ideologies, to construct the people’s, and most particularly, pupils and students’, personality, and thus induce nonsense and negative attitudes that become a whole culture⁴³.

In this sense, students’ negative attitudes in Algeria towards the *other* can be deemed as a dysfunction of the social institutions which have come short

⁴² (MOT)

⁴³ Many scholars, however, tend to refute the link between attitudes and stereotypes, considering attitudes as individualised phenomena quite distinct from stereotypes which are collective evaluations of things (see Baker 1992).

of achieving one of their main roles: the socialisation of the individual within and outside of his small community. This dysfunction produces stereotypes which blurs diversity among the others and gives the impression of an irreconcilable opposition to one's model, itself considered as *the* norm. Viewing 'Westerners' as the same homogeneous body because they are supposed to be all Christians, in total opposition to us, because we are supposed to be all Muslims, is a stereotype which masks the reality of both the 'West' and us.

Stereotyping is part of the whole process of categorisation of individuals, i.e. the tendency to placing people into distinct and exclusive categories, on the basis of, for instance, nationality, religion, or geography. The less knowledge people have of the *other's* culture, the more his representation tends to categorisation which, according to Ladmiral and Lipiansky (1989: 206-207), consists in three processes:

- *Effect of contrast*: the accentuation of difference between groups;
- *Effect of stereotyping*: the fixing and generalisation of particular views;
- *Effect of assimilation*: the accentuation of similarities within the same group.

In education, categorisation stands all the more as an obstacle to learning as it prevents from perceiving real facts that contradict the assumptions that stem out of the three processes of categorisation. Though facts show a different thing, categorisation bounds the individual to keep all the attributes of the stereotype, which is, to use Said's (1995: 207) expression, "*an already pronounced evaluative judgement ... [and] an implicit program of action.*" This happens because of the very reason that difference and distinction between categories are established according to normative

models which do not exist in reality, at least not the extent to which stereotypes seem to claim it.

For example, such an assumption as ‘all Jews are anti-Palestinian’ prevents some Algerian students from the benefits of reading the writings of such Jews as Noam Chomsky, who has probably been a defender of the Palestinian cause more than many Arabs. With categorisation, the individual is effaced by the image, or the representation, of the group he is supposed to belong to, and all the features attributed to the group are inevitably endorsed by its individual members.

Abdallah-Preteille (2004a: 113-115) pinpoints four major mechanisms that help the development of stereotypes, and which sum up their characteristics that have already been mentioned above:

1. Generalisation: extension of a feature out of extrapolation from a single individual to the whole group. As Klineberg put it:

*... stereotypes are not inferred from a set of data: they are based on hearsays, rumours, anecdotes, in short, on testimonies which are not sufficient for generalisation.*⁴⁴

(Quoted in *ibid*: 113)

An observed feature in a particular experience with an individual belonging to a group is hypothetically attributed to all the members of the group.

2. Reductionism: a complex set of features of a group of people is presented in a simplistic way by reducing it into a caricature of the group which is far from being faithful to its reality. Such vast cultural entities as Europeans or Africans are reduced to simplistic groups

⁴⁴ (MOT)

based on religion or economic and technological categorisation.

3. Permanence: the generalisation of features and the reductionist view of a given group resist across space and time as pure conjectural and temporal opinions are transformed into “*fundamental and immutable truths*” (ibid: 114), which become postulates for any relationships with that group. Ante-colonial attitudes and relations between peoples, which at a certain time and in these particular conditions were justified, are sometimes kept as valid in post-colonial circumstances on either side, despite the change in the actual conditions. As Poirier (1988: 37) put it, people “*stick to the comfortable vision, and refuse to see the gap*” between their vision and the immediate experience.

4. Amalgamation: the integration of any other group into the stereotyped one by virtue of whatever common feature between the two groups. Thus, different groups are gathered under such designations as the Orient, the West, the Third World, Muslims, and Christians. Particularities are thus viewed as generalities. Other types of stereotypes operate in the opposite way, transforming a general feature, common to all human beings, into a one-group-specific feature. This is often done for self-praising, when describing one’s people as courageous, heroic, or determined, thus suggesting that the other peoples are not.

The interference of representations, and stereotypes as their most rigid expressions, in an educational situation consists in being obstacles to knowledge and learning by preceding any scientific formulation, since they are often part of the students’ prior burden at their arrival to the classroom, i.e. formed outside the educational institutions. Representations and

stereotypes, as *approximate embryos of conceptualisation* (Poirier 1989: 7)⁴⁵, form this obstacle as they influence perception of reality and are positioned in conflict with experience. Klineberg (1966: 80-81) explained the way they obstruct learning.

- He observed that when they are not guided by scientific objectivity, people tend to select elements of experience and integrate them to conscience on the basis of their conformity to already-established representations, thus discarding any contradicting ones.
- When this is pushed to its limits, an individual is capable of distorting, unwillingly, reality so as to match with his representations and stereotypes about the thing or group he is in contact with.
- Distortion of reality, effectuated by different individuals, helps sustaining and reinforcing the representations and stereotypes, by virtue of the confirmation they get out of the supposed distinct experiences of these different individuals.
- In front of these mechanisms, experiences and facts which contradict the representations and stereotypes held by a group are considered, to the best, as mere exceptions.

Todorov cleverly seized the negative implications of such psychological processes as representations and stereotypes as he writes:

*While it is indisputable that a superiority prejudice is an obstacle in the way of learning, we should also admit that equality prejudice is even worse, as it consists purely and simply in identifying the other with one's own 'ideal ego'.*⁴⁶

(Todorov 1982: 171)

⁴⁵ (MOT)

⁴⁶ (MOT)

1.6. Conclusion

As it will be stated in the next chapters, representations and stereotypes intervene in the pedagogical context as outside influences (in Algeria, political and religious ideologies), or to use Poirier's (1988: 33) words, the students' "*motivation is hindered from the outside, independently from what the teacher decides to do and from what the textbook he uses offers.*"⁴⁷ No matter how these representations and stereotypes are, positive or negative, they necessarily drift from reality (ibidem), thus creating a situation whereby students' expectations, extremely determined by these false images, are in opposition to a scientific discourse with which they can hardly be reconciled.

Beyond the indisputable utility of representations and stereotypes in any culture, they still stand as psychological inhibitions outside and inside the classroom by inducing students to cope with one of the most common principle among human beings, the principle of 'the least effort'. It is easier and far more comfortable to face the familiar than confront the unfamiliar, to find ready-made answers than strive for explanations, to be certain than doubt. What political and religious ideologies in Algeria have laid, as far as foreign language and culture students are concerned, is a substratum of stereotyped and representation-based picture of the *other* that jeopardises their very objective of engaging in a university education, by inducing in them negative attitudes that impede the realisation of this objective, i.e. finding their way out of the ethnocentric cocoon.

⁴⁷ (MOT)

1.7. Original Quotations

Page 46

L'attitude est une prédisposition psychique latente, acquise, à réagir d'une certaine manière à un objet.

(Lüdi & Py 1986: 97)

Page 52

من تعلم لغة قوم أمن شرهم

Page 59

La configuration personnelle qui est adoptée par l'ensemble des membres de la société parce qu'elle est le résultat de l'expérience qu'ils ont en commun.

(Kardiner, quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 86)

Page 60

[Cette] conception de la culture ... prend le parti du monde spirituel contre le monde matériel en opposant la 'culture' comme lieu des valeurs véritables et de la finalité en soi au monde social de l'utilité et de la médiateté. Cette conception sépare la culture de la civilisation et l'éloigne, sociologiquement ...

(Marcuse 1970: 109)

... la satisfaction n'est possible qu'avec une lutte contre la culture idéaliste, et c'est seulement en opposition à cette culture qu'elle pourrait apparaître comme une exigence universelle.

(Marcuse 1970: 115)

Page 63

Les membres du groupe récepteur éliminent radicalement leur identité ethno-culturelle pour endosser une autre identité, qu'ils cessent d'être eux-mêmes pour devenir autres.

(Abou 1981: 59)

Page 65

L'interculturation est première : c'est à partir d'elle que les cultures se produisent ensemble alors mêmes qu'elles s'isolent ou se combattent.

(Demorgon 2000: 39)

Page 69

On n'achète pas un journal mais un principe générateur de prises de position.

(Bourdieu 1977: 15)

C'est une forme de connaissance ... ayant une visée pratique et concourant à la construction d'une réalité commune à un ensemble social.

(Candelier 1997: 46)

(Footnote 19)

... la compétence culturelle se définit en ces termes par la lecture des écarts significatifs et des lieux où ils prennent leur sens.

(Zarate 2004: 43)

Page 70

(Footnote 20)

... l'attitude d'un groupe à s'accorder une place centrale par rapport aux autres groupes, à valoriser positivement ses réalisations et particularismes, et menant à un comportement projectif à l'égard des hors-groupes qui sont interprétés à travers le mode de pensée de l'engroupe.

(Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 119)

Page 71

Universalité d'autant plus négative qu'elle se traduit politiquement par l'expansionnisme. L'ethnocentrisme occidental se double, il est vrai, de l'attribution de valeurs et d'une hiérarchisation des cultures, ce qui lui confère un caractère idéologique ou, tout au moins, autorise les manipulations idéologiques.

(Abdallah-Pretceille 2004: 120)

Page 72

Puisque partager des représentations, c'est manifester son adhésion à un groupe, affirmer un lien social et contribuer à son renforcement, les représentations participent d'un processus de définition de l'identité sociale.

(Zarate 2004: 30)

Page 73

Le monde que nous savons est celui que nous faisons.

(Sartre 1966: 62)

Page 74

... un processus de médiation entre concept et perception.
(Moscovici 1976: 302)

Page 75

Les représentations sociales prennent leur forme initiale à travers des formules primitives stéréotypées et font ensuite l'objet d'un travail de reformulation par atténuation, modalisation, réduction ou déplacement du domaine d'application ...
(Py 2000: 8)

Page 76

Les représentations sociales sont générées par les individus, mais aussi acquises de la société; reproductrices du social... elles produisent en même temps de la nouveauté.
(Bonardi and Roussiau 1999: 18)

Page 77

Les représentations ne se côtoient pas dans une relation de simple juxtaposition, mais dans un espace concurrentiel où les enjeux sont ceux d'une lutte symbolique pour la conquête d'une reconnaissance sociale et parfois politique.
(Zarate 2004: 31)

... pas de langue sans message, pas de message sans intention de signifier, pas de signification sans système de référence.
(Poirier 1989: 2)

Page 78

(Footnote 33)

Les représentations sociales sont le produit et le processus d'une activité mentale par laquelle un individu ou un groupe reconstruit le réel auquel il est confronté et lui attribue une signification spécifique.
(Abric, quoted in Nuchèze & Colletta 2002: 171)

Page 80

Il n'y aura pas de science de l'homme que si on s'adresse à la manière dont les individus ou les groupes se représentent leurs partenaires, dans la production et dans l'échange, le mode sur lequel ils éclairent ou ignorent ou masquent ce fonctionnement et la position qu'ils y occupent, la façon dont ils se représentent la société où il a lieu, la manière dont ils se

sentent intégrés à elle ou isolés, dépendants, soumis ou libres.

(Foucault 1966: 364)

Page 82

(Footnote 37)

Une interprétation, c'est la représentation d'une représentation par un autre en vertu d'une similarité de contenu. En ce sens, une représentation publique dont le contenu ressemble à celui d'une représentation mentale qu'elle sert à communiquer est une interprétation, et il en va de même de la représentation mentale résultant de la compréhension d'une représentation publique.

(Sperber 1996: 52)

Page 84

... images, concepts et attitudes que la plupart des membres d'un même groupe social ont en commun et qu'ils considèrent comme justes...

(Gordon, quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 112-113)

...une mise en évidence des relations de tensions entre les différentes communautés en contact...

(Moore 2001: 14)

Page 86

Il s'agit de formules toutes faites, d'éléments sémiotiques préfabriqués, de passe-partout verbaux qui circulent au sein d'une communauté donnée et qui jouent le rôle d'évidences pratiques, utilisables dans le nombre le plus grand possible de situations.

(Oesch-Serra and Py 1997: 31)

Page 88

... les stéréotypes ne sont pas formés par induction à partir d'un ensemble de données : ils se fondent sur les 'on-dit', des rumeurs, des anecdotes, bref sur des témoignages qui ne suffisent pas à justifier une généralisation.

(Klineberg, quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 113)

Page 89

... on s'accroche à la vision confortable, on refuse de voir le décalage.

(Poirier 1988: 37)

Page 90

S'il est incontestable que le préjugé de supériorité est un obstacle dans la voie de la connaissance, il faut aussi admettre que le préjugé d'égalité en est un encore plus grand, car il consiste purement et simplement à identifier l'autre avec son propre 'idéal du moi'...

(Todorov 1982: 171)

Page 91

... la motivation des élèves est entravée de l'extérieur, indépendamment de ce que l'enseignant décide de faire et de ce que propose le manuel qu'il emploie...

(Poirier 1988: 33)

CHAPTER TWO

Occidentalism: An Ideology of Alliance Between Religion and Politics

2.1. Introduction.....	98
2.2. Debating the Concept of Ideology.....	100
2.3. Occidentalism as a Utilitarian Rationality to Approach Otherness.....	110
2.4. Criteria for the Definition of Occidentalism.....	113
2.5. Characteristics of Occidentalism.....	136
2.6. Occidentalism and Perceptive Effects.....	153
2.6.1.Situational Effects.....	155
2.6.1.1. Effects of Position.....	156
2.6.1.2. Effects of Disposition.....	157
2.6.2. Effects of Perspective.....	158
2.6.3. Epistemological Effects.....	160
2.6.4. Effects of Communication.....	162
2.7. Conclusion.....	166
2.8. Original Quotations.....	167

CHAPTER TWO

Occidentalism: An Ideology of Alliance Between Religion and Politics

Institutional practices which people draw upon without thinking often embody assumptions which directly or indirectly legitimize existing power relations. Practices may appear universal and commonsensical can often be shown to originate in the dominant class or the dominant bloc, and to have become naturalized. Where types of practice, and in many cases of discourse, function in this way to sustain unequal power relations, I shall say they are functioning ideologically.

(Fairclough 2001: 27)

2.1. Introduction

Due to their character of shared and commonly admitted opinions and beliefs within a given community, representations are a sort of *hearsay* which, according to Manuel Fernandez (2004: 99), "*carries the mark of a certain enunciative legitimacy*"¹ as public opinion. The main feature of public opinion is that it is what discourse analysts call *interdiscourse*, i.e. the "*others' words ... what has already been said*" (Authier-Revuz 1995: 117)². One of the means political power implements in order to be effective and secured is to precisely occupy this anonymous sphere of *interdiscourse*, as

¹ (MOT)

² (MOT)

a way to mould people's representations or public opinion. This strategy is undertaken by means of Ideology which purposes to transform particular interest-based ideas into public-shared ones. The main purpose of ideology is then to universalise representations which determine people's behaviour (Capdevila 2004: 66-68). These representations concern the way society views its past, present and future. As Aron (1968: 286) advanced, ideologies are "*systems of interpretation of the social world which induce a scale of values and suggest reforms to be undertaken, upheavals to fear or long for.*"³

Though culture is responsible for many of the representations held by people of the same culture, it cannot be taken as the unique source. First, because culture is not shared equally by all its members, something which explains the presence of myriads of sub-cultures in the same society (see Chapter One). Mainstream culture, shared by all members, is only a part of the cultural reservoir in a society. As Linton stated:

*Because of this difference in cultural participation, it is a mistake to consider a culture as the common denominator between the activities, ideas and attitudes of members of one society. Such common denominators can be established by individuals who share the same particular status.*⁴

(Linton 1967: XXXVIII)

Second, because members of the same culture tend to have different views of the same things. This difference is due to the fact that, beside the cultural referents, they do have other referents that vary according to an individual's context of life, studies, work and recreation. Among these referents ideology holds an important place.

³ (MOT)

⁴ (MOT)

2.2. Debating the Concept of Ideology

Ideology has often been announced as being dead by the so-called ‘end of ideology’ theorists like D. Bell (1960) and F. Fukuyama (1989). While Bell claimed that the West is witnessing a broad consensus among political parties and that no major ideological division has remained, Fukuyama believes in what he calls the *end of history*, a state where western liberalism has triumphed and overcome all other ideological systems since the defeat and collapse of communist Soviet Union. While this theory is quite debatable in the West, especially with the emergence of such civil society groups as the *mouvement altermondialiste*⁵, as an emancipatory movement standing against the rugged neo-liberal policies of governments and big business in the world, it is absolutely irrelevant to the Arab-Muslim world where ideology is vital to the maintaining of the totalitarian regimes in place as it is illustrated below. The form and functioning of ideology in these countries, and most particularly in Algeria, need, though, a theoretical debate over this concept in order to be clearly evinced.

It is quite tempting to define ideology in this case in the simplest way as those ideas “*which harm so much*” (Boudon 1991: 21)⁶. Although, this is exactly the way ideology functions in Algeria, scientific analysis imposes a theoretical debate⁷ as this concept has a long history and has been dealt with in different schools of thought, political systems and cultural settings, each one defining it specifically and even instrumentalising it out of self-

⁵ This movement emerged during the ministerial conference of the WTO in Seattle in 1999. It calls for the right of all the peoples of the world to decide for their future and the undermining of inequalities between the rich north and poor south. It aims to work as a lobby which could influence government decisions especially in the most industrialised countries.

⁶ (MOT)

⁷ The importance of a theoretical debate on the concept of ideology lies in the fact that no single definition seems to be satisfying in translating the functioning of ideology in the case of Algeria, and that each one captures only a part of the ideological apparatus implemented consciously or unconsciously as it will be shown.

interest.

Considered as one of the most problematic concepts in social sciences, it belongs to that type of concepts referred to by Gallie (1964) as *essentially contested concepts*. These concepts are *appraisive*, i.e. always subject to value-judgements; *complex*, described in various ways according to the variety of circumstances, and thus often used defensively or offensively. The profusion of definitions of ideology is, however, not redhibitory, though a bit confusing, and rather behoves prudence.

It was Napoleon that would first give to this concept its modern meaning, or rather its negative/pejorative meaning of abstract and doubtful ideas used to supplant political reality⁸. Marx, and later, Marxist scholars, would definitely stick this classical/theoretical conception to ideology as referring to false ideas. Marx (1970), in his *The German Ideology*, uses the metaphor of a *camera obscura* in which things look upside down to describe ideologies which he fundamentally holds as “*the false rationalisation...of events*” (Capdevila 2004: 172)⁹, events which are actually determined by factors other than those advanced by ideologues. In the same meaning, Engels uses another metaphor to describe ideologies. He considers them as *distorting spectacles* through which reality is deformed (quoted in Boudon 1991: 56).

The theoretical Marxist conception does not serve completely the case studied in this work as they mainly believe that ideologues are necessarily scholars or scientists. As it will be shown below, in the case of Algeria, and probably in most Arab-Islamic countries, ideology is, on the contrary, in the hands of politicians and preachers who use it as a practical/symbolic tool of

⁸ Napoleon used the term ideologue to refer to his opponents (Destutt de Tracy and Volney) who opposed his imperial plan (Capdevila 2004: 39; Boudon 1986: 40)

⁹ (MOT)

domination. Consequently, and contrary to what is admitted by Marxists who think that the forces that sustain ideology are material, in Algeria these forces are principally symbolic, i.e. exercised through political and religious discourses.

What may, however, be of some interest in the Marxist view is the fact that they admit the deviation of ideology from what is scientifically established, an illusion served on a scientific platter¹⁰, a characteristic that makes of ideology a very contested form of discourse in Algeria. It should also be noted that Marx conceived of ideology as *phantom ideas* (Stirner 1971), created by ideologues to deceive people. This idea is pertinent as far as ideology in Algeria is concerned. It can be observed that politicians, in Algeria, or Arab countries as a whole, try to create 'phantom enemies' that justify their tyrannical policies. In the name of terrorism or the Jewish threat, many of these countries have maintained the state of emergency for years, even when the threat, which may have been real at a given time, is no longer present. This state has provided the best conditions for the implementation of complete and closed totalitarian regimes¹¹.

Here is where the strong link between ideology, politics and religion can well be seen. For the perpetuation of totalitarianism, there is a need for an official ideology that can justify it (Aron 1965: 284-285). Ideology is the best means for a totalitarianism without terror, and the latter needs the people's support. People's support is obtained through the lever of religion that is there to persuade them of the benefits of the regime, if not in earthly matters, it would be spiritually (the hereafter). Fairclough argues that:

¹⁰ This view is shared by Parsons who writes: "*The problem of ideology appears when we find a contradiction between what we believe and what is scientifically proven as correct.*" (Quoted in Boudon 1986: 35) (MOT)

¹¹ I must admit that totalitarianism is not peculiar to Arab dictatorships. According to Marcuse (1968), totalitarianism is not incompatible with political pluralism and democracy in the West.

Ideologies are closely linked to power, because the nature of the ideological assumptions embedded in particular conventions, and so the nature of those conventions themselves, depends on the power relations which underlie the conventions; and because they are a means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power, simply through the recurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving which take these relations and power differences for granted.

(Fairclough 2001: 2)

The relation of ideology to power, and most particularly to totalitarian power, is important since it is a determining factor of the people's peaceful submission to this power. As cleverly expressed by Ricoeur (1997: 34): "*ideology overcomes pure integration towards distortion and pathology inasmuch as it seeks to reduce the tension between authority and domination*"¹². This is what Gramsci labels hegemony. Hegemony is a form of dominance by consent, instead of the application of sheer brute force (Gramsci 1971). In Algeria today, physical violence has proved to be inefficient for the preservation of the status quo as events such as the *Printemps Berber, October 5* and the *Printemps Noir*¹³ have shown it. With

¹² (MOT)

¹³ The *Printemps Berbère* of April 20, 1980 was the first popular uprising in Algeria since its independence in 1962. It refers to the demonstrations and riots of the people in Kabylia (in the central region of Algeria) claiming political freedom and recognition of Berber culture and language. This was the outcome of reflexions of major Berber intellectuals such as Mouloud Mammeri and Taos Amrouche. The demonstrators encountered much police repression which resulted in many injured people, a few deaths and imprisonment of 24 people. This movement would pave the way to the emergence of a generation of committed intellectuals such as Tahar Djaout and Said Saadi and would herald the 1988 revolt all over the country.

October 5th events of 1988 are the most violent popular revolt in independent Algeria that burst in Algiers and many other major cities in the country to call for the end of the totalitarian regime established since independence. To suppress the movement, the army took over the streets and opened fire on rioters to leave hundreds of casualties. These bloody events precipitated the end of the one-party system to see the emergence of more than 50 political parties and the legalisation of private newspapers. Although it did not establish democracy in the country, October 5th remains a landmark in the Algerians' expression of their total rejection of the political regime in place as well as their access to some political liberties that were undreamt of prior to this date.

The *Printemps Noir* of April 18, 2001 in Kabylia was a renewal of the *Printemps Berbère* as its claims remained unsatisfied. Triggered by the assassination of a youngster in a gendarmerie (military police force station) in the small village of Béni Douala (Tizi Ouzou), the events (demonstrations, riots and strikes) brought 123 death due to military repression.

the multiplication of political parties and private newspapers, political power in Algeria has admitted that the only guarantee of its perpetuation is people's consent. For an ideology to dominate, it needs to be "*shared by the rulers and the ruled.*" (Capdevila 2004: 73)¹⁴. It thus needs to condition people and apply some kind of daily brainwashing by means of the alliance between politics and religion. Aron (1965: 284-285) considers that this *ideological terror* is necessary for a perfect form of totalitarianism, when added to party monopoly and state-control-based economy. Party monopoly is, however, not a sine qua non condition for totalitarianism which may well cope with multi-party systems. According to Marcuse (1964), it is rather the monopoly on the production and distribution of ideas that really lead to a perfect form of totalitarianism. This view seems to correspond perfectly to the case of Algeria as the presence of multi-party system and private newspapers has not demised state hegemony.

In this connection, Shils (1968) suggests a practical/symbolic conception of ideology, as a system of beliefs, like religions and myths, which calls upon the people's affective involvement and requires a total devotion on their part. This view is quite relevant to the case under study inasmuch as ideology in Algeria is partly instrumentalised by politicians and preachers that mainly rely on the emotional dynamic in their discourse, where they often act as 'prophets', as opposed to scientists (in Marx's understanding).

The conception of ideology as a system of beliefs close to religion is a strong contention in this work. I will sustain the functioning of ideology in Algeria as a *secularisation* of religion, and equally, the functioning of religion as a *sacralisation* of ideology and politics, notably through the notion of heresy. This connection between religion and ideology is by no means

The movement culminated in the creation of popular committees of representatives (called *Arouch*) who drafted a declaration of political claims referred as the Plateforme d'El-Kseur.
¹⁴ (MOT)

peculiar to Algeria. Gramsci linked the terms ideology and faith (Capdevila 2004: 75) and most ideologues, not to say all, present their ideologies as offers of salvation. In his analysis of Soviet communism, Monnerot (1949: 268-269) writes that communism was a secular religion since its supporter identified to “*impersonal, omnipresent and ineluctable forces*”¹⁵, forces that any believer in religion fears. It is very difficult, as admitted by Capdevila (2004), to avoid the conceptualisation of ideology in religious terms, and it will be shown below that preachers, to use Marx’s description about Christian priests, are often the first ideologues.

The theorist of ideology, Pareto (1968), sustains the same conception of ideology. He conceives of ideology as *intellectual constructions* whose role is to answer sentiments. It will be observed that ideology in Algeria partly possesses this function as some people’s feelings of (say) frustration, are answered by the politician or preacher’s recourse to scapegoats, be it the United States, the Jew or the ‘West’¹⁶. Bell cleverly writes:

*Ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers used to exploit the emotional energy of certain passions, then channel it into political action to transform individuals.*¹⁷

(Quoted in Capdevila 2004: 193)

¹⁵ (MOT)

¹⁶ I will use the terms such as West, East, Orient, etc., in inverted commas as they are ideologically loaded and often used to refer to imprecise cultural entities that are far from corresponding to the geographical delimitations. These entities are attributed emotional sense by a process called by Bachelard (1964) the *poetics of space*. It is a process whereby a space is associated with some positive or negative value such as intimacy, safety, fear on the basis of the experience or representation one may have of it, though it may well be neutral. This poetic process, in the case of ‘East’ and ‘West’, often leads to, as Said makes it, “*that imaginative geography and history [that] help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself and dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away.*” (1995: 55)

¹⁷ (MOT)

Boudon (1991: 34) finds eight characteristics that mark ideologies as a type of belief systems distinct from the other ones, and it will be shown that ideology in Algeria possesses most of them:

1. they are explicitly formulated;
2. they rally groups around normative and supposedly positive beliefs;
3. they clearly establish their differences to other ideologies;
4. they are impermeable to all sorts of innovation;
5. they are intolerant;
6. they are fundamentally emotive in their expressions;
7. they rely on membership (through various forms of institutions);
8. they are closely linked to institutions that have the power to enforce their principles.

Capdevila (2004: 21) acknowledges the second characteristic as he admits that ideologies often play the role of unifying forces. He writes: “*The concept of ideology is analytically contained in the concept of social group as it is its idea of unity and identity.*”¹⁸The seventh characteristic appears in the vital need of ideologies for popular support, first to get political power and then to be implemented. This popular support requires from the people a great deal of credulity and from ideologues to present things in the most simplistic and definite terms, as is the case of Algerian ideological discourses, so as to avoid the complexities of scientific analyses that may show shortcomings and defects in them. Sutton et al. write:

Ideology tends to be straightforward and clear-cut, even when this straightforwardness and this clarity are not faithful to the subject under discussion. ...The ideologue overstates and caricatures like a writer of a comic book.

(Sutton et al.1956: 4-5)

¹⁸ (MOT)

Sutton's view is not shared by people like Geertz (1964) who thinks that oversimplification cannot be considered as a malicious strategy to deceive people, but rather a *metaphor* or *symbolic action* necessary to rally people. Shils also falls short of perceiving a sort of rationality that may underlie some ideologies, and which, in the case of Algeria, can be found at least in some of the arguments used to convince, or to persuade I should say, people.

People's credulity and confidence are vital to the success of ideologies considered by ordinary people as *boxes* (Boudon 1991: 126) which can only be approached by experts. As it will be evinced, religious ideology relies completely on this relationship people, or believers, have to ideas. Considering religious knowledge as an expert field that can only be dealt with by exegetes, they totally surrender to their interpretations and prescriptions without any sense of criticism, even when they sound irrational.

In this sense, Lenin (1988) is quite right in emphasising the utilitarian character of ideology. He believes that ideologies are systems of ideas or theories, whether true or false, used as weapons in class struggle. In the case of Algeria, ideology is used to tip the power scales in favour of those who have held it since its independence. Althusser (1965) confirms the utilitarianism of ideology as he admits that ideologies (in the form of religion, morality, philosophy, etc.) are organically part of the social structure along with the economic activity. His conception is quite relevant to the case studied in this work inasmuch as he conceives of ideologies as systems of representations that serve specific and practical social roles as opposed to the theoretical role of science (ibid.: 238-239). This practical role in Algeria consists in keeping the people under the total control of power holders.

Boudon (1991: 45) clearly admits that ideologies are doctrines based on wrong or misinterpreted scientific theories. Ideologues tend to disguise their ideologies in a pseudo-scientific discourse that advances ideas that seem acceptable at first sight. To sustain their logic, these ideas are often drawn from the daily life of the people addressed, and thus become quite resistant to any criticism and questioning, and acquire an apparent scientificity. As it will be shown below, ideologues instrumentalise language, Arabic in this case, to say “*nothingness, to make exist in words what does not exist in reality, to give a form of being, capable of inducing belief...*” (Bourdieu 2001: 327)¹⁹. Ideologues then may base their discourse on both scientific or sophistic arguments to deceive people and gain their subscription to their ideologies.

The vital question here is why people, particularly students, believe in these ideologies. Can this act of believing be described as rational or irrational? That is, can we find concrete and identifiable reasons for the people’s and students’ tendency, in Algeria and Arab countries, to believe in the political and religious discourse, such as Occidentalism, without any form of criticism, or is it a complex case of irrational behaviour that has its secrets in irrational forces?

It may be both. Yet, as put forward by Max Weber (1968), any explanation of a social phenomenon has first to be based on the individual rational behaviours in question, and irrational explanation can only be advanced in case the first one fails. An illustration of a wrong irrational explanation of a phenomenon, while it has a rational basis, is provided by the Luddites²⁰ in eighteenth century England. The wrecking of machines by

¹⁹ (MOT)

²⁰ The Luddites, named after their leader Ned Ludd, were a social movement in England in the 1800s, which protested against the intensive and devastating introduction of the machine into the factory with the Industrial Revolution mainly through industrial sabotage. The movement began in 1811 and quickly spread throughout the whole country, and

workers was interpreted irrationally as an anti-progress reaction against the emerging mechanisation of the Industrial Revolution which accordingly threatened the traditional form of production (Boudon 1991: 139). Yet, Coser (1982) rather advances a different interpretation of this movement which, according to him, expressed their worries about the danger of losing their jobs with the mechanisation of production. By destroying the machines, the Luddites showed their *nuisance value* to warn the employers, owners of the means of production, that workers had to be taken into account in this progress, as well as to refuse to be the outcasts and victims of technological development (Hobshawn 1952; Thompson 1966).

Another illustration is found in the case of contraceptive pills in India. As an explanation to the fact why Indian women, in the 1960s, refused to take contraceptive pills, a group of American researchers, hired by the Indian government to find the best solutions to reduce birth-rate in the country, concluded that this was due to the Indians' strong attachment to their traditions and superstitious belief in the necessity to have many children. A closer study showed that it was actually due to the very utilitarian reason of the profitability of children who cost far less than they were useful to the agrarian economy of regions like the Punjab (Boudon 1991: 11-13).

The interest of these two examples lies in the fact that, as far as ideology in Algeria is concerned, one needs to avoid the easy irrational explanation of Islamist/Occidentalists ideology as a mere rejection of progress. As it will be evinced below, this ideology serves more concrete and political concerns and is adhered to by people and students because of objective and identifiable reasons, which will be referred to as *perceptive effects*, including

ended in 1813 with the train of trials that resulted in executions and deportations of workers to British colonies. The movement remained in the British collective memory and history as the symbol of the struggle of the working class, and induced such equivalent movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Fox 2003; Binfield 2004).

what Boudon (1991) labelled as: situational effects, epistemological effects, effects of perspective and effects of communication.

Being aware of the existence of various types of rationality, it is admitted here that Occidentalism is mainly related to utilitarian rationality for its producers, and to situated rationality²¹ for those who subscribe to it. Utilitarian rationality is what brings Occidentalists to consciously produce their discourse for the sake of achieving planned objectives, whether political (seeking political domination), religious (seeking salvation), or intellectual (seeking the implementation of a given social project). Situated rationality is the sum of *good reasons* (Boudon 1982), be they philosophical, political, religious, or cultural, which induce people to embrace Occidentalist ideas.

2.3. Occidentalism as a Utilitarian Rationality to Approach Otherness

It must be observed that there developed in Algeria and the Arab world a utilitarian ideology which is central to the support of political power. This ideology, to which I will refer to as *Occidentalism*, i.e. Arab-Islamist²² conception of and theories about the 'West' and 'Westerners', is in the pure tradition of the Orientalist approach to the Arab and Muslim in its propagandist, ideological and lack of scientific validity. Applying the criteria that brought Said to consider that 'Western' scholars and writers' way of coming to terms with the 'Orient' as a particular ideological tradition he called Orientalism, I will advance that the Arab-Islamist politicians,

²¹ For a thorough examination of utilitarian and situated rationalities, see Boudon 1982.

²² I use the term Islamist instead of Islamic first to highlight the political base of this approach in its reference to the sacred text, the Koran. Second, I do claim that this approach belongs to a group of people in the Arab-Islamic countries and can by no means be generalised to all the members of these societies where many other political and cultural expressions exist, though not visible enough because they are the focus of neither local nor international media attention.

preachers and scholars' depiction of the 'West' is Occidentalism.

Although Said used this term to refer to that Oriental's distorted and biased view of the 'West', he did not develop this concept as a systematic and widespread conception in the Arab world. The concept of Occidentalism has been given more significance by Ian Buruma (2004), with Avishai Margalit²³, in their book *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies*. The authors use the term Occidentalism to designate the Japanese traditionalists' negative reaction to Western cultural invasion in Japan, viewed as "*shallow, rootless, and destructive of creative power. The West, particularly the United States, was coldly mechanical, a machine civilization without spirit or soul, a place where people mixed to produce mongrel races.*" (Buruma 2004: B10) Occidentalism is also a desire "*to restore the warm organic Asian community to spiritual health.*" (ibid.) The authors extended the concept to include all negative views and violent reactions to western culture and western presence in the Orient at large, thus integrating such people as Muslims and Arabs (Buruma & Margalit 2004). As defined by the authors, Occidentalism is then:

... a war against a particular idea of the West, which is neither new nor unique to Islamist extremism.... Occidentalism was part of the counter-Enlightenment, to be sure, but also of the reaction against industrialization.... Occidentalism is a revolt against rationalism (the cold, mechanical West, the machine civilization) and secularism, but also against individualism Wherever it occurs.... Occidentalism is fed by a sense of humiliation, of defeat.
(Buruma 2004: B10)

The authors' conception of Arab-Islamic Occidentalism seems then to be limited to a purely militant and violent ideology of destruction, synonymous to Islamism and terrorism, upheld by spokespeople like Bin Ladin and al-

²³ Ian Buruma is a professor of human rights, democracy, and new-media studies at Bard College. Avishai Margalit is a professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University, in Jerusalem.

Zawahiri. This Occidentalism is definitely in need of recruits completely devoted to the cause, pledging their life and fortune, who ultimately turn into terrorists and kamikazes.

The concept of Occidentalism in this work takes Buruma and Margalit's understanding as a very limited dimension of this phenomenon. The physically violent expression of Occidentalism, through terrorism, and its political manifestation, through Islamism, are but small-scaled and a very extreme practice of Occidentalism that often do not serve it in its propagation. The most dangerous and efficacious form of Occidentalism, as advanced here, is that ideology as a discourse of hatred and rejection of otherness. This discourse puts up perfectly with peace as it often calls for self-isolationism, and discards confrontation. It is a discourse produced and relayed by acknowledged and common representatives in society such as politicians, preachers and pseudo-intellectuals, as opposed to clearly established deviants such as terrorist. As such, it all the more adhered and lived up to by laypeople. Occidentalism is wider and more complex than a propaganda war. It is a social project concerned more with the inside rather than the outside of the Arab-Islamic world. The invocation of the *other* in Occidentalism serves only the confirmation and containment of the *self*.

One must clarify, at this stage, the notion of *pseudo-intellectuals* opposed here to the term *intellectuals*. As observed in the Introduction, the intellectual can only be radical, autonomous and committed, fundamentally oppositional; opposed to official political discourse, mainstream cultural discourse, established religious discourse. His opposition is not here in the sense of systematic rejection, but rather in the sense of systematic criticism. As Said cleverly put it:

Least of all should an intellectual be there to make his/her audiences feel good; the whole point is to be embarrassing,

contrary, even unpleasant. ... There is no such thing as private intellectual since the moment you set down words and then publish them you have entered a public world. Nor is there only a public intellectual, someone who exists just as a figurehead or spokesperson or symbol of a cause, movement, or position.

(Said 1994: 12)

It is in this sense that those producers of ideas, whether religious or nationalist, are not considered here as intellectuals, but rather as pseudo-intellectuals, since the intellectual is believed to follow the legitimating credo of his social role, “*never solidarity before criticism*” (Said quoted in Bayoumi & Rubin 2000: 440), while pseudo-intellectuals always sacrifice criticism on the altar of solidarity, as their ‘critical mind’ is always ready “*to fall into line to wage a war against one official enemy or another.*” (Said 2003) The importance of the intellectual’s commitment to criticism before solidarity brought Said to ironically comment that he was “*the last Jewish intellectual*” (quoted in Todorov 2004: 33), meaning that it was hard today to find among Jewish intellectuals, as among Arab intellectuals, those who still stick to the legitimating credo.

2.4. Criteria for the Definition of Occidentalism

Part of the ideology at work in Algeria and the Arab world is that which defines *otherness*, that which establishes difference to the *other* and which is called upon by students in their approach to foreign cultures in such classes as American Civilisation, i.e. Occidentalism. Occidentalism plays more the role of a self-identification process than a process for the identification of the *other*. Ideologues make use of Occidentalism as a reminder to people, as Muslims and Arabs, of what they are, or what they ought to be, as opposed to what the *other*, the non-Muslim ‘Westerner’ is, or is supposed to be.

Occidentalism is there to fix identities of both *we* and the *other*, for fear of deculturation and possible loss of Arab-Islamic identity. It is a discourse of over-self-affirmation, such as the African-American *Black is beautiful*²⁴, which consists in putting one's identity forward as the reversal of the stigma, to form an 'identity of reaction' to the *other* (Camilleri 1989: 383), in a context of Arab-Islamic technological and economic backwardness, cultural fragility and psychological confusion. This concern is voiced by many Arab religious scholars from different Arab countries. A theology teacher, a civilisation teacher and the faculty dean, the three from Oum El Koura University in Saudi Arabia, with a member of the Moroccan Arabisation Commission clearly pointed to the dangers of teaching English to Arab young children and called for the exclusive teaching of Arabic. In their arguments, they described Arabic as the language of the hereafter and English as the language of life, and that the hereafter was definitely more important than earthly life ("Awlawiyat", *Iqraa*, September 26th, 2005). Mohamed Amara (2005) also affirms that dialogue between religions cannot work because it is based on the Christian strive to convert all Muslims. Obviously, Occidentalism is produced not only by politicians and preachers, but also by pseudo-intellectuals, and relayed, consciously or unconsciously, by the media.

It must also be observed that Occidentalism does not reserve exclusion to 'Western' cultural and intellectual production. It also, in even more emphasised terms, overshadows an important part of the Arab-Islamic history of ideas, where anti-orthodox and anti-clerical Arab or Muslim scholars' views are expressed. Arab-Islamic intellectual history has functioned on the American president Andrew Jackson's principle "to the victor's belong spoils", and oppositional scholars have always been the

²⁴ *Black is beautiful* was an expression, coined by the militant black nationalist Marcus Garvey (1887-1940) in the 1920s in the United States, which referred to African-American pride in reaction to centuries-long white stigmatisation of the black race (Marable 1984; Salley 1994).

losers, thus rarely mentioned. When dealing with the same historical eras, Occidentalists refer to people, like Ibn Taymiya (1263-1328)²⁵, who offer suitable arguments for their ideology, while they constantly eclipse those scholars who had a contradictory discourse, and stood against the excessive domination of religion over civil life.

European historians focus on European Enlightenment scholars, like Rousseau and Locke, who vindicated reason and rational thinking, while they omit to mention that that same *Age of Reason* was not void of orthodox and pro-religion scholars, such as Mgr. Beaumont or Abbey Bergier (Urvoy 1996: 8). Likewise, Occidentalists, deliberately, and non-Occidentalists, deliberately or not, represent Arab-Islamic intellectual tradition exclusively through those scholars who rejected reason and rationality as instruments of acquisition, production and evaluation of knowledge and facts, while critical reflexion was definitely consubstantially part of Arab-Islamic intellectual tradition. As Urvoy put it:

Critical thinking is a native phenomenon in Arab civilisation. Its repression in the past, for others, was carried out through oppression and not by conviction, and for itself, by arguments of convenience and not by an exhaustive reflexion.

(ibid.: 225)

Reference to scholars, that were not religious exegetes, is limited to those religiously-supervised philosophers, called *mutakallimūn*, such as Abu l'Hasan al-Ashari and Abu Mansur al-Maturidi²⁶, who engaged in dialectical

²⁵ Ibn Abdullah Ibn Taymiya (ابن عبد الله ابن تيمية) was a theologian who believed that any innovation different to the teachings of the Prophet, his companions, and their first followers (the children and grandchildren of the first Muslims) was a forbidden deviation or *bidah* (بدعة). He then emphasised the strictly literal interpretation of the Koran. He is known to be the main source for the Wahhabi and Salafi schools of Sunni Islam (see Little 1975; Sivan 1990; Kepel 2003).

²⁶ Abu l'Hasan al-Ashari (ابو الحسن بن إسماعيل الأشعري) (873-935) was the founder of the Ash'ari Islamic school of philosophy which included members like Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) (or Algazel) who criticised Muslim philosophers in his famous book *Tahafut al-falasifa* (The

discussions of religious matters. This religious-philosophical discipline (*ilm al-kalām*) was much more apologetic than really critical and scientific. Yet, real philosophers, who were innovators and precursors of many of European Enlightenment ideas, were often, and still are, labelled with such anathema as *zindiq* (literally a hypocrite), which referred to any scholar who did not conform to mainstream ideas (Stroumsa 1985; Chokr 1994). Examples of such scholars who belong to the Arab-Islamic civilisation, and who remained quite unknown till they paradoxically revealed by some Orientalist scholars (Urvoy 1991), are by no means exceptional. These scholars were not necessarily Arabs, nor were they all Muslims. Yet, they lived in geographical areas dominated by Arab-Islamic civilisation and the Arabic language. Suffice it, here, to mention, with Ibn Sina (إبن سينا), Ibn Rushd (إبن رشد) and al-Farabi (الفرابي) (see below), three other figures, Ibn al-Muqaffa (إبن المقفع), Ibn Ishaq (إبن إسحاق) and al-Razi (الرازي), a Muslim Persian, a Christian Arab, and a deist Persian respectively, that left an outstanding contribution to the world patrimony of scholarship, yet, rarely, if not never, referred to in Arab-Islamic countries when dealing with their intellectual tradition. The Muslim Persian Abdullah Ibn al-Muqaffa (724-759) is often restrictively presented as a writer and mostly translator of the famous *Kalila wa Dimna* (*Kallilag and Demnag*), from the Persian language Pahlavi into Arabic. Yet, his distinction between political wisdom, a long process acquired over time, and arbitrary religious authority expressed in *Kallilag and Demnag* and *Adab al-kabir* (ibid: 41) is silenced. Hunain Ibn Ishaq (808-912), known in Europe as Joannitius, was an Arab Nestorian physician who remained completely unknown despite his valuable works, notably his translation of Galenic and Hellenic treaties. Within the context of the historical period he was living in, a period full of religious fervour, he raised,

Incoherence of the Philosophers) and closed the door of *Ijtihad*. Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (أبو منصور الماتريدي) (?-944) was a Muslim theologian whose philosophy was very much dominated by religion. He claimed that men are inherently able to find out the sins without the help of revelation, and thus even those who are reached by the Prophet's message will end up in the hellfire if they don't find out God's true words.

in an unprecedented style of scientific precision, such disturbing questions as the reasons behind adherence to a religious belief based on the sole reliance on a prophet's words, or the dangers of psychological manipulation by religions (ibid: 67-68). Abu Bakr al-Razi (865-925), a physician, philosopher and scholar, is mostly remembered for his scientific contributions in the fields of medicine, alchemy, chemistry. Yet, his ideas in philosophy and its relation to religion are not made conspicuous. His ostracism in the Arab-Islamic intellectual tradition, as approached by Occidentalists, is mostly due to his emphasis on the notion of *Ijtihad* (literally effort of reflexion), which is, in religion, an individual's independent interpretation of available sources like the Koran and the *Sunnah* (Prophet Mohammed's words and deeds), and individual ingenuity in the lack of a textual reference in a given subject. Al-Razi extended *Ijtihad* to all fields of knowledge and used to claim that "*the one who reflects and takes much care is right*" even if he does not achieve his aim (Abd al-Kafi 1978: 291-297).

These three independent thinkers, independent from the religious hegemony of scholarship of the time, though advanced different views, shared one important principle which did not conform to the postulate of their contemporaries, nor of present time Occidentalists: that "*political power can be the source of order and ... religion does not have a function of legitimacy in itself but rather one of mere pedagogy.*" (Urvoy 1996: 217) Religion, as a source of law, was then questioned much to the distress of religious authorities of their time and of today.

This false representation of Arab-Islamic intellectual tradition has underlay Occidentalism, which first emerged as a socio-political movement

within civil society in Egypt, with the foundation of al-ikhwān al-muslimūn²⁷ (the Society of the Muslim Brothers), in March 1928, under the leadership of Hassan al-Banna²⁸ (Wikipedia). Within the context of the fight for decolonisation in Egypt and the Arab world, this religious, political and social movement also stood against the ‘westernisation’ of Egyptian society and politics as it called for the creation of an Islamic republic, based on the *sharea* (Koranic law). Al-ikhwān al-muslimūn gained much support and had echoes in various Arab countries, such as Syria, Lebanon and Jordan (and in an unstructured manner in Algeria), where movements, holding the same name, even well after the death of Hassan al-Banna, emerged and subscribed to the same claims of the need to hold the Koran as the supreme law of the land and the rejection of all ‘Western’ cultural manifestations in these countries. This eventually gave full form to the politicisation of Islam and the construction of a new ideology, Islamism as political Islam, which would compete with the other ideologies like communism, socialism and capitalism.

The contribution of other influential pseudo-intellectuals such as the Egyptian Sayid Kotb²⁹ also brought more credit and echo to al-ikhwān al-muslimūn. Sayid Kotb strengthened the close link between Islamism,

²⁷ This society first founded after the model of the freemasonry in Europe for which Hassan al-Banna had much admiration in terms of organisation and secrecy, with its motto: "*The secrecy of the organization and the publicity of the da'wa* [proselytism]" (Wikipedia). The organisation undertook important social work by founding many social institutions such as schools and hospitals. It also had an armed branch, the *الجهاز الخاص* (the special organism), composed of members of the Egyptian army and whose function was to assassinate *unruly Ikhwān* and liquidate political figures. It started with a limited membership to reach, by 1948, about half a million members (see Cohen 1982). Today, al-ikhwān al-muslimūn have formally renounced violence and definitely entered the political arena with their parliamentary elections win in 2005.

²⁸ Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) started as a teacher to turn editor of a monthly magazine called E-Shihab.

²⁹ Sayid Kotb (1906-1966), a contemporary of Hassan al-Banna, was a writer and literary critic, and worked as a teacher and then as a civil servant in the Egyptian Ministry of Education. His education and international experience, through his two-year stay in the United States as a student in educational sciences, brought a complementary dimension to al-ikhwān al-muslimūn.

Occidentalism and the relation to the ‘West’ as a culturally and religiously different *other*, with whom the Arab-Islamic world is supposed to maintain adversarial rapport. His conception of material and spiritual life, as he upheld, was different from that of Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd or al-Farabi³⁰, as he believed that theirs was based on ancient Greek philosophy, that is, not purely Islamic. He then called for the imperative of al-ikhwān al-muslimūn and Arab-Islamic societies at large to develop an approach to society and politics in a totally antagonistic position to the ‘Western’ one. ‘Western’ society, as illustrated by the United States according to Kotb, though at the highest degree of economic and technological growth, is in a primitive moral and cultural state. Arab-Muslims were then asked to construct societies that had to be fundamentally opposed to ‘Western’ philosophy and style of life lest they fall back into what he labelled *El-Jahiliya El-Moassira* (literally modern ignorance), a state that revives the pre-Islamic way of life.

In the last ten years, the world has witnessed, thanks to the satellite media boom, the emergence of Arab satellite channels, such as the Saudi *Iqraa*, whose main purpose is to propagate Occidentalism among Muslim and Arab viewers, first to compete with the other extremist ideologies diffused by such TV channels as American *Fox News*; second, to proselytise for the Occidentalist interpretation of Islamic theology. These

³⁰ Al-Farabi, or Alfarabius (872-950), a Persian Muslim philosopher, was the instigator of that current of openness of thought in Islam that looked into all present philosophy of the time, mainly the Greek one with Aristotle and Plato, to construct an original Islamic political philosophy (see al-Farabi 2001). Ibn Sina, or Avicenna (980-1037), very much influenced by al-Farabi, was a Persian Muslim physician, philosopher and mystic who innovated in joining Greek philosophy to Islamic metaphysics in search for an Oriental philosophy (see Sinoué 1989). Ibn Rushd, or Averroes (1126-1198), was an Andalusian-Arab philosopher, physician, jurist, theologian and mathematician whose philosophical openness and modernity shocked his contemporaries and won him enmity and persecution. He mainly vindicated the importance of the position of philosophy in all matters, including religion, in his book *Tahafut al-tahafut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) to answer Algazel’s attack on philosophy one century before in his book *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*. He also stressed the importance of analytical thinking as a prerequisite to interpret the Koran, in opposition to orthodox Muslim theology which rather emphasised extensive knowledge of sources other than the Koran. (see Bazzana et al. 2005).

channels have provided the best pulpit for Occidentalists, such as Mohamed Amara³¹, to voice their views to the entire world. Launched by the Arab Media Company (AMC) on October 21st, 1998, *Iqraa* television channel has seduced a considerable number of viewers in Arab-Islamic countries thanks to its use of preachers and pseudo-intellectuals, of all ages, that master the suitable discourse for the different categories of people, ranging from adolescents to senior people. 64% of the students who responded to the questionnaire considered this channel as the most reliable in comparison to other channels such as *Algerian TV*, *Al Jazeera*, *Al Arabya*, *BBC* or *CNN*.

Completely different to the official and dull presentation of government-owned TV channels in the Arab countries, *Iqraa* has succeeded in innovating in form and content, with the contribution of both male and female hosts dealing with a great variety of themes that tackle the daily preoccupations of people. This has raised the interest of people who could not find it neither in their public media, too propagandist for local political regimes, nor in the foreign/European or American media, culturally too far away from their close concerns.

Taking full advantage of the positive response among the Arabic-Islamic viewers, Occidentalists have found in this channel, the best medium to reach the maximum of people. The close link between this channel and Occidentalism is clearly established in the Preamble (*Iqraa* 2006) available on the channel's website:

- Re-establish our Islamic identity;
- form an Islamic society identity;
- build the modern Islamic society:

³¹ Mohamed Amara (1931-) holds a Ph.D. in Islamic Studies and is the author of many books such as *في فقه المواجهة بين الغرب والإسلام* (Studies in the Confrontation between the West and Islam) (2003) and *الأصولية بين الغرب والإسلام* (Fundamentalism between the West and Islam) (2004).

- * which applies the *sharea* (Islamic law)) in its entirety in all aspects of life;
- * deepen our Islamic identity;
- * revive *fouroudh el kifaya* (extra prescriptions)
- * provide a purposeful Arabic medium that deal from an Islamic perspective with subjects drawn on the viewers' cultural, social, and economic life.

With the Egyptian Mohamed Amara, probably with whom Occidentalism is best articulated, this ideology, just as Orientalism had once been with Ernest Renan (ibid.), has become a discipline and a career. The specificity of Occidentalism is that Occidentalists show less allegiance to the discipline from an intellectual viewpoint than to their theological, cultural and political belonging. In their attempt to combat Orientalist racist view of the Arab and Muslim, Occidentalism has come to be just an Arab and Muslim version of Orientalism. Thus chauvinism, ethnocentrism and extremism, based on the definition of the 'West' and 'East' in religious terms, do direct their pens more often than scientific objectivity does. Occidentalism, in its chauvinism, comes even to turn the most negative facts into positive ones. A good instance is advanced by Amara (2004) who ascribes the most positive attributes to fundamentalism in its Islamic version. He blatantly admits that Islamic fundamentalism is a revival of the glorious Islamic past, while Christian fundamentalism is a negation of modernity and progress.

The success of Islamism in attracting supporters is that it burgeoned as one of the voices that expressed opposition to a Christian coloniser, whether English or French, and later grew and matured against the corrupt and tyrannical post-independence political regimes in Arab countries. This is clearly observed in the words of Hassan al-Banna (2006) for whom *al-ikhwān al-muslimūn* had two main objectives: "*The liberation of*

*the Islamic world from any foreign power... and the creation of a free Islamic state based on Islamic law...*³²

It seems clear then that, from its outset, Occidentalism, as a definition of the *other*, would maintain close ties with Islamism as a struggle against this *other*, first as the physical on-the-scene coloniser, and then, after independences, as a cultural distant coloniser. However, while Occidentalism was the monopoly of such political opponents as al-ikhwān al-muslimūn, it ended by being embraced by the Arab political regimes themselves as it offered opportunities to gain support and acquiescence from the populations. Islamism and totalitarianism in Arab countries have relied on Occidentalism in the same way as Imperialism and colonialism had relied on Orientalism.

The importance of Occidentalism, as far as foreign culture teaching, such as American Civilisation, is concerned, lies in the fact that it is the prism through which students approach the foreign culture and its carriers. Their prior knowledge, representations and stereotypes are, to a large extent, moulded by Occidentalist pseudo-theories about the *other*, in this case the 'West'. Responsible for most of the deformations and misrepresentations of the 'West', Occidentalism deserves close attention as a national, and even pan-Islamic and pan-Arab, enterprise of distortion and manipulation of discourse produced by various social actors including politicians, preachers, scholars and media professionals.

What allows to designate this Arab-Islamic approach to *otherness*, in its various expressions (cultural, religious or national), as Occidentalism, in a Saidian sense of the term, is that it bears the same criteria that brought Said to consider 'Western' conceptions of the 'Orient' as Orientalism. Among

³² (MOT)

these criteria are:

- First: the fact that ideologues use Occidentalism as a *mediator* between *we* and the *other*, with its supposed learned grids and codes that inform about the 'West' which could not be viewed in its true nature without Occidentalists' preachers and scholars' expertise who are the only ones who are able to reveal it. The 'West', in the Arab world, just like the 'Orient' for Orientalists (Said 1995: 67), then cannot exist but Occidentalised, i.e. only as depicted by Occidentalists with their body of biased knowledge dominated by the imperative to keep people in total ignorance. This is expressed, for instance, through the *obligation* for any Muslim, according to an Occidentalist, to have a *sheikh* (a religious mentor), whose role is to guide him in all aspects of his life, be it spiritual or material ("Qur-ān wa hayat", *Iqraa*, October 6th, 2005).

Political imperatives do also have their share in the instrumentalisation of the *other* through Occidentalism for the sake of preserving the political status quo. This is illustrated by such cases as the Algerian government's reaction to the *loi du 23 février*³³, described by the Algerian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, as a law which "*approached mental blindness, negationism and revisionism*"

³³ Part of what is admitted as positive historical revisionism, according to its advocates, which attempts to right the wrongs of history, i.e. change false commonly held ideas about the past, the *loi du 23 février 2005* (the law of February 23rd, 2005) is a law on the 'positive value' of French colonialism. Mostly enacted for the vindication of the *Harki* community (Algerians who supported and fought for French presence in Algeria), the law states clearly that the French "*acknowledge and recognize in particular the positive role of the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa.*" (LOI n° 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés). The law provoked great backlash from former French colonies and also from French academics and intellectuals who rejected the French Parliament's influence over the writing of history. The negative effect of the law brought the French president Jacques Chirac to urge parliament to revise it saying that "*In a Republic, there is no official history. It is not to the law to write history. Writing history is the business of historians.*" ("History should not be written by law" says Jacques Chirac (Ce n'est pas à la loi d'écrire l'histoire), *RFI*, December 11th, 2005).

(“Les principales prises de position concernant la loi du 23 février 2005, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, January 26th, 2006). Focusing people’s attention on this French unjust interpretation of a common history which affirms the positive effects of French colonialism, the government deliberately turns away from a far more important debate over the ‘negative effects’ of independence, i.e. dictatorship. While all state-controlled media were mobilised to ‘debate’ over this law, the failure of independence to extract Algerians, and all Arab peoples, from their economic dependence on their former colonisers as well as their miserable political and social conditions are never open to debate. Nor is the historical revisionism of Algerian official history allowed by permitting full access to the historical archives exclusively controlled by the state.

The polemic over the *loi du 23 février* shows that debate over the past is very selective and determined by the rulers’ interest in its positive or negative effects. Calling upon the collective memory never serves its transformation into a *random access memory* which could allow creativity for the benefit of the whole society (Daniel Maximin, “Culture et dépendances”, *TV5 Monde*, March 23rd, 2006), but rather functions as an instrument of power and domination. As cleverly expressed by George Orwell in his novel *1984*, governments (Big Brother) always revise history in accordance with the current political situation and constantly have recourse to public brainwashing to ensure their support by any means necessary, mainly ideology and propaganda, a sort of *Ministry of Truth*, which may be, depending on the case, religion or history.

The relation between religion and politics in Arab countries (which will be explained below) as far as *otherness* is concerned is of a great importance for the maintenance of the political status quo. There is a tacit agreement between the representatives of each of these two

sides in which religious representatives are allowed to use state-controlled media instruments to express their attacks on the *other* (the 'West'), in return for total silence on domestic politics. The example of the foundation of the Conference for the Defence of the Prophet Mohammed which gathered, for its first meeting, more than 400 Muslim religious exegetes, coming from all Muslim countries in the world, to discuss the ways to defend Islam and Muslims in 'Western' countries, according to its spokesperson Khaled Abderrahmene al-Ajimi ("Hassad al-yaoum", *Al-Jazeera*, March 24th, 2006) is a case in point. While this event enjoyed wide official media coverage, these same exegetes have never had such a meeting or foundation to discuss the possible means to defend Muslims, as citizens, in their own countries where their rights are encroached on by the political regimes in place on a regular basis.

- Second: this approach is far from being *objective scholarship*, and rather based on representations, or more accurately, misrepresentations of the 'West', instead of natural depictions of reality. The 'West' is not presented but rather re-presented according to the Occidentalists' conception. His conception corresponds to his interpretation of the image of the *heathen* in the Koran, a stigmatising image which responds to the national and international political requirements of the time. Far from any apology of 'Western' culture, it must be reckoned that it offers a substantial scope for political and intellectual liberty that desperately lacks in the Arab-Islamic part of the world³⁴. This makes of it a clear danger to the stability of the

³⁴ I will use the phrases 'Islamic world' and 'Arab-Islamic world', not as actual cultural or religious entities, but as political ones, i.e. groups of countries whose governments claim officially in legal documents, such as constitutions, that they are Arab and Islamic countries. I am aware that these documents often betray a reality in this part of the world of multiethnicity and diversity of religions which are not officially acknowledged. Besides, Arabs and Muslims are also present in great numbers as fully-acknowledged citizens in

political regimes holding power in these countries. Instrumentalising, then, the trust and emotional investment people have in their religion, politicians, preachers, and scholars disseminate that image of the 'West' to discard this danger and deceive people for the purpose of masking reality and gaining their total acquiescence. This situation is what Marcuse (1964) describes as the most ideological world, where individuals are incapable of perceiving their society's contradictions, where false conscience takes the appearance of a true one, where the irrational looks like the rational, and servitude like liberty, where "*the invisibility of ideology means the total identification of individuals to their society.*" (Capdevila 2004: 164)³⁵.

Among the instances that illustrate this point is the Occidentalists' ambivalent treatment of those religions that are supposed to be exclusively 'Western', i.e. Christianity and Judaism. While they claim that they have much respect for these religions and the people who believe in them, who are of course always referred to as 'Westerners' despite the presence of Christian and Jewish Arabs and non-Arabs living in Arab countries, they contradict their statement by questioning the authenticity of these religions. The case of Kamel Chekat who, on a programme on revealed religions on *Canal Algérie*, while calling for respect of all religions, as prescribed in Islam, assumes that the very sacred books on which these religions are based, the Gospels and the Torah, were deliberately forged by priests and rabbis out of self-interest ("Bonjour d'Algérie", *Canal Algérie*, November 23rd, 2005).

This contradiction is also sustained in Algerian law. Alleged offence against Islam earned editors of two Algerian newspapers, *Errisala* and *Assafir*, a committal order for the republication of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed, published for the first time in the Danish

'Western' countries. The phrases 'Islamic world' and 'Arab-Islamic world' are then used for mere operational reasons.

³⁵ (MOT)

newspaper *Jyllands Posten* on September 30th, 2005, in the name of Article 144 bis 2 of the Algerian penal code. However, though Arab and Islamic countries protested against the publication of these cartoons as an offence against Islam, they do not sanction offence against Christianity as Jesus, the Son of God according to Christian theology, is referred to as a simple prophet and a mortal on a regular basis in state-run institutions like mosques. The violent and peaceful protests induced by these cartoons were in the name of, according to the protestors, the right to the protection of one's sacred beliefs and mutual respect between religions and cultures. This is, however, quite contradictory, in the eyes of many 'Westerners', to these protestors' interpretation of Islamic law which condemns to death any Muslim accused of converting to Christianity. These same protestors rejected any 'Western' intervention, in the name of national sovereignty, to prevent the beheading of the Afghan Abdu Rahman for converting to Christianity in March 2006 (*CNBC Europe*, March 25th, 2006).

The contradiction is pushed to its utmost limits when Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the general secretary of the Organisation for Islamic Conference (OIC), urges the EU, in his meeting with Javier Solana, to fight against Islamophobia, just as it struggles against xenophobia and anti-Semitism (*El-Watan*, February 12th, 2006), while anti-Semitic statements are commonplace in the media, the mosques and even popular culture in Arab countries.

Occidentalism aims mainly to establish an unrealistic relationship to the 'West', in which the originality of the Arab-Islamic culture is preserved from any acculturation or interculturalisation, while imitation at the technological and economic levels is encouraged. This utilitarian and materialistic view of history, which aims at separating 'Western' technology from its cultural background, started to take form as early

as the 1830s with al-Tahtawi³⁶ (Urvoy 1996: 221). Berque commented on this saying that: “*Arabs like neither to be compared to others nor be different from them.*” (Quoted in Deguy 1964: 864)³⁷

- Third: this approach admits that the conflicts and animosities that exist between countries from the two sides, and which are a mere historical experience, are an *eternal order* of things that cannot be overcome and that can only be settled through the total destruction of one or the other, or the domination of one over the other, as suggested by Orientalism (Said 1995: 354). This is confirmed by such Occidentalists as Mohamed Amara who, in a paper on “The role of cinema in the promotion of the Islamic past”, asserts that ‘East’-‘West’ conflict is still valid (*The Seventh Iqraa Jurisprudential Conference on Cinema*, 16, 17 October, 2004). The Christian ‘West’ and the Muslim ‘East’ can but exist as enemies as they hold two exclusive religions as claimed by the same Amara (2005) who writes: “*Islam is the only religion whose founding principles are the antithesis of the Christian ones.... It is thus a fundamentally hostile religious movement to Christianity.*”³⁸

The diffusion of the culture of suspicion about the *other* (the Christian or the Jew), wrongly based on Koranic verses that are particular to the historical context of revelation, i.e. to the Muslims’ relations with the other religions during Prophet Mohammed’s days, is important to the support of animosities. The following verse is a case in point:

³⁶ The Egyptian Rifa al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) was somehow one of the pioneering figures of the movement of cultural and intellectual renaissance known in the Arab world as *Al-Nahda* (النهضة) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This movement stood most in reaction to colonisation and contributed to the rise of Arab nationalism. Al-Tahtawi claimed that the Arab world had a lot to learn from Europe but should mould it to Arab-Islamic values and culture (see Hourani 1991).

³⁷ (MOT)

³⁸ (MOT)

Among the People of the Book are some who, if entrusted with a hoard of gold, will (readily) pay it back; others, who, if entrusted with a single silver coin, will not repay it unless thou constantly stoodest demanding... (Āl-Imrān, S.3, A.75)

This principle of enmity is basic to the whole ideology of Occidentalism as expressed by Amara (2006b), who asserts that if the spiritual mission of Muslims is over with the spread of Islam, their religious mission is still to come by protecting the *sharea al-ilahiya* (divine law) through the subjection of the rest of mankind to Islam, whether by the exercise of political power or military power within the state. Taken out of context, some verses of the Koran are thus instrumentalised:

Fight those who believe not in Allah not the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His messenger, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, from among the People of the Book. (At-Tauba, S.9, A.29)

O ye who believe! Fight the Unbelievers who are near to you and let them find harshness in you...(At-Tauba, S.9, A.123)

Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies... (Al-Anfāl, S.8, A.60)

- Fourth: Difference between ‘East’ and ‘West’, being part of an eternal order as claimed by Occidentalists, entails that distinction between the people in these two geographical spaces is *ontological* rather than cultural, and thus an Arab or Muslim is to deal with the ‘West’ as an Arab or Muslim first, as an individual second.

This state of mind is even adopted by high-ranked political leaders such as the president of the Algerian Islamist party *MSP*, A. Soltani. As a minister of the republic, he blatantly breaks the law by advising a criminal, under Algerian law, a member of the banned Islamist party

FIS, Anwar Haddam, not to come back to Algeria before the enactment of amnesty law (*Liberté*, April 20th, 2006). Loyalty to Islamist ideology, to a particular interpretation of Islam, prevails over loyalty to the state of which he is supposed to be one of the official representatives and protectors.

Orientalist views brought Europeans to adopt the same state of mind in the nineteenth and part of the twentieth centuries, notably those who lived in the Orient, intellectuals like the English writer R. Kipling who clearly showed it in his writings. As Said put it:

Being a White Man was therefore an idea and a reality. It involved a reasoned position towards both the white and the non-white worlds.... It meant specific judgements, evaluations, gestures.
(Said 1995: 227)

It is part of the Occidentalists strategy to naturalise this idea of the primacy of religious and geographical identities in order to transform it into a social *habitus* (see below). Amara refers to some Koranic verses to establish this principle of eternal enmity:

- “Nor will they cease fighting you until they turn you back from your faith if they can.” (Al-Baqarah S.2, A.217);
- “They would not follow thy Qibla; nor art thou going to follow their Qibla...” (Al-Baqarah S.2, A.145)

The primacy of religious identity is backed up by Occidentalists, such as Hamid Ibn Abdellah al-Aliy (2006), with a Koranic verse that is interpreted to suit this political attitude and in which cultural, national or economic concerns are relegated to a lower position in favour of religious loyalty:

Say: If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your mates, or your kindred: the wealth that ye have gained; the commerce in which ye fear a decline: or the dwellings in which ye delight – are dearer to you than Allah or his Messenger, or the striving in His

cause; - then wait until Allah brings about His decision: and Allah guides not the rebellious (At-Tauba S.9, A.24)

This division of humans into groups on the basis of permanent features such as space and religion is essential to the rationalisation of the myth of a group consensual vision of the social world, to the recognition of a particular ideologically-based opinion as the whole group's legitimate view, a view which becomes necessarily part of the group's identity, or more accurately of the group's representation of itself. In this sense, any rejection of this view is perceived as an encroachment on the group's natural integrity. As explicated by Bourdieu:

*The quest for distinction ... produces separations which are meant to be perceived, or better, known and acknowledged as legitimate differences, i.e. often as natural differences...*³⁹

(Bourdieu 2001: 305)

- Fifth: like the 'Orient' for Orientalism (ibid.: 207), the mere designation of that region as 'West' and those people as 'Westerners' is an *evaluative judgement* that entails a particular attitude and behaviour, and more importantly, suspicion and stigmatisation. Amara (2003), in his answer to a question about the course of the so-called religious war between Islam and the 'West', states that the 'West' cannot win the war under the leadership of the United States which is neither a nation nor a people, but a mere group of *cowboys* owning power and money.
- Sixth: what is also implied is that *moral superiority* the 'East' is supposed to possess, failing economic, technological and political strength, and which the 'West' lacks, despite its economic,

³⁹ (MOT)

technological and political superiority. This idea is encompassed within the Biblical (Cherry 1972) and Koranic metaphor of the *chosen people*. This myth is common to the three revealed religions as many Muslims, Christians and Jews do believe in the transcendent purpose of their community, which is to bring redemption to humankind. This necessarily attributes to the *chosen people* both monopoly of truth and the responsibility to guide and, consequently, lead the world. Monopoly of truth induces denying it to the other, and as a community claims to be the *chosen people*, it also claims the subjection of the others to its moral code. Occidentalists then, while criticising the other religions about their claim of divine election, assume the postulate that Muslims are the *chosen people*. Hamid Ibn Abdallah al-Aliy (2006), in his reaction to Prophet Mohammed's cartoons, writes that Muslims are God's chosen people, and as such they have the duty to defend the Prophet even through violence, on the basis of the interpretation of koranic verses such as: "*If ye help not (the Prophet), (It is no matter): for Allah did indeed help him, when the Unbelievers drove him out...*" (At-Tauba S.9, A.40) Occidentalists' idea of the *chosen people* is based on such Koranic verses as the following:

For denial, they refer to: "*(Both) the Jews and the Christians say: 'We are the sons of Allah, and His beloved.' Say: 'Why then doth He punish you for your sins? Nay, ye are but men...*" (Al-Māida S.4, A.18)

For their claim, they refer to: "*Ye are the best of Peoples, evolved for mankind. Enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah.*" (Āl-Imrān S.3, A.110)

This call for violence is in total contradiction with Koranic directives which uphold dialogue in such matters, as one of the verses stipulates: "*Invite (all) to the Way of the Lord with wisdom and*

beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious..." (An-Nahl S.16, A.125). It is worth mentioning the fact that though condemnation of the violent response to these cartoons, such as the mob attacks against the Danish and French embassies in some Muslim countries, was expressed by some voices among religious figures like the Saudi Sheikh Al Habib Ali, this had no official or wide diffusion in these countries. Such voices found no other medium than internet as was the case of some of them who made the following statement:

We appeal to all Muslims to exercise self-restraint in accordance with the teachings of Islam and we reject countering an act of aggression by acts not sanctioned in Islam, such as breaking treaties and breaching time-honoured agreements by attacking foreign embassies or innocent people and other targets. Such violent reactions can lead to a distortion of the just and balanced nature of our request or even to our isolation from the global dialogue. The support that we give to our Prophet will not be given by flouting his teachings.

(Duaat al Islam 2006)

Moral superiority is, however, invoked as a means to reject the alleged decadent 'Western' culture, with of course everything it contains, be it positive or negative. Amara (2003) argues that backwardness in the Arab-Islamic world is economic and technological. While in the 'West', Amara carries on, backwardness is moral as proved by the rates of violence, suicide, and rape, which are presumably higher there as compared to Arab countries.⁴⁰

The place of women in society is probably one of the favourite topics dealt with by Occidentalists. A case in point is Mohamed Moussa El-Sherif, a Saudi preacher, who thinks that women need to hold

⁴⁰ It must be noted that while such statistics are constantly put forward in order to develop critical depictions of the 'West', something which can be scientifically admitted, no reliable statistics about the Arab-Islamic world are available to allow a scientific comparison between the rates of suicide, rape and violence in the two regions of the world.

political positions in ‘Western’ countries to defend their rights, while they do not have the right to do it in Islam because Islam preserves their rights (“Awrak”, *Iqraa*, January 18th, 2006). It is clear here that this is a religious interpretation that serves to keep the woman in her place, out of men’s business, as the case is in Saudi Arabia where women do not have the right to vote.

- Seventh: being morally superior to the supposedly depraved ‘West’, ‘Western’ civilisation stands as the *antithesis* of *the* Islamic civilisation, and any appreciation of these “Western’ cultural expressions on the part of an Arab-Muslim is a renunciation to and betrayal to his Arab-Islamic identity.

For instance, Mohamed Moussa El-Sherif (ibid.) also deems those intellectuals who advocate the woman’s full citizenship as ignoramuses and, "*above all, traitors who sin when speaking*" for women.

- Eighth: As a corollary of the seventh criterion is the *problematic attitude* towards the ‘West’ and ‘Westerners’ observed in some students and people in Algeria, as reference to anything which has ‘Western’ origins is felt as a provocation or aggression of the so-called *thawabit* (the constant features) of Arabity and Islamity.
- Nineth: Last is the criterion that sustains all the precedent ones and without which all the Occidental construction is undermined. It is the *unquestionable character* of this approach as it is supposed to be based on the constant reference to the sacred text. Just as the Orientalist was "*to confirm the Orient in his readers’ eyes; he neither tries nor want to unsettle already firm convictions*" (ibid.: 65), Occidentalists instil these convictions and never question them within

a state of unanimity that transforms them into a sort of *idées fixes*.

Occidentalism is then the 'Oriental' version of Orientalism, an ideological arsenal supplemented with religious, historical and sociological insights that tend to establish the fundamental and incommensurable difference and exclusive antinomy between 'East' and 'West', the Arab-Islamic world and the Judeo-Christian world.

It is quite extraordinary to observe that the 'Orient' has come to develop an ideological theory about the 'West' and 'Westerners' that bears the same characteristics as the one – Orientalism – it was victim of for centuries, thus contradicting Said's warning in the final words of his seminal book *Orientalism*:

Above all I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism. No former "Oriental" will be comforted by the thought that having been an Oriental himself he is likely – too likely – to study new "Orientals" – or "Occidentals" – of his own making.

(ibid.: 328)

As a matter of fact, the 'West' and 'Westerners' are viewed in Occidentalism as 'Occident' and 'Occidentals', i.e. as people who are, just like Orientalism did it with 'Orientals', geographically, culturally and, most particularly, morally different and having a life-long conflicting relation to the 'Orient' and 'Orientals'. Occidentalism tends to demonise the 'West' in the way Orientalism came to be totally under the hold of nineteenth-century "*imaginative demonology of 'the mysterious Orient'*" (ibid.: 26). The idea of eternal confrontation is essential to sustain the Occidentalist myth of natural enmity between 'East' and 'West', for, as put forward by Ladmiral and Lipiansky (1989: 200), cultural, economic and physical differences are not necessarily sources of conflict between groups. It is the situation of

confrontation, nurtured by ideology, which is responsible for hostile attitudes and false representations.

The corollary of this reflection is the idea that there is no natural organic link between extremism and Islam in the sense that it is the appropriation of this religion by ideology and ideologues that develops in it, and in those who believe in it, extremist views. Islam, just like Christianity or Judaism, is, to use Gallie's (2000: 167-169) formulation, an *open concept*, i.e. subject to change over history according to the dominant ideology of the time.

2.5. Characteristics of Occidentalism

It is quite extraordinary to observe the extent to which Said's various definitions of Orientalism apply to Occidentalism as:

1. a "*system of ideological fictions*" (ibid.: 321);
2. "*social-science ideological expertise*" (ibid.: 321);
3. "*a distribution of geographical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts*" (ibid.: 12);
4. "*an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction...but also of a whole series of 'interests' which...it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate...*" (ibid.: 12);
5. "*it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power...power moral (as with ideas about what 'we' do and what 'they' cannot do or understand as 'we' do).*" (Ibid.: 12)

Yet, distinctions between these two approaches can be found due, of course, to the different contexts within which each one developed and the purpose for which it was and is implemented. While Orientalism was mainly ideological knowledge that served the European powers' imperialist and colonialist purposes starting from the eighteenth century as "*Oriental experts all, posted to the Orient as agents of empire, friends of the Orient, formulators of policy alternatives because of their intimate and expert knowledge of the Orient and of Orientals,*" (ibid.: 224), Occidentalism is an ideology that serves the hegemonic regimes of Arab-Islamic countries in their totalitarian rule of their peoples. While Orientalism existed only in relation to the other, and can be singled out, as opposed to Occidentalism, in its dealing with the Orient with the aims, as Said (ibid.: 3) put it, of "*ruling over it...dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient*", Occidentalism exists first and foremost in relation to the locals, contrary to Thierry de Montbrial's opinion ("*Le monde tel qu'il est*", Bibliothèque Médicis, *public Sénat*, February 25th, 2006). Occidentalism is home-oriented in purpose as control and manipulation are directed towards local people rather those described, as is the case in Orientalism. Probably the technological, economic and military means Orientalism had and which Occidentalism lacks makes this latter an enterprise that cannot afford outside domination and control.

However, what Occidentalism shares with Orientalism is a sum of characteristics that make of it a set of authorised and generally-accepted views about the 'West'; views that describe it, teach it in order either to justify local repressive political measures in Arab-Islamic countries enforced through physical violence, or to manipulate the people's will and choice through symbolic violence. What Occidentalism also shares with Orientalism is its seeming harmlessness while it is gradually destructive of the peoples' true awareness, and in the case of students, destructive of their freedom to

think and express what they think. This is cleverly expressed by Said in his introduction to *Orientalism*:

Lastly, for readers in the so-called Third World, this study [the book] purposes itself as a step towards an understanding not so much of Western politics...as of the strength of Western cultural discourse, a strength too often mistaken as merely decorative or 'superstructural.' My hope is to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves or upon others.

(ibid.: 25)

This second warning by Said has not prevented the emergence of a discourse in the Arab-Islamic world which employs an Orientalist approach which bears the following characteristics:

- As a doctrine, it is *limitative* and *restrictive* of thought. It does not allow criticism since it is presumably based on the sacred text that admits no reconsideration. Occidentalists hold the principle that Islam, in its traditional form, is “*good for every place and time.*” (Amara 2006c) and that it is *the* solution to all Muslims’ problems (Amara 2005b).

This feature is probably one of the strongest obstacles to foreign culture studies. As observed by Bakhtin:

In the realm of culture, outsidersness is a most powerful factor in understanding. ... A meaning only reveals its depths once it has encountered and come into contact with another foreign meaning: they engage in a kind of dialogue, which surmounts the closedness and one-sidedness of these particular meanings, of these cultures.

(Bakhtin 2002: 7)

To avoid the questions and questionings that cross-cultural encounters induce, Occidentalism stresses the pretended *unquestionability* of its ideology as part of the divine word. Filled with this intellectual inhibitor, students are often impermeable to any

contradictory discourse that could shake the stability of their representations.

- Its rejection of the right to doubt makes it a mere *propaganda* even when it claims to be objective social scientific knowledge. An illustration is provided by Mohamed Moussa El-Sherif who relies on far-fetched psychological theories to justify the social status of women. In his rejection of the 'Western' woman's equality to man in the issue of divorce, he claims that women, in Islam, do not have the right to repudiate because they are not capable of rational reasoning as they are subject to their emotions ("Awrak", *Iqraa*, January 18th, 2006). Amara (2006c) admits, as well, that the freedom of women in the 'West' does not suit the Muslim woman, who is bound by different moral values. Amara uses Koranic verses to provide arguments for the fact that the Muslim woman is already free: "*And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable...*" (Al-Baqarah S.2, A.228) Yet, the difference between what is stated in the Koran and the reality of Muslim women is equivalent to that which may exist between theory and practice.
- It is a tangible observable reality, a *historical experience* that deserves attention on the part of intellectuals, and it is far from being a fad (like clothes or hair-style) that lasts over a short period of time and vanishes, but is rather a *social project* of dramatic implications, or, to use Bakhtin's (2002: 3) words, "*a deep current of culture*". What mostly transforms Occidentalism into a social project is the fact that it is taken in charge, as advanced above, by varied social representatives such as politicians, preachers, journalists, and academics, as Orientalism had once been the concern of politicians like the British politician Lord Arthur James Balfour, of writers like

Nerval and Chateaubriand, of scholars like Edward William Lane (Said 1995). Probably, the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed are an instance that has shown the contributions of these different people to Occidentalism, as it is shown below.

- It rationalises and takes maximum advantage of human division into cultures, histories and traditions aimed at the *exacerbation of polarisation* and hostility. Outside enemies often induce inside solidarity even with totalitarian regimes.

The exacerbation of polarisation is based on the distinction Muslim vs. non-Muslim. In Occidentalism, recourse to religious identity is central to all aspects of life, including the relation to the *other*, in a sort of national creed, or a *civil religion*, that mixes religion and civil life. Civil religion is a concept that translates an important philosophy of life upheld by Occidentalists. It refers to the tendency to approach civil matters in moral terms, or as defined by Wald (1992: 58): “*The idea that a nation tries to understand its historical experience and national purpose in religious terms.*” (See also Bellah and Hammond 1980)

Occidentalists, such as Amara (2006a), firmly admit that religion, in the relation to the *other*, prevails over nationalism and culture. This relation is based on the imperative to proselytise rather than tolerate, and on the idea that knowing the *other* purposes to find the best way to achieve his conversion to Islam (*ibid.*), the *other's* beliefs being a falsification of the divine word. The systematic invocation of religion brings people to be under the psychological and intellectual domination of preachers being the ones who possess religious expertise.

- Occidentalism also takes advantage of the mind's need of order. This

is what Lévi-Strauss (1967) called a *science of the concrete*, the human tendency to attribute a place to everything, to discriminate between all things to be easily identified. There has to be a 'West' to be opposed to an 'East', and this 'West' has to be all-Christian to sustain its opposition to a supposedly all-Muslim 'East', though Islam and Christianity, as belief systems, do not acknowledge political borders.

- Based on representation and stereotypical depiction of the 'Westerner', it *evacuates individuality* and refers to the 'Westerner' as a collective group. Commenting on the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed, the leader of the Algerian Islamist party *El Islah*, Abdallah Djaballah, considered these cartoons as an umpteenth insult of the 'West' to Islam (*El Watan*, February 14th, 2006), a view subscribed to by many other Occidentalists such as Hamid Ben Abdallah Al-Aliy (2006), though the newspaper is a small private press organ in a small country of about 5 million inhabitants like Denmark, which does not really play a major role on the world geopolitical arena, thus by no means representative of a population of more than two billion people restrictively referred to as the 'West', and scattered over five continents.⁴¹

The Occidentalist tendency to hold a collective group for an individual act on the basis of some religious justification contradicts Koranic principles that Occidentalism pretends to follow. Individual responsibility is clearly stated in the Koran in five instances (Al-An'ām S. 6, A.164; Al-Isrāa S.17, A.15; Fatir S.35, A.18; Az-Zumar S.39, A.7; An-Najm S.53, A.38, Al-Qiyāmat S.75, A.11), each stating that:

⁴¹ This Occidentalist discourse of mixing identities, religious, national and cultural, has a great influence on students and is heard and adhered to by them. For instance, in their reaction to the cartoons, students in the English Department, University of Chlef, posted slogans on walls of classrooms where we could read "*The European Union are infidels*", thus blaming the whole European Union for the deeds of a single member country like France.

“No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another...” (Al-Isrāa S.17, A.15), literally meaning that no one can be held responsible for somebody else’s wrongdoing.

The idea of the supremacy of the collective over the individual backs the totalitarian regimes in the Arab countries as a means to curb any opposition in the name of the collective interest, since this interest is determined by politicians as the collective group’s representatives, or mandated spokespeople (see below). While the individual can only exist as a member of the collective group in these countries, thus unable to have an individual view in its own right, in the ‘West’ the individual enjoys much more autonomy which allows him to have individual opinions that do not necessarily commit the whole group. As such, a ‘Western’ society can in no way be held liable for an opinion, or even misconduct or misdemeanour, a press organ in the ‘West’ commits, since it enjoys the freedom press organs in Arab countries lack. Lacking freedom, most Arab press organs are only those totalitarian regimes’ organs that relay official opinions. By holding the whole ‘Western’ society responsible for an act committed by one of its private members, it is applying concepts specific to a particular Arab society to a different ‘Western’ reality.

- As such, any action from an individual or group from the ‘West’ is deemed, by Occidentalists, as part of the general conspiracy of the ‘West’ against the ‘East’, Islam, and Arabs. The *conspiracy theory* underlies all reactions against the ‘West’, reactions that should involve, according to Occidentalists, all members of the *Ummah* as their duty to defend it.

The case of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed and the subsequent reaction in the Arab-Islamic world are a vivid illustration of this theory. With the lack of sensitivity and decency that may be found in these

cartoons, they were also represented as part of a Western conspiracy against the Arab-Islamic world. This view was expressed by such Occidentalists as the Rector of the mosque of Lille (France), Amar Lasfar (living in France for twenty years) (“C Dans L’air”, *France 5*, February 6th, 2006), a member of the Moroccan Parliament, Hassan Daoudi (“El-Akhbar”, *Al Jazeera*, February 3rd, 2006), a politician in a country known for its important Christian and Jewish communities, as there are, for instance, two synagogues in the city of Fez, and an Jewish-Arab as a member in the Moroccan government, two quite exceptional cases in the whole Arab world (“L’Islam est-il soluble dans la démocratie”, *Théma, Arte*, February 21st, 2006), or the leader of the other Algerian Islamist party *MSP*, Aboudjerra Soltani (a party member of the governmental coalition in Algeria) (*Le Quotidien d’Oran*, February 5th, 2006). The latter considered these cartoons as part of European attempts to undermine the Islamist political successes in the Arab world (with *Hamas*’s arrival to power in Palestine in January 2006, or al-ikhwān al-muslimūn’s devastating success in the Egyptian parliamentary elections by the end of 2005), thus mixing religion and politics.

The functioning of Occidentalism as a political ideology in Arab countries is strikingly clear in this affair. The political explicit or implicit support in these countries is part of the concretisation of this adversity rapport the people are called to have with the ‘West’. This rapport is necessary for the demonisation of ‘Western’ culture and its rejection in its entirety, i.e. including its positive elements such as the sacredness of political freedom that is dangerous⁴² to political stability

⁴² The freedom of the press in the Arab world is subjected to political power. This cartoons case, in which the press is said to have abused its freedom, was a good opportunity for governments in these countries to remind its peoples of the ‘wisdom’ of such a decision. The local example was also given with the case of Jihad Momani, editor of the Jordanian tabloid *Shihane*. The editor was dismissed and the tabloid banned for having published three of the prophet’s cartoons. The cartoons were published, on February 2nd, 2006, along with a paper by the editor who wondered whether the cartoons were more harmful

in these countries. Demonisation is carried out, of course, by the instrumentalisation people's wrath and frustrations through "*media pictures ... which can easily be manipulated in times of crisis and insecurity*" (Said 2003).

Modernisation itself has come to be equated with westernisation (Wallerstein 1990; Chang 2004). Islam is of course there to back up the need to reject all what is foreign in the name of religious duty. As expressed by Cheikh Ibrahim al-Shirbini (2006), in his comments on Prophet Mohammed's cartoons, Muslims do not need to wait until their Prophet is insulted to boycott 'Western' goods and life style (including the way of dressing, cuisine, architecture), since it is their duty to live according to an Islamic way that is in total contradiction to the heathen 'West'.

Occidentalism blurs a very important reality of Islam and Muslims in order to serve political interests. While Muslims living in 'Western' countries claim full citizenship and protest against any encroachment on their rights and liberties as citizens, they are paradoxically induced by Occidentalists, in the name of their position against blasphemy, to question these claims as they refuse to integrate the basic features of 'Western' democratic and republican culture in these countries:

- that freedom of speech and the press were conquered precisely by means of blasphemy against dominant ideologies, be they socio-political (feudalism) or religious (Church);
- that all individuals (including politicians) and belief systems (including religions) are subordinate to the right of criticism and satire (as in cartoons)⁴³.

to Islam than the pictures of executions of hostages on television in the name of this religion. The press is, however, never banned for attack on religions or people when thousands of anti-Semitic cartoons are published in Arab newspapers on a daily basis.

⁴³ It must be observed that freedom of the press, of speech, or intellectual publication is nonetheless somehow circumscribed in 'Western' countries, where, for instance, certain

Moreover, Occidentalism, while Islam is said to be a world religion and ethnic-blind, as admitted by one of the exceptional imams who criticise Occidental views, the Algerian Soheib Bencheikh (“L’Islam est-il soluble dans la démocratie”, Théma, *Arte*, February 21st, 2006), attributes the exclusive appropriation of this religion to the Arab-Islamic world as it considers any supposed attack on Islam as an attack against these countries, i.e. as part of the so-called clash of civilisations⁴⁴. This is well suggested by comments of politicians such as the Algerian minister of religious affairs, Bouabdellah Ghlamallah, who implicitly denies Islam to Europe as he claims that the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed are a provocation of Arab countries when

topics are paradoxically not open to debate and are completely unquestionable. This is the case of revisionist ideas denying the Nazi Holocaust. These ideas are totally banned and their authors can be sentenced to imprisonment for their publication as part of what is called negationism (denial of historic crimes). There is certainly ridicule in such limitations and laws, which in the name of the sensitivity of a given topic, it is closed to historical investigation and discussion, or historical revisionism. However, the Jewish lobby, by means of hegemonic intellectualism and political lobbying has come to impose these limitations. What is unfortunately the proper of those movements in Arab-Islamic countries is that they attempt to exercise the same influence through violence (such as terrorism), something which harms their cause more than it serves it. The ban on revisionism in historical facts is also common in Arab countries. The case of the Peace and National Reconciliation Charter (PNRC) implementing decree (February 27, 2006) is a direct illustration of this. Article 46 clearly stipulates that “*Is sentenced to a three to a five-year imprisonment and a fine of 250.000 to 500.000 DA whoever, through written statements, or any other act, uses or instrumentalises the wounds of the national tragedy to undermine the institutions of the popular and democratic republic of Algeria ...*” (Ordonnance n°06-01 du 28 Moharram 1427 correspondant au 27 février 2006 portant mise en oeuvre de la charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale). This law is an indirect way to forbid any criticism of the PNRC or write anything that contradicts the official history of this Algerian tragedy of the 1990s.

⁴⁴ This view was first expressed by Samuel Huntington (1993) who believes that, after the fall of communism and the subsequent end of ideology, “*the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.... The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.*” With his definition of civilisation, Huntington comes to the conclusion that this clash of civilisations is to bring a confrontation between Arab-Islamic and Western civilisations, these two being too differentiated. In his criticism of this theory, Said (2001) *cleverly writes*: “*These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice, than to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed analysis. ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ thesis is a gimmick like ‘The War of the Worlds,’ better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time.*”

saying that “*human rights according to the Western conception are the rights of the European.*” (*El Watan*, February 15th, 2006) Amara (2003) goes even further to call it a religious war, part of a ‘Western’ and mainly American plan to dominate the Muslim world following September 11, and an attempt to Christianise Muslims.

The media, and even ‘Western media’, play a major role in relaying this Occidentalist myth. In an article published in *Le Quotidien d’Oran* (February 9th, 2006), Pierre Morville, the newspaper’s correspondent in Paris, makes the following comment on the re-publication of Prophet Mohammed’s cartoons on *France-Soir*: “*The initiative to publish cartoons of the Prophet is all the more weird as the Maghrebi community is an important readership to France-Soir,*” and Vincent Lalu, director of *Vie du rail*, agreeing by saying that this Maghrebi readership amounts to 30% of the total *France-Soir* readers in France.

What these comments imply, in admitting that these cartoons of a Muslim prophet, and which hurt Muslims, are shocking to the Maghrebi community, is that Islam belongs to this community and that this community is all-Muslim. Cultural distinctions become geographical ones to finally become religious ones. Furthermore, even associations struggling against racism, such as the MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples) in France, contribute to this Occidentalist confusion between religion, culture and race, in its reaction against the cartoons, as it lodged a complaint against *France-Soir* for incitement to racial hatred (*El-Watan*, February 12th, 2006).

- This conflicting relationship to the ‘West’ is backed up, by Occidentalism, through the fallacious *textual approach* Occidentalists have to the ‘West’. Orientalists dealt with the Orient, more often than

not, through books, i.e. by taking their colleagues' texts produced before them as *the* unquestionable source of knowledge about the Orient, with the total neglect of reality, thus preferring "*the schematic authority of text to the disorientations of direct encounters with the human.*" (Said 1995: 93) Similarly, Occidentalists deal with the 'West' through texts, and mainly through the sacred text, the Koran. The Occidentalist definition of Christianity and Judaism is that of an effrontery to Islam. Their definition of the 'West' is that of the heathen, the enemy of Islam as represented in the Koran, whose main objective is the destruction of this religion and its people. Among the Koranic verses instrumentalised by Occidentalism is the following: "*Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou follow their form of religion. ...*" (Al-Baqarah S.2, A.120)

Many verses from the Koran, that deal with the early days of Islam (the 7th century) and its relation to the other religions, are thus taken out of their context to be applied to the present. A case in point is Amara's argumentation on the approach of the 'West' to Islam and Muslims today. Despite the presence of many institutions of Islamic or Oriental studies, Amara (2006a) denies this reality and rather has recourse to some Koranic verses to present a different version:

- *If they saw every one of the Signs, they will not believe in them; in so much that when they come to thee, they (but) dispute with thee; the Unbelievers say: 'These are nothing but tales of the ancients. (Al-An'ām S.6, A.25)*
- *'Nay,' they say '(these are) medleys of dreams!-Nay, he forged it! (Al-Anbiyāa S.21, A.5)*
- *And the Unbelievers say, 'This is a sorcerer telling lies. (Sād S.38, A.4)*
- *The Unbelievers say: 'Listen not to this Qur-ān, but talk at random in the midst of its (reading), that ye may gain the upper hand! (Fussilat S.41, A.26)*

Verses which assert the opposite view are often silenced. "Say, *The*

Truth is from the Lord' Let him who will believe, and let him who will, reject (it)" (Al-Kahf S.18, A.29) or "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error." (Al-Baqarah S.2 ,A.256) are not taken as calls for tolerance, and Occidentalists tend to divide the world into two sections: *dar al-Islam* (literally house of submission) and *dar al-harb* (literally house of war). The former refers to the areas under Muslim rule. The latter designates the areas outside Muslim rule and where war, or *jihad*, is necessary until the establishment of Islamic government (see Ramadan 2005).

Another case of Koranic-based approach is Amara's view of the place of women in society. His interpretation of the Koran leads him to the same position upheld by Mohamed Moussa El-Sherif in their denial of the right of women to hold the highest political positions such as presidency. To back up his view, Amara (2005b) claims that Islam protects women's rights, while in Judaism, the woman is stigmatised as she is held responsible for mankind's curse of the Original Sin according to the Old Testament. Apart from any theological debate over the Koran or the Old Testament, the problem in Amara's statements is that he keeps his arguments at the theoretical/textual level, thus completely evacuating the realities of women's status in Islamic and Jewish societies. Despite the fact that neither society abides by the principles stated in its sacred book, Amara refers to these books as if they reflect the social reality of these societies. What is characteristic of Occidentalists, as was the case of Orientalists, is that they often take fantasy for reality, and pretend to be empirical while they are strictly hypothetical.

- This textual approach implies the last characteristic of Occidentalism. Reference to the Koran in the Occidentalist definition of the 'West' and the subsequent desired relationship Muslims should have with it

attributes necessarily a character of *arrested development* to human groups, whether in the 'East' or the 'West'. Thus, in the same way Orientalists such as Ernest Renan in the 1840s described Semites as instances of arrested development (Said 1995: 234), Occidentalists understand Muslims, Jews or Christians and the relationships between them as reasserted versions of the old past, a past of Islamic conquests (*Foutouhate*), of Christian crusades, in short, of mutual destruction.

In Occidentalism the past is made sacred as it is exclusively the past of Islam, the past of Prophet Mohammed, his companions (*sahaba*) and their followers. The systematic invocation of the past in the Arab-Islamic world, since the 1950s, to fulfil the functions of the present stands as an anachronism, as the Algerian Islamologist Mohamed Arkoun (2005) put it. By making the past sacred, Occidentalism ignores the human fallibility and all possible mistakes that the characters of this past may have made. It is also the closing down of any forms of *Ijtihad* that could confront the Islamist-Occidentalist discourse by providing other rival forms of modern knowledge. As Said writes:

The gradual extinction of the Islamic tradition of Ijtihad or of individual interpretation has been one of the major cultural disasters of our time, which induced the disappearance of a whole critical thought and of any individual confrontation with the questions raised by contemporary world.

(Said 2003)

A vivid illustration is provided by the Saudi preacher Abdullah Ibn Slimane El-Menbaa who asserts that the Islamic empire, through the *foutouhate* (the conquests) was a positive achievement, while 'Western' empires were destructive (*The Seventh Iqraa Jurisprudential Conference on Cinema*, 16, 17 October, 2004). It is

quite extraordinary how two imperial and colonialist machines, responsible for the extermination of large populations and their cultures, are treated differently by Occidentalism.

Recourse to the past for Occidentalists is central to their disguise of reality. A case in point is their view of the reality of the woman's status in the Islamic world. To present a very positive picture of the roles women are allowed in these societies, instead of drawing on illustrations from present time, they go back to the past to find examples of great women who played major roles in their time, such as the Prophet's wife Khadija, the first martyr in Islamic history, Sumaya Bint Khabat, the daughter of the Prophet's close companion Abu Bakr, Asmaa, the first Prophet's kind of trade minister, Samraa Bint Nah-y, and many others (Amara 2005b). While these figures really had a great contribution to their society's progress, what is not said by Occidentalists is that women today, in Islamic society, are not given the same opportunities to undertake the same achievements. In Occidentalism, positive past is there just to stand as an argument, never as a model to follow.

Another illustration of the omission of truth through the sacredness of the past is the statement of the former dean of El-Azhar University in Cairo, Ahmad Omar Hashem ("El bayenna", *Iqraa*, January 26th, 2006). He assumed that division of the Islamic *Ummah* into small countries is due to the geographical borders made by European colonial powers, thus completely perverting the historical truth of the existence of many Islamic countries prior to European colonialist scramble on these countries in the nineteenth century. Amara (2003) as well, who takes the Islamist Iranian revolution as a case of the ability of Muslims to build a modern nation, hides a true part of the story. Although there can be no doubt that Muslims, as a human group and not as a religious community, are capable of building

nations, Amara avoids speaking about the atrocities and oppressive character of the Khomeini regime. In his criticism of the dialogue between religions, Amara (2005) claims, as observed above, that this dialogue should be rejected by Muslims because it is based on the desire of Christians to convert Muslims. What he does not acknowledge is that Muslims have exactly the same objective as he upholds it when he writes that: “*the globalisation of Islam behoves us to proselytise it among the other peoples of the world.*” (2006a) Counteracting *ijtihad*, Occidentalism puts forward an approach to the past in the way Bakhtin described it:

... we have narrowed it terribly by selecting and modernizing what has been selected. We impoverish the past and do not enrich ourselves. We are suffocating in the captivity of narrow and homogeneous interpretations.

(Bakhtin 2002: 142)

Beside the racism and ethnocentrism Occidentalism induces, as Orientalism did (Said 1995: 204), it also leads to this state of absence of thought among students and society at large, brought by the daily and intensive ideological hype of politicians and preachers, ruins the great mission of education and keeps the people in a straitjacket of a one-dimensional thought and conformism. In the absence of an oppositional intellectual's discourse, and the lack of educational institutions where the 'East' and 'West' are critically and objectively studied, while we can find, as observed above, dozens of institutions in the United States and Europe for studying Islamic and Arab civilisation, *otherness* is taken in charge by Occidentalists, be they politicians, preachers or pseudo-intellectuals.

While Orientalism started as an academic knowledge about and attitude towards the Orient to become an Imperial and instrumental machinery (ibid.: 246), Occidentalism shifted from an amateur or unofficial propaganda, taken

in charge mostly by non-governmental extremist Islamist groups like al-ikhwān al-muslimūn in Egypt, to official ideology advocated by politicians, preachers and some pseudo-intellectuals in Islamic-Arab countries and 'Western' countries. This shift is due to the supporting institutions, sponsored by private or state financial means, which claim the defence and protection of Arab-Islamic identity and Islam against 'Western' aggression.

In this sense, Occidentalism as an ideology, in the K. Popper (1945), H. Arendt (1951), L. Talmon (1952) and B. Crick's (1962) usage, functions in Algeria, and the entire Arab world, as a closed system which claims "*monopoly of truth, refuse[s] to tolerate opposing ideas and rival beliefs*" (Heywood 1998: 10) in order to ensure subordination by the mere exercise of symbolic violence. This symbolic violence is first exercised on intellectuals, oppositional and secular intellectuals, who are called traitors and puppets of the 'West', as expressed by the Tunisian pro-Ben Ali pseudo-intellectual, Abu Bakr Es-Seghir ("Al-Bud al-akher", *ANB*, February 10th, 2006), who, while advocating dialogue between civilisations, refers to the 'West' as the enemy. Intellectuals or any other individual who dare refer to 'Western' culture are stigmatised and described as errant. This epithet is taken here in the sense of "*deviating from the true or correct*" (Richardson 1963: 224).

The extent to which Occidentalism comes to be a major source of influence on people's and students' way of approaching *otherness* and apprehending their relation to the *other* is considered here to be undoubtedly substantial and far from being an epiphenomenon. Modelling and nurturing the sum of representations of the *other* in students' minds, Occidentalism has constructed a take-away discourse for students. This discourse, descriptive and prescriptive in essence, tends to be formatted and closed to any discursive questioning or criticism. As the questionnaire

showed, more than 65% of the respondents claimed that their favourite book was the Koran and/or books about religion.

2.6. Occidentalism and Perceptive Effects

Adherence to Occidentalism among Arab peoples in general, and Algerian university students in particular, is due more to rational reasons (conscious motives) rather than to what is described as irrational and inexplicable causes (unconscious motives) (Capdevila 2004) circumscribed within the sphere of emotional responses to facts and events, as upheld by Pareto (1968), or Aron (1968: 9) who writes that “*Pareto rightly thought that rational criticism of derivations [ideologies] has a minor influence on residues, in other words, on the feelings which make people act, reason or un-reason*”⁴⁵. Although, emotions and feelings play a major role in standing for an ideology or a cause, as observed by Baechler (1976), these emotions need to be aroused by a conscious and voluntary acceptance of ideas that are deemed true and of acts that are considered legitimate, or at least justified.

This view is contrary to the Baconian theory of *idols* that people follow because they hold them in awe, something which prevents them from having any critical attitude. Bacon writes: “*Idols and false notions have become fixed in the human mind and got deeply rooted in it. They are not only so beset in the minds of people but also inaccessible.*” (Quoted in Boudon 1991: 54)⁴⁶ The fact that an ideology is based on false postulates and inaccurate scientific principles does not necessarily mean people’s adherence is irrational and due to some inexplicable awe for idols or ideas. When people subscribe to an ideology, they are convinced of its proclaimed

⁴⁵ (MOT)

⁴⁶ (MOT)

truth on the basis of cognitive process to make up their opinions and judgements relying on facts. The notion of charisma of the ideologue, or the spokesperson (see below for discussion of the mandated spokesperson), is not sufficient to explain adherence. Adherence is more linked to the nature and form of the message itself, and the felicity conditions within which this message is delivered, than to the charisma of the deliverer. Charismatic ideologues owe their charisma first to their appliance to the message, second to the conditions that prepared the public to be psychologically ready to accept that message. As Boudon wrote:

... if ayatollah Khomeiny decided to repudiate Islamic faith, this would probably harm his authority. And if Pope John Paul's statements on abortion and contraception are not strictly consistent with some orthodox Catholics' beliefs, the charismatic leader still enjoys, nonetheless, some respect due to his person, more than to his message, as long as he does not go beyond certain limits.⁴⁷

(Boudon 1991: 85)

Students' adherence to Occidentalism or any other ideology then cannot be simply circumscribed within the sphere of irrationality, but rather imputed to the distortion of their opinions, judgements and representations, mostly due to a wrong interpretation and/or a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the facts; two processes that often fall under the influence of *perceptive effects*.

Opinion is extremely determined by perception of facts, that is by the state, in its various dimensions, psychological, religious, cultural, political, economic and geographical, one is standing in when observing these facts. Each one of the *perceptive effects* determines the opinions of a given category of people according to the type of life they lead. There are identifiable social reasons that underlie students' embrace of a given type of

⁴⁷ (MOT)

ideology, and obscurity in the understanding of their attitude is due to the ignorance of these reasons. Far from completely neglecting the individual dimension of ideas, society, through culture and ideology, favours the emergence of and subscription to one idea instead of another. Mannheim observes that:

Every individual is thus doubly predetermined by the fact of growing in a society: on the one hand, he faces a ready-made situation and, on the other, he finds in this situation ready-made modes of thought and behaviour.

(Mannheim 1954: 3)

These social reasons or *felicity conditions* (Bourdieu 2001) provide a nutrient broth for the development of a particular type of ideology and its acceptance among people by giving birth, in people, to a *habitus* (ibid.) that attributes to ideologues a *symbolic power* (ibid.), necessary for the success and maintenance of their ideology, as this will be evinced below. As far as students are concerned, these conditions are in the form of the four types of *perceptive effects* by virtue of their special position that brings them to be in contact with different channels of common and specialised knowledge, outside and inside the university.

2.6.1. Situational Effects

Situational effects are those psychological determinants of perception and behaviour that grow within a particular socio-cultural setting (Boudon 1991). The particularity of a setting, as different to another, stems from the existence of distinct cultures and ideologies that dominate the market of ideas in society. Under the influence of these situational effects, students tend to perceive things, not as they really are, but as distorted by cultures,

through representations, and ideologies, such as Occidentalism, through discourse. Said explains this point as follows:

One ought again to remember that all cultures impose corrections upon raw reality, changing it from free-floating objects into units of knowledge. ...therefore cultures have always been inclined to impose complete transformations on other cultures, receiving these cultures not as they are but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be.

(Said 1995: 67)

The importance of their perception of things lies in the fact that it determines their interpretation of the behaviours and actions of the *other*, here the 'Westerner', and the behaviours and actions they are to adopt in response. Occidentalists rely mostly on these effects in order to make their ideas accepted by people. These effects are two types:

2.6.1.1. Effects of Position:

Position refers to the social role an individual plays in society. Thus being a doctor, a teacher or a factory worker entitles each one to a specific social role or to a specific position in society. It constructs a subjectivity that is used to perceive things and that is specific to an individual's position in society and his specific experience of things and events (Boudon 1979: 107-113). For instance, a teacher's view of his status in society is certainly different from the politician's view of the consideration teachers should have. The costs, benefits and risks of a particular occupation determine then the perception of things of the person who exercises it. This influence on the individual due to his social position is referred to as effects of position. Students, being in a not-fully-completed position which subjects them to a great number of influences, including those of their parents, teachers, the media, religious and political leaders, fall

under an extraordinary arsenal of effects of position that come to be, in some cases, contrary to their immediate interests as students. As students, they expose themselves, or are unwillingly exposed, to a great number of sources of knowledge in their quest for answers to their questions. They often turn to the easiest source and the closest one that does not require much effort and time. Nor does it need the necessary and painful effort to question preconceived ideas. It then saves them time and provides them with comfortable concepts to deal with the body of knowledge they face in a class like the American Civilisation class. Lacking the necessary maturity and knowledge to distinguish between what is sensible or not, they take the validity of these sources for granted. Occidentalism, in this case, seems to be *the* major source that provides them with a definition of the *other*. This definition, being exclusively negative, brings them to develop the negative attitude that prevents them from fully approaching the foreign culture without negative a priories.

2.6.1.2. Effects of Disposition:

While effects of position are social and somehow utilitarian, effects of disposition are cognitive and moral. They refer to the influences that stem out of an individual's representations and schemata, nurtured by his culture. It is a case where one's culture stands as an obstacle to the apprehension of a foreign culture. Students' readiness to easily accept Occidentalist ideas is the outcome of a long process of enculturation as advanced in Chapter One. Reaction to ideas produced by Jewish scholars is a vivid illustration of the point in question. Many students come to change their positive view of Chomsky, for instance, once they get to know that he is Jewish. This is due to the long process of demonisation of the Jews on a

regular basis in mosques, as the invocation of God to destroy them is part of a typical Friday sermon. Ethnophaulisms⁴⁸ against Jews is also very common in everyday speech in Algeria. The word *Ihoudi* (meaning Jew) itself is an ethnophaulism used by many Algerians to describe a mischievous person. On the basis of these representations of the Jew, and the 'Westerner' in general, students easily adhere to Occidentalism which takes advantage of this disposition to diffuse its ideology of hatred and confrontation.

It is quite extraordinary to observe that out of all the words respondents to the questionnaire were asked to associate with the word Jew, none was positive. Among the words suggested were: criminal, bad, evil, war, traitor, settlement, disgusting, depravity, moral decay, malice, hatred, cheating, cowardice, enemy, devil, atheist, violence, tyranny, insult, cruel, terror, murder, pitiless, hypocrisy, lying, revenge.

Students' acceptance of and adherence to Occidentalist ideology can then not be imputed to mere blind passion but rather to cognitive and utilitarian processes that can be studied and remedied. In addition to the situational effects, students undergo other influences such as the following.

2.6.2. Effects of Perspective

Effects of perspective are very close to effects of position. They are those influences that are due to an individual's position, not as his social role like

⁴⁸ Ethnophaulisms are derogatory words or expressions used to describe a category of people on the basis of their ethnic origin. Many ethnophaulisms are used by Algerians to address or refer to other Algerians or foreigners, such as: *Izikher* (literally a flimsy rope), used by Berbers to refer to an Arab; *Zwawi* (member of a *Zawiya* meaning a religious brotherhood), used by Arabs to refer to a Berber; *Nigru* (equivalent to nigger) used by white Algerians to refer to blacks.

in effects of position, but in relation to the degree of his knowledge of facts, i.e. his point of view in its literal sense. The extent to which individuals in society are aware of all the realities and implications of facts varies from one to another depending on his daily environment. Workers, teachers, journalists do certainly not enjoy the same degree of knowledge of facts, due of course to their profession and also to their daily preoccupations. The example of the Luddites shows that their reaction to the introduction of the machine, viewed as the direct cause of unemployment, is totally based on their point of view as workers. They did certainly not possess the wider and holistic view of (say) economists that would see in machines a technological and economic development that would bring a lot more job opportunities. A famous fable precisely illustrates the effects of perspective. Describing an elephant, three blind men fail to provide an accurate description of the animal as each one made it from his own perspective. Feeling the tail, for the first one it was like a tail; feeling the side, for the second it was flat and leathery; feeling the trunk; for the third it was like a long rubber hose (Saville-Troike 2003: 8). Although each one captured part of it, no one really got an accurate description of the animal.

Students tend to believe in Occidentalism because they are also under the effects of perspective; that is, because of the perspective from which they look at facts, they are not completely aware of all the facts and their implications. Occidentalists take advantage of this Students' lack of information to convince them of the legitimacy of their ideas. Their discourse lacks one of the basic laws of true discourse, i.e. exhaustiveness (Anscombe & Ducrot 1997: 52). A case in point is the approach to the Palestinian cause. Although, there can be no doubt about the legitimacy and justness of this cause, which is a people's right to have their own country, Occidentalists tend to completely blame Israel for the failure to settle this crisis and the terrible life conditions of this people. Students, and people in

Arab countries in general, totally subscribe to this view because they miss part of the truth that Occidentalists purpose not to reveal.

Hamas' victory in the legislative elections in January 2006 is presented as the Palestinians' attachment to Islam as they have chosen a party that claims to defend this religion, but never as this people's rejection of the corrupt government of *Fatah*, whose reputation is stained with cases of embezzlements and abuse of power. The corruption of the *Fatah* government is certainly partly responsible for the Palestinians dire conditions. In 1970, King Hussein of Jordan unleashed his tanks against Palestinians in Amman, killing over 3,000 to crack down on all attempts by Jordan's Palestinian majority to gain any political voice in the country. This event is rarely, not to say ever, mentioned by Occidentalists who highlight the Sabra and Chatila massacre which left 2,000 Palestinians refugees slaughtered, in September 1982, by Lebanese Maronite Christian militias before the total passivity of the Israeli army.

The effects of perspectives blur the complete and true vision of events, and prevent students from making sound and informed opinions about local and world events. Occidentalists instrumentalise these effects to fix their ideas as the *only true* source of knowledge available to students in their approach to *otherness* incarnated in the Christian or Jewish 'Western'.

2.6.3. Epistemological Effects

Epistemological effects are those that prevent epistemological ruptures with the past (Boudon 1991; Kuhn 1967; FerKiss 1977). While present reality is obviously different from past reality, concepts of the past are still applied to the present. The past and its concepts become the prison of the

mind, as obsolete concepts become completely irrelevant to the evolution of society and characters. These past concepts are paradigms, frames of thought (Kuhn 1967), that orient the construction of opinions.

As far students are concerned, their adherence to Occidentalism is partly due to the fact that they take Islamic past as a sacred model, i.e. paradigmatic ideal, which their reality should be adapted to, instead of adapting the concept of the past to their own reality, if not totally left out. *Ijtihad* is minimised though it is central to Islamic law. An illustration of this matter is found in the students' systematic rejection of secularism. The Islamic past, as a dominant cultural history, is a history of thorough mixture between religion and politics, i.e. a theocratic management of society. This type of society is held by students as the ideal one that should prevail in present time, and against which all other systems are assessed. Secularism is rejected because it does not correspond to the ancient concept of social and political management. All arguments that are taken from present reality and that back up the need for a secular society do not resist the past epistemological burden. The epistemological strength of *taqlid* (imitation of the past) excludes all efforts and attempts of *Ijtihad* as it is admitted by many Islamic currents that the time of *Ijtihad* ended in the tenth century with the establishment of the four *madahib* of *fiqh* (schools of Islamic jurisprudence), following the four major Sunni scholars: Malik ibn Anas (715-796), Abu Hanifa an-Nu'man (669-765), Imam Shafi'i (767-820) and Ibn Hanbal (780-855) (see Hallaq 1984).

Occidentalism draws heavily on the past and finds a terrain of epistemological effects favourable for the positive reaction among students. The work of Occidentalism is mainly to highlight the positive parameters of the paradigm rather than the negative ones. The glorious time of the Islamic past stands as a convincing argument for the success of theocracy and the

dangers of secularism. The fall of the Islamic empire within the same system is however not made conspicuous.

2.6.4. Effects of Communication

Effects of communication refer to that influence due to the large diffusion of ideas by intellectuals. A particular ideology acquires the status of science, and gets thus much credit, when embraced and propagated by intellectuals who play a major role in transforming an idea into an established fact and, to use Durkheim's (1995) concept, a collective belief. World history is full of examples of false ideas that enjoyed much scientific validity and which turned to be totally erroneous. Africans were a victim of such ideas that justified colonialism and imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the name of the English *white man's burden*, the French *mission civilisatrice*, or the American *manifest destiny*⁴⁹.

Occidentalism, just as Orientalism had once been, is a perfect example of this case of effects of communication. Many Arab pseudo-intellectuals who, as shown with Mohamed Amara, pushed by the passionate drive of Arab nationalism or Islamic *Ummah*, tend to provide all kinds of social scientific argumentation for the validity of such ideologies as Occidentalism or theories like 'the clash of civilisations'. What strengthens effects of communication is the lack of debate and the compartmentalisation of knowledge, in which large groups of intellectuals are discarded to give full monopoly to *one and only* one specific category in the name of subject

⁴⁹ As expressed by the American Senator Fulbright, all conquests were justified by generous and noble motives: "*The British called it the 'white man's burden'. The French called it their 'mission civilisatrice'.*" ("Of Destiny and Choice", *International Herald Tribune*, January 31, 1968) (MOT) Extending Fulbright's idea, C. Julien (1968: 28) observed that "*Americans, in their turn, called it their manifest destiny. What all these terms have in common is that they postulate an involuntary element ... outside a rational choice.*" (MOT)

expertise. As it will be advanced below, as far as religion and the relation to the ‘West’ are concerned, collective beliefs and official propaganda attribute the legitimacy to discuss these matters to the specific category of intellectuals referred to as *oulema* (plural of *alim*, a religious exegete) who have exclusivity in prescribing the relevant norms. All other categories of intellectuals, academics, journalists, sociologists, historians and others, seem not to be legitimately and rightly allowed to express opinions in these matters. Reference to such Muslim scholars, like Ibn Rushd, is totally overlooked as he claims, in his *Fasl al-maqāl* (The Decisive Treatise), that the Koran is an address to all people, whatever their cultural knowledge is, and as such, philosophers, meaning intellectuals, have the right to discuss religious matters.

This is not peculiar to religious matters. History, in Arab countries and most particularly in Algeria, has also been expropriated from historians and intellectuals to be left in the hands of politicians. Mohamed Harbi, the Algerian historian, rightly says that “*History in Algeria is confused with memory and is not a case for the professionals.*” (*El-Watan*, March 3, 4, 2006) This bypassing of an important category of society certainly helps the diffusion of false ideas that never undergo the test of public multidisciplinary cross-examination. As cleverly expressed by Boudon:

Thus, when the scientific community corresponding to a given discipline or a group of disciplines withdraws, thanks to institutionalised jolts ... and seems incapable of properly exercising its critical function ... effects of communication may have such an influence that the most absurd theories can become biblical truth. We can then witness a virtual institutionalisation ... of the right to say nonsense. ... The tribunal of rational criticism ... does then no longer exist or is incapable of making itself heard.... It is then enough... for a terrorism of the false idea to settle.⁵⁰

(Boudon 1991: 206-207)

⁵⁰ (MOT)

Students find in these *specialised* and *established* intellectuals (or more accurately pseudo-intellectuals) the 'sensible' voices and 'reliable' sources to which they turn to form their own opinions about religion and *otherness*, and consequently adopt the corresponding behaviour. These pseudo-intellectuals' opinion is all the more credited when those who are supposed to provide contradiction fall within the same trap of emotionalism and become oblivious of their social function of oppositional criticism. The spread, influence and dramatic effects of Occidentalism have not yet been adequately evaluated because one of the pernicious features of this ideology is precisely that it is sometimes unconsciously embraced by the intellectuals who should subject it to reconsideration. The wave of emotionalism and adherence to the same view from these intellectuals in the case of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed stands as a vivid illustration of this dysfunction of the intellectual's social mission.

The success that pseudo-intellectuals have achieved is due precisely to the fact that their exegetic discourse is disguised in a scientific frame that seduces even intellectuals, beyond the emotional involvement. This is not particular to Algeria or Arab-Islamic countries as history offers some examples of exegetic theories that had a considerable success among intellectuals in other places of the world. In the 16th century, Erasmus' *The Praise of Folly* (1511)⁵¹ is a case in point. In his criticism of the role of the Christian, Erasmus undertook an exegetic study of some parts of the Bible in the frame of a pamphlet against the teachings of the traditional Church. The pamphlet form, not only discarded the backlash of the Church, the study having a scientific form which the Church did not feel the need to indulge in, but also seduced intellectuals who took it as a modern discourse

⁵¹ Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus (1466-1536) was a Dutch humanist, theologian and classical scholar who harshly criticised Catholic doctrine though he remained Catholic till the end of his life. His popularity, during his life and after, has made his writings very successful as he is considered as the precursor and leading figure of religious reformation in Europe (Hoffman 1994; Dockery 1995).

on religion to become one of the most influential works of literature in Western civilisation. Erasmus' theory was actually purely exegetic in content as it examined the pious, yet superstitious, abuses of Catholic doctrine and the corrupt practices of part of the clergy, something which made it one of the Catalysts of religious Reformation in Europe, thus influencing people like Martin Luther, one of the founders of Protestantism (Chantraine 1971; Hoffman 1994; Botley 2004).

In Algeria, effects of communication are also multiplied with the state monopoly on important means of communication, such as the media or the mosque, and means of intellectual production like publishing and book distribution and importation. This monopoly allows the diffusion of selected ideas favourable to the status quo, as well as the exclusion of all forms of criticism, opposition or debate. It also leads to the separation between ideas and their historical context (i.e. their specificity) in order to present them as *the* ideas of the time, or universal ideas that should be shared by all sensible people.

Just as strong and far-reaching instruments of communication like television and internet are vital to Islamist terrorism (Gilles Kepel ("Le terreau du terrorisme", Théma, ARTE, February 28th, 2006), as they give the impression that the dreamt-of-old-days *Ummah* really exists and in a very large proportion (Marc Sageman, *ibid.*), they are also vital to Occidentalism. Occidentalism, like a commercial product, is organically linked to its large advertising and many people and students adhere to it because they are desperately in need of being part of a collective project that values their contribution, something that Arab politicians have never been able to provide, except as unfulfilled promises as the case was with the Arab leaders of the 1960s and 1970s such as Houari Boumèdienne, Gamal Abdenasser or Maamar Kaddafi.




Diagram 1: *Perceptive effects and students' intellectual activity*⁵²

2.7. Conclusion

Diagram 1, based on Boudon's (1991: 134) and adapted to the case of Algerian students, illustrates the process of perceptive effects that influence students in their intellectual activity. Perceptive effects, in Algeria, are exercised within a complex process of ideological discourse production and diffusion that involves a firm alliance between two important social institutions: religion and politics.

It can be stated at this stage that Occidentalism and the purely political ideology in Algeria are definitely belief systems that bear the characteristics listed by Boudon in his description of ideologies as peculiar belief systems (see p. 92). They are explicit in formulation, intolerant and closed to innovation, dependent on rallying a membership around optimised normative beliefs, conveyed through a discourse filled with an expressive style, fundamentally established in contradiction to the other ideologies, and allied with the institutions that detain the power of decision making.

⁵² Eff. P: Effects of position; Eff. Disp.: Effects of disposition; Eff. Com: Effects of communication; Eff. E.: Epistemological effects; Effects of perspective.

2.8. Original Quotations

Page 98

Le ON-dit comporte la trace d'une certaine prise en charge énonciative.

(Manuel Fernandez 2004: 99)

... les paroles des autres ... ce qui a déjà été dit dans d'autres discours.

(Authier-Revuz 1985: 117)

Page 99

[Les idéologies sont des] systèmes d'interprétation du monde social qui impliquent un ordre de valeurs et suggèrent des réformes à accomplir, un bouleversement à craindre ou à espérer.

(Aron 1968: 286)

En raison de cette différence dans la participation culturelle, c'est une erreur de considérer une culture comme le commun dénominateur des activités, idées et attitudes des membres composant une société. De tels dénominateurs communs peuvent être établis pour les individus qui ont un statut particulier en commun.

(Linton 1967: XXXVIII)

Page 100

... ces idées qui nous ont fait tant de mal...

(Boudon 1991: 21)

Page 101

... la rationalisation mensongère ... d'évènements...

(Capdevila 2004: 172)

Page 102

(Footnote 10)

Le problème de l'idéologie apparaît lorsqu'il existe une contradiction entre ce à quoi l'on croit et ce qui peut être établi comme scientifiquement correct.

(Parsons, quoted in Boudon 1991: 35)

Page 103

L'idéologie dépasse la pure intégration vers la distorsion et la pathologie dans la mesure où elle cherche à réduire la tension entre autorité et domination.

(Ricoeur 1997: 34)

Page 104

L'idéologie domine parce qu'elle peut être partagée par les dominants et les dominés...

(Capdevila 2004: 73)

Page 105

... des forces impersonnelles, omniprésentes et inéluctables... (Monnerot 1949: 268-269)

L'idéologie est la conversion d'idées en leviers sociaux [de manière à] exploiter l'énergie émotionnelle de certaines passions, à les canaliser dans l'action politique.

(Bell, quoted in Capdevila 2004: 193)

Page 106

Le concept d'idéologie est analytiquement contenu dans celui de groupe social car il est le concept de son unité et de son identité.

(Capdevila 2004: 21)

Page 108

...dire le rien, le néant, de faire exister dans les mots et par les mots ce qui n'existe pas dans les choses, de donner une forme d'être, capable de susciter la croyance...

(Bourdieu 2001: 327)

Page 121

*...أن يتحرر الوطن الإسلامي من كل سلطان أجنبي...
...أن تقوم في هذا الوطن الحر دولة إسلامية حرة تعمل بأحكام الإسلام*

(Ikhwan 2006)

Page 126

L'invisibilité de l'idéologie signifie que l'identification des individus à leur société est totale.

(Capdevila 2004: 164)

Page 128

Les Arabes n'aiment pas être comparés aux autres ni être différents des autres.

(Berque, quoted in Deguy 1964: 864)

إن الإسلام هو الدين الوحيد الذي تناقض مصادره الأصلية أسس النصرانية
...إنه حركة دينية معادية للنصرانية
(Amara 2005a)

Page 131

La recherche de la distinction...produit des séparations destinées à être perçues, ou mieux connues ou reconnues comme différences légitimes, c'est-à-dire le plus souvent comme différences de nature...

(Bourdieu 2001: 305)

Page 153

Pareto pensait, à juste titre, que la critique rationnelle des dérivations n'exerce qu'une faible influence sur les résidus, autrement dit sur les sentiments qui font agir, raisonner et déraisonner les hommes.

(Aron 1968: 9)

Les idoles et les notions fausses se sont installées dans l'esprit humain et elles sont profondément enracinées en lui. Elles sont non seulement si incrustées dans l'esprit des hommes qu'elles se révèlent comme difficiles d'accès...

(Bacon, quoted in Boudon 1991: 54)

Page 154

...si l'ayatollah Khomeiny décidait de répudier la foi islamique, il est probable que son autorité en souffrirait. Et si l'on voit bien que les déclarations du pape Jean-Paul II sur l'avortement et la contraception mettent mal à l'aise beaucoup de catholiques, il n'en demeure pas moins que, tant que le chef charismatique ne s'écarte pas trop de certaines limites, il suscite un sentiment de respect qui s'attache à sa personne plutôt qu'au contenu de son message.

(Boudon 1991: 85)

Page 162

(Footnote 49)

Les Britanniques l'appelaient 'le Fardeau de l'homme blanc'. Les Français l'appelaient leur 'mission civilisatrice'.

(Fulbright, "Of Destiny and Choice", *International Herald Tribune*, January 31, 1968)

Les Américains, à leur tour, l'appelaient leur 'destinée manifeste'. Ce que tous ces termes ont en commun, c'est qu'ils postulent en élément involontaire ... extérieur au choix rationnel.

(Julien 1968: 28)

Page 163

Ainsi, lorsque la communauté scientifique correspondant à telle discipline ou à tel ensemble de disciplines s'écarte, à la faveur de soubresauts institutionnels par exemple ... et qu'elle s'avère incapable d'exercer convenablement la fonction critique que je lui prête, les effets de communication peuvent avoir une influence telle que les théories les plus absurdes peuvent être prises au sérieux et passer pour vérités d'Évangile. On peut alors assister à une quasi institutionnalisation ... du droit de dire n'importe quoi. ...le tribunal de la critique rationnelle cesse ... d'exister ou d'avoir la capacité de faire entendre sa voix Il suffit alors ... pour que s'installe un terrorisme de l'idée fausse.

(Boudon 1991: 206-207)

CHAPTER THREE

Ideology as Discourse: The Practice of a Speech Genre

3.1. Introduction.....	172
3.2. Language as Discourse.....	173
3.3. Ideology as a Speech Genre.....	176
3.4. Felicity Conditions.....	179
3.5. Classical Arabic.....	187
3.6. The Right to Speak.....	196
3.7. The Speech Genre.....	202
3.8. Students as the 'Third'.....	218
3.9. The Intellectual.....	222
3.10. Ideology and Symbolic Power.....	227
3.11. Religion and Politics.....	233
3.11.1. Ideology as a Religious System.....	235
3.11.2. Religion as an Ideological System.....	237
3.12. Conclusion.....	242
3.13. Original Quotations.....	244

CHAPTER THREE

Ideology as Discourse: The Practice of a Speech Genre

Celui qui est forcé de parler plus haut qu'il n'y est habitué (comme devant un demi-sourd ou devant un grand auditoire) exagère ordinairement les choses qu'il doit communiquer. – Plus d'un devient conspirateur, colporteur de calomnies, intrigant, uniquement parce que sa voix se prête surtout bien au chuchotement.

(Nietzsche 1995 : 329)

3.1. Introduction

As observed in Chapter Two, power is far more efficacious when it is hegemonic, i.e. exercised with the consent of the people. To allow power to achieve hegemony, ideology is called into play, mainly through language since it is “*the commonest form of social behaviour*” (Fairclough 2001: 2), where assumptions find the best and easiest channel of expression. Ideology constructs then the assumptions (including representations) that permeate language, and thus permeates the individual mind to allow the completion of hegemony.

It is through language that politics, religion and scholarship come to form an influential machinery of thought and opinion modelling among people in Arab-Islamic countries, in general, and Algerian university students in particular. As a symbolic system (Lévi-Strauss 1958: 348), ideology is best propagated through another symbolic system, i.e. language. Language is understood here as discourse, i.e. as “*a form of social practice.*” (Fairclough

2001: 16), as a public representation (Sperber 1996: 49) that contribute to moulding the people's mental representations. The relationship between discourse and representations stems from the conception that, contrary to the commonly asserted link between language and culture, one should rather speak of the link between discourse and culture (which partly moulds representations) (Charaudeau 2003: 377). This is sustained by the fact that societies sharing the same language do by no means share the same culture, because they do not share the same language use. It is then language use, i.e. discourse, which coincides with culture, and by extension with representations.

This conception of language is essential to understanding the functioning of ideologies, such as Occidentalism, which is a discourse on *otherness* and the *other*, in Algeria. Apprehending language as a social practice implies that linguistic phenomena are essentially social phenomena, that is, whenever language is used orally or in a written form, it is socially determined to a great extent (see the Bakhtinian approach below), and it also has social effects that determine other social practices of the ones who listen. Language is thus inextricably linked to the other social practices like religion, politics, scholarship and education, and as such, it is fundamentally ideological.

3.2. Language as Discourse

This conception of language as discourse is substantially different to the Saussurian theory of language. While Saussure (1916) conceived of language as a combination of *langue* (the general and purely social system including the rules of language equally shared by all members of the speech community) and *parole* (the purely individualistic performance of the system)

(Emerson & Holquist 2002: XVI), the practice of language in the extremely ideologically saturated context of society, notably Arabic-Islamic ones, has shown that the Saussurian distinction between language and language use, through his *langue/parole* dichotomy, is unsatisfactory as it neglects the ideological aspect of language as a system and the social/ideological dimension of language use. The Saussurian approach to language is, as stated by Bourdieu (2001: 11), exclusively semiotic inasmuch as it emphasises the linguistic sign since it "*focuses on the intrinsic constitution of a text or a corpus of texts at the expense of the socio-historical conditions of their production and reception.*"¹ As it will be shown below, the Saussurian notion of equal access to *langue* in a speech community is far from being validated, or to use Bourdieu's (ibid.) provocative phrase, it is an *illusion of linguistic communism* as, for instance, the case of classical Arabic in Arab countries, where inequality is rather the rule and the means that allows the ideological (political and religious) instrumentalisation of this language as a hegemonic lever.²

Discourse designates that social interaction whose means is language. Language as discourse is more than the product of language use, i.e. the text (written or oral). Discourse includes also the context of production of the text and its context of interpretation (Fairclough 2001: 20). These two contexts are basically social, and thus permeated by all forms of influence

¹ (MOT)

² It must be noted that because of the fact Algerians entertain a symbolic relation to classical Arabic, a relation which by no means is based on an actual linguistic reality of use, they have developed a kind of schizophrenic rapport to this language. As a matter of fact, despite the fact that they show great respect to this language as the language of the Koran, they nonetheless happen to greet it with derision, precisely because it does not translate their daily reality. Instances of this kind of behaviour can be found in sketches about Algerians' everyday life made in classical Arabic. These sketches are funny not because of their content but because of the language used as it does not suit the settings and plots, classical Arabic being identified only with religious and political topics. The situation is equivalent to the schizophrenia speakers of other social dialects or other languages in modern multilingual Britain have developed with standard English. Although these speakers do "*acknowledge the dominance of standard English, they do not accept it in the full sense of the term.*" (Fairclough 2001: 48)

and manipulation. This influence and manipulation of language that is external to the text is guided by what Fairclough labels *members' resources* which are what:

... people have in their heads and draw upon when they produce or interpret texts – including their knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on. ...The members' resources ... are cognitive ... but they are also social in the sense that ... they are socially generated, and their nature is dependent on the social relations and struggles out of which they were generated."

(ibidem)

As discourse, language, the system and its use, is subjected and practised in a network of power relations that purpose the implementation of planned social projects and establishment of particular types of society. Apprehending language as discourse reveals then the social forces that have a vitally important foothold in the individual mind when using and interpreting language, and when forming opinion and taking actions accordingly. As advanced by Van Der Maren (1996: 424), the meaning of discourse results from all what expresses "*social stakes*". Actually, apprehending language as discourse is not a methodological option in language study, it is the approach the reality of the practice of language, or as Poirier (1983: 158) put it as early as 1983: "*the linguistic exercise undertaken without consideration of the real content of discourses and situations resembles learning music theory without any musical practice.*"³

Among these forces is ideology, which reaches the individual psyche through the manipulation of language. Ideology is therefore part and parcel of the context of production and interpretation of language, i.e. it is organically linked to discourse. Discourse, being the shortest route to

³ (MOT)

people's minds, is targeted by hegemonic power by means of ideology for the purpose of subduing people, and gaining their consent by legitimising existing social and power relations, or in short, the status quo. As Bakhtin put it: "*Language is not a neutral medium... it is populated – overpopulated with the intentions of others.*" (Quoted in Cazden 1989: 122) These intentions, which are an ideology transformed into a discursive form through a particular type of language (a speech genre), make the dialogic process that links the speaking subjects (the ideologues: politicians, preachers, pseudo-intellectuals) to their listeners (the people and students).

3.3. Ideology as a Speech Genre

Ideologies, such as Occidentalism, need to be integrated into the process of maturation of societies in order to be effective. When founding myths are formed, their adoption by people takes time through their intrusion in mainstream national culture by means of such social institutions as the school, religion, politics, or language. The concept *institution*, here, is handled in its French Bourdieusian sense, i.e. as "*any relatively lasting set of social relations which attribute to individuals distinct forms of power, status and resources.*" (Thompson 2001: 18)⁴ These institutions, when instrumentalised, help the establishment of a kind of discourse within which there are two participants:

- a group of people who get the status of official and social representatives of the whole society: the *mandated spokesperson*, apart from whom none is allowed to speak in the name of the society nor listened to by the people;
- the rest of the society form another group whose function is to follow

⁴ (MOT)

the normative prescriptions of the mandated spokesperson and relay his discourse within a fixed type of speech genre.

Most particularly, attributing to a given language the status of an official language, thus making thereof the language of school education and political communication, is vital to the integration of the dominant ideology, conveyed through that language, into the process of socialisation of young individuals such as students. This is what Bourdieu (2001: 75) described as the making of, beside the speech or discourse community, a “*conscience community which is the cement of the nation*”⁵, where linguistic homogenisation or unification means intellectual and cultural purification or cleansing (ibid.). The official language teacher is transformed from a language teacher into a *mentor* (Davy 1950: 233), propagator of, not an official language, but rather of an official ideology, who teaches pupils or students not only what to say but also what to think.

Classical Arabic plays this utilitarian role in all Arab countries, and its maintenance in this highest political position is the safeguard of the position of official ideology, which, because of the long association between the two, has come to be inseparable from it. The social structure and power relations, which the dominant ideologies in Arab countries have established, can well be visible in classical Arabic that definitely keeps both the spokespeople and the people in their respective positions. Here lies the ideologues’ fear of the exposition of students to foreign languages as languages of culture, which can, through acculturation or interculturalisation, rust the official ideological machine. Foreign culture is a clear and present danger to the unity of the conscience community, as ideas are very much contagious and they never immigrate without damage.

⁵ (MOT)

Fishman (1971) rightly raised the issue of *domain* and its importance in the "*description and explanation of means of communication*" (Saville-Troike 2003: 42). He defines it as:

... a socio-cultural construct abstracted from topics of communication, relationships between communicators, and locales of communication, in accord with the institutions of a society and the spheres of activity of a speech community.

(Fishman 1971: 587)

In other words, choosing a language of communication is to a large extent determined by the general subject area (in this case religion and politics), the roles and relationships between the participants (here the mandated spokespeople and the people), and the context within which the communication takes place (in this case an environment overwhelmed by a political-religious ideology, including Occidentalism). Within this *domain*, Classical Arabic seems to be the language that suits the effective realisation of the dominant group's interests in Algeria.

Language and the other institutions function then as *legitimizers* of the self-proclaimed spokesperson's discourse, to which they confer a performative dimension, i.e. social efficiency. As Said (1995: 321) claimed it, discourse is systematic and cannot be made at will. It always belongs "*to the ideology and the institutions that guarantee its existence.*" Performative discourse is speech acts, or utterances, in which the speaking subject performs an action by saying (Lyons 1996: 238). Doing by saying (Austin 1962) means here to produce an efficient effect in the listener so as to either alter or form his opinion, or bring him to act according to one's suggestions. Ideological discourse is then never constative (or descriptive) (Levinson 2003: 228), even when it seems to be so. As Anscombe & Ducrot observed:

*... there are, in most utterances, certain traits which determine their pragmatic value, independently from their content. And these traits cannot even be considered as marginal... . They are, on the contrary, marks which are interwoven in the syntactic structure.*⁶

(Anscombre & Ducrot 1997: 18)

Ideological discourse is then always performative as it possesses an illocutionary force, i.e. a power of conviction and persuasion, and purposes to produce a perlocutionary effect, i.e. the effectuation of the speaking subject's desired action by the listener (see below Bakhtin's *delayed purposed action*). Part of this effect is its symbolic violence that lies in the fact that ideological discourse discards any contradiction or questioning that aims to show objectively its manipulating character and interest-based purpose, to the point that it paradoxically describes any scientific discourse which attempts to denounce it as mere ideology.

3.4. Felicity Conditions

Yet, illocutionary force and the perlocutionary effect are not naturally contained in the words (or language) (Bourdieu 2001), as suggested by Austin (1962) and, later, by Haberman (1987). Nor is there a natural environment favourable to the transformation of words into a performative discourse. Words get substantial illocutionary force and a considerable perlocutionary effect as discourse within an environment which is created, fabricated by social conditions (cultural, religious and political) that will be referred to as *felicity conditions* (Austin 1962). These conditions, which include the speaking subject's social position as well as his position within the field of his intervention, the context of production and reception of discourse, the form of discourse (speech genre) and the relation between the speaking subject and the listener, allow performative discourse to be

⁶ (MOT)

successful and achieve its producer's objectives.

It must be stated here that the Austinian approach to felicity conditions does not really correspond to the case studied in this work. Austin remained very much at the linguistic-pragmatic level which does not render the real importance of felicity conditions in the success of ideological discourse and its social implications. The analysis of the felicity conditions in Algeria, as an illustration of the rest of the Arab-Islamic countries, is based here on Bourdieu's approach which reveals all the social and political dimensions of their relation, mediated by the social institutions, to the ideological discourse produced by politicians, preachers and the pseudo-intellectuals.

Felicity conditions are all the more determinant of the success of ideological discourse as the latter needs more the listener's acknowledgement of the message and the speaking subject than it needs his comprehension. This is illustrated by all those political speeches of Arab political or religious leaders, made in classical Arabic, incomprehensible for most of those the speech is addressed to, yet accepted by these same people. This is due to the felicity conditions, including the status of the speaking subject. Bourdieu purports this view writing that:

*... a performative utterance is bound to fail whenever it is made by a person who is not entitled to make it, or, more generally, whenever the people or the particular circumstances are not suitable...*⁷

(Bourdieu 2001: 165)

Without favourable felicity conditions, an utterance (as a unit of discourse) is but a speech act, and not a performative act that possesses a perlocutionary effect. As Ducrot (1977) put it, a performative utterance contains "*a clear pretension of possessing a given power.*"

⁷ (MOT)

Part, then, of these felicity conditions, and first of all, is the statutory condition of the speaking subject (Bourdieu 2001: 270), the politician, the preacher or the pseudo-intellectual. This status is that of the mandated spokesperson that confers the right to speak to, and in the name of, the people. Once this status is attributed to a person, he becomes a person-to-listen-to, worthy of attention, of trust, and most importantly, worthy to be followed. He is what he seems to be, or what the majority of the group believes him to be. The epithet ‘mandated’ is of a great importance here as he is the spokesperson as long as he is mandated by the group, through the official social institutions like religion or the school, who believes in him (Bourdieu 2001). The mandated spokesperson’s discourse succeeds as long as he *preaches the converted*, or as expressed by Bourdieu (ibid.: 113): “*each utterance is produced for and by the market to which it owes its existence and its specific characteristics.*”⁸

It is to be observed that, despite the fact that the personal qualities of an orator play a role in constructing his charisma, it is his status of mandated spokesperson that gives him the authority to speak and be listened to. By his status of mandated spokesperson, he holds the *skeptron*⁹, with which he has the authority to speak and without which he is not allowed to. The case, for instance, of Amr Khaled¹⁰, the very successful preacher on *Iqraa* is an interesting illustration. This charismatic preacher, though he masters the speech genre and the medium (classical Arabic), relies on the social conditions that have attributed to the religious discourse a privileged

⁸ (MOT)

⁹ The *skeptron*, meaning a heralds wand in Greek mythology, is a magic wand which was carried by Hermes, the god of shepherds, orators, literature and poets in Greek myths, as the messenger of the gods. The *skeptron* was a symbol of authority and inviolability and protected the herald who carried it. In Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the *skeptron* is mentioned as a type of magic wand by which Hermes opened and closed the eyes of mortals (see Benveniste 1969).

¹⁰ 52% of the respondents to the questionnaire found that Amr Khaled was among those who personified their most cherished values. This percentage covers even half of those who did not find *Iqraa* a reliable channel, and who rather found *BBC* or *Al-Jazeera* more worthy of trust as sources of information.

position, as compared to that produced by intellectuals, mainly when they express themselves in a language which bears the epithet, not to say the anathema, of foreign like French or English.

Bourdieu (ibid.: 163) uses this metaphor to speak of the authority of the spokesperson. It is used here to refer to the power these self-proclaimed representatives have and which makes them the only ones, in society, who have the right to speak and be followed, a right that political and religious ideology hands to the politician, the preacher and the pseudo-intellectual, to make of them the mandated spokespeople for the rest of the society. As stated above, Occidentalism instrumentalises religion to attribute to this category of people their official status. Since religion is there to enlighten the people's spiritual as well as their material lives, only experts in religion, the exegetes who know the *fiqh*, can show the right way to follow. The religious mentor, or the *sheikh* (criterion n°1), is the only one entitled to be the guide. Politicians, by claiming reference to religion, as inscribed in all the constitutions of the Arab countries (Islam is the religion of the state), with the support of the religious institutions, also acquire the status of the mandated spokesperson.

The case of Arab presidents is a vivid illustration of this particular point. In a written discourse (*El-Watan*, April 16th, 2006), published in some Algerian newspapers prior to the President Bouteflika's visit to the city of Constantine (Eastern part of the country), the authors (who signed Constantine) introduce their text, meant to welcome the president, by addressing him as the *faithful* and *saviour*, thanking God for having sent him. This is an implicit analogy to the Prophet Mohammed whose aim is to establish the status of the president as a God-mandated spokesperson, i.e. confer to him the credit of truth, relying on the Muslims' religious representations based on the Koran. From the status of a politician in charge of public affairs, the

president is sublimated, through an excessive personality cult, to a *messiah* without whom his people will fall into darkness, as illustrated by this extract from an Algerian newspaper in which the journalist recounts the popular gathering to welcome Bouteflika on his return from his stay in hospital in Paris in December 2005:

*The Algerians, I think, fear that something terrible happens to the president. They fear that his withdrawal from the management of the country's business might induce the total end of his programme which they consider as the only thing capable of saving them from their unrest.*¹¹

("Bouteflika promet le droit pour chacun et la loi pour tous", *L'Echo d'Oran*, January 2nd, 2006)

As a matter of fact, many verses, such as the ones below, are implicitly invoked and in which these qualities and function are attributed by God to the Prophet Mohammed according to the Koran:

Allah did confer a great favour on the believers when he sent among them a Messenger from among themselves, rehearsing unto them the Signs of Allah, purifying them, and instructing them in Scripture and Wisdom, while, before that, they had been in manifest error. (Āl-i-'Imrān, S.3, A.164)

O Prophet! Truly We have sent thee as a Witness, a Bearer of Glad Tidings, and a Warner, - and as one who invites to Allah's (Grace) by His leave, and a Lamp spreading Light. (Al-Ahzāb, S.33, A.45-46)

We sent thee not, but as a Mercy for all creatures. (Al-Anbiyāa, S.21, A.107)

The mandated spokesperson's power, the *skeptron*, is not to be understood as that of physical, economic strength. It is the *symbolic capital* or *credit* (Bourdieu 1980) that people invest in a category which is supposed to *know* more than any other member of society, including real intellectuals

¹¹ (MOT)

or professionals. It is the trust based on the representative image of the spokesperson by virtue of his sources, in this case, religion. The mandated spokesperson is right because he invokes the word of God.

Benveniste's (1969: 121) etymological analysis of the term *credit* reveals clearly its effects on the people's identification with their spokesperson. The term *credit* originates from the Latin word *credere* which literally means "*put the 'kred', i.e. the magical power, in a being from whom we expect protection, and consequently believe in him.*"¹² The mandated spokesperson, once he reaches this status, he acquires a magical power over the people who cease the natural process of reflection to start that of seduction. The mandated spokesperson exercises his magical power by proceeding in his persuasion of the people like an illusionist, i.e. by means of illusions, the illusion that the country is in continual progress, the illusion of a foreign enemy against whom the people should show solidarity with their government, the illusion that the society is on the right track. Every successful political act which gains the people's support is, as Bourdieu (2001: 66) cleverly put it, but a "*successful act of social magic.*"¹³

Obviously, the danger here does not really lie in the status of the mandated spokesperson per se. It is rather that transformation of this status from one of representative power into one of dictatorial power, in which the suggestive act becomes a performative act. As observed by Bourdieu (2001: 270), once a person acquires the status of the mandated spokesperson, whether by usurpation or consent, his discourse changes from the indicative to the imperative form. By means of what Bourdieu (ibidem) calls the *oracle effect*, the mandated spokesperson exercises a constraint on the people to mutate from a representative of the group into the group itself. The group ceases to have an opinion, as it is shown what to

¹² (MOT)

¹³ (MOT)

think through suggestive ideological discourse and driven to act accordingly as this discourse is performative.

This is particularly important, as far as students are concerned, as they often cease to be speaking subjects, voicing their own constructed opinions in their exam essays for instance, to turn into mere voices of the mandated spokespeople's discourse. The mandated spokesperson is the being, even when he is absent, and they are nothingness, even when they are present. It is quite extraordinary the extent to which social representatives, in Arab countries, tend to acquire a status characterised by qualities of visible omnipresence and public-acknowledged omniscience that grant them a considerable power over the group. As observed above, concerning the idea of ideology as a black box, the pretended expertise that the preacher or pseudo-intellectual is supposed to possess in religious matters, or the politician's wide knowledge of the requirements of politics, economy or the management of the society, behoves on the general public, who do not possess that knowledge, to not only acquiesce to their recommendations and prescriptions, but also avoid any pretension to attempt to reflect on these matters.

It is noteworthy to observe that while some mandated spokespeople are aware of the illegitimacy of their status, at least in moral terms, many others tend, because of the act of institution and the positive response of the people due to the cultural brainwashing they undergo, to cope without any remorse and sense of wrongdoing with their status. This is what Bourdieu (2001: 273) labels the *legitimate imposture* which describes a situation whereby the mandated spokesperson "*is not a cynical calculating person who consciously deceives people, but someone who sincerely thinks he is what he is not.*"¹⁴ The ideologies they uphold, such as Occidentalism, are of

¹⁴ (MOT)

the first and second types in Boudon's (1991: 286-287) typology. According to Boudon, ideologies are three main types:

1. Those which claim to do the individual good even against his wishes so as he can serve the community.
2. Those which hold the *other* in contempt out of an exasperated *sociocentrism* and ethnocentrism.
3. Those which admit the necessity to accept the individual as he is and thus adapt the institutions to him.

This is particularly true for many religious leaders who think it is their religious and moral duty, as knowledgeable people, to speak for those who do not know their own good. It is also true for some nationalist leaders and intellectuals for whom people are not aware enough to distinguish between what is good to them and what is bad. Moreover, it would be erroneous and misleading to believe that the mandated spokesperson's interests are always material. In many cases, these interests are not quantifiable and are part of the proselytising of ideas believed to be the sole and only truth, especially in symbolic systems like religion, which the mandated spokesperson believes it his duty to convey it to his fellow countrymen and countrywomen.

In such situations, the mandated spokespeople insist on the necessity to attribute the most positive value to the three main components of social organisation: tradition, authority and hierarchy. With the *positivisation* of these three sources of power, the regime enshrines a conservative system which automatically attributes a negative connotation to anything which expresses a revolutionary idea as subversion. This contributes to the creation of the most favourable felicity conditions for the acceptance of the ideological discourse and, in parallel, the worst infelicity ones that lead to

the rejection of the intellectual's discourse.

3.5. Classical Arabic

The mandated spokesperson certainly needs qualities to be entitled to this status. His symbolic capital that confers to him credit relies on the act of institution, but also on his cultural capital. The act of institution is an act of communication (Bourdieu 2001: 180), by which an individual is publicly attributed by the social institutions an identity. This identity is then acknowledged by the whole society which institutes that individual officially as its representative. The title of *sheikh*, for instance, granted by the religious institution and confirmed by the political one (such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs), positions its carrier as the only one who has the authority to speak in religious matters, and by extension in many earthly matters, to become the authority itself.

The cultural capital is the sum of technical qualifications including types of knowledge (religious or political for instance) and many other cultural acquisitions that allow him to hold an official position like a civil servant, a minister or deputy (Bourdieu & Boltanski 1975). Precisely, classical Arabic is for the mandated spokesperson in Arab countries part of the cultural capital that offers him a substantial advantage over any intellectual who does not master this language, and paradoxically over his listeners who do not master it, yet are supposed to understand it. This 'category language' plays the role of a dialect turned into a standard language due to particular social conditions favourable to the category of people who instituted it in this high position, on cultural, political or ethnic bases. This is well illustrated by Fairclough who comments on Standard English writing:

The power of its claims as a national language even over those whose use of it is limited is apparent in the widespread self-depreciation of working-class people who say they do not speak English, or do not speak 'proper' English. On the other hand, it is a class dialect not only in the sense that its dominance is associated with capitalist class interests... but also because it is the dominant bloc that makes most use of it, and gains most from it as an asset – as a form of 'cultural capital' analogous to capital in the economic sense, as Pierre Bourdieu has put it.

(Fairclough 2001: 48)

Sanctifying classical Arabic in Algeria has also meant stigmatising the other languages, and as a consequence stigmatising the cultures they carry. Just as the upheld linguistic correctness in standard English led to the moral correctness of its users and the denigration of the cultures and lifestyles of those who used other social dialects (ibid.: 48), the cultures conveyed through other languages than classical Arabic, are also viewed in Algeria as not worthy of respect and consideration, not to say of existence at all.

The status of classical Arabic is central to the whole ideological enterprise of the political regimes in Arab countries. In Algeria, it has been given a political position, by means of political documents and most importantly of education, which does not reflect the linguistic reality of the country. As advanced by Miliani (2001: 14) in his analysis of the sociolinguistic situation in Algeria: "*Language (foreign and national) planning, as well as teaching, has always responded to considerations or policies imbued with partisanship far from the sociolinguistic reality of the country.*" This virtual position serves the whole system of power relations necessary for the maintenance of the political status quo, since, as it will be shown below, it deprives a large proportion of society, the oppositional intellectuals who do not master this language nor find in French the most suitable vehicle of their 'disturbing' ideas, from all opportunities to be heard, and frustrate other categories of society, such as students, who can only express themselves in their native languages. For this, the political regime makes use of a trilogy of

elements:

- the fact that this language is the langue of the sacred book, the Koran;
- the fact that it is a language of national identification;
- a pseudo-scientific conception of the Algerian linguistic reality in which classical Arabic is in a diglossic relation with the other languages present in the Algerian linguistic repertoire.

The diglossic situation in which classical Arabic is supposed to be the high variety and an Algerian dialectical Arabic a low variety is somewhat fanciful as it is partly irrelevant to the Algerian linguistic reality. Whether according to Ferguson's (1959) first definition or to the revisionist definition of Fishman (1971a) and Gumperz (1982)¹⁵, diglossia is not a concept that translates this reality. As a matter of fact, the two criteria that define a diglossia, genetic relatedness and sociological status, do not seem to apply to the case of classical Arabic and the language the majority of Algerians use and refer to as Algerian Arabic.

Genetic relatedness in diglossia, i.e. the fact that the two linguistic variants are varieties of the same language, is not a feature of the relationship between classical Arabic and the Algerians' daily-used language. Algerian Arabic is certainly Algerian but by no means Arabic. Many linguists, notably in Algeria (Elimam 2003), have now rejected the appellation of 'Algerian Arabic' to suggest a more realistic denomination, *Maghribi*, which refers to the language used, in its various variants

¹⁵ While Ferguson (1959) admitted that diglossia concerns two varieties of the same language, one having a high privileged high position and the other a low one, Fishman (1971a) and Gumperz (1982) would later extend diglossia to varieties that sustain the same relationship even when they are not part of the same language. American linguists would even consider all unequal bilingualisms as cases of diglossia (Charaudeau & Maingueneau 2002: 184).

according to each country, in the Maghreb. These linguists admit that *Maghribi*, which is the native language of a great number of the populations in these countries, is a Semitic language. Despite the morphological influence of classical Arabic, *Maghribi* has a Punic substratum (relative to the peoples of Carthage, Phoenicians who peopled part of the Old Maghreb). Probably, this conception does not take into account all the influences that *Maghribi* has undergone, and still undergoes, like that of Berber, French and Spanish¹⁶, yet, it clearly establishes the fact that the language Algerians use in their daily life is not by any means a mere variety of Arabic, thus invalidating one of the two characteristics of diglossia, genetic relatedness.

As to the criterion of the sociological status of the high variety in a diglossic situation, classical Arabic has a high political, cultural and psychological status rather than a high sociological one which would mean that it is the language of all formal situations. Examples of formal situations in politics, administration, media, education where it is rather French and *Algerian*, and even Berber, which are used bear witness for the fact that classical Arabic is far from being the sociological high variety, which in reality struggles to correspond to its theoretical political status on the practical linguistic stage. French, *Algerian* and, to a lesser extent, Berber

¹⁶ It is first to be observed that the Algerians' language of everyday goes beyond a mere code switching between well established languages like Arabic, French or Berber. S.M. Lakhdar Barka (2006) suggests another concept, code-sliding (*glissement codique*) that describes the influences of other languages on *Algerian*, as a way to signal the birth of a language in its own right: "In the case of [code-]sliding, there is an alteration and/or complementarity of the discursive coherence, but not cohesive, by the adaptation of the 'borrowed' item to the linguistic rules of cohesion of the host language, or matrix, and thus an extension of the rules of cohesion in the enunciation, what Saville-Troike calls 'intrasentential switching'..." (MOT) Second, the point made here is that the thesis of *Maghribi* is not fully satisfactory as it does not, in its turn, take into account the peculiar linguistic realities of each country in the Maghreb. Algeria, for instance, is a scene for a language that falls under the influence, in its specific way, of the different Berber varieties that do not exist in Morocco or Tunisia. It is then my contention here to admit that this Algerian variety is to be called *Algerian*, instead of *Maghribi*, as different to the other varieties in the other countries of the Maghreb.

have had the lion's share in official situations where code-switching between these three languages has become a general rule. Classical Arabic, as the language of formal settings, is becoming quite exceptional, limited to the religious field, sometimes in politics, administrative documents, and part of the press, television and radio.

Algerian, with its capacity of openness over the other languages and cultures, allows much easier borrowings and the integration of words that belong to the other languages with which it coexists, such as Berber, French, English, by means of different channels such as music, cinema, the media and science. Consequently, *Algerian* is developing and permeating settings that were inaccessible to it, thanks to a youth which is quantitatively more important and which lack enough competence in the other languages to fully express itself.

It seems clearly then that classical Arabic as a high variety and *Algerian* as a low one is more a political fancy than a sociological reality. The Algerian linguistic reality can then not be described as a case of diglossia, but, at the very most, a case of bilingualism in Tabouret-Keller's (1969: 309) sense, i.e.: "*situations which induce a use, frequently in speaking and in some cases in writing, of two or more languages by the same individual or group.*"

A different approach to languages in Algeria, an approach that integrates the ideological-political factors as opposed to the mere linguistic and sociolinguistic ones, more in the line of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of critical language study, initiated by people like Fairclough (2001), and critical discourse analysis as advanced by van Dijk (1997a; 1997b), is the one that can really inform about the real implications of the political status of classical Arabic in a context of a contradictory sociological one, and about the real

relationship between classical Arabic and *Algerian*, as well as the social role each one plays.

The first contribution of this approach is that it shows that this relationship is not innocent, as diglossia seems to suggest it. On the basis of this approach, it is admitted here that the real linguistic situation in Algeria, where classical Arabic, *Algerian*, Berber and French coexist, is a case of colinguism. Coined by Balibar (1993: 7), this neologism is defined as “*the association, through education and politics, of certain written languages in communication between legitimate partners.*”¹⁷ This concept raises a very important aspect in language planning, that of the *act of institution of languages* (Charaudeau & Maingueneau 2002: 101). Colinguism is the outcome of the institutionalisation of one language by attributing to it a privileged status, and thus, all the means to attain this status, at the expense of the other languages present in the same society. The high variety or language, in colinguism, is imposed in this position in order to exclude categories of society from power struggle, categories which use the other varieties or languages that consequently get the low position and, thus, have no means for their promotion. This shows again the vital role of the political, juridical or educational institutions which have the decision making and enforcing powers.

As opposed to diglossia, where the positions and roles of languages are determined almost naturally according to what these languages can offer to society practically and objectively, colinguism is a situation where languages are assigned positions and roles according to what they can *serve* ideologically and politically, i.e. according to their relations to the political regime in office. Colinguism in Algeria designates then the fact that classical Arabic, a non-native language, is given the status of national and official

¹⁷ (MOT)

language, while Berber, *Algerian*, native languages, and French, a second language, are refused the positions which their sociological reality entitles them to have. The institution of a language as an official and national language establishes its organic link to the state and the political regime, "*whether in its genesis or its social use.*" The corollary of this statement is advanced by Bourdieu:

*It is in the process of the constitution of the state that the conditions of constituting a unified linguistic market dominated by an official language are created: being obligatory in official occasions and official settings (School, public administrations, political institutions, etc.), this state language becomes the theoretical norm according to which all linguistic practices are objectively measured.*¹⁸

(Bourdieu 2001: 71)

The symbolic capital of classical Arabic, as the language of the Koran and an identity reference, is then turned to the mandated spokesperson's advantage in the construction of his symbolic capital or credit by elevating this language to the highest position. To equip his discourse with the necessary illocutionary force and reach the perlocutionary effect, the mandated spokesperson needs to transform his discourse into what Maingueneau (1993: 87) labels *inscribed utterances* (*énoncés inscrits*), i.e. utterances which are stabilised through use by people who enjoy "*a strong symbolic position for the group*" (Charaudeau & Maingueneau 2002: 204)¹⁹. This explains quite clearly recourse to religion and to the people who incarnate religious rectitude, such as the Prophet Mohammed and his companions, and to the type of speech genre commonly used to speak about them or for them, i.e. the religious sermon. The inscribed utterances found in the words of these symbolic figures are integrated in the mandated spokesperson's discourse in order to transmit into it the same symbolic

¹⁸ (MOT)

¹⁹ (MOT)

capital. This transfer of credit can only be achieved in classical Arabic, and this justifies the religion-politics alliance where the work tool of the first serves the interests of the second in colinguism.

With classical Arabic, and with the religious sermon as a speech genre of the political-religious discourse (see below), the mandated spokesperson reinforces his power by an abuse of power, through what Bourdieu (2001: 327) calls *fallacy*, which he defines "*not as the fact of saying the false, the mere lie, but rather the fact of saying the false with all the apparent logic of the true.*"²⁰ As the language of the Koran, a book of truth according to Muslims, the language itself becomes truth. By the mere fact of saying something in this language, it exists, without any need for the speaking subject to prove its existence. Words and expressions such as الأمة الإسلامية (the Islamic Ummah) and القومية العربية (Arabic nationalism) are, for instance, formulations that are taken as realities but which are actually fantasies.

Contrary to the linguistic rule which states that there can be no meaning without referents, the fallacy of classical Arabic, as used by ideologists, is precisely the production of formulas without referents in reality, a case of words which fabricate things (ibid.: 328). By extracting this language from its natural linguistic environment to transpose it, thanks to colinguism, into the political and sacred spheres, it became a language of fallacy par excellence. Bourdieu cleverly captured the logic of this phenomenon writing:

*Thus rigour in form can mask semantic laxity. All religious theologies and all political théodicées have taken advantage of the fact that the generative capacities of language can exceed the limits of intuition and of empirical verification to produce discourses correct in form but semantically empty.*²¹

(ibid.: 65)

²⁰ (MOT)

²¹ (MOT)

In this colinguism, classical Arabic, religion and politics form a 'united front' whose purpose is to maintain a solidarity which can guarantee to the ideological-political discourse its illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect through the people's consent and rallying belief in a community, not of citizens, but rather of believers composed of the people and their political leader turned into a religious leader at the same time. By instituting a colinguism favourable to classical Arabic, politics protects its *sword of Damocles*, which is paradoxically viewed by the people, not as an instrument of domination, or at least a mere language that belongs to their cultural heritage, but rather as a sacred language they *ought* to protect and defend as the moral/religious duty of any Muslim.

As matter of fact, colinguism in Algeria fulfils three main political objectives:

- control the shortest route to the hearts of the people through Islam whose sacred book is written in classical Arabic;
- exclude the people from the field of politics;
- exclude all oppositional intellectuals who do not use this language, either because they do not have enough competence in it, or because, within the field of their scientific competence, they have to use another language such as French.

The exclusion of the people operates in a very precise manner. By using classical Arabic in addressing them, a language which is obviously not mastered by a great proportion of them, politicians dissuade them from developing any interest in politics which seems to them beyond their sphere of competence, and mostly quite far from their daily preoccupations. The politicians' arbitrariness and lack of competence are thus disguised by a pseudo-esoteric language imposed as the means of 'communication'

between the governor and the governed. Yet, without being understood (as observed above), the spokesperson's discourse in classical Arabic, the language of faith, is accepted as part of the pact of solidarity in the community of believers. The dramatic paradox lies here in the fact that the people acquiesce to the alienation of their native languages which are the only ones in which they really can express their frustrations and aspirations. By taking part in the destruction of their most suitable means of expression, they give one of the most cherished human rights, the right to speak for themselves and participate in the determination of their future.

3.6. The Right to Speak

This state, in which people are not invited to speak nor even think, becomes a general social environment where students, as young growing citizens, are formatted within a frame that does not equip them with the habit to be *thinking subjects* who, to paraphrase Descartes, exist because they think, but rather content themselves with existing as *subjects* (in its European Middle Ages sense) without thinking, i.e. politically inexistent as citizens. The omission of the right to think induces the omission of the right to speak. This is a general observation that is made through the reading of students' exam papers, in which they swing between the regurgitation of the teacher's words, a scholar's, or, in questions that involve their political and cultural environments, the mandated spokesperson's ones. They express themselves from a specific role of which they are well aware and which they have been assigned through their home and school education; the role of someone who does not know, who cannot be able to form a sound opinion, who is thus not listened to. The word role, here, is, as defined by Charaudeau, that:

... in the name of which the protagonists exercise their right to speak. They speak as an expert, a witness, a friend, an opponent, a superior, an inferior, etc. It is not a status, but rather what defines the interpersonal relationship between the protagonists, a relation of aggression, of consensus, of alliance, etc. Here again, roles can be claimed or contested in a movement of exclusion or inclusion.²²

(Charaudeau 2004: 25)

Students hold then, and often unconsciously claim, the role of the inferior protagonist in a relation of consensus by relaying the other's discourse. The mandated spokesperson's discourse enjoys of course, notably through the Arab satellite TV channels, all the means that allow its wide diffusion, these channels being in their majority either state-owned or financed by Islamist organisations or individuals. Students are at the centre of an ideological-media-controlled sphere that bombards them with all kinds of thought except that which would invite them to have their own. The media, as a public organ of communication, witness and reporter of events, allow the circulation of ideological discourse and intervene, against their natural mission, in the neutralisation of debate by their alliance with either the political regime or Islamism.

Moreover, it is a characteristic of the Arab world the fact that these countries have skipped certain technological phases that probably makes them more overwhelmed by and vulnerable to excessive media coverage, as they have not had the necessary time to integrate the changes. This time of adaptation allows the acquisition of a culture of information which helps one to put into perspective the sum of informative data he is faced with on a daily basis. While in Europe people have undergone a smooth technological mutation, which has by no means left them totally safe from manipulation, many people in the Arab countries have jumped from the most elementary instruments of communication to the most sophisticated ones. The case of

²² (MOT)

the cell phones and internet booms in an environment which lacked the traditional telephone is, despite the actual benefits, a vivid illustration of the dangers of an abrupt move from a limited access to information to an unlimited one. This certainly adds to the limitation of opportunities for students to learn how to think and speak for themselves, a way to keep them in intellectual illiteracy.

Added to the status of the mandated spokesperson, and among the felicity conditions is the form of delivery of discourse, a kind of *liturgical conditions* (Bourdieu 2001: 167). The forms range from the language through which the mandated spokesperson delivers his discourse to the rituals he observes when doing it. In Arab-Islamic countries, as observed above, classical Arabic holds the status of the exclusive channel of mediation between the ideologues and the people, outside of which ideological discourse loses its illocutionary force and its perlocutory effect. For it is the special place that this language enjoys in the minds and hearts of the people that makes it the language of hegemonic power. In ideological discourse, it is vital for the mandated spokesperson to undertake a very careful work on form by which he becomes a *rhetor*.

As a matter of fact, Classical Arabic is not enough. A set of rituals are to be observed in order to create the necessary conditions for the total acceptance and adherence to the message. Chomsky's linguistic competence as well as Hymes' (1974) communicative competence in classical Arabic are by all means important to the mandated spokesperson's assets. Mastery of the language of discourse delivery, for it cannot be considered as the language of communication since it is not mastered by the addressees, within the special context of *sacralisation* of this language, grants the addresser more authority over his listeners. "*Appropriate the words,*" writes Bourdieu (2001: 203, fn7), "*which contain all what the group*

acknowledges is to guarantee a considerable advantage in the struggle for power... the most precious word is the sacred word'.²³

Yet, grammaticality and linguistic acceptability (Trudgill 1992) are not sufficient here for a discourse to be listened to. There is a *social acceptability* (Bourdieu 2001: 84) that allows a discourse, when made according to the prescribed rituals, to be performative. The mandated spokesperson needs also, beside communicative competence, a speech genre competence. Social acceptability in this case is the extent to which the mandated spokesperson's utterances conform to the listeners' *habitus*, Bourdieu's (ibid: 116) term for those social and cultural schemata. The speech genre competence is the mandated spokesperson's knowledge of his listener's *habitus* and the requirements of the *market* (environment) and the type of discourse (speech genre) he uses to convey his message. In this sense, ideological discourse is a euphemism, the result of linguistic, cultural and social compromises between the requirements of the *market* and the mandated spokesperson undisclosed interests.

The notions of *habitus* and *market*, borrowed from other fields by Bourdieu and introduced into sociology, are quite relevant to understand the conditions of the success of ideological discourse in Algeria. Bourdieu's use of the term *market* to refer to the social environment evinces two very important elements as far as the practice of discourse is concerned. First, that discourse is always practised in a context of conflict between ideologies, i.e. interest-based intellectual constructions, some trying to keep the status quo, the others attempting to alter it. Second, that discourse is a commodity that is handled by ideologues who need to know the conditions of the *market* of language, passion, frustrations and aspirations (the social conditions) in order to succeed in selling their product.

²³ (MOT)

Within this *market*, discourse acquires a price which is the value of the speaking subject's utterances i.e. the credit they have in the people's minds and which determines their acceptability. Knowing the conditions implies knowing the listeners' *habitus*, i.e. the cultural and psychological dispositions that bring the individual to act and react in a certain manner (Bourdieu 2001). The *habitus* includes then the representations, schemata and stereotypes that the individual acquires in his social environment (or the *market* itself), influenced by all the social institutions in action, including the family, religion, politics, education, and the media. Acceptability of a discourse depends thus on the listener's *habitus*, the market that produced it and that forms the context for the reception, appreciation, interpretation and reproduction of that discourse.

Classical Arabic holds the position of the only legitimate language that is used by the self-mandated spokesperson to address the people. It is the language that is compatible with and which does not disturb their discursive *habitus*. This discursive *habitus* is constructed over long periods of time, corresponding to the periods of the upbringing of children, by means of an enormous, religious and rhetorical redundancy, tolerated by this language, of ritual formulas and images drawn from the past. The constant references to extraordinary anecdotes of past popular heroes whose sole faith in *Allah* has brought them to carry out great achievements, not to say miracles, contribute to the formation of a consensual and rigid vision of the social world which resists all possible methodical questioning.

Actually, understanding the relation of classical Arabic with the people's discursive *habitus* clarifies the ideologues' suspicious attitude towards foreign languages. Carrying foreign cultures, i.e. different visions of the social world that may disturb and alter *habitus*, foreign languages stand as

threats to the harmony of the *market* which guarantees the acceptability of the mandated spokesperson's ideological discourse. The accentuation of the *habitus*, through the use of classical Arabic develops in the individual what Bourdieu (ibid.) calls a body *hexis*, a sum of mechanical and spontaneous behaviours which seem like a second nature, of which the accent, or the articulatory style (Guiraud 1965), for instance, is but a constituent linguistic element of how an individual moves his tongue and lips in a particular way by imitating the group. Bourdieu (ibid.: 25) cleverly detected the work of ideology in nurturing a favourable *hexis*. He writes that "*the corporal hexis is the political mythology realised, incorporated, which becomes a permanent disposition, a lasting manner to be, to speak, to walk, and thus, to feel and think.*"²⁴

Ideological discourse is always made in a way to call upon the listener's *habitus* and *hexis*. This is also what explains Arab ideologues' recourse to religion. The type of speech genre, for example, chosen to deliver the discourse is very much related to the way Algerians are used to consider what a true utterance is. Their discursive *habitus* determines the acceptability of the mandated spokesperson's utterances or discourse. As Bourdieu put it:

*The effects that a new experience can have on the habitus depends on the relation of practical 'compatibility' between this experience and the already-integrated experiences in the habitus in the form of schemata of production and appreciation...*²⁵
(ibid.: 121)

In practical terms, and as far as the Algerian society is concerned, the mandated spokespeople (the politician, the preacher and the pseudo-intellectual) have made an option for a particular type of speech genre, the

²⁴ (MOT)

²⁵ (MOT)

religious sermon, in order to reach discursive acceptability.

3.7. The Speech Genre

The religious sermon is not handled here as a mere communicative event part of the non-linguistic or experiential context in language use (Nunan 1993: 7-8), something which would not reveal its ideological substratum in the way it is instrumentalised, consciously or not, by political and religious ideologues. It is rather understood as a speech genre in the Bakhtinian sense of the term, i.e. as a socially-determined form of combination of language (Bakhtin 2002).

Speech genres are two main types: primary and secondary. Primary speech genres are everyday generic forms, such as greetings, congratulations, wishes, in which people cast their speech (ibid.: 79). Although they are quite flexible, plastic and free, they still are “*stable typical forms of construction of the whole*” (ibid.: 78). As opposed to the Saussurian conception of language use as a purely individualistic act, through the concept of *parole* as stated above, with primary speech genres, Bakhtin assumes that speakers do not really have all this pretended scope of freedom and rather use language within quite stable types of the utterance (a spoken or written unit of discourse). As for secondary speech genres, they include literary genres (poetry, the novel, etc.) and rhetorical genres (scientific research writing, all kinds of commentary, judicial and political writing or speech). They are complex genres that “*arise in more complex and comparatively highly developed and organised cultural communication (primarily written) that is artistic, scientific, socio-political, and so on.*” (ibid.: 62). They are then sophisticated primary genres which are *absorbed, digested* and *altered* in a number of varied ways, called styles, according to

different writers or *rhetors*.

On the basis of these Bakhtinian definitions of primary and secondary speech genres, the religious sermon is considered as a secondary rhetorical speech genre. According to these same definitions, the normal process is that in which primary speech genres are handled by professional language users to transform them into secondary and sophisticated speech genres. Yet, it is admitted in this work that the religious sermon, in Algeria and the Arab-Islamic world, has taken the reverse direction and mutated from an originally secondary speech genre into a primary one. This phenomenon occurred with its extraction from the religious field and the generalisation of its use to other social realms, including politics, the media, and most importantly education. What motivated this transfer is the symbolic capital and apparent credit that the religious sermon confers to its user within an environment overwhelmed by religious culture, that is, an environment that forms the suitable felicity conditions for a discourse that bears the hallmark of religion.

As an originally secondary speech genre, the religious sermon is characterised by all the sophistication these types have in terms of refined style, attractive imagery and individuality. As a converted primary speech genre, it enjoys wide diffusion and free access to general culture. The point made here is that the religious sermon has become in Algeria *the* genre most discourses destined to the people are framed in. Moreover, as the most common genre the youth is exposed to, in mosques or television, since their early age, students come to university with an expressive tradition dominated by this genre. As a matter of fact, the reading of their exam papers shows less the influence of their native language in writing English than the influence of this discursive form in writing essays supposed to be scientific, or at least methodical and objective. Their essays sound

more like religious sermons in which they feel the need to persuade the reader rather than convince him with scientific arguments. Filled with assertion, affirmations and ungrounded statements, their exams papers betray their belief that what they write is true because of the very reason that it is written, not proved, just as God's word or the Prophet's words are true because they were uttered.

F. Lakhdar Barka (2006), an experienced teacher of written expression and a researcher in the issue of the relationship between native culture and foreign culture expressed through writing among students of English at the University of Oran, has pointed at the students' propensity to relate most issues to religion in their free writings, which look more like sermons rather than an intellectual's form of writing. Through a classroom experiment, a classroom journal where students are invited to express views on any topic they feel like tackling, Lakhdar Barka (ibid.) observed that "*signs of hostility towards the FL and the culture that it vehicles, which were slightly perceptible, have become explicit*"²⁶, probably because of Occidentalism which has not only nurtured them but also rationalised them, notably through the generalisation of the sermon as a genre.

Students' essays and the mandated spokesperson's discourse are thus considered here as instances of the religious sermon on the basis of the fact

²⁶ Extracts from the students' free essays, in the classroom journal, inform quite well about the students' general tendency to indulge into the religious sermon in style and content, and the extent to which this has changed as compared to a few years ago. As a matter of fact, while, three to four years ago, students were more concerned about their personal problems or social issues, as illustrated by the topics discussed (immigration, obesity, the future, success, delinquency, cruelty, etc.), today, they tend to emphasise the conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, identity, religious piety. The following examples are taken from the teacher's classroom journal of 2005-2006:

"*Why they lose their Algerian Muslim identity?... Why we see a handsome boy wear a half pair of trousers, make his hair orange or make it long like girls? Why we see a very nice girl wear clothes of the boys? Why we see them make their hair very short like boys?*"

"*I was an admirer of the West civilisation. I thought that they respect other's culture and religion, but after their last crime [the Prophet's cartoons], everything good about them disappear.*"

that they bear its fundamental constituent characteristics:

- invocation of Allah;
- arguments based on the Koran and the Prophet's life and words;
- incantatory and cathartic style;
- expressive aspect.

Politicians, pseudo-intellectuals, just like any religious representative, often start their discourses with the invocation of *Allah* as a moral guarantee for the truth of discourse and credibility of the speaking subject, by using the introductory phrase 'بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ' (in the name of Allah, most Gracious most Merciful). Statements made in the discourse are often presented as true, not on the basis of facts or some scientific theory, but on the grounds of a Koranic verse or Prophet's words or deeds. With all due respect to these two sources, they can only be sources of establishing and reinforcing faith and not proving a truth in politics, economy or science.

As to style, the mandated spokesperson's discourse and the students' essays tend to be irrelevant to the field they are produced in. While their style is supposed to be argumentative, it is rather assertive and declarative, allowing no doubt, inducing the speaker or writer to profess, proclaim, and prescribe, instead of arguing, suggesting, inviting his listeners or readers to thinking. While style is one of the elements that often show the individuality of the author of an utterance, especially in secondary speech genres, in the case of the religious sermon as a perverted primary speech genre, style is rather predetermined and stereotyped, and is fundamentally an element of the generic unity of this genre. Two main features characterise this style: tempting (الترغیب) and intimidating or terrorising (الترهیب). This style, drawn on the Koranic style of tempting by paradise and terrorising by hell, something common to all revealed religions in search for moral rectitude, when

transposed to politics, becomes a tool of playing on emotions in a discourse which is supposed to address the mind and provoke reflexion. In politics, tempting and terrorising is of course carried out by other means than paradise and hell. Depending on the matter, it varies from peace and violence to economic welfare and crisis. Algerian politics is filled, just like religion in which it is quite normal, with promises of a better day²⁷ on condition to show patience. Politics, supposed to be suggestions of solutions to social problems, becomes, like religion, incantatory and catharsis to the people's frustrations.

The stylistic playing on emotions in the religious sermon is reinforced with what Bakhtin (2002: 84) calls the *expressive aspect*, which he defines as "*the speaker's subjective emotional evaluation of the referentially semantic content of his utterance.*" As such, the mandated spokesperson's discourse, made in the religious sermon form, states ideas that are emotionally evaluated by the speaker himself, by having recourse to religious referents and justifications, emotional tone and stylistic aura. Linguistic and paralinguistic features characterise this genre. The linguistic ones vary from lexical markers such as the use of the same recurrent words with unique meanings to morphological markers "*involving more deferential forms*" (Saville-Troike 2003: 64) such as the use of the first person plural or the third person singular when the speaker refers to himself. The paralinguistic features range from the intonation, pitch, stress, yelling to kinesic, including formatted and particular body language such as knocking on the pulpit. The ideas are then evaluated by the listeners as well as definitely true, thus discarding any criticism or questioning. Emotional involvement invites adherence and commitment and rejects discussion and doubt. Instances of

²⁷ The discourse of welcome for the Algerian President Bouteflika (*El-Watan*, April 16th, 2006) offers illustrates quite perfectly these cases. Expressions like "*in order to show us a prosperous and peaceful tomorrow*", "*progress in the economic and social situations*", "*You, the leader of the modern Algerian renaissance*" translate the spirit of political discourse in Algeria.

this kind of discourse are quite explicit with Occidentalism which relies exclusively on religion as a reference and on emotion as feedback.

With the use of the religious sermon as the speech genre to address the people in classical Arabic, this language, made sacred and thus transformed into an exclusively religious language, is also turned, by distortion of use, into an expressive language, not allowing rational and objective use. While words and languages "*belong to nobody, and in themselves they evaluate nothing*," as observed by Bakhtin (ibid.: 85), classical Arabic has paradoxically become the propriety of the mandated spokesperson (the preacher, the politician and the pseudo-intellectual).

It is not our intention to uphold a manichean view of languages, that there are rational languages and irrational ones. We definitely admit the fact that languages are what their users make of them. Classical Arabic is by no means a language that is inherently unfit for science and rational discourse. This language was the vehicle of a great literature, whether scientific or fiction, at different periods of history, and was the instrument of a momentous civilisation that left indelible traces in human patrimony. It is still a language which is, at times, used to transmit all what its users have to offer to the world in terms of beauty and useful contribution. Yet, the ideological instrumentalisation of classical Arabic, added to the fact that it does not possess a native speaking community, have made of it an instrument which is cut off people's reality, devoid of its human dimension, and mainly used for political domination.

The mastery of classical Arabic is, however, not sufficient, as stated earlier, as the mastery of the speech genre is also essential to giving the impression of the mandated spokesperson's individuality in terms of discourse content and consequently to the completion of his charisma. As

Bakhtin rightly observed:

Frequently a person who has an excellent command of speech in some areas of cultural communication... is silent or very awkward in social conversation. Here it is not a matter of an impoverished vocabulary or of style, taken abstractly: this is entirely a matter of the inability to command a repertoire of genres of social conversation, the lack of a sufficient supply of those ideas about the whole of the utterance that help to cast one's speech quickly and naturally in certain compositional and stylistic forms...

(ibid.: 80)

Mastery of speech genres, and in this particular case of the religious sermon, equips the mandated spokesperson with the means to have control over his audience. This explains the impressive success of such religious or pseudo-intellectuals on satellite Arab channels like Amr Khaled (*Iqraa*), or Mohammed Amara (*ESC*). This applies also, to some extent, to American Evangelist preachers, like Dr. C.A. Dollar (*TBN*) or Bishop T.D. Jakes (*Church Channel*), who attract large audiences on American evangelist TV channels, and who attempt to resolve the failure of the Christian discourse. This failure has long been attributed to the sole demise of the people's belief in the Church's interpretation of the world, in rugged competition with science. Actually, as Bourdieu noted, it is also the collapse of the special social relationship between the clergy and the people, between the Christian believer and his mandated spokesperson or mediator, the priest, in his relation to God. This relationship faded at the very moment it ceased to be magical, i.e. based on the belief and trust in the mediator himself. This clarifies perfectly the success of the Islamist religious discourse, through such TV channels as *Iqraa*, as it is first based on the charisma of orators, like Amr Khaled, Abdallah Muslih, Wajdi Ghunaim and Ali al-Djafri, who have become household names, competing with movie and music stars in the Arab-Islamic world.

Control over the audience is part of what Bakhtin (ibid.: 78) labels the *speech will* in discourse. The speech will is the speaking subject's will in producing his discourse, his intention behind the choice of a particular type of speech genre. When choosing the religious sermon, the mandated spokesperson already establishes a particular type of relationship with his audience, that of a *prescriber* with his *followers*, that of a guide who expects from his disciples, to use Bakhtin's concept, a *purposed delayed action* (ibid.: 69). The purposed delayed action is the planned perlocutionary effect which the mandated spokesperson attempts to achieve through his ideological discourse, an understanding that will bring the listener to behave in a particular desired way. The action is delayed because the mandated spokesperson does not expect immediate reaction. His discourse is a phase which is part of the process of maturation the people undergo to internalise the ideas and produce the adequate behaviour. As Bakhtin clearly admitted:

An actively responsive understanding of what is heard (a command, for example) can be directly realised in action ... or it can remain, for the time being, a silent responsive understanding... but this is, so to speak, responsive understanding with delayed reaction. Sooner or later what is heard and actively understood will find its response in the subsequent speech or behaviour of the listener.

(ibid.: 68-69)

In addition to the examples stated above in the analysis of Occidentalism, other illustrations can be drawn from politicians' speeches to show how they instrumentalise religion to achieve the status of the mandated spokesperson, by the use of classical Arabic as the language of communication and the religious sermon as the speech genre of this communication. Probably the best examples can be found in presidential speeches, first because the speaker holds the highest political and symbolic position in the country, and second because, probably, no other period in Algerian modern history has witnessed such overuse or abuse of religious

references in politics for ideological considerations. A quite vivid instance is provided by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in his address to the state executives about the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (Discours du Président de la République à l'occasion de la conférence des cadres), on which the Algerian people were invited to pronounce on in the national referendum of September 29th, 2005. In the pure tradition of the religious sermon, reference to God was systematic and reached twelve times, whether to ask for his blessing or to justify an action or idea, as these four extracts show it:

1. *Along years, we have done our best to extinguish the inferno of the Fitna ... till God's mercy helps us.*²⁸

This is a perfect example of self-proclamation as a God-mandated spokesperson by joining the pronoun 'we' (which refers to the speaker) in the first clause to the word 'God' in the second. The direct induction is that the action of those referred to with 'we' is in itself God's mercy, and which can only expect from the listener, as a believer, to welcome. Equally important, the use of the word *fitna* (which can mean 'turmoil' or 'sedition') in Arabic in the French version of the address, instead of a French equivalent, is also a deliberate intention to refer the listeners back to religion, this word standing for the worst state a community could be in according to the Koran, as this verse, very well known by most Muslims, states it: "*For Persecution [Fitna] is worse than slaughter*" (Al-Baqarah S.2, A.191). As such, anyone who contradicts this discourse is supporting the *Fitna*, and thus standing against God.

2. *I have committed myself before God and you ... to extinguish the destructive fire of the Fitna.*²⁹

²⁸ (MOT)

²⁹ (MOT)

The speaker's commitment is first admitted as a religious and moral one. The use of the pronoun 'I', instead of 'we', establishes the real status of the speaker alone as the God-mandated spokesperson, i.e. the spiritual guide, in the line of prophets, whose following becomes then a religious duty of any real Muslim.

3. *With God's help, thanks be given to Him, we have opened together the road to the Civil Concord.*³⁰

This is a clear case of the sacralisation of a political decision, the Civil Concord, by claiming that it is the direct realisation of divine Help. Again, any criticism of or opposition to this law is equated to an opposition to God's will.

4. *Does the people's will not emanate from God's will...?*³¹

Probably, this statement is the one which definitely affixes the seal of the definite status of the God-mandated spokesperson to the speaker. This statement almost re-establishes the divine-right legitimacy, as divine election, in the European Middle Ages sense of the term, where the political leader is the one who holds power in the name of God. By claiming that the people's will is God's will, the speaker attributes to his authority a divine character since he was elected by the people, thus indirectly elected by God.

A myriad of other examples are available in this speech and in others³²,

³⁰ (MOT)

³¹ (MOT)

³² Here are other extracts from the same address and that transform the whole of it from a political speech into a religious sermon:

"I have invested in it [the Charter] ... my faith of believer." (MOT)

"We rely on God and our dear people." (MOT)

From other speeches, these extracts converge to the same purpose:

and that clearly evince the fact that politicians have definitely made an option for the religious sermon as the unique channel of communication to the people. Grown in this discursive bath, in which the religious sermon is the most common speech genre, through the religious and political discourses, students have internalised this form as the only form of expression. Before even learning classical Arabic at school, they have experienced this type in mosques, a situation that does not seem to be exceptional as Bakhtin (ibid.: 78) advances that we "*are given these speech genres in almost the same way that we are given our native language, which master fluently long before we begin to study grammar.*" What is exceptional is the fact that, while in many other cultures children are exposed to a multitude of speech genres, some which teach them unconsciously argumentation, in Algerian culture, primacy is awarded to the religious sermon. Students have acquired the religious sermon schemata, by which they tend to refuse any other genre whether for learning or producing. As they are used to the prescriptive and limitative patterns of thought of this genre, they find in all the other genres, such as fiction or scientific essays which do not correspond to their discursive *habitus*, difficulty of comprehension and apprehension since they require mechanisms they have not acquired, doubt, reflexion and the ability to analyse. The only mechanisms the religious sermon taught them are certainty, acceptance, conformity, and acquiescence, something a believer is expected to do for his deity.

Some examples, taken from their exam papers, of such expressions

"*Our faith and belief ... is the indestructible cement of our cohesion.*" (Discours du Président de la République à l'occasion de la semaine nationale sur le Coran) (MOT)

"*They [extremists] created in the Algerian society grave ruptures which could destroy the whole of it if God's grace and goodness have not guided us towards the road of peace, of wisdom and the Concord.*" (Discours du Président de la République à l'ouverture de la Conférence Nationale des Avocats) (MOT)

"*Unemployment ... with God's help, will be brought down to 10% by 2009.*" (Discours du Président de la République à l'occasion de la Journée Mondiale de la Femme) (MOT)

show how they use ready-made statements, often found in the religious sermons in mosques or the Arab satellite channels, to answer questions asked in exams. What is more dramatic is the fact that these statements are sometimes completely irrelevant to the questions, yet they are incorporated, either as a means to fill in the paper or as a way to take an opportunity to express their thoughts in an environment which rarely allows them some for it. In both cases, these thoughts seem to be spontaneous and somehow part of their deepest beliefs. To the question "To what extent can American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq be explained on the basis of American culture and history?", a question put to second year students of English as their final term exam which contained three other questions, about 50% of the answers (i.e. 18 out the thirty-eight students who chose this question, out of a total of 150 students) contained the following statements:

America hates Muslims and Islamic countries. This is the reason that explains their involvement in Islamic countries and not others.

What explains this is religion. Iraq and Afghanistan are Muslims. America has a Christian religion.

The cultural basis is the religious motive ... Americans think that Islamic beliefs are wrong and against other religions; these beliefs ask people to fight each other and help terrorism which is a threat to the world nowadays. However they want to spread Christianity worldwide, which is thought to call for peace, tolerance, brotherhood and self-confidence. But this is wrong.

Jewish people had the same idea and they influenced American to help them settle in Palestine

It is religion. Their religion is menaced by Islam. America tried her best to show Arabs as terrorists and the US in the image of the saviour to protect the world.

Since America was discovered, it is fighting. At the beginning it was between Americans and Indians, then between whites and blacks, and now against Muslims.

America wanted to 'clean up' terrorism especially because Bin Laden is an Afghan, and the Muslim countries because they are Muslim. They think: 'you are a Muslim, so you are a terrorist'.

America dislikes the Arab world mainly Muslim ones. ... America hates all what has a link to Islam.

The reason is the spread of Christianity. America hates Muslims.

To the question of the first make up exam, "According to the Puritans, what is the purpose of America?", comments, such as the following, could be found in some of the answers:

But this remains an American Puritan thought. Because we, as Muslims, know that they are not the Chosen people, and America is not the Promised Land.

But the real purpose [of the first and second Gulf wars] in the first and in the second is oil, and I think that it is a Jewish idea and America is the spokesperson.

These statements show, though they contain some truth in terms of the American governments' instrumentalisation of the false representations of the Arab and Muslim inside and outside America, the regurgitation of the same statements made in mosques and the media, for which the study of American culture, whether in American civilisation or literature, has brought absolutely no single change. These students came and left with exactly the same representations of America and the American-Arab relations based on the mandated spokespeople's discourses, be they politicians, preachers or pseudo-intellectuals. Although some of the respondents to the questionnaire could associate the word American to others relevant to the American Civilisation course, such as culture, capitalism, or even the name of their American Civilisation teacher, more than 60% still referred to the same terms which the dominant Occidental discourse attributes exclusively to America, like war, racism, terror, lying, enemy of Islam, malice, hypocrisy,

depravity, evil, disgusting, detestable.

It is then one of this work's theses to admit that, given the discursive genre students have been educated in, they have developed the *un-deliberate will of non-learning*. This antinomic phrase, as will be in itself deliberate, marks the paroxysmic and paradoxical state whereby students take the decision to come to class, aware of the necessity to learn, and in most cases willing to learn, especially when they enjoy the course, they nevertheless show resistance, quite unconsciously, to learning. Their difficulties in using the English language is partly due to the fact that this language does not suit the speech genre they tend to express themselves in, and which was acquired through classical Arabic. Their failure to produce good essays in such modules as American Civilisation or American literature is rooted in the fact that these subjects require the intellectual skills of critical thinking and analysis while the discursive genre through which they translate their thoughts into a written form does not allow room for criticism and analysis. It is a genre that perfectly suits matters of faith but is totally unfit for matters of science.

Another thesis is the fact that their negative attitude towards the *other* and his culture can be explained upstream as a delayed action which stems from their rejection of anything that could question their fixed beliefs, established through the life-long discursive bath they have grown in, and which brings them to react in a hostile manner towards anything that does not conform to their cultural and discursive *habitus*. Delayed action is thus a manifestation of the others' words, the mandated spokesperson's words as authoritative utterances, an expression of *otherness* (in its negative sense, i.e. as masters of thought) and a negation of what Bakhtin (ibid.: 89) calls *our-ownness*, the expression of the self in one's speech.

The monopolisation of the religious sermon as a speech genre is accordingly the first step towards the monopolisation of power over the people and students. Politicians have understood this all too well as illustrated by the MSP's continual strive to control the mosques, by any means necessary (including physical threats against imams), in a country where official records show that an average of more than 14 million people attends the Friday Prayer in mosques every week (*El Watan*, February 20th, 2006)³³. Thanks to the religious sermon, political discourse, a secondary speech genre in essence, has also become a primary speech genre. To diffuse its ideology, political discourse, as a primary genre, gets full access to the largest portion of the population that does not possess the intellectual means to understand and respond to specialised discourse used in "*complex cultural communication*" (Bakhtin 2002: 98). Within this large population, students, as the leading category of the youth, are thus attained before and during their university years, inside and outside university.

The mandated spokesperson, with the command of classical Arabic and the sermon as a speech genre, is then no more than a *rhetor*, i.e. a professional practitioner of rhetoric. Rhetoric is understood here in its pejorative meaning, a discourse technique whose main objective is to persuade people of the false by manipulating them through a beautiful, "*tendentious... emphatic, and shallow*" language (Reboul 1993: 5)³⁴. The main characteristic of this rhetoric is that it is *epidictic*, that is, amplifying and aimed at self-praising. In the epidictic," writes Reboul (ibid.: 19), "*the rhetor*

³³ On February 20th, 2006, the Algerian newspaper *El-Watan* reported that, according to the Ministry of Religious Affairs spokesman, M. Tamine, 20% of the 1500 mosques in the country were a scene for such violent threats. Official records show that in 2005 10 imams, who refused to relay messages of some religious associations under the control of the *MSP*, were either subject to violent aggressions or unjustly accused of incompetence or even such disgraceful crimes as paedophilia in order to be removed from their positions and be replaced by more conciliatory ones.

³⁴ (MOT)

is alone before a public whose only role is to applaud him."³⁵

Along with praise and amplification, the epideictic discourse includes blame of the other, and is based on the principle of *transfer*. Ideological discourse does not create beliefs. It rather transfers them onto the mandated spokesperson and his ideology. Belief in God, for instance, is transferred into belief in the mandated spokesperson who claims he is the representative of His word. Fighting for a just cause is transferred into fighting for the cause of the side which proclaims itself as its representative. *Transfer* is then a continual process that ideologues use to embezzle people's symbols and beliefs. Transfer may also function the reverse way inasmuch as particularities can be made general by transferring them from the spokesperson to the people. An illustration of this procedure is the Algerian President Bouteflika's comments after his leaving the French hospital Val-de-Grâce in April 2006. His admission to hospital followed his first provocative declaration that France undertook "*genocide of Algerian identity*" during colonisation three days earlier. The political class' indignation at this declaration and some French politicians' ironical comments about how Bouteflika could accept to get treatment in a country he outrageously criticised a few days before induced the President to say that "*France continues its attacks on Algeria*" ("*Journal de l'international*", *I TELE*, April 23rd, 2006). The French politicians' criticism of Bouteflika was then transferred onto the whole people of Algeria in order to involve them and induce their support. Another illustration is offered by Bin Ladin who claimed that the 'Western' embargo on *Hamas*, subsequent to their takeover as the new Palestinian Authority, is a proof of 'Western' attack on Islam (*Al-Jazeera*, April 23rd, 2006; *Le Figaro*, April 24th, 2006). Bin Ladin thus equates a political party with Islam by transferring a critical reaction towards it onto this religion.

³⁵ (MOT)

3.8. Students as the 'Third'

It is to be noted that students are not the target of ideological discourse, as an epideictic discourse, in the traditional sense of communication, where they would be the direct addressee. It is admitted here that students play the role of what discourse analysts, since the works of Bakhtin, have labelled the *third* (*tiers*). The *third* is not the directly visible participant in discourse. It is the one to whom discourse is indirectly addressed, the one whom the speaking subject attempts to convince in his confrontation to an interlocutor. The *third*, especially in political discourse, is the one politicians pretend to defend, to speak on his behalf, the one that is flattered in order to gain his support, a kind of *superaddressee* who:

... can react even when he is not asked to do so. Yet, this reaction... can only be deferred and not immediate. In any way, the presence – real or virtual – of the third has an effect on discourse, opens the possibility of modification in what is said and the way it is said. (Berruecos 2004: 148)³⁶

Ideological discourse is then made in consideration of the youth, and most particularly students, as the *third*. Its content and form are not designed only in relation to the direct addressee, but also in relation to those who are indirectly touched and from whom a delayed action is expected. When politicians, such as the president, address executives, lawyers, the nation, or any other category of society, the youth and students are there as the *third*. The meaning and effects of these discourses are completely missed if this *dialogic* dimension is not taken into account. "Unless," writes Bakhtin (2002: 97-98), "one accounts for the speaker's attitude toward the other [third] and his utterances (existing or anticipated), one can understand neither the genre nor the style of speech." What is meant here by the *dialogic* dimension is the fact that it is a basic feature of ideological

³⁶ (MOT)

discourses to be addressed to somebody, even when they seem monological (ibid.: 92), i.e. when the addressee is absent or not specified.

Students' status as the *third* in ideological discourse explains the extent to which they are influenced by it to the point that they become unable to have their own opinions. This situation is all the more accentuated since this status is not temporary. It is a permanent process within which they are imprisoned since their childhood thanks to the form of this discourse, i.e. its speech genre which is the religious sermon. Students are the target par excellence of ideological discourse and they are its first collateral damage, as they have been for Occidentalism. This students and people's status of the *third* is all the more politically significant inasmuch as it reinforces the politician's status of the mandated spokesperson. When people and students are brought to give up their right to speak by accepting their status of the *third*, they necessarily leave room for the politician, the preacher and the pseudo-intellectual to speak on their behalf, and they consequently mandate the latter to be their spokespeople and legitimise the usurpation of this right, or reinforce the *legitimate imposture*.

The exclusion of the youth from the public sphere of expression is of course not peculiar to dictatorships. Many democratic societies in the world have developed a consumerist relationship with their youth as young people are never invited to participate in the debate over the realisation of the national project. The youth is only fit for consuming Nikes, Jeans and Gameboys. Politics is monopolised by the old generations who, at the very best, "*maintain with the youth*," as sustained by Malek Boutih, "*a utilitarian rapport of billposting*" in political campaigns ("Mots croisés", *France 2*, April 10th, 2006). Probably, the youth's revolt against the CPE law³⁷ in France in

³⁷ The CPE (contrat première embauche), or first employment contract, was part of the "Statute on the Equality of Opportunities" law proposed by the French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin as a response to the youth riots that shook the suburbs of major

the first quarter of 2006 illustrates the French young generation's desire to re-appropriate their republican right to have their say in the decisions that determine the future of their society, reclaim the "I" status in the public debate, and reject the status of the *third* that politicians, leftists and rightists, have assigned to them.

In Algeria, Bakhtin's (ibid.: 99) three characteristics of discourse, *addressivity*, *anticipated response*, and *dialogical echoes*, establish clearly the students' status as the *third* of ideological discourse such as Occidentalism. These characteristics establish the logic of discourse in the sense that when they cannot be detected in a discourse, it becomes meaningless. When Bin Ladin's speeches, for instance, are taken as a discourse destined to the 'West', they become meaningless since the addressee, the 'West', is unable to understand them. For the first and foremost condition to understand a discourse and have the expected delayed action is to have, as an addressee, the *apperceptive background*, i.e.:

... the extent to which he is familiar with the situation, whether he has special knowledge of the given cultural area of communication, his views and convictions, his prejudices (from my viewpoint), his sympathies – because all this will determine his

cities in France in October 2005. It allowed employers to fire workers under the age of 26 without juridical motive during the first two-year-try-out period of the contract. These two measures launched hot debates among the political classes, and induced massive protests from students, trade unions (including the CGT, CFDT, FO), and left-wing parties to the streets of France, along with sudden strikes as a heavy resistance to the law in February and March 2006. The French government and law supporters' arguments for the benefits of the law in reducing the extremely high unemployment by weakening the constraints of the French job security laws did not convince the protestors to give up their main claim: the repeal of the law. With the demonstrations that drew between 1 and 3 million people, the blockade of more than 50 out of the country's 84 universities, the protestors eventually brought the government to withdraw the CPE and rewrite it by introducing new measures on April 10th, 2006 ("Huge protests against French job law, some violence", *Reuters*, March 18th, 2006; "French Protests Over Youth Labor Law Spread to 150 Cities and Towns", *The New York Times*, March 18th, 2006; "French court approves disputed youth jobs law", *Reuters*, March 30th, 2006).

active responsive understanding of the utterance.

(ibid.: 95-96)

'Westerners' are completely unfamiliar with the referents Bin Ladin makes use of to justify his actions. They are logically unable to have the relevant response to his speeches and calls. *Addressivity* (i.e. whom is he addressing?) shows that he targets the *third* when he pretends that he is addressing the 'West'. This *third* is the Muslims who possess the *apperceptive background* to understand his discourse. These Muslims are the *superaddressee* "whose absolutely just and responsive understanding is presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time" (Emerson and Holquist 2002: XVIII). As such, they are the ones who can have Bin Ladin's *anticipated response* (i.e. the purposed delayed action). Their ability to have this response stems from the fact they are familiar with Bin Ladin's referents, i.e. they are caught within *dialogic echoes* (i.e. a discursive environment in which these referents are common representations). As rightly put forward by Bourdieu, in a linguistic market, what people exchange is not language, it is discourses which are:

*... stylistically marked, both in production ... and in reception since each receiver contributes to the production of the message that he perceives and appreciates by bringing to it all his personal and collective experience.*³⁸

(Bourdieu 2001: 61)

Being part of these Muslims, students are then indirectly affected by his discourse, especially because they live in an environment quite dominated by Occidentalism, an ideology which is already hostile to Bin Ladin's *Islamic enemy number one*, the 'West'.

³⁸ (MOT)

3.9. The Intellectual

One of the questions that remain to be asked so far deals with the dramatic monolithic and conformist nature of the intellectual environment in Algeria. Why do students always hear the same version? Probably, one of the answers is the fact that the felicity conditions described above, conditions that provide the suitable environment for the success of ideological discourse in affecting students' representations and behaviour, that elevate the politician, the preacher and the pseudo-intellectual to the status of the mandated spokesperson, come also to be the failure conditions for the intellectual's discourse. Despite his physical presence in this environment, the intellectual is completely voiceless, unheard. The intellectual, in Algeria, does not possess the *skeptron*, the right to speak for the people or be listened to. His speech acts remain at the level of speech acts and never reach that of performative acts that have the necessary illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect. The absence of the right to speak, and thus the right to influence decision-making, deprives not only the political regime but also the whole society, which copes with this situation, from its legitimacy. As put forward by Habermas (1987), the legitimacy of a society is measured by the extent to which it corresponds to the model of a pure and perfect society of communication, for "*contestation and malaise*," writes Boudon (1991: 119), "*are directly proportional to the distance between the society as it is and the one people would establish if they were able to discuss freely the measures to reform it.*"³⁹

The intellectual is not listened to because he does not have the symbolic credentials that would allow him to get his *rightful* position, that of the mandated spokesperson in society. In an environment that is dominated by irrational religious discourse, he speaks rationally. In an environment where

³⁹ (MOT)

classical Arabic is the language of persuasion and conviction, he uses French, a language which is presented as being in complete opposition to classical Arabic and the values it incarnates (Miliani 1997). In an environment where the discursive form is the religious sermon, he uses argumentative genres. In an environment in which you can only preach to the converted, he finds himself turned into a voice in the wilderness because he lacks the symbolic capital necessary to have the right to be listened to.

The intellectual is all the more socially invisible as he does not benefit from the social act of institution by which the social institutions officially and publicly acknowledge his utility to society. On the contrary, these institutions, be they political (such as the government), economic (like the media and publishing houses) or educational (such as the university), converge to the same principle of social management: the intellectual is useless. They put this principle into practice by the total ostracism and devaluation of the intellectual, including financial underestimation of intellectual jobs, and the extent of interest their work attract as compared to others such as sport, music, religion or politics. Even when successful people are put in the news and publicised, these people, such as singers or sportsmen, are those who owe nothing to the school as the provider of intellectuals.

Without any social credit, the intellectual is relegated, at the very best, to the role of a buffoon who is not worth listening to, an appendix who can only play to the gallery by talking for nothing in conferences, filling newspaper columns with his incomprehensible words, or occupy unexplored national television time in so-called debate programmes that gather people who share the same dictated view. At the very worst, he is discredited as the traitor, the *hizb fransa* (حزب فرنسا), whose work is said to be destructive of all what makes our traditional values and principles, a menace to society that

needs to be muzzled, if not eliminated.

Students are not socially motivated to invest their time and effort in serious studies because the intellectual is not taken seriously by his society. An intellectual's work is not valued by the mere fact of existing. It is valued when society turns to it in order to find solutions to its problems. A society makes use of its intellectuals when its institutions, political, social or economic, call upon their expertise, as the case is, for instance, in European countries where governmental institutions and companies develop strong ties with universities which produce then functional and utilitarian research.

Intellectuals in Algeria are in a home exile, a long and dreadful process of wandering in their own place aimlessly, producing work that has no use. There is in Said's definition of exile, an exile himself, a relevant description of the intellectual's state in this country:

There is a popular but wholly mistaken assumption that being exiled is to be cut off, isolated, hopelessly separated from your place of origin. ... The fact is that for most exiles the difficulty consists not simply in being forced to live away from home, but rather, ... in living with the many reminders that you are in exile, that your home is not in fact so far away, and that the normal traffic of everyday contemporary life keeps you in constant but tantalizing and unfulfilled touch with the old place.

(Said 2000b: 370)

Although Said pictures real physical exile, this depiction corresponds to the Algerian intellectual's 'discoursal' condition of exile. The tormenting and dramatic situation of Algerian intellectuals, for some of them at least, is that they have not left their homes, voluntarily or not, and that every single day in Algeria is there to remind them of their people's urgent need of their active presence, of their imperative contribution to the making of the nation, something which provides to the intellectual his real sense of life. This is

what has probably pushed them, for those who have chosen not to leave, to stay despite molestation and mostly lack of consideration.

The social displacement of the intellectual in Algeria is not uninvolved in the dislocation of the Algerian society as the people, and students, fall short of perceiving sensible points of reference which establish the social role of every social category such as intellectuals. These intellectuals are those who are outsiders, who are at odds with their society, what Said (ibid.: 373) labels the *nay-sayers*, as opposed to those called here the pseudo-intellectuals who fit in perfectly with the Algerian society as it is, "*who flourish in it without an overwhelming sense of dissonance or dissent, those who can be called yea-sayers.*" While the pseudo-intellectuals seem to be satisfied with the society whatever its state as long as they enjoy the privileges, some power and honours the regime offers them as rewards for 'service to the country', the intellectuals keep believing in Adorno's (1951: 39) comment: "*Wrong life cannot be lived rightly*". Living by this principle requires from the intellectual to develop what Said (2000a: 223) calls *secular criticism*, in which it "*is not practicing [sic.] criticism either to validate the status quo or to join up with a priestly caste of acolytes and dogmatic metaphysicians*" This criticism affiliated to no dogmatic system, including religion, has also to be *anationalistic*, i.e. faithful to no ideology of nationalism that would treat gently the country's founding myths at the expense of truth.

The absent presence of the intellectual in the student's daily environment has deprived him from the necessary critical vision which is vital to learning, a vision which evinces the contingency of cultures, of societies, of ideologies, entities which are but "*the result of a series of historical choices made by men and women, as facts of society made by human beings, and not natural or god-given, therefore unchanged, permanent, irreversible.*"

(Said 2000b: 378) They, therefore, become mere consumers of ideas as technical commodities, and, as Boudon (1991: 123) observed, no one would check the quality of the parts of a TV set before buying it.

It has to be noted that the act of institution is important inasmuch as it opens the way to culture. Once an individual is officially given the status of the mandated spokesperson, such as that of *sheikh*, by the social institutions, like religion or the school, he is acknowledged as such by culture and thus transmitted to all members of society by means of education. For any idea to become institutionalised and grow into a political movement that attracts the people's support, it needs to be acknowledged outside the limited circle of professionals, i.e. by the general public (Bourdieu 2001: 236). Denying the intellectual the act of institution is closing the door of culture to him, i.e. depriving him from any possibility of being embraced by society.

In Algerian culture, the intellectual has of course not benefited from this act of institution, something which behoves him to resist, not only against the system, but also against culture as individuals, as Said put it, who are:

... declared out of bounds or inferior by the culture (here of course the range is vast, from the ritual scapegoat to the lonely prophet, from the social pariah to the visionary artist from the working class to the alienated intellectual.

(Said 2000a: 229)

The pernicious triad of exclusion of the intellectual from the public scene, the imposition of self-proclaimed mandated spokespeople for the whole society, and manipulation of the youth's intellectual education is definitely a long-standing process of power of a particular nature. It is not merely political power in the traditional sense of the term, i.e. exercised through political institutions, such as the government, whether democratically

(through free elections) or tyrannically (through violence). It is also and mainly symbolic as it instrumentalises all sorts of cultural, religious and political symbols for the sake of reaching the state of hegemony vital to the maintenance of the political status quo. For values which are seen as *uncontested givens* (Janks & Ivanič 1992: 306) require far less coercion to be propagated, maintained and adhered to. The maintenance of the political status quo, in which the legitimacy of the politician in Algeria is religious and historical (being a Muslim and a *moujahid*), has always considered intellect, thus the intellectual, a subversive danger which could question this system by gradually establishing another form of legitimacy based on knowledge and scholarship.

3.10. Ideology and Symbolic Power

The third characteristic of ideologies, as stated by Boudon, is very determinant in the Algerian ideological system as it considers difference vital to adherence. Algerians are reminded on a regular basis of who they are or who they are supposed to be, as if they could ever forget it, and this is always done in opposition to some other entity. They are told they are Algerians as opposed to non-Algerians, Arabs as opposed to non-Arabs, Muslims as opposed to non-Muslims. This is taken in charge by the school as, for instance, all children have to study and learn by heart Abdelhamid Bendadis' poem: "*The Algerian people is Muslim, and to Arabity it belongs, anyone who claims it deviated from its origins or it is dead would have lied.*"⁴⁰ For the ideologues, adherence to their ideology is determined by the people being conspicuous and seeing themselves different. These divisions are presented as real and objective, and thus require from the individual to take a stance, either be with one or the other. A collectivist view is imposed and the individual choice of feeling sympathy for ideas that do not belong to

⁴⁰ (MOT)

his/her group is condemned in the name of group solidarity, something which condemns, from its outset, any objection of oppositional intellectuals.

Bourdieu's notion of *market* is also important here to explain how ideological discourse is imposed, without even having recourse to violence. The relation between the speaking subject and the listener, or between the mandated spokesperson and the people, is presented by Bourdieu as an economic relation, through the use of the term *market*, because, just as in economy the two are involved in a power struggle for the capital, in the case of ideological discourse it is a symbolic capital or credit that legitimises the speaking subject's discourse to be accepted by his listener. As Bourdieu explained it:

*Discourses are not only (or exceptionally) signs meant to be understood, decoded; they are also signs of wealth meant to be evaluated, appreciated and signs of authority, meant to be believed and obeyed.*⁴¹

(Bourdieu 2001: 99)

This imposition of the idea of group solidarity is part of *symbolic power* which is defined, by Bourdieu, as follows:

*Symbolic power, as power to constitute the given through utterance, to make see and make believe, to confirm and transform the vision of the world and, thus, the action on the world, a power which is almost magical and which allows to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained by force (physical or economic), thanks to the specific effect of rallying, can only be exercised when it is acknowledged, that is to say unrecognised as arbitrary.*⁴²

(ibid.: 210)

The main feature of symbolic power is the fact that those for whom it is

⁴¹ (MOT)

⁴² (MOT)

the least profitable are those who are its most fervent protectors. It is an invisible power that is exercised with the complicity of those on whom it is exercised (ibid.: 202), i.e. with the people's full acquiescence. This is achieved through the dissimulation of violence or the *euphemisation* of the psychological and intellectual violence by closing all channels of reflection, notably by excluding intellectuals, that could lead to opposition and questioning. Because intelligence is viewed as a *contre-pouvoir* (forces of opposition), intellectuals represent, therefore, the most dangerous threat to symbolic power in the sense that they strive to raise people's consciousness and awareness of their situation of accomplices of their own social and political misery, by the demise of the collective beliefs and representations that ideologies, such as Occidentalism, mould in order to transform the people's power of mobilisation into a power of subversion. The power of subversion threatens the whole enterprise of production of sense that sustains the stability of the vision of the world that the mandated spokesperson's ideology strives to generalise as the only legitimate vision and "*division of this world*" (ibid.: 306), while it is but a distorted representation of the world constructed to suit the interests of those who detain power and the means to exercise it (i.e. symbolic power). In this sense, one of the main objectives of ideologues is to succeed in transforming ideology, which is there to serve particular interests, into myth, which is "*a collective product collectively appropriated*" (ibid.: 205)⁴³. As shown with Occidentalism, the vision and division of the world Occidentalists attempt to instil in the minds of the people induce students to reject those very ideas that call for human emancipation because they were produced by those who do not possess the symbolic capital since they are *re-presented* as belonging to the wrong side of the division, be it intellectually (*hizb fransa*) or culturally and geographically ('the 'West').

⁴³ (MOT)

One of the means implemented, for instance, for the *euphemisation* of symbolic power is the usurpation of religious authority, as stated above, by which a group of people, in the name of religious exegesis, monopolise discourse over religious matters, and by extension, over many earthly matters. With this monopoly, the preachers, in close alliance with the political regime, exercise this hidden violence over the believers, who are themselves citizens, to influence their choices in civil life. It is quite extraordinary the extent to which Kant's (1979: 217-218) description of the Church in its embezzling of religious authority applies quite perfectly to the case of the instrumentalisation of Islamic religion in Algeria. Through the rigid hierarchy of the Church, clergymen turn into high-ranked officials who "*rise in words against any pretension, yet want to be considered as the only authorised exegetes of the sacred Scriptures*", thus transforming "*service of the Church into a domination of its members*"⁴⁴.

Another means is language. As observed above, language does not contain illocutionary force nor does it have a perlocutionary effect in essence. Language, as a symbolic system such as myths, art, religion and science, can then not be an instrument of power if it is not equipped with that symbolism that would transform it into an instrument of symbolic power. "*Linguistic exchanges,*" reminds Bourdieu (2001: 59), "*which are rapports of communication par excellence, are also relations of symbolic power.*"⁴⁵ By constantly presenting classical Arabic as the language of the Koran, this language acquires the necessary symbolism that makes it the perfect channel for ideological discourse and consequently the exercise of symbolic power. Political *coup de force* is disguised by what Bourdieu (ibid.: 271) calls a *coup de forme* thanks to the exacerbated symbolism of language. Classical Arabic is filled with stereotyped expressions that function as rituals whose purpose is to produce the perlocutionary effect. This effect here is to

⁴⁴ (MOT)

⁴⁵ (MOT)

perpetuate the same vision of the world, or as put forward by Bourdieu (ibid.: 157), to impose “*a consensus over the sense of the social world which founds common sense.*”⁴⁶

This justifies the linguistic analysis of the language situation in Algeria, through colinguism, which then becomes in actual terms political criticism, and the rhetoric of the religious sermon as a speech genre a criticism of symbolic power, since language and the form of discourse, in Algeria and Arab countries, become part of the symbolism of power. In his study of the process of Arabisation in Algeria, Grandguillaume painstakingly singled out the political role classical Arabic has been given:

*Arabic has served lust for power. For those who were excluded from it by their culture, yet wanted to hold it, Arabic has been cut from its real linguistic environment, and erected as an emblem manipulated in an identification with Islam and nationalism: to carry out a full Arabisation has been a means to chase from their positions all those who ruled the country through French, without taking into account any pedagogical or economic consideration.*⁴⁷
(Grandguillaume 1998: 215-216)

Again, the maintenance of colinguism in Algeria, in which classical Arabic holds a privileged position while French is demonised, constitutes a very important manoeuvre of symbolic power that can be neutralised by questioning the status of classical Arabic as a sacred language. As symbolic

⁴⁶ (MOT)

⁴⁷ (MOT). The identification of classical Arabic with Islam and nationalism is constantly reclaimed in religious sermons. By playing on the faith of the people and all the symbols that make up their theological beliefs, the mandated spokespeople attempt to persuade the people of the sacred character of this language. Along with the sermons in mosques, such as the Friday prayer, any opportunity is used to remind people and students of this equation. A case in point is the tribute paid to a student, at the ENSET (Ecole Normale Supérieure d'Enseignement Technique), a teacher training college in Oran, who died accidentally in 2005. As a conclusion to his speech devoted to the philosophy of life and death in Islam, the preacher called upon the students to study and take great care of classical Arabic because, he insisted, it is the language of all of the Algerian people, and most importantly, because it is the language of the Koran and the language human beings will have to use to address the Angel of Death in their tomb.

systems, languages are the means of moulding new schemata and representations. As such, foreign languages, as codes referring to different socially-marked realities, represent a major threat to the political status quo as they enter into a symbolic struggle in which politicians try by all means to preserve their symbolic power through two main measures:

- Preserve the sacred status of classical Arabic in order to keep it as the only source of representations and schemata, of students and the people; these representations and schemata being the ones that guarantee the maintenance of the status quo.
- Empty foreign languages from their cultural substance which may be the source of contradictory representations and schemata. This is undertaken by emphasising the functional teaching of foreign languages in public education.

Languages encompass words which are not *neutral* or *innocent*, i.e. without an ideological base. The danger of foreign languages lies in the fact that every single word, “*every single phrase threatens to take two antagonistic meanings according to the way the speaker and listener would take it*” (ibid.: 64), thus menacing to break up into pieces the ideological consensus that keeps the people down. The concern in this work for the case of university students stems precisely from the idea that for political power to be absolute and hegemonic, it needs to be backed up by symbolic power that sustains consensus. For power to be symbolic, i.e. invisible, it needs to be merged within the values that are taught through formal education. The students' objetivisation of the ideas diffused by ideology, through their transformation into representations that underlie behaviour which takes the appearance of spontaneous and natural reaction, is one of the main and tragic effects of symbolic power in Algeria. This symbolic power is certainly one of the main desired consequences of the sacrosanct

alliance between religion and politics in Algeria.

3.11. Religion and Politics

The instrumentalisation of religion as a provider of credit for the mandated spokesperson and the political regime he is affiliated to is a common commodity in Arab-Islamic countries. The business of religion and politics permeates all spheres of power, vertically within the same country and horizontally across countries. The case of the media-mediated confrontation over the control of the Arab-Islamic public opinion between the Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat (1970 – 1981) and the Iranian cleric and political leader Ayatollah Khomeini (1979 – 1989) is an instance of the strategic use of religion as a major stake to discredit the opponent. Answering CBS News “60 Minutes” correspondent Mike Wallace’s question about al-Sadat calling him “*a disgrace to Islam and a lunatic*”, Khomeini commented that al-Sadat was “*not a Muslim because he compromised with the enemies of Islam.*” (“Larry King Live”, CNN, March 27th, 2006) Establishing one’s *Islamity* and denying the opponent’s is central to each one’s political capital in his country and in the entire Arab-Islamic world.

Probably, as far as foreign languages and cultures are concerned, i.e. concerning the definition of *otherness* and the relation to the *other*, politics activates the lever of religion in order to bring people and students to suspect and reject the foreign approach to the social world. This suspicion is based on the presentation of the foreign culture discourse as a heretic discourse. The idea of heresy, as it will be shown in Chapter Four, is essential to break up any subscribing to a subversive idea that could threaten the established order.

The nexus of religion and politics in Algeria is the people's frustrations and relevant desires and wishes. People turn to religion to find explanations and solace for their cultural, social and economic misery and religion provides them with scapegoats which are often the infidels. The infidels, i.e. the non-Muslims, are necessarily the 'Westerners' who are taken responsible for this misery, and the history of colonialism and crusades is there to prove it. The elevation of Occidentalism to the status of a real social institution can precisely be explained by the function of this institution, which is to answer people's needs to exorcise these frustrations. The genesis of Occidentalism itself has been determined by its function as an institution, i.e. a response to a social need.⁴⁸ In times of trouble, societies always try to find scapegoats, and with the influence of religion, crisis is viewed as the result of sin, the sin of not having followed the word of God. This is not peculiar to Muslims. In his outstanding play, *The Crucible* (1952), the American playwright Arthur Miller shows how this conflict between *predestination* and *original sin*, at the heart of the Calvinist doctrine, permeates American culture since the days of Puritans in the early times of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the 17th century. Miller explains the dramatic events of the Salem Witch trials in Massachusetts in 1692 and the *witch hunt* of 'communists' through McCarthyism in the 1950s as an illustration of the Americans' need to find a scapegoat, witches in Salem and communists with McCarthyism, for the disruption of their life, believed to be part of a divine plan.

With this explanation, people are promised better days when the Muslims would recover and regain their past prestige. This approach to the social world clears politics and politicians from all their responsibility for people's

⁴⁸ The genesis of any institution lies in the fact that it has the function of answering a social need, independently from the real interests or objectives of those who establish it. R. Merton (1965) has shown that the growth of the Democratic Party in the United States, for instance, into real political machinery was due to the fact that it took in charge the need for social security while the state did not do it at that time.

suffering. Representatives of official religion act as *spin doctors*, as specialists in media communication, as handlers whose job is to present the political leader in a *saleable packaging* ready for public consumption. Instead of affirming its responsibility, on the contrary, the political regime becomes part of this salvation plan, as the *ouli al-amr* (literally: those charged with authority), and to whom a good Muslim owes allegiance and obedience as long as they are Muslims on the basis of the Koranic verse: "*O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger and those charged with authority among you.*" (An-Nisāa S.4, A.59)

3.11.1. Ideology as a Religious System

By perverting the truth of political responsibility, politics ceases to be a search for solutions to social problems at the service of the people, as it ought to be, to become a mere ideology. By approving of the subjection of social and spiritual salvation to allegiance to the political leader, this ideology is transformed into a secular religion. It is religion⁴⁹ because it is presented as salutary. It is religion for it is not knowledge, thus not science (Capdevila 2004: 197), since totally based on people's faith and belief, and not on rational arguments. It is secular because it does not require an allegiance to a god, but rather to a human, a group or a regime. As Capdevila defined it:

Religion consists in worshipping the divine being as required by his essence. Consequently, all religions which do not worship in the right way the right being, i.e. which replaced God by an idol, are godless religions. Idolatry is then the theological concept of a

⁴⁹ Capdevila asserts that ideology cannot be conceived but in a religious form since ideology is the human strive to live in the best conditions. He writes: "*The quest for the hereafter and the fear of hell [i.e. religion], is but a way to live in this world [i.e. ideology].*" (2004: 193) (MOT)

*godless religion.*⁵⁰

(Capdevila 2004: 188)

Although refuted by Arendt (1990: 143), who asserts it is attributing too great an honour to ideologies to consider them as religions, Monnerot (1949: 268) justifies this equivalence by claiming that such ideologies function like religions in the sense that people identify with certain “*omnipresent, ineluctable impersonal forces.*” Occidentalism and political ideology in Algeria are perfect instances of this type of ideologies as people are overwhelmed by the omnipresence of the discursive rhetoric and rhetorical discourse, present both in the political speech and the religious sermon, of politicians, preachers and pseudo-intellectuals with whom they have developed an irrational attachment based on the pledge of a *promised day of glory* that has never come. This relationship bears the characteristics of a religious expression, as listed by Sironneau (1982: 67): *myth, rite, communion, and faith.* The myth, defined as an illusory representation of Man and the world (Godelier 1977: 276), that proposes to answer unanswered questions, lies in the fact that people believe in false things that soothe their worries; rite is all the manifestation of joy and love for the leader people have to show whenever he comes on a visit; communion refers to that faithfulness people are expected to have for their leader and that is shown in elections; faith is the only argument people have to believe in the veracity of their leader’s discourse as he has no other rational argument to provide.

By associating its ideas to religion, political ideology acquires, by virtue of the inalterability of sacred principles, the sacredness (i.e. the anonymous force that confers power) that justifies the cracking on any opposing ideas (that may question the status of a language, a religion, a revolutionary myth) in the name of a pretended purity of its values that can be stained by

⁵⁰ (MOT)

opponents.

3.11.2. Religion as an Ideological System

Religion in Algeria and the entire Arab-Islamic world, since the emergence of Islamism as a political movement, has been also transformed into an ideology. This transformation has first been necessary since religion, as transcendence, needs to have a concrete experiential manifestation in order to be embraced as a political project, by believers who become militants. This concreteness or immanence is found in political ideology. “*Faith without ideology,*” writes Segundo, “*is a dead faith*” (quoted in Gotay 1986: 240)⁵¹. The purpose of this ideology is to theologise all aspects of life so as to construct a society that not only integrates the idea of Islamism as a political theory and regime, but also protects and defends at the risk of its members' lives. This is a strategy that was borrowed from totalitarian regimes, the Soviet system being a typical case, in every social domain, ranging from economy to culture, in which “*everything was politicised, and everywhere politics expressed the ideological objectives of the State-Party*” for the effectuation of one supreme objective: the *construction and defence of socialism* (Malia 1995: 318-319).

I should note that religion is considered by many scholars as ideology in essence. S. Breton (1987: 16), for instance has equated between religion and ideology and defined them as systems of “*representations, values and behaviours*”. Yet, the conception of religion here, and according to the theoretical debate on the concept of ideology developed in Chapter Two, is that religion starts to be an ideology at the very moment it enters the realm of politics, where discourse is centred around the intention to deceive for the

⁵¹ (MOT)

preservation of the status quo, advantageous to the political regime, as is the case of official religion, or for the alteration of the status quo by the annihilation of the political regime in place and its substitution by another totalitarian one, as purposed by Islamism.

In the latter, i.e. Islamism, religion is conceived as a *theology of liberation* (see Chapter Four), i.e. a discourse on political freedom by means of religious fervour. Islamism has arisen as a counter-discourse and action against the totalitarian regimes in Arab-Islamic countries. In their social, political and economic despair, this theology of liberation has represented the only solution in a context of the complete absence of another rational counter-discourse, such as that of intellectuals. Within the intellectual vacuum, the Islamist theology of liberation has stood as the panacea.

What religion, in the form of a theology of liberation, has, and which other political movements strive hard to get, is the emotional capital and the force of persuasion necessary for rallying and support. As Bell (1960) put it, the fact that religion provides an answer to the existential human question of the fear of death has made it the “*most persuasive human institution.*” This belief in the afterlife has conferred to religion superiority over all other modern ideologies, as it is capable of bringing its fervent militant, the suicide bomber, to give his life for it with far less hesitation than would do any of the others. This explains the total rejection in Islamism of the idea of religion as a private matter. Privacy of worship leads to the impossibility to rally the group around the same cause, something which would deprive Islamism from having “*any influence on the world.*” (Capdevila 2004: 112). This influence needs ideas which are totally cut off reality, for such ideas are easily subject to manipulation (ibid.: 252).

Religion as ideology is mostly the objectivisation and rationalisation of

inner feelings, sentiments and desires which spare the ideologues the effort of argumentation. Away from conviction, which needs rational argumentation, the ideologues rely only on persuasion to attract supporters whose adherence, thanks to the religious discourse, becomes a pure act of faith, whose strength emanates, to paraphrase Freud (1971: 43), from the strength of these feelings and desires. Rational argumentation is scientific, i.e. based on objective and demonstrable principles, while the act of faith is based on exegetic and rhetorical argumentation that induces belief and seduction.

In the definition of *otherness* and the relation to the *other*, Islamism has a quite easier mission in its stigmatisation through its religious ideology. Sparing itself the bother of convincing historical and scientific arguments that would justify the hatred of the 'West' as the *other*, something which works as the Islamist *Trojan Horse* to the hearts of the people, Islamism, notably through Occidentalism, takes shortcuts and argues with Islam and Muslims' most cherished reference, i.e. the Koran. The 'West' is seen through the prism of its representation in the Koran, the image of the *al-kāfirīn* (the infidel) who is seen with much suspicion and whose existence is a threat to Islam as a world religion.

This is of course not peculiar to Islam and it is but a particular interpretation of the sacred text. Said did clearly show how Orientalism, as a Western approach of the Oriental (their *other*), based its representation of Islam and Muslims on the conflictual relationship in the Bible:

In addition, I think, the likelihood was very great that European scholars would continue to see the Near orient through the perspective of the Biblical 'origins,' that is, as a place of unshakably influential religious primacy.... Islam remained forever the Orientalist's idea (or type) of original cultural effrontery, aggravated naturally by the fear that Islamic civilization ...

continued to stand somehow opposed to the Christian West.
(Said 1995: 260)

Even worse, just as Orientalism assumed that modern Islam could not be anything but “*a reasserted version of the old*” (ibid: 261), Occidentalism and Islamism admit that the ‘West’ can be nothing more than the old crusading enemy whose daily preoccupation is how to succeed in effectuating its plot of re-appropriating Muslims’ land. It is quite amazing to realise that the very prejudiced ideology that Islamism and Occidentalism pretend to fight is nothing but its twin sister, with the exception that it was born some time before and in a different place. Paradoxically, Orientalism has been resuscitated by those who had once been its victims, and tends to be propagated among students who take its myths, its lamentable jargon, and rarely-hidden prejudice as reality. “*The modern Orient, in short*” writes Said (ibid: 325) with bitterness, “*participates in its own Orientalizing.*”

The transformation of religion into ideology, in a political movement such as Islamism, has been vital to Islamism and the political regimes in Arab Islamic countries inasmuch as it has allowed the elevation of ordinary people into the position of the mandated spokesperson by means of a process of double fetishism⁵². First, the latter transforms the original function of a preacher, a spiritual guide and comforter, into that of a prescriber of political behaviour in the name of some religious duty that people feel morally bound to *execute*, lest they jeopardise their chances of salvation. Second, the mere accessories, such as the beard or the *abaya* (man's traditional gown), confer to the person who wears them the status of *sheikh*, i.e. somebody who owns religious knowledge and thus the authority to

⁵² Fetishism is taken here in its Marxist sense. Marx (1993) speaks of fetishism which attributes to money an intrinsic value which it does actually possess. Money is valuable only as a means that allows exchange of consumable commodities, i.e. as “*a general equivalent to all the other goods*” (Capdevila 2004: 228). Fetishism attributes deceptively to money a particular social role which gives it, according to I. Roubine, a great “*power to influence people*” (quoted in ibid.: 228).

prescribe in religion, and by fetishist extension, in politics. This is a phantasmagoria that imposes respect, which Capdevila (2004: 234) calls a sociological metaphor in which a social object is constituted, not by its intrinsic qualities, but rather by "*the significations he carries*".

3.12. Conclusion

Within this context where discourse is permeated with an ideology constructed by the triadic alliance of religion, politics and pseudo-intellectualism, students are trapped within a vicious circle that offers no opportunity for intellectual emancipation necessary for the acquisition of knowledge and attainment of awareness. Symbolic of all is *yaoum al-ilm* (knowledge day, on April 16th), a day supposed to be the moment where Algeria celebrates knowledge and science. In his address on this occasion, President Bouteflika definitely seals this alliance by claiming that "*the history of democracy in Algeria can by no means be separated from the history of Islam.*" (*Al-Khabar*, April 16th, 2006) Actually, the very idea of the Algerian nation is subjected to religion and religious sentiments and fervour that Algerians presumably showed during their Revolution. In his analysis of the foundation of the Algerian school right after independence, while many researchers claim that Benbadis' *Association des Oulémas* did not call for independence (Mahsas 1979; Keddache 1980; Ageron 1993; Remaoun 2000), Harbi observes that:

*It is in this context that the spiritual heirs of the 'Association des Oulémas' (1931-1956), who took control of primary school teaching in the wake of the minister of education, Ahmed Taleb, forge a new version of the origins of the national revolution whose paternity is attributed to sheikh Abdelhamid Benbadis.*⁵³

(Harbi 1994: 41-42)

The negation of all what is not Arab and Muslim in the origins of the Algerian people, what Dourari (2004: 55) calls "*the original plurality of the historical formation of the Algerian people*"⁵⁴ and that can be observed in the denomination of simplest things like plants, herbs and birds according to Lacheraf (1998), is a discourse of denial of the real Algerian identity .To

⁵³ (MOT)

⁵⁴ (MOT)

counteract this type of discourse of disempowerment, which tends to conceal any other discourse which could question the sacrosanct myth of the *communauté-Une* (ibid.: 57), there is a need for another type of discourse, one which breaks *the cycle of reproducing domination* (Janks & Ivanič 1992: 305), an *emancipatory discourse* (see Chapter Four) whose main function is to accompany students, throughout their university years, towards greater freedom of thought and respect for *otherness*, one which would allow them to regain the *skeptron* in order to exist as students, as citizens, or simply as human beings.

3.13. Original Quotations

Page 174

... en mettant ... l'accent sur la constitution interne d'un texte ou d'un corpus de textes au détriment des conditions sociohistoriques de sa production et sa réception.

(Bourdieu 2001: 11)

Page 175

... l'exercice linguistique accompli sans considération du contenu réel des discours et des situations ressemble à l'apprentissage du solfège coupé de toute pratique musicale.

(Poirier 1983: 158)

Page 176

... tout ensemble relativement durable de relations sociales qui confèrent aux individus des formes différentes de pouvoir, de statut et de ressources.

(Thompson 2001: 18)

Page 177

... la communauté de conscience qui est le ciment de la nation.

(Bourdieu 2001: 75)

Page 179

... il y a, dans la plupart des énoncés, certains traits qui déterminent leur valeur pragmatique indépendamment de leur contenu informatif. Et ces traits ne peuvent même pas toujours être considérés comme des traits marginaux... Il s'agit souvent, au contraire, de marques imbriquées dans la structure syntaxique.

(Anscombe & Ducrot 1997: 18)

Page 180

... un énoncé performatif est voué à l'échec toutes les fois qu'il n'est pas prononcé par une personne ayant le 'pouvoir' de le prononcer, ou, plus généralement, toutes les fois que les personnes ou circonstances particulières ne sont pas celles qui conviennent...

(Bourdieu 2001: 165)

Page 181

... toute parole est produite pour et par le marché auquel elle doit son existence et ses propriétés les plus spécifiques.

(Bourdieu 2001: 113)

Page 183

Les Algériens, je pense, ont peur qu'un malheur arrive au président. Ils ont peur que son retrait des affaires du pays induise la fin complète de son programme qu'ils considèrent comme le seul moyen qui puisse les sauver de leur précarité.

("Bouteflika promet le droit pour chacun et la loi pour tous",
L'Echo d'Oran, January 2nd, 2006)

Page 184

... 'placer le kred', c'est-à-dire la 'puissance magique' en un être dont on attend protection, par suite 'croire' en lui.

(Benveniste 1969: 121)

... un acte de magie sociale qui réussit.

(Bourdieu 2001: 66)

Page 185

... l'usurpateur n'est pas un calculateur cynique qui trompe consciemment le peuple, mais quelqu'un qui se prend en toute bonne foi pour autre chose que ce qu'il est.

(Bourdieu 2001: 273)

Page 190

(Footnote 16)

Dans le cas du glissement, il y a altération et/ ou complémentarité de la cohérence discursive, mais non cohésive, par adaptation de l'item 'emprunté' aux règles de cohésion linguistiques de la langue hôte, ou matrice, et donc prolongement des règles cohésives dans l'énonciation, ce que Saville-Troïke appelle 'intrasentential switching'...

(Lakhdar Barka 2006: fn 10)

Page 192

... l'association, par l'enseignement et la politique, de certaines langues écrites faisant communiquer des partenaires légitimes.

(Balibar 1993: 7)

Page 193

C'est dans le processus de constitution de l'Etat que se créent les conditions de la constitution d'un marché linguistique unifié et dominé par la langue officielle: obligatoire dans les occasions officielles et dans les espaces officiels (Ecole, administrations publiques, institutions politiques, etc.), cette langue d'Etat devient la norme théorique à laquelle toutes les pratiques linguistiques sont objectivement mesurées.

(Bourdieu 2001: 71)

... une forte charge symbolique pour la collectivité.

(Charaudeau & Maingueneau 2002: 204)

Page 194

... non le fait de dire le faux, le simple mensonge, mais le fait de le dire avec toutes les apparences logiques du vrai...

(Bourdieu 2001: 327)

C'est dire que la rigueur formelle peut masquer le décollage sémantique. Toutes les théologies religieuses et toutes les théodicées politiques ont tiré parti du fait que les capacités génératives de la langue peuvent excéder les limites de l'intuition ou de la vérification empirique pour produire des discours formellement corrects mais sémantiquement vides.

(Bourdieu 2001: 65)

Page 197

... au nom de quoi les protagonistes exercent leur droit à la parole. Ils parlent en tant qu'expert, témoin, ami, adversaire, supérieur, inférieur, etc. Il ne s'agit pas tant du statut, mais de ce qui spécifie le lien interpersonnel qui relie les protagonistes, lien d'agression, de consensus, d'alliance, etc. Ici aussi, les rôles peuvent être revendiqués ou contestés dans un mouvement d'exclusion ou d'inclusion.

(Charaudeau 2004: 25)

Page 198

S'appropriier les mots où se trouve déposé tout ce que reconnaît un groupe, c'est s'assurer un avantage considérable dans les luttes pour le pouvoir.... le mot le plus précieux est le mot sacré ...

(Bourdieu 2001: 303, fn 7)

Page 201

L'hexis corporelle est la mythologie politique réalisée, incorporée, devenue disposition permanente, manière durable de se tenir, de parler, de marcher, et, par là, de sentir et de penser.

(Bourdieu 2001: 25)

Les effets qu'une expérience nouvelle peut exercer sur l'habitus dépendent de la relation de 'compatibilité' pratique entre cette expérience et les expériences déjà intégrées à l'habitus sous forme de schèmes de production et d'appréciation...

(Bourdieu 2001: 121)

Page 210

Des années durant, nous avons donné le meilleur de nous-mêmes pour que s'éteigne le brasier de la Fitna ... pour que la Miséricorde divine nous vienne en aide.

(Bouteflika 2005)

... je me suis engagé devant Dieu et devant vous à ne ménager aucun effort ni aucune initiative pour éteindre le feu destructeur de la Fitna.

(Bouteflika 2005)

Page 211

Avec l'aide de Dieu, auquel nous rendons grâce, nous avons ensemble, ouvert la voie à la Concorde Civile...

(Bouteflika 2005)

La volonté des peuples n'émane-t-elle pas de la volonté de Dieu...

(Bouteflika 2005)

(Footnote 32)

...j'y ai investi, tout au long de ces dernières années, ma Foi de croyant...

(Bouteflika 2005)

...nous comptons sur Dieu et sur notre cher peuple...

(Bouteflika 2005)

Page 212

(Following Footnote 32)

Notre foi et notre croyance... est [sic.] le ciment indestructible de notre cohésion...

(Bouteflika 2001)

Ils ont créé au sein de la société algérienne de graves ruptures qui allaient tout ébranler, n'était-ce la grâce et la bonté de Dieu qui nous a guidés vers la voie de la paix, de la sagesse et de la concorde.

(Bouteflika 2006b)

Avec l'aide de Dieu, il sera ramené à 10 % à l'horizon 2009.

(Bouteflika 2006a)

Page 216

... tendancieux ... emphatique et superficiel.

(Reboul 1993: 5)

... le rhéteur est seul devant un public dont l'unique rôle est de l'applaudir.

(Reboul 1993: 19)

Page 218

... est capable de réagir, même quand on ne le lui demande pas. Cependant, cette réaction... ne peut être que différée et non immédiate. De toutes façons, la présence –réelle ou virtuelle- du tiers a une incidence sur le discours, ouvre la possibilité qu'il y ait une modification dans ce qui est dit ou comment cela est dit.

(Berruecos 2004: 148)

Page 221

... stylistiquement caractérisés, à la fois du côté de la production ... et du côté de la réception, dans la mesure où chaque récepteur contribue à produire le message qu'il perçoit et apprécie en y important tout ce qui fait son expérience singulière et collective.

(Bourdieu 2001: 61)

Page 222

Car la contestation et le malaise sont proportionnels à la distance entre la société telle qu'elle est et la société que

construiraient les citoyens s'ils pouvaient débattre sans entraves des mesures à prendre pour la réformer.

(Boudon 1991: 119)

Page 227

شعب الجزائر مسلم و إلى العروبة ينتسب . من قال حاد عن أصله أو مات
(A. Benbadis)

Page 228

... les discours ne sont pas seulement (ou seulement par exception) des signes destinés à être compris, déchiffrés; se sont aussi des signes de richesse destinés à être évalués, appréciés et des signes d'autorité, destinés à être crus et obéis.

(Bourdieu 2001: 99)

Le pouvoir symbolique comme pouvoir de constituer le donné par l'énonciation, de faire voir et de faire croire, de confirmer ou de transformer la vision du monde et, par là, l'action sur le monde, donc le monde, pouvoir quasi magique qui permet d'obtenir l'équivalent de ce qui est obtenu par la force (physique ou économique), grâce à l'effet spécifique de mobilisation, ne s'exerce que s'il est reconnu, c'est-à-dire méconnu comme arbitraire.

(Bourdieu 2001: 210)

Page 229

... produit collectif et collectivement approprié...

(Bourdieu 2001: 205)

Page 230

... s'élèvent en paroles contre une telle prétention, veulent néanmoins être considérés comme les seuls exégètes autorisés des Ecritures saintes, [et transforment ainsi] le service de l'Eglise (ministerium) en une domination de ses membres (imperium)

(Kant 1979: 217-218).

... les rapports de communication par excellence que sont les échanges linguistiques sont aussi des rapports de pouvoir symbolique...

(Bourdieu 2001: 59)

Page 231

... consensus sur le sens du monde social qui fonde le sens commun.

(Bourdieu 2001: 157)

La langue arabe a été ainsi mise au service de la soif de pouvoir. Pour ceux qui en étaient exclus par leur culture, mais souhaitaient s'en emparer, la langue arabe fut coupée de son environnement linguistique réel, elle fut érigée en emblème manipulé dans une identification étroite avec l'islam et le nationalisme : établir une arabisation totale était un moyen de chasser de leurs places ceux qui géraient le pays en utilisant la langue française, en faisant abstraction de toute considération pédagogique ou économique.

(Grandguillaume 1998: 215-216)

Page 235

La religion consiste à rendre à l'être divin le culte adéquat exigé par sa nature. En conséquence, toutes les religions qui ne rendent pas le culte adéquat à l'être divin, c'est-à-dire qui ont remplacé Dieu par une idole, sont des religions sans Dieu. L'idolâtrie est donc le concept théologique de la religion sans Dieu.

(Capdevila 2004: 188)

(Footnote 49)

La quête de l'au-delà et la crainte de l'enfer ne sont jamais qu'une manière de vivre ici-bas.

(Capdevila 2004: 193)

Page 237

La foi sans idéologie est une foi morte.

(Segundo, quoted in Gotay 1986: 240)

... tout est politisé, et partout la politique exprimait les objectifs idéologiques du Parti-Etat... la construction et la défense du socialisme.

(Malia 1995: 318-319)

Page 242

C'est dans ce contexte que les héritiers spirituels de l'Association des Oulémas (1931-1956), qui avaient pris le contrôle de l'enseignement primaire dans le sillage du ministre de l'éducation, Ahmed Taleb, forgent une nouvelle

version des origines de la révolution nationale et en attribuent la paternité au cheikh Abdelhamid Benbadis.

(Harbi 1994: 41-42)

... pluralité originale de la formation historique du peuple algérien ...

(Dourari 2004: 57)

CHAPTER FOUR

Developing a New Intercultural Pedagogy: The Third Place

4.1. Introduction.....	253
4.2. Otherness and Authentic Discourse.....	254
4.3. Otherness and Language.....	273
4.4. Facing Ideology.....	278
4.5. Islamist Discourse.....	279
4.6. The Self-mandated Spokesperson vs. the Intellectual....	283
4.7. The Need for a New Counter-culture.....	285
4.8. A New Counter-culture Through Intercultural Pedagogy.	287
4.9. Critical Discourse Analysis in Culture Studies.....	292
4.10. Towards a 'Third Culture'.....	295
4.11. Conclusion.....	302
4.12. Original Quotations.....	304

CHAPTER FOUR

Developing a New Intercultural Pedagogy: The Third Place

If we don't want to see pedagogy get bogged down in conformism, it must at all times teach the refusal to conform. Constructive pedagogy is always untamed; true pedagogy scoffs at pedagogy.

(Yves Châlon, cited in Kramsch 2001: 31)

L'histoire de la folie est l'histoire de l'Autre et de ce qui, pour une culture est à la fois intérieur et étrange, donc à exclure (pour en conjurer le péril intérieur) mais en l'enfermant (pour en réduire l'altérité)

(Foucault 1966: 15)

4.1. Introduction

Students' negative attitudes towards foreign cultures, expressed in more explicit terms in foreign language degrees, are then based on the very representations of the *other*, their subsequent definitions of both self-identity and otherness, the relationship between them, the stakes of their confrontation and the existential implications of this confrontation. Whether developing as cultural traits, or fashioned by political and religious ideologies, these representations have transformed into a widespread culture in its own right, clustering social categories of students who have not necessarily grown within the same subculture. This commonness has been the outcome of the intensive work of the ideologies described in the

preceding chapters, carried out through a discourse of conflict which has not yet faced a counter-discourse where it is supposed to find it, University.

However, as a culture, these representations and negative attitudes certainly bear the same characteristics of any culture: they grow and change. Over time, and because of, or thanks to, many influences they acquire new aspects as much as they give away old ones. This entails, on the one hand, that any description of a culture is but the description of a moment in its life, the description of “*the form and content of a cross-section carried out at a particular point of the cultural continuum*” (Linton 1968: 331)¹, something which artificially stabilises a state which is unstable by essence. On the other hand, it implies that any culture can be subjected to conscious and desired alterations, depending on the social credit and power those who intend to operate them enjoy.

4.2. Otherness and Authentic Discourse

With the development of Zavalloni’s concept of *subjective culture*, i.e. “*a cultural group’s typical ways to perceive and conceptualise its environment*” (quoted in Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 26)², it is admitted that in matters of representation, mainly self-representations as well as representations of the *other*, it is “*the viewpoint which creates the object*” (ibid.: 26)³. This idea leads to two main conclusions as far as foreign culture teaching and learning are concerned:

1. An individual describes his culture, which in his mind is the national culture he shares with all his fellow citizens, not necessarily as it really

¹ (MOT)

² (MOT)

³ (MOT)

is, but rather according to his own viewpoint, which varies according to his own position and role within his society. His description is then, at worse, wrong and, at best, only a part of the whole truth. As such, a foreign culture is probably not fully and accurately experienced when approached in its entirety, when reified in documents devoted to the study of a given culture, which rather circumscribe it. Such books which intend to present real culture, a kind of objective culture, end up, contrary to their pretension, advancing but a viewpoint of that culture, even when the author possesses great expertise.

Real culture is subjective culture, dynamic and pluralistic, which can then be best retrieved through the study of individual experiences, expressions and voices, which either declaim their subjectivity from the outset, such as artistic and literary works, or do not have the purpose to inform about culture, like political, legal or media documents. Both forms put forward culture through the individual, and the variety of individuals is a variety of viewpoints which make up the cultural jigsaw of a given group. The first form, art and literature, allows its author to speak, not only for himself, but also for his society, thus revealing things about himself as well as his society. He possesses what Bakhtin (2002) labels the *double-voiced discourse*, in which, according to Sheldon:

... the primary orientation is to the self, to one's agenda. The other orientation is to the members of the group. The orientation to others does not mean that the speaker necessarily acts in an altruistic, accommodating, or even self-sacrificing manner. It means, rather, that the speaker pays attention to the companion's point of view, even while pursuing her own agenda, as a result, the voice of the self is enmeshed with and regulated by the voice of the other.

(Sheldon 1992: 99)

This attention paid to the others is accentuated with a fiction writer,

with his pertinence and ambiguity (Vovelle 1982) which make his discourse, i.e. literature, probably more informative about his group than any other speaker. Thus, literature represents one of the most reliable sources to know about the *other*, and its neglect, in the name of the primacy of facts, often leads to biased views. Said (1995: 291), in his scrutiny of the American social-science attention to the Orient in the 1970's, for instance, and its avoidance of literature in its approach reduced the region and its peoples to “‘attitudes,’ ‘trends,’ statistics: in short, dehumanized.” He rightly states that

Since an Arab poet or novelist ... writes of his experiences, of his values, of his humanity,... he effectively disrupts the various patterns (images, clichés, abstractions) by which the Orient is represented. A literary text speaks more or less directly of a living reality. Its force is not that it is Arab, or French, or English; its force is in the power and vitality of words that, to mix in Flaubert's metaphor from La Tentation de Saint Antoine, tip the idols out of the Orientalists' arms and make them drop those great paralytic children – which are their ideas of the Orient – that attempt to pass for the Orient.

(ibid.: 291)

Foreign culture studies in Algerian universities without an appropriate place in the curriculum to literature is running the risk of the perpetuation of Occidentalism and its elevation to the position Orientalism enjoyed in Europe for long decades.

Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, immediate experience may not be the best way to know the *other*, especially if this experience has been unsatisfactory. Literary texts may well provide the best conditions for such an encounter, the pleasure to enjoy it being one of these conditions⁴. Knowledge about a culture through an individual

⁴ This idea is also claimed by such scholars as F.S.C. Northrop who rejects the ‘illusion’ that immediate experience provides appropriate knowledge, as he states that: “*the study of Chinese literature would be preferable to paying a visit to China in order to know it.*” (Quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 193)

experience, the writer's, is certainly particular, yet it is, as expressed by Abdallah-Pretceille and Porcher (1996: 142), a *peculiar-universal*, based on a verifiable reality. As such, literature can play a major role in the experience of *otherness* (Beacco 2000: 154), mainly in dealing with false representations.

Studies (Sherif 1971; Tapia 1973; Klineberg 1982, Byram 1989), conducted on intercultural experiences of ethnic groups that coexist within the same society, have shown that direct physical contact is not enough to eradicate false representations, prejudices and stereotypes, which often are the basis for all sorts of negative attitudes and behaviours such as racism and discrimination. Sherif (1971: 157) regretfully stated that: "*The naïve assertion that mere contiguity in an agreeable context is enough to promote harmony has sadly been refuted.*"⁵ Intercultural relations have usually required the interference of mediating institutions, what Tapia (1973) names *regulating institutions*, such as the school. In cross-cultural contacts, i.e. between communities that do not share the same closed geographical space, literature and art, along with other university subjects, can play this role of regulation that cannot be achieved with "*the sole spontaneity and good will of participants*" (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 184)⁶ in cross-cultural exchanges. Relying on the work carried out in cross-cultural psychology, Byram (1989: 103) firmly admitted that the mere exposition of individuals, and foreign language and culture learners, to the target culture without this cognitive support would "*not necessarily lead to desired educational*

⁵ (MOT). Sherif (1971) observed, in his study, that contact is not enough to modify negative attitudes and stereotypes. He rather suggested that only *common cooperative tasks* between members of different ethnic groups can help alter negative representations. Ladmiraal and Lipiansky (1989), however, claimed that the achievement of this objective depends also on the type of activity chosen. Cooperation, according to the authors, may not be sufficient as friendship and hostility between ethnic groups are *group processes* that cannot be reduced to mere variations in interpersonal relations that cooperation between individuals would change radically.

⁶ (MOT)

outcomes and indeed may be quite counter-productive.”⁷

Non-fiction documents, such as newspaper articles, do also have a great importance in informing about culture. Their purpose being far from achieving this informative objective, a society’s newspapers, legal and political documents shed light on the culture (or cultures) of those who produce them, often free from the magnifying and embellishing manners that may carry false information, something which books that are exclusively directed towards the description of a given culture may have.

2. Any modifications or alterations in a culture are and can be undertaken through the change of the viewpoint, i.e. the change of representations. The fact that ideologies, as shown in the preceding chapters with Orientalism and Occidentalism, do influence the construction of representations, stereotypes and prejudices through discourse, other types of discourse may also counteract these ideological discourses by allowing students to be aware of the existence of other viewpoints which necessarily suggest different approaches to the *other*, and different interpretations of his discourse and behaviour. While ideological discourse tends to narrow down students’ scope and vision of the *other*, university education, especially in foreign language degrees, is to widen them.

The viewpoint through which members of an ethnic group perceives members of another group is also the same through which they view

⁷ In their recommendations concerning intercultural education in Europe, the committee of ministers of member states clearly stated the following:

“The promotion of exchanges of all kinds goes through a better knowledge of peoples’ cultures and modes of life and, if need be, of their common cultural patrimony.

“The presence in schools in Europe of millions of children belonging to foreign cultural communities is a wealth and a long-term important asset on condition that educative policies that encourage open-mindedness and understanding of mutual differences be promoted” (Jones & Kimberley 1989)

themselves, i.e. their self-representation. Representation and the ideological arsenal that affects it determine not only the view of the other but conception of identity as well. Contrary to Piaget's theory of personality which established three successive stages of development (autism, egocentrism, and social consciousness) (Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 37), meaning that self-identity grows separately and prior to the awareness of otherness, intercultural experiences show that otherness is part and parcel of self-identity. As Wallon (1959: 284) put it: "*Socius or the other is a perpetual partner of the self in the psychic life*"⁸. This entails that representation of the *other* is inextricably linked to self-representation, and thus an individual views himself and the *other* through the same viewpoint.

One of the main implications of such an idea is that any work on representations of the *other*, and the negative attitudes they induce, is to take into account self-representations, i.e. the group's conception of its existence as a group sharing common values and fate which distinguish them from others. Otherness and identity are then part of the same mechanisms, *osmotic mechanisms* (Tomé 1972), which are operated in intercultural relationships and which are based on the very definitions, according to each particular ethnic group, of the self and the *other*. Hunfeld pertinently pointed at this writing that one "*cannot teach an understanding of the foreign as long as the familiar has not become foreign to us in many respects*" (quoted in Kramsch 2001: 234)

Many studies on immigration (Rist 1978; Sayad 1978) and the way foreigners are viewed have shown that discourse on the *other* has actually constantly been discourse on the self. In his analysis of how the Swiss perceived the peoples of the 'Third World', Sayad concluded that:

⁸ (MOT)

*While every society thinks it deals with the others and their problems, ... while it pretends 'going out' of itself, it actually poses its own problems. Thus its discourse on the cultural personality of immigrants reveals its own tendencies.*⁹

(Sayad 1978: 2)

The integration of self-representation in a study that purposes to find remedies to the spreading of false representations of the *other*, as the only basis to approach otherness, especially in academic contexts, in replacement of real scientific methods and sources as shown in the preceding chapters, entails the reconsideration of the status and definition of culture itself, and of the difference between cultures. This difference is to be re-evaluated as a social one, and not as an ontological one. Cultural differences being thus not ontological, this entails that there can exist no cultural norms which could be universal and superior, nor can it be admitted that admitting cultural change is a denial of the past, but it is rather recognising the natural evolution of human variables, such as culture or identity, which are in constant mutation. Culture and identity, along with the relation to the *other*, are constructions which “*are always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation*” (Said 1995: 332)

Cultures often tend to elevate themselves to what Fairclough (2001) refers to as *common sense*, a state where legitimacy is attributed to traits and facts by the “*misrecognition of [their] arbitrariness*” (Bourdieu 1984). By obliterating the arbitrariness of certain cultural facts and traits, they are *naturalised* (Fairclough 2001: 76), i.e. given the status of natural attributes, and consequently the culture is erected as the norm, against which all other cultures are ‘ab-norm-al’. This puts any questioning of these facts and traits in the position of a heretic discourse which goes against the natural course of things.

⁹ (MOT)

When differences that define otherness and identity are naturalised, these latter are represented not only as fixed but also as distinct and delimited. Otherness and identity are actually intertwined inasmuch as what is considered in a certain context as the *other* may be part of the self, i.e. sharing the same identity. Depending on the criteria used to define otherness and identity (ethnic, religious, national), an Algerian himself can be represented as the *other*, while a French can be represented as somebody who possesses an Algerian identity. On the basis of religious criteria, an Algerian Christian is represented as the *other*, while a French Muslim of Algerian origin is represented as Algerian. The case of French footballer (of Algerian origin), Zinedine Zidane¹⁰, is a vivid illustration of this point. The frenzy that this sportsman induced among millions of Algerians, who showed great support for him, and for the whole French football team in the 2006 FIFA World Cup, and all along this player's long career, poses real questions as to the meaning of otherness and identity. Although Zidane has always claimed his Frenchness, this has never deterred Algerians from considering him as Algerian, and consequently, show him the same love, admiration, fervour and idolatry they would show to any successful Algerian athlete, such as footballer Rabah Madjer¹¹, or middle-distance runners Noureddine Morcelli¹² and Hassiba Boulemerka¹³. The representation of

¹⁰ Zinedine Zidane, popularly nicknamed as Zizou, has just put an end to his brilliant career as a mid-fielder in the French national football team and the Spanish club Real Madrid. Of an Algerian Kabyle origin, Zidane was born and grew in the city of Marseille, and moved to play for the first league club AS Cannes. His international career and fame were boosted by his brilliant performance in the 1998 FIFA World Cup, won, for the first time, by France. He closed his outstanding career after French loss at the final game of the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zidane).

¹¹ Rabah Madjer is a former Algerian footballer who played as striker for the Algerian national team in the 1980's and early 1990's, and for the Portuguese club FC Porto for three years between the years 1986 and 1991. He became known thanks to his famous goal in Algeria's 2-1 win over former West Germany in the 1982 FIFA World Cup. After retiring, he began a career as a football manager (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabah_Madjer).

¹² Noureddine Morcelli is a former Algerian athlete who specialised in the 1500 m. middle-distance. His best performances were his first ever Algerian gold medal in the Seville World Athletics Championships in 1991 and his title at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta (USA) in 1996. He also broke several world records in different middle distances following Moroccan Said Aouita (fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noureddine_Morcelli).

Zidane as an Algerian, i.e. as somebody who shares the same identity as the Algerians, and thus not considered as the *other*, is held by people who are most careful about national identity, most concerned by establishing categories and distinguishing individuals on the basis of nationalistic grounds, such as politicians. The Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika himself expressed it, in a letter to the sportsman, as he clearly stated that Zidane was “*not only an Algerian, but also the best player in the world*” (“Le message du Président à Zidane”, *El-Watan*, July 12, 2006).

Otherness and identity cannot be circumscribed within inherently definable characteristics, and a real step towards a serious reconsideration of self-representations and representations of the *other* would certainly require a process about which Byram commented:

Otherness within our national geographical boundaries on the other hand requires a re-definition of national identity which can be painful and may therefore be ignored for as long as possible.
(Byram 1989: 26)

Claiming universality has never been a proper characteristic of a particular culture. History shows that all societies have assumed at some time or another superiority of their values and correctness of their representations, and consequently the right to impose them on the rest of the world. Religions, most particularly, like most ideologies, are grounded on this idea of universality, especially when they are politicised. Universality is often based on two contradictory postulates:

1. that a given culture contains exceptional and superior values that

¹³ Hassiba Boulmerka, the first Algerian to win an Olympic gold medal, is a former middle-distance runner. She won her Olympic title at the 1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona in the 1,500 m. After the end of her brilliant career, she was elected to the athlete's commission of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassiba_Boulmerka).

should be extended to other cultures for their own benefit;

2. that this superior culture is considered as a systematic and pure set.

The second postulate results from an approach to cultures called, in culture studies, cultural relativism. Cultural relativism considers cultures as closed and coherent systems, free from outside influences, thus discarding all natural processes of acculturation or interculturalisation. By so doing, cultural relativism, or culturalism, “*confines itself in a fixist, rigid and mosaic conception of cultures where systems grow in parallel without any inter-penetration or inter-comprehension*” (Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 89)¹⁴. It is a quite paradoxical development of cultural relativism as this scientific approach to cultures first developed in opposition to the ethnocentric evolutionist approach of the second half of nineteenth century anthropology, which rather established certain cultures as norms and evaluated the other cultures according to these norms, thus instituting a cultural hierarchy.

At its inception, cultural relativism claimed a positivist and pluralistic view of cultures that called for decentring and the relativisation of the norm in culture studies (see Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 90), while cultural evolutionism argued that all cultures follow the same linear evolution of which Western civilisation is the most refined and accomplished stage. In this sense, the anthropologist E.B. Tylor argued that all societies go through three main cultural degrees: the ‘wild’ state, the ‘barbaric’ state, and the state of ‘civilisation’ (Cazeneuve 1990: 944). Cazeneuve comments that, through this classification, Tylor identifies ‘civilisation’, and European civilisation most particularly, with the highest degree of culture¹⁵.

¹⁴ (MOT)

¹⁵ The Spanish philosopher, Jose Ortega Y Gasset, suggests the same equation and upholds that “*civilisation is nothing but the effort to reduce coercion to be but the last resort*” (quoted in Johnson 1972: 19). Opposing Tylor’s view, O. Spengler subscribes to a different view. He rather equates ‘civilisation’ to decadent culture. Marcuse (1970: 110)

By questioning the cultural relativist approach, it is the intention of this work to claim a comeback to cultural evolutionism. It is rather, first, an observation, or a praxis based on the reality of foreign language teaching, of the course the approach to cultures in Algeria is taking, at the expense of foreign language studies. Second, it is a rejection of the yoke ideologies, whatsoever, tend to exercise on intercultural relations, mainly in the context of university studies. In Algeria, and most Arab-Islamic countries, cultural relativism has met a quite successful response. This has mostly been the case with anti-foreign ideologies such as Islamism and Occidentalism for which this theory offered the scientific argument for their claims. On grounds of culturalism, they advocate the purity of 'Arab-Islamic' culture, which is, according to these ideologies, not only self-sufficient but should be protected from outside influences, the so-called *cultural invasion* (الغزو الثقافي). A lot of customs and traditions, whatever their negative impact on some categories of the society, are kept, and even *sacralised*, in the name of cultural relativism. Such customs as excision, forced marriage, disinheritance of women are thus tolerated in the name of respect for traditional culture. Such examples are, of course, by no means peculiar to 'Oriental' cultures. Numerous voices are heard all around Europe denouncing the cruel treatment of animals in bullfighting, still kept as an ancestral tradition.

Such a protective and exclusive approach to cultures, in foreign language and culture studies, is probably an obstacle to learning and to developing, at least, a neutral and objective attitude which would allow positive and fruitful cross-cultural experiences. There is a need to *dis-ideologise* foreign language and culture studies in order to cease to view individuals only through the spectacles of the dichotomy *self/other*. Ideologies certainly

commented on Spengler's thesis writing: "O. Spengler does not conceive of the relationship between civilisation and culture as a simultaneity, but as a necessary organic succession; civilisation is the inescapable and the end of any culture." (MOT)

require having and sustaining it since power, and precisely political power, as Apfelbaum put it:

*... works as the active principle of the differentiation process Power cannot be exercised unless there is effectively two distinct groups, unless there is distinction between 'we' and 'them'. Distinguish to better spot a group of individuals and assign them a separate, distinct place constitutes the fundamental procedures of power. Branding is the first instrument.*¹⁶

(Quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 64)

Accentuation of difference is the 'fast track' to isolating the group and neutralising influence. As Europe did it with the 'Orient', through Orientalism, by representing it as exotic, primitive, only worthy of aesthetic appreciation and museum exhibition (Rist 1978: 394), Occidentalism tends to represent the 'West', the *other*, only as depraved, materialistic and exploitative. Probably teaching about similarities between peoples, as much as singling out differences, is likely to balance the approach and re-establish truth about who 'we' are and who 'they' are. In this sense, constant reference to native culture in foreign culture classes, thus establishing a systematic to-and-fro approach between the native culture and the foreign one, is likely to put, explicitly, what the two share and what they do not, and the extent to which what is held as the norm is but a special way, 'ours' or 'theirs' to manage daily life situations. Analogy and contrast between native and foreign cultures, joined together, would then form a process of *euphemisation* (Bourdieu 2001: 124) that can attenuate the cultural shock¹⁷.

Emphasising similarity does not mean hiding what cultures and peoples of the world do not share. Yet, instead of talking of difference, it is rather of

¹⁶ (MOT)

¹⁷ The *euphemisation* process in cross-cultural experiences is similar to what happens in verbal exchanges. Bourdieu (2001: 124, fn23) observed that all sorts of kidding, smiling, and gestures that accompany asking embarrassing questions is part of this euphemising effect that aims at making the questions less shocking and more acceptable.

diversity that scientific discourse speaks. Focusing on difference purposes identifying people for the sake of categorisation, exclusion, and stigmatisation of the *other*. It establishes virtual frontiers of isolation based on subjective criteria. Larger groups, such as the 'Arab world', are constructed mainly on the grounds of, for instance, a common catastrophic fate, something which makes it, essentially, a group of exclusion, i.e. against all those who are held responsible for this lot. However, acknowledging diversity is admitting the possibility of cooperation and peaceful coexistence that may cross not only geographical frontiers, but also symbolic ones, such as religion and culture.

It is not assumed here that an objective scientific approach to native and foreign culture is completely free of representations, even false representations. Behind any discourse, there is a human being who has grown within a system of representations that he can by no means totally clear himself of, whatever his expertise and professionalism are. Yet what differs is that scientific discourse elaborates new representations, of the self and the *other*, which are far more pertinent, refined, closer to reality, and more importantly, based on the postulate that they 'might be' inaccurate and are necessarily temporary. Scientific discourse, instead of claiming to discard representations from identity and otherness, something impossible to happen, rather acknowledges their arbitrariness, provisional nature and necessity to be constantly reformulated. It then reintegrates them to the historical process by rejecting what would be equated to an end-of-history thesis where all symbolic interpretations are permanent and unrelated to historical mutations.

Scientific discourse, by pointing at the share of ideology in the making of representations, and not by denying its participation, admits, contrary to what is assumed by ideological discourse, that otherness is an integral part

of identity inasmuch as the latter is actually made up of two permanently contradictory processes:

- self-identification or assimilation, which allows the individual to feel he belongs to a group;
- *identisation* (Tap 1980), “by which an individual distances himself from the other and considers himself as distinct from him” (Camilleri 1980: 331)¹⁸, i.e. his understanding of otherness.

The work of ideology is often to exaggerate the first process and exclude the second from identity as being completely irreconcilable with the first. To a natural process of acculturation, or interculturalisation, ideology erects a manoeuvre of *counter-acculturation* (Devereux 1972) as a form of resistance which takes various forms such as “*nativism, prophetism, messianism... . These are attempts to go back to the past, effort of re-tribalisation*” (Bastide 1971: 58)¹⁹. Islamism, in Arab-Islamic countries and Nazism, in Europe, are two perfect examples of such ideologies of negation, each in its own way. Devereux (1972: 212) lists three main modalities in counter-acculturation that have the purpose of struggling against what is viewed as the disorganising effects of acculturation:

1. *Defensive isolation*: It is the creation of symbolic barriers which state the sacredness of certain spheres of life, something which discards all possible influence as heresy. Family relations, the place of women, the place of religion are aspects of life which political and religious authorities, in Arab-Islamic countries, attempt to ‘protect’.
2. *Cultural selection*: Adoption of new instruments, such as technological ones, but by emptying them from their original cultural

¹⁸ (MOT)

¹⁹ (MOT)

content. Such is the case of internet. Many religious societies attempt to transform it into a means exclusively destined to proselytising, partly to deter users from taking advantage from its original cultural purpose: have full access to all sorts of information.

3. *Dissociative acculturation*: Creation, by a group, of new cultural items that clearly show their opposition to another group as a way to mark difference. The way of dressing is probably one of the most ostentatious forms of marking distinction. All attempts, through religion for instance, to convince people to adopt a way of dressing instead of another one, this latter being too westernised, draw on this process of resistance.

Students' negative attitudes towards foreign cultures can then be viewed as part of this counter-acculturation based on an over-self-identification coupled with an over-*identisation*, taken as two processes which function one against the other, while they are actually part of the same psychological process of identity. Negative attitudes towards the *other* are symptomatic of a real psychological crisis, at the level of the individual, and of a cultural crisis at the level of the group. When there is a rupture between the two processes of self-identification and *identisation*, this marks a dysfunction in the whole continuum of identity, something which brings the individual to show “*angst, the feeling of guilt, despair, indifference*” (ibidem)²⁰, all of which translate what psychologists label ‘identity crisis’, and which also favours the development of all kinds of “*absurd significations*” and representations in their “*confrontation with otherness*” (Zarate 1986: 24). From an identity which is, in essence, unaccomplished, the individual, who is caught within an identity crisis, has recourse to a *mechanical identity*

²⁰ (MOT)

(ibidem), fixed and rigid, that accentuates ethnicity²¹ and tends to “*reduce all modifications which can jeopardise the integrity of the individual*” (Raveau 1976: 478)²².

Students’ negative attitudes towards foreign cultures are then the expression of an identity crisis, created and sustained by all sorts of ideological discourses, religious and political, that emanate from categories of people who either do not have the right answer to such psychological/cultural problems, or for whom such a situation represents the best favourable conditions to keep the political status quo. As Maestri rightly expressed it: “*certain features of a group’s cultural identity become either dominant, or recessive for the good of the cause*” (quoted in Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 55)²³. Recourse to the mechanical identity may be justified in times of real threats, as the case may be in a situation of colonisation, where the native part of identity is deeply menaced, but this becomes unjustified when such threats are no more than ‘Don Quixote’s windmills’ against which students are called ‘to tilt’.

Identity, being both an individual construction as much as a collective one, is sometimes regulated as strategies of defence, survival, manipulation, or domination. These strategies make call for the accentuation of a given component of identity: language, religion, territory, ethnic origin. With all these criteria involved, it becomes quite difficult for students, young and inexperienced individuals, to seize the real identity and the opinions and behaviours it implies, especially when indulging into a

²¹ Ethnicity is defined as a mode of action and representation that brings individuals to take decisions on the basis of their symbolic depiction of themselves as holders of a distinct identity. In this sense, A.P. Cohen (2000) defines it as the “*politicization of culture*”. McKay (1982) concurs to this view claiming that ethnicity is irrational inasmuch as it consists in deep-seated attachments to kin, territory or religion. Okamura (1981), sharing this idea, considers ethnicity as an ideology or “*false consciousness*” which is manipulated for sheer political and economic goals (Galkina 2000)

²² (MOT)

²³ (MOT)

cross-cultural experience such as a foreign language and culture class.

In the absence of real threats to identity, all strategies to preserve it become counter-productive, like hard treatment for an illusory disease. To take refuge in a mechanical identity, in a *racialised* culture, full of stereotypes, and false self-representations and false representations of the *other*, is to submit to an identity that reduces full individuals into mere representatives of a religion, a political movement, or an ideology, an identity referred to by Gorm as a *confusionist identity* (see Tap 1980). While this identity may be useful for a coloniser who purposes to segregate and dominate the colonised, it is certainly restrictive, penalising, and unfruitful for the group which is desperately in need of all opportunities to interact with others for its own benefits.

By being subdued to such an official identity, students are trapped into a cultural cocoon that does not really correspond to their idiosyncratic expression of individual identity, one that does not answer ideological needs, but rather existential and human ones. Within a context of interculturalisation, where they have access to all sorts of cultural expressions that have roots in all kinds of societies regardless of religion or nationality, as this can clearly be seen when they are given opportunities to express themselves whether through writing, music, or performing²⁴, students

²⁴ it is quite extraordinary to note that in cultural events, such as end-of-year parties, in which students participate by singing, reading their poetry, or performing plays, it is often almost impossible to claim *the* culture or *the* identity these students belong to as they seem to bear so many different ones, with so many influences. In the 2006 party, held at the Faculty of Letters, Languages and Arts (University of Oran), students sang in Berber, 'Algerian', Classical Arabic, French, English and Spanish. This variety is a mere linguistic one; it is actually extremely permeated with some cultural substratum that is quite far from the exclusive one claimed by official discourse. They performed plays from the English repertoire, Algerian one, and others which were written and produced by them, performed both in French and 'Algerian'. They excelled at the most traditional Algerian music genre called *Karkabou* (percussion and drum rhythmic set) as well as the very American genres like *rhythm and blues*. Theatre performance, of such intercultural richness, does not remain at the amateur level. Some of the students in this party have even established a professional company such as *Shems* or *Lagoual*.

regularly raise questions, even if they do not do it explicitly or willingly, about the gap that subsists between ideological discourse, officially claimed identity and real identity.

Referring to a virtual identity and culture, ideologically loaded and inconsistent with some of their behaviours and likings, denotes a lack of opportunities for Algerian students to express their real self, the negation of their right to hold the *skeptron*, or the right to speak, even in the place which is supposed to be the most democratic one: university. University is probably one of those 'instruments' that undergo intensive cultural selection inasmuch as while one of its main purposes is to allow the change of the individual's vision of the world, this very purpose is viewed by ideologues as a threat, as a cognitive subversion which is not less dangerous than political subversion. By preventing all sorts of discourses to find a safe haven in universities, it is denaturalising them and transforming them into mere production companies that are expected to produce 'uncultured human robots' who are only capable of performing very animal and vegetative activities.

At university, and in foreign language and culture classes, Algerian students engage in a tedious exercise that takes extreme psychological effort: the fight between cultural *habitus* and *hexis* on the one hand, as fashioned by mainstream culture and ideological discourse, and the individual idiosyncratic experience of each student, as enriched by the various intercultural interactions, through the media, reading, encounters, and for the luckiest among them, travelling. This is a case of symbolic violence where individuals find themselves forced to struggle unwillingly, and even unconsciously, against a dominant cultural and ideological dictation of 'a way of being', which is in total contradiction to what daily reality offers. This is all the more accentuated for young individuals, such as

second year students of English, who, with the difficulties posed by an introduction to a foreign language and foreign cultures in which they do not have substantial competence, they have to deal with such serious and hard subjects as identity and otherness.

The pedagogical situation of a foreign culture class becomes the stage for collective symbolic power confronting the individual's, the student, strive to exist and choose. Within this context, foreign language and culture classes become at times moments of suffering for students who react in a number of different ways:

- Swimming against the tide by taking full advantage of what is offered to them in terms of knowledge and experience;
- resisting against foreign cultures, viewed as a threat against self-identification;
- turning away from the class itself, felt as boring, tedious or hard.

In all of these cases, students find themselves in a situation where the problems and questions raised go far beyond simple didactic issues, since what is often called upon is their profound feelings about their own existence both as human beings and citizens in a specific nation called Algeria, and their relations with those who do not belong to this nation, as Bourdieu put it:

*This is what the interactionist description ignores, when treating interaction as an empire within an empire, omitting the fact that what occurs between two individuals ... in a colonial situation ... or even a post-colonial situation... owes its peculiar form to the objective relationship between languages or their corresponding uses, i.e. to the relationship between the groups that speak these languages.*²⁵

(Bourdieu 2001: 101)

²⁵ (MOT)

4.3. Otherness and Language

Identity and otherness, and their relationship to foreign language and culture teaching and learning, seem then to be closely related to the place languages hold in a particular society, and the ties members of this society develop with what they consider as the official and national language. The expression ‘linguistic phenomena are essentially social phenomena’, already used in Chapter Three, takes, therefore, its full sense as it can clearly be observed that linguistic phenomena, most particularly in countries such as Algeria, are really political, ideological and pedagogical phenomena. The position, the status and the affective consideration people attribute to a language determines not only general language management and planning in a country, but also each individual’s approach to the other languages, and their corresponding cultures, which he is in contact with, whether in a pedagogical setting, professional or a mundane one.

These ties with languages, within a context of intensive ideological agitation, are closely related to the whole power relations in society, in which languages are by no means mere objects of “*intellection*” but rather instruments of “*action and power*” (ibid.: 59). Classical Arabic, in Algeria, not as the extraordinary language which has been, for centuries, the vehicle of an outstanding intellectual production, but as the instrumentalised means of power, has much to do with students’ conception of identity and otherness.

Probably, one of the means to bring back this language to its natural position, as a cultural heritage, and thus allow students to make unobstructed steps towards foreign languages and the cultures they carry, is to release them from the suffocating linguistic straitjacket of classical Arabic as an ideological-cultural stake to be transformed into a language that serves practical life purposes as well as mark cultural belonging. As an

ideological-cultural instrument of power, classical Arabic is completely managed by two nihilist orientations:

- Reasons of State and official religion that actually serve mere sectional political purposes;
- Occidentalist-Islamist ideology that uses language as a means of persuasion.

It is not meant here that a language can be totally free from ideological considerations. The relations between ideology and linguistic questions are a reality in every country throughout the world. Yet, what is suggested here is the fact that language becomes an exclusively *ideologised* issue when, instead of serving social and existential interests, it is devoted to the realisation of sectional ones, in which case it does not answer social needs but rather a category's ones.

The power classical Arabic enjoys in Algeria, and in all Arab-Islamic countries, is not peculiar to this language. Any language, with its infinite capacity to generate performative discourse and illocutionary force, and consequently produce great effects on the collective representation, is a potential "*support by excellence of the dream of absolute power*" (ibid.: 66)²⁶. Yet, what is peculiar with classical Arabic is that it possesses those felicity conditions, including its sacred character as the language of the Koran, which make it an important lever of power. With its status of official and national language, it is the first language of school education. This makes it the main vehicle of the society's values and representations through which its young generations are socialised.

The example provided by the first year textbook of primary school

²⁶ (MOT)

(Bouchina & Oussif 2004) is a vivid illustration of this. The following extracts from the book show how language is used to instil in children what the dominant ideology considers as the important values and representations of the roles of men and women they should acquire:

- A schoolboy talking about his parents:

“أبي موظف قديم في الإدارة و أمي ربة بيت” (My father is a senior civil servant in the administration and my mother is a housewife).

Here the man works while his wife stays at home.

- A schoolboy talking about his mother: “وهي خياطة ماهرة” (and she is a good dressmaker).

The activities attributed to women are the traditional ones, such as dressmaking or cooking.

- “جاء أبي و أخرج سيارته” (My father came and took his car out).

It is the man who owns and drives the car.

- Talking about a man inviting his neighbour for lunch:

“دعا مصطفى جاره عمر إلى تناول الغذاء... عادا فوجدا الأكل حاضرا” (Mustafa invited his neighbour Omar for lunch... . When they arrived home they found the meal ready).

The woman, who is completely absent from the scene, is the one who prepares the meal. The man is not supposed to help.

- “قالت لي أمي هاك القفة يا مصطفى وأذهب إلى السوق” (My mother told me: “Take the basket and go to the market”).

Again, the woman stays at home as she sends her son to do the shopping.

- Describing a boy and his sister going back home from school: "خرج مصطفى من المدرسة ... وها هي أخته ليلى تسير وراءه" (Mustafa left school... and here is his sister Leila walking behind him).

This is quite extraordinary as, even at an early age, the woman is supposed to walk behind the man.

- A girl talking about what she does at home: "أساعد أمي في أعمال البيت" (I help my mother at doing the housework).

Following the steps of her mother, the daughter is the one who is supposed to help for the housework.

What contributes to the deepening of the gap between what the official ideology professes and the reality of the Algerian society is the fact that these values and representations, listed above, do not correspond to facts. While this may have been true during a given period of history in Algeria, the Algerian society has witnessed, for decades now, changes that have completely revolutionised the roles of men and women, and their styles of life. Women who work, drive and fully take part in social activities are no longer freaks.

Classical Arabic probably remains one of the last weapons dominant ideology has at hand to resist the wave of globalisation, at the cultural level more than the economic one. As Fairclough rightly advanced:

Questions of language and power are fundamental to understanding the new order and to the politics of the new order, because language is becoming increasingly important in social life. Struggles to impose or resist the new order are partly struggles over language, both over new ways of using language, and over linguistic representations of change.

(Fairclough 2001: 203-204)

Cultural, and most particularly linguistic, globalisation is one of the ways to

the globalisation of a particular vision of the world, including the view of the right place an individual should have in society, i.e. the conception of democracy. Cultural globalisation is then a discourse that may threaten the interests of those who do not find in it favourable circumstances, felicity conditions, for the maintenance of the status quo. Dominant ideology in Algeria has understood this all too well as this is illustrated by the launching of three supposedly different national channels (*Canal Algérie*, *A3*, *ENTV*), in Arabic and French, but which actually contain very little difference in terms of programmes and no autonomy at all. Despite the fact that they broadcast in two different languages, they do share the same official discourse whose main purpose is to guarantee the preservation of dominant ideology values and the protection against *representations of change*.

National television channels as well as the official and national language are of course part of those institutions that aim at the preservation of the society's most cherished values. Yet, these values are also supposed to be shared by the majority of the society, established for the exclusive benefits of all its members. At the very moment they start to be manipulated, they lose their authenticity to become mere instruments of power.

Classical Arabic, with its claimed intrinsic virtues that do not reflect the real linguistic market in Algeria, is one of these instruments that continue to determine students' readiness to learn foreign languages inseparably from their cultural content. There is then an urgent need for foreign language and culture teachers to integrate these students' representations of this language in the design of their courses and their delivery. Teaching and learning would probably be far more effective if students are not taken as blank pages that come to the classroom with full readiness to be filled in. then devoting time to treatment of their representations, even at the expense of the completion of the whole syllabus, may be more productive

than being solely concerned with finishing the whole programme.

4.4. Facing Ideology

Treating these representations goes through digging up their origins. One of the main sociological principles is that phenomena can not be fully understood unless their social origins are deeply revealed (Boudon 1991: 66). For, in the case of students' self-representations and their representations of the *other*, it is mostly their growing up in ready-made situations that is more determinant than their individual experiences of life. Bourdieu (2001: 198) admits that the best way to neutralise a system is to fully know its social mechanisms of symbolic domination which tend to rationalise it. In this sense, these representations are fundamentally historical, and consequently teaching foreign languages and cultures is to be carried out by teachers who are profoundly aware of the historical/social context in which they perform their job. The intellectuals and teachers' role is to reject fatalism and defeatism by bearing in mind that:

... the social world is mostly made by agents at every single moment; but they [intellectuals] can only un-make or re-make it on the basis of a realistic knowledge of what this world is and of what they can do about it from their own position.²⁷

(ibid.: 311)

A realistic knowledge of the Algerian social environment is a deep awareness of the origins and ramifications of representations within their market of production (politics and religion) and of consumption (people in general, and students in particular).

²⁷ (MOT)

4.5. Islamist Discourse

It is to be admitted that this context is the setting for a substantial ideological discourse partly permeated by Islamist ideas. Ignoring this fact in foreign language and culture teaching is showing naivety or hypocrisy that does not help effective learning. Islamist discourse about the *other* does stop at the university campus. It does then accompany the student inside the classroom and stands as one of the filters of the scientific discourse about the *other* in foreign culture classes. The pernicious character of Islamist discourse lies in the fact that it draws heavily on what many Algerians consider as the most sacred. As Nietzsche (1990: 77) expressed it: “*The priest calls God his own will*”²⁸. Islamist discourse, by monopolising morality, thus notions such as God and Truth, inasmuch as dominant ideology monopolises notions like People, Nation, Revolution, succeeds in developing a sense of guilt in individuals who do not conform to it in their relation to the *other* who does not share the same religious beliefs.

The degree of success of this discourse relies mainly on the degree of knowledge students have of their own religion, culture and history. The less knowledge they have, the more effectiveness Islamist discourse attains. As observed in Chapter Two, Islamist discourse takes advantage of the effects of perspective, i.e. students’ position in society and their age, which do not allow them to have enough maturity and life experience to possess the necessary scope for detecting contradictions in the discourse. Despite the fact that Islamist discourse about the *other* is falsified, students are not able to perceive it as they are not aware of the ins and outs of this relation to the *other*.

Islamist discourse has also innovated as compared to traditional religious

²⁸ (MOT)

discourse. While the latter was reactionary in the sense that it was conservative, the former took the form of a *liberation theology* by combining discourse on God and political practice and activism. People and students see it as an alternative to dominant political/ideological discourse and regimes that took hold of Arab-Islamic countries since independence. What the liberation theology proposed as a thesis to explain the state of social and economic decadence is that the corrupt political regimes in Arab-Islamic countries have confiscated the freedom and wealth of their peoples, and that the only solution for these peoples to regain their wealth and liberate themselves is to re-establish the Islamic republic, a regime based on Islamic theology and law, al-sharea.

The liberation theology, an ideology that is of course not peculiar to Islam as it is also present in other religions such as Christianity (see Metz 1971; Segundo 1982; Löwy 1998; Capdevila 2004), has taken religion out of mosques to intrude it into spaces, such as university, where it can be far more effective as discourse and political action. Just as the liberation theology in Christianity has been the result of the failure of the church to meet desired response (Capdevila 2004: 124), it has also been in Islam a means to allow religious discourse to permeate all aspects of people's lives as the mosque failed to do it. By associating theology to liberty, it attempts to bring religion to all places where the question of liberty is posed, i.e. everywhere.

The first technique the liberation theology makes use of in order to be effective is to establish the postulate that religion cannot be a mere private matter; it is a societal concern that should determine all decisions about the management of society. By transferring a private issue into the public sphere, the liberation theology undertakes the *theologisation* (ibid.: 130) of life in general, politics and education in particular. Moreover, religion, being

in the hands of a religious and political oligarchy that aims at achieving a whole social project, is itself politicised and *ideologised* (ibid.: 130). The emphasis put on the idea that Prophet Mohammed had various statuses at the same time, that of a sacred being and human being, religious leader as well as a political one, counsellor in private and public matters, purposes to sustain the fact that religion, private life and public life are inseparable.

By integrating all social spaces, foreign language students are persuaded that religion does also have a place in language and culture studies, especially when they involve the study of languages and cultures that are viewed as being attributed to non-Muslims. Religion thus becomes a legitimate, reliable and unquestioned source of knowledge on the basis of which opinions, attitudes and behaviours are selected, without any distinction between belief, myth, and science.

The problem of such a transfer is that, while any other source may be subjected to doubt without any sense of guilt, religion holds a privileged place and is exempted from such doubt, mainly through the 'Sword of Damocles' represented by heresy (بدعة). It is to know that heresy in Islam plays a major role in the psychological heritage of Muslims for whom it is equivalent to apostasy. The Prophet's famous hadith, which is repeatedly taken as an argument against questioning, tells the following: "كل محدثة بدعة و كل بدعة ضلالة و كل ضلالة صاحبها في النار" (every 'modern' innovation is a heresy, every heresy is a fault, and everyone who makes fault goes to hell). By instrumentalising religion and the lever of heresy, considered as a negation of 'truth' (the ideological truth) and tradition, dominant ideology discards all forms of oppositional discourse as perverse and deviant, thus equating between a religious concept (heresy) and a political one (opposition). This is the most efficient weapon against democracy where heresy is not valid since it is a system which acknowledges plurality of

opinions and questioning.

Instrumentalisation of religion operates also in the very selective use of verses from the Koran and the Prophet's discourse. While the above hadith condemns innovation as a heresy, many exegetes claim, on the basis of the same Prophet's discourse, that Islam acknowledges the notion of good innovation with the concept of "بدعة حسنة". Concerning women's social status, while the Koran often addresses men and women equally, Islamist discourse tends to make specific verses, such as the following, more conspicuous:

"الرجال قوامون على النساء بما فضل الله بعضهم على بعض
وبما أنفقوا من أموالهم فالصالحات قانتات حافظات للغيب بما حفظ الله"

["Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard." (An-Nisāa, S.4, A.34)]

As far as imposing one's religion on others is concerned, while there is a clear verse forbidding it: "لا إكراه في الدين قد تبين الرشد من الغي" ["Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error" (Al-Baqarah, S.2, A.256)], other verses are more emphasised in order to justify compulsion, even when it is violent: "ومن يبتغي غير الإسلام دينا فلن يقبل منه" ["If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah) never will it be accepted" (Āl-Imrān, S.3, A.85)]

There can then be no effective foreign language and culture teaching and learning, which have positive and fruitful intercultural experiences as their

main objectives, without the secularisation of education in particular, and civil life in general. Inasmuch as the separation between religion and politics has had position effects in many countries in the world, it would probably bring about the same results if Algeria operates the same separation between religion and science, religion and pedagogy, religion and otherness.

Secularism in Algeria is not of course to be an imitation of any other in the rest of the world. It is of course admitted here that secularism has had various forms and implementations in different countries, according to the cultural, social, economic and political specificities of each one. It is then imperative to think of an Algerian secularism, one that suits Algerian culture (s) and that *“participates in the quest for social coherence based on a permanent construction and not a stable and definite state.”* (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004b: 107)²⁹

4.6. The Self-mandated Spokesperson vs. the Intellectual

Within this context of confusion between discursive registers, Islamist discourse does not base its credit completely on its confrontation logic, though it fully takes profit from facts that, taken separately, seem to confirm its arguments about the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis between ‘they’ and ‘we’. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and more recently, Israeli attacks on Lebanon are all instances that flow into the logic of Islamist discourse. Yet, what seems to really help this discourse to develop a positive response among the peoples of the Arab-Islamic world, and students in particular, is rather the credit Islamist spokespeople, the self-mandated spokespeople, have been able to accumulate throughout the

²⁹ (MOT)

years, especially with the help of satellite TV channels.

Islamist discourse cannot be questioned if the self-mandated spokesperson's credit is not questioned first. As Bourdieu put it in more general terms:

*... strong ideas owe part of their credit to the credit of the person who, by advocating them, guarantees them and it is not enough to refute them, with a purely logical argumentation, but rather discredit them by discrediting their author.*³⁰

(Bourdieu 2001: 242)

The Islamist spokesperson should not be considered as a mere calculator, who is necessarily aware of the falseness of his discourse and thus purposes manipulation. It is high time now Algerian intellectuals admitted the fact that the Islamist spokesperson can be earnest and a fervent believer in his arguments. He owes his status of spokesperson, and thus his credit among people, to his devotion to the cause. Bourdieu cleverly seized the nature of this kind of sanctimonious people, whether in politics or religion:

*... it by completely cancelling his self for God or the People, that devotion becomes God or people. It is when I become Nothing – and because I am able to forget myself, to sacrifice myself, to devote myself –, that I become the Whole. I am nothing but the spokesman of God and the People...*³¹

(ibid: 269)

The intellectual, and the teacher, cannot develop a discourse capable of confronting the Islamist one unless he becomes himself devout, or more accurately committed, in the practice of his profession, somebody whose discourse about the *other* reflects his own behaviour with the *other*, starting

³⁰ (MOT)

³¹ (MOT)

from the student, the colleague, the institution as a whole. He should reduce his action to the mere enunciation of an opposite discourse, thus at best, creating a sort of new group of followers of whom he would be the spokesperson. He has rather to re-appropriate his group, the students, the people, by standing and facing the self-mandated telling him, to use Bourdieu's (2001: 270) expression: "*No. You are not the group*"³².

4.7. The Need for a New Counter-culture

Newcomb (1942), Hyman (1942) and Doise (1989) speak of the possibility for the individual to have various *groups of reference*, including those whom he does not belong to from a cultural or social point of view, that are the basis for the construction of his opinions and representations. This creates a context for intellectual and cultural competition as each group, through its ideology, attempts to influence a greater number of people, within the group and across others. Islamist discourse, for instance, has integrated this parameter very well. It is plainly observed that Islamist ideologues and Occidentalists, such as those mentioned in Chapter Two, have adopted, for instance, modern, and even 'westernised', ways of dressing so as to reach the minds of those who are not comfortable with traditional or middle-eastern ways.

Within these competitive conditions, foreign language and culture teachers, and intellectuals in general, need to struggle for becoming the students' group of reference that provides positive points of *anchoring* (see Chapter One), mainly as far as the relation to and representation of the *other* are concerned. This is likely to be one of the incentives for inducing more favourable attitudes which would be grounded on true representations

³² (MOT)

and less subjective opinions that can counteract culture, for it has become one in its own right, of suspicion and rejection towards the *other* and self-praising.

Cultures change in contact with others. To bring changes in this culture of conflict, there should be, at least at the academic level, a new counter-culture of curiosity, doubt, questioning and possible cooperation. It can no longer be admitted that the culture of conflict is the inescapable lot of Algerian mainstream culture, and university, and most particularly foreign languages departments, are probably the first institutions which can produce a change in this collective state of mind which has long normalised believing in unfounded ideas, even at places where questioning and arguing are central to learning.

Foreign culture modules are not mere university subjects that may answer immediate needs corresponding to the completion of a qualifying degree necessary to finding a job. They should rather represent those opportunities, whether in Algeria or anywhere all around the world, for the confrontation of contradictory discourses, not for the sake of confusion or brainwashing, but for the mitigation of certainty that is often the shortest way to ignorance and extremism. Foreign culture studies are to have the purpose Capdevila attributed to studying philosophy:

*Reference to philosophy, conceived as non-mythical thinking, evinces clearly that prior to a negative evaluation of the myth is not necessarily possessing truth, but rather the introduction of another kind of thinking, in a different historical context, where relativity of subscription to myth is shown and where myth is revealed as myth. For whom are religious representations illusory? Not for those who believe in them, but those who do not, or no longer, believe in them.*³³

(Capdevila 2004: 219)

³³ (MOT)

4.8. A New Counter-culture Through Intercultural Pedagogy

“*Myth is myth only for those who do not believe in it*” (Godelier 1984: 202)³⁴. The function of foreign cultures is to question what the members of the native culture take for granted. This is undertaken, first, by the fact that foreign cultures, and foreign languages as their instruments, are at times spaces where students are able to operate what might be called *cultural escapism*. It is the fact of finding a psychological leeway that allows liberating oneself from the shackles of self-censorship imposed by the integration of one’s native culture and its restrictive inhibitors, i.e. through enculturation. Experience, especially with literature teachers, shows that many students, who have writing talents, take the opportunity of studying the English language to use this language to express themselves, even when they are better users of the first language they learnt at school, i.e. classical Arabic. Students’ writings seem to be products of a compromise between the internalised cultural/social censorship and their *expressive interest* (Bourdieu 2001: 343). Recourse to foreign languages is then part of what Bourdieu (ibidem) labels *euphemisation strategies* which enable the student to find a common ground between their expressive interest and cultural/social restrictions. Euphemisation strategies are tools of escaping silence, of regaining the *skeptron* without causing scandals.

Classical Arabic and one’s native culture function as invisible and perfect forms of censorship as students accept the imposed restrictions that exclude them from communication. Foreign languages, in this sense, play often the role of weapons of struggling for the right to re-integrate the process of social communication. Foreign cultures, in general, offer students opportunities for not only destroying the shackles of cultural/social censorship but also, and probably more importantly, self-censorship which is

³⁴ (MOT)

nurtured by the internalisation of ethnocentrism, i.e. self-confinement within one's native cultural prisms.

Against the devastating effects of ethnocentrism, the remedy is certainly not the rejection or denial of one's own culture but rather the promotion of the practice of *decentration* which is defined as “*the awareness and ‘deconstruction’ of attitudes and other elements of personality which prevent accepting the other as different*” (Camilleri & Cohen-Emerique 1989: 393)³⁵. *Decentration* is the capacity to step out of one's own culture to have a critical perspective towards it as much as towards the others.

Scholars have suggested different methods for the practice of *decentration* in intercultural experiences. They vary from cultural mimetism, where the individual identifies with the *other*, to empathetic otherness, where he attempts to understand the *other* by putting himself in his place (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 153-158). These methods have proved to be idealistic and inaccessible as learners find almost impossible to put aside their native culture. They have also been, at times, hypocritical by minimising difference (Kramsch 1987).

What may be more feasible is what Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a: 154) calls a *difference ethic*, in which students admit that the *other* exists as different and “*tolerate this existence, even if it is not understood, because it is not understood*”³⁶. This is what might be called an intercultural pedagogy that can leave a space, however small it is, for a possible sensitivity to values produced by other cultures, a pedagogy that functions as a systematic *apprenticeship of difference* (Kramsch 2001: 235). It must be acknowledged that civilisations and cultures differ in the way they view the world and, as the French philosopher, P. Ricoeur (1961: 452), cleverly expressed it: “*being*

³⁵ (MOT)

³⁶ (MOT)

*a Man, it is being capable of transfer into another centre of perspective*³⁷, i.e. capable of *decentration*.

Intercultural pedagogy does not rely exclusively on content, a syllabus, but also on an approach and a method. Foreign culture classes, such as American Civilisation, have long been places for listing facts, even if cultural ones, without a comparative approach that could bring students to see clearly the purpose of what they learn and, consequently, induce the process of questioning their own taken-for-granted values, opinions and representations. Methods, such as analogy and contrast, which confront native and foreign cultures, can help students to effectuate *decentration* by revealing the degree to which false representations and stereotypes are often the only instruments that are used to approach the *other*, instead of objective and realistic tools of analysis. Because representations and stereotypes are not merely cognitive processes and rather psychological mechanisms of interpretation, solutions to alter or correct them cannot be found in the contents of syllabi. As Abadallah-Pretceille (2004: 160) put it: “*Intercultural pedagogy is a pedagogy in action that builds and develops within confrontation, experience and analysis*”³⁸.

Accumulation of information and data about a foreign culture is a vain way to deal with representations and stereotypes. Ignorance is not the cause of false representations and stereotypes. It is their nutrient broth which favours their growth. Studies in the United States, for instance, have shown that institutional policies to struggle against prejudice in schools, through cinema and conferences, as a way to inform people, have not been effective (Bastide 1970). The real cause is rather the various ideologies, religious and political, that construct the false representations and stereotypes through the continuous discursive hype in the media and by

³⁷ (MOT)

³⁸ (MOT)

means of other social institutions like the school and the mosque. Thus, dealing with false self-representations, representations of the *other* and the subsequent stereotypes, in a foreign culture class or elsewhere, starts by showing the contradictions of the ideological discourse. Confronting false representations and stereotypes only through knowledge and reasoning is remaining at the very theoretical level, while ideology, as stated by C. Guillaumin, “*thinks nothing, believes in nothing, it claims itself*” (quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 183)³⁹.

What ideologies rely on, in their influence on students, is affect, i.e. the individuals’ psychological attachment to their own cultural values and their fear, disgust or total rejection of the *other’s*. Many regimes, now, even democratic ones, instrumentalise affective factors to convince the people to accept policies. The case, for instance, of how the American government has succeeded in maintaining the Patriot Act⁴⁰, which is in total contradiction with the most cherished American values of freedom, shows the extent to which affect can bring the individual to change his mind on some of the most tremendously important subjects.

Affect needs to be central to any pedagogy of foreign culture teaching. Taking into account the students’ prior feelings about the subject studied in the lesson preparation stage is essential to anticipating students’ negative reactions. Students’ verbalisation of these feelings becomes part of the

³⁹ (MOT)

⁴⁰ “Subtitled “*Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism*”, It [the Patriot Act] is a law enacted by American Congress in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks [on the World Trade Center] (45 days later) to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world. Very much criticised by some people inside and outside the United States as a threat against civil liberties (for example, without a warrant, the FBI now has the power to access one’s most private school or medical records), it was meant by the Bush administration as the only means to preserve innocent lives from terrorism by: allowing FBI investigators to use the tools that were already available to investigate organised crime and drug trafficking, and allowing law enforcement to use surveillance against more crimes of terror” (Nait Brahim 2005: 121-122).

lesson plan, not to say the most important part. It is in this sense that intercultural pedagogy can be learner-centred, where working in class is focused more on the prejudiced student than on the object of prejudice itself, more on the teaching process than on the teaching material (Zarate 2004: 72). Anticipation of such responses is based on the principle that the human mind is “*an active instrument, an agent of transformation which filters information by comparing it to what it already knows*” (Sherif 1971: 141)⁴¹. This implies that native culture is the filter for foreign cultures as new information and experiences, and as long as old information is not *relativised*, new information is automatically rejected if it contradicts it.

Thus, by bearing in mind students’ affective apprehension of foreign cultures, intercultural pedagogy can transform foreign culture teaching from mere intellectual upbringing into real education which can enable them to view their native culture in its entirety, to *objectivise* it (i.e. make it concrete), to view it as a human *particularism*, and not as a universal one outside of which anything else would be deemed abnormal. This is the realisation of the fact that culture is necessarily subjective, something which leads to reaching relative objectivity, at least in intention. Learning foreign cultures is learning to overcome first-hand difference that may impede going into details. It is constructing and developing a scientific mind that can initiate reflection where affect curbs it. The scientific mind allows breaking, as far as otherness is concerned, bipolarisation which always puts the individual in a simplistic relationship to the *other* as a single entity, while it is actually many, or to use Said’s (1995: 332) words: “*Each age and society re-creates its ‘Others’.*”

If information is to take a place in foreign culture modules, it has first to be about the real functioning of cultures, i.e. foreign culture teaching has to

⁴¹ (MOT)

make use of applied anthropology (including theories drawn on anthropology, ethnography and ethnology) in an intercultural perspective. By showing how culture operates, students can objectivise their own culture and analyse its processes as they would do it for a foreign one. The use of anthropology, not as a mere science of man but rather as an *ethnography of communication* used to know what is needed to “*communicate appropriately and to make sense of communicative situations*” (Saville-Troike 2001: 351), will have the purpose to distinguish between the natural and the cultural, the universal and the particular, and thus learn, for students, to put what their culture and others establish as universal norms between inverted commas. Anthropology in an American Civilisation course would make of this subject, as Porcher put it, “*not a teaching for knowledge, but ... a teaching for communication, i.e. for the learner’s effective use of what he has learned, what he has made his own*” (quoted in Zarate 2004: 6)⁴².

4.9. Critical Discourse Analysis in Culture Studies

The anthropological approach to foreign culture teaching has, above all, the purpose of making students aware of the fact that, when dealing with cultures, there are a complex range of discourses and social knowledge available, that these discourses vary from stereotypes to sociological analyses, that the accuracy of the discourse depends on the degree one relies on the first or the second, that all these discourses are subjected to different political/ideological imperatives and influences.

While for ordinary people relying on first-hand representations and stereotypes in their approach to the *other* may be understood, students need to be conscious of the fact that, at the academic level, they are bound

⁴² (MOT)

to undertake a critical discourse analysis before taking any discourse, religious, cultural, political or scientific, at face value. Critical discourse analysis starts by rejecting postulates, ground-rules on which already-made opinions about the *other* are formed. It is not denying discourse outright; it is rather re-negotiating the terms of the contract of whether to be convinced or not. As defined by Saville-Troike:

Critical discourse analysis is not an objective ‘value-free’ science, but a socially committed activity with an acknowledged political, ideological, and ethical stance. ... In contrast to the Saussurian notion of an arbitrary relation between linguistic signs and meanings ... [and because] linguistic signs are the result of social processes, linguistic features are never arbitrary conjuncts of form and meaning.

(Saville-Troike 2003: 254)

Critical discourse analysis unfolds in three steps:

- Refusing what Giroux (2001) labelled *accommodation*, i.e. “*accepting the preferred meaning, or the subject position*” (Janks & Ivanič 1992: 309).
- Opposing the discourse by being aware of the forces that lead people to accept it. This means that one needs to be aware of the ideological grounds of opinions, representations and stereotypes that form a culture’s view of another, whether his about the foreign or the foreign about his.
- Resisting by thinking differently if proof is made of the inaccuracy of the discourse. This is bringing about a new discourse, one that liberates from the ideological blinders that blur vision, a discourse that can be called an *emancipatory discourse*.

The development of an emancipatory discourse is the individual's refusal of what Althusser (1993) called *interpellation*:

Ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among the individuals, ... or 'transforms' the individuals into subjects ... by that very operation that I called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!'... the hailed individual will turn around. By this mere one hundred and eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he recognised that the hail was 'really' addressed to him, and that 'it was really him who was hailed' and not someone else.

(ibid.: 48)

When one is *interpellated* by ideological discourses and accepts the appellations attributed to people and things, without any critical response, he recognises them and becomes then a subject. He surrenders his *skeptron*, the right to speak, the right to think, and the right to name things differently. Naming, i.e. using language, is an important aspect of fashioning the vision of the world and subsequently behaviour. Emancipatory discourse is about having the right to naming things differently from the way dominant ideologies have done it, and this may probably not be more vital than it is for foreign language and culture students, whose daily concern is about the right words to use to name the right things, whether about their native culture or the foreign ones. Emancipatory discourse, for teachers, is to show clearly how ideological substratum underlies all discourses in order to show the various forms of power or power abuse through language, native or foreign.

It is probably through religious discourse that ideology is the most effective as religion has the greatest power of interpellation, showing patronising, demeaning and exclusive attitudes, where the individual is the subject of God, عبد (slave), and by extension, becomes the subject of God's

self-mandated spokespeople. It is probably in front of such a discourse that individuals and students are disempowered, and it is certainly in this context that emancipatory discourse is mostly needed, allowing students to be, more than self-asserting or self-empowering, and rather be not effaced as human beings first, as intellectuals second, to know precisely when to yield and when to resist.

In foreign language and culture studies, where the main object of study is the text (be it a text of fiction or not), the position from which the student approaches the text is essential in determining his attitude towards it. When he feels interpellated, as a subject, i.e. as a person who does not have the right to have an opinion, to criticise, he acquiesces to any thesis presented in the text as truth. Whereas when he feels in an empowered position, as somebody who can formulate a view, he is able to criticise, to have a choice, i.e. a person who needs to be convinced with sound arguments. Instilling this idea in the student's mind is part of *critical language pedagogy* (Kramsch 2001: 244) that will teach him to have a critical attitude inside and outside the classroom, towards his cultural assumptions or the *other's*, towards religious, political or any other type of discourse. This, of course, behoves the teacher to have a great ability to listen, not only to "*the linguistic form or the propositional content of students' utterances*", but also, and mainly, to their "*silences and to their ... implicit assumptions and beliefs*" (ibid.: 245).

4.10. Towards a 'Third Culture'

Adopting an intercultural pedagogy, on the part of the teacher, and developing an emancipatory discourse through a critical discourse analysis of all available discourses, on the student's, is to enable the latter to be

aware of his potential to make new meanings, especially through the use of the foreign language they learn. This is probably one of the most advantageous outcomes of foreign language learning: the possibility to make thoughts, in the target language, that were not available in the native one, a phenomenon described by Britton et al. as “*shaping at the point of utterance*” (quoted in Kramsch 2001: 105).


Learning a foreign language and experiencing a foreign culture are together opportunities for exercising “*both a social and a personal voice*” (ibid.: 233) that may not be allowed to express itself in the native language and culture. This is what pro-status-quo ideologies fear in foreign cultures, viewed as breakers of social invisible censorship. Breaking censorship may lead to questioning traditional social practices by penetrating, on the one hand, a new speech community that makes available new meanings not present in the one’s speech community.

On the other hand and most importantly, it is also integrating a new discourse community that can provide the discursive means to criticise and form new opinions different from the ones advocated by dominant ideologies. This is possible because a discourse community is formed by a group with “*similar social characteristics and/or academic or professional orientations, as well as a shared set of rhetorical norms and conventions*” (Saville-Troike 2003: 145)⁴³. As such, foreign language and culture learning offers the opportunity to be part of an intellectual, and mostly an ethical group, intellectuals, regardless of ethnic, religious or national considerations. Being part of such a group, because of common concerns, gives birth to a *group crossing* (Ladmiral & Lipiansky 1989) in which

⁴³ On the basis of Mesthrie’s (2000: 323) definition of discourse as “*different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practices*” or “*systems of rules implicated in specific kinds of power relations*”, Saville-Troike (2003: 255) suggests another definition of discourse community as “a group of people who share ways of thinking, believing, behaving, and using language which are embodied in particular social roles...”

individuals belonging to different social categories rediscover each other and overcome false representations and stereotypes, something impossible to happen when ethnic or religious interests are more valued than human ones.

Foreign language and culture learning is a formidable opportunity for group crossing, and it is also for such a reason that foreign cultures are viewed by conservative regimes as carriers of subversive discourse. Where intellectuals see change and evolution, these regimes see subversion as this change is the first threat to the status quo. Contact with foreign cultures necessarily brings alterations in self-representations or representations of the *other*, something which, in its turn, induces change in taken-for-granted opinions about vital institutions such as political ones:



Struggling against objective intercultural experiences is, according to Kramersch, struggling against:

... the opportunity for personal meanings, pleasures and power. From the clash between the familiar meanings of the native culture and the unexpected meanings of the target culture, meanings that were taken for granted are suddenly questioned, challenged, problematized.

(Kramersch 2001: 238)

What then learning a foreign language and experiencing a foreign culture offer is crossing the cultural, national and ideological boundaries that confinement within one's speech community does not allow. Language being "a major factor in inequalities of access to knowledge" (ibid.: 266), mastering a foreign language is having access to the means to break the control imposed by the lack of competence in classical Arabic in the case of

Algerian students. By crossing symbolic boundaries, in case they are free from false representations and stereotypes, i.e. free from ideological inhibitors, students indulge into the process of creating a new culture, different from their native one and distinct from the target one, a culture Kramersch (2001) refers to with the expression *third culture*.

It is certainly not an easy matter to be part of a discourse community like the intelligentsia in societies where this community lacks recognition or a symbolic capital. As it has been advanced in Chapter Three, in an ideologically-loaded environment, words do not carry, in essence, the illocutionary force necessary for inducing a perlocutionary effect (i.e. initiate corresponding action); it is society that attributes this force to words by attributing authority and the power to speak for it to people who become its mandated spokespeople. Within unfavourable conditions, due to political and religious stigmatisation, intellectuals fall short of gaining this power that would enable them to have some influence in the discursive market, and consequently on people's opinions and representations. Being part of this community becomes then a great challenge for students who would feel that they integrate a social minority, not quite appreciated by the rest of society.

The third culture, however, is not the feeling of being "*betwixt and between, no longer at home in their original culture, nor really belonging to the host culture*" (ibid.: 234), it is bringing about change in one's culture by integrating, from the foreign culture, what makes the individual feel himself an agent within his social environment, capable of thinking, speaking, and in no need of a self-mandated spokesperson. It is speaking out oneself through whatever linguistic means suitable. This is the culture that can rehabilitate intellectuals within the Algerian intellectual and social market.

This is actually not a new situation to create in Algeria. It is rather a re-

creation of state that writers, such as Mouloud Mammeri, Kateb Yacine and Mohammed Dib, for instance, have experienced and lived on a daily basis by appropriating the French language to express the most profound Algerian sentiments.⁴⁴

The third culture is to be the space where the rhetorical⁴⁵ relationship, between *rhetor* (speaker) and audience, between discourse and students, would change. That relationship of master to disciple, of dictator to executor, would become a relationship of somebody who suggests and someone who considers, decides, and acts accordingly. If classical Arabic, the instrument of power that has long been used to maintain this rhetorical relationship in Algeria, is to get a place in a balanced public debate, it must cease to be a stake, transforming a linguistic legitimacy and competence into a political one, in the hands of politicians and religious representatives.

Classical Arabic has been associated with highly demanding fields, religion and politics. This has raised generations of Algerians who have acquired the habit of accepting without questioning, either because it is forbidden, sinful, or exclusively reserved for experts. What classical Arabic can gain from students' experience with foreign languages and cultures is to become, within the third culture, part of their tools of expression, reflection, and debate, i.e. become a means at the service of communication instead of ideology.

Access to the third culture is blocked by the lack, on the part of teachers

⁴⁴ Algerians' appropriation of the French language has long questioned the official status of this language. Despite the wide use of French in all aspects of life, it is still considered by Algerian official discourse as a foreign language. Experts, whether in Algeria or elsewhere, have formulated various opposite views about this case, to the point that Byram (1989: 40) himself acknowledged the existence of Frenches, as varieties of French, among which Algerian French.

⁴⁵ Rhetoric is understood here, beyond the traditional definition of "*artful and skilled use of language ... for persuasive purposes.*" (Saville-Troike 2003: 145), as discursive strategies used for the regulation of power relationships.

in foreign language degrees, of working on representations. Zarate (2004: 75) spoke of the necessity to undertake a diagnosis of initial representations before starting any programme in foreign culture teaching. The advantage the Algerian teacher teaching in Algerian universities has is that he is aware of these representations well in advance. This spares him the time he would waste in detecting them and gives enough scope to anticipate students' responses to themes studied in foreign cultures subjects such as American or British Civilisation. He is able to adapt the programme which is designed at a given moment according to the events that may alter representations and thus necessitate other types of approaches, methods, and teaching materials. It is probably not wise to think that the introduction of new technological means, such as internet, into the classroom is enough to deal with representations. Technology is not pedagogy; it can only be at its service. What is certainly needed is opening the students' eyes before their cultural assumptions and confront them with the *other's*. In this connection, Zarate sees that history should hold an important place in culture studies. The history of the relations between various cultural groups allows observing the evolution of representations over time:

*The description of outdated cultural practices offers a great interest for a work of distancing from the present. It allows a distant examination of relations of symbolic domination ... the historical document permits to find how meaning was constructed, to restore the diversity of interests which first were at stake.*⁴⁶

(ibid.: 39)

Representations have often been determined by daily events that may bring groups closer together or separate between them. Algerian relations, and Arab countries' relations in general, to France have been, these last years, oscillating between the first and second kinds according to the French position in conflicts and affairs involving Arab-Islamic interests.

⁴⁶ (MOT)

Representations of the French people have also followed this oscillation continuously over short intervals of time. Deconstruction of representations through a historical line is essential to avoiding the restrictive and blurring immediate vision of events and relations to the *other*.

As already hinted at in the Introduction, studying a foreign culture is necessarily involving private and personal aspects of one's life, since it is ways of life, as experienced by individuals, which are discovered. Personal involvement in the course and reference to students' individual experiences are welcome. They can only reveal the truth about the representations that may be the cause for the negative attitudes towards the *other*. In front of personal uncovering, the teacher will certainly be more effective if he avoids a moralistic discourse, in one way or another, which may have a counter-productive effect and induce repression instead of discussion and correction.

4.11. Conclusion

Foreign culture teaching in Algeria, as part of foreign language teaching, has often expressed three main orientations among teachers, according to the teacher's ideological stance and his conception of the role and objectives of foreign culture studies:

1. Stigmatisation of the foreign culture and over-praising of the native one leading to the belief in an all-positive 'we' and a 'they' as a scapegoat responsible for the life hardships of the 'we'. This tends to be the stance of teachers who, because they consider that Algerian culture is under threat when in contact with foreign cultures, feel the need to protect students from acculturation/interculturalisation in order to preserve the outcome of enculturation. This orientation exasperates negative attitudes and stands, willingly or unconsciously, as a relay for the dominant ideological discourse.
2. Over-praising of the foreign culture and total neglect of the native one. This is the attitude of teachers who enshrine foreign cultures (mainly 'Western') as models that their students should look up to. This prevents students from appreciating the positive aspects of their culture and from viewing the foreign one in its real form.
3. Exposition of the two cultures as two separate equal entities without any influence of one over the other. This is the approach of teachers who prefer to avoid confrontation and keep the pace of syllabus steady without any hindrance.

In the three directions, students are not invited to have their own say and are rather geared towards frames of opinions to which they are bound to

conform. Without even stating it in explicit terms, the fact of valuing one culture at the expense of the other, or claiming a clear-cut distinction is implicitly advocating possession of absolute truth and dissuading students from expressing views.

There must then be a fourth direction, that of a third culture which acknowledges the ineluctable interaction between cultures, an interculturalisation that takes place at the smallest occasion of contact, be it direct or indirect. Bringing students to be aware of this phenomenon and its full understanding and practice is probably one of the main objectives of the didactics of culture teaching, expressed in clear terms by Byram and Zarate:

*Learning how to conceptualise a reference (relate an opinion with the medium which conveys it, with the position of dominant or dominated of the one who claims it, with the historical period it belongs to), learning how to link historical references to a generation.*⁴⁷

(Byram and Zarate 1997: 21)

This fourth direction will call upon students' critical understanding of both their native values and the *other's* by looking at present situations as moments of history subject to alteration and evolution. It will also bring them to take a stance on grounds of personal research and analysis, an approach that can be described as *political-action orientated* (Byram 1989: 60). This may probably be a suitable disposition for students who intend to integrate the new university system, the LMD system.

⁴⁷ (MOT)

4.12. Original Quotations

Page 254

... c'est la forme et le contenu d'une coupe transversale opérée en un point particulier du continuum culturel.

(Linton 1968: 331)

... les manières typiques d'un groupe culturel de percevoir et de conceptualiser son environnement.

(Zavalloni, quoted in Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 26)

... c'est finalement le point de vue qui crée l'objet.

(Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 26)

Page 257

L'assertion naïve selon laquelle la simple contiguïté dans un contexte agréable suffit à promouvoir l'harmonie a été tristement réfutée.

(Sherif 1971: 157)

... la seule spontanéité et bonne volonté des participants.

(Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 184)

Page 259

... le socius ou l'autre est un partenaire perpétuel du moi dans la vie psychique.

(Wallon 1959: 284)

Page 260

Alors que chaque société croit traiter des autres et de leurs problèmes (...), alors qu'elle feint de 'sortir' d'elle-même, elle ne se pose en réalité que les problèmes qui sont les siens. C'est ainsi que le discours qu'elle tient sur la personnalité culturelle des immigrés ne révèle en fait que ses propres tendances.

(Sayad 1978: 2)

Page 263

... s'enferme dans une conception fixiste, rigide et mosaïque des cultures où les systèmes évolueraient parallèlement sans inter-pénétration et inter-compréhension.

(Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 89)

(Footnote 15)

O. Spengler ne conçoit pas le rapport entre la civilisation et la culture comme une simultanéité, mais comme 'une succession organique nécessaire' ; la civilisation est le destin inéluctable et la fin de toute culture.

(Marcuse 1970: 110)

Page 265

... le principe actif du processus de différenciation... Le pouvoir ne peut s'exercer que s'il existe effectivement deux groupes différenciés, s'il existe une distinction entre 'nous' et 'eux'. Différencier afin de mieux repérer un ensemble d'individus et de pouvoir leur assigner une place déterminée, séparée, constitue donc des procédures fondamentales du pouvoir. Le marquage en est le premier instrument.

(Apfelbaum, quoted in Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 64)

Page 267

... par lequel l'individu prend distance par rapport à l'autre et se saisit comme distinct de lui.

(Camilleri 1980: 331)

... nativism, prophetism, messianism Ce sont des essais de retour en arrière, des efforts de retribalisation.

(Bastide 1971: 58)

Page 268

... l'angoisse, le sentiment de culpabilité, le désespoir, l'indifférence.

(Devereux 1972: 212)

Page 269

... réduire toutes les modifications capables de mettre en péril l'intégrité du sujet.

(Raveau 1976: 478).

... certains caractères de l'identité culturelle d'un groupe deviennent soit dominants, soit récessifs selon les besoins de la cause.

(Maestri, quoted in Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 26)

Page 272

C'est ce qu'ignore la description interactionniste qui traite l'interaction comme un empire dans un empire, oubliant que ce qui se passe entre deux personnes... en situation

coloniale... ou encore en situation postcoloniale... doit sa forme particulière à la relation objective entre les langues ou les usages correspondants, c'est-à-dire entre les groupes qui parlent ces langues.

(Bourdieu 2001: 101)

Page 274

... le support par excellence du rêve de pouvoir absolu.

(Bourdieu 2001: 66)

Page 278

... le monde social est, pour une grande part, quelque chose que les agents font, à chaque moment; mais ils n'ont de chances de le défaire et de le refaire que sur la base d'une connaissance réaliste de ce qu'il est et de ce qu'ils peuvent sur lui en fonction de la position qu'ils y occupent.

(Bourdieu 2001: 311)

Page 279

... le prêtre appelle Dieu sa propre volonté.

(Nietzsche 1990: 77)

Page 283

... participe à cette recherche de cohérence sociale qui repose sur une construction permanente et non sur un état stable, défini une fois pour toutes.

(Abdallah-Preteille 2004b: 107)

Page 284

... les idées-forces doivent une part de leur crédit au crédit de la personne qui, en les professant, les garantit et qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement de les réfuter, par une argumentation purement logique, mais les discréditer en discréditant leur auteur.

(Bourdieu 2001: 242)

... c'est en s'annulant complètement au profit du Dieu ou du peuple, que le sacerdoce se fait Dieu ou Peuple. C'est lorsque je deviens Rien – et parce que je suis capable de devenir Rien, de m'annuler, de m'oublier, de me sacrifier, de me dévouer -, que je deviens Tout. Je ne suis rien que le mandataire de Dieu ou du Peuple...

(Bourdieu 2001: 269)

Page 285

... 'tu n'es pas le groupe' ...

(Bourdieu 2001: 270)

Page 286

La référence à la philosophie, conçue comme pensée non mythique, montre bien que le préalable à l'évaluation négative du mythe n'est pas nécessairement la possession de la vérité, mais l'avènement d'un autre type de pensée, dans un autre contexte historique, où se montre la relativité de l'adhésion au mythe et se révèle le mythe comme mythe : 'ce qui illusoire en elles ... [dans les représentations religieuses] l'est pour qui ? Non pour ceux qui y croient, mais pour ceux qui n'y croient pas ou plus...'

(Capdevila 2004: 219)

Page 287

... un mythe n'est un mythe que pour ceux qui n'y croient pas.

(Godelier 1984: 202).

Page 288

... la prise de conscience et 'déconstruction' des attitudes et autres éléments de la personnalité qui empêchent de prendre en compte l'autre dans sa différence.

(Camilleri & Cohen-Emerique 1989: 393)

... d'en supporter l'existence, même incomprise, parce qu'incomprise.

(Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 154).

... être homme, c'est être capable de transfert dans un autre centre de perspective.

(Ricoeur 1961: 452)

Page 289

La pédagogie interculturelle est une pédagogie en acte qui se construit et se développe dans la confrontation, l'expérience et l'analyse.

(Abdallah-Pretceille 2004: 160).

Page 290

... pense rien, et ne croit rien, il se pose.

(Guillaumin, quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 183).

Page 291

... l'esprit humain est un instrument actif, un agent de transformation ... [qui] filtre l'information ... [en] la comparant à ce qu'il connaît déjà...

(Sherif 1971: 144)

Page 292

... pas un enseignement pour la connaissance, mais ... un enseignement pour la communication, c'est-à-dire pour l'usage effectif, par l'apprenant, de ce qu'il a appris, de ce qu'il s'est approprié.

(Porcher, in Zarate 2004: 6).

Page 300

La description des pratiques culturelles périmées présente un grand intérêt pour un travail de distanciation par rapport au présent. Elle permet l'examen, avec recul, des relations de domination symbolique... le document historique permet de retrouver comment le sens s'est construit, de restaurer la diversité des intérêts qui étaient alors en jeu.

(Zarate 2004: 39)

Page 303

... savoir conceptualiser une référence (mettre en relation une opinion avec le média qui la porte, avec la position de dominant ou de dominé de celui qui l'expose, avec l'époque historique à laquelle elle se rapporte), savoir associer des références historiques à une génération.

(Byram and Zarate 1997: 21)

GENERAL CONCLUSION

MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

UNIVERSITY OF ORAN

**FACULTY OF LETTERS, LANGUAGES AND ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF ANGLO-SAXON LANGUAGES
SECTION OF ENGLISH**

**The Ideological Trojan Horse in the Pedagogical Realm:
Towards a Recovery of the Intellectual Skeptron
(A study of the role of ideological discourse in the formation of foreign
language students' social and cultural representations of the Other)**

Thesis submitted to the Department of Anglo-Saxon Languages in Candidature for the
Degree of DOCTORAT in the Didactics of Civilisation

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Academic Year : 2005-2006

The Ideological Trojan Horse¹ in the Pedagogical Realm: Towards a Recovery of the Intellectual Skeptron²

**(A study of the role of ideological discourse in the formation of
foreign language students' social and cultural representations
of the Other)**

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¹ The *Trojan Horse* is part of the myth of the Trojan War which marked the confrontation between the Greeks and the Trojans. The legend of a huge hollow wooden horse, built by the Greeks and offered to the Trojans, that was used as a trick to bring the Trojans to open the city gates and thus put an end to the Greek army's ten-year siege of Troy, remained as a metaphor for any apparent advantage which is actually a deceitful, malicious and harmful trick, such as computer viruses. What characterises also the *Trojan Horse* is the fact that it needs the full cooperation of the victim to be effective, just as the success of the Greeks' trick depended greatly on the Trojans' naïve acceptance of the gift.

² Magic wand (see p. 181, fn.9).

DECLARATION

I, hereby, declare that this work has not already been accepted in substance for any degree, and is not concurrently being submitted in candidature for any other degree.

Abdelghani NAIT BRAHIM

The researching, preparation and presentation of the thesis have been undertaken entirely by the author.

Abdelghani NAIT BRAHIM

DEDICATION

For Fadila, Naima, Hammi and Mohamed

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to Professor Mohamed MILIANI whose patience, confidence, wisdom and grace have been central to the making of this work.

His knowledge and most valuable general intellectual comments have lightened my reflection as a researcher and inspired my prospects as a teacher.

I am deeply aware of the great privilege I have to have him as my supervisor, to have met him, and I do wish, one day, to be faithful to the most honourable values that he embodies as an Algerian intellectual.

I am immeasurably indebted to Doctor Sidi Mohamed LAKHDAR BARKA who has been present at every single stage of my reflection in this work, with his advice, invaluable and sound comments, challenging thoughts, and mostly, his infectious enthusiasm. He has been responsible for every moment of intellectual and human elevation since I had the honour, luck and pleasure to meet him fifteen years ago.

I thank him for his contribution to my career as a researcher, a teacher, and to my whole existence.

I have also been exceptionally fortunate in the help offered by Doctor Farida LAKHDAR BARKA with whom I had interesting discussions and brainstorming which provided me with insights that clarified my ideas at some hard moments of my reflection. I am very thankful to her and do owe her great esteem and respect.

ABSTRACT

Foreign culture teaching, as an integral part of foreign language teaching at the Algerian university, has long been subject to a pedagogical context which has strong ties with the social context of both students and teachers. As a matter of fact, students' learning behaviour is determined by some negative attitudes towards foreign cultures, most particularly those underlying the English language. These attitudes, which stand as real obstacles to the learning process according to the objectives set for the foreign language degree, are due to the psychological process of representation that brings students to view the *other*, who holds a different culture to theirs, as an irreconcilable adversary whose culture is incommensurably antithetical to their own.

False representations of the *other* are by no means the outcome of a purely cultural process of denial. They are rather partly constructed and nourished by an ideology of confrontation, an ideology which instrumentalises the most important religious and national symbols in order to maintain power relations that are most favourable to the political status quo. This ideology, referred to here as Occidentalism, impedes the functioning of a central process in a university education: interculturalisation. Against this ideology, there is then a need for an intercultural pedagogy that can reconstruct a suitable pedagogical context for successful cross-cultural encounters in the foreign language and culture classroom.

Chapter One presents the theoretical background upon which this thesis is based. It clarifies the intricacies of the rapport between attitudes, culture and representations.

Chapter Two reviews the concept of ideology and deals with the ways it comes to fashion representations. It also shows the functioning of the ideology of Occidentalism within the Algerian society and the foreign language and culture class, as an ideology that defines identity and otherness.

Chapter Three evinces the strategies of ideological prevalence in the Algerian university as it discloses the means Occidentalism influences students, mostly through one of the most efficient means: discourse.

Chapter Four attempts to reflect on possible solutions and remedies for this pedagogical problem, i.e. how to bring students overcome the false representation of the *other* in order to approach him objectively.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	I
DEDICATION	II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	III
ABSTRACT	IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS	V
GENERAL INTRODUCTION	9
Original Quotations.....	42
CHAPTER ONE: Representations as the Background of Students’ Negative Attitudes	45
1.1. Introduction.....	45
1. 2. Attitude and Motivation.....	48
1.3. Attitude and Otherness.....	53
1.4. Attitude and Culture.....	54
1.5. Representations.....	73
1.6. Conclusion.....	91
1.7. Original Quotations.....	92
CHAPTER TWO: Occidentalism: An Ideology of Alliance Between Religion and Politics	98
2.1. Introduction.....	98
2.2. Debating the Concept of Ideology.....	100
2.3. Occidentalism as a Utilitarian Rationality to Approach Otherness.....	110
2.4. Criteria for the Definition of Occidentalism.....	113

2.5. Characteristics of Occidentalism.....	136
2.6. Occidentalism and Perceptive Effects.....	153
2.6.1.Situational Effects.....	155
2.6.1.1.Effects of Position.....	156
2.6.1.2. Effects of Disposition.....	157
2.6.2. Effects of Perspective.....	158
2.6.3. Epistemological Effects.....	160
2.6.4. Effects of Communication.....	162
2.7. Conclusion.....	166
2.8. Original Quotations.....	167

CHAPTER THREE: Ideology as Discourse:

The Practice of a Speech Genre.....	172
3.1. Introduction.....	172
3.2. Language as Discourse.....	173
3.3. Ideology as a Speech Genre.....	176
3.4. Felicity Conditions.....	179
3.5. Classical Arabic.....	187
3.6. The Right to Speak.....	196
3.7. The Speech Genre.....	202
3.8. Students as the ‘Third’.....	218
3.9. The Intellectual.....	222
3.10. Ideology and Symbolic Power.....	227
3.11. Religion and Politics.....	233
3.11.1. Ideology as a Religious System.....	235
3.11.2. Religion as an Ideological System.....	237
3.12. Conclusion.....	242
3.13. Original Quotations.....	244

CHAPTER FOUR: Developing a New Intercultural Pedagogy: The Third Place.....	253
4.1. Introduction.....	253
4.2. Otherness and Authentic Discourse.....	254
4.3. Otherness and Language.....	273
4.4. Facing Ideology.....	278
4.5. Islamist Discourse.....	279
4.6. The Self-mandated Spokesperson vs. the Intellectual....	283
4.7. The Need for a New Counter-culture.....	285
4.8. A New Counter-culture Through Intercultural Pedagogy.	287
4.9. Critical Discourse Analysis in Culture Studies.....	292
4.10. Towards a ‘Third Culture’.....	295
4.11. Conclusion.....	302
4.12. Original Quotations.....	304
GENERAL CONCLUSION.....	310
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	323
APPENDICES:	
1. APPENDIX I: Questionnaire.....	348
2. APPENDIX II : President Bouteflika’s Speeches.....	352
3. APPENDIX III: Mohamed Amara’s Articles.....	384
4. APPENDIX IV: Mohamed Khalil’s Article.....	403
5. APPENDIX V: Mohamed Reda’s Article.....	405

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Only the Arabists and Islamologists still function unrevised. For them there are still such things as an Islamic society, an Arab mind, an Oriental psyche. Even the ones whose specialty is the modern Islamic world anachronistically use texts like the Koran to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian society.

(Said 1995: 301)

The relationship between language and culture has long ceased to be a matter of controversy, and it has become a truism to say that teaching a foreign language is necessarily teaching a foreign culture. The integration of the foreign culture, whether implicitly/incidentally through 'language modules', such as listening or reading comprehension, or overtly/consciously through 'content modules', like literature or 'civilisation', into the curricula of the teaching of English as a foreign language, is today rather a matter of consensus since the works of D. Hymes (1974), M.A.K. Halliday (1978), C. Kramsch (1991; 2000; 2001), M. Byram (1989), G. Zarate (1986), M. Abdallah-Preteille (2004a; 2004b) and others brought a new insight in language encounters.

However, while it is claimed that teaching a foreign culture is the best means to overcome some of the obstacles to learning a foreign language, it is foreign culture teaching itself which is hindered by some psychological barriers. The cure (the foreign culture) for the disease (i.e. the problems of

foreign language learning) is sometimes not efficient and sometimes even rejected as a transplant in a diseased body. This medical analogy informs somehow about what really takes place in this educational setting. Just as the body rejects the transplant because the former is not the original environment of the latter, the Algerian social or cultural context of the foreign culture learning process is not the Western original context of the production process of the target culture. The cultural context of the educational process has then never been neutral, embedded with the collective psychology of its people (the Algerian native cultures) as well as the individual interpretation of these cultures (the idiosyncratic integration and effectuation of those native cultures).

There is no doubt that the foreign language and culture class is sometimes a place for enjoyable, fruitful and cooperative human experiences that result in the best of what cross-cultural¹ encounters can produce. There is certainly an immense pleasure in using a new (somehow exotic) medium to express familiar and new meanings that could not be otherwise (in one's native language) revealed and in "*having the ability and power to manipulate these meanings.*" (Kramsch 2001: 30) These encounters between people of different cultures are the natural lot of all societies, and lead to what is labelled *acculturation*. When acculturation is successful, it contributes to open-mindedness, understanding and tolerance, necessary conditions for the progress of those societies that need it desperately.

Yet, what deserves attention is the other side of the story, the hard, conflicting and confrontational experiences that both teachers and students undergo in the foreign language class, in general, and the foreign culture course in particular. It is high time in Algeria we stopped pretending and

¹ The concept of cross-culturality will be discussed below in comparison to the other concept of interculturality.

acknowledged the disorganising effects of the foreign language and culture classes on students² in order to develop a suitable and efficient pedagogy which could offer solutions to the cultural cancer that gradually develops social metastases. Abdallah-Pretceille rightly claims that conflict is to be seriously taken into account when dealing with cross-cultural encounters.³

An effective and efficient cross-cultural pedagogy is all the more necessary in the light of the wave of globalisation that is invading the whole world. It is up to each country to make globalisation a beneficial experience or a trauma. The gradual introduction of the LMD (Licence-Master-Doctorat) system is but a tiny illustration of the inevitable process of globalisation, and which unfortunately encounters more resistance on the part of teachers, in Algeria, than a suitable strategy of adaptation, while they still have some freedom of decision.

The first rationale behind this work is that the educational case study taken here, i.e. the American Civilisation class, is but a microcosmic representation of the situation occurring in a macrocosm, the Algerian society. The Students' attitudes towards American culture, as a foreign culture, are determined to a great extent by their overall social conditions. They are not individual responses but rather responses of individuals that are culturally situated⁴ in a very particular type of society that induces particular kinds of attitudes, moulded by the cultures within which they grow, and fixed by the institutions that have the function of perpetuating them,

² The cultural conflicts that rise in the foreign language class are by no means peculiar to the Algerian university students as Abou (1981: 198) seems to admit it in the case of France: "... *every contact between cultures is also a conflict of cultures.*" (MOT) (MOT: My Own Translation. Quotations marked with this acronym are translated by the author. Original versions are presented at the end of each section in the whole work).

³ "*The mood of angelism in which encounters flow helps avoid and evacuate a fundamental problem of the education of the relation to the other, and of which conflict is one of the driving forces.*" (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 187) (MOT)

⁴ A whole section on the theory of situational effects that explain the students' attitudes will be developed in Chapter Two.

such as politics, religion, the school and the media. These attitudes do not seem to be temporary, but rather a lasting characteristic of the Algerian society and culture. It will be shown that they are based on what Durkheim and Boudon call *collective beliefs* (Boudon 1991) that are nourished and propagated by ideology, ideology being part of the whole social context that includes culture and the individual's interactions with his people as well.

These *collective beliefs*, present in society, form *collective opinions*, i.e. a distinctive group's shared opinions about another one (Charaudeau 2004: 37). The deviation, and thus the danger, is that these *collective opinions*, which are very particular and stained with value judgements, are often presented by ideologies as *common opinions*, i.e. views that belong to the human patrimony, made up by a long history of human wisdom, and which bear the name universal. This may be the case of some proverbs, for instance, which can be found in many different cultures.

It is not my intention to claim that Algerian students in particular, and Algerians in general, are totally submitted to their society and cultures, incapable of any purely individual attitude or behaviour. I certainly admit part of it that explains some Algerians' rejection of certain Algerian cultural traits. I also acknowledge that, in many cases, some attitudes are adopted for the mere sake of group solidarity or even fear of social sanctions against anti-social behaviour⁵. Yet, my contention is that an important number of students, and Algerians, fall under some kind of social/cultural influence, not to say determinism, that, through the hype of culture and

⁵ Group solidarity and fear of social sanctions do induce in people attitudes and behaviours that they do not necessarily accept. Rose puts forward an interesting illustration in the case of prejudice and discrimination in the United States. He observed that among the people who discriminate, there is a good number of those who do it, not out of prejudice against the victim, but rather out of pragmatism that makes them conform to the majority's behaviour. Rose (1965: 81) calls this type the *unprejudiced discriminator*, whose motto is "*expediency ... and his creed is to 'live and let live'; a man's got to get along.*"

political/religious ideology, tends to induce in them formatted attitudes towards the foreign culture.

Yet, the sociocultural origins of the students' attitudes are not the incentive that motivated this work. What really motivated it is the fact that these students, that develop socioculturally-conditioned attitudes and behaviours, will probably perpetuate and disseminate them as members of the Algerian future elite, especially as teachers in charge of forming generations. Here, it should be admitted that their number does not matter as it will necessarily multiply over time. The sample of students taken here are representative of a wider population, among students and the Algerian society, that is growing in alarming proportions, and that will surely rage with the bulk of negative attitudes developed against all what bears the name *foreign*, in the name of religion, nationalism or pan-arabism/pan-islamism.

What are then these students' attitudes that are responsible for their incapacity to join the cross-cultural adventure? What induces them?

Throughout a nine-year experience in teaching American Civilisation at the Section of English (University of Oran), I have observed in students a number of negative attitudes, exasperated since September 11, 2001, towards American culture in particular, and 'western cultures in general'⁶, and which range from stigmatisation to total rejection. The problem, here, does not lie in the fact that the American Civilisation class has become a place for struggle and conflict; the school is partly the place for such symbolic struggles (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004b: 3). The problematic issue, as

⁶ Although the American Civilisation module aims to teach about American culture, substantial reference is of course made to European cultures (English, Irish, French, etc.), non-Muslim African cultures and the Judeo-Christian heritage and patrimony that Europe, Africa and the United States share. Consequently, we can clearly observe students' attitudes towards all of these cultures as foreign and different to theirs. I will then use the terms American culture and foreign culture almost interchangeably as they often share the same referent, in terms of attitude, in the students' representations.

far as the pedagogical objective of this class is concerned, is the fact that learning has become secondary, and the class stands as an opportunity for settling scores with Americans, a group therapy to exorcise frustrations, and a pulpit to voice ready-made value judgements.

While the class is supposed to be a place to approach reality through rational knowledge, it is rather through a different mode of learning – representations, those mental structures of perception necessary to define oneself and the other, that students apprehend the reality of American culture. Moreover and most importantly, as it will be shown in Chapter One, these negative attitudes do not completely hinder successful learning of the target language and of the limited classroom content of the programme. Negative attitudes may accompany certain types of motivation that induce the student to learn. Yet, while learning may well take place, education does certainly not occur, for, though the former is part of the latter, there exists a substantial difference between them. For *“learning to be truly educative it must give a broader value and meaning to the learner’s life. It must be concerned with educating the whole person.”* (Williams and Burden 2001: 6)

The aim of a university education goes beyond the mere learning of items in a designed syllabus. University education in a language degree, beside the primary aim of learning a means of communication, engages students in cultural expeditions whose basic goals are to learn about different visions of life and free themselves from ethnocentrism and stereotyped narrow-minded visions of foreign cultures. Learning English, for instance, in an academic frame – a four-year degree – is a four-year exploration of the cultures that fashion this language and their contributions to world civilisations. It is an invaluable opportunity for students to get rid of opinions frequently driven by prejudice, ignorance or bias towards foreign sociocultural systems. It is also an alternative for narcissistic ideological self-images that may be spread by

foreign media. This contact with foreign cultures is aimed to offer students new perspectives and ways of looking at their own culture and society too. It provides them with new tools for undertaking self-criticism and a reflexive approach to their own culture, something which may disclose aberrations which otherwise cannot be revealed. It is, in a way, undermining cultural and political inhibitions that prevent students from questioning their learned values and conceptions and carrying out political and cultural critique.

University education is part of the university's enterprise of producing an intelligentsia capable of thinking outside politically self-interested, rationalised ideas, capable of having a relational rather than hierarchical view of cultures including theirs, capable of engaging, critically, political and cultural issues to identify their society's contradictions and resist prevailing practices. Giroux points at the danger of the absence of such intellectuals, a state in which the dominant culture faces no resistance, and thus prevails over all opposing elements of civil society.⁷

University education is expected to produce intellectuals who can be "*mediators, legitimators, and producers of ideas and practices,*" or to use Gramsci's words *radical intellectuals*, rather than mere agents of the status quo, "*propagators of its ideologies and values.*" (ibid.: 4). The university is not a locus of domination but rather a political and cultural project that develops critique and social transformation through the provision, in such degrees as English, of oppositional discourses and practices (foreign cultures).

It is on the basis of this conception of educative learning that underpins this work and its significant social and societal role that I consider these

⁷ "*In the absence of intellectuals who can critically analyse a society's contradictions,*" writes Giroux, "*the dominant culture continues to reproduce its worst effects all the more efficaciously. And, without a sphere for cultural critique, the resisting intellectual has no voice in public affairs.*" (Giroux et al.1984: 1)

negative attitudes, despite the possible completion of the short-term and immediate objective of learning, as counterproductive in terms of the long-term and strategic objective of education. The teacher, when he/she is not under the influence of the same representations or when he/she is not complacent about the mere exposition of facts in his/her culture class, is supposed to provide this type of education, and thus strives to find a balance between these two modes of learning, rational knowledge and representations.

Students tend to confuse two systems: the system of knowledge and the system of belief. While the former is about establishing truth about the real world (this is being the function of a university education), the latter is characterised by “*a mental activity focused on ... behaviours (thus its affective nature) and by taking a stance (thus its subjective aspect)*” (Charaudeau 2004: 34)⁸. The first is made up of scientific theories and methodical practices; the second consists of doctrines that lead to dogmas. It is precisely these doctrines and dogmas that political and religious ideologies nourish.

What is peculiar to the subject of American Civilisation, as compared to other cultural studies modules⁹ in the English degree curriculum, and which adds to the difficulties encountered, is that students come to the very first class with prior knowledge, acquired outside the educational setting because of the overexposure of the United States in the media¹⁰, and

⁸ MOT

⁹ I would not like to indulge into the controversy over the appellation of this module. This has changed with time and from one country to another. While in Germany it has the name of *Landeskunde*, meaning literally ‘knowledge of the country’, in France the term *civilisation* is well established. In Britain the appellation changes from *background studies* to *cultural studies* through *area studies*. In the United States, the term *culture studies* is today a commonplace.

¹⁰ Fukuyama (2001) rightly observes that the United States has become part and parcel of the process of globalisation: “*America is the most advanced capitalist society in the world*

because of the fact that this country has become a household subject since American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. The students' reality becomes an insurmountable obstacle to the learning process. Particularly, students tend to share with Americans, at a distance, a past and a present of conflict. They are filled with paradoxical feelings, such as injustice, that they rarely bear for other peoples. This feeling-at-distance is responsible for most of the negative responses to American culture, responses which are often extended to the rest of the 'West' (Doise 1989: 232). This is what Zarate labels the *nearness of the far*, when she comments about the context of teaching culture in which two things are essential: the institutional context of teaching and the media environment.¹¹

These feelings are paradoxical in the sense that they are often mixed with appreciation of, or admiration for, many of the expressions of this same American culture that the students despise in class. They clearly express their liking of such an American singer, actor, writer, or great contemporary or historical personality. While the America of Bush is regarded with suspicion, the America of Brad Pitt, Britney Spears, William Faulkner and Abraham Lincoln is embraced. What prevents them from being aware of the fact that these people they like are as American as those they dislike is the international character of American culture that often masks its Americanness as well as their a priorities.

The principal characteristic of the American Civilisation class is then that students are unable to approach foreign cultures and realities but through mediation, i.e. the prisms of their representations they come up with to the course. Plato's idea of illusory world has never been as true as it is for them.

today ... [so] if market forces are what drives globalization in some sense, it is inevitable that Americanization will accompany globalization."

¹¹ "[the] nature of the geopolitical relation between the student's native culture and the target culture, measure of the effects induced by the institutional context of teaching and the local media environment." (Zarate 2004: 73) (MOT)

Negative attitudes, such as rejection, are observable symptoms of these representations held by students on the American people and culture in particular, and 'western' peoples and cultures in general.

Thus, the main thesis in this work is that the students' negative attitudes towards foreign cultures are due to their representations of these cultures¹². Given that these representations are basically sociocultural¹³, and that culture can only be retrieved from the attitudes and behaviours of its people¹⁴, I will depart from the students' attitudes in the American Civilisation class to find out about the origins of these representations.

The work is an upstream study of these representations to reveal those sociocultural phenomena that hinder the foreign culture praxis¹⁵, phenomena to which teachers need to turn their attention to overcome them. It is also a reflection on the ideological and *clientéliste* drifts of politics and religion in an educational setting in particular, and society in general, and a re-reading of the Algerian educational and social realities in the light of power practice and relations that take place outside the university, and which have a direct impact inside it. The ideologies in question are not well

¹² "People represent ideologically their actions before they actually act." (Capdevila 2004: 68) (MOT)

¹³ I use the epithet socio-cultural because of the fact that, as it will be exposed in the first and second chapters, these representations are cultural in the sense that they are part and parcel of the students' culture, and social in the sense that they are disseminated in society by religious and political ideologies.

¹⁴ There is no such a thing as encounter or dialogue between cultures, but rather encounter and dialogue between individuals having different cultures. Culture, then, can only be captured through the way it is expressed by individuals. Linton (1967: 321) writes that: "Culture is essentially a sociopsychological phenomenon. It is carried by individual understandings and can only be expressed through individuals." (MOT) This implies that the same culture may be expressed differently by different people, and it is just a matter of convenience if we speak of culture instead of cultures.

¹⁵ It is probably not appropriate to use the word learning when we refer to that pedagogical activity that takes place in a culture studies class. The traditional learning process that applies to language, for example, does not take place here, as what students experience in this type of course is a practice and an encounter with a different world, rather a body of knowledge that they are supposed to learn, at least in my view. I will then use the terms 'study', 'experience' and 'praxis' to refer to the activity that takes place in culture studies classes.

and definitely constituted, i.e. they are *in statu nascendi*, something which allows seeing their connections to the students' daily preoccupations.

Culture and ideology are addressed here as hotbeds, *nutrient broths* for the students' representations. "*Every representation*," write Banbion-Broye et al. (1977: 51), "*grows on the basis of an ideology*."¹⁶ The importance of these representations, in this work, lies in the fact that they influence, not to say condition, behaviour in general¹⁷, and the pedagogical behaviour –or learning – in particular, to a great extent. Whether false or true (though very often false), positive or negative (usually negative), they are used by the students, on the one hand, as tools to approach foreign, and sometimes their own, reality, and to provide oversimplified and erroneous answers that prevent them from apprehending the true nature of the foreign culture, on the other. Besides, they, at times, determine the student's motivation to get involved in or stay out of this cross-cultural experience.

For, the American Civilisation class is basically cross-cultural communication as it is the place of "*verbal and non-verbal processes of interaction between members of different cultural groups*" (Porter and Samovar, quoted in Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 102-103)¹⁸. This communication is of course not live, but at a distance. It is still communication inasmuch as it brings students to interact with texts and ideas produced by other people of a different culture, where the teacher often plays the role of a mediator, and sometimes a substitute for this absent interlocutor. Kramsch (2001: 29) observes that "*The [foreign] language classroom should therefore be viewed as the privileged site of cross-cultural fieldwork, in which participants are both informants and*

¹⁶ MOT

¹⁷ "*Representations*," writes Doise (1961: 206), "*play a particular role in the interaction between groups, a space that they structure in a precise way according to certain cognitive rules*." (MOT)

¹⁸ MOT

ethnographers.”

To see culture studies modules as cross-cultural experiences, one needs to be aware of the new approaches to communication studies. Jakobson's traditional model¹⁹ of participants in a communicative event has to be replaced by the new model put forward by discourse analysts. While Jakobson considered addresser and addressee as the main and only actors in discourse, Charaudeau et al. (2004) speak of the *third (tiers)*, who may be present or absent, to or about whom we speak, and who may sometimes be one of the most, if not the most, important participant in discourse. In a foreign culture class, the other (or foreigner) holds this position of the *third*, just as students are the *third* for the political ideological discourse.

Any cross-cultural experience is bound to be intertwined with the social/cultural, philosophical, economic and political contexts of the people involved, and this justifies the necessity to have a look at the functioning of culture, religious and political ideologies in Algeria to fathom this educational case. Cross-culturality is a social fact (Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 1), and as such, cross-culturality in education has to be linked to the society within which it evolves. Moreover, my recourse to ideology to examine this case is due to the fact that culture, religion and politics are often subject to manipulation, and in this sense they are basically ideological.

It is then the double objective of this work, a contribution to the cross-cultural discourse, to better understand the formation and growth of these representations, whether in Algerian education or society, and shed some light on their connections with the cognitive and psychological processes of approaching a foreign culture. Thus, notions such as cultural identity, ethnocentrism, enculturation, acculturation, interculturalization, ideology (each

¹⁹ Addresser (addressee) → Context/message/contact/code → addressee (addresser)
(The components of a communicative event) (Jakobson 1990: 73)

one contributing to the formation, alteration and perpetuation of representations) are the important *variables* that influence the students' attitudes in class and in their daily social lives, and the ones to be at the centre of the study.

As products of the mind, representations are fashioned by all the constraints which the mind is subjected to, such as culture and political and religious ideologies which construct people's value-systems (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 6). What adds to the importance of ideology in the study of representations is the fact that they both are, with language and religion, symbolic systems. They, therefore, interplay within the same sphere, each one pushing the society towards the direction chosen by those who manipulate them, whether politicians, preachers, pseudo-intellectuals or communication professionals. Ideologies themselves are sometimes defined as systems of representations (see Chapter Two), with specific historical roles in society (Althusser 1965: 238-239), roles that legitimise their persistence and acceptance by people. These roles vary from being the instrument of cultural, religious, or national unity, the preservation of *our* Islamic or Arabic authenticity, to being the supposed weapon to fight foreign cultural aggression and colonisation.

The presence of ideology in a language class, as opposed to other types classes, and apart from the fact that ideology is always connected to knowledge (Poirier 1983: 161), is due to the fact that language representations do not only determine students' attitudes towards these languages but also towards their native speakers (Moore 2001: 9). It is exactly this space between the student and the *other* that ideology occupies and manipulates. As such, any study of the problems in this type of relations

is to take into account ideology²⁰. Moreover, any study of representations and ideology has to consider the types and functions of discourse available in society. As this will be discussed in Chapter Three, language, as a social practice, i.e. as discourse, is the ideal channel through which representations are constructed and diffused. “*Discourse*,” claims Py (2004: 6), “*is specifically the place where social representations are constituted, fashioned, modified or disintegrate.*”²¹

* * *

This work will, therefore, attempt to discuss the following research questions:

1. What is the genesis of the students’ exclusive and negative responses towards foreign cultures and peoples?
2. Are the students’ representations responsible for their negative attitudes towards foreign cultures and peoples?
3. What is the relationship between these representations and the students’ culture (s)?
4. Which cultural manifestations fashion these representations?
5. Are social practices, such as religious and political ideological discourses, hotbeds for the students’ negative representations?
6. Is this discourse a particular ideology to the Arab-Islamic world?

²⁰ Much research on bilingualism has related attitudes, representations, social practices (such as discourse), motivation, success and failure (see Ervin 1954; Lambert and Gardner 1972; Labov 1976; Ryan and Giles 1982).

²¹ MOT

7. What are the motives that underlie the stigmatisation of foreign cultures by these discourses?
8. Why do students believe in these discourses?
9. Where do students' credulity and the credibility of these ideas come from?
10. How do they subscribe to these ideas?
11. How can we set, as teachers and intellectuals, some common ground between the students' culture (s) and the foreign ones to overcome difference without evacuating it?

To these questions a number of hypotheses will be advanced and developed throughout the work.

1. Students' negative attitudes towards foreign cultures originate from the influence of an extremely ideologically-loaded social and educational context that establishes an antithetical relationship between native culture and the *other's* one.
2. Out of this context, representations of the *other* are formed and bring students to develop negative attitudes towards all what does not conform to their native view of the world.
3. These representations are deeply connected to the students' native cultures as they are exposed to them since their early age.

4. Among the cultural manifestations that fashion these representations are the religious practices that consider the relation to the *other*, who does not share the same religion, central to the completion of a *right* religious practice.
5. Religious, as well as political, discourses, as constructed by Occidentalists, provide favourable hotbeds for the formation and maintenance of negative representations of the *other*.
6. Although discourse of denial is not peculiar to the Arab-Islamic world, there has developed a specific type of such a discourse that functions as an ideology in its own right, and that bears the name Occidentalism.
7. Among the reasons that underlie this discourse is the preservation of the social and political status quo which is absolutely favourable to the power elite.
8. Students are grown within social conditions that allow them very few opportunities to question this ideology; mainly because it is firmly connected to their most cherished spiritual symbols such as Islam.
9. Students express their adherence to the ideology of Occidentalism by responding negatively to the cultures transmitted through the foreign language they learn.
10. To overcome such intellectual and pedagogical difficulties of bringing students to cross cultural boundaries, there is a need to develop a specific pedagogy, an intercultural pedagogy, which

can take into account the students' immediate social, cultural and ideological contexts within which they indulge into cross-cultural encounters.

The university receives a population of students who have spent part of their lives – along years of family upbringing, of political and media (local and Arab) bludgeoning, of religious instruction and sermons in mosques, and of school education where foreign languages, devoid of their cultures, are taught – in a system oriented towards the stigmatisation of foreign cultures and the promotion of the native one. As the foreign language is taught as a mere medium to access science and technology, emptied from its cultural and ideological content²², nothing can question their acquired assumptions that ultimately induce negative attitudes. As early as 1961, The anthropologist Ruth Benedict drew attention to the ravages of this type of distinction between local and foreign, where the familiar is enshrined into the norm and the foreign stigmatised and demonised as a permanent threat to that familiar.²³

The students' negative response is symptomatic of a symbolic struggle taking place in society and reproduced in the classroom. The students are victims of this struggle between those who strive to preserve the status quo and those who call for a different social project. Deprived from the right to speak, and grown in a system that has never equipped them with the means to develop personal views, the students, as a great number of the Algerian youth, become the unconscious voices of their masters, of the political and

²² Zarate (2004: 16), in her study of foreign language teaching, has noticed that this approach to foreign languages is often a system of defence, whose function is to 'protect' learners from the encroachments of foreign cultures on the local value-systems which could be put into question: "...the discrepancies between the foreign culture and the native culture are rubbed out to maintain the description of the foreign culture in conformity with local values." (MOT)

²³ "So modern man," writes Benedict (1989: 7-8), "differentiating into Chosen People and dangerous aliens, groups within his own civilisation genetically and culturally related to one another... has the justification of a vast historical continuity behind his attitude."

religious ideologues who subject them to this intellectual alienation and dispossession. They are trapped in a conception of *otherness* which is synonymous only with the need to reaffirm and exasperate cultural and religious identity, or with “*the fanatic desire ... to search, in appearances, only differences and oppositions to maintain distances intact.*” (Castro 1976: 357)²⁴

The students have often not been given the opportunity to develop the capacity to construct by themselves a contradictory discourse to the official ones lest they dare push the society towards change. The only discourses they have been served, instead of the rational and scientific one, are those of:

- the situational space (Charaudeau 2004), or cultural, to preserve common identity;
- the interdiscursive space (Bakhtin 1981), or the religious, to protect common beliefs and values;
- and the interlocutory (Chabrol 2004), or political, to perpetuate hegemony and control.

The only tool the students then have, when they are in a situation of *otherness*, is their luggage of representations as constructed by the three types of discourse they have grown in. They are imprisoned in a bilingualism where classical Arabic is completely managed by *reasons of state* (la raison d'état) and the faith in an official religion, on one hand, and a native language dominated by tradition and permeated by extremist Islamism, on the other.

Their credulity and the credibility of these discourses are based on the

²⁴ MOT

fact that they fall under various effects of situation, effects of perspective and effects of epistemology (as this will be advanced in Chapter Two) that mask their own reality and the *other's*. The *other* is always the one to be blamed for their society's tragedies and misfortunes; the *other* who may be the 'West', the Jew, the American, a scapegoat in any case.

Religious and political discourses take advantage of the flaws, rifts, and dysfunctions of Algerian culture which does not take in charge the intellectual formation of the youth, left to the winds of manipulation and indoctrination. The social role of culture is then left to a particular form of ideology, specific to the Arab-Islamic world. This ideology takes in charge the definition of *otherness* as well as the proper way to deal with it. I will refer to this ideology as *Occidentalism* (see Chapter Two), an Arabist-Islamist conception of the West and Westerner, as the anti-thesis of the Arab-Muslim that induces a fundamentally negative attitude towards anything Western, be it language or culture.

This work puts forward the idea that an important part of foreign language students are under the influence of Occidentalism that functions as their mediating channel in their approach to foreign languages and cultures, and which consequently *neutralises* and *anaesthetises* all possible effects of acculturation, interculturalisation, and thus the whole process of education.

* * *

This work is pluridisciplinary as it makes use of concepts and theories drawn from different disciplines in its investigation and analysis. Besides educational sciences, with contributions of such people as J. Arnold, H. Stern, M. Williams, R. Burden in educational psychology (through concepts such as attitude and motivation), and C. Kramsch, G. Zarate, M. Abdallah-

Pretceille, and M. Byram in cross-cultural education, and since cross-cultural issues are fundamentally social, sociological tools are called into play through concepts developed by P. Bourdieu, in his approach to the concepts of discourse and ideology. Working on a cultural subject, that is a subject involving such concepts as cultural identity, ethnocentrism and stereotypes, the contributions of the sociologist R. Boudon, with his explanation of situational effects, and of Edward Said, with his cross-cultural theory of Orientalism, stand as essential. Anthropological insights, with M. Saville-Troike on the ethnography of communication, serve the purpose of this work, which is meant to be a critical anthropology whose aim is mainly emancipation. Social psychology, with S. Moscovici on the concept of representation, guides the research as this concept, borrowed by educational sciences, is central to the work. Discourse analysts, such as P. Charaudeau and C. Chabrol, bring as well their expertise to deconstruct the functioning of discourse in its different formulations according to various channels. All of these concepts and theories will certainly be adapted to the particular Algerian, and Arab-Islamic, sociocultural and educational reality.

My position, as a participant-observer-intellectual-researcher, is also particular. Being a member of the culture in question, a teacher in the class described, working on a cultural issue, and investigating a personal experience in which I may be involved emotionally, I run the risks of being autobiographical, as Weston La Barre (1980: 7) warned. Yet, does any scientific culture not start, as expressed by Bachelard (1971: 162), by “*an intellectual and affective catharsis* [?].” Personal inflection and private sensibility are what gives meaning to what is written (Said 1994). This is empathy, necessary for research, which, as a cognitive approach, is “*a cognitive intention, a participative will, an imaginative effort, a tentative of prediction and anticipation*” (Maucorps and Bassoul 1960: 8)²⁵, yet distinct

²⁵ MOT

from sympathy, which is driven by a purely affective dynamic.

As a researcher, I may also be tempted by what Van Der Maren (1996: 472) labels “*the roundabout way effect*”, i.e. the influence of the research results by the researcher’s discriminatory selection of conceptions and tools of analysis. It behoves me then to explicitly say that I am aware of this status for which I have tried to put some methodological safeguards of objectivity, objectivity which is vital to any research work.

Among these are the cross-examination of my statements drawn from my introspection and observation with the implementation of two other self-report methods, the questionnaire and the exams papers (see below), in order to allow the observed people’s voices to emerge.

As an intellectual, I may be carrying and defending, consciously or not, some ideology, as reminded by Saville-Troike who ideology and political considerations always underlie linguistic issues.²⁶ I admit then that I do challenge these interests and that I am, however, the vassal of no social class or power sphere. I am only deeply committed to that humanism that “*has to do with,*” as Said put it, “*knowledge, rigor, commitment to pedagogy,*” (quoted in Bayoumi and Rubin 2000: 435). A humanism in which the humanist is not isolated, but rather “*cherishes a feeling of community with other researchers, other societies and other epochs.*” (Said 2003) I also do subscribe to *oppositional criticism*, which is, according to Said, the best bulwark against autocratic regimes ad policies.²⁷

²⁶ “*Issues regarding language in the public sphere*” she admits, “*are always politically embedded and potentially charged, and by conducting research affecting these issues, linguists will ineluctably be supporting or challenging the interests maintaining the status quo.*” (Saville-Troike 2003: 280)

²⁷ “*Oppositional criticism,*” asserts Said (1983: 29), “*is... life-enhancing and constitutively opposed to every form of tyranny, domination, and abuse; its social goals are non-coercive knowledge produced in the interests of human freedom.*”

As a member of the culture observed, I am also struggling to reach some *cultural neutrality* (Devereux 1977: 339) which could allow me to avoid uncritical solidarity. Moreover, as a native Berber speaker, i.e. a member of an Algerian 'sub-culture' that has sometimes been in conflict with the Arab and Middle-East-oriented one, this may also help distance myself from some of the discourses studied in this work. For intellectual hospitality, i.e. keeping a place in research for the *other*, is a "*creative action of openness to the Other... [which] is the most important dimension in a researcher's mission.*" (Said 2003)

The fact that I refer to representations available in my culture does not necessarily mean I hold the same. Moreover, belonging to the culture I have studied has certainly freed me from the representations, stereotypes and ethnocentrism an outsider may possibly have, and has allowed me to have introspective knowledge that the outsider may not possess. Saville-Troike points to this when she writes about the ethnographer investigating his own culture, performing a dual function as observer and informant, allowing objectivity and subjectivity to intrude into the same piece of reasoning.²⁸

This work is principally a case of ethnographic research as my purpose is to retrieve insights from the culture studies class as a cultural system through *uncontrolled observation* (Nunan 1992: 3). My hypotheses are not prior to the research, but they have rather emerged during the course of my introspection and observation phases, and then probed by the questionnaire and analysis of the students' exam papers. The ethnographic character of this research makes it very dependent on anthropology and sociology, as

²⁸ "*The extension of this perspective to the study of culture,*" she writes, "*acknowledges the member of the society as the repository of cultural knowledge, and recognizes that the ethnographer who already possesses this knowledge can tap it introspectively to validate, enrich, and expedite the task of ethnographic description.... In the same way then, with the ethnographer able to function as both observer and informant, some of the problems of verification can be overcome, and a corrective to unbridled speculation provided.*" (Saville-Troike 2003: 89-90)

one of its tenets is that behaviour is greatly influenced by the context within which it occurs, as observed above. I will then confirm that this work contains the main characteristics attributed to any ethnographic research (ibid.: 56):

- *Contextual* (The students have not been displaced as the research is undertaken in the native context, where they live and study);
- *unobtrusive* (There is no conscious manipulation of the investigation on my part);
- *longitudinal* (The introspection and observation phases having taken years, this made the research long-term);
- *interpretive* (I will interpret the data collected to confirm the hypotheses);
- *organic* (I admit that there has been interaction between the questions/hypotheses and data collection/interpretation, as each one induced changes in the other in the course of the investigation).

I also take the risk of admitting that this work enjoys external validity, i.e. the observations and results found in the culture studies class (American Civilisation class) are not unique and peculiar, and can thus be extended to the Algerian society and generalised. As assumed previously, this class is but a microcosmic representation of the Algerian society, and its investigation is a case study, limited to a number of individuals, yet very informative about the rest of the population and a revealing pointer to the Algerian sociocultural situation.

This research is also an action research as I mainly conduct it as a teacher, i.e. a practitioner, facing a pedagogical and didactic problem which I attempt to resolve, and hope the solutions proposed might produce the expected changes in the students' representations. However, I am deeply aware that as action research, the questions and tentative answers

suggested can constantly be reformulated and re-evaluated.

* * *

I should now give some methodological indications as to the tools of analysis I have made use of. I should speak of discourse rather than method as I have clearly stated the cultural and ideological context of the production of this work. This discourse is intercultural and cross-cultural, applied to a pedagogical situation in general (teaching about culture), and a didactic case in particular (teaching about American culture).

I have to put forward, though, some warnings for mere methodological reasons and which will stand as precautions on my part to avoid any misunderstandings due to any possible lack of clarity in my statements.

1. Cross-cultural vs. intercultural: It is worth noting from the outset of this work that the concepts *cross-cultural* and *intercultural* are very polemical notions, characterised by what Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a: 9) calls “*semantic elasticity*”. They are sometimes taken as synonyms, following the conceptions of scholars such as Devereux (1977), Saville-Troike (2003) and Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a; 2004b). Saville-Troike (2003: 168) defines the two concepts as: “*interaction (spoken or written) between participants who have significantly different linguistic and cultural backgrounds.*” Kramsch (2000: 81), though, while she admits that they do share a shade of meaning: “*‘cross-cultural’ or intercultural usually refers to the meeting of two cultures or two languages across political boundaries of nation-state.*” She adds that the concept *intercultural* may also stand for the meeting of two cultures or languages within the same country. It is then Kramsch’s understanding of the terms that will be

used in this work, i.e. *cross-cultural* will refer to encounters across political boundaries (the case of Algerian students learning English as a foreign language); and *intercultural* will describe situations of contact between languages or cultures within the same country (the case of Berber and Arabic in Algeria).

2. Although culture teaching here takes place in a foreign language curriculum, I will not discuss language representations, even if they are closely linked to the social representations that come into play in foreign culture experiences. For, it must be admitted that language learning theory, though it may inform about aspects of culture learning, is different from culture learning theory, in terms of both pedagogical and didactic demands and implications.

Actually, the language that plays a substantial role in the Algerian students' foreign culture study is rather classical Arabic, not English, though the latter is the medium used in culture studies classes. Religious and political ideologues have always used classical Arabic as the vehicle of their ideologies which nurture students' representations. This language has always been used as a tool of *euphemisation* (Bourdieu 2001) of these ideologies, for the sake of obtaining support and, more importantly, consent, i.e. an instrument of hegemony²⁹. Fairclough expresses the relation between language, ideology and power claiming that ideology instrumentalises language to gain power.³⁰

Language and ideology in Algeria have always been interconnected, or to use Poirier and Rosselin's (1982: 177) word, *consubstantial*.

²⁹ See Chapter Two for Gramsci's concept of hegemony.

³⁰ "Ideologies," observes Fairclough (2001: 2), "are closely linked to language, because using language is the commonest form of social behaviour, and the form of social behaviour where we rely most on 'commonsense' assumptions. ... the exercise of power, in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language."

As it will be shown in Chapter Two, classical Arabic has accompanied the anchoring of the political and religious ideologies in Algeria. The attempts of purification of the Algerian linguistic environment, at the expense of the Algerians' native languages³¹, through the systematic exclusion of the other languages from power spheres (political, religious or media) and imposition of classical Arabic, have always aimed at the purification of Algerians' thoughts from possible 'dangerous' residues of those languages, considered as threats to the political status quo that resulted from the Algerian Revolution³². This created, in addition to bilingualism and diglossia, a situation of *colingualism* (Balibar 1993) where classical Arabic is used by power holders to exclude part of the society which used and understood the native languages, along with French. Classical Arabic has been attributed a privileged status by the political and religious institutions. It is precisely for the preservation of this status quo that any destabilisation of representations, which may be induced by exposition to foreign cultures and their value-systems, is deemed by the Algerian ideologues as a *clear and present* danger that may weaken or question their power organisation.

3. I should also affirm that my criticism of the religious/ideological discourse and classical Arabic is by no means a censure of religion, Islam in this case, or the language. Although, this may well be a

³¹ It should be noted that classical Arabic, in Algeria, has never been a mother tongue, for the very simple linguistic reason that there are no Algerian speakers who use it as their first language. Although it is presented as such by politicians, religious representatives, lay people, and – strangely! – by some intellectuals and language experts, Algerians, in their majority, have either 'Algerian Arabic' (or Maghrebi) or Berber (in its different varieties) as their native language.

³² It is quite interesting to draw an analogy with the French case of standardisation. Bourdieu (2001: 74) advances: "*It would be naïve to attribute the linguistic unification policy to the sole technical needs of communication between the different parts of the [French] territory and, notably, between Paris and the provinces The conflict between the French of the revolutionary intelligentsia and the idioms or patois is a conflict over the symbolic power whose stake is the formation and re-formation of mental structures.*" (MOT)

subject matter of a thesis, it is not that of this one. The criticism concerns the ideologues, the spokespeople, who instrumentalise Islam and Arabic for sheer political purposes, and their interpretation of the sacred text, just as Nietzsche's *Antichrist* was anything but a criticism of Christianity. Most ideologies and doctrines, even when they are originally designed for the good of humanity, are perverted by some people's interpretations and implementations. This has been the case for revealed religions, Marxism and many other social theories and projects.

The alliance between religion and politics in the construction of the same ideological discourse is not new. Human history is full of illustrations of this unnatural union, ranging from Arab-Islamic history to Europe of the Middle Ages, through African primitive and modern social organisations. The genesis of political ideology, as a symbolic system, needs the assistance of a symbolic authority which could guarantee its credibility, legitimacy, and thus full acceptance among people. Any social institution needs to have a role to subsist in society. Political ideology has never found a better ally than religion, an ideology itself, to provide sense to its social role and thus facilitate its penetration into the minds and hearts of people. While in Europe, for instance, ideology has often been the product of intellectuals, whether rightwing or leftwing, in Algeria, it is precisely the absence of these intellectuals, or more accurately, their *muzzling*, that gives a free hand to politicians and preachers to form and diffuse their ideologies with the complicity of a certain type of media, consciously or unconsciously, as it will be shown below.

4. It should as well be noted that the use of the phrase Algerian culture does not, by any means, suggest that an Algerian individual partakes of only one culture. I am totally aware that Algerian culture

is not monolithic, and is rather a common denominator of various, sometimes conflicting, cultures carried by every individual. The phrase Algerian culture is then used for mere convenience. I completely subscribe to Kramersch's view, who admits the fact that delimitations between cultures and the fact of claiming one's belonging to one instead of the other is more a work of the mind, i.e. a representation, than a reality.³³

This work is by no means purely descriptive, but rather an attempt to construct a critical discourse of the Algerian sociocultural facts that form the student's learning environment. Departing from a personal experience, it is partly empirical and pragmatic since cultural facts are, by essence, practices.

However, to overcome simple intuitive introspection, I make use of the following concepts and theories to carry out my investigation:

- The students' negative response is taken as an *attitude*, i.e. as a disposition to react in a cross-cultural situation. This concept of *attitude* will be handled as defined by G. Lüdi (1986), B. Py (1986) and J. Arnold (1999), and implemented in the light of the theory of *situational effects* as put forward by R. Boudon (1991).
- *Attitudes*, as a dependent variable in the learning process, will be put in perspective as related to S. Moscovici's (1972) concept of *representation*, which is taken as an independent variable influencing *attitudes*. This will be undertaken according to the theory of *social representation* as advanced by G. Zarate (1986; 2004) and

³³ "Thus we have to view the boundary [between cultures] not as an actual event but, rather, as a state of mind, as a positioning of the learner at the intersection of multiple social roles and individual choices." (Kramersch 2001: 234)

M. Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a).

- Close reference will be made to *discourse* as the main vehicle of *representations*, on the basis of the theory of *critical discourse analysis* (CDA), constructed by discourse analysts such as N. Fairclough (1992; 2001), and the theory of the *third*, made by P. Charaudeau (2004).
- *Discourse*, as a social practice, will be presented as being the outgrowth of political and religious *ideologies*, as conceptualised by P. Bourdieu (2001) in his theory of *symbolic power* and *symbolic violence*. M. Saville-Troike's (2003) theory of the *ethnography of communication* will also be called upon to probe into the role of classical Arabic in the religious and political discourse.
- E. Said's (1995) theory of *Orientalism* will guide one of the analyses of one of the main theses in this work, i.e. *Occidentalism*. On the basis of the criteria that brought Said to conceptualise Western conceptions of the Orient as Orientalism, I will construct the concept of *Occidentalism*.
- The form of discourse, taken here as an essential feature that constructs the ideal conditions for the success of ideology, is tackled through Bakhtin's (2002) theory of speech genres. This approach will provide the tool to evince the channel that enables ideologies such as Occidentalism to enjoy large and lasting penetration in the Algerian society.
- C. Kramsch's theory of *the third culture* (2001), M. Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a; 2004b) theory of *intercultural pedagogy*, and H.

Janks and R. Ivanič's (1992) *emancipatory discourse* will provide directions towards suggestions of possible remedies.

It is then the aim of this work, by using this complex and varied conceptual apparatus, to comprehend and explain, in Sperber's (1996) sense, a practical sociocultural/educational situation on the basis of a theoretical conceptualisation:

- Comprehension, in this particular sociocultural case, necessarily goes through the understanding of the human being in general, i.e. through an *intellectualist* approach which is part of "*the effort to explain the world*" (ibid.: 59), in order to identify the general mechanisms that are at work in the students' process of representation.
- Explanation of the process of representation will be:
 - a. *epidemiological*, i.e. how representations are acquired by students and transmitted as an epidemic;
 - b. *functionalist*, i.e. how representations are instrumentalised by political and religious ideologues.

* * *

The corpora that underlie this work are formed of data collected from four fields of exploration:

1. Introspection: my own perceptions as a member of the culture and society under study.
2. Participant-observation: my observation as a teacher in my

American Civilisation class.

3. Exam papers: the students' answers in exams provide a bulk of data that inform about their attitudes, since a great number of students tackle the questions, either through a very conformist perspective, stuck to their notes taken in class, or, when they attempt to be personal, through their representations, instead of pertinent knowledge of a rational nature. The exams papers used are of exams that were taken at different moments of the year (first term exam in February, final term exam in May, first resit in June, and second resit in September). This data collection method is then administered at different moments so as to check whether any changes in attitudes and opinions have occurred or not, and to what extent in case they did.

4. Questionnaire: it is used as a means to check and cross-examine my observations and interpretations of the students' answers in exams. It was handed to:
 - Two hundred and fifty second year students of English at the English Section, University of Oran. Out of these, a hundred and eighty responded.
 - Two hundred third year students of English at the English Section, University of Oran. Out of these, a hundred and fifty responded.
 - A hundred and eighty second year students of English at the English Department, University of Chlef. Out of these, two hundred responded.
 - A hundred third year students of English at the English Department, University of Chlef. Out of these, eighty-three responded.

While the English language is the sole vehicle of the students' attitudes and representations in my participant observation, which is based on their questions, answers and comments made in the classroom, and in their exams papers, I asked them to answer the questionnaire in any language they feel comfortable in, and add any comment they feel necessary, so as to allow the maximum of spontaneity, and thus get some relative sincerity in their statements.

The detection of the trace of the sociocultural origins of the students' representations is carried out through the analysis of various authentic and pedagogical documents. Data will then be retrieved from:

- Algerian newspaper articles,
- Algerian and Arab television channels programmes,
- Religious sermons in mosques or the media,
- Algerian political speeches,
- Algerian school textbooks.

The population of the case study, that sustains the hypotheses which I extend to a part of the Algerian society, consists of second and third year students of English, at the Section of English, Faculty of Letters, Languages and Arts, Es-Sénia University, Oran and at the English Department, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, Hassiba Ben Bouali University, Chlef. The questionnaire was filled in by this academic year's second and third year students (2005-2006). Close observation has really started three years ago (2002), though my experience with such students, as a teacher of American Civilisation, dates back to 1996, i.e. a nine-year experience.

These students come from different parts of Algeria (urban and rural; north and south; mostly from the western part of the country), from various social milieus, and of both sexes. This provide a wide coverage of the Algerian society and varied expressions of Algerian culture, a characteristic

that can allow drawing conclusions that have some validity, i.e. representativity, as far as diversity in the Algerian society is concerned.

* * *

Chapter One deals with some theoretical debates relating to key concepts such as attitude, representation, acculturation and interculturalisation. It also explains how students' negative attitudes towards *otherness* are based on their representations of foreign cultures, and the fact that these representations stand as symptoms of a dysfunction in their process of acculturation, posed in an oppositional relationship with their process of enculturation.

Chapter Two examines Algerian political and religious ideologies as hotbeds for these representations. An attempt to establish a theory about the practice of the main ideology of Occidentalism, developed out of the politicisation and instrumentalisation of Islam, and the way its propagation in all spheres of society, including education, has given birth to a culture of confrontation with the *other*, a culture that induces inhibitory obstacles in the process of foreign language and culture learning.

Chapter Three evinces the most efficacious tools, language (classical Arabic) and discourse (religious sermon), that Occidentalism is making use of in order to insure its persistence in Algerian society. It also explains how students come to develop negative attitudes towards foreign cultures due to the great influence of those ideological tools.

Chapter Four provides more vivid illustrations of the working of these ideologies in their production of representations, and suggests a few directions towards finding a suitable cross-cultural liberating pedagogy.

Original Quotations

Page 11

(Footnote 2)

Tout contact de cultures est aussi un conflit de cultures.

(Abou 1981: 198)

(Footnote 3)

Le climat d'angélisme dans lequel baignent les rencontres permet d'éviter et d'évacuer un problème de fond qui est celui de l'éducation de la relation à l'autre, et dont le conflit est un des éléments moteurs.

(Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 187)

Page 16

Une activité mentale polarisée sur ces comportements (d'où son aspect affectif) et par une prise de position (d'où son aspect subjectivant)

(Charaudeau 2004: 34)

Page 17

(Footnote 11)

La nature de la relation géopolitique entre la culture nationale de l'élève et la culture enseignée, mesure des effets induits par le contexte institutionnel d'enseignement et par l'environnement médiatique local.

(Zarate 2004: 73)

Page 18

(Footnote 12)

Les individus ne peuvent agir matériellement qu'en se représentant idéologiquement leur propre pratique.

(Capdevila 2004: 68)

(Footnote 14)

La culture est essentiellement un phénomène sociopsychologique. Elle est véhiculée par les entendements individuels et ne peut s'exprimer que par l'intermédiaire des individus.

(Linton 1967: 321)

Page 19

Toute représentation se développe sur le fondement d'une idéologie ...

(Banbion-Broye et al. 1977: 51)

La communication interculturelle peut être définie comme les processus d'interaction tant verbaux que non-verbaux, qui existent entre membres appartenant à des groupes culturels différents.

(Porter and Samovar, quoted in Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 102-103)

(Footnote 17)

Les représentations jouent un rôle particulier dans l'interaction des groupes, domaine qu'elles structurent de façon précise en obéissant à certaines lois de nature cognitive.

(Doise 1961: 206)

Page 22

... le discours est plus spécifiquement le lieu où les représentations sociales se constituent, se façonnent, se modifient ou se désagrègent.

(Py 2004: 6)

Page 26

... au désir fanatique ... de ne chercher, sous les apparences, que les seules différences et oppositions, afin de maintenir intactes ses distances.

(Castro 1976: 357)

Page 28

... une intention cognitive , une volonté participatrice, un effort imaginatif, une tentative de prévision ou d'anticipation.

(Maucorps and Bassoul 1960: 8)

Page 34

(Footnote 32)

Il serait naïf d'imputer la politique d'unification linguistique aux seuls besoins techniques de la communication entre les différentes parties du territoire et, notamment, entre Paris et la province le conflit entre le français de l'intelligentsia révolutionnaire et les idiomes ou les patois est un conflit pour le pouvoir symbolique qui a pour enjeu la formation et la ré-formation des structures mentales.

(Bourdieu 2001: 74)

CHAPTER ONE

Representations as the Background of Students' Negative Attitudes

1.1. Introduction.....	45
1. 2. Attitude and Motivation.....	48
1.3. Attitude and Otherness.....	53
1.4. Attitude and Culture.....	54
1.5. Representations.....	73
1.6. Conclusion.....	91
1.7. Original Quotations.....	92

CHAPTER ONE

Representations¹ as the Background of Students' Negative Attitudes

L'enfer, c'est les autres. (J.P. Sartre, Huis-Clos)
J'ai besoin de la médiation d'Autrui pour être ce que je suis. (J.P. Sartre, L'Être et le Néant)
L'autre est indispensable à mon existence, aussi bien d'ailleurs qu'à la connaissance que j'ai de moi. (J.P. Sartre, L'existentialisme est un humanisme)

(Quoted in Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 39)

1.1. Introduction

Since the writings of the social and clinical psychologist Uri Bronfenbrenner (1979), researchers in education have come to consider the importance of environment in determining the success or failure of learning. His work emphasised the effects of the environmental systems of the individual, i.e. his *ecology*, on his development. Whether the *microsystem*

¹ The concept of *representation*, first coined by the French school of social psychology in the 1970s, as it will be shown below, has been fully integrated into the Anglo-Saxon epistemology, notably with the works of Edward Said as early as 1978. Although the concept of *perception* is sometimes used, in English, to refer to what *representation* is used for, I have made a clear option for the latter, in this work, as it seems to better convey the depths of my reflection and to go beyond the limitations of the first concept. As a matter of fact, while *perception* is quite limited to an individualised and passive view of reality, *representation* involves, not only a collective depiction of reality but also the whole process of self-identification and the corresponding behaviour. *Representation* is then to be taken here as it has been conceptualised by E. Said, i.e. as a *subjective restructure* (Said 1995: 129) of reality, which is “*embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer.*” (ibid.: 272)

(e.g. family and peers), the *mesosystem* (home-school relationships), the *ecosystem* (e.g. the school, the teacher's behaviour), or the *macrosystem* (the culture of the whole society) (Williams 2001: 189), these categories of environment concur to develop in the individual a personality and a behaviour that would certainly differ if he happened to grow within a different environment.

In education, the learner's readiness to learn languages and be open to discover their cultures is also quite related to his ecology inasmuch as it develops in him positive or negative attitudes towards these languages and cultures and which influence greatly his involvement in the learning process. The concept of *attitude* is central to understand the situation of foreign language learning in Algeria in the sense that it explains the learning behaviour of the foreign language student, especially in his relationship to the culture or cultures he is exposed to in the classroom.

Generally defined as "*an acquired, latent, psychological predisposition to react in a certain manner towards an object*" (Lüdi & Py 1986: 97)², attitude, as a sociopsychological factor, is also viewed as a visible tendency to react positively or negatively towards a set of things or a group of individuals (Cooper & Fishman 1974; Agheyisi & Fishman 1979; Moore 2001). Doise (1989: 222-223) considers it as a specific position from which an individual evaluates a "*given social entity*" and which determines his readiness to maintain or break relationships with the members of the group evaluated. This view is shared by the sociologist Boudon (1991) who prefers to speak of *situational effects*, as this will be exposed in Chapter Two.

In foreign language and culture learning at university level in Algeria, attitudes towards the target language and culture play a major role in the

² (MOT)

student's readiness and subsequent achievement of the objectives of the curriculum of the degree he intends to obtain. Emphasis is put here on university level as, in this particular case and as put forward in the Introduction, the objectives of a university education go beyond the mere fact of accumulating knowledge in a specific field for a future job after graduation. University education is part and parcel of the great social enterprise of producing citizens capable of taking in charge the country's management, including its relationships with the rest of the world. As such success and failure of a university education is to be assessed not only in terms of how much knowledge the graduate has or has not accumulated, but also how much *savoir-être* he has been able or not to integrate to live up to the hopes and expectations his society has invested in him.

Attitude is all the more important inasmuch as it is associated with deep-rooted emotional responses, as a psychological process very much relevant to the cognitive process of learning, in which the contact with the foreign language and culture are based on feelings, stereotypes, and prejudices about the people who speak that language or hold that culture. A conflicting or amicable relation to a people influences a student's interest in their language and culture, i.e. their attitude to approach them³. Beacco (2000: 55), in this matter, observed that cultures in the pedagogical context have always been caught in rapports of domination and resistance, adherence or rejection.

It is observed that considerable numbers of foreign language students in Algerian universities, students of English as a foreign language, do show negative attitudes towards the cultures of the native peoples of this

³ Works on the strong relationship between attitude and learning were produced as early as the 1950's with Adorno and others through their *Authoritarian Personality* (1950), which explored the relations between prejudice, personality and learning. Other consistent works also continued this type of investigation with people like d'Anglejan and Tucker (1973), or later Gardner and Lambert (1972), Gardner (1979), Gardner and Smythe (1981).

language, most particularly Americans. These attitudes seem often surprising to teachers and somehow not taken into account by syllabus designers and language teaching methods. This is partly due to the fact that these attitudes have coped quite well with the learning of the language, instead of being a definite deterrent or a psychological inhibitor, though they are sometimes so. Foreign language learning in Algeria, as far as English is concerned, takes place in a non-supportive, and at times even hostile, environment of resentment, suspicion and rejection of the culture of the target language. This hostile ecology brings many Algerian foreign language students to miss a great part of the objectives of the foreign language curriculum as they view the foreign culture as a *subtractive* (Gardner 1979) threat that could take the place of their own culture, while the foreign culture is meant to be *additive* to their own, i.e. approached in a positive give-and-take relationship that can be profitable to them in terms of widening their scope, vista and comprehension of the world.

1. 2. Attitude and Motivation

It is in this sense that attitudes towards foreign languages and cultures among Algerian students stand as prerequisites to the real effectuation of the university curriculum objectives. This is all the more true as these attitudes determine the student's motivation to engage body and soul into achieving these objectives. Defined as:

... a state of cognitive and emotional arousal, which leads to a conscious decision to act, and which gives rise to a period of sustained intellectual and/or physical effort in order to attain a previously set goal (or goals)

(Williams & Burden 2001: 120)

motivation, as a crucial affective variable in the learning process, which

comprises psychological factors that “*energize behaviour and give it direction*” (Hilgard, Atkinson & Atkinson 1979: 281), determines the student’s interest in the subject studied and the amount of time and effort he is ready and willing to invest in it.

Yet, because there is a clear distinction between language and culture as far as attitude is concerned in the sense that a negative attitude towards a culture does not necessarily induce a negative attitude towards the language that conveys it, motivation to learn the language may vary from the motivation to really know the people who speak it, i.e. the motivation to discover in an unbiased manner their culture or cultures. Although attitude towards the language may well coincide with attitude towards the culture, in which case it would induce or not the motivation to learn both, attitudes towards language and culture may well not operate on the same wavelength, and produce a situation whereby the student develops a motivation to learn the language, and at the same time remains completely impermeable to and turns away from its culture.

Contrary to Schumann's (1986) theory of the 'acculturation model', which states that rejection of a group's culture is likely to lead to inhibiting the learning of the group's language, many students in Algerian universities manage to be quite good users of English in spite of their negative attitudes towards the English or the Americans. This is mainly due to the type of motivation they activate in their approach to this language. Probably, a positive attitude towards the culture is likely to correlate with higher achievement in the language, a situation in which it is the *integrative motivation* that directs the learning process. This type of motivation refers to the student's "*desire to learn the language in order to relate to and even become part of the target language culture*" (Arnold & Brown 1999: 13), to identify with the culture of speakers of the target language, or to discover

the *other* out of a humanistic curiosity. Integrative motivation is then one of the main positive results of the personality variable referred to as empathy.

Since the works of Gardner (1985) and until recently, integrative motivation held a privileged position in foreign language learning as it stood as the best booster for the language learning process. Yet, Gardner (1995) himself, and many researchers before him, such as Lukmani (1972) or Ellis (1994), have come to mitigate this statement and reconsider this theory, more applicable to second language learning, and admit that other types of motivation could induce successful learning, especially in the case of foreign languages.

In the case of Algerian university students, other types of motivation play an important role to overcome the culture inhibition and achieve successful learning of the foreign language. Despite the fact that the other, not less important, objectives of university education are not achieved, these types of motivation bring the students to spend the necessary time and effort to attain a decent, if not a good, mastery of the language. These types can be grouped under the general name of *instrumental motivation*, in which practical factors external to the individual come to induce the desire to learn. Among these factors, Williams and Burden (2001: 116) mention “*passing exams, financial rewards, furthering a career or gaining a promotion.*” This type of motivation is labelled by Atkinson (1964) as *achievement motivation* in the sense that the student’s desire to learn is induced and sustained by his need to achieve a success in a given subject. Achievement motivation is then necessary for students who struggle against the fear of failure.

However, with the works of the Canadian psychologist Donald Hebb, the distinction between instrumental and integrative motivations seems unsatisfactory. Hebb (1966) spoke of *optimal arousal*, a motivation which

induces learning without having to meet other needs than novelty, curiosity and pleasure. The psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990) uses the concept of *flow* to describe this psychological state in which learning becomes an optimal experience of effortless movement of energy. *Flow* is defined by Goleman as:

... the ultimate in harnessing the emotions in the service of performance and learning. In flow the emotions are not just contained and channeled, but positive, energized and aligned with the task at hand. Because flow feels so good, it is intrinsically rewarding. It is a state in which people become utterly absorbed in what they are doing ...

(Goleman 1995: 90-91)

Williams and Burden (2001) prefer to define motivation in terms of a combination of either internal or external influences. Internal influences range from a mere interest in an activity to a wish to succeed. External influences refer to the impact of other people in determining the desire to learn. Deci and Ryan (1985) express the same idea using the concepts of *intrinsic and extrinsic motivation*. With intrinsic motivation, according to the authors, the reward is the learning experience itself, instead of an external reward like success⁴.

In the case of some Algerian students that learn a foreign language despite their negative attitudes towards its culture, it is a special type of motivation that prompts learning. It is a motivation that combines internal and external factors. This combination operates in a special way in the sense that internal factors are the result of the external ones, and gives birth to a type of motivation that can be called *oppositional motivation*. It is a

⁴ Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura (1989) share this approach to motivation. They consider that an activity which induces interest and a feeling of enjoyment is performed thanks to an intrinsic motivation, while when an activity is undertaken in search for, for instance, financial rewards, it is external motivation that sustains the effort made.

psychological state of defiance and challenge, in which the student learns the language of a people whose culture he despises and considers as the antithesis of his. It is a motivation of confrontation in which language becomes an arm that can lead to defeat the *other*. *Otherness* is viewed, in the eyes of such students, not as an opportunity for enrichment, but rather as adversity, enmity and conflict.

On the basis of a social view of motivation, as opposed to the cognitive perspective which affirms the individual choice in making decisions, it is then suggested here that the learning of foreign languages among some Algerian university students is, sometimes, successful, despite negative attitudes towards their culture, because it is underlain by an oppositional motivation. This motivation is based on the internal factor of self-satisfaction induced by the external factor of their religious-dominated culture that makes up the social context of their upbringing and education. Students are motivated to learn the language by their response to a religious prescription, an Islamic one, which establishes foreign language learning as a moral duty. Their learning is viewed by them as an act of piety as they put into practice the words Prophet Mohammed is supposed to have said: "*He who learns a people's language is safe from their harm.*"⁵

Their oppositional motivation includes an instrumental one as they learn the language as an act of self-defence. It also comprises an extrinsic one as they are influenced by their religious-cultural environment. It integrates an intrinsic motivation as well in the sense that it relies on a belief and a moral conformity to this belief. It is not meant here that all students are motivated in this way, nor is it assumed that oppositional motivation is the only motivation that brings a category of Algerian students to learn the foreign language. Oppositional motivation is rather what allows these students to

⁵ (MOT)

overcome the cultural obstacle and engage in the language learning process despite their negative attitudes towards the foreign culture.

It appears here that the student's views of the foreign language and the foreign culture play a substantial role in determining his attitudes towards both of them and his motivation to approach them. These views are nothing but his *representation* of the *other* and the relationship he is supposed to have with him, i.e. his conception of *otherness*⁶.

1.3. Attitude and Otherness

The notion of *otherness*, or the relation to the *other*, underlies attitude, and consequently the whole intercultural process experience, whether in or out of class. In his analysis of this notion, Todorov (1982: 1982) observed the multiplicity of dimension of *otherness*. According to him, it involves:

1. An axiological dimension: a manichean value judgement of the *other*; good/bad, like/dislike.
2. A praxeological dimension: the decision to get close to or turn away from the *other* ranges from the identification to him to his domination, through submission or total ignorance.
3. An epistemic dimension: the extent to which one knows or is familiar with the *other*.

⁶ Although the question of *otherness* is central to the study conducted in this work, no reference will be made to the complex theories on the construction and evolution of personality in relation to environment, including humans and objects. First, because this needs great expertise in these psychological theories. Second, suffice it here to rely on the results available on the functioning of *otherness* to answer the question of how the view of the *other* influences the effectuation of pedagogical objectives. A close look at these theories necessitates a consideration of such works as Lacroze (1956) and Levy Schoen (1964) which suggested visions like:

- Awareness of the *other* being a transposition of self-awareness;
- awareness of the *other* preceding self-awareness;
- the self and the *other* being both the same and different.

Negative attitudes are to be seen as a reaction to a culture shock and culture stress. The former, described by Stern (2001: 382) as "*the state of anxiety to which the learner is exposed upon entering a new and totally unfamiliar culture*", is, in the case of Algerian students, rather a state of anxiety due to the negative representation⁷ they have of the foreign culture, because they are only familiar with its distorted image made, for instance, by Occidentalism (see Chapter II). Culture stress, "*the more prolonged discomfort resulting from discrepancies between the self-image and the expectations of the new culture*" (ibidem), is induced, in this case, by the discrepancies of their representation of the foreign culture as constructed by Occidentalism and the contradictory views presented by teachers and the various teaching materials in class.

Culture holds a quite special position in education in general in the sense that it possesses a double status as opposed to other university subjects. In foreign language learning, culture is not only a subject among many others, such as grammar or linguistics, but it is also a concrete environment, a foreign macrosystem, within which the people of the target language evolve, which is in competition with the student's own macrosystem, i.e. his culture.

1.4. Attitude and Culture

The understanding of the concept of culture is to be clarified here in order to objectivise the implications of such a competition. Aware of what Leslie White calls a *conceptual jungle of definitions* (Bénéton 1992: 124) where this concept may be lost in, partly because it has a long history fashioned in multiple ways, as observed by Beacco (2000: 22), by western philosophical and sociological traditions, one then needs to lay some conceptual

⁷ Doise (1989: 224) admits that when dealing with attitudes in social relations, they are to be considered as social representations themselves.

foundation to allow a methodological analysis of what follows. Far from exposing over one hundred and fifty definitions of culture that Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1963) have compiled, and the proliferating meanings that have been developed after them, a short overview of the directions taken by various scholars is certainly to evince the wide scope of human life this concept covers, and whose definition has always been, according to Beacco (2000: 22), beyond the lexicographical dimension, an intellectual and social stake. Exhaustivity in the definition of this concept is neither achievable nor purposed as what is really desired is to single out in Algerian culture what induces negative attitudes towards the *other* and foreign cultures.

In the French intellectual tradition, culture has at times been defined, with such people as Durkheim (1914), as the moral and intellectual products of a given society (Bénéton 1992: 128). The British anthropologist, E.B. Tylor (1924), uses the same concept to cover all human activity, such as science, beliefs, art, morals and customs. This view is shared by McLver (1931) who admits that culture is the *expressions of life*, i.e. ideologies, religions and arts, or what Marxists call the superstructure. O. Spengler rather limits culture to the highest phase of human development and that ends when mankind starts to fall into moral decadence (see Marcuse 1970: 110).

In the United States, culture has often been used to refer to distinctive life styles (Sowell 1991). Conversely, Wald equates culture with what other scholars label subcultures⁸:

The members of a congregation may share regular social interaction, a common status, and a distinctive way of life. Out of

⁸ Wallace and Wallace (1989: 42) define subculture as follows: “*Large, complex societies often contain smaller social groups with distinctive cultural features not shared with the dominant culture. A subculture is the culture of a subgroup of society which adopts norms that set them apart from the dominant group.*” Other scholars equate between culture and subculture which are viewed as “*the characteristic behaviours of some particular group.*” (Beals et al. 1977: 27)

these experiences, a common culture may emerge.

(Wald1992: 28)

Another view of culture is put forward by Sykes who admits that it is what allows predicting a particular individual's behaviour which is determined by his position in society, or what he terms the *public role*. People are expected, in a particular culture, to behave, according to their sex, age, occupation and social status, in ways which are different from the ways other people who belong to a different culture would behave. Culture is then those beliefs about how people react in their environment and, as observed by Sykes:

... when one examines any culture ... one possible approach is through the role expectations of that culture, through the beliefs that people have about how individuals perform or should perform.

(Sykes 1963: 264)

A quite different conception is advanced by the anthropologist A. Wallace who specialises in the relationship between culture and personality, and who views culture as “*a set of standardised models of such contractual relationships*” (quoted in Coben & Ratner 1983: 5). The dichotomy culture/personality is, according to Cuhe, a whole current of thought in anthropology led by E. Sapir, R. Benedict and M. Mead, as compared to the other currents such as the functionalist approach championed by Malinowski and cultural history led by Boas (Cuhe 1998: 30-50). Yet, Coben and Ratner assert that many American scholars, in their study of American culture, conceived of culture as “*the dominant ideas and values that exercised decisive influence over the development of American institutions.*” (ibid.: 6)

Shalhope claims that culture is born when people start to develop common ways of assessing and responding to their environment (1990:

XIII). Stewart and Bennett distinguish between two types of culture: subjective culture and objective culture. The first refers to the common assumptions, values and thoughts, while the second stands for the group's artefacts ranging from institutions to arts and crafts (1991: 2).

However, many scholars claim that the existence of culture does by no means mean the existence of a uniform set of thoughts and behaviours to which all members of society conform. Culture is rather a host of patterns which are subject to individual interpretation, something which induces various applications of the same cultural value. Ideal patterns that make a culture do not oust idiosyncratic and individualised thinking and behaviour which, in general, fall within the limits set by that culture. Culture, in this sense, is a set of ideal patterns observed through quite modified and diversified actual patterns of thought and behaviour among individuals (Stewart & Bennett 1991: 35). Commenting on the difference between ideal and actual patterns, Stewart and Bennett write:

The difference ... was originally thought to be ... a result of cultural change... . A cultural tradition is not a folk description of what happens; it is much more often a folk description of what ought to happen... . Cultural systems are composed of individuals who generally find it convenient to do what they are supposed to do, but who are quite willing to do something else if it is more convenient.

(ibid.: 36)

This view applies quite well to the case of Algerian students who are often trapped within ideal patterns of behaviour which they feel compelled to conform to. Beals et al. (1977: 36) categorise five distinct patterns of behaviour that are variously adopted by members of the same culture and which are responsible for the variety of behaviours in the same situation:

- Compulsory patterns where the general culture provides a particular behaviour in a particular situation.
- Restricted patterns where the general culture allows some specific behaviour for particular members of society and not for society as a whole.
- Preferred patterns where various patterns are acceptable in a particular situation but “*one is more highly valued than the rest*”.
- Typical patterns where various behaviours are acceptable in a particular situation but the members of society tend to adopt one more than the others.
- Alternative patterns where various behaviours are acceptable in a particular situation and are equally valued and expressed.

These patterns are observed in the relationship people are expected to have with the *other*. Obviously society has implicit and explicit cultural and social safeguards, not often consciously established, against *black sheep* who behave outside the dictated patterns. These safeguards take the form of social sanctions which can have different expressions according to the degree of gravity of the pattern breaking and the degree of *closedness* of the culture where it takes place. Maunier lists four major sanctions that are commonly exercised by society on individuals who do not conform to its rules of thought and behaviour:

- mystical (excommunication, curse, penance, blacklisting);
- legal (sentence, compensation);
- moral (disapproval, criticism);
- satirical (bullying, laughter, mockery) (see Cuvillier 1967: 91)

In cultures, such as the Algerian one, where religion and morality exercise a great influence, the first and third types are more commonly applied.

Yet, despite the influence that culture exercises on the individual, there is considerable room for individualised behaviour that can result either from the person's own and personalised reading and realisation of some cultural pattern, or from his blatant rejection of the pattern and his recourse to another one which, in its turn, may either be his own creation or belong to another culture. This view of cultural behaviours is opposed to that approach of cultural determinism, often labelled by some scholars *culturalism*, a theory that developed with the works of M. Mead, R. Benedict and A. Kardiner in the 1930s. The latter spoke of "*the personal configuration which is adopted by all the members of society because it is the outcome of an early common experience*" (quoted in Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 86)⁹. *Culturalism* is by all means questioned by the very existence of cultural pluralism, referred to in the Introduction, which proves that individuals are not, to use Bidney's words, "*passive vehicles and instruments*" of culture (quoted in *ibid.*: 87).

Culturalism, with its generalising assumptions, is often a basis for false representations as it takes all the members of a cultural group as a homogeneous entity sharing the same opinions and behaviours since they have all grown within the same culture. As it will be evinced in Chapter Two, the ideology of Occidentalism in Algeria, and the Arab world in general, has subscribed wholly to this theory of culture as it considers that all those who belong to the 'West' bear the same feelings towards the non-westerners, feelings of enmity and stigmatisation since, according to Occidentalists, they carry the same 'Western' culture which is the antithesis of Arab-Islamic culture.

A less common conception of culture is put forward by people like Marcuse who, in his analysis of advanced industrial societies, viewed it as

⁹ (MOT)

the *spiritual world* where men try to find the psychological solace for their life hardships and sufferings. He establishes an antithetical relationship between culture and civilisation as he assumes that the former is purely idealistic and metaphysical and the latter socially real. What men, according to Marcuse, are actually unable to achieve or attain is realised or, at least, longed for in fancy. This helps men accept the rugged reality they live in through the various outlets, such as religion, sport and art, which provide hope and aspiration and soothe worries and disturbance. Mauk and Oakland have thus noted that certain values in American culture, associated with symbols such as individualism, egalitarianism, liberty, self-reliance, form layers of idealism and abstraction which often conflict with American reality (1998: 5) This is what Marcuse calls the *culture of affirmation* which disguises, and even justifies, the hard conditions of life. As he writes:

[This] *conception of culture...takes the part of the spiritual world against the material world, opposing culture, as the embodiment of real valuations and the end itself, to the social world of utility. ... This conception separates culture from civilisation and puts a distance between them sociologically...*¹⁰

(Marcuse 1970: 109)

The very essence of this culture, found in advanced industrial societies, is that, while culture is by essence particular to a given group, it boasts to be universal, transcending the limits of ethnicity, religion and nationhood. It is thus professed as a sermon to the entire humanity advocating equality in rights and duties as well as opportunities. Marcuse (ibid.: 115) rejects this culture and claims that the sole universal thing about it is the necessity to abolish it. He promptly states that “*satisfaction is not possible without a struggle against the idealistic culture, and it is only in opposition to this culture that it may appear as a universal exigency.*”¹¹

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Closer to the conception of culture which best serves and justifies the purposes of this work is the following understanding. Clarke, Hall, Jefferson and Roberts hold culture, not for the human group's product and way of existence, i.e. not as a possession, but rather for the sense this group makes of this existence (Giroux et al. 1994: 7), or what Wald (1992: 28) labels the group's *common consciousness*. This consciousness has historical, social as well as political bases that allow a particular group to assert what is intrinsic or extrinsic to their own culture. Culture is that collective power that society acquires to “*authorize, to dominate, to legitimate, demote, interdict, and validate*” (Said 2000a: 227) through a saturating system of values and representations that creates an environment where people feel they belong to. This feeling of belonging develops a sense of identity, a national identity, that is threatened by anything that puts into question the system's values.

In this Saidian sense, culture can only be hegemonic and exclusive by means of “*its vindicated power as a victor over everything not itself*” (ibid.: 228). It is the hegemonic character of culture which induces individual resistance of those community members, such as intellectuals, who do not agree with the values imposed by their national culture. These *renegades* are then demoted and face social hostility and opposition. Commenting on this resistance of individual consciousness to culture, as a collective consciousness, Said writes:

Often it has come from individuals or groups declared out of bounds or inferior by the culture (here of course the range is vast, from the ritual scapegoat to the lonely prophet, from the social pariah to the visionary artist, from the working class to the alienated intellectual).

(Ibid.: 229)

On the basis of this conception of culture, it can be stated that the students' negative attitudes are the logical outcome of the society's, or at least part of it, understanding and evaluation of the process of acculturation in its relationship to the first process of enculturation. Acculturation, as a set of phenomena that bring changes in the cultures that are in contact over a period of time (Basdide 1971: 98; Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 45), is viewed as a threat to enculturation as a collective consciousness and the individual's process of socialisation in his native community. Acculturation is understood then, as expressed by Abdallah-Pretceille (ibid.: 47), as *acculturation*, i.e. the deprivation of culture, or rather the deprivation of the original culture, to be replaced by the foreign culture, a phenomenon that some scholars in culture studies rather label *deculturation*¹². In this sense, acculturation is judged as a gradual extinction of the native culture by means of a chain reaction of substitution (Bastide 1971: 54) which is triggered off by the first contact with the foreign culture, as the case may be in a foreign language classroom. Acculturation is also seen as being destructive of group membership which is expressed by the group members' common attitudes, which are mainly acquired, according to Saville-Troike (2003: 183), during the process of enculturation.

This threat is all the more accentuated as acculturation actually and necessarily operates alterations in the set of schemata of the native culture¹³. These alterations are viewed by mainstream culture, and by those for whom the status quo is advantageous, as a favourable environment for the development of what Durkheim called *anomie*, i.e. "a feeling of

¹² This question of the relationship between acculturation and deculturation was the subject of a UNESCO conference as early as 1980: "Phenomenon of acculturation and of deculturation in contemporary world", Paris, November 3-5.

¹³ This view of acculturation is confirmed by Byram (1989: 109) who claims that, while culture study is the study of its schemata, the study of acculturation is the study of the gradual changes that occur in these schemata. Actually, the study of acculturation is also the study of the changes that take place in the representations held by the members of both the native culture and the target one.

dissatisfaction with one's role in society" (Stern 2001: 380), a state which induces the questioning and eventually the rejection of some of the most cherished principles of the culture. To counteract anomie, society and the dominant group in society often activate mechanisms to curb it, among which *machiavellianism*, or "*the tendency to manipulate*" (ibidem.), is used by ideology, as the case of Occidentalism in Algeria (see Chapter Two).

This negative view of acculturation places then foreign culture learning or experience in foreign language classes in a suspicious position. Actually, this view is reductive as it singles out one process of acculturation only, called by many scholars *assimilation*, in which "*members of the receiving group eliminate radically their ethno-cultural-identity to embrace another one, ceasing to be themselves in order to be others.*" (Abou 1981: 59)¹⁴ This process is now considered as almost unrealistic as groups never reach this state of deculturation. Besides, acculturation is almost unavoidable as it occurs in various forms and situations such as immigration, slavery, colonisation, wars, as well as the foreign language classroom. Distance has long ceased to be an obstacle to acculturation thanks to the devastating development of media and information technology in the last thirty years, something which rendered cultural isolationism as unrealistic as deculturation.

Actually, acculturation is a natural continual process that is initiated since childhood in the individual's interaction with his ever-expanding environment or ecology. As rightly expressed by Byram:

As the child grows, its social space expands and with it its knowledge. The advantage of linking the concept of social space with that of knowledge schemata is that a link can be made from the analysis of the psychological process of acculturation to the analysis of cultural meanings as they are embodied in the adult

¹⁴ (MOT)

world, in their 'finished' shape.

(Byram 1989: 107)

Abou (1981: 57-59) describes other processes of acculturation which cannot be categorised as deculturation as they rather add up to the original native culture. He states:

- The process of reinterpretation: only the material life is influenced; thoughts and feelings remain intact. This is the case, for instance, of Japan which, in the second half of the nineteenth century according to Demorgon (2000: 28), adapted western industrialisation without a perceptible impact on the Japanese traditional culture.
- The process of synthesis: a state whereby both thoughts and feelings are influenced in both cultures in contact, something which often induces the emergence of innovations in both of them.
- The process of syncretism: a state in which the material and moral lives are totally altered, something which results in the development of a new culture.

The observation of the reality of cultures in the world shows that all these processes combine and integrate the natural evolution of cultures in contact, even in states of domination as both the dominant and the dominated cultures are altered. Actually, it is rather the concept of acculturation which seems to be no longer operative to describe the intercultural experiences that take place at the meeting of two cultures, whether peacefully or violently, closely or from a distance, within or out of a pedagogical context. Devereux (1972) has suggested the concept of *antagonistic acculturation* to refer to that situation where cultural alterations occur even when the members of the host culture attempt to prevent it, or precisely because they do so.

Demorgon (2000: 39) rather prefers to speak of *interculturalisation*, a state of cultural exchange as an outcome of borrowings, influence, opposition and resistance. According to him, opposition and resistance to a foreign culture offer more opportunities for *interculturalisation* than the passive reception and submission of the host culture. The main implication in the use of the concept of *interculturalisation* is the fact that the two cultures in contact have both the status of host and provider, even in a rapport of domination. “*Interculturalisation*,” writes Demorgon (ibidem), “*is primary: it is its basis that cultures perform together while isolating themselves and fighting each other.*”¹⁵

With the concept of *interculturalisation*, *otherness*, i.e. the relation to the *other*, is redefined in terms of what Demorgon calls *interness* (intérité) instead of cultural purity. *Interness* implies continual transfer of cultural content between cultures that necessarily plays havoc with the so-called cultural homogeneity. This transfer may take various forms according to the conditions within which contact is established. These forms range, according to Demorgon, from *osmosis* to *crisis*, with intermediate forms such as *transplant* and *hybridisation*. These variations are determined by the degree of violence that underlies the transfer.

Osmosis is a smooth, sometimes unconscious, process of *interculturalisation*. It often takes place through immigration as second generation immigrants tend to go astray from their parents' culture to come closer to the mainstream one, something which develops a new one. First generation immigrants rather undergo the process of *transplant* as they get slowly influenced by mainstream culture that replaces part of their native one.

¹⁵ (MOT)

Intercultural *hybridisation* is a very common process of interculturalisation where contact between cultures brings a practice from one culture to merge into one from the second culture to produce a brand new one. The example of styles of music often hybridise to give a different style is a case in point. On the contrary, *Interculturalisation by crisis* can be violent in two ways. First, a cultural practice can be imposed because of the domination of one culture over the other, whether by sheer force or by controlling the means of diffusion such as the media. Second, it is violent as the introduction of a new cultural practice may occur at the expense of the native culture practice, viewed, at least by the members of the host culture, as a sign of decadence. The use of the cell phone and internet, which invaded slow-developing societies like Algeria, has probably induced damages in the native cultures which used to favour more interpersonal relationships.

Despite the variety in types of *interculturalisation*, it is observed that these forms may well coexist within the same community or society that is a context for intense and active intercultural experiences. Yet, what brings societies to adopt a positive or negative approach to acculturation or interculturalisation is the degree of their members' acceptance of new and confusing situations, i.e. the degree of what Chapelle and Roberts (1986) label *ambiguity tolerance*¹⁶. Originally applied to language, this concept that refers to a personality variable is implemented here to express the extent to which individuals and societies are ready to cope with the confusion and questioning in their own culture when exposed to a foreign one, and their

¹⁶ Ehrman (1999: 75) distinguishes three levels of ambiguity tolerance, which we can adapt to the intercultural situation:

1. Intake: the penetration of the foreign culture information into the individual's conceptual schema constructed by his native culture.
2. Tolerance of ambiguity proper: successful accomplishment of intake by dealing with contradictions.
3. Accommodation: the making of discriminations between the input of each culture, the native and the foreign, and the setting of priorities, hierarchies and the final options and integration which induce the restructuring of the individual's schemata, i.e. the mergence of what Kramsch (2001) calls the *third culture*.

capacity to moderate the cultural shock and clash and turn it into a positive experience of give-and-take between their native culture and the foreign one.

In the case of Algerian students, their negative attitudes stems precisely from the low degree of ambiguity tolerance in the intercultural situation of the foreign language and culture class. This phenomenon is due to the influence of their ecology, mainly the political-religious ideologies such as Occidentalism, which favours the strengthening of the *ego boundary*, and consequently the weakening of ambiguity tolerance.

Borrowed from psychoanalytic theory (Hartmann 1991), ego boundary is defined as "*the degree to which individuals compartmentalize their experience*" (Ehrman 1999: 68). It is the psychological line that delineate the 'self', with all its declensions such as one's own culture, from the *other*, with all its declensions like the *other's* culture. It influences then the receptivity of individuals to outside input, and in the case of foreign cultures, to the extent to which they are open to discourses contrary to that of their native culture and environment. Thus thickness and thinness of ego boundary affects the degree of *tolerance of ambiguity*, the capacity to cope with confusing situations that may induce temporary frustrations. Tolerance of ambiguity, in its turn, determines the learning of foreign languages and cultures as it makes the learner patient to learn by perceiving "*such situations as acceptable*" (Stern 2001: 382).

Thickness in ego boundary results in resistance to learning, questioning, and reconsideration of native culture schemata and representations, while thinness allows room for the integration of new and different cultural traits and visions. In this sense, Ehrman writes:

Flexible ego boundaries are related to disinhibition and potentially to openness to unconscious process, they tend to promote empathy and the ability to take in another language and culture.

(Ehrman 1999: 76)

Although ego boundary is in a large measure a personality characteristic that may differ from one individual to another within the same culture, it can be said that ecology, through native culture and the dominant ideology, contributes substantially in thickening or thinning it, to the point that it may become common to a great number of the members of one community or society. In the case of Algerian students, and as this will be clarified in the next two chapters, the dominant discourse of Occidentalism has helped reinforcing ego boundary in relation to foreign cultures, something which has induced the negative attitudes observed among some students. Reinforcement of the cultural ego boundary, by Occidentalism, has been achieved mainly through cultural self-congratulation, i.e. the overestimation of one's native culture, coupled with hostility and aggression towards the *other's* culture. Occidentalism has attributed more importance to differences based on culture, religion and race than to those based on socio-economic or politico-historical categories. These negative attitudes inhibit the intercultural experience by neutralising the process of empathy, a necessary mechanism to the optimisation of intercultural encounters.

Ideology in the pedagogical context, mainly as one of the main creators and feeders of representations, plays sometimes a negative role as it stands between the student and the other sources of knowledge, representing itself as the most reliable and truthful source, especially in its discourse about morality, *otherness*, and cultures. Whether through the textbook, television or the press, ideology enjoys various channels of accessibility to students' self-representations or representations of the *other*, and has thus a substantial capacity to fashion them and divert them from opposing sources of knowledge that can threaten the status quo. Bourdieu (1977: 15) rightly

observed that: “*We do not buy a newspaper but rather a generating principle of stands*”¹⁷ or of opinions, a view shared by Doise (1989: 228) who admits that representations are symbolic stands, organised in various manners such as “*opinions, attitudes or stereotypes*”. These opinions, when they are taken for granted and fully adhered to by students, prevent efficient learning in class as they relegate all the other sources, be it the teacher, the book, or any other document, to the position of a dangerous, false discourse.

By permeating the process of representation, ideology permeates one of the main socially elaborated and shared processes of knowledge which has, to quote Candelier (1997: 46), the “*practical objective of constructing a reality shared by the whole society*”¹⁸. Moreover, this process of knowledge, described by Py (2004: 8) as a ready-for-use micro-theory, is viable especially in the absence of argumentation, and legitimised by the fact that it is wide diffusion. As such, ideology in the educational context, by constructing false representations about the *other*, becomes an insurmountable obstacle to one of the main criteria of effective cross-cultural encounters: empathy.

Empathy, as the capacity of “*appreciation, possibly in a detached manner, of the identity of another individual or culture*” (Arnold & Brown 1999: 19), and as an important component of intercultural competence¹⁹, is essential to intercultural encounters as it brings the individual to understand

¹⁷ (MOT)

¹⁸ (MOT)

¹⁹ Lustig and Koester (1999: 66-73) list the major components of intercultural competence, something which suggests that foreign language learning involves more than communicative competence along with the importance of affective factors:

Respect, orientation to knowledge, empathy, interaction management, task role behaviour, ambiguity tolerance, and interaction posture.

Zarate (2004: 43) defines cultural competence as the ability “*to read the significant gaps and the places where they get full sense*” (MOT), as opposed to the apparent differences that are not faithful to the real nature of the cultures in contact, and which people often stick to, thus avoiding to seize their real essence.

the *other*, identify with him, by mitigating the certainty of his cultural norms and admitting the right of the *other* to have different ones, and even 'right' ones, a phenomenon labelled *cultural relativity* (see Chapter Four).

It is then the lack of empathy, due to a lack of *cultural relativity*, which is partly responsible for the students' negative attitudes towards the foreign culture. The weaker empathy is, the stronger is then the ethnocentric view of the world and the relation to the *other*. Defined as “*centrality of culture*” (Stewart & Bennett 1991: 161), ethnocentrism neutralises empathy as it is the tendency to take one’s particular values, assumptions, customs and social norms as the ‘absolute truth’, thus becoming closed and impermeable to any other discourse produced by a foreign culture²⁰. When ethnocentrism is pushed to its utmost logic, or more accurately its utmost illogic, the individual views his “*own community as superior and other groups inferior*” (Stern 2001: 379). What inhibits positive cross-cultural experiences is the fact that an ethnocentric personality is often uncritical of one’s culture, prone to prejudice, and more importantly, approaches the *other* in terms of stereotypes.

Ethnocentrism, as a matter of fact, is not expressed in the same way, nor does it induce the same consequences in different cultures and contexts. European ethnocentrism, by claiming the superiority of its values, did also claim their universality, and this formed the basis for the whole European colonial campaigns in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As stated by Abdallah-Pretceille, universality advocated by European

²⁰ From a psychological point of view, ethnocentrism is viewed as the ego’s tendency to construct a referential norm that is never objectivised (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 118). This means that the ethnocentric personality never confronts its norms to the reality of events which can put them into question. From another perspective, ethnocentrism is also the human obsessive worry to find a place in the vast world. In an anthropological sense, ethnocentrism is “*a group’s attitude of attributing to itself a central place in relation to the others, of positively valuing its achievements and particularities, and of having a projective behaviour towards those who do not belong to it, and who are viewed through its mode of thought.*” (ibid.: 119) (MOT)

ethnocentrism:

is all the more negative that it is politically expressed through expansionism. Western ethnocentrism is doubled, actually, with the attribution of values and the making of a hierarchical system of cultures, something which gives it an ideological nature, or at least, induced ideological manipulations.²¹

(Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 120)

This type of ethnocentrism, despite its negative character, brought peoples into contact, whether through colonialism, or through imperialism as it is still the case with American imperialism. However, ethnocentrism in Arab-Islamic countries, under the influence of such ideologies as Islamism and Occidentalism, rather claims distinction and divine election, and favours separation between categories which are established on the basis of their confessional specificities: Muslims versus non-Muslims.

This chain reaction that induces the thickening of ego boundary, which reduces ambiguity tolerance and blocks empathy, which, in their turn, prevent cultural relativity, and finally develops in the students negative attitudes, is based on a particular conception of identity. The relevance of identity to intercultural experiences lies in the fact that it is, according to Erik H. Erikson, the individual's awareness and conception of his distinction from others and the others' recognition of this distinction (quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 38). Said also defines identity in terms of the relationship one establishes with the *other*:

The construction of identity – for identity, whether of Orient or Occident, France or Britain, while obviously a repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction - involves establishing opposites and 'others' whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from 'us'. Each age and society re-creates its 'Others'.

(Said 1995: 332)

²¹ (MOT)

Socialisation within a particular community brings the individual to be aware, beyond his personal identity, of a cultural identity that he shares, or thinks he shares, with the other members of his community. Bekombo (1980: 13) admits that cultural identity is but a person's idea about himself as a member of a group, a view shared by Levi-Strauss (1964: 10) who considers that cultural identity, as well as culture, functions like myths.

Whether mythic or real, cultural identity becomes central to intercultural experiences inasmuch as the individual's attitude and behaviour are determined by the degree to which he feels his cultural identity is threatened by his contact with the *other*, mainly because, as explained by Devereux (1972: 39), confrontation with and differentiation from the *other* is the dynamic to the development of an ethnic identity²². This threat is measured by the capacity of the *other's* culture to break what the group has in common. Part of this commonness is the group's shared representation of the *other* and of his own culture, mainly in relation to that group and its culture. As Zarate put it:

*Because sharing representations is expressing one's adherence to the group, affirming a social link and contributing to its reinforcement, representations are part of the process of defining social identity.*²³

(Zarate 2004: 30)

The relationship between culture and representations is established by the process of reification of culture. As seen with Said's definition of culture, it is a human-made abstract phenomenon that is objectivised and comes to exercise a major influence on its creator, i.e. the human being. Culture can then only be subjective, that is, people view themselves and the others on

²² Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a: 38) states that the relationship between the Self and the *other* is an integral part of identity, be it ethnic, psychosocial, collective, cultural or personal.

²³ (MOT)

the basis of their own conception of things, not as they really are. The view of the *other* is thus a representation, which has little chance to correspond to reality. On the basis of these representations, opinions are formed and attitudes are expressed (Doise 1989: 228; Jodelet 1994: 36)

1.5. Representations

The concept of representation²⁴, borrowed from social psychology where it was first tackled by S. Moscovici (1976), has become central to understanding educational issues such as the one dealt with here. It is mainly epitomised in Sartre's (1966: 62)²⁵ statement: "*The world that we know is the one we make.*" Representations, as the outcome of an individual's interaction with his immediate social environment or ecology at large (Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 30), are mental constructions used to perceive and evaluate reality, something that had long been rejected by behaviourists such as Bloomfield or Skinner (Nuchèze & Colletta 2002: 171). They go beyond cultural schemata which are *structures of expectation* (Kramsch 2000: 27) drawn from previous experience and used to interpret situations, expect behaviour, and react accordingly, within one's culture or outside it.

Although schemata and representations both "*point,*" as put forward by Byram (1989: 110), "*in the same direction and offer a reasonable basis for discussing the nature of exposure to experience of a foreign culture*", yet, schemata are rather cognitive structures, acquired and/or learned, while representations are mostly psychological/emotional categories acquired

²⁴ The concept of representation is cross-disciplinary, as shown by Porcher (1997), as it has been used in philosophy, sociology, psychology, social psychology and educational sciences, since the early days of Aristotle and later Schopenhauer, Durkheim, Freud, Lévy-Bruhl, Piaget and Weber.

²⁵ (MOT)

and/or constructed unconsciously. One way to distinguish between these two mental categories may be the fact that when views of oneself or the *other* are confirmed by reality, they are then schemata, while when they divert from it, they remain representations which are expressed through stereotypes or prejudices.

Representations do not necessarily have this utilitarian function as they may be held, yet remain dormant as long as they are not called upon, a view quite upheld by people like Mondada and Pekarek (2000). The peculiarity of representations lies, though, mainly in the fact that, while they grow out of the interaction between individuals, once they are well-constructed, they organise and direct this interaction since they become almost the sole mediators between individuals and between the individual and his environment.

The main concern here is social representations, i.e. the group's imagination of one's position in the world and its relationships with the other groups which are believed to possess different cultures. As opposed to individual representations, which are the individual's imagination of his own position as a member of his community or society and personal perceptions and projections, social representations are collective conceptions that are shared by a cultural group. They are social as they involve social rapports, and they are collective in the sense that they become the group's mode of knowing the world, i.e. "*processes of mediation between concept and perception*" (Moscovici 1976: 302)²⁶ that result from the very interrelations and contacts between members of the same group and across different groups.

They are approximations (Moore 2001: 10) that compartmentalise reality

²⁶ (MOT)

according to the pertinence of a particular element. For instance, some Algerians' representation of a particular group, such as the Americans, may have a negative representation, while another one, such as the Swedish, may have a positive one, despite the fact they are generally viewed as belonging to the same general category referred to as the 'West'. In this sense, representations retain only elements that may justify prejudiced behaviours or favourable ones. As a "*form of practical knowledge*" (Nuchèze & Colletta 2002: 172), they are inescapably part of the individual's database that helps him decide on the most appropriate and suitable actions in various situations. They are, to use Maisonneuve's words, "*spaces of opinions*" (quoted in *ibid.*: 16) which determine not only general behaviour, but also learning behaviours²⁷. As observed by Py:

*Social representations take their initial form through stereotyped primitive formulas and are then reformulated by attenuation, modalisation, reduction, or transfer to other fields of application...*²⁸

(Py 2000: 8)

In certain instances, representations acquire a greater importance as far as opinion and behaviour are concerned as they are the only sources of knowledge, as this will be advanced, about some students' views of the 'West'. In this case, negative attitudes can only be explained by the kind of representations they hold, representations which become the central "*mental schemata*" (Zarate 2004: 29), not only in the relation to the *other*, but also in defining one's identity, individual or ethnic.

Culture, as observed above, being the group's common consciousness,

²⁷ W. Doise (1979: 184), working on the linguistic behaviours of categories of the Swiss population speaking different regional dialects, has observed that the nature of the relationships between these groups, whether in a situation of competition or cooperation, affects to a great extent, not only their readiness to learn each other's language, but also each group's tendency to accentuate its regional accent so as to distinguish themselves from the others.

²⁸ (MOT)

and representations being part of the shared cultural patrimony, the latter functions as the mechanism that gives the impression or the illusion²⁹ of a common identity³⁰. “*We are alike because we represent people and things in the same way*” would be the underlying principle of a common cultural/national identity. Here lies the role of ideology whose function is to provide myths to sustain the national illusion (see Chapter Two), and this explains also the fact that variety and proliferation of subcultures questions even the existence of a real national culture.

The relation between representation and culture can probably explain the availability of a great many behaviours and views within the same cultural group where we expect certain homogeneity. This is due to the fact that representations, as psychological phenomena, are at the crossroads of a strictly individual domain and the social one. As stated by Bonardi and Roussiau (1999: 18): “*social representations are generated by individuals, but also acquired from society; thus reproducing the social ... as well as the new.*”³¹.

Moreover, representations, not only across communities but also within the same community, are not peacefully juxtaposed. They are often in competition, depending on the types of discourse they emerge from and the people who produce this discourse. As it will explicitly be demonstrated in

²⁹ The illusion of culture is equivalent to that of the truth of language which Nietzsche (1954: 46-47) describes as “*a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are.*”

³⁰ Beacco (2000: 30) advances a quite interesting view of culture. He admits that, beyond the fact of sharing a common patrimony, culture expresses a group’s will to remain together. This brings certain cultures to show more and more tolerance, and less and less prescription in order to achieve this goal and avoid to push its members to bear the status of black sheep.

³¹ (MOT). For some scholars, such as Grize (1998), social representations are exclusively individual phenomena as they refer to individual beliefs used to approach and interpret reality for the sake of taking appropriate action.

the next chapters, ideology, and most particularly, Occidentalism in Algeria, does a lot in producing a particular type of discourse which fashions and sustains some representations of the *other* (the 'West'), in a logic of conflict and opposition to other types of discourses and representations that are available in the Algerian society. Those who are likely to hold power and exercise domination, socially and politically, are those who are capable of imposing, by force or consent, their discourse and their representations. As Zarate wrote it:

*Representations do not coexist in a mere relation of juxtaposition, but in a competing space where the stakes are those of a symbolic struggle for a social, and sometimes political, recognition.*³²

(Zarate 2004: 31)

The transfer of social representations to other fields of application occurs in education in the case of foreign language and culture learning, mainly because they affect the individual learning behaviour. Here, they intervene in this pedagogical context and play a substantial role in directing learners' attitudes towards the subjects studied. In language learning, two types of representations interfere: language representations and social representations. As observed in the Introduction, there is a clear-cut distinction between these two types as one can be negative while the second is positive. The representation of the English language is positive among many Algerian students, while some of the cultures underlying this language, such as American culture, may have a negative representation among the same students.

The distinction between language representations and social representations is probably not natural, since "*there is no language,*" as put by Poirier (1989: 2), "*without a message, there is no message without the*

³² (MOT)

*intention to signify, and there is no signification without a reference system*³³ This distinction is often the result of a deliberate action, much like a nuclear fission, undertaken by ideologies that purpose to split language from culture. As it will be made clear in the next chapters, this split, in Algeria and most of the Arab-Islamic countries, is operated by some currents of thought for the sake of preserving younger generations from any 'negative' influence that foreign cultures may induce.

What is peculiar with social representations, as compared to language representations, as far as foreign language learning is concerned, is the fact that when they are negative about a particular culture, they do not prevent from learning language, since language learning is sustained by positive language representations. In the case of Algerian students, the negative representations of American culture, though they induce negative attitudes towards this culture and thus prevent students from fully experiencing it and taking advantage of its benefits, yet, they do not deter English language learning.

In this matter, Py (2004: 13) advanced a distinction between representation of reference and representation of use. The first are abstract and collective, and generally expressed through, for instance, maxims and proverbs, without necessarily being effectuated through the behaviour of members of a cultural group. Negative representations about an ethnic group³⁴ do not always induce negative behaviours towards that group.

³³ (MOT). J.-C. Abric defines social representations as a system of interpretation of reality: "*Social representations*," he writes, "*are the product and process of a mental activity by which an individual reconstitutes and attributes a specific signification to the reality he faces.*" (Quoted in Nuchèze & Colletta 2002: 171) (MOT) These representations, according to Moscovici (1976: 39), are expressed and observed through "*a speech, a gesture, an encounter, in a daily environment.*"

³⁴ F. Barth suggests four features found in a population designated by the concept ethnic group:

1. *is biologically self-perpetuating;*
2. *shares fundamental cultural values, realised in overt unity in cultural forms;*

Representations of use, however, are often unconscious as they determine the behaviours of some individuals who are not always capable of explaining them. Representations of use about women, in certain societies, induce discriminatory treatment by individuals who cannot explain why they adopt such attitudes towards this category of society.

These two types of representation coexist together and form social representations in general. Social representations involve imagination of various aspects of life. Charaudeau (2003: 376) enumerates some of these aspects, out of which four can be considered as the main ramifications of social representations. These representations, which differ from one culture to another, show the inextricable link between culture and representations as imagination:

- Imagination of space: it is the way a cultural group views its geographical territory and the relationship they think they should have with it. It often determines people's opinion about exile and immigration.
- Imagination of time: it is the way a cultural group views its past, present and future, and the importance each has for the life of the group. For many Algerians, especially under the influence of Occidentalism (see Chapter Two), the past holds a higher position which relegates the present and future to the status life auxiliaries.
- Imagination of social relations: it is the way a cultural group views the relations between its members and the behaviours they should adopt in society. This determines the group's self-representation

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3. *makes up a field of communication and interaction;*
 4. *has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order.* (Quoted in Byram 1989: 52)

and, thus, the identification of its interests that are considered as vital to its survival as a distinct group. This induces in parallel the next ramification, the imagination of the *other*, as self-representation is often enshrined as a reference model³⁵ according to which all other representations outside the self are formed (Cain 1995: 6).

- Imagination of the *other*: it is the way a cultural group views the people who are outside the group because they have a different culture, and thinks about the kind of relations they should have with them. It induces rapports of cooperation, competition, adversity, hostility, or enmity.

The relationship of representations to education lies in the very fact that they are related to everything about Man as a social being. The way people represent themselves and the others exercises an influence on their daily life including the way and what they learn. Foucault seized the importance of representations when writing:

*... there will not be a science of Man unless we tackle the way individuals and groups represent their partners, in production and exchange, the mode in which they lighten, ignore or mask this functioning and the position they hold, the way they represent society where it takes place, the way they feel integrated to or isolated from it, dependent, submitted or free.*³⁶

(Foucault 1966: 364)

Moscovici (1976: 310) concurs to say that representations are symptomatic of the state of society as their change signals a change in

³⁵ The status of self-representations as models of reference, especially in people's approach to foreign cultures, can well be observed in class through students' reactions to the lesson and their comments. In a lesson on American Puritan heritage in my American civilisation seminar, I singled out the similarities between Puritan theology and Islam. One of my second year students made a quite revealing comment about Puritans: "So, *they are good, since they are like us.*" His positive self-representation brought to have a positive evaluation of the Puritans since their religion shares common points with his.

³⁶ (MOT)

society and its culture. In this sense, representations are by no means static, and are rather subject to alteration and modification over time depending on the influences society undergoes, such as ideologies. As it will clearly be stated in the Second Chapter, representations of the *other* in Algeria, mainly among students, are greatly affected by the propagandist work of ideologies such as Occidentalism, and the degree of *misrepresentation* in these representations is directly proportional to the degree to which a student adheres to such an ideology.

The pertinence of representation in the study of Man in his various life activities is also due to its three-dimensional permeation:

- Individual belief: the personal representation of the immediate environment determines the beliefs one holds, and consequently his attitudes towards whatever goes against them;
- Cultural identity: the representation of the native community underlies the individual's sense of identity and belonging, and subsequently his relations to other cultural communities;
- Political and religious identity: the representation of political and religious symbols establishes the individual's loyalty to political and religious organisations, and this influences his view and behaviour towards the ideas and organisations that differ from or contradict his own.

These three dimensions are essential when individuals are exposed to foreign discourses and cultures as they are the determinant criteria in what Guimelli (1994) labels *ancrage* (anchoring), which allows the

interpretation³⁷, adaptation, or rejection of a new cultural fact or trait on the basis of a familiar one.

When social representations concern intercultural experiences they are often designated by the term cultural representations. As advanced by Kramsch (1991), they correspond to the outcome of all what society produces in terms of imagination, such as myths, beliefs and knowledge based on generation-long experiences, which serves to define the *other*, i.e. those who do not belong to the same cultural group, and the relation to them. They are also cultural because they are collective and lasting, and their change marks and signals the change in the group's culture, whether smoothly, over time, or abruptly, after a crisis.

Whether it is considered as a defect or as a quality, the main characteristic of cultural representations is that they are, to use Sperber's (1996: 71) word, *contagious*. In this sense, negative cultural representations are to be considered as an epidemic, i.e. the small number of those who hold them in a society should not be a deterrent to their study and the search for solutions to correct them since the number of those people grows gradually. This is what Sperber labels an *epidemiology of representations* (ibidem.). In this matter, Said, as early as the 1970s, expressed the necessity of a field of study on representations as they are embedded in the culture, institutions and political environment of the *representer*.

... we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is eo ipso implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the 'truth,' which is itself a

³⁷ Sperber (1996: 52) defines the process representation as a continual cyclic process of interpretation of public and mental/individual representations, both of which make up the process of communication. As he writes: "An interpretation is the representation of a representation by another one by virtue of content similarity. In this sense, a public representation, whose content resembles the mental representation which it transmits, is an interpretation, and vice versa." (MOT)

representation. What this must lead us to methodologically is to view representations ... as inhabiting a common field of play defined for them ... by some common history, tradition, universe of discourse.

(Said 1995: 272)

Teaching culture, and more specifically foreign culture, is also taking into consideration the two types of representation, of use and reference, found in the foreign culture, as they underlie what J.L. Martinand call *social practices of reference* (see Raisky & Caillot 1996: 22-23) that direct, not only social choices, but also didactic ones. These practices, based on the economic and social situation of society, they are what society has fixed as the representative and most appropriate behaviours that all its members ought to adopt. In a cross-cultural situation, it is the confrontation between the social practices of reference the representations of use and reference of the native culture and the target one that is the dynamic of the cross-cultural experience. It is the balance in this confrontation that determines the success or failure of this experience.

In the absence of an epidemiology of representations, whether in the native or target culture, cultural representations are pushed to their utmost logic and give birth to the most rigid views of and approaches to the *other*, prejudices and stereotypes, considered as “*the grotesque form of social representations*” (Preiswerk & Perrot 1975: 239)³⁸. The degree of adherence to prejudices and stereotypes, mainly due to the degree of ethnocentrism, is the most responsible for the discrepancy between the behaviours, and learning behaviour in particular, from one individual to another, and in this case, from one student to another. Probably, the most problematic characteristic of prejudices and stereotypes is their tendency to

³⁸ The development of representations into stereotypes is not automatic. Actually, the more representations depart from reality and acquire rigidity and stability, the more they have probability to induce stereotypes (see Cain 1995: 6). This implies that when representations are closer to reality, the appearance of stereotypes is less likely to happen.

accommodate reality to the representation, instead of the opposite³⁹.

There is a need first to distinguish between prejudice and stereotype, though they are both unfounded generalisations based on quite stubborn and automatic value judgements (Abdallah-Preteuille 2004a: 111). While the prejudice is rather an opinion or view that may be subject to alteration and change, depending on individual experience, stereotype is a picture that seems to resist empirical experience. This resistance makes stereotypes far more spread within a community than prejudices which may vary according to the different experiences its members may have of the subject of prejudice.

The stereotype, as defined by Gordon, refers to “*images, concepts and attitudes which are shared by the same social group and which are considered by them as being right*” (quoted in *ibid.*: 112-113)⁴⁰. The stereotype is the outcome of an erroneous oversimplification of reality which is not directly experienced. Basing one’s opinion about an ethnic group on the way it is depicted in the media, by a particular ideology or historical experience induces the development of stereotypes about that group which do not necessarily correspond to facts as they tend to be overgeneralisations, transferable and inconsiderate of circumstances. They reveal, in this sense, “*the relations of tensions between groups in contact*” (Moore 2001: 14)⁴¹.

Views of the Jews in Algeria, for instance, are typical stereotypes as they are by no means based on direct experience Algerians have with this group,

³⁹ In Algeria, there is a popular saying that illustrates the resistance of representation despite the contradiction that reality provides. To express this, Algerians say: “*maaza walaw taref*” (it’s a goat even if it flies), meaning that a person is so stuck to and blinded by his representation that he doesn’t change his mind even when reality disproves him.

⁴⁰ (MOT)

⁴¹ (MOT)

but rather mediated by various types of media. Opinions about them are overgeneralisations as they do not take into account any particularity and apply negative features to all members of this group, which cannot actually be considered as a uniform group. They are transferable since they remain static over time and are sometimes drawn from historical experiences of past generations, and usually from religious descriptions (such as in the Koran). They are inconsiderate of circumstances as they do not admit any possible change despite the change in the political and social conditions of the relationships between this group and Algerians as part of the Arab-Islamic world.

These characteristics of the stereotype are mainly due to the fact that they are generally collective, i.e. held by the whole group or society. They often become identity markers, not only for those who hold them, but also of its subject group. Moore (ibidem) speaks here of *self-stereotypes* and *hetero-stereotypes*. On the one hand, self-stereotypes tend to be an integral part of the national identity to the point that rejecting them by a member of the group may expose him to the denial of his national identity by the rest of the group as it is seen as a threat to the group's cohesion. When you are Algerian, for example, you ought to have the general opinion about the Jews. On the other hand, hetero-stereotypes are markers of the subject group identity in the sense that it is the stereotype which defines the identity of an individual. For instance, the existence in Algeria of the stereotype which assumes that a Jew is malicious brings Algerians to designate any malicious person with the term Jew. This view is shared by Oesch-Serra and Py (1997) who claim that stereotypes can be criteria even for the definition of a speech community.

It is by no means here to claim that stereotypes are to be totally eradicated, something which would of course be impossible. Human beings

need stereotypes as a simple manner to approach the world (see Poirier 1988). *Stereotypisation*, as a process of categorisation, is an indispensable cognitive mechanism necessary for the processing of data for any human being (Moore 2001: 15). It gives sense by offering keys of interpretation of events. As Oesch-Serra and Py put it:

[Stereotypes are] *ready-made formulas, prefabricated semiotic elements, verbal catch-alls which circulate in a given community, and play the role of practical evidences, useful in a great number of situations.*⁴²

(Oesch-Serra and Py 1997: 31)

Yet, what is claimed here is the fact that stereotypes become obstacles to learning and truth when they are the only source of knowledge that supplants and discards all other sources. In an educational context, the resistance of stereotypes and prejudices is symptomatic of the failure of the acts of teaching and learning, both of which are supposed to enhance knowledge and mitigate stereotypes and prejudices. As explained by Marandon, stereotypes and prejudices “*appear when knowledge decreases and affect increases*” (quoted in *ibid.*: 111). The failure of educational institutions, like the university, to bring students to rely more on knowledge, as a mediator and maker of sense, in their approach to foreign cultures is a sign of a terrible dysfunction in the social institutions which allow much more room for other types of discourse-producers, like ideologies, to construct the people’s, and most particularly, pupils and students’, personality, and thus induce nonsense and negative attitudes that become a whole culture⁴³.

In this sense, students’ negative attitudes in Algeria towards the *other* can be deemed as a dysfunction of the social institutions which have come short

⁴² (MOT)

⁴³ Many scholars, however, tend to refute the link between attitudes and stereotypes, considering attitudes as individualised phenomena quite distinct from stereotypes which are collective evaluations of things (see Baker 1992).

of achieving one of their main roles: the socialisation of the individual within and outside of his small community. This dysfunction produces stereotypes which blurs diversity among the others and gives the impression of an irreconcilable opposition to one's model, itself considered as *the* norm. Viewing 'Westerners' as the same homogeneous body because they are supposed to be all Christians, in total opposition to us, because we are supposed to be all Muslims, is a stereotype which masks the reality of both the 'West' and us.

Stereotyping is part of the whole process of categorisation of individuals, i.e. the tendency to placing people into distinct and exclusive categories, on the basis of, for instance, nationality, religion, or geography. The less knowledge people have of the *other's* culture, the more his representation tends to categorisation which, according to Ladmiral and Lipiansky (1989: 206-207), consists in three processes:

- *Effect of contrast*: the accentuation of difference between groups;
- *Effect of stereotyping*: the fixing and generalisation of particular views;
- *Effect of assimilation*: the accentuation of similarities within the same group.

In education, categorisation stands all the more as an obstacle to learning as it prevents from perceiving real facts that contradict the assumptions that stem out of the three processes of categorisation. Though facts show a different thing, categorisation bounds the individual to keep all the attributes of the stereotype, which is, to use Said's (1995: 207) expression, "*an already pronounced evaluative judgement ... [and] an implicit program of action.*" This happens because of the very reason that difference and distinction between categories are established according to normative

models which do not exist in reality, at least not the extent to which stereotypes seem to claim it.

For example, such an assumption as ‘all Jews are anti-Palestinian’ prevents some Algerian students from the benefits of reading the writings of such Jews as Noam Chomsky, who has probably been a defender of the Palestinian cause more than many Arabs. With categorisation, the individual is effaced by the image, or the representation, of the group he is supposed to belong to, and all the features attributed to the group are inevitably endorsed by its individual members.

Abdallah-Preteille (2004a: 113-115) pinpoints four major mechanisms that help the development of stereotypes, and which sum up their characteristics that have already been mentioned above:

1. Generalisation: extension of a feature out of extrapolation from a single individual to the whole group. As Klineberg put it:

*... stereotypes are not inferred from a set of data: they are based on hearsays, rumours, anecdotes, in short, on testimonies which are not sufficient for generalisation.*⁴⁴

(Quoted in *ibid*: 113)

An observed feature in a particular experience with an individual belonging to a group is hypothetically attributed to all the members of the group.

2. Reductionism: a complex set of features of a group of people is presented in a simplistic way by reducing it into a caricature of the group which is far from being faithful to its reality. Such vast cultural entities as Europeans or Africans are reduced to simplistic groups

⁴⁴ (MOT)

based on religion or economic and technological categorisation.

3. Permanence: the generalisation of features and the reductionist view of a given group resist across space and time as pure conjectural and temporal opinions are transformed into “*fundamental and immutable truths*” (ibid: 114), which become postulates for any relationships with that group. Ante-colonial attitudes and relations between peoples, which at a certain time and in these particular conditions were justified, are sometimes kept as valid in post-colonial circumstances on either side, despite the change in the actual conditions. As Poirier (1988: 37) put it, people “*stick to the comfortable vision, and refuse to see the gap*” between their vision and the immediate experience.

4. Amalgamation: the integration of any other group into the stereotyped one by virtue of whatever common feature between the two groups. Thus, different groups are gathered under such designations as the Orient, the West, the Third World, Muslims, and Christians. Particularities are thus viewed as generalities. Other types of stereotypes operate in the opposite way, transforming a general feature, common to all human beings, into a one-group-specific feature. This is often done for self-praising, when describing one’s people as courageous, heroic, or determined, thus suggesting that the other peoples are not.

The interference of representations, and stereotypes as their most rigid expressions, in an educational situation consists in being obstacles to knowledge and learning by preceding any scientific formulation, since they are often part of the students’ prior burden at their arrival to the classroom, i.e. formed outside the educational institutions. Representations and

stereotypes, as *approximate embryos of conceptualisation* (Poirier 1989: 7)⁴⁵, form this obstacle as they influence perception of reality and are positioned in conflict with experience. Klineberg (1966: 80-81) explained the way they obstruct learning.

- He observed that when they are not guided by scientific objectivity, people tend to select elements of experience and integrate them to conscience on the basis of their conformity to already-established representations, thus discarding any contradicting ones.
- When this is pushed to its limits, an individual is capable of distorting, unwillingly, reality so as to match with his representations and stereotypes about the thing or group he is in contact with.
- Distortion of reality, effectuated by different individuals, helps sustaining and reinforcing the representations and stereotypes, by virtue of the confirmation they get out of the supposed distinct experiences of these different individuals.
- In front of these mechanisms, experiences and facts which contradict the representations and stereotypes held by a group are considered, to the best, as mere exceptions.

Todorov cleverly seized the negative implications of such psychological processes as representations and stereotypes as he writes:

*While it is indisputable that a superiority prejudice is an obstacle in the way of learning, we should also admit that equality prejudice is even worse, as it consists purely and simply in identifying the other with one's own 'ideal ego'.*⁴⁶

(Todorov 1982: 171)

⁴⁵ (MOT)

⁴⁶ (MOT)

1.6. Conclusion

As it will be stated in the next chapters, representations and stereotypes intervene in the pedagogical context as outside influences (in Algeria, political and religious ideologies), or to use Poirier's (1988: 33) words, the students' "*motivation is hindered from the outside, independently from what the teacher decides to do and from what the textbook he uses offers.*"⁴⁷ No matter how these representations and stereotypes are, positive or negative, they necessarily drift from reality (ibidem), thus creating a situation whereby students' expectations, extremely determined by these false images, are in opposition to a scientific discourse with which they can hardly be reconciled.

Beyond the indisputable utility of representations and stereotypes in any culture, they still stand as psychological inhibitions outside and inside the classroom by inducing students to cope with one of the most common principle among human beings, the principle of 'the least effort'. It is easier and far more comfortable to face the familiar than confront the unfamiliar, to find ready-made answers than strive for explanations, to be certain than doubt. What political and religious ideologies in Algeria have laid, as far as foreign language and culture students are concerned, is a substratum of stereotyped and representation-based picture of the *other* that jeopardises their very objective of engaging in a university education, by inducing in them negative attitudes that impede the realisation of this objective, i.e. finding their way out of the ethnocentric cocoon.

⁴⁷ (MOT)

1.7. Original Quotations

Page 46

L'attitude est une prédisposition psychique latente, acquise, à réagir d'une certaine manière à un objet.

(Lüdi & Py 1986: 97)

Page 52

من تعلم لغة قوم أمن شرهم

Page 59

La configuration personnelle qui est adoptée par l'ensemble des membres de la société parce qu'elle est le résultat de l'expérience qu'ils ont en commun.

(Kardiner, quoted in Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 86)

Page 60

[Cette] conception de la culture ... prend le parti du monde spirituel contre le monde matériel en opposant la 'culture' comme lieu des valeurs véritables et de la finalité en soi au monde social de l'utilité et de la médiateté. Cette conception sépare la culture de la civilisation et l'éloigne, sociologiquement ...

(Marcuse 1970: 109)

... la satisfaction n'est possible qu'avec une lutte contre la culture idéaliste, et c'est seulement en opposition à cette culture qu'elle pourrait apparaître comme une exigence universelle.

(Marcuse 1970: 115)

Page 63

Les membres du groupe récepteur éliminent radicalement leur identité ethno-culturelle pour endosser une autre identité, qu'ils cessent d'être eux-mêmes pour devenir autres.

(Abou 1981: 59)

Page 65

L'interculturation est première : c'est à partir d'elle que les cultures se produisent ensemble alors mêmes qu'elles s'isolent ou se combattent.

(Demorgon 2000: 39)

Page 69

On n'achète pas un journal mais un principe générateur de prises de position.

(Bourdieu 1977: 15)

C'est une forme de connaissance ... ayant une visée pratique et concourant à la construction d'une réalité commune à un ensemble social.

(Candelier 1997: 46)

(Footnote 19)

... la compétence culturelle se définit en ces termes par la lecture des écarts significatifs et des lieux où ils prennent leur sens.

(Zarate 2004: 43)

Page 70

(Footnote 20)

... l'attitude d'un groupe à s'accorder une place centrale par rapport aux autres groupes, à valoriser positivement ses réalisations et particularismes, et menant à un comportement projectif à l'égard des hors-groupes qui sont interprétés à travers le mode de pensée de l'engroupe.

(Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 119)

Page 71

Universalité d'autant plus négative qu'elle se traduit politiquement par l'expansionnisme. L'ethnocentrisme occidental se double, il est vrai, de l'attribution de valeurs et d'une hiérarchisation des cultures, ce qui lui confère un caractère idéologique ou, tout au moins, autorise les manipulations idéologiques.

(Abdallah-Pretceille 2004: 120)

Page 72

Puisque partager des représentations, c'est manifester son adhésion à un groupe, affirmer un lien social et contribuer à son renforcement, les représentations participent d'un processus de définition de l'identité sociale.

(Zarate 2004: 30)

Page 73

Le monde que nous savons est celui que nous faisons.

(Sartre 1966: 62)

Page 74

... un processus de médiation entre concept et perception.
(Moscovici 1976: 302)

Page 75

Les représentations sociales prennent leur forme initiale à travers des formules primitives stéréotypées et font ensuite l'objet d'un travail de reformulation par atténuation, modalisation, réduction ou déplacement du domaine d'application ...
(Py 2000: 8)

Page 76

Les représentations sociales sont générées par les individus, mais aussi acquises de la société; reproductrices du social... elles produisent en même temps de la nouveauté.
(Bonardi and Roussiau 1999: 18)

Page 77

Les représentations ne se côtoient pas dans une relation de simple juxtaposition, mais dans un espace concurrentiel où les enjeux sont ceux d'une lutte symbolique pour la conquête d'une reconnaissance sociale et parfois politique.
(Zarate 2004: 31)

... pas de langue sans message, pas de message sans intention de signifier, pas de signification sans système de référence.
(Poirier 1989: 2)

Page 78

(Footnote 33)

Les représentations sociales sont le produit et le processus d'une activité mentale par laquelle un individu ou un groupe reconstitue le réel auquel il est confronté et lui attribue une signification spécifique.
(Abric, quoted in Nuchèze & Colletta 2002: 171)

Page 80

Il n'y aura pas de science de l'homme que si on s'adresse à la manière dont les individus ou les groupes se représentent leurs partenaires, dans la production et dans l'échange, le mode sur lequel ils éclairent ou ignorent ou masquent ce fonctionnement et la position qu'ils y occupent, la façon dont ils se représentent la société où il a lieu, la manière dont ils se

sentent intégrés à elle ou isolés, dépendants, soumis ou libres.

(Foucault 1966: 364)

Page 82

(Footnote 37)

Une interprétation, c'est la représentation d'une représentation par un autre en vertu d'une similarité de contenu. En ce sens, une représentation publique dont le contenu ressemble à celui d'une représentation mentale qu'elle sert à communiquer est une interprétation, et il en va de même de la représentation mentale résultant de la compréhension d'une représentation publique.

(Sperber 1996: 52)

Page 84

... images, concepts et attitudes que la plupart des membres d'un même groupe social ont en commun et qu'ils considèrent comme justes...

(Gordon, quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 112-113)

...une mise en évidence des relations de tensions entre les différentes communautés en contact...

(Moore 2001: 14)

Page 86

Il s'agit de formules toutes faites, d'éléments sémiotiques préfabriqués, de passe-partout verbaux qui circulent au sein d'une communauté donnée et qui jouent le rôle d'évidences pratiques, utilisables dans le nombre le plus grand possible de situations.

(Oesch-Serra and Py 1997: 31)

Page 88

... les stéréotypes ne sont pas formés par induction à partir d'un ensemble de données : ils se fondent sur les 'on-dit', des rumeurs, des anecdotes, bref sur des témoignages qui ne suffisent pas à justifier une généralisation.

(Klineberg, quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 113)

Page 89

... on s'accroche à la vision confortable, on refuse de voir le décalage.

(Poirier 1988: 37)

Page 90

S'il est incontestable que le préjugé de supériorité est un obstacle dans la voie de la connaissance, il faut aussi admettre que le préjugé d'égalité en est un encore plus grand, car il consiste purement et simplement à identifier l'autre avec son propre 'idéal du moi'...

(Todorov 1982: 171)

Page 91

... la motivation des élèves est entravée de l'extérieur, indépendamment de ce que l'enseignant décide de faire et de ce que propose le manuel qu'il emploie...

(Poirier 1988: 33)

CHAPTER TWO

Occidentalism: An Ideology of Alliance Between Religion and Politics

2.1. Introduction.....	98
2.2. Debating the Concept of Ideology.....	100
2.3. Occidentalism as a Utilitarian Rationality to Approach Otherness.....	110
2.4. Criteria for the Definition of Occidentalism.....	113
2.5. Characteristics of Occidentalism.....	136
2.6. Occidentalism and Perceptive Effects.....	153
2.6.1.Situational Effects.....	155
2.6.1.1. Effects of Position.....	156
2.6.1.2. Effects of Disposition.....	157
2.6.2. Effects of Perspective.....	158
2.6.3. Epistemological Effects.....	160
2.6.4. Effects of Communication.....	162
2.7. Conclusion.....	166
2.8. Original Quotations.....	167

CHAPTER TWO

Occidentalism: An Ideology of Alliance Between Religion and Politics

Institutional practices which people draw upon without thinking often embody assumptions which directly or indirectly legitimize existing power relations. Practices may appear universal and commonsensical can often be shown to originate in the dominant class or the dominant bloc, and to have become naturalized. Where types of practice, and in many cases of discourse, function in this way to sustain unequal power relations, I shall say they are functioning ideologically.

(Fairclough 2001: 27)

2.1. Introduction

Due to their character of shared and commonly admitted opinions and beliefs within a given community, representations are a sort of *hearsay* which, according to Manuel Fernandez (2004: 99), "*carries the mark of a certain enunciative legitimacy*"¹ as public opinion. The main feature of public opinion is that it is what discourse analysts call *interdiscourse*, i.e. the "*others' words ... what has already been said*" (Authier-Revuz 1995: 117)². One of the means political power implements in order to be effective and secured is to precisely occupy this anonymous sphere of *interdiscourse*, as

¹ (MOT)

² (MOT)

a way to mould people's representations or public opinion. This strategy is undertaken by means of Ideology which purposes to transform particular interest-based ideas into public-shared ones. The main purpose of ideology is then to universalise representations which determine people's behaviour (Capdevila 2004: 66-68). These representations concern the way society views its past, present and future. As Aron (1968: 286) advanced, ideologies are "*systems of interpretation of the social world which induce a scale of values and suggest reforms to be undertaken, upheavals to fear or long for.*"³

Though culture is responsible for many of the representations held by people of the same culture, it cannot be taken as the unique source. First, because culture is not shared equally by all its members, something which explains the presence of myriads of sub-cultures in the same society (see Chapter One). Mainstream culture, shared by all members, is only a part of the cultural reservoir in a society. As Linton stated:

*Because of this difference in cultural participation, it is a mistake to consider a culture as the common denominator between the activities, ideas and attitudes of members of one society. Such common denominators can be established by individuals who share the same particular status.*⁴

(Linton 1967: XXXVIII)

Second, because members of the same culture tend to have different views of the same things. This difference is due to the fact that, beside the cultural referents, they do have other referents that vary according to an individual's context of life, studies, work and recreation. Among these referents ideology holds an important place.

³ (MOT)

⁴ (MOT)

2.2. Debating the Concept of Ideology

Ideology has often been announced as being dead by the so-called ‘end of ideology’ theorists like D. Bell (1960) and F. Fukuyama (1989). While Bell claimed that the West is witnessing a broad consensus among political parties and that no major ideological division has remained, Fukuyama believes in what he calls the *end of history*, a state where western liberalism has triumphed and overcome all other ideological systems since the defeat and collapse of communist Soviet Union. While this theory is quite debatable in the West, especially with the emergence of such civil society groups as the *mouvement altermondialiste*⁵, as an emancipatory movement standing against the rugged neo-liberal policies of governments and big business in the world, it is absolutely irrelevant to the Arab-Muslim world where ideology is vital to the maintaining of the totalitarian regimes in place as it is illustrated below. The form and functioning of ideology in these countries, and most particularly in Algeria, need, though, a theoretical debate over this concept in order to be clearly evinced.

It is quite tempting to define ideology in this case in the simplest way as those ideas “*which harm so much*” (Boudon 1991: 21)⁶. Although, this is exactly the way ideology functions in Algeria, scientific analysis imposes a theoretical debate⁷ as this concept has a long history and has been dealt with in different schools of thought, political systems and cultural settings, each one defining it specifically and even instrumentalising it out of self-

⁵ This movement emerged during the ministerial conference of the WTO in Seattle in 1999. It calls for the right of all the peoples of the world to decide for their future and the undermining of inequalities between the rich north and poor south. It aims to work as a lobby which could influence government decisions especially in the most industrialised countries.

⁶ (MOT)

⁷ The importance of a theoretical debate on the concept of ideology lies in the fact that no single definition seems to be satisfying in translating the functioning of ideology in the case of Algeria, and that each one captures only a part of the ideological apparatus implemented consciously or unconsciously as it will be shown.

interest.

Considered as one of the most problematic concepts in social sciences, it belongs to that type of concepts referred to by Gallie (1964) as *essentially contested concepts*. These concepts are *appraisive*, i.e. always subject to value-judgements; *complex*, described in various ways according to the variety of circumstances, and thus often used defensively or offensively. The profusion of definitions of ideology is, however, not redhibitory, though a bit confusing, and rather behoves prudence.

It was Napoleon that would first give to this concept its modern meaning, or rather its negative/pejorative meaning of abstract and doubtful ideas used to supplant political reality⁸. Marx, and later, Marxist scholars, would definitely stick this classical/theoretical conception to ideology as referring to false ideas. Marx (1970), in his *The German Ideology*, uses the metaphor of a *camera obscura* in which things look upside down to describe ideologies which he fundamentally holds as “*the false rationalisation...of events*” (Capdevila 2004: 172)⁹, events which are actually determined by factors other than those advanced by ideologues. In the same meaning, Engels uses another metaphor to describe ideologies. He considers them as *distorting spectacles* through which reality is deformed (quoted in Boudon 1991: 56).

The theoretical Marxist conception does not serve completely the case studied in this work as they mainly believe that ideologues are necessarily scholars or scientists. As it will be shown below, in the case of Algeria, and probably in most Arab-Islamic countries, ideology is, on the contrary, in the hands of politicians and preachers who use it as a practical/symbolic tool of

⁸ Napoleon used the term ideologue to refer to his opponents (Destutt de Tracy and Volney) who opposed his imperial plan (Capdevila 2004: 39; Boudon 1986: 40)

⁹ (MOT)

domination. Consequently, and contrary to what is admitted by Marxists who think that the forces that sustain ideology are material, in Algeria these forces are principally symbolic, i.e. exercised through political and religious discourses.

What may, however, be of some interest in the Marxist view is the fact that they admit the deviation of ideology from what is scientifically established, an illusion served on a scientific platter¹⁰, a characteristic that makes of ideology a very contested form of discourse in Algeria. It should also be noted that Marx conceived of ideology as *phantom ideas* (Stirner 1971), created by ideologues to deceive people. This idea is pertinent as far as ideology in Algeria is concerned. It can be observed that politicians, in Algeria, or Arab countries as a whole, try to create 'phantom enemies' that justify their tyrannical policies. In the name of terrorism or the Jewish threat, many of these countries have maintained the state of emergency for years, even when the threat, which may have been real at a given time, is no longer present. This state has provided the best conditions for the implementation of complete and closed totalitarian regimes¹¹.

Here is where the strong link between ideology, politics and religion can well be seen. For the perpetuation of totalitarianism, there is a need for an official ideology that can justify it (Aron 1965: 284-285). Ideology is the best means for a totalitarianism without terror, and the latter needs the people's support. People's support is obtained through the lever of religion that is there to persuade them of the benefits of the regime, if not in earthly matters, it would be spiritually (the hereafter). Fairclough argues that:

¹⁰ This view is shared by Parsons who writes: "*The problem of ideology appears when we find a contradiction between what we believe and what is scientifically proven as correct.*" (Quoted in Boudon 1986: 35) (MOT)

¹¹ I must admit that totalitarianism is not peculiar to Arab dictatorships. According to Marcuse (1968), totalitarianism is not incompatible with political pluralism and democracy in the West.

Ideologies are closely linked to power, because the nature of the ideological assumptions embedded in particular conventions, and so the nature of those conventions themselves, depends on the power relations which underlie the conventions; and because they are a means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power, simply through the recurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving which take these relations and power differences for granted.

(Fairclough 2001: 2)

The relation of ideology to power, and most particularly to totalitarian power, is important since it is a determining factor of the people's peaceful submission to this power. As cleverly expressed by Ricoeur (1997: 34): "*ideology overcomes pure integration towards distortion and pathology inasmuch as it seeks to reduce the tension between authority and domination*"¹². This is what Gramsci labels hegemony. Hegemony is a form of dominance by consent, instead of the application of sheer brute force (Gramsci 1971). In Algeria today, physical violence has proved to be inefficient for the preservation of the status quo as events such as the *Printemps Berber, October 5* and the *Printemps Noir*¹³ have shown it. With

¹² (MOT)

¹³ The *Printemps Berbère* of April 20, 1980 was the first popular uprising in Algeria since its independence in 1962. It refers to the demonstrations and riots of the people in Kabylia (in the central region of Algeria) claiming political freedom and recognition of Berber culture and language. This was the outcome of reflexions of major Berber intellectuals such as Mouloud Mammeri and Taos Amrouche. The demonstrators encountered much police repression which resulted in many injured people, a few deaths and imprisonment of 24 people. This movement would pave the way to the emergence of a generation of committed intellectuals such as Tahar Djaout and Said Saadi and would herald the 1988 revolt all over the country.

October 5th events of 1988 are the most violent popular revolt in independent Algeria that burst in Algiers and many other major cities in the country to call for the end of the totalitarian regime established since independence. To suppress the movement, the army took over the streets and opened fire on rioters to leave hundreds of casualties. These bloody events precipitated the end of the one-party system to see the emergence of more than 50 political parties and the legalisation of private newspapers. Although it did not establish democracy in the country, October 5th remains a landmark in the Algerians' expression of their total rejection of the political regime in place as well as their access to some political liberties that were undreamt of prior to this date.

The *Printemps Noir* of April 18, 2001 in Kabylia was a renewal of the *Printemps Berbère* as its claims remained unsatisfied. Triggered by the assassination of a youngster in a gendarmerie (military police force station) in the small village of Béni Douala (Tizi Ouzou), the events (demonstrations, riots and strikes) brought 123 death due to military repression.

the multiplication of political parties and private newspapers, political power in Algeria has admitted that the only guarantee of its perpetuation is people's consent. For an ideology to dominate, it needs to be "*shared by the rulers and the ruled.*" (Capdevila 2004: 73)¹⁴. It thus needs to condition people and apply some kind of daily brainwashing by means of the alliance between politics and religion. Aron (1965: 284-285) considers that this *ideological terror* is necessary for a perfect form of totalitarianism, when added to party monopoly and state-control-based economy. Party monopoly is, however, not a sine qua non condition for totalitarianism which may well cope with multi-party systems. According to Marcuse (1964), it is rather the monopoly on the production and distribution of ideas that really lead to a perfect form of totalitarianism. This view seems to correspond perfectly to the case of Algeria as the presence of multi-party system and private newspapers has not demised state hegemony.

In this connection, Shils (1968) suggests a practical/symbolic conception of ideology, as a system of beliefs, like religions and myths, which calls upon the people's affective involvement and requires a total devotion on their part. This view is quite relevant to the case under study inasmuch as ideology in Algeria is partly instrumentalised by politicians and preachers that mainly rely on the emotional dynamic in their discourse, where they often act as 'prophets', as opposed to scientists (in Marx's understanding).

The conception of ideology as a system of beliefs close to religion is a strong contention in this work. I will sustain the functioning of ideology in Algeria as a *secularisation* of religion, and equally, the functioning of religion as a *sacralisation* of ideology and politics, notably through the notion of heresy. This connection between religion and ideology is by no means

The movement culminated in the creation of popular committees of representatives (called *Arouch*) who drafted a declaration of political claims referred as the Plateforme d'El-Kseur.
¹⁴ (MOT)

peculiar to Algeria. Gramsci linked the terms ideology and faith (Capdevila 2004: 75) and most ideologues, not to say all, present their ideologies as offers of salvation. In his analysis of Soviet communism, Monnerot (1949: 268-269) writes that communism was a secular religion since its supporter identified to “*impersonal, omnipresent and ineluctable forces*”¹⁵, forces that any believer in religion fears. It is very difficult, as admitted by Capdevila (2004), to avoid the conceptualisation of ideology in religious terms, and it will be shown below that preachers, to use Marx’s description about Christian priests, are often the first ideologues.

The theorist of ideology, Pareto (1968), sustains the same conception of ideology. He conceives of ideology as *intellectual constructions* whose role is to answer sentiments. It will be observed that ideology in Algeria partly possesses this function as some people’s feelings of (say) frustration, are answered by the politician or preacher’s recourse to scapegoats, be it the United States, the Jew or the ‘West’¹⁶. Bell cleverly writes:

*Ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers used to exploit the emotional energy of certain passions, then channel it into political action to transform individuals.*¹⁷

(Quoted in Capdevila 2004: 193)

¹⁵ (MOT)

¹⁶ I will use the terms such as West, East, Orient, etc., in inverted commas as they are ideologically loaded and often used to refer to imprecise cultural entities that are far from corresponding to the geographical delimitations. These entities are attributed emotional sense by a process called by Bachelard (1964) the *poetics of space*. It is a process whereby a space is associated with some positive or negative value such as intimacy, safety, fear on the basis of the experience or representation one may have of it, though it may well be neutral. This poetic process, in the case of ‘East’ and ‘West’, often leads to, as Said makes it, “*that imaginative geography and history [that] help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself and dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away.*” (1995: 55)

¹⁷ (MOT)

Boudon (1991: 34) finds eight characteristics that mark ideologies as a type of belief systems distinct from the other ones, and it will be shown that ideology in Algeria possesses most of them:

1. they are explicitly formulated;
2. they rally groups around normative and supposedly positive beliefs;
3. they clearly establish their differences to other ideologies;
4. they are impermeable to all sorts of innovation;
5. they are intolerant;
6. they are fundamentally emotive in their expressions;
7. they rely on membership (through various forms of institutions);
8. they are closely linked to institutions that have the power to enforce their principles.

Capdevila (2004: 21) acknowledges the second characteristic as he admits that ideologies often play the role of unifying forces. He writes: “*The concept of ideology is analytically contained in the concept of social group as it is its idea of unity and identity.*”¹⁸The seventh characteristic appears in the vital need of ideologies for popular support, first to get political power and then to be implemented. This popular support requires from the people a great deal of credulity and from ideologues to present things in the most simplistic and definite terms, as is the case of Algerian ideological discourses, so as to avoid the complexities of scientific analyses that may show shortcomings and defects in them. Sutton et al. write:

Ideology tends to be straightforward and clear-cut, even when this straightforwardness and this clarity are not faithful to the subject under discussion. ...The ideologue overstates and caricatures like a writer of a comic book.

(Sutton et al.1956: 4-5)

¹⁸ (MOT)

Sutton's view is not shared by people like Geertz (1964) who thinks that oversimplification cannot be considered as a malicious strategy to deceive people, but rather a *metaphor* or *symbolic action* necessary to rally people. Shils also falls short of perceiving a sort of rationality that may underlie some ideologies, and which, in the case of Algeria, can be found at least in some of the arguments used to convince, or to persuade I should say, people.

People's credulity and confidence are vital to the success of ideologies considered by ordinary people as *boxes* (Boudon 1991: 126) which can only be approached by experts. As it will be evinced, religious ideology relies completely on this relationship people, or believers, have to ideas. Considering religious knowledge as an expert field that can only be dealt with by exegetes, they totally surrender to their interpretations and prescriptions without any sense of criticism, even when they sound irrational.

In this sense, Lenin (1988) is quite right in emphasising the utilitarian character of ideology. He believes that ideologies are systems of ideas or theories, whether true or false, used as weapons in class struggle. In the case of Algeria, ideology is used to tip the power scales in favour of those who have held it since its independence. Althusser (1965) confirms the utilitarianism of ideology as he admits that ideologies (in the form of religion, morality, philosophy, etc.) are organically part of the social structure along with the economic activity. His conception is quite relevant to the case studied in this work inasmuch as he conceives of ideologies as systems of representations that serve specific and practical social roles as opposed to the theoretical role of science (ibid.: 238-239). This practical role in Algeria consists in keeping the people under the total control of power holders.

Boudon (1991: 45) clearly admits that ideologies are doctrines based on wrong or misinterpreted scientific theories. Ideologues tend to disguise their ideologies in a pseudo-scientific discourse that advances ideas that seem acceptable at first sight. To sustain their logic, these ideas are often drawn from the daily life of the people addressed, and thus become quite resistant to any criticism and questioning, and acquire an apparent scientificity. As it will be shown below, ideologues instrumentalise language, Arabic in this case, to say “*nothingness, to make exist in words what does not exist in reality, to give a form of being, capable of inducing belief...*” (Bourdieu 2001: 327)¹⁹. Ideologues then may base their discourse on both scientific or sophistic arguments to deceive people and gain their subscription to their ideologies.

The vital question here is why people, particularly students, believe in these ideologies. Can this act of believing be described as rational or irrational? That is, can we find concrete and identifiable reasons for the people’s and students’ tendency, in Algeria and Arab countries, to believe in the political and religious discourse, such as Occidentalism, without any form of criticism, or is it a complex case of irrational behaviour that has its secrets in irrational forces?

It may be both. Yet, as put forward by Max Weber (1968), any explanation of a social phenomenon has first to be based on the individual rational behaviours in question, and irrational explanation can only be advanced in case the first one fails. An illustration of a wrong irrational explanation of a phenomenon, while it has a rational basis, is provided by the Luddites²⁰ in eighteenth century England. The wrecking of machines by

¹⁹ (MOT)

²⁰ The Luddites, named after their leader Ned Ludd, were a social movement in England in the 1800s, which protested against the intensive and devastating introduction of the machine into the factory with the Industrial Revolution mainly through industrial sabotage. The movement began in 1811 and quickly spread throughout the whole country, and

workers was interpreted irrationally as an anti-progress reaction against the emerging mechanisation of the Industrial Revolution which accordingly threatened the traditional form of production (Boudon 1991: 139). Yet, Coser (1982) rather advances a different interpretation of this movement which, according to him, expressed their worries about the danger of losing their jobs with the mechanisation of production. By destroying the machines, the Luddites showed their *nuisance value* to warn the employers, owners of the means of production, that workers had to be taken into account in this progress, as well as to refuse to be the outcasts and victims of technological development (Hobshawn 1952; Thompson 1966).

Another illustration is found in the case of contraceptive pills in India. As an explanation to the fact why Indian women, in the 1960s, refused to take contraceptive pills, a group of American researchers, hired by the Indian government to find the best solutions to reduce birth-rate in the country, concluded that this was due to the Indians' strong attachment to their traditions and superstitious belief in the necessity to have many children. A closer study showed that it was actually due to the very utilitarian reason of the profitability of children who cost far less than they were useful to the agrarian economy of regions like the Punjab (Boudon 1991: 11-13).

The interest of these two examples lies in the fact that, as far as ideology in Algeria is concerned, one needs to avoid the easy irrational explanation of Islamist/Occidentalists ideology as a mere rejection of progress. As it will be evinced below, this ideology serves more concrete and political concerns and is adhered to by people and students because of objective and identifiable reasons, which will be referred to as *perceptive effects*, including

ended in 1813 with the train of trials that resulted in executions and deportations of workers to British colonies. The movement remained in the British collective memory and history as the symbol of the struggle of the working class, and induced such equivalent movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Fox 2003; Binfield 2004).

what Boudon (1991) labelled as: situational effects, epistemological effects, effects of perspective and effects of communication.

Being aware of the existence of various types of rationality, it is admitted here that Occidentalism is mainly related to utilitarian rationality for its producers, and to situated rationality²¹ for those who subscribe to it. Utilitarian rationality is what brings Occidentalists to consciously produce their discourse for the sake of achieving planned objectives, whether political (seeking political domination), religious (seeking salvation), or intellectual (seeking the implementation of a given social project). Situated rationality is the sum of *good reasons* (Boudon 1982), be they philosophical, political, religious, or cultural, which induce people to embrace Occidentalist ideas.

2.3. Occidentalism as a Utilitarian Rationality to Approach Otherness

It must be observed that there developed in Algeria and the Arab world a utilitarian ideology which is central to the support of political power. This ideology, to which I will refer to as *Occidentalism*, i.e. Arab-Islamist²² conception of and theories about the 'West' and 'Westerners', is in the pure tradition of the Orientalist approach to the Arab and Muslim in its propagandist, ideological and lack of scientific validity. Applying the criteria that brought Said to consider that 'Western' scholars and writers' way of coming to terms with the 'Orient' as a particular ideological tradition he called Orientalism, I will advance that the Arab-Islamist politicians,

²¹ For a thorough examination of utilitarian and situated rationalities, see Boudon 1982.

²² I use the term Islamist instead of Islamic first to highlight the political base of this approach in its reference to the sacred text, the Koran. Second, I do claim that this approach belongs to a group of people in the Arab-Islamic countries and can by no means be generalised to all the members of these societies where many other political and cultural expressions exist, though not visible enough because they are the focus of neither local nor international media attention.

preachers and scholars' depiction of the 'West' is Occidentalism.

Although Said used this term to refer to that Oriental's distorted and biased view of the 'West', he did not develop this concept as a systematic and widespread conception in the Arab world. The concept of Occidentalism has been given more significance by Ian Buruma (2004), with Avishai Margalit²³, in their book *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies*. The authors use the term Occidentalism to designate the Japanese traditionalists' negative reaction to Western cultural invasion in Japan, viewed as "*shallow, rootless, and destructive of creative power. The West, particularly the United States, was coldly mechanical, a machine civilization without spirit or soul, a place where people mixed to produce mongrel races.*" (Buruma 2004: B10) Occidentalism is also a desire "*to restore the warm organic Asian community to spiritual health.*" (ibid.) The authors extended the concept to include all negative views and violent reactions to western culture and western presence in the Orient at large, thus integrating such people as Muslims and Arabs (Buruma & Margalit 2004). As defined by the authors, Occidentalism is then:

... a war against a particular idea of the West, which is neither new nor unique to Islamist extremism.... Occidentalism was part of the counter-Enlightenment, to be sure, but also of the reaction against industrialization.... Occidentalism is a revolt against rationalism (the cold, mechanical West, the machine civilization) and secularism, but also against individualism Wherever it occurs.... Occidentalism is fed by a sense of humiliation, of defeat.
(Buruma 2004: B10)

The authors' conception of Arab-Islamic Occidentalism seems then to be limited to a purely militant and violent ideology of destruction, synonymous to Islamism and terrorism, upheld by spokespeople like Bin Ladin and al-

²³ Ian Buruma is a professor of human rights, democracy, and new-media studies at Bard College. Avishai Margalit is a professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University, in Jerusalem.

Zawahiri. This Occidentalism is definitely in need of recruits completely devoted to the cause, pledging their life and fortune, who ultimately turn into terrorists and kamikazes.

The concept of Occidentalism in this work takes Buruma and Margalit's understanding as a very limited dimension of this phenomenon. The physically violent expression of Occidentalism, through terrorism, and its political manifestation, through Islamism, are but small-scaled and a very extreme practice of Occidentalism that often do not serve it in its propagation. The most dangerous and efficacious form of Occidentalism, as advanced here, is that ideology as a discourse of hatred and rejection of otherness. This discourse puts up perfectly with peace as it often calls for self-isolationism, and discards confrontation. It is a discourse produced and relayed by acknowledged and common representatives in society such as politicians, preachers and pseudo-intellectuals, as opposed to clearly established deviants such as terrorist. As such, it all the more adhered and lived up to by laypeople. Occidentalism is wider and more complex than a propaganda war. It is a social project concerned more with the inside rather than the outside of the Arab-Islamic world. The invocation of the *other* in Occidentalism serves only the confirmation and containment of the *self*.

One must clarify, at this stage, the notion of *pseudo-intellectuals* opposed here to the term *intellectuals*. As observed in the Introduction, the intellectual can only be radical, autonomous and committed, fundamentally oppositional; opposed to official political discourse, mainstream cultural discourse, established religious discourse. His opposition is not here in the sense of systematic rejection, but rather in the sense of systematic criticism. As Said cleverly put it:

Least of all should an intellectual be there to make his/her audiences feel good; the whole point is to be embarrassing,

contrary, even unpleasant. ... There is no such thing as private intellectual since the moment you set down words and then publish them you have entered a public world. Nor is there only a public intellectual, someone who exists just as a figurehead or spokesperson or symbol of a cause, movement, or position.

(Said 1994: 12)

It is in this sense that those producers of ideas, whether religious or nationalist, are not considered here as intellectuals, but rather as pseudo-intellectuals, since the intellectual is believed to follow the legitimating credo of his social role, “*never solidarity before criticism*” (Said quoted in Bayoumi & Rubin 2000: 440), while pseudo-intellectuals always sacrifice criticism on the altar of solidarity, as their ‘critical mind’ is always ready “*to fall into line to wage a war against one official enemy or another.*” (Said 2003) The importance of the intellectual’s commitment to criticism before solidarity brought Said to ironically comment that he was “*the last Jewish intellectual*” (quoted in Todorov 2004: 33), meaning that it was hard today to find among Jewish intellectuals, as among Arab intellectuals, those who still stick to the legitimating credo.

2.4. Criteria for the Definition of Occidentalism

Part of the ideology at work in Algeria and the Arab world is that which defines *otherness*, that which establishes difference to the *other* and which is called upon by students in their approach to foreign cultures in such classes as American Civilisation, i.e. Occidentalism. Occidentalism plays more the role of a self-identification process than a process for the identification of the *other*. Ideologues make use of Occidentalism as a reminder to people, as Muslims and Arabs, of what they are, or what they ought to be, as opposed to what the *other*, the non-Muslim ‘Westerner’ is, or is supposed to be.

Occidentalism is there to fix identities of both *we* and the *other*, for fear of deculturation and possible loss of Arab-Islamic identity. It is a discourse of over-self-affirmation, such as the African-American *Black is beautiful*²⁴, which consists in putting one's identity forward as the reversal of the stigma, to form an 'identity of reaction' to the *other* (Camilleri 1989: 383), in a context of Arab-Islamic technological and economic backwardness, cultural fragility and psychological confusion. This concern is voiced by many Arab religious scholars from different Arab countries. A theology teacher, a civilisation teacher and the faculty dean, the three from Oum El Koura University in Saudi Arabia, with a member of the Moroccan Arabisation Commission clearly pointed to the dangers of teaching English to Arab young children and called for the exclusive teaching of Arabic. In their arguments, they described Arabic as the language of the hereafter and English as the language of life, and that the hereafter was definitely more important than earthly life ("Awlawiyat", *Iqraa*, September 26th, 2005). Mohamed Amara (2005) also affirms that dialogue between religions cannot work because it is based on the Christian strive to convert all Muslims. Obviously, Occidentalism is produced not only by politicians and preachers, but also by pseudo-intellectuals, and relayed, consciously or unconsciously, by the media.

It must also be observed that Occidentalism does not reserve exclusion to 'Western' cultural and intellectual production. It also, in even more emphasised terms, overshadows an important part of the Arab-Islamic history of ideas, where anti-orthodox and anti-clerical Arab or Muslim scholars' views are expressed. Arab-Islamic intellectual history has functioned on the American president Andrew Jackson's principle "to the victor's belong spoils", and oppositional scholars have always been the

²⁴ *Black is beautiful* was an expression, coined by the militant black nationalist Marcus Garvey (1887-1940) in the 1920s in the United States, which referred to African-American pride in reaction to centuries-long white stigmatisation of the black race (Marable 1984; Salley 1994).

losers, thus rarely mentioned. When dealing with the same historical eras, Occidentalists refer to people, like Ibn Taymiya (1263-1328)²⁵, who offer suitable arguments for their ideology, while they constantly eclipse those scholars who had a contradictory discourse, and stood against the excessive domination of religion over civil life.

European historians focus on European Enlightenment scholars, like Rousseau and Locke, who vindicated reason and rational thinking, while they omit to mention that that same *Age of Reason* was not void of orthodox and pro-religion scholars, such as Mgr. Beaumont or Abbey Bergier (Urvoy 1996: 8). Likewise, Occidentalists, deliberately, and non-Occidentalists, deliberately or not, represent Arab-Islamic intellectual tradition exclusively through those scholars who rejected reason and rationality as instruments of acquisition, production and evaluation of knowledge and facts, while critical reflexion was definitely consubstantially part of Arab-Islamic intellectual tradition. As Urvoy put it:

Critical thinking is a native phenomenon in Arab civilisation. Its repression in the past, for others, was carried out through oppression and not by conviction, and for itself, by arguments of convenience and not by an exhaustive reflexion.

(ibid.: 225)

Reference to scholars, that were not religious exegetes, is limited to those religiously-supervised philosophers, called *mutakallimūn*, such as Abu l'Hasan al-Ashari and Abu Mansur al-Maturidi²⁶, who engaged in dialectical

²⁵ Ibn Abdullah Ibn Taymiya (ابن عبد الله ابن تيمية) was a theologian who believed that any innovation different to the teachings of the Prophet, his companions, and their first followers (the children and grandchildren of the first Muslims) was a forbidden deviation or *bidah* (بدعة). He then emphasised the strictly literal interpretation of the Koran. He is known to be the main source for the Wahhabi and Salafi schools of Sunni Islam (see Little 1975; Sivan 1990; Kepel 2003).

²⁶ Abu l'Hasan al-Ashari (ابو الحسن بن إسماعيل الأشعري) (873-935) was the founder of the Ash'ari Islamic school of philosophy which included members like Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) (or Algazel) who criticised Muslim philosophers in his famous book *Tahafut al-falasifa* (The

discussions of religious matters. This religious-philosophical discipline (*ilm al-kalām*) was much more apologetic than really critical and scientific. Yet, real philosophers, who were innovators and precursors of many of European Enlightenment ideas, were often, and still are, labelled with such anathema as *zindiq* (literally a hypocrite), which referred to any scholar who did not conform to mainstream ideas (Stroumsa 1985; Chokr 1994). Examples of such scholars who belong to the Arab-Islamic civilisation, and who remained quite unknown till they paradoxically revealed by some Orientalist scholars (Urvoy 1991), are by no means exceptional. These scholars were not necessarily Arabs, nor were they all Muslims. Yet, they lived in geographical areas dominated by Arab-Islamic civilisation and the Arabic language. Suffice it, here, to mention, with Ibn Sina (ابن سينا), Ibn Rushd (ابن رشد) and al-Farabi (الفرايبي) (see below), three other figures, Ibn al-Muqaffa (ابن المقفع), Ibn Ishaq (ابن إسحاق) and al-Razi (الرازي), a Muslim Persian, a Christian Arab, and a deist Persian respectively, that left an outstanding contribution to the world patrimony of scholarship, yet, rarely, if not never, referred to in Arab-Islamic countries when dealing with their intellectual tradition. The Muslim Persian Abdullah Ibn al-Muqaffa (724-759) is often restrictively presented as a writer and mostly translator of the famous *Kalila wa Dimna* (*Kallilag and Demnag*), from the Persian language Pahlavi into Arabic. Yet, his distinction between political wisdom, a long process acquired over time, and arbitrary religious authority expressed in *Kallilag and Demnag* and *Adab al-kabir* (ibid: 41) is silenced. Hunain Ibn Ishaq (808-912), known in Europe as Joannitius, was an Arab Nestorian physician who remained completely unknown despite his valuable works, notably his translation of Galenic and Hellenic treaties. Within the context of the historical period he was living in, a period full of religious fervour, he raised,

Incoherence of the Philosophers) and closed the door of *Ijtihad*. Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (أبو منصور الماتريدي) (?- 944) was a Muslim theologian whose philosophy was very much dominated by religion. He claimed that men are inherently able to find out the sins without the help of revelation, and thus even those who are reached by the Prophet's message will end up in the hellfire if they don't find out God's true words.

in an unprecedented style of scientific precision, such disturbing questions as the reasons behind adherence to a religious belief based on the sole reliance on a prophet's words, or the dangers of psychological manipulation by religions (ibid: 67-68). Abu Bakr al-Razi (865-925), a physician, philosopher and scholar, is mostly remembered for his scientific contributions in the fields of medicine, alchemy, chemistry. Yet, his ideas in philosophy and its relation to religion are not made conspicuous. His ostracism in the Arab-Islamic intellectual tradition, as approached by Occidentalists, is mostly due to his emphasis on the notion of *Ijtihad* (literally effort of reflexion), which is, in religion, an individual's independent interpretation of available sources like the Koran and the *Sunnah* (Prophet Mohammed's words and deeds), and individual ingenuity in the lack of a textual reference in a given subject. Al-Razi extended *Ijtihad* to all fields of knowledge and used to claim that "*the one who reflects and takes much care is right*" even if he does not achieve his aim (Abd al-Kafi 1978: 291-297).

These three independent thinkers, independent from the religious hegemony of scholarship of the time, though advanced different views, shared one important principle which did not conform to the postulate of their contemporaries, nor of present time Occidentalists: that "*political power can be the source of order and ... religion does not have a function of legitimacy in itself but rather one of mere pedagogy.*" (Urvoy 1996: 217) Religion, as a source of law, was then questioned much to the distress of religious authorities of their time and of today.

This false representation of Arab-Islamic intellectual tradition has underlay Occidentalism, which first emerged as a socio-political movement

within civil society in Egypt, with the foundation of al-ikhwān al-muslimūn²⁷ (the Society of the Muslim Brothers), in March 1928, under the leadership of Hassan al-Banna²⁸ (Wikipedia). Within the context of the fight for decolonisation in Egypt and the Arab world, this religious, political and social movement also stood against the ‘westernisation’ of Egyptian society and politics as it called for the creation of an Islamic republic, based on the *sharea* (Koranic law). Al-ikhwān al-muslimūn gained much support and had echoes in various Arab countries, such as Syria, Lebanon and Jordan (and in an unstructured manner in Algeria), where movements, holding the same name, even well after the death of Hassan al-Banna, emerged and subscribed to the same claims of the need to hold the Koran as the supreme law of the land and the rejection of all ‘Western’ cultural manifestations in these countries. This eventually gave full form to the politicisation of Islam and the construction of a new ideology, Islamism as political Islam, which would compete with the other ideologies like communism, socialism and capitalism.

The contribution of other influential pseudo-intellectuals such as the Egyptian Sayid Kotb²⁹ also brought more credit and echo to al-ikhwān al-muslimūn. Sayid Kotb strengthened the close link between Islamism,

²⁷ This society first founded after the model of the freemasonry in Europe for which Hassan al-Banna had much admiration in terms of organisation and secrecy, with its motto: "*The secrecy of the organization and the publicity of the da'wa* [proselytism]" (Wikipedia). The organisation undertook important social work by founding many social institutions such as schools and hospitals. It also had an armed branch, the *الجهاز الخاص* (the special organism), composed of members of the Egyptian army and whose function was to assassinate *unruly Ikhwān* and liquidate political figures. It started with a limited membership to reach, by 1948, about half a million members (see Cohen 1982). Today, al-ikhwān al-muslimūn have formally renounced violence and definitely entered the political arena with their parliamentary elections win in 2005.

²⁸ Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) started as a teacher to turn editor of a monthly magazine called E-Shihab.

²⁹ Sayid Kotb (1906-1966), a contemporary of Hassan al-Banna, was a writer and literary critic, and worked as a teacher and then as a civil servant in the Egyptian Ministry of Education. His education and international experience, through his two-year stay in the United States as a student in educational sciences, brought a complementary dimension to al-ikhwān al-muslimūn.

Occidentalism and the relation to the ‘West’ as a culturally and religiously different *other*, with whom the Arab-Islamic world is supposed to maintain adversarial rapport. His conception of material and spiritual life, as he upheld, was different from that of Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd or al-Farabi³⁰, as he believed that theirs was based on ancient Greek philosophy, that is, not purely Islamic. He then called for the imperative of al-ikhwān al-muslimūn and Arab-Islamic societies at large to develop an approach to society and politics in a totally antagonistic position to the ‘Western’ one. ‘Western’ society, as illustrated by the United States according to Kotb, though at the highest degree of economic and technological growth, is in a primitive moral and cultural state. Arab-Muslims were then asked to construct societies that had to be fundamentally opposed to ‘Western’ philosophy and style of life lest they fall back into what he labelled *El-Jahiliya El-Moassira* (literally modern ignorance), a state that revives the pre-Islamic way of life.

In the last ten years, the world has witnessed, thanks to the satellite media boom, the emergence of Arab satellite channels, such as the Saudi *Iqraa*, whose main purpose is to propagate Occidentalism among Muslim and Arab viewers, first to compete with the other extremist ideologies diffused by such TV channels as American *Fox News*; second, to proselytise for the Occidentalist interpretation of Islamic theology. These

³⁰ Al-Farabi, or Alfarabius (872-950), a Persian Muslim philosopher, was the instigator of that current of openness of thought in Islam that looked into all present philosophy of the time, mainly the Greek one with Aristotle and Plato, to construct an original Islamic political philosophy (see al-Farabi 2001). Ibn Sina, or Avicenna (980-1037), very much influenced by al-Farabi, was a Persian Muslim physician, philosopher and mystic who innovated in joining Greek philosophy to Islamic metaphysics in search for an Oriental philosophy (see Sinoué 1989). Ibn Rushd, or Averroes (1126-1198), was an Andalusian-Arab philosopher, physician, jurist, theologian and mathematician whose philosophical openness and modernity shocked his contemporaries and won him enmity and persecution. He mainly vindicated the importance of the position of philosophy in all matters, including religion, in his book *Tahafut al-tahafut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) to answer Algazel’s attack on philosophy one century before in his book *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*. He also stressed the importance of analytical thinking as a prerequisite to interpret the Koran, in opposition to orthodox Muslim theology which rather emphasised extensive knowledge of sources other than the Koran. (see Bazzana et al. 2005).

channels have provided the best pulpit for Occidentalists, such as Mohamed Amara³¹, to voice their views to the entire world. Launched by the Arab Media Company (AMC) on October 21st, 1998, *Iqraa* television channel has seduced a considerable number of viewers in Arab-Islamic countries thanks to its use of preachers and pseudo-intellectuals, of all ages, that master the suitable discourse for the different categories of people, ranging from adolescents to senior people. 64% of the students who responded to the questionnaire considered this channel as the most reliable in comparison to other channels such as *Algerian TV*, *Al Jazeera*, *Al Arabya*, *BBC* or *CNN*.

Completely different to the official and dull presentation of government-owned TV channels in the Arab countries, *Iqraa* has succeeded in innovating in form and content, with the contribution of both male and female hosts dealing with a great variety of themes that tackle the daily preoccupations of people. This has raised the interest of people who could not find it neither in their public media, too propagandist for local political regimes, nor in the foreign/European or American media, culturally too far away from their close concerns.

Taking full advantage of the positive response among the Arabic-Islamic viewers, Occidentalists have found in this channel, the best medium to reach the maximum of people. The close link between this channel and Occidentalism is clearly established in the Preamble (*Iqraa* 2006) available on the channel's website:

- Re-establish our Islamic identity;
- form an Islamic society identity;
- build the modern Islamic society:

³¹ Mohamed Amara (1931-) holds a Ph.D. in Islamic Studies and is the author of many books such as *في فقه المواجهة بين الغرب والإسلام* (Studies in the Confrontation between the West and Islam) (2003) and *الأصولية بين الغرب والإسلام* (Fundamentalism between the West and Islam) (2004).

- * which applies the *sharea* (Islamic law)) in its entirety in all aspects of life;
- * deepen our Islamic identity;
- * revive *fouroudh el kifaya* (extra prescriptions)
- * provide a purposeful Arabic medium that deal from an Islamic perspective with subjects drawn on the viewers' cultural, social, and economic life.

With the Egyptian Mohamed Amara, probably with whom Occidentalism is best articulated, this ideology, just as Orientalism had once been with Ernest Renan (ibid.), has become a discipline and a career. The specificity of Occidentalism is that Occidentalists show less allegiance to the discipline from an intellectual viewpoint than to their theological, cultural and political belonging. In their attempt to combat Orientalist racist view of the Arab and Muslim, Occidentalism has come to be just an Arab and Muslim version of Orientalism. Thus chauvinism, ethnocentrism and extremism, based on the definition of the 'West' and 'East' in religious terms, do direct their pens more often than scientific objectivity does. Occidentalism, in its chauvinism, comes even to turn the most negative facts into positive ones. A good instance is advanced by Amara (2004) who ascribes the most positive attributes to fundamentalism in its Islamic version. He blatantly admits that Islamic fundamentalism is a revival of the glorious Islamic past, while Christian fundamentalism is a negation of modernity and progress.

The success of Islamism in attracting supporters is that it burgeoned as one of the voices that expressed opposition to a Christian coloniser, whether English or French, and later grew and matured against the corrupt and tyrannical post-independence political regimes in Arab countries. This is clearly observed in the words of Hassan al-Banna (2006) for whom *al-ikhwān al-muslimūn* had two main objectives: "*The liberation of*

*the Islamic world from any foreign power... and the creation of a free Islamic state based on Islamic law...*³²

It seems clear then that, from its outset, Occidentalism, as a definition of the *other*, would maintain close ties with Islamism as a struggle against this *other*, first as the physical on-the-scene coloniser, and then, after independences, as a cultural distant coloniser. However, while Occidentalism was the monopoly of such political opponents as al-ikhwān al-muslimūn, it ended by being embraced by the Arab political regimes themselves as it offered opportunities to gain support and acquiescence from the populations. Islamism and totalitarianism in Arab countries have relied on Occidentalism in the same way as Imperialism and colonialism had relied on Orientalism.

The importance of Occidentalism, as far as foreign culture teaching, such as American Civilisation, is concerned, lies in the fact that it is the prism through which students approach the foreign culture and its carriers. Their prior knowledge, representations and stereotypes are, to a large extent, moulded by Occidentalist pseudo-theories about the *other*, in this case the 'West'. Responsible for most of the deformations and misrepresentations of the 'West', Occidentalism deserves close attention as a national, and even pan-Islamic and pan-Arab, enterprise of distortion and manipulation of discourse produced by various social actors including politicians, preachers, scholars and media professionals.

What allows to designate this Arab-Islamic approach to *otherness*, in its various expressions (cultural, religious or national), as Occidentalism, in a Saidian sense of the term, is that it bears the same criteria that brought Said to consider 'Western' conceptions of the 'Orient' as Orientalism. Among

³² (MOT)

these criteria are:

- First: the fact that ideologues use Occidentalism as a *mediator* between *we* and the *other*, with its supposed learned grids and codes that inform about the 'West' which could not be viewed in its true nature without Occidentalists' preachers and scholars' expertise who are the only ones who are able to reveal it. The 'West', in the Arab world, just like the 'Orient' for Orientalists (Said 1995: 67), then cannot exist but Occidentalised, i.e. only as depicted by Occidentalists with their body of biased knowledge dominated by the imperative to keep people in total ignorance. This is expressed, for instance, through the *obligation* for any Muslim, according to an Occidentalist, to have a *sheikh* (a religious mentor), whose role is to guide him in all aspects of his life, be it spiritual or material ("Qur-ān wa hayat", *Iqraa*, October 6th, 2005).

Political imperatives do also have their share in the instrumentalisation of the *other* through Occidentalism for the sake of preserving the political status quo. This is illustrated by such cases as the Algerian government's reaction to the *loi du 23 février*³³, described by the Algerian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, as a law which "*approached mental blindness, negationism and revisionism*"

³³ Part of what is admitted as positive historical revisionism, according to its advocates, which attempts to right the wrongs of history, i.e. change false commonly held ideas about the past, the *loi du 23 février 2005* (the law of February 23rd, 2005) is a law on the 'positive value' of French colonialism. Mostly enacted for the vindication of the *Harki* community (Algerians who supported and fought for French presence in Algeria), the law states clearly that the French "*acknowledge and recognize in particular the positive role of the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa.*" (LOI n° 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés). The law provoked great backlash from former French colonies and also from French academics and intellectuals who rejected the French Parliament's influence over the writing of history. The negative effect of the law brought the French president Jacques Chirac to urge parliament to revise it saying that "*In a Republic, there is no official history. It is not to the law to write history. Writing history is the business of historians.*" ("History should not be written by law" says Jacques Chirac (Ce n'est pas à la loi d'écrire l'histoire), *RFI*, December 11th, 2005).

(“Les principales prises de position concernant la loi du 23 février 2005, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, January 26th, 2006). Focusing people’s attention on this French unjust interpretation of a common history which affirms the positive effects of French colonialism, the government deliberately turns away from a far more important debate over the ‘negative effects’ of independence, i.e. dictatorship. While all state-controlled media were mobilised to ‘debate’ over this law, the failure of independence to extract Algerians, and all Arab peoples, from their economic dependence on their former colonisers as well as their miserable political and social conditions are never open to debate. Nor is the historical revisionism of Algerian official history allowed by permitting full access to the historical archives exclusively controlled by the state.

The polemic over the *loi du 23 février* shows that debate over the past is very selective and determined by the rulers’ interest in its positive or negative effects. Calling upon the collective memory never serves its transformation into a *random access memory* which could allow creativity for the benefit of the whole society (Daniel Maximin, “Culture et dépendances”, *TV5 Monde*, March 23rd, 2006), but rather functions as an instrument of power and domination. As cleverly expressed by George Orwell in his novel *1984*, governments (Big Brother) always revise history in accordance with the current political situation and constantly have recourse to public brainwashing to ensure their support by any means necessary, mainly ideology and propaganda, a sort of *Ministry of Truth*, which may be, depending on the case, religion or history.

The relation between religion and politics in Arab countries (which will be explained below) as far as *otherness* is concerned is of a great importance for the maintenance of the political status quo. There is a tacit agreement between the representatives of each of these two

sides in which religious representatives are allowed to use state-controlled media instruments to express their attacks on the *other* (the 'West'), in return for total silence on domestic politics. The example of the foundation of the Conference for the Defence of the Prophet Mohammed which gathered, for its first meeting, more than 400 Muslim religious exegetes, coming from all Muslim countries in the world, to discuss the ways to defend Islam and Muslims in 'Western' countries, according to its spokesperson Khaled Abderrahmene al-Ajimi ("Hassad al-yaoum", *Al-Jazeera*, March 24th, 2006) is a case in point. While this event enjoyed wide official media coverage, these same exegetes have never had such a meeting or foundation to discuss the possible means to defend Muslims, as citizens, in their own countries where their rights are encroached on by the political regimes in place on a regular basis.

- Second: this approach is far from being *objective scholarship*, and rather based on representations, or more accurately, misrepresentations of the 'West', instead of natural depictions of reality. The 'West' is not presented but rather re-presented according to the Occidentalists' conception. His conception corresponds to his interpretation of the image of the *heathen* in the Koran, a stigmatising image which responds to the national and international political requirements of the time. Far from any apology of 'Western' culture, it must be reckoned that it offers a substantial scope for political and intellectual liberty that desperately lacks in the Arab-Islamic part of the world³⁴. This makes of it a clear danger to the stability of the

³⁴ I will use the phrases 'Islamic world' and 'Arab-Islamic world', not as actual cultural or religious entities, but as political ones, i.e. groups of countries whose governments claim officially in legal documents, such as constitutions, that they are Arab and Islamic countries. I am aware that these documents often betray a reality in this part of the world of multiethnicity and diversity of religions which are not officially acknowledged. Besides, Arabs and Muslims are also present in great numbers as fully-acknowledged citizens in

political regimes holding power in these countries. Instrumentalising, then, the trust and emotional investment people have in their religion, politicians, preachers, and scholars disseminate that image of the 'West' to discard this danger and deceive people for the purpose of masking reality and gaining their total acquiescence. This situation is what Marcuse (1964) describes as the most ideological world, where individuals are incapable of perceiving their society's contradictions, where false conscience takes the appearance of a true one, where the irrational looks like the rational, and servitude like liberty, where *"the invisibility of ideology means the total identification of individuals to their society."* (Capdevila 2004: 164)³⁵.

Among the instances that illustrate this point is the Occidentalists' ambivalent treatment of those religions that are supposed to be exclusively 'Western', i.e. Christianity and Judaism. While they claim that they have much respect for these religions and the people who believe in them, who are of course always referred to as 'Westerners' despite the presence of Christian and Jewish Arabs and non-Arabs living in Arab countries, they contradict their statement by questioning the authenticity of these religions. The case of Kamel Chekat who, on a programme on revealed religions on *Canal Algérie*, while calling for respect of all religions, as prescribed in Islam, assumes that the very sacred books on which these religions are based, the Gospels and the Torah, were deliberately forged by priests and rabbis out of self-interest ("Bonjour d'Algérie", *Canal Algérie*, November 23rd, 2005).

This contradiction is also sustained in Algerian law. Alleged offence against Islam earned editors of two Algerian newspapers, *Errisala* and *Assafir*, a committal order for the republication of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed, published for the first time in the Danish

'Western' countries. The phrases 'Islamic world' and 'Arab-Islamic world' are then used for mere operational reasons.

³⁵ (MOT)

newspaper *Jyllands Posten* on September 30th, 2005, in the name of Article 144 bis 2 of the Algerian penal code. However, though Arab and Islamic countries protested against the publication of these cartoons as an offence against Islam, they do not sanction offence against Christianity as Jesus, the Son of God according to Christian theology, is referred to as a simple prophet and a mortal on a regular basis in state-run institutions like mosques. The violent and peaceful protests induced by these cartoons were in the name of, according to the protestors, the right to the protection of one's sacred beliefs and mutual respect between religions and cultures. This is, however, quite contradictory, in the eyes of many 'Westerners', to these protestors' interpretation of Islamic law which condemns to death any Muslim accused of converting to Christianity. These same protestors rejected any 'Western' intervention, in the name of national sovereignty, to prevent the beheading of the Afghan Abdu Rahman for converting to Christianity in March 2006 (*CNBC Europe*, March 25th, 2006).

The contradiction is pushed to its utmost limits when Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, the general secretary of the Organisation for Islamic Conference (OIC), urges the EU, in his meeting with Javier Solana, to fight against Islamophobia, just as it struggles against xenophobia and anti-Semitism (*El-Watan*, February 12th, 2006), while anti-Semitic statements are commonplace in the media, the mosques and even popular culture in Arab countries.

Occidentalism aims mainly to establish an unrealistic relationship to the 'West', in which the originality of the Arab-Islamic culture is preserved from any acculturation or interculturalisation, while imitation at the technological and economic levels is encouraged. This utilitarian and materialistic view of history, which aims at separating 'Western' technology from its cultural background, started to take form as early

as the 1830s with al-Tahtawi³⁶ (Urvoy 1996: 221). Berque commented on this saying that: “*Arabs like neither to be compared to others nor be different from them.*” (Quoted in Deguy 1964: 864)³⁷

- Third: this approach admits that the conflicts and animosities that exist between countries from the two sides, and which are a mere historical experience, are an *eternal order* of things that cannot be overcome and that can only be settled through the total destruction of one or the other, or the domination of one over the other, as suggested by Orientalism (Said 1995: 354). This is confirmed by such Occidentalists as Mohamed Amara who, in a paper on “The role of cinema in the promotion of the Islamic past”, asserts that ‘East’-‘West’ conflict is still valid (*The Seventh Iqraa Jurisprudential Conference on Cinema*, 16, 17 October, 2004). The Christian ‘West’ and the Muslim ‘East’ can but exist as enemies as they hold two exclusive religions as claimed by the same Amara (2005) who writes: “*Islam is the only religion whose founding principles are the antithesis of the Christian ones.... It is thus a fundamentally hostile religious movement to Christianity.*”³⁸

The diffusion of the culture of suspicion about the *other* (the Christian or the Jew), wrongly based on Koranic verses that are particular to the historical context of revelation, i.e. to the Muslims’ relations with the other religions during Prophet Mohammed’s days, is important to the support of animosities. The following verse is a case in point:

³⁶ The Egyptian Rifa al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) was somehow one of the pioneering figures of the movement of cultural and intellectual renaissance known in the Arab world as *Al-Nahda* (النهضة) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This movement stood most in reaction to colonisation and contributed to the rise of Arab nationalism. Al-Tahtawi claimed that the Arab world had a lot to learn from Europe but should mould it to Arab-Islamic values and culture (see Hourani 1991).

³⁷ (MOT)

³⁸ (MOT)

Among the People of the Book are some who, if entrusted with a hoard of gold, will (readily) pay it back; others, who, if entrusted with a single silver coin, will not repay it unless thou constantly stoodst demanding... (Āl-Imrān, S.3, A.75)

This principle of enmity is basic to the whole ideology of Occidentalism as expressed by Amara (2006b), who asserts that if the spiritual mission of Muslims is over with the spread of Islam, their religious mission is still to come by protecting the *sharea al-ilahiya* (divine law) through the subjection of the rest of mankind to Islam, whether by the exercise of political power or military power within the state. Taken out of context, some verses of the Koran are thus instrumentalised:

Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His messenger, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, from among the People of the Book. (At-Tauba, S.9, A.29)

O ye who believe! Fight the Unbelievers who are near to you and let them find harshness in you...(At-Tauba, S.9, A.123)

Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies... (Al-Anfāl, S.8, A.60)

- Fourth: Difference between ‘East’ and ‘West’, being part of an eternal order as claimed by Occidentalists, entails that distinction between the people in these two geographical spaces is *ontological* rather than cultural, and thus an Arab or Muslim is to deal with the ‘West’ as an Arab or Muslim first, as an individual second.

This state of mind is even adopted by high-ranked political leaders such as the president of the Algerian Islamist party *MSP*, A. Soltani. As a minister of the republic, he blatantly breaks the law by advising a criminal, under Algerian law, a member of the banned Islamist party

FIS, Anwar Haddam, not to come back to Algeria before the enactment of amnesty law (*Liberté*, April 20th, 2006). Loyalty to Islamist ideology, to a particular interpretation of Islam, prevails over loyalty to the state of which he is supposed to be one of the official representatives and protectors.

Orientalist views brought Europeans to adopt the same state of mind in the nineteenth and part of the twentieth centuries, notably those who lived in the Orient, intellectuals like the English writer R. Kipling who clearly showed it in his writings. As Said put it:

Being a White Man was therefore an idea and a reality. It involved a reasoned position towards both the white and the non-white worlds.... It meant specific judgements, evaluations, gestures.
(Said 1995: 227)

It is part of the Occidentalists strategy to naturalise this idea of the primacy of religious and geographical identities in order to transform it into a social *habitus* (see below). Amara refers to some Koranic verses to establish this principle of eternal enmity:

- “Nor will they cease fighting you until they turn you back from your faith if they can.” (Al-Baqarah S.2, A.217);
- “They would not follow thy Qibla; nor art thou going to follow their Qibla...” (Al-Baqarah S.2, A.145)

The primacy of religious identity is backed up by Occidentalists, such as Hamid Ibn Abdellah al-Aliy (2006), with a Koranic verse that is interpreted to suit this political attitude and in which cultural, national or economic concerns are relegated to a lower position in favour of religious loyalty:

Say: If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your mates, or your kindred: the wealth that ye have gained; the commerce in which ye fear a decline: or the dwellings in which ye delight – are dearer to you than Allah or his Messenger, or the striving in His

cause; - then wait until Allah brings about His decision: and Allah guides not the rebellious (At-Tauba S.9, A.24)

This division of humans into groups on the basis of permanent features such as space and religion is essential to the rationalisation of the myth of a group consensual vision of the social world, to the recognition of a particular ideologically-based opinion as the whole group's legitimate view, a view which becomes necessarily part of the group's identity, or more accurately of the group's representation of itself. In this sense, any rejection of this view is perceived as an encroachment on the group's natural integrity. As explicated by Bourdieu:

*The quest for distinction ... produces separations which are meant to be perceived, or better, known and acknowledged as legitimate differences, i.e. often as natural differences...*³⁹

(Bourdieu 2001: 305)

- Fifth: like the 'Orient' for Orientalism (ibid.: 207), the mere designation of that region as 'West' and those people as 'Westerners' is an *evaluative judgement* that entails a particular attitude and behaviour, and more importantly, suspicion and stigmatisation. Amara (2003), in his answer to a question about the course of the so-called religious war between Islam and the 'West', states that the 'West' cannot win the war under the leadership of the United States which is neither a nation nor a people, but a mere group of *cowboys* owning power and money.
- Sixth: what is also implied is that *moral superiority* the 'East' is supposed to possess, failing economic, technological and political strength, and which the 'West' lacks, despite its economic,

³⁹ (MOT)

technological and political superiority. This idea is encompassed within the Biblical (Cherry 1972) and Koranic metaphor of the *chosen people*. This myth is common to the three revealed religions as many Muslims, Christians and Jews do believe in the transcendent purpose of their community, which is to bring redemption to humankind. This necessarily attributes to the *chosen people* both monopoly of truth and the responsibility to guide and, consequently, lead the world. Monopoly of truth induces denying it to the other, and as a community claims to be the *chosen people*, it also claims the subjection of the others to its moral code. Occidentalists then, while criticising the other religions about their claim of divine election, assume the postulate that Muslims are the *chosen people*. Hamid Ibn Abdallah al-Aliy (2006), in his reaction to Prophet Mohammed's cartoons, writes that Muslims are God's chosen people, and as such they have the duty to defend the Prophet even through violence, on the basis of the interpretation of koranic verses such as: "*If ye help not (the Prophet), (It is no matter): for Allah did indeed help him, when the Unbelievers drove him out...*" (At-Tauba S.9, A.40) Occidentalists' idea of the *chosen people* is based on such Koranic verses as the following:

For denial, they refer to: "*(Both) the Jews and the Christians say: 'We are the sons of Allah, and His beloved.' Say: 'Why then doth He punish you for your sins? Nay, ye are but men...*" (Al-Māida S.4, A.18)

For their claim, they refer to: "*Ye are the best of Peoples, evolved for mankind. Enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah.*" (Āl-Imrān S.3, A.110)

This call for violence is in total contradiction with Koranic directives which uphold dialogue in such matters, as one of the verses stipulates: "*Invite (all) to the Way of the Lord with wisdom and*

beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious..." (An-Nahl S.16, A.125). It is worth mentioning the fact that though condemnation of the violent response to these cartoons, such as the mob attacks against the Danish and French embassies in some Muslim countries, was expressed by some voices among religious figures like the Saudi Sheikh Al Habib Ali, this had no official or wide diffusion in these countries. Such voices found no other medium than internet as was the case of some of them who made the following statement:

We appeal to all Muslims to exercise self-restraint in accordance with the teachings of Islam and we reject countering an act of aggression by acts not sanctioned in Islam, such as breaking treaties and breaching time-honoured agreements by attacking foreign embassies or innocent people and other targets. Such violent reactions can lead to a distortion of the just and balanced nature of our request or even to our isolation from the global dialogue. The support that we give to our Prophet will not be given by flouting his teachings.

(Duaat al Islam 2006)

Moral superiority is, however, invoked as a means to reject the alleged decadent 'Western' culture, with of course everything it contains, be it positive or negative. Amara (2003) argues that backwardness in the Arab-Islamic world is economic and technological. While in the 'West', Amara carries on, backwardness is moral as proved by the rates of violence, suicide, and rape, which are presumably higher there as compared to Arab countries.⁴⁰

The place of women in society is probably one of the favourite topics dealt with by Occidentalists. A case in point is Mohamed Moussa El-Sherif, a Saudi preacher, who thinks that women need to hold

⁴⁰ It must be noted that while such statistics are constantly put forward in order to develop critical depictions of the 'West', something which can be scientifically admitted, no reliable statistics about the Arab-Islamic world are available to allow a scientific comparison between the rates of suicide, rape and violence in the two regions of the world.

political positions in ‘Western’ countries to defend their rights, while they do not have the right to do it in Islam because Islam preserves their rights (“Awrak”, *Iqraa*, January 18th, 2006). It is clear here that this is a religious interpretation that serves to keep the woman in her place, out of men’s business, as the case is in Saudi Arabia where women do not have the right to vote.

- Seventh: being morally superior to the supposedly depraved ‘West’, ‘Western’ civilisation stands as the *antithesis* of *the* Islamic civilisation, and any appreciation of these “Western’ cultural expressions on the part of an Arab-Muslim is a renunciation to and betrayal to his Arab-Islamic identity.

For instance, Mohamed Moussa El-Sherif (ibid.) also deems those intellectuals who advocate the woman’s full citizenship as ignoramuses and, "*above all, traitors who sin when speaking*" for women.

- Eighth: As a corollary of the seventh criterion is the *problematic attitude* towards the ‘West’ and ‘Westerners’ observed in some students and people in Algeria, as reference to anything which has ‘Western’ origins is felt as a provocation or aggression of the so-called *thawabit* (the constant features) of Arabity and Islamity.
- Nineth: Last is the criterion that sustains all the precedent ones and without which all the Occidental construction is undermined. It is the *unquestionable character* of this approach as it is supposed to be based on the constant reference to the sacred text. Just as the Orientalist was "*to confirm the Orient in his readers’ eyes; he neither tries nor want to unsettle already firm convictions*" (ibid.: 65), Occidentalists instil these convictions and never question them within

a state of unanimity that transforms them into a sort of *idées fixes*.

Occidentalism is then the 'Oriental' version of Orientalism, an ideological arsenal supplemented with religious, historical and sociological insights that tend to establish the fundamental and incommensurable difference and exclusive antinomy between 'East' and 'West', the Arab-Islamic world and the Judeo-Christian world.

It is quite extraordinary to observe that the 'Orient' has come to develop an ideological theory about the 'West' and 'Westerners' that bears the same characteristics as the one – Orientalism – it was victim of for centuries, thus contradicting Said's warning in the final words of his seminal book *Orientalism*:

Above all I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism. No former "Oriental" will be comforted by the thought that having been an Oriental himself he is likely – too likely – to study new "Orientals" – or "Occidentals" – of his own making.

(ibid.: 328)

As a matter of fact, the 'West' and 'Westerners' are viewed in Occidentalism as 'Occident' and 'Occidentals', i.e. as people who are, just like Orientalism did it with 'Orientals', geographically, culturally and, most particularly, morally different and having a life-long conflicting relation to the 'Orient' and 'Orientals'. Occidentalism tends to demonise the 'West' in the way Orientalism came to be totally under the hold of nineteenth-century "*imaginative demonology of 'the mysterious Orient'*" (ibid.: 26). The idea of eternal confrontation is essential to sustain the Occidentalist myth of natural enmity between 'East' and 'West', for, as put forward by Ladmiral and Lipiansky (1989: 200), cultural, economic and physical differences are not necessarily sources of conflict between groups. It is the situation of

confrontation, nurtured by ideology, which is responsible for hostile attitudes and false representations.

The corollary of this reflection is the idea that there is no natural organic link between extremism and Islam in the sense that it is the appropriation of this religion by ideology and ideologues that develops in it, and in those who believe in it, extremist views. Islam, just like Christianity or Judaism, is, to use Gallie's (2000: 167-169) formulation, an *open concept*, i.e. subject to change over history according to the dominant ideology of the time.

2.5. Characteristics of Occidentalism

It is quite extraordinary to observe the extent to which Said's various definitions of Orientalism apply to Occidentalism as:

1. a "*system of ideological fictions*" (ibid.: 321);
2. "*social-science ideological expertise*" (ibid.: 321);
3. "*a distribution of geographical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts*" (ibid.: 12);
4. "*an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction...but also of a whole series of 'interests' which...it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate...*" (ibid.: 12);
5. "*it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power...power moral (as with ideas about what 'we' do and what 'they' cannot do or understand as 'we' do).*" (Ibid.: 12)

Yet, distinctions between these two approaches can be found due, of course, to the different contexts within which each one developed and the purpose for which it was and is implemented. While Orientalism was mainly ideological knowledge that served the European powers' imperialist and colonialist purposes starting from the eighteenth century as "*Oriental experts all, posted to the Orient as agents of empire, friends of the Orient, formulators of policy alternatives because of their intimate and expert knowledge of the Orient and of Orientals,*" (ibid.: 224), Occidentalism is an ideology that serves the hegemonic regimes of Arab-Islamic countries in their totalitarian rule of their peoples. While Orientalism existed only in relation to the other, and can be singled out, as opposed to Occidentalism, in its dealing with the Orient with the aims, as Said (ibid.: 3) put it, of "*ruling over it...dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient*", Occidentalism exists first and foremost in relation to the locals, contrary to Thierry de Montbrial's opinion ("*Le monde tel qu'il est*", Bibliothèque Médicis, *public Sénat*, February 25th, 2006). Occidentalism is home-oriented in purpose as control and manipulation are directed towards local people rather those described, as is the case in Orientalism. Probably the technological, economic and military means Orientalism had and which Occidentalism lacks makes this latter an enterprise that cannot afford outside domination and control.

However, what Occidentalism shares with Orientalism is a sum of characteristics that make of it a set of authorised and generally-accepted views about the 'West'; views that describe it, teach it in order either to justify local repressive political measures in Arab-Islamic countries enforced through physical violence, or to manipulate the people's will and choice through symbolic violence. What Occidentalism also shares with Orientalism is its seeming harmlessness while it is gradually destructive of the peoples' true awareness, and in the case of students, destructive of their freedom to

think and express what they think. This is cleverly expressed by Said in his introduction to *Orientalism*:

Lastly, for readers in the so-called Third World, this study [the book] purposes itself as a step towards an understanding not so much of Western politics...as of the strength of Western cultural discourse, a strength too often mistaken as merely decorative or 'superstructural.' My hope is to illustrate the formidable structure of cultural domination and, specifically for formerly colonized peoples, the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon themselves or upon others.

(ibid.: 25)

This second warning by Said has not prevented the emergence of a discourse in the Arab-Islamic world which employs an Orientalist approach which bears the following characteristics:

- As a doctrine, it is *limitative* and *restrictive* of thought. It does not allow criticism since it is presumably based on the sacred text that admits no reconsideration. Occidentalists hold the principle that Islam, in its traditional form, is “*good for every place and time.*” (Amara 2006c) and that it is *the* solution to all Muslims’ problems (Amara 2005b).

This feature is probably one of the strongest obstacles to foreign culture studies. As observed by Bakhtin:

In the realm of culture, outsidersness is a most powerful factor in understanding. ... A meaning only reveals its depths once it has encountered and come into contact with another foreign meaning: they engage in a kind of dialogue, which surmounts the closedness and one-sidedness of these particular meanings, of these cultures.

(Bakhtin 2002: 7)

To avoid the questions and questionings that cross-cultural encounters induce, Occidentalism stresses the pretended *unquestionability* of its ideology as part of the divine word. Filled with this intellectual inhibitor, students are often impermeable to any

contradictory discourse that could shake the stability of their representations.

- Its rejection of the right to doubt makes it a mere *propaganda* even when it claims to be objective social scientific knowledge. An illustration is provided by Mohamed Moussa El-Sherif who relies on far-fetched psychological theories to justify the social status of women. In his rejection of the 'Western' woman's equality to man in the issue of divorce, he claims that women, in Islam, do not have the right to repudiate because they are not capable of rational reasoning as they are subject to their emotions ("Awrak", *Iqraa*, January 18th, 2006). Amara (2006c) admits, as well, that the freedom of women in the 'West' does not suit the Muslim woman, who is bound by different moral values. Amara uses Koranic verses to provide arguments for the fact that the Muslim woman is already free: "*And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what is equitable...*" (Al-Baqarah S.2, A.228) Yet, the difference between what is stated in the Koran and the reality of Muslim women is equivalent to that which may exist between theory and practice.
- It is a tangible observable reality, a *historical experience* that deserves attention on the part of intellectuals, and it is far from being a fad (like clothes or hair-style) that lasts over a short period of time and vanishes, but is rather a *social project* of dramatic implications, or, to use Bakhtin's (2002: 3) words, "*a deep current of culture*". What mostly transforms Occidentalism into a social project is the fact that it is taken in charge, as advanced above, by varied social representatives such as politicians, preachers, journalists, and academics, as Orientalism had once been the concern of politicians like the British politician Lord Arthur James Balfour, of writers like

Nerval and Chateaubriand, of scholars like Edward William Lane (Said 1995). Probably, the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed are an instance that has shown the contributions of these different people to Occidentalism, as it is shown below.

- It rationalises and takes maximum advantage of human division into cultures, histories and traditions aimed at the *exacerbation of polarisation* and hostility. Outside enemies often induce inside solidarity even with totalitarian regimes.

The exacerbation of polarisation is based on the distinction Muslim vs. non-Muslim. In Occidentalism, recourse to religious identity is central to all aspects of life, including the relation to the *other*, in a sort of national creed, or a *civil religion*, that mixes religion and civil life. Civil religion is a concept that translates an important philosophy of life upheld by Occidentalists. It refers to the tendency to approach civil matters in moral terms, or as defined by Wald (1992: 58): “*The idea that a nation tries to understand its historical experience and national purpose in religious terms.*” (See also Bellah and Hammond 1980)

Occidentalists, such as Amara (2006a), firmly admit that religion, in the relation to the *other*, prevails over nationalism and culture. This relation is based on the imperative to proselytise rather than tolerate, and on the idea that knowing the *other* purposes to find the best way to achieve his conversion to Islam (*ibid.*), the *other's* beliefs being a falsification of the divine word. The systematic invocation of religion brings people to be under the psychological and intellectual domination of preachers being the ones who possess religious expertise.

- Occidentalism also takes advantage of the mind's need of order. This

is what Lévi-Strauss (1967) called a *science of the concrete*, the human tendency to attribute a place to everything, to discriminate between all things to be easily identified. There has to be a 'West' to be opposed to an 'East', and this 'West' has to be all-Christian to sustain its opposition to a supposedly all-Muslim 'East', though Islam and Christianity, as belief systems, do not acknowledge political borders.

- Based on representation and stereotypical depiction of the 'Westerner', it *evacuates individuality* and refers to the 'Westerner' as a collective group. Commenting on the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed, the leader of the Algerian Islamist party *El Islah*, Abdallah Djaballah, considered these cartoons as an umpteenth insult of the 'West' to Islam (*El Watan*, February 14th, 2006), a view subscribed to by many other Occidentalists such as Hamid Ben Abdallah Al-Aliy (2006), though the newspaper is a small private press organ in a small country of about 5 million inhabitants like Denmark, which does not really play a major role on the world geopolitical arena, thus by no means representative of a population of more than two billion people restrictively referred to as the 'West', and scattered over five continents.⁴¹

The Occidentalist tendency to hold a collective group for an individual act on the basis of some religious justification contradicts Koranic principles that Occidentalism pretends to follow. Individual responsibility is clearly stated in the Koran in five instances (Al-An'ām S. 6, A.164; Al-Isrāa S.17, A.15; Fatir S.35, A.18; Az-Zumar S.39, A.7; An-Najm S.53, A.38, Al-Qiyāmat S.75, A.11), each stating that:

⁴¹ This Occidentalist discourse of mixing identities, religious, national and cultural, has a great influence on students and is heard and adhered to by them. For instance, in their reaction to the cartoons, students in the English Department, University of Chlef, posted slogans on walls of classrooms where we could read "*The European Union are infidels*", thus blaming the whole European Union for the deeds of a single member country like France.

“No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another...” (Al-Isrāa S.17, A.15), literally meaning that no one can be held responsible for somebody else’s wrongdoing.

The idea of the supremacy of the collective over the individual backs the totalitarian regimes in the Arab countries as a means to curb any opposition in the name of the collective interest, since this interest is determined by politicians as the collective group’s representatives, or mandated spokespeople (see below). While the individual can only exist as a member of the collective group in these countries, thus unable to have an individual view in its own right, in the ‘West’ the individual enjoys much more autonomy which allows him to have individual opinions that do not necessarily commit the whole group. As such, a ‘Western’ society can in no way be held liable for an opinion, or even misconduct or misdemeanour, a press organ in the ‘West’ commits, since it enjoys the freedom press organs in Arab countries lack. Lacking freedom, most Arab press organs are only those totalitarian regimes’ organs that relay official opinions. By holding the whole ‘Western’ society responsible for an act committed by one of its private members, it is applying concepts specific to a particular Arab society to a different ‘Western’ reality.

- As such, any action from an individual or group from the ‘West’ is deemed, by Occidentalists, as part of the general conspiracy of the ‘West’ against the ‘East’, Islam, and Arabs. The *conspiracy theory* underlies all reactions against the ‘West’, reactions that should involve, according to Occidentalists, all members of the *Ummah* as their duty to defend it.

The case of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed and the subsequent reaction in the Arab-Islamic world are a vivid illustration of this theory. With the lack of sensitivity and decency that may be found in these

cartoons, they were also represented as part of a Western conspiracy against the Arab-Islamic world. This view was expressed by such Occidentalists as the Rector of the mosque of Lille (France), Amar Lasfar (living in France for twenty years) (“C Dans L’air”, *France 5*, February 6th, 2006), a member of the Moroccan Parliament, Hassan Daoudi (“El-Akhbar”, *Al Jazeera*, February 3rd, 2006), a politician in a country known for its important Christian and Jewish communities, as there are, for instance, two synagogues in the city of Fez, and an Jewish-Arab as a member in the Moroccan government, two quite exceptional cases in the whole Arab world (“L’Islam est-il soluble dans la démocratie”, *Théma, Arte*, February 21st, 2006), or the leader of the other Algerian Islamist party *MSP*, Aboudjerra Soltani (a party member of the governmental coalition in Algeria) (*Le Quotidien d’Oran*, February 5th, 2006). The latter considered these cartoons as part of European attempts to undermine the Islamist political successes in the Arab world (with *Hamas*’s arrival to power in Palestine in January 2006, or al-ikhwān al-muslimūn’s devastating success in the Egyptian parliamentary elections by the end of 2005), thus mixing religion and politics.

The functioning of Occidentalism as a political ideology in Arab countries is strikingly clear in this affair. The political explicit or implicit support in these countries is part of the concretisation of this adversity rapport the people are called to have with the ‘West’. This rapport is necessary for the demonisation of ‘Western’ culture and its rejection in its entirety, i.e. including its positive elements such as the sacredness of political freedom that is dangerous⁴² to political stability

⁴² The freedom of the press in the Arab world is subjected to political power. This cartoons case, in which the press is said to have abused its freedom, was a good opportunity for governments in these countries to remind its peoples of the ‘wisdom’ of such a decision. The local example was also given with the case of Jihad Momani, editor of the Jordanian tabloid *Shihane*. The editor was dismissed and the tabloid banned for having published three of the prophet’s cartoons. The cartoons were published, on February 2nd, 2006, along with a paper by the editor who wondered whether the cartoons were more harmful

in these countries. Demonisation is carried out, of course, by the instrumentalisation people's wrath and frustrations through "*media pictures ... which can easily be manipulated in times of crisis and insecurity*" (Said 2003).

Modernisation itself has come to be equated with westernisation (Wallerstein 1990; Chang 2004). Islam is of course there to back up the need to reject all what is foreign in the name of religious duty. As expressed by Cheikh Ibrahim al-Shirbini (2006), in his comments on Prophet Mohammed's cartoons, Muslims do not need to wait until their Prophet is insulted to boycott 'Western' goods and life style (including the way of dressing, cuisine, architecture), since it is their duty to live according to an Islamic way that is in total contradiction to the heathen 'West'.

Occidentalism blurs a very important reality of Islam and Muslims in order to serve political interests. While Muslims living in 'Western' countries claim full citizenship and protest against any encroachment on their rights and liberties as citizens, they are paradoxically induced by Occidentalists, in the name of their position against blasphemy, to question these claims as they refuse to integrate the basic features of 'Western' democratic and republican culture in these countries:

- that freedom of speech and the press were conquered precisely by means of blasphemy against dominant ideologies, be they socio-political (feudalism) or religious (Church);
- that all individuals (including politicians) and belief systems (including religions) are subordinate to the right of criticism and satire (as in cartoons)⁴³.

to Islam than the pictures of executions of hostages on television in the name of this religion. The press is, however, never banned for attack on religions or people when thousands of anti-Semitic cartoons are published in Arab newspapers on a daily basis.

⁴³ It must be observed that freedom of the press, of speech, or intellectual publication is nonetheless somehow circumscribed in 'Western' countries, where, for instance, certain

Moreover, Occidentalism, while Islam is said to be a world religion and ethnic-blind, as admitted by one of the exceptional imams who criticise Occidental views, the Algerian Soheib Bencheikh (“L’Islam est-il soluble dans la démocratie”, Théma, *Arte*, February 21st, 2006), attributes the exclusive appropriation of this religion to the Arab-Islamic world as it considers any supposed attack on Islam as an attack against these countries, i.e. as part of the so-called clash of civilisations⁴⁴. This is well suggested by comments of politicians such as the Algerian minister of religious affairs, Bouabdellah Ghlamallah, who implicitly denies Islam to Europe as he claims that the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed are a provocation of Arab countries when

topics are paradoxically not open to debate and are completely unquestionable. This is the case of revisionist ideas denying the Nazi Holocaust. These ideas are totally banned and their authors can be sentenced to imprisonment for their publication as part of what is called negationism (denial of historic crimes). There is certainly ridicule in such limitations and laws, which in the name of the sensitivity of a given topic, it is closed to historical investigation and discussion, or historical revisionism. However, the Jewish lobby, by means of hegemonic intellectualism and political lobbying has come to impose these limitations. What is unfortunately the proper of those movements in Arab-Islamic countries is that they attempt to exercise the same influence through violence (such as terrorism), something which harms their cause more than it serves it. The ban on revisionism in historical facts is also common in Arab countries. The case of the Peace and National Reconciliation Charter (PNRC) implementing decree (February 27, 2006) is a direct illustration of this. Article 46 clearly stipulates that “*Is sentenced to a three to a five-year imprisonment and a fine of 250.000 to 500.000 DA whoever, through written statements, or any other act, uses or instrumentalises the wounds of the national tragedy to undermine the institutions of the popular and democratic republic of Algeria ...*” (Ordonnance n°06-01 du 28 Moharram 1427 correspondant au 27 février 2006 portant mise en oeuvre de la charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale). This law is an indirect way to forbid any criticism of the PNRC or write anything that contradicts the official history of this Algerian tragedy of the 1990s.

⁴⁴ This view was first expressed by Samuel Huntington (1993) who believes that, after the fall of communism and the subsequent end of ideology, “*the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.... The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.*” With his definition of civilisation, Huntington comes to the conclusion that this clash of civilisations is to bring a confrontation between Arab-Islamic and Western civilisations, these two being too differentiated. In his criticism of this theory, Said (2001) *cleverly writes*: “*These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and injustice, than to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed analysis. ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ thesis is a gimmick like ‘The War of the Worlds,’ better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time.*”

saying that “*human rights according to the Western conception are the rights of the European.*” (*El Watan*, February 15th, 2006) Amara (2003) goes even further to call it a religious war, part of a ‘Western’ and mainly American plan to dominate the Muslim world following September 11, and an attempt to Christianise Muslims.

The media, and even ‘Western media’, play a major role in relaying this Occidentalist myth. In an article published in *Le Quotidien d’Oran* (February 9th, 2006), Pierre Morville, the newspaper’s correspondent in Paris, makes the following comment on the re-publication of Prophet Mohammed’s cartoons on *France-Soir*: “*The initiative to publish cartoons of the Prophet is all the more weird as the Maghrebi community is an important readership to France-Soir,*” and Vincent Lalu, director of *Vie du rail*, agreeing by saying that this Maghrebi readership amounts to 30% of the total *France-Soir* readers in France.

What these comments imply, in admitting that these cartoons of a Muslim prophet, and which hurt Muslims, are shocking to the Maghrebi community, is that Islam belongs to this community and that this community is all-Muslim. Cultural distinctions become geographical ones to finally become religious ones. Furthermore, even associations struggling against racism, such as the MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples) in France, contribute to this Occidentalist confusion between religion, culture and race, in its reaction against the cartoons, as it lodged a complaint against *France-Soir* for incitement to racial hatred (*El-Watan*, February 12th, 2006).

- This conflicting relationship to the ‘West’ is backed up, by Occidentalism, through the fallacious *textual approach* Occidentalists have to the ‘West’. Orientalists dealt with the Orient, more often than

not, through books, i.e. by taking their colleagues' texts produced before them as *the* unquestionable source of knowledge about the Orient, with the total neglect of reality, thus preferring "*the schematic authority of text to the disorientations of direct encounters with the human.*" (Said 1995: 93) Similarly, Occidentalists deal with the 'West' through texts, and mainly through the sacred text, the Koran. The Occidentalist definition of Christianity and Judaism is that of an effrontery to Islam. Their definition of the 'West' is that of the heathen, the enemy of Islam as represented in the Koran, whose main objective is the destruction of this religion and its people. Among the Koranic verses instrumentalised by Occidentalism is the following: "*Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou follow their form of religion. ...*" (Al-Baqarah S.2, A.120)

Many verses from the Koran, that deal with the early days of Islam (the 7th century) and its relation to the other religions, are thus taken out of their context to be applied to the present. A case in point is Amara's argumentation on the approach of the 'West' to Islam and Muslims today. Despite the presence of many institutions of Islamic or Oriental studies, Amara (2006a) denies this reality and rather has recourse to some Koranic verses to present a different version:

- *If they saw every one of the Signs, they will not believe in them; in so much that when they come to thee, they (but) dispute with thee; the Unbelievers say: 'These are nothing but tales of the ancients. (Al-An'ām S.6, A.25)*
- *'Nay,' they say '(these are) medleys of dreams!-Nay, he forged it! (Al-Anbiyāa S.21, A.5)*
- *And the Unbelievers say, 'This is a sorcerer telling lies. (Sād S.38, A.4)*
- *The Unbelievers say: 'Listen not to this Qur-ān, but talk at random in the midst of its (reading), that ye may gain the upper hand! (Fussilat S.41, A.26)*

Verses which assert the opposite view are often silenced. "Say, *The*

Truth is from the Lord' Let him who will believe, and let him who will, reject (it)" (Al-Kahf S.18, A.29) or "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error." (Al-Baqarah S.2 ,A.256) are not taken as calls for tolerance, and Occidentalists tend to divide the world into two sections: *dar al-Islam* (literally house of submission) and *dar al-harb* (literally house of war). The former refers to the areas under Muslim rule. The latter designates the areas outside Muslim rule and where war, or *jihad*, is necessary until the establishment of Islamic government (see Ramadan 2005).

Another case of Koranic-based approach is Amara's view of the place of women in society. His interpretation of the Koran leads him to the same position upheld by Mohamed Moussa El-Sherif in their denial of the right of women to hold the highest political positions such as presidency. To back up his view, Amara (2005b) claims that Islam protects women's rights, while in Judaism, the woman is stigmatised as she is held responsible for mankind's curse of the Original Sin according to the Old Testament. Apart from any theological debate over the Koran or the Old Testament, the problem in Amara's statements is that he keeps his arguments at the theoretical/textual level, thus completely evacuating the realities of women's status in Islamic and Jewish societies. Despite the fact that neither society abides by the principles stated in its sacred book, Amara refers to these books as if they reflect the social reality of these societies. What is characteristic of Occidentalists, as was the case of Orientalists, is that they often take fantasy for reality, and pretend to be empirical while they are strictly hypothetical.

- This textual approach implies the last characteristic of Occidentalism. Reference to the Koran in the Occidentalist definition of the 'West' and the subsequent desired relationship Muslims should have with it

attributes necessarily a character of *arrested development* to human groups, whether in the 'East' or the 'West'. Thus, in the same way Orientalists such as Ernest Renan in the 1840s described Semites as instances of arrested development (Said 1995: 234), Occidentalists understand Muslims, Jews or Christians and the relationships between them as reasserted versions of the old past, a past of Islamic conquests (*Foutouhate*), of Christian crusades, in short, of mutual destruction.

In Occidentalism the past is made sacred as it is exclusively the past of Islam, the past of Prophet Mohammed, his companions (*sahaba*) and their followers. The systematic invocation of the past in the Arab-Islamic world, since the 1950s, to fulfil the functions of the present stands as an anachronism, as the Algerian Islamologist Mohamed Arkoun (2005) put it. By making the past sacred, Occidentalism ignores the human fallibility and all possible mistakes that the characters of this past may have made. It is also the closing down of any forms of *Ijtihad* that could confront the Islamist-Occidentalist discourse by providing other rival forms of modern knowledge. As Said writes:

The gradual extinction of the Islamic tradition of Ijtihad or of individual interpretation has been one of the major cultural disasters of our time, which induced the disappearance of a whole critical thought and of any individual confrontation with the questions raised by contemporary world.

(Said 2003)

A vivid illustration is provided by the Saudi preacher Abdullah Ibn Slimane El-Menbaa who asserts that the Islamic empire, through the *foutouhate* (the conquests) was a positive achievement, while 'Western' empires were destructive (*The Seventh Iqraa Jurisprudential Conference on Cinema*, 16, 17 October, 2004). It is

quite extraordinary how two imperial and colonialist machines, responsible for the extermination of large populations and their cultures, are treated differently by Occidentalism.

Recourse to the past for Occidentalists is central to their disguise of reality. A case in point is their view of the reality of the woman's status in the Islamic world. To present a very positive picture of the roles women are allowed in these societies, instead of drawing on illustrations from present time, they go back to the past to find examples of great women who played major roles in their time, such as the Prophet's wife Khadija, the first martyr in Islamic history, Sumaya Bint Khabat, the daughter of the Prophet's close companion Abu Bakr, Asmaa, the first Prophet's kind of trade minister, Samraa Bint Nah-y, and many others (Amara 2005b). While these figures really had a great contribution to their society's progress, what is not said by Occidentalists is that women today, in Islamic society, are not given the same opportunities to undertake the same achievements. In Occidentalism, positive past is there just to stand as an argument, never as a model to follow.

Another illustration of the omission of truth through the sacredness of the past is the statement of the former dean of El-Azhar University in Cairo, Ahmad Omar Hashem ("El bayenna", *Iqraa*, January 26th, 2006). He assumed that division of the Islamic *Ummah* into small countries is due to the geographical borders made by European colonial powers, thus completely perverting the historical truth of the existence of many Islamic countries prior to European colonialist scramble on these countries in the nineteenth century. Amara (2003) as well, who takes the Islamist Iranian revolution as a case of the ability of Muslims to build a modern nation, hides a true part of the story. Although there can be no doubt that Muslims, as a human group and not as a religious community, are capable of building

nations, Amara avoids speaking about the atrocities and oppressive character of the Khomeini regime. In his criticism of the dialogue between religions, Amara (2005) claims, as observed above, that this dialogue should be rejected by Muslims because it is based on the desire of Christians to convert Muslims. What he does not acknowledge is that Muslims have exactly the same objective as he upholds it when he writes that: "*the globalisation of Islam behoves us to proselytise it among the other peoples of the world.*" (2006a) Counteracting *ijtihad*, Occidentalism puts forward an approach to the past in the way Bakhtin described it:

... we have narrowed it terribly by selecting and modernizing what has been selected. We impoverish the past and do not enrich ourselves. We are suffocating in the captivity of narrow and homogeneous interpretations.

(Bakhtin 2002: 142)

Beside the racism and ethnocentrism Occidentalism induces, as Orientalism did (Said 1995: 204), it also leads to this state of absence of thought among students and society at large, brought by the daily and intensive ideological hype of politicians and preachers, ruins the great mission of education and keeps the people in a straitjacket of a one-dimensional thought and conformism. In the absence of an oppositional intellectual's discourse, and the lack of educational institutions where the 'East' and 'West' are critically and objectively studied, while we can find, as observed above, dozens of institutions in the United States and Europe for studying Islamic and Arab civilisation, *otherness* is taken in charge by Occidentalists, be they politicians, preachers or pseudo-intellectuals.

While Orientalism started as an academic knowledge about and attitude towards the Orient to become an Imperial and instrumental machinery (ibid.: 246), Occidentalism shifted from an amateur or unofficial propaganda, taken

in charge mostly by non-governmental extremist Islamist groups like al-ikhwān al-muslimūn in Egypt, to official ideology advocated by politicians, preachers and some pseudo-intellectuals in Islamic-Arab countries and 'Western' countries. This shift is due to the supporting institutions, sponsored by private or state financial means, which claim the defence and protection of Arab-Islamic identity and Islam against 'Western' aggression.

In this sense, Occidentalism as an ideology, in the K. Popper (1945), H. Arendt (1951), L. Talmon (1952) and B. Crick's (1962) usage, functions in Algeria, and the entire Arab world, as a closed system which claims "*monopoly of truth, refuse[s] to tolerate opposing ideas and rival beliefs*" (Heywood 1998: 10) in order to ensure subordination by the mere exercise of symbolic violence. This symbolic violence is first exercised on intellectuals, oppositional and secular intellectuals, who are called traitors and puppets of the 'West', as expressed by the Tunisian pro-Ben Ali pseudo-intellectual, Abu Bakr Es-Seghir ("Al-Bud al-akher", *ANB*, February 10th, 2006), who, while advocating dialogue between civilisations, refers to the 'West' as the enemy. Intellectuals or any other individual who dare refer to 'Western' culture are stigmatised and described as errant. This epithet is taken here in the sense of "*deviating from the true or correct*" (Richardson 1963: 224).

The extent to which Occidentalism comes to be a major source of influence on people's and students' way of approaching *otherness* and apprehending their relation to the *other* is considered here to be undoubtedly substantial and far from being an epiphenomenon. Modelling and nurturing the sum of representations of the *other* in students' minds, Occidentalism has constructed a take-away discourse for students. This discourse, descriptive and prescriptive in essence, tends to be formatted and closed to any discursive questioning or criticism. As the questionnaire

showed, more than 65% of the respondents claimed that their favourite book was the Koran and/or books about religion.

2.6. Occidentalism and Perceptive Effects

Adherence to Occidentalism among Arab peoples in general, and Algerian university students in particular, is due more to rational reasons (conscious motives) rather than to what is described as irrational and inexplicable causes (unconscious motives) (Capdevila 2004) circumscribed within the sphere of emotional responses to facts and events, as upheld by Pareto (1968), or Aron (1968: 9) who writes that “*Pareto rightly thought that rational criticism of derivations [ideologies] has a minor influence on residues, in other words, on the feelings which make people act, reason or un-reason*”⁴⁵. Although, emotions and feelings play a major role in standing for an ideology or a cause, as observed by Baechler (1976), these emotions need to be aroused by a conscious and voluntary acceptance of ideas that are deemed true and of acts that are considered legitimate, or at least justified.

This view is contrary to the Baconian theory of *idols* that people follow because they hold them in awe, something which prevents them from having any critical attitude. Bacon writes: “*Idols and false notions have become fixed in the human mind and got deeply rooted in it. They are not only so beset in the minds of people but also inaccessible.*” (Quoted in Boudon 1991: 54)⁴⁶ The fact that an ideology is based on false postulates and inaccurate scientific principles does not necessarily mean people’s adherence is irrational and due to some inexplicable awe for idols or ideas. When people subscribe to an ideology, they are convinced of its proclaimed

⁴⁵ (MOT)

⁴⁶ (MOT)

truth on the basis of cognitive process to make up their opinions and judgements relying on facts. The notion of charisma of the ideologue, or the spokesperson (see below for discussion of the mandated spokesperson), is not sufficient to explain adherence. Adherence is more linked to the nature and form of the message itself, and the felicity conditions within which this message is delivered, than to the charisma of the deliverer. Charismatic ideologues owe their charisma first to their appliance to the message, second to the conditions that prepared the public to be psychologically ready to accept that message. As Boudon wrote:

... if ayatollah Khomeiny decided to repudiate Islamic faith, this would probably harm his authority. And if Pope John Paul's statements on abortion and contraception are not strictly consistent with some orthodox Catholics' beliefs, the charismatic leader still enjoys, nonetheless, some respect due to his person, more than to his message, as long as he does not go beyond certain limits.⁴⁷

(Boudon 1991: 85)

Students' adherence to Occidentalism or any other ideology then cannot be simply circumscribed within the sphere of irrationality, but rather imputed to the distortion of their opinions, judgements and representations, mostly due to a wrong interpretation and/or a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the facts; two processes that often fall under the influence of *perceptive effects*.

Opinion is extremely determined by perception of facts, that is by the state, in its various dimensions, psychological, religious, cultural, political, economic and geographical, one is standing in when observing these facts. Each one of the *perceptive effects* determines the opinions of a given category of people according to the type of life they lead. There are identifiable social reasons that underlie students' embrace of a given type of

⁴⁷ (MOT)

ideology, and obscurity in the understanding of their attitude is due to the ignorance of these reasons. Far from completely neglecting the individual dimension of ideas, society, through culture and ideology, favours the emergence of and subscription to one idea instead of another. Mannheim observes that:

Every individual is thus doubly predetermined by the fact of growing in a society: on the one hand, he faces a ready-made situation and, on the other, he finds in this situation ready-made modes of thought and behaviour.

(Mannheim 1954: 3)

These social reasons or *felicity conditions* (Bourdieu 2001) provide a nutrient broth for the development of a particular type of ideology and its acceptance among people by giving birth, in people, to a *habitus* (ibid.) that attributes to ideologues a *symbolic power* (ibid.), necessary for the success and maintenance of their ideology, as this will be evinced below. As far as students are concerned, these conditions are in the form of the four types of *perceptive effects* by virtue of their special position that brings them to be in contact with different channels of common and specialised knowledge, outside and inside the university.

2.6.1. Situational Effects

Situational effects are those psychological determinants of perception and behaviour that grow within a particular socio-cultural setting (Boudon 1991). The particularity of a setting, as different to another, stems from the existence of distinct cultures and ideologies that dominate the market of ideas in society. Under the influence of these situational effects, students tend to perceive things, not as they really are, but as distorted by cultures,

through representations, and ideologies, such as Occidentalism, through discourse. Said explains this point as follows:

One ought again to remember that all cultures impose corrections upon raw reality, changing it from free-floating objects into units of knowledge. ...therefore cultures have always been inclined to impose complete transformations on other cultures, receiving these cultures not as they are but as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be.

(Said 1995: 67)

The importance of their perception of things lies in the fact that it determines their interpretation of the behaviours and actions of the *other*, here the 'Westerner', and the behaviours and actions they are to adopt in response. Occidentalists rely mostly on these effects in order to make their ideas accepted by people. These effects are two types:

2.6.1.1. Effects of Position:

Position refers to the social role an individual plays in society. Thus being a doctor, a teacher or a factory worker entitles each one to a specific social role or to a specific position in society. It constructs a subjectivity that is used to perceive things and that is specific to an individual's position in society and his specific experience of things and events (Boudon 1979: 107-113). For instance, a teacher's view of his status in society is certainly different from the politician's view of the consideration teachers should have. The costs, benefits and risks of a particular occupation determine then the perception of things of the person who exercises it. This influence on the individual due to his social position is referred to as effects of position. Students, being in a not-fully-completed position which subjects them to a great number of influences, including those of their parents, teachers, the media, religious and political leaders, fall

under an extraordinary arsenal of effects of position that come to be, in some cases, contrary to their immediate interests as students. As students, they expose themselves, or are unwillingly exposed, to a great number of sources of knowledge in their quest for answers to their questions. They often turn to the easiest source and the closest one that does not require much effort and time. Nor does it need the necessary and painful effort to question preconceived ideas. It then saves them time and provides them with comfortable concepts to deal with the body of knowledge they face in a class like the American Civilisation class. Lacking the necessary maturity and knowledge to distinguish between what is sensible or not, they take the validity of these sources for granted. Occidentalism, in this case, seems to be *the* major source that provides them with a definition of the *other*. This definition, being exclusively negative, brings them to develop the negative attitude that prevents them from fully approaching the foreign culture without negative a priories.

2.6.1.2. Effects of Disposition:

While effects of position are social and somehow utilitarian, effects of disposition are cognitive and moral. They refer to the influences that stem out of an individual's representations and schemata, nurtured by his culture. It is a case where one's culture stands as an obstacle to the apprehension of a foreign culture. Students' readiness to easily accept Occidentalist ideas is the outcome of a long process of enculturation as advanced in Chapter One. Reaction to ideas produced by Jewish scholars is a vivid illustration of the point in question. Many students come to change their positive view of Chomsky, for instance, once they get to know that he is Jewish. This is due to the long process of demonisation of the Jews on a

regular basis in mosques, as the invocation of God to destroy them is part of a typical Friday sermon. Ethnophaulisms⁴⁸ against Jews is also very common in everyday speech in Algeria. The word *Ihoudi* (meaning Jew) itself is an ethnophaulism used by many Algerians to describe a mischievous person. On the basis of these representations of the Jew, and the 'Westerner' in general, students easily adhere to Occidentalism which takes advantage of this disposition to diffuse its ideology of hatred and confrontation.

It is quite extraordinary to observe that out of all the words respondents to the questionnaire were asked to associate with the word Jew, none was positive. Among the words suggested were: criminal, bad, evil, war, traitor, settlement, disgusting, depravity, moral decay, malice, hatred, cheating, cowardice, enemy, devil, atheist, violence, tyranny, insult, cruel, terror, murder, pitiless, hypocrisy, lying, revenge.

Students' acceptance of and adherence to Occidentalist ideology can then not be imputed to mere blind passion but rather to cognitive and utilitarian processes that can be studied and remedied. In addition to the situational effects, students undergo other influences such as the following.

2.6.2. Effects of Perspective

Effects of perspective are very close to effects of position. They are those influences that are due to an individual's position, not as his social role like

⁴⁸ Ethnophaulisms are derogatory words or expressions used to describe a category of people on the basis of their ethnic origin. Many ethnophaulisms are used by Algerians to address or refer to other Algerians or foreigners, such as: *Izikher* (literally a flimsy rope), used by Berbers to refer to an Arab; *Zwawi* (member of a *Zawiya* meaning a religious brotherhood), used by Arabs to refer to a Berber; *Nigru* (equivalent to nigger) used by white Algerians to refer to blacks.

in effects of position, but in relation to the degree of his knowledge of facts, i.e. his point of view in its literal sense. The extent to which individuals in society are aware of all the realities and implications of facts varies from one to another depending on his daily environment. Workers, teachers, journalists do certainly not enjoy the same degree of knowledge of facts, due of course to their profession and also to their daily preoccupations. The example of the Luddites shows that their reaction to the introduction of the machine, viewed as the direct cause of unemployment, is totally based on their point of view as workers. They did certainly not possess the wider and holistic view of (say) economists that would see in machines a technological and economic development that would bring a lot more job opportunities. A famous fable precisely illustrates the effects of perspective. Describing an elephant, three blind men fail to provide an accurate description of the animal as each one made it from his own perspective. Feeling the tail, for the first one it was like a tail; feeling the side, for the second it was flat and leathery; feeling the trunk; for the third it was like a long rubber hose (Saville-Troike 2003: 8). Although each one captured part of it, no one really got an accurate description of the animal.

Students tend to believe in Occidentalism because they are also under the effects of perspective; that is, because of the perspective from which they look at facts, they are not completely aware of all the facts and their implications. Occidentalists take advantage of this Students' lack of information to convince them of the legitimacy of their ideas. Their discourse lacks one of the basic laws of true discourse, i.e. exhaustiveness (Anscombe & Ducrot 1997: 52). A case in point is the approach to the Palestinian cause. Although, there can be no doubt about the legitimacy and justness of this cause, which is a people's right to have their own country, Occidentalists tend to completely blame Israel for the failure to settle this crisis and the terrible life conditions of this people. Students, and people in

Arab countries in general, totally subscribe to this view because they miss part of the truth that Occidentalists purpose not to reveal.

Hamas' victory in the legislative elections in January 2006 is presented as the Palestinians' attachment to Islam as they have chosen a party that claims to defend this religion, but never as this people's rejection of the corrupt government of *Fatah*, whose reputation is stained with cases of embezzlements and abuse of power. The corruption of the *Fatah* government is certainly partly responsible for the Palestinians dire conditions. In 1970, King Hussein of Jordan unleashed his tanks against Palestinians in Amman, killing over 3,000 to crack down on all attempts by Jordan's Palestinian majority to gain any political voice in the country. This event is rarely, not to say ever, mentioned by Occidentalists who highlight the Sabra and Chatila massacre which left 2,000 Palestinians refugees slaughtered, in September 1982, by Lebanese Maronite Christian militias before the total passivity of the Israeli army.

The effects of perspectives blur the complete and true vision of events, and prevent students from making sound and informed opinions about local and world events. Occidentalists instrumentalise these effects to fix their ideas as the *only true* source of knowledge available to students in their approach to *otherness* incarnated in the Christian or Jewish 'Western'.

2.6.3. Epistemological Effects

Epistemological effects are those that prevent epistemological ruptures with the past (Boudon 1991; Kuhn 1967; FerKiss 1977). While present reality is obviously different from past reality, concepts of the past are still applied to the present. The past and its concepts become the prison of the

mind, as obsolete concepts become completely irrelevant to the evolution of society and characters. These past concepts are paradigms, frames of thought (Kuhn 1967), that orient the construction of opinions.

As far students are concerned, their adherence to Occidentalism is partly due to the fact that they take Islamic past as a sacred model, i.e. paradigmatic ideal, which their reality should be adapted to, instead of adapting the concept of the past to their own reality, if not totally left out. *Ijtihad* is minimised though it is central to Islamic law. An illustration of this matter is found in the students' systematic rejection of secularism. The Islamic past, as a dominant cultural history, is a history of thorough mixture between religion and politics, i.e. a theocratic management of society. This type of society is held by students as the ideal one that should prevail in present time, and against which all other systems are assessed. Secularism is rejected because it does not correspond to the ancient concept of social and political management. All arguments that are taken from present reality and that back up the need for a secular society do not resist the past epistemological burden. The epistemological strength of *taqlid* (imitation of the past) excludes all efforts and attempts of *Ijtihad* as it is admitted by many Islamic currents that the time of *Ijtihad* ended in the tenth century with the establishment of the four *madahib* of *fiqh* (schools of Islamic jurisprudence), following the four major Sunni scholars: Malik ibn Anas (715-796), Abu Hanifa an-Nu'man (669-765), Imam Shafi'i (767-820) and Ibn Hanbal (780-855) (see Hallaq 1984).

Occidentalism draws heavily on the past and finds a terrain of epistemological effects favourable for the positive reaction among students. The work of Occidentalism is mainly to highlight the positive parameters of the paradigm rather than the negative ones. The glorious time of the Islamic past stands as a convincing argument for the success of theocracy and the

dangers of secularism. The fall of the Islamic empire within the same system is however not made conspicuous.

2.6.4. Effects of Communication

Effects of communication refer to that influence due to the large diffusion of ideas by intellectuals. A particular ideology acquires the status of science, and gets thus much credit, when embraced and propagated by intellectuals who play a major role in transforming an idea into an established fact and, to use Durkheim's (1995) concept, a collective belief. World history is full of examples of false ideas that enjoyed much scientific validity and which turned to be totally erroneous. Africans were a victim of such ideas that justified colonialism and imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the name of the English *white man's burden*, the French *mission civilisatrice*, or the American *manifest destiny*⁴⁹.

Occidentalism, just as Orientalism had once been, is a perfect example of this case of effects of communication. Many Arab pseudo-intellectuals who, as shown with Mohamed Amara, pushed by the passionate drive of Arab nationalism or Islamic *Ummah*, tend to provide all kinds of social scientific argumentation for the validity of such ideologies as Occidentalism or theories like 'the clash of civilisations'. What strengthens effects of communication is the lack of debate and the compartmentalisation of knowledge, in which large groups of intellectuals are discarded to give full monopoly to *one and only* one specific category in the name of subject

⁴⁹ As expressed by the American Senator Fulbright, all conquests were justified by generous and noble motives: "*The British called it the 'white man's burden'. The French called it their 'mission civilisatrice'.*" ("Of Destiny and Choice", *International Herald Tribune*, January 31, 1968) (MOT) Extending Fulbright's idea, C. Julien (1968: 28) observed that "*Americans, in their turn, called it their manifest destiny. What all these terms have in common is that they postulate an involuntary element ... outside a rational choice.*" (MOT)

expertise. As it will be advanced below, as far as religion and the relation to the ‘West’ are concerned, collective beliefs and official propaganda attribute the legitimacy to discuss these matters to the specific category of intellectuals referred to as *oulema* (plural of *alim*, a religious exegete) who have exclusivity in prescribing the relevant norms. All other categories of intellectuals, academics, journalists, sociologists, historians and others, seem not to be legitimately and rightly allowed to express opinions in these matters. Reference to such Muslim scholars, like Ibn Rushd, is totally overlooked as he claims, in his *Fasl al-maqāl* (The Decisive Treatise), that the Koran is an address to all people, whatever their cultural knowledge is, and as such, philosophers, meaning intellectuals, have the right to discuss religious matters.

This is not peculiar to religious matters. History, in Arab countries and most particularly in Algeria, has also been expropriated from historians and intellectuals to be left in the hands of politicians. Mohamed Harbi, the Algerian historian, rightly says that “*History in Algeria is confused with memory and is not a case for the professionals.*” (*El-Watan*, March 3, 4, 2006) This bypassing of an important category of society certainly helps the diffusion of false ideas that never undergo the test of public multidisciplinary cross-examination. As cleverly expressed by Boudon:

Thus, when the scientific community corresponding to a given discipline or a group of disciplines withdraws, thanks to institutionalised jolts ... and seems incapable of properly exercising its critical function ... effects of communication may have such an influence that the most absurd theories can become biblical truth. We can then witness a virtual institutionalisation ... of the right to say nonsense. ... The tribunal of rational criticism ... does then no longer exist or is incapable of making itself heard.... It is then enough... for a terrorism of the false idea to settle.⁵⁰

(Boudon 1991: 206-207)

⁵⁰ (MOT)

Students find in these *specialised* and *established* intellectuals (or more accurately pseudo-intellectuals) the 'sensible' voices and 'reliable' sources to which they turn to form their own opinions about religion and *otherness*, and consequently adopt the corresponding behaviour. These pseudo-intellectuals' opinion is all the more credited when those who are supposed to provide contradiction fall within the same trap of emotionalism and become oblivious of their social function of oppositional criticism. The spread, influence and dramatic effects of Occidentalism have not yet been adequately evaluated because one of the pernicious features of this ideology is precisely that it is sometimes unconsciously embraced by the intellectuals who should subject it to reconsideration. The wave of emotionalism and adherence to the same view from these intellectuals in the case of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed stands as a vivid illustration of this dysfunction of the intellectual's social mission.

The success that pseudo-intellectuals have achieved is due precisely to the fact that their exegetic discourse is disguised in a scientific frame that seduces even intellectuals, beyond the emotional involvement. This is not particular to Algeria or Arab-Islamic countries as history offers some examples of exegetic theories that had a considerable success among intellectuals in other places of the world. In the 16th century, Erasmus' *The Praise of Folly* (1511)⁵¹ is a case in point. In his criticism of the role of the Christian, Erasmus undertook an exegetic study of some parts of the Bible in the frame of a pamphlet against the teachings of the traditional Church. The pamphlet form, not only discarded the backlash of the Church, the study having a scientific form which the Church did not feel the need to indulge in, but also seduced intellectuals who took it as a modern discourse

⁵¹ Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus (1466-1536) was a Dutch humanist, theologian and classical scholar who harshly criticised Catholic doctrine though he remained Catholic till the end of his life. His popularity, during his life and after, has made his writings very successful as he is considered as the precursor and leading figure of religious reformation in Europe (Hoffman 1994; Dockery 1995).

on religion to become one of the most influential works of literature in Western civilisation. Erasmus' theory was actually purely exegetic in content as it examined the pious, yet superstitious, abuses of Catholic doctrine and the corrupt practices of part of the clergy, something which made it one of the Catalysts of religious Reformation in Europe, thus influencing people like Martin Luther, one of the founders of Protestantism (Chantraine 1971; Hoffman 1994; Botley 2004).

In Algeria, effects of communication are also multiplied with the state monopoly on important means of communication, such as the media or the mosque, and means of intellectual production like publishing and book distribution and importation. This monopoly allows the diffusion of selected ideas favourable to the status quo, as well as the exclusion of all forms of criticism, opposition or debate. It also leads to the separation between ideas and their historical context (i.e. their specificity) in order to present them as *the* ideas of the time, or universal ideas that should be shared by all sensible people.

Just as strong and far-reaching instruments of communication like television and internet are vital to Islamist terrorism (Gilles Kepel (“Le terreau du terrorisme”, Théma, ARTE, February 28th, 2006), as they give the impression that the dreamt-of-old-days *Ummah* really exists and in a very large proportion (Marc Sageman, *ibid.*), they are also vital to Occidentalism. Occidentalism, like a commercial product, is organically linked to its large advertising and many people and students adhere to it because they are desperately in need of being part of a collective project that values their contribution, something that Arab politicians have never been able to provide, except as unfulfilled promises as the case was with the Arab leaders of the 1960s and 1970s such as Houari Boumèdienne, Gamal Abdenasser or Maamar Kaddafi.




Diagram 1: *Perceptive effects and students' intellectual activity*⁵²

2.7. Conclusion

Diagram 1, based on Boudon's (1991: 134) and adapted to the case of Algerian students, illustrates the process of perceptive effects that influence students in their intellectual activity. Perceptive effects, in Algeria, are exercised within a complex process of ideological discourse production and diffusion that involves a firm alliance between two important social institutions: religion and politics.

It can be stated at this stage that Occidentalism and the purely political ideology in Algeria are definitely belief systems that bear the characteristics listed by Boudon in his description of ideologies as peculiar belief systems (see p. 92). They are explicit in formulation, intolerant and closed to innovation, dependent on rallying a membership around optimised normative beliefs, conveyed through a discourse filled with an expressive style, fundamentally established in contradiction to the other ideologies, and allied with the institutions that detain the power of decision making.

⁵² Eff. P: Effects of position; Eff. Disp.: Effects of disposition; Eff. Com: Effects of communication; Eff. E.: Epistemological effects; Effects of perspective.

2.8. Original Quotations

Page 98

Le ON-dit comporte la trace d'une certaine prise en charge énonciative.

(Manuel Fernandez 2004: 99)

... les paroles des autres ... ce qui a déjà été dit dans d'autres discours.

(Authier-Revuz 1985: 117)

Page 99

[Les idéologies sont des] systèmes d'interprétation du monde social qui impliquent un ordre de valeurs et suggèrent des réformes à accomplir, un bouleversement à craindre ou à espérer.

(Aron 1968: 286)

En raison de cette différence dans la participation culturelle, c'est une erreur de considérer une culture comme le commun dénominateur des activités, idées et attitudes des membres composant une société. De tels dénominateurs communs peuvent être établis pour les individus qui ont un statut particulier en commun.

(Linton 1967: XXXVIII)

Page 100

... ces idées qui nous ont fait tant de mal...

(Boudon 1991: 21)

Page 101

... la rationalisation mensongère ... d'évènements...

(Capdevila 2004: 172)

Page 102

(Footnote 10)

Le problème de l'idéologie apparaît lorsqu'il existe une contradiction entre ce à quoi l'on croit et ce qui peut être établi comme scientifiquement correct.

(Parsons, quoted in Boudon 1991: 35)

Page 103

L'idéologie dépasse la pure intégration vers la distorsion et la pathologie dans la mesure où elle cherche à réduire la tension entre autorité et domination.

(Ricoeur 1997: 34)

Page 104

L'idéologie domine parce qu'elle peut être partagée par les dominants et les dominés...

(Capdevila 2004: 73)

Page 105

... des forces impersonnelles, omniprésentes et inéluctables... (Monnerot 1949: 268-269)

L'idéologie est la conversion d'idées en leviers sociaux [de manière à] exploiter l'énergie émotionnelle de certaines passions, à les canaliser dans l'action politique.

(Bell, quoted in Capdevila 2004: 193)

Page 106

Le concept d'idéologie est analytiquement contenu dans celui de groupe social car il est le concept de son unité et de son identité.

(Capdevila 2004: 21)

Page 108

...dire le rien, le néant, de faire exister dans les mots et par les mots ce qui n'existe pas dans les choses, de donner une forme d'être, capable de susciter la croyance...

(Bourdieu 2001: 327)

Page 121

*...أن يتحرر الوطن الإسلامي من كل سلطان أجنبي...
...أن تقوم في هذا الوطن الحر دولة إسلامية حرة تعمل بأحكام الإسلام
(Ikhwan 2006)*

Page 126

L'invisibilité de l'idéologie signifie que l'identification des individus à leur société est totale.

(Capdevila 2004: 164)

Page 128

Les Arabes n'aiment pas être comparés aux autres ni être différents des autres.

(Berque, quoted in Deguy 1964: 864)

إن الإسلام هو الدين الوحيد الذي تناقض مصادره الأصلية أسس النصرانية
 ...إنه حركة دينية معادية للنصرانية
 (Amara 2005a)

Page 131

La recherche de la distinction...produit des séparations destinées à être perçues, ou mieux connues ou reconnues comme différences légitimes, c'est-à-dire le plus souvent comme différences de nature...

(Bourdieu 2001: 305)

Page 153

Pareto pensait, à juste titre, que la critique rationnelle des dérivations n'exerce qu'une faible influence sur les résidus, autrement dit sur les sentiments qui font agir, raisonner et déraisonner les hommes.

(Aron 1968: 9)

Les idoles et les notions fausses se sont installées dans l'esprit humain et elles sont profondément enracinées en lui. Elles sont non seulement si incrustées dans l'esprit des hommes qu'elles se révèlent comme difficiles d'accès...

(Bacon, quoted in Boudon 1991: 54)

Page 154

...si l'ayatollah Khomeiny décidait de répudier la foi islamique, il est probable que son autorité en souffrirait. Et si l'on voit bien que les déclarations du pape Jean-Paul II sur l'avortement et la contraception mettent mal à l'aise beaucoup de catholiques, il n'en demeure pas moins que, tant que le chef charismatique ne s'écarte pas trop de certaines limites, il suscite un sentiment de respect qui s'attache à sa personne plutôt qu'au contenu de son message.

(Boudon 1991: 85)

Page 162

(Footnote 49)

Les Britanniques l'appelaient 'le Fardeau de l'homme blanc'. Les Français l'appelaient leur 'mission civilisatrice'.

(Fulbright, "Of Destiny and Choice", *International Herald Tribune*, January 31, 1968)

Les Américains, à leur tour, l'appelaient leur 'destinée manifeste'. Ce que tous ces termes ont en commun, c'est qu'ils postulent en élément involontaire ... extérieur au choix rationnel.

(Julien 1968: 28)

Page 163

Ainsi, lorsque la communauté scientifique correspondant à telle discipline ou à tel ensemble de disciplines s'écarte, à la faveur de soubresauts institutionnels par exemple ... et qu'elle s'avère incapable d'exercer convenablement la fonction critique que je lui prête, les effets de communication peuvent avoir une influence telle que les théories les plus absurdes peuvent être prises au sérieux et passer pour vérités d'Évangile. On peut alors assister à une quasi institutionnalisation ... du droit de dire n'importe quoi. ...le tribunal de la critique rationnelle cesse ... d'exister ou d'avoir la capacité de faire entendre sa voix Il suffit alors ... pour que s'installe un terrorisme de l'idée fausse.

(Boudon 1991: 206-207)

CHAPTER THREE

Ideology as Discourse: The Practice of a Speech Genre

3.1. Introduction.....	172
3.2. Language as Discourse.....	173
3.3. Ideology as a Speech Genre.....	176
3.4. Felicity Conditions.....	179
3.5. Classical Arabic.....	187
3.6. The Right to Speak.....	196
3.7. The Speech Genre.....	202
3.8. Students as the 'Third'.....	218
3.9. The Intellectual.....	222
3.10. Ideology and Symbolic Power.....	227
3.11. Religion and Politics.....	233
3.11.1. Ideology as a Religious System.....	235
3.11.2. Religion as an Ideological System.....	237
3.12. Conclusion.....	242
3.13. Original Quotations.....	244

CHAPTER THREE

Ideology as Discourse: The Practice of a Speech Genre

Celui qui est forcé de parler plus haut qu'il n'y est habitué (comme devant un demi-sourd ou devant un grand auditoire) exagère ordinairement les choses qu'il doit communiquer. – Plus d'un devient conspirateur, colporteur de calomnies, intrigant, uniquement parce que sa voix se prête surtout bien au chuchotement.

(Nietzsche 1995 : 329)

3.1. Introduction

As observed in Chapter Two, power is far more efficacious when it is hegemonic, i.e. exercised with the consent of the people. To allow power to achieve hegemony, ideology is called into play, mainly through language since it is “*the commonest form of social behaviour*” (Fairclough 2001: 2), where assumptions find the best and easiest channel of expression. Ideology constructs then the assumptions (including representations) that permeate language, and thus permeates the individual mind to allow the completion of hegemony.

It is through language that politics, religion and scholarship come to form an influential machinery of thought and opinion modelling among people in Arab-Islamic countries, in general, and Algerian university students in particular. As a symbolic system (Lévi-Strauss 1958: 348), ideology is best propagated through another symbolic system, i.e. language. Language is understood here as discourse, i.e. as “*a form of social practice.*” (Fairclough

2001: 16), as a public representation (Sperber 1996: 49) that contribute to moulding the people's mental representations. The relationship between discourse and representations stems from the conception that, contrary to the commonly asserted link between language and culture, one should rather speak of the link between discourse and culture (which partly moulds representations) (Charaudeau 2003: 377). This is sustained by the fact that societies sharing the same language do by no means share the same culture, because they do not share the same language use. It is then language use, i.e. discourse, which coincides with culture, and by extension with representations.

This conception of language is essential to understanding the functioning of ideologies, such as Occidentalism, which is a discourse on *otherness* and the *other*, in Algeria. Apprehending language as a social practice implies that linguistic phenomena are essentially social phenomena, that is, whenever language is used orally or in a written form, it is socially determined to a great extent (see the Bakhtinian approach below), and it also has social effects that determine other social practices of the ones who listen. Language is thus inextricably linked to the other social practices like religion, politics, scholarship and education, and as such, it is fundamentally ideological.

3.2. Language as Discourse

This conception of language as discourse is substantially different to the Saussurian theory of language. While Saussure (1916) conceived of language as a combination of *langue* (the general and purely social system including the rules of language equally shared by all members of the speech community) and *parole* (the purely individualistic performance of the system)

(Emerson & Holquist 2002: XVI), the practice of language in the extremely ideologically saturated context of society, notably Arabic-Islamic ones, has shown that the Saussurian distinction between language and language use, through his *langue/parole* dichotomy, is unsatisfactory as it neglects the ideological aspect of language as a system and the social/ideological dimension of language use. The Saussurian approach to language is, as stated by Bourdieu (2001: 11), exclusively semiotic inasmuch as it emphasises the linguistic sign since it "*focuses on the intrinsic constitution of a text or a corpus of texts at the expense of the socio-historical conditions of their production and reception.*"¹ As it will be shown below, the Saussurian notion of equal access to *langue* in a speech community is far from being validated, or to use Bourdieu's (ibid.) provocative phrase, it is an *illusion of linguistic communism* as, for instance, the case of classical Arabic in Arab countries, where inequality is rather the rule and the means that allows the ideological (political and religious) instrumentalisation of this language as a hegemonic lever.²

Discourse designates that social interaction whose means is language. Language as discourse is more than the product of language use, i.e. the text (written or oral). Discourse includes also the context of production of the text and its context of interpretation (Fairclough 2001: 20). These two contexts are basically social, and thus permeated by all forms of influence

¹ (MOT)

² It must be noted that because of the fact Algerians entertain a symbolic relation to classical Arabic, a relation which by no means is based on an actual linguistic reality of use, they have developed a kind of schizophrenic rapport to this language. As a matter of fact, despite the fact that they show great respect to this language as the language of the Koran, they nonetheless happen to greet it with derision, precisely because it does not translate their daily reality. Instances of this kind of behaviour can be found in sketches about Algerians' everyday life made in classical Arabic. These sketches are funny not because of their content but because of the language used as it does not suit the settings and plots, classical Arabic being identified only with religious and political topics. The situation is equivalent to the schizophrenia speakers of other social dialects or other languages in modern multilingual Britain have developed with standard English. Although these speakers do "*acknowledge the dominance of standard English, they do not accept it in the full sense of the term.*" (Fairclough 2001: 48)

and manipulation. This influence and manipulation of language that is external to the text is guided by what Fairclough labels *members' resources* which are what:

... people have in their heads and draw upon when they produce or interpret texts – including their knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on. ...The members' resources ... are cognitive ... but they are also social in the sense that ... they are socially generated, and their nature is dependent on the social relations and struggles out of which they were generated."

(ibidem)

As discourse, language, the system and its use, is subjected and practised in a network of power relations that purpose the implementation of planned social projects and establishment of particular types of society. Apprehending language as discourse reveals then the social forces that have a vitally important foothold in the individual mind when using and interpreting language, and when forming opinion and taking actions accordingly. As advanced by Van Der Maren (1996: 424), the meaning of discourse results from all what expresses "*social stakes*". Actually, apprehending language as discourse is not a methodological option in language study, it is the approach the reality of the practice of language, or as Poirier (1983: 158) put it as early as 1983: "*the linguistic exercise undertaken without consideration of the real content of discourses and situations resembles learning music theory without any musical practice.*"³

Among these forces is ideology, which reaches the individual psyche through the manipulation of language. Ideology is therefore part and parcel of the context of production and interpretation of language, i.e. it is organically linked to discourse. Discourse, being the shortest route to

³ (MOT)

people's minds, is targeted by hegemonic power by means of ideology for the purpose of subduing people, and gaining their consent by legitimising existing social and power relations, or in short, the status quo. As Bakhtin put it: "*Language is not a neutral medium... it is populated – overpopulated with the intentions of others.*" (Quoted in Cazden 1989: 122) These intentions, which are an ideology transformed into a discursive form through a particular type of language (a speech genre), make the dialogic process that links the speaking subjects (the ideologues: politicians, preachers, pseudo-intellectuals) to their listeners (the people and students).

3.3. Ideology as a Speech Genre

Ideologies, such as Occidentalism, need to be integrated into the process of maturation of societies in order to be effective. When founding myths are formed, their adoption by people takes time through their intrusion in mainstream national culture by means of such social institutions as the school, religion, politics, or language. The concept *institution*, here, is handled in its French Bourdieusian sense, i.e. as "*any relatively lasting set of social relations which attribute to individuals distinct forms of power, status and resources.*" (Thompson 2001: 18)⁴ These institutions, when instrumentalised, help the establishment of a kind of discourse within which there are two participants:

- a group of people who get the status of official and social representatives of the whole society: the *mandated spokesperson*, apart from whom none is allowed to speak in the name of the society nor listened to by the people;
- the rest of the society form another group whose function is to follow

⁴ (MOT)

the normative prescriptions of the mandated spokesperson and relay his discourse within a fixed type of speech genre.

Most particularly, attributing to a given language the status of an official language, thus making thereof the language of school education and political communication, is vital to the integration of the dominant ideology, conveyed through that language, into the process of socialisation of young individuals such as students. This is what Bourdieu (2001: 75) described as the making of, beside the speech or discourse community, a “*conscience community which is the cement of the nation*”⁵, where linguistic homogenisation or unification means intellectual and cultural purification or cleansing (ibid.). The official language teacher is transformed from a language teacher into a *mentor* (Davy 1950: 233), propagator of, not an official language, but rather of an official ideology, who teaches pupils or students not only what to say but also what to think.

Classical Arabic plays this utilitarian role in all Arab countries, and its maintenance in this highest political position is the safeguard of the position of official ideology, which, because of the long association between the two, has come to be inseparable from it. The social structure and power relations, which the dominant ideologies in Arab countries have established, can well be visible in classical Arabic that definitely keeps both the spokespeople and the people in their respective positions. Here lies the ideologues’ fear of the exposition of students to foreign languages as languages of culture, which can, through acculturation or interculturalisation, rust the official ideological machine. Foreign culture is a clear and present danger to the unity of the conscience community, as ideas are very much contagious and they never immigrate without damage.

⁵ (MOT)

Fishman (1971) rightly raised the issue of *domain* and its importance in the "*description and explanation of means of communication*" (Saville-Troike 2003: 42). He defines it as:

... a socio-cultural construct abstracted from topics of communication, relationships between communicators, and locales of communication, in accord with the institutions of a society and the spheres of activity of a speech community.

(Fishman 1971: 587)

In other words, choosing a language of communication is to a large extent determined by the general subject area (in this case religion and politics), the roles and relationships between the participants (here the mandated spokespeople and the people), and the context within which the communication takes place (in this case an environment overwhelmed by a political-religious ideology, including Occidentalism). Within this *domain*, Classical Arabic seems to be the language that suits the effective realisation of the dominant group's interests in Algeria.

Language and the other institutions function then as *legitimizers* of the self-proclaimed spokesperson's discourse, to which they confer a performative dimension, i.e. social efficiency. As Said (1995: 321) claimed it, discourse is systematic and cannot be made at will. It always belongs "*to the ideology and the institutions that guarantee its existence.*" Performative discourse is speech acts, or utterances, in which the speaking subject performs an action by saying (Lyons 1996: 238). Doing by saying (Austin 1962) means here to produce an efficient effect in the listener so as to either alter or form his opinion, or bring him to act according to one's suggestions. Ideological discourse is then never constative (or descriptive) (Levinson 2003: 228), even when it seems to be so. As Anscombe & Ducrot observed:

*... there are, in most utterances, certain traits which determine their pragmatic value, independently from their content. And these traits cannot even be considered as marginal... . They are, on the contrary, marks which are interwoven in the syntactic structure.*⁶

(Anscombre & Ducrot 1997: 18)

Ideological discourse is then always performative as it possesses an illocutionary force, i.e. a power of conviction and persuasion, and purposes to produce a perlocutionary effect, i.e. the effectuation of the speaking subject's desired action by the listener (see below Bakhtin's *delayed purposed action*). Part of this effect is its symbolic violence that lies in the fact that ideological discourse discards any contradiction or questioning that aims to show objectively its manipulating character and interest-based purpose, to the point that it paradoxically describes any scientific discourse which attempts to denounce it as mere ideology.

3.4. Felicity Conditions

Yet, illocutionary force and the perlocutionary effect are not naturally contained in the words (or language) (Bourdieu 2001), as suggested by Austin (1962) and, later, by Haberman (1987). Nor is there a natural environment favourable to the transformation of words into a performative discourse. Words get substantial illocutionary force and a considerable perlocutionary effect as discourse within an environment which is created, fabricated by social conditions (cultural, religious and political) that will be referred to as *felicity conditions* (Austin 1962). These conditions, which include the speaking subject's social position as well as his position within the field of his intervention, the context of production and reception of discourse, the form of discourse (speech genre) and the relation between the speaking subject and the listener, allow performative discourse to be

⁶ (MOT)

successful and achieve its producer's objectives.

It must be stated here that the Austinian approach to felicity conditions does not really correspond to the case studied in this work. Austin remained very much at the linguistic-pragmatic level which does not render the real importance of felicity conditions in the success of ideological discourse and its social implications. The analysis of the felicity conditions in Algeria, as an illustration of the rest of the Arab-Islamic countries, is based here on Bourdieu's approach which reveals all the social and political dimensions of their relation, mediated by the social institutions, to the ideological discourse produced by politicians, preachers and the pseudo-intellectuals.

Felicity conditions are all the more determinant of the success of ideological discourse as the latter needs more the listener's acknowledgement of the message and the speaking subject than it needs his comprehension. This is illustrated by all those political speeches of Arab political or religious leaders, made in classical Arabic, incomprehensible for most of those the speech is addressed to, yet accepted by these same people. This is due to the felicity conditions, including the status of the speaking subject. Bourdieu purports this view writing that:

*... a performative utterance is bound to fail whenever it is made by a person who is not entitled to make it, or, more generally, whenever the people or the particular circumstances are not suitable...*⁷

(Bourdieu 2001: 165)

Without favourable felicity conditions, an utterance (as a unit of discourse) is but a speech act, and not a performative act that possesses a perlocutionary effect. As Ducrot (1977) put it, a performative utterance contains "*a clear pretension of possessing a given power.*"

⁷ (MOT)

Part, then, of these felicity conditions, and first of all, is the statutory condition of the speaking subject (Bourdieu 2001: 270), the politician, the preacher or the pseudo-intellectual. This status is that of the mandated spokesperson that confers the right to speak to, and in the name of, the people. Once this status is attributed to a person, he becomes a person-to-listen-to, worthy of attention, of trust, and most importantly, worthy to be followed. He is what he seems to be, or what the majority of the group believes him to be. The epithet ‘mandated’ is of a great importance here as he is the spokesperson as long as he is mandated by the group, through the official social institutions like religion or the school, who believes in him (Bourdieu 2001). The mandated spokesperson’s discourse succeeds as long as he *preaches the converted*, or as expressed by Bourdieu (ibid.: 113): “*each utterance is produced for and by the market to which it owes its existence and its specific characteristics.*”⁸

It is to be observed that, despite the fact that the personal qualities of an orator play a role in constructing his charisma, it is his status of mandated spokesperson that gives him the authority to speak and be listened to. By his status of mandated spokesperson, he holds the *skeptron*⁹, with which he has the authority to speak and without which he is not allowed to. The case, for instance, of Amr Khaled¹⁰, the very successful preacher on *Iqraa* is an interesting illustration. This charismatic preacher, though he masters the speech genre and the medium (classical Arabic), relies on the social conditions that have attributed to the religious discourse a privileged

⁸ (MOT)

⁹ The *skeptron*, meaning a heralds wand in Greek mythology, is a magic wand which was carried by Hermes, the god of shepherds, orators, literature and poets in Greek myths, as the messenger of the gods. The *skeptron* was a symbol of authority and inviolability and protected the herald who carried it. In Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the *skeptron* is mentioned as a type of magic wand by which Hermes opened and closed the eyes of mortals (see Benveniste 1969).

¹⁰ 52% of the respondents to the questionnaire found that Amr Khaled was among those who personified their most cherished values. This percentage covers even half of those who did not find *Iqraa* a reliable channel, and who rather found *BBC* or *Al-Jazeera* more worthy of trust as sources of information.

position, as compared to that produced by intellectuals, mainly when they express themselves in a language which bears the epithet, not to say the anathema, of foreign like French or English.

Bourdieu (ibid.: 163) uses this metaphor to speak of the authority of the spokesperson. It is used here to refer to the power these self-proclaimed representatives have and which makes them the only ones, in society, who have the right to speak and be followed, a right that political and religious ideology hands to the politician, the preacher and the pseudo-intellectual, to make of them the mandated spokespeople for the rest of the society. As stated above, Occidentalism instrumentalises religion to attribute to this category of people their official status. Since religion is there to enlighten the people's spiritual as well as their material lives, only experts in religion, the exegetes who know the *fiqh*, can show the right way to follow. The religious mentor, or the *sheikh* (criterion n°1), is the only one entitled to be the guide. Politicians, by claiming reference to religion, as inscribed in all the constitutions of the Arab countries (Islam is the religion of the state), with the support of the religious institutions, also acquire the status of the mandated spokesperson.

The case of Arab presidents is a vivid illustration of this particular point. In a written discourse (*El-Watan*, April 16th, 2006), published in some Algerian newspapers prior to the President Bouteflika's visit to the city of Constantine (Eastern part of the country), the authors (who signed Constantine) introduce their text, meant to welcome the president, by addressing him as the *faithful* and *saviour*, thanking God for having sent him. This is an implicit analogy to the Prophet Mohammed whose aim is to establish the status of the president as a God-mandated spokesperson, i.e. confer to him the credit of truth, relying on the Muslims' religious representations based on the Koran. From the status of a politician in charge of public affairs, the

president is sublimated, through an excessive personality cult, to a *messiah* without whom his people will fall into darkness, as illustrated by this extract from an Algerian newspaper in which the journalist recounts the popular gathering to welcome Bouteflika on his return from his stay in hospital in Paris in December 2005:

*The Algerians, I think, fear that something terrible happens to the president. They fear that his withdrawal from the management of the country's business might induce the total end of his programme which they consider as the only thing capable of saving them from their unrest.*¹¹

("Bouteflika promet le droit pour chacun et la loi pour tous", *L'Echo d'Oran*, January 2nd, 2006)

As a matter of fact, many verses, such as the ones below, are implicitly invoked and in which these qualities and function are attributed by God to the Prophet Mohammed according to the Koran:

Allah did confer a great favour on the believers when he sent among them a Messenger from among themselves, rehearsing unto them the Signs of Allah, purifying them, and instructing them in Scripture and Wisdom, while, before that, they had been in manifest error. (Āl-i-'Imrān, S.3, A.164)

O Prophet! Truly We have sent thee as a Witness, a Bearer of Glad Tidings, and a Warner, - and as one who invites to Allah's (Grace) by His leave, and a Lamp spreading Light. (Al-Ahzāb, S.33, A.45-46)

We sent thee not, but as a Mercy for all creatures. (Al-Anbiyāa, S.21, A.107)

The mandated spokesperson's power, the *skeptron*, is not to be understood as that of physical, economic strength. It is the *symbolic capital* or *credit* (Bourdieu 1980) that people invest in a category which is supposed to *know* more than any other member of society, including real intellectuals

¹¹ (MOT)

or professionals. It is the trust based on the representative image of the spokesperson by virtue of his sources, in this case, religion. The mandated spokesperson is right because he invokes the word of God.

Benveniste's (1969: 121) etymological analysis of the term *credit* reveals clearly its effects on the people's identification with their spokesperson. The term *credit* originates from the Latin word *credere* which literally means "*put the 'kred', i.e. the magical power, in a being from whom we expect protection, and consequently believe in him.*"¹² The mandated spokesperson, once he reaches this status, he acquires a magical power over the people who cease the natural process of reflection to start that of seduction. The mandated spokesperson exercises his magical power by proceeding in his persuasion of the people like an illusionist, i.e. by means of illusions, the illusion that the country is in continual progress, the illusion of a foreign enemy against whom the people should show solidarity with their government, the illusion that the society is on the right track. Every successful political act which gains the people's support is, as Bourdieu (2001: 66) cleverly put it, but a "*successful act of social magic.*"¹³

Obviously, the danger here does not really lie in the status of the mandated spokesperson per se. It is rather that transformation of this status from one of representative power into one of dictatorial power, in which the suggestive act becomes a performative act. As observed by Bourdieu (2001: 270), once a person acquires the status of the mandated spokesperson, whether by usurpation or consent, his discourse changes from the indicative to the imperative form. By means of what Bourdieu (ibidem) calls the *oracle effect*, the mandated spokesperson exercises a constraint on the people to mutate from a representative of the group into the group itself. The group ceases to have an opinion, as it is shown what to

¹² (MOT)

¹³ (MOT)

think through suggestive ideological discourse and driven to act accordingly as this discourse is performative.

This is particularly important, as far as students are concerned, as they often cease to be speaking subjects, voicing their own constructed opinions in their exam essays for instance, to turn into mere voices of the mandated spokespeople's discourse. The mandated spokesperson is the being, even when he is absent, and they are nothingness, even when they are present. It is quite extraordinary the extent to which social representatives, in Arab countries, tend to acquire a status characterised by qualities of visible omnipresence and public-acknowledged omniscience that grant them a considerable power over the group. As observed above, concerning the idea of ideology as a black box, the pretended expertise that the preacher or pseudo-intellectual is supposed to possess in religious matters, or the politician's wide knowledge of the requirements of politics, economy or the management of the society, behoves on the general public, who do not possess that knowledge, to not only acquiesce to their recommendations and prescriptions, but also avoid any pretension to attempt to reflect on these matters.

It is noteworthy to observe that while some mandated spokespeople are aware of the illegitimacy of their status, at least in moral terms, many others tend, because of the act of institution and the positive response of the people due to the cultural brainwashing they undergo, to cope without any remorse and sense of wrongdoing with their status. This is what Bourdieu (2001: 273) labels the *legitimate imposture* which describes a situation whereby the mandated spokesperson "*is not a cynical calculating person who consciously deceives people, but someone who sincerely thinks he is what he is not.*"¹⁴ The ideologies they uphold, such as Occidentalism, are of

¹⁴ (MOT)

the first and second types in Boudon's (1991: 286-287) typology. According to Boudon, ideologies are three main types:

1. Those which claim to do the individual good even against his wishes so as he can serve the community.
2. Those which hold the *other* in contempt out of an exasperated *sociocentrism* and ethnocentrism.
3. Those which admit the necessity to accept the individual as he is and thus adapt the institutions to him.

This is particularly true for many religious leaders who think it is their religious and moral duty, as knowledgeable people, to speak for those who do not know their own good. It is also true for some nationalist leaders and intellectuals for whom people are not aware enough to distinguish between what is good to them and what is bad. Moreover, it would be erroneous and misleading to believe that the mandated spokesperson's interests are always material. In many cases, these interests are not quantifiable and are part of the proselytising of ideas believed to be the sole and only truth, especially in symbolic systems like religion, which the mandated spokesperson believes it his duty to convey it to his fellow countrymen and countrywomen.

In such situations, the mandated spokespeople insist on the necessity to attribute the most positive value to the three main components of social organisation: tradition, authority and hierarchy. With the *positivisation* of these three sources of power, the regime enshrines a conservative system which automatically attributes a negative connotation to anything which expresses a revolutionary idea as subversion. This contributes to the creation of the most favourable felicity conditions for the acceptance of the ideological discourse and, in parallel, the worst infelicity ones that lead to

the rejection of the intellectual's discourse.

3.5. Classical Arabic

The mandated spokesperson certainly needs qualities to be entitled to this status. His symbolic capital that confers to him credit relies on the act of institution, but also on his cultural capital. The act of institution is an act of communication (Bourdieu 2001: 180), by which an individual is publicly attributed by the social institutions an identity. This identity is then acknowledged by the whole society which institutes that individual officially as its representative. The title of *sheikh*, for instance, granted by the religious institution and confirmed by the political one (such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs), positions its carrier as the only one who has the authority to speak in religious matters, and by extension in many earthly matters, to become the authority itself.

The cultural capital is the sum of technical qualifications including types of knowledge (religious or political for instance) and many other cultural acquisitions that allow him to hold an official position like a civil servant, a minister or deputy (Bourdieu & Boltanski 1975). Precisely, classical Arabic is for the mandated spokesperson in Arab countries part of the cultural capital that offers him a substantial advantage over any intellectual who does not master this language, and paradoxically over his listeners who do not master it, yet are supposed to understand it. This 'category language' plays the role of a dialect turned into a standard language due to particular social conditions favourable to the category of people who instituted it in this high position, on cultural, political or ethnic bases. This is well illustrated by Fairclough who comments on Standard English writing:

The power of its claims as a national language even over those whose use of it is limited is apparent in the widespread self-depreciation of working-class people who say they do not speak English, or do not speak 'proper' English. On the other hand, it is a class dialect not only in the sense that its dominance is associated with capitalist class interests... but also because it is the dominant bloc that makes most use of it, and gains most from it as an asset – as a form of 'cultural capital' analogous to capital in the economic sense, as Pierre Bourdieu has put it.

(Fairclough 2001: 48)

Sanctifying classical Arabic in Algeria has also meant stigmatising the other languages, and as a consequence stigmatising the cultures they carry. Just as the upheld linguistic correctness in standard English led to the moral correctness of its users and the denigration of the cultures and lifestyles of those who used other social dialects (ibid.: 48), the cultures conveyed through other languages than classical Arabic, are also viewed in Algeria as not worthy of respect and consideration, not to say of existence at all.

The status of classical Arabic is central to the whole ideological enterprise of the political regimes in Arab countries. In Algeria, it has been given a political position, by means of political documents and most importantly of education, which does not reflect the linguistic reality of the country. As advanced by Miliani (2001: 14) in his analysis of the sociolinguistic situation in Algeria: "*Language (foreign and national) planning, as well as teaching, has always responded to considerations or policies imbued with partisanship far from the sociolinguistic reality of the country.*" This virtual position serves the whole system of power relations necessary for the maintenance of the political status quo, since, as it will be shown below, it deprives a large proportion of society, the oppositional intellectuals who do not master this language nor find in French the most suitable vehicle of their 'disturbing' ideas, from all opportunities to be heard, and frustrate other categories of society, such as students, who can only express themselves in their native languages. For this, the political regime makes use of a trilogy of

elements:

- the fact that this language is the langue of the sacred book, the Koran;
- the fact that it is a language of national identification;
- a pseudo-scientific conception of the Algerian linguistic reality in which classical Arabic is in a diglossic relation with the other languages present in the Algerian linguistic repertoire.

The diglossic situation in which classical Arabic is supposed to be the high variety and an Algerian dialectical Arabic a low variety is somewhat fanciful as it is partly irrelevant to the Algerian linguistic reality. Whether according to Ferguson's (1959) first definition or to the revisionist definition of Fishman (1971a) and Gumperz (1982)¹⁵, diglossia is not a concept that translates this reality. As a matter of fact, the two criteria that define a diglossia, genetic relatedness and sociological status, do not seem to apply to the case of classical Arabic and the language the majority of Algerians use and refer to as Algerian Arabic.

Genetic relatedness in diglossia, i.e. the fact that the two linguistic variants are varieties of the same language, is not a feature of the relationship between classical Arabic and the Algerians' daily-used language. Algerian Arabic is certainly Algerian but by no means Arabic. Many linguists, notably in Algeria (Elimam 2003), have now rejected the appellation of 'Algerian Arabic' to suggest a more realistic denomination, *Maghribi*, which refers to the language used, in its various variants

¹⁵ While Ferguson (1959) admitted that diglossia concerns two varieties of the same language, one having a high privileged high position and the other a low one, Fishman (1971a) and Gumperz (1982) would later extend diglossia to varieties that sustain the same relationship even when they are not part of the same language. American linguists would even consider all unequal bilingualisms as cases of diglossia (Charaudeau & Maingueneau 2002: 184).

according to each country, in the Maghreb. These linguists admit that *Maghribi*, which is the native language of a great number of the populations in these countries, is a Semitic language. Despite the morphological influence of classical Arabic, *Maghribi* has a Punic substratum (relative to the peoples of Carthage, Phoenicians who peopled part of the Old Maghreb). Probably, this conception does not take into account all the influences that *Maghribi* has undergone, and still undergoes, like that of Berber, French and Spanish¹⁶, yet, it clearly establishes the fact that the language Algerians use in their daily life is not by any means a mere variety of Arabic, thus invalidating one of the two characteristics of diglossia, genetic relatedness.

As to the criterion of the sociological status of the high variety in a diglossic situation, classical Arabic has a high political, cultural and psychological status rather than a high sociological one which would mean that it is the language of all formal situations. Examples of formal situations in politics, administration, media, education where it is rather French and *Algerian*, and even Berber, which are used bear witness for the fact that classical Arabic is far from being the sociological high variety, which in reality struggles to correspond to its theoretical political status on the practical linguistic stage. French, *Algerian* and, to a lesser extent, Berber

¹⁶ It is first to be observed that the Algerians' language of everyday goes beyond a mere code switching between well established languages like Arabic, French or Berber. S.M. Lakhdar Barka (2006) suggests another concept, code-sliding (*glissement codique*) that describes the influences of other languages on *Algerian*, as a way to signal the birth of a language in its own right: "In the case of [code-]sliding, there is an alteration and/or complementarity of the discursive coherence, but not cohesive, by the adaptation of the 'borrowed' item to the linguistic rules of cohesion of the host language, or matrix, and thus an extension of the rules of cohesion in the enunciation, what Saville-Troike calls 'intrasentential switching'..." (MOT) Second, the point made here is that the thesis of *Maghribi* is not fully satisfactory as it does not, in its turn, take into account the peculiar linguistic realities of each country in the Maghreb. Algeria, for instance, is a scene for a language that falls under the influence, in its specific way, of the different Berber varieties that do not exist in Morocco or Tunisia. It is then my contention here to admit that this Algerian variety is to be called *Algerian*, instead of *Maghribi*, as different to the other varieties in the other countries of the Maghreb.

have had the lion's share in official situations where code-switching between these three languages has become a general rule. Classical Arabic, as the language of formal settings, is becoming quite exceptional, limited to the religious field, sometimes in politics, administrative documents, and part of the press, television and radio.

Algerian, with its capacity of openness over the other languages and cultures, allows much easier borrowings and the integration of words that belong to the other languages with which it coexists, such as Berber, French, English, by means of different channels such as music, cinema, the media and science. Consequently, *Algerian* is developing and permeating settings that were inaccessible to it, thanks to a youth which is quantitatively more important and which lack enough competence in the other languages to fully express itself.

It seems clearly then that classical Arabic as a high variety and *Algerian* as a low one is more a political fancy than a sociological reality. The Algerian linguistic reality can then not be described as a case of diglossia, but, at the very most, a case of bilingualism in Tabouret-Keller's (1969: 309) sense, i.e.: "*situations which induce a use, frequently in speaking and in some cases in writing, of two or more languages by the same individual or group.*"

A different approach to languages in Algeria, an approach that integrates the ideological-political factors as opposed to the mere linguistic and sociolinguistic ones, more in the line of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of critical language study, initiated by people like Fairclough (2001), and critical discourse analysis as advanced by van Dijk (1997a; 1997b), is the one that can really inform about the real implications of the political status of classical Arabic in a context of a contradictory sociological one, and about the real

relationship between classical Arabic and *Algerian*, as well as the social role each one plays.

The first contribution of this approach is that it shows that this relationship is not innocent, as diglossia seems to suggest it. On the basis of this approach, it is admitted here that the real linguistic situation in Algeria, where classical Arabic, *Algerian*, Berber and French coexist, is a case of colinguism. Coined by Balibar (1993: 7), this neologism is defined as “*the association, through education and politics, of certain written languages in communication between legitimate partners.*”¹⁷ This concept raises a very important aspect in language planning, that of the *act of institution of languages* (Charaudeau & Maingueneau 2002: 101). Colinguism is the outcome of the institutionalisation of one language by attributing to it a privileged status, and thus, all the means to attain this status, at the expense of the other languages present in the same society. The high variety or language, in colinguism, is imposed in this position in order to exclude categories of society from power struggle, categories which use the other varieties or languages that consequently get the low position and, thus, have no means for their promotion. This shows again the vital role of the political, juridical or educational institutions which have the decision making and enforcing powers.

As opposed to diglossia, where the positions and roles of languages are determined almost naturally according to what these languages can offer to society practically and objectively, colinguism is a situation where languages are assigned positions and roles according to what they can *serve* ideologically and politically, i.e. according to their relations to the political regime in office. Colinguism in Algeria designates then the fact that classical Arabic, a non-native language, is given the status of national and official

¹⁷ (MOT)

language, while Berber, *Algerian*, native languages, and French, a second language, are refused the positions which their sociological reality entitles them to have. The institution of a language as an official and national language establishes its organic link to the state and the political regime, "*whether in its genesis or its social use.*" The corollary of this statement is advanced by Bourdieu:

*It is in the process of the constitution of the state that the conditions of constituting a unified linguistic market dominated by an official language are created: being obligatory in official occasions and official settings (School, public administrations, political institutions, etc.), this state language becomes the theoretical norm according to which all linguistic practices are objectively measured.*¹⁸

(Bourdieu 2001: 71)

The symbolic capital of classical Arabic, as the language of the Koran and an identity reference, is then turned to the mandated spokesperson's advantage in the construction of his symbolic capital or credit by elevating this language to the highest position. To equip his discourse with the necessary illocutionary force and reach the perlocutionary effect, the mandated spokesperson needs to transform his discourse into what Maingueneau (1993: 87) labels *inscribed utterances* (*énoncés inscrits*), i.e. utterances which are stabilised through use by people who enjoy "*a strong symbolic position for the group*" (Charaudeau & Maingueneau 2002: 204)¹⁹. This explains quite clearly recourse to religion and to the people who incarnate religious rectitude, such as the Prophet Mohammed and his companions, and to the type of speech genre commonly used to speak about them or for them, i.e. the religious sermon. The inscribed utterances found in the words of these symbolic figures are integrated in the mandated spokesperson's discourse in order to transmit into it the same symbolic

¹⁸ (MOT)

¹⁹ (MOT)

capital. This transfer of credit can only be achieved in classical Arabic, and this justifies the religion-politics alliance where the work tool of the first serves the interests of the second in colinguism.

With classical Arabic, and with the religious sermon as a speech genre of the political-religious discourse (see below), the mandated spokesperson reinforces his power by an abuse of power, through what Bourdieu (2001: 327) calls *fallacy*, which he defines "*not as the fact of saying the false, the mere lie, but rather the fact of saying the false with all the apparent logic of the true.*"²⁰ As the language of the Koran, a book of truth according to Muslims, the language itself becomes truth. By the mere fact of saying something in this language, it exists, without any need for the speaking subject to prove its existence. Words and expressions such as الأمة الإسلامية (the Islamic Ummah) and القومية العربية (Arabic nationalism) are, for instance, formulations that are taken as realities but which are actually fantasies.

Contrary to the linguistic rule which states that there can be no meaning without referents, the fallacy of classical Arabic, as used by ideologists, is precisely the production of formulas without referents in reality, a case of words which fabricate things (ibid.: 328). By extracting this language from its natural linguistic environment to transpose it, thanks to colinguism, into the political and sacred spheres, it became a language of fallacy par excellence. Bourdieu cleverly captured the logic of this phenomenon writing:

*Thus rigour in form can mask semantic laxity. All religious theologies and all political théodicées have taken advantage of the fact that the generative capacities of language can exceed the limits of intuition and of empirical verification to produce discourses correct in form but semantically empty.*²¹

(ibid.: 65)

²⁰ (MOT)

²¹ (MOT)

In this colinguism, classical Arabic, religion and politics form a 'united front' whose purpose is to maintain a solidarity which can guarantee to the ideological-political discourse its illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect through the people's consent and rallying belief in a community, not of citizens, but rather of believers composed of the people and their political leader turned into a religious leader at the same time. By instituting a colinguism favourable to classical Arabic, politics protects its *sword of Damocles*, which is paradoxically viewed by the people, not as an instrument of domination, or at least a mere language that belongs to their cultural heritage, but rather as a sacred language they *ought* to protect and defend as the moral/religious duty of any Muslim.

As matter of fact, colinguism in Algeria fulfils three main political objectives:

- control the shortest route to the hearts of the people through Islam whose sacred book is written in classical Arabic;
- exclude the people from the field of politics;
- exclude all oppositional intellectuals who do not use this language, either because they do not have enough competence in it, or because, within the field of their scientific competence, they have to use another language such as French.

The exclusion of the people operates in a very precise manner. By using classical Arabic in addressing them, a language which is obviously not mastered by a great proportion of them, politicians dissuade them from developing any interest in politics which seems to them beyond their sphere of competence, and mostly quite far from their daily preoccupations. The politicians' arbitrariness and lack of competence are thus disguised by a pseudo-esoteric language imposed as the means of 'communication'

between the governor and the governed. Yet, without being understood (as observed above), the spokesperson's discourse in classical Arabic, the language of faith, is accepted as part of the pact of solidarity in the community of believers. The dramatic paradox lies here in the fact that the people acquiesce to the alienation of their native languages which are the only ones in which they really can express their frustrations and aspirations. By taking part in the destruction of their most suitable means of expression, they give one of the most cherished human rights, the right to speak for themselves and participate in the determination of their future.

3.6. The Right to Speak

This state, in which people are not invited to speak nor even think, becomes a general social environment where students, as young growing citizens, are formatted within a frame that does not equip them with the habit to be *thinking subjects* who, to paraphrase Descartes, exist because they think, but rather content themselves with existing as *subjects* (in its European Middle Ages sense) without thinking, i.e. politically inexistent as citizens. The omission of the right to think induces the omission of the right to speak. This is a general observation that is made through the reading of students' exam papers, in which they swing between the regurgitation of the teacher's words, a scholar's, or, in questions that involve their political and cultural environments, the mandated spokesperson's ones. They express themselves from a specific role of which they are well aware and which they have been assigned through their home and school education; the role of someone who does not know, who cannot be able to form a sound opinion, who is thus not listened to. The word role, here, is, as defined by Charaudeau, that:

... in the name of which the protagonists exercise their right to speak. They speak as an expert, a witness, a friend, an opponent, a superior, an inferior, etc. It is not a status, but rather what defines the interpersonal relationship between the protagonists, a relation of aggression, of consensus, of alliance, etc. Here again, roles can be claimed or contested in a movement of exclusion or inclusion.²²

(Charaudeau 2004: 25)

Students hold then, and often unconsciously claim, the role of the inferior protagonist in a relation of consensus by relaying the other's discourse. The mandated spokesperson's discourse enjoys of course, notably through the Arab satellite TV channels, all the means that allow its wide diffusion, these channels being in their majority either state-owned or financed by Islamist organisations or individuals. Students are at the centre of an ideological-media-controlled sphere that bombards them with all kinds of thought except that which would invite them to have their own. The media, as a public organ of communication, witness and reporter of events, allow the circulation of ideological discourse and intervene, against their natural mission, in the neutralisation of debate by their alliance with either the political regime or Islamism.

Moreover, it is a characteristic of the Arab world the fact that these countries have skipped certain technological phases that probably makes them more overwhelmed by and vulnerable to excessive media coverage, as they have not had the necessary time to integrate the changes. This time of adaptation allows the acquisition of a culture of information which helps one to put into perspective the sum of informative data he is faced with on a daily basis. While in Europe people have undergone a smooth technological mutation, which has by no means left them totally safe from manipulation, many people in the Arab countries have jumped from the most elementary instruments of communication to the most sophisticated ones. The case of

²² (MOT)

the cell phones and internet booms in an environment which lacked the traditional telephone is, despite the actual benefits, a vivid illustration of the dangers of an abrupt move from a limited access to information to an unlimited one. This certainly adds to the limitation of opportunities for students to learn how to think and speak for themselves, a way to keep them in intellectual illiteracy.

Added to the status of the mandated spokesperson, and among the felicity conditions is the form of delivery of discourse, a kind of *liturgical conditions* (Bourdieu 2001: 167). The forms range from the language through which the mandated spokesperson delivers his discourse to the rituals he observes when doing it. In Arab-Islamic countries, as observed above, classical Arabic holds the status of the exclusive channel of mediation between the ideologues and the people, outside of which ideological discourse loses its illocutionary force and its perlocutory effect. For it is the special place that this language enjoys in the minds and hearts of the people that makes it the language of hegemonic power. In ideological discourse, it is vital for the mandated spokesperson to undertake a very careful work on form by which he becomes a *rhetor*.

As a matter of fact, Classical Arabic is not enough. A set of rituals are to be observed in order to create the necessary conditions for the total acceptance and adherence to the message. Chomsky's linguistic competence as well as Hymes' (1974) communicative competence in classical Arabic are by all means important to the mandated spokesperson's assets. Mastery of the language of discourse delivery, for it cannot be considered as the language of communication since it is not mastered by the addressees, within the special context of *sacralisation* of this language, grants the addresser more authority over his listeners. "*Appropriate the words,*" writes Bourdieu (2001: 203, fn7), "*which contain all what the group*

acknowledges is to guarantee a considerable advantage in the struggle for power... the most precious word is the sacred word'.²³

Yet, grammaticality and linguistic acceptability (Trudgill 1992) are not sufficient here for a discourse to be listened to. There is a *social acceptability* (Bourdieu 2001: 84) that allows a discourse, when made according to the prescribed rituals, to be performative. The mandated spokesperson needs also, beside communicative competence, a speech genre competence. Social acceptability in this case is the extent to which the mandated spokesperson's utterances conform to the listeners' *habitus*, Bourdieu's (ibid: 116) term for those social and cultural schemata. The speech genre competence is the mandated spokesperson's knowledge of his listener's *habitus* and the requirements of the *market* (environment) and the type of discourse (speech genre) he uses to convey his message. In this sense, ideological discourse is a euphemism, the result of linguistic, cultural and social compromises between the requirements of the *market* and the mandated spokesperson undisclosed interests.

The notions of *habitus* and *market*, borrowed from other fields by Bourdieu and introduced into sociology, are quite relevant to understand the conditions of the success of ideological discourse in Algeria. Bourdieu's use of the term *market* to refer to the social environment evinces two very important elements as far as the practice of discourse is concerned. First, that discourse is always practised in a context of conflict between ideologies, i.e. interest-based intellectual constructions, some trying to keep the status quo, the others attempting to alter it. Second, that discourse is a commodity that is handled by ideologues who need to know the conditions of the *market* of language, passion, frustrations and aspirations (the social conditions) in order to succeed in selling their product.

²³ (MOT)

Within this *market*, discourse acquires a price which is the value of the speaking subject's utterances i.e. the credit they have in the people's minds and which determines their acceptability. Knowing the conditions implies knowing the listeners' *habitus*, i.e. the cultural and psychological dispositions that bring the individual to act and react in a certain manner (Bourdieu 2001). The *habitus* includes then the representations, schemata and stereotypes that the individual acquires in his social environment (or the *market* itself), influenced by all the social institutions in action, including the family, religion, politics, education, and the media. Acceptability of a discourse depends thus on the listener's *habitus*, the market that produced it and that forms the context for the reception, appreciation, interpretation and reproduction of that discourse.

Classical Arabic holds the position of the only legitimate language that is used by the self-mandated spokesperson to address the people. It is the language that is compatible with and which does not disturb their discursive *habitus*. This discursive *habitus* is constructed over long periods of time, corresponding to the periods of the upbringing of children, by means of an enormous, religious and rhetorical redundancy, tolerated by this language, of ritual formulas and images drawn from the past. The constant references to extraordinary anecdotes of past popular heroes whose sole faith in *Allah* has brought them to carry out great achievements, not to say miracles, contribute to the formation of a consensual and rigid vision of the social world which resists all possible methodical questioning.

Actually, understanding the relation of classical Arabic with the people's discursive *habitus* clarifies the ideologues' suspicious attitude towards foreign languages. Carrying foreign cultures, i.e. different visions of the social world that may disturb and alter *habitus*, foreign languages stand as

threats to the harmony of the *market* which guarantees the acceptability of the mandated spokesperson's ideological discourse. The accentuation of the *habitus*, through the use of classical Arabic develops in the individual what Bourdieu (ibid.) calls a body *hexis*, a sum of mechanical and spontaneous behaviours which seem like a second nature, of which the accent, or the articulatory style (Guiraud 1965), for instance, is but a constituent linguistic element of how an individual moves his tongue and lips in a particular way by imitating the group. Bourdieu (ibid.: 25) cleverly detected the work of ideology in nurturing a favourable *hexis*. He writes that "*the corporal hexis is the political mythology realised, incorporated, which becomes a permanent disposition, a lasting manner to be, to speak, to walk, and thus, to feel and think.*"²⁴

Ideological discourse is always made in a way to call upon the listener's *habitus* and *hexis*. This is also what explains Arab ideologues' recourse to religion. The type of speech genre, for example, chosen to deliver the discourse is very much related to the way Algerians are used to consider what a true utterance is. Their discursive *habitus* determines the acceptability of the mandated spokesperson's utterances or discourse. As Bourdieu put it:

*The effects that a new experience can have on the habitus depends on the relation of practical 'compatibility' between this experience and the already-integrated experiences in the habitus in the form of schemata of production and appreciation...*²⁵
(ibid.: 121)

In practical terms, and as far as the Algerian society is concerned, the mandated spokespeople (the politician, the preacher and the pseudo-intellectual) have made an option for a particular type of speech genre, the

²⁴ (MOT)

²⁵ (MOT)

religious sermon, in order to reach discursive acceptability.

3.7. The Speech Genre

The religious sermon is not handled here as a mere communicative event part of the non-linguistic or experiential context in language use (Nunan 1993: 7-8), something which would not reveal its ideological substratum in the way it is instrumentalised, consciously or not, by political and religious ideologues. It is rather understood as a speech genre in the Bakhtinian sense of the term, i.e. as a socially-determined form of combination of language (Bakhtin 2002).

Speech genres are two main types: primary and secondary. Primary speech genres are everyday generic forms, such as greetings, congratulations, wishes, in which people cast their speech (ibid.: 79). Although they are quite flexible, plastic and free, they still are “*stable typical forms of construction of the whole*” (ibid.: 78). As opposed to the Saussurian conception of language use as a purely individualistic act, through the concept of *parole* as stated above, with primary speech genres, Bakhtin assumes that speakers do not really have all this pretended scope of freedom and rather use language within quite stable types of the utterance (a spoken or written unit of discourse). As for secondary speech genres, they include literary genres (poetry, the novel, etc.) and rhetorical genres (scientific research writing, all kinds of commentary, judicial and political writing or speech). They are complex genres that “*arise in more complex and comparatively highly developed and organised cultural communication (primarily written) that is artistic, scientific, socio-political, and so on.*” (ibid.: 62). They are then sophisticated primary genres which are *absorbed, digested* and *altered* in a number of varied ways, called styles, according to

different writers or *rhetors*.

On the basis of these Bakhtinian definitions of primary and secondary speech genres, the religious sermon is considered as a secondary rhetorical speech genre. According to these same definitions, the normal process is that in which primary speech genres are handled by professional language users to transform them into secondary and sophisticated speech genres. Yet, it is admitted in this work that the religious sermon, in Algeria and the Arab-Islamic world, has taken the reverse direction and mutated from an originally secondary speech genre into a primary one. This phenomenon occurred with its extraction from the religious field and the generalisation of its use to other social realms, including politics, the media, and most importantly education. What motivated this transfer is the symbolic capital and apparent credit that the religious sermon confers to its user within an environment overwhelmed by religious culture, that is, an environment that forms the suitable felicity conditions for a discourse that bears the hallmark of religion.

As an originally secondary speech genre, the religious sermon is characterised by all the sophistication these types have in terms of refined style, attractive imagery and individuality. As a converted primary speech genre, it enjoys wide diffusion and free access to general culture. The point made here is that the religious sermon has become in Algeria *the* genre most discourses destined to the people are framed in. Moreover, as the most common genre the youth is exposed to, in mosques or television, since their early age, students come to university with an expressive tradition dominated by this genre. As a matter of fact, the reading of their exam papers shows less the influence of their native language in writing English than the influence of this discursive form in writing essays supposed to be scientific, or at least methodical and objective. Their essays sound

more like religious sermons in which they feel the need to persuade the reader rather than convince him with scientific arguments. Filled with assertion, affirmations and ungrounded statements, their exams papers betray their belief that what they write is true because of the very reason that it is written, not proved, just as God's word or the Prophet's words are true because they were uttered.

F. Lakhdar Barka (2006), an experienced teacher of written expression and a researcher in the issue of the relationship between native culture and foreign culture expressed through writing among students of English at the University of Oran, has pointed at the students' propensity to relate most issues to religion in their free writings, which look more like sermons rather than an intellectual's form of writing. Through a classroom experiment, a classroom journal where students are invited to express views on any topic they feel like tackling, Lakhdar Barka (ibid.) observed that "*signs of hostility towards the FL and the culture that it vehicles, which were slightly perceptible, have become explicit*"²⁶, probably because of Occidentalism which has not only nurtured them but also rationalised them, notably through the generalisation of the sermon as a genre.

Students' essays and the mandated spokesperson's discourse are thus considered here as instances of the religious sermon on the basis of the fact

²⁶ Extracts from the students' free essays, in the classroom journal, inform quite well about the students' general tendency to indulge into the religious sermon in style and content, and the extent to which this has changed as compared to a few years ago. As a matter of fact, while, three to four years ago, students were more concerned about their personal problems or social issues, as illustrated by the topics discussed (immigration, obesity, the future, success, delinquency, cruelty, etc.), today, they tend to emphasise the conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, identity, religious piety. The following examples are taken from the teacher's classroom journal of 2005-2006:

"*Why they lose their Algerian Muslim identity?... Why we see a handsome boy wear a half pair of trousers, make his hair orange or make it long like girls? Why we see a very nice girl wear clothes of the boys? Why we see them make their hair very short like boys?*"

"*I was an admirer of the West civilisation. I thought that they respect other's culture and religion, but after their last crime [the Prophet's cartoons], everything good about them disappear.*"

that they bear its fundamental constituent characteristics:

- invocation of Allah;
- arguments based on the Koran and the Prophet's life and words;
- incantatory and cathartic style;
- expressive aspect.

Politicians, pseudo-intellectuals, just like any religious representative, often start their discourses with the invocation of *Allah* as a moral guarantee for the truth of discourse and credibility of the speaking subject, by using the introductory phrase 'بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ' (in the name of Allah, most Gracious most Merciful). Statements made in the discourse are often presented as true, not on the basis of facts or some scientific theory, but on the grounds of a Koranic verse or Prophet's words or deeds. With all due respect to these two sources, they can only be sources of establishing and reinforcing faith and not proving a truth in politics, economy or science.

As to style, the mandated spokesperson's discourse and the students' essays tend to be irrelevant to the field they are produced in. While their style is supposed to be argumentative, it is rather assertive and declarative, allowing no doubt, inducing the speaker or writer to profess, proclaim, and prescribe, instead of arguing, suggesting, inviting his listeners or readers to thinking. While style is one of the elements that often show the individuality of the author of an utterance, especially in secondary speech genres, in the case of the religious sermon as a perverted primary speech genre, style is rather predetermined and stereotyped, and is fundamentally an element of the generic unity of this genre. Two main features characterise this style: tempting (الترغیب) and intimidating or terrorising (الترهیب). This style, drawn on the Koranic style of tempting by paradise and terrorising by hell, something common to all revealed religions in search for moral rectitude, when

transposed to politics, becomes a tool of playing on emotions in a discourse which is supposed to address the mind and provoke reflexion. In politics, tempting and terrorising is of course carried out by other means than paradise and hell. Depending on the matter, it varies from peace and violence to economic welfare and crisis. Algerian politics is filled, just like religion in which it is quite normal, with promises of a better day²⁷ on condition to show patience. Politics, supposed to be suggestions of solutions to social problems, becomes, like religion, incantatory and catharsis to the people's frustrations.

The stylistic playing on emotions in the religious sermon is reinforced with what Bakhtin (2002: 84) calls the *expressive aspect*, which he defines as "*the speaker's subjective emotional evaluation of the referentially semantic content of his utterance.*" As such, the mandated spokesperson's discourse, made in the religious sermon form, states ideas that are emotionally evaluated by the speaker himself, by having recourse to religious referents and justifications, emotional tone and stylistic aura. Linguistic and paralinguistic features characterise this genre. The linguistic ones vary from lexical markers such as the use of the same recurrent words with unique meanings to morphological markers "*involving more deferential forms*" (Saville-Troike 2003: 64) such as the use of the first person plural or the third person singular when the speaker refers to himself. The paralinguistic features range from the intonation, pitch, stress, yelling to kinesic, including formatted and particular body language such as knocking on the pulpit. The ideas are then evaluated by the listeners as well as definitely true, thus discarding any criticism or questioning. Emotional involvement invites adherence and commitment and rejects discussion and doubt. Instances of

²⁷ The discourse of welcome for the Algerian President Bouteflika (*El-Watan*, April 16th, 2006) offers illustrates quite perfectly these cases. Expressions like "*in order to show us a prosperous and peaceful tomorrow*", "*progress in the economic and social situations*", "*You, the leader of the modern Algerian renaissance*" translate the spirit of political discourse in Algeria.

this kind of discourse are quite explicit with Occidentalism which relies exclusively on religion as a reference and on emotion as feedback.

With the use of the religious sermon as the speech genre to address the people in classical Arabic, this language, made sacred and thus transformed into an exclusively religious language, is also turned, by distortion of use, into an expressive language, not allowing rational and objective use. While words and languages "*belong to nobody, and in themselves they evaluate nothing*," as observed by Bakhtin (ibid.: 85), classical Arabic has paradoxically become the propriety of the mandated spokesperson (the preacher, the politician and the pseudo-intellectual).

It is not our intention to uphold a manichean view of languages, that there are rational languages and irrational ones. We definitely admit the fact that languages are what their users make of them. Classical Arabic is by no means a language that is inherently unfit for science and rational discourse. This language was the vehicle of a great literature, whether scientific or fiction, at different periods of history, and was the instrument of a momentous civilisation that left indelible traces in human patrimony. It is still a language which is, at times, used to transmit all what its users have to offer to the world in terms of beauty and useful contribution. Yet, the ideological instrumentalisation of classical Arabic, added to the fact that it does not possess a native speaking community, have made of it an instrument which is cut off people's reality, devoid of its human dimension, and mainly used for political domination.

The mastery of classical Arabic is, however, not sufficient, as stated earlier, as the mastery of the speech genre is also essential to giving the impression of the mandated spokesperson's individuality in terms of discourse content and consequently to the completion of his charisma. As

Bakhtin rightly observed:

Frequently a person who has an excellent command of speech in some areas of cultural communication... is silent or very awkward in social conversation. Here it is not a matter of an impoverished vocabulary or of style, taken abstractly: this is entirely a matter of the inability to command a repertoire of genres of social conversation, the lack of a sufficient supply of those ideas about the whole of the utterance that help to cast one's speech quickly and naturally in certain compositional and stylistic forms...

(ibid.: 80)

Mastery of speech genres, and in this particular case of the religious sermon, equips the mandated spokesperson with the means to have control over his audience. This explains the impressive success of such religious or pseudo-intellectuals on satellite Arab channels like Amr Khaled (*Iqraa*), or Mohammed Amara (*ESC*). This applies also, to some extent, to American Evangelist preachers, like Dr. C.A. Dollar (*TBN*) or Bishop T.D. Jakes (*Church Channel*), who attract large audiences on American evangelist TV channels, and who attempt to resolve the failure of the Christian discourse. This failure has long been attributed to the sole demise of the people's belief in the Church's interpretation of the world, in rugged competition with science. Actually, as Bourdieu noted, it is also the collapse of the special social relationship between the clergy and the people, between the Christian believer and his mandated spokesperson or mediator, the priest, in his relation to God. This relationship faded at the very moment it ceased to be magical, i.e. based on the belief and trust in the mediator himself. This clarifies perfectly the success of the Islamist religious discourse, through such TV channels as *Iqraa*, as it is first based on the charisma of orators, like Amr Khaled, Abdallah Muslih, Wajdi Ghunaim and Ali al-Djafri, who have become household names, competing with movie and music stars in the Arab-Islamic world.

Control over the audience is part of what Bakhtin (ibid.: 78) labels the *speech will* in discourse. The speech will is the speaking subject's will in producing his discourse, his intention behind the choice of a particular type of speech genre. When choosing the religious sermon, the mandated spokesperson already establishes a particular type of relationship with his audience, that of a *prescriber* with his *followers*, that of a guide who expects from his disciples, to use Bakhtin's concept, a *purposed delayed action* (ibid.: 69). The purposed delayed action is the planned perlocutionary effect which the mandated spokesperson attempts to achieve through his ideological discourse, an understanding that will bring the listener to behave in a particular desired way. The action is delayed because the mandated spokesperson does not expect immediate reaction. His discourse is a phase which is part of the process of maturation the people undergo to internalise the ideas and produce the adequate behaviour. As Bakhtin clearly admitted:

An actively responsive understanding of what is heard (a command, for example) can be directly realised in action ... or it can remain, for the time being, a silent responsive understanding... but this is, so to speak, responsive understanding with delayed reaction. Sooner or later what is heard and actively understood will find its response in the subsequent speech or behaviour of the listener.

(ibid.: 68-69)

In addition to the examples stated above in the analysis of Occidentalism, other illustrations can be drawn from politicians' speeches to show how they instrumentalise religion to achieve the status of the mandated spokesperson, by the use of classical Arabic as the language of communication and the religious sermon as the speech genre of this communication. Probably the best examples can be found in presidential speeches, first because the speaker holds the highest political and symbolic position in the country, and second because, probably, no other period in Algerian modern history has witnessed such overuse or abuse of religious

references in politics for ideological considerations. A quite vivid instance is provided by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in his address to the state executives about the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (Discours du Président de la République à l'occasion de la conférence des cadres), on which the Algerian people were invited to pronounce on in the national referendum of September 29th, 2005. In the pure tradition of the religious sermon, reference to God was systematic and reached twelve times, whether to ask for his blessing or to justify an action or idea, as these four extracts show it:

1. *Along years, we have done our best to extinguish the inferno of the Fitna ... till God's mercy helps us.*²⁸

This is a perfect example of self-proclamation as a God-mandated spokesperson by joining the pronoun 'we' (which refers to the speaker) in the first clause to the word 'God' in the second. The direct induction is that the action of those referred to with 'we' is in itself God's mercy, and which can only expect from the listener, as a believer, to welcome. Equally important, the use of the word *fitna* (which can mean 'turmoil' or 'sedition') in Arabic in the French version of the address, instead of a French equivalent, is also a deliberate intention to refer the listeners back to religion, this word standing for the worst state a community could be in according to the Koran, as this verse, very well known by most Muslims, states it: "*For Persecution [Fitna] is worse than slaughter*" (Al-Baqarah S.2, A.191). As such, anyone who contradicts this discourse is supporting the *Fitna*, and thus standing against God.

2. *I have committed myself before God and you ... to extinguish the destructive fire of the Fitna.*²⁹

²⁸ (MOT)

²⁹ (MOT)

The speaker's commitment is first admitted as a religious and moral one. The use of the pronoun 'I', instead of 'we', establishes the real status of the speaker alone as the God-mandated spokesperson, i.e. the spiritual guide, in the line of prophets, whose following becomes then a religious duty of any real Muslim.

3. *With God's help, thanks be given to Him, we have opened together the road to the Civil Concord.*³⁰

This is a clear case of the sacralisation of a political decision, the Civil Concord, by claiming that it is the direct realisation of divine Help. Again, any criticism of or opposition to this law is equated to an opposition to God's will.

4. *Does the people's will not emanate from God's will...?*³¹

Probably, this statement is the one which definitely affixes the seal of the definite status of the God-mandated spokesperson to the speaker. This statement almost re-establishes the divine-right legitimacy, as divine election, in the European Middle Ages sense of the term, where the political leader is the one who holds power in the name of God. By claiming that the people's will is God's will, the speaker attributes to his authority a divine character since he was elected by the people, thus indirectly elected by God.

A myriad of other examples are available in this speech and in others³²,

³⁰ (MOT)

³¹ (MOT)

³² Here are other extracts from the same address and that transform the whole of it from a political speech into a religious sermon:

"I have invested in it [the Charter] ... my faith of believer." (MOT)

"We rely on God and our dear people." (MOT)

From other speeches, these extracts converge to the same purpose:

and that clearly evince the fact that politicians have definitely made an option for the religious sermon as the unique channel of communication to the people. Grown in this discursive bath, in which the religious sermon is the most common speech genre, through the religious and political discourses, students have internalised this form as the only form of expression. Before even learning classical Arabic at school, they have experienced this type in mosques, a situation that does not seem to be exceptional as Bakhtin (ibid.: 78) advances that we "*are given these speech genres in almost the same way that we are given our native language, which master fluently long before we begin to study grammar.*" What is exceptional is the fact that, while in many other cultures children are exposed to a multitude of speech genres, some which teach them unconsciously argumentation, in Algerian culture, primacy is awarded to the religious sermon. Students have acquired the religious sermon schemata, by which they tend to refuse any other genre whether for learning or producing. As they are used to the prescriptive and limitative patterns of thought of this genre, they find in all the other genres, such as fiction or scientific essays which do not correspond to their discursive *habitus*, difficulty of comprehension and apprehension since they require mechanisms they have not acquired, doubt, reflexion and the ability to analyse. The only mechanisms the religious sermon taught them are certainty, acceptance, conformity, and acquiescence, something a believer is expected to do for his deity.

Some examples, taken from their exam papers, of such expressions

"*Our faith and belief ... is the indestructible cement of our cohesion.*" (Discours du Président de la République à l'occasion de la semaine nationale sur le Coran) (MOT)

"*They [extremists] created in the Algerian society grave ruptures which could destroy the whole of it if God's grace and goodness have not guided us towards the road of peace, of wisdom and the Concord.*" (Discours du Président de la République à l'ouverture de la Conférence Nationale des Avocats) (MOT)

"*Unemployment ... with God's help, will be brought down to 10% by 2009.*" (Discours du Président de la République à l'occasion de la Journée Mondiale de la Femme) (MOT)

show how they use ready-made statements, often found in the religious sermons in mosques or the Arab satellite channels, to answer questions asked in exams. What is more dramatic is the fact that these statements are sometimes completely irrelevant to the questions, yet they are incorporated, either as a means to fill in the paper or as a way to take an opportunity to express their thoughts in an environment which rarely allows them some for it. In both cases, these thoughts seem to be spontaneous and somehow part of their deepest beliefs. To the question "To what extent can American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq be explained on the basis of American culture and history?", a question put to second year students of English as their final term exam which contained three other questions, about 50% of the answers (i.e. 18 out the thirty-eight students who chose this question, out of a total of 150 students) contained the following statements:

America hates Muslims and Islamic countries. This is the reason that explains their involvement in Islamic countries and not others.

What explains this is religion. Iraq and Afghanistan are Muslims. America has a Christian religion.

The cultural basis is the religious motive ... Americans think that Islamic beliefs are wrong and against other religions; these beliefs ask people to fight each other and help terrorism which is a threat to the world nowadays. However they want to spread Christianity worldwide, which is thought to call for peace, tolerance, brotherhood and self-confidence. But this is wrong.

Jewish people had the same idea and they influenced American to help them settle in Palestine

It is religion. Their religion is menaced by Islam. America tried her best to show Arabs as terrorists and the US in the image of the saviour to protect the world.

Since America was discovered, it is fighting. At the beginning it was between Americans and Indians, then between whites and blacks, and now against Muslims.

America wanted to 'clean up' terrorism especially because Bin Laden is an Afghan, and the Muslim countries because they are Muslim. They think: 'you are a Muslim, so you are a terrorist'.

America dislikes the Arab world mainly Muslim ones. ... America hates all what has a link to Islam.

The reason is the spread of Christianity. America hates Muslims.

To the question of the first make up exam, “According to the Puritans, what is the purpose of America?”, comments, such as the following, could be found in some of the answers:

But this remains an American Puritan thought. Because we, as Muslims, know that they are not the Chosen people, and America is not the Promised Land.

But the real purpose [of the first and second Gulf wars] in the first and in the second is oil, and I think that it is a Jewish idea and America is the spokesperson.

These statements show, though they contain some truth in terms of the American governments' instrumentalisation of the false representations of the Arab and Muslim inside and outside America, the regurgitation of the same statements made in mosques and the media, for which the study of American culture, whether in American civilisation or literature, has brought absolutely no single change. These students came and left with exactly the same representations of America and the American-Arab relations based on the mandated spokespeople's discourses, be they politicians, preachers or pseudo-intellectuals. Although some of the respondents to the questionnaire could associate the word American to others relevant to the American Civilisation course, such as culture, capitalism, or even the name of their American Civilisation teacher, more than 60% still referred to the same terms which the dominant Occidental discourse attributes exclusively to America, like war, racism, terror, lying, enemy of Islam, malice, hypocrisy,

depravity, evil, disgusting, detestable.

It is then one of this work's theses to admit that, given the discursive genre students have been educated in, they have developed the *un-deliberate will of non-learning*. This antinomic phrase, as will be in itself deliberate, marks the paroxysmic and paradoxical state whereby students take the decision to come to class, aware of the necessity to learn, and in most cases willing to learn, especially when they enjoy the course, they nevertheless show resistance, quite unconsciously, to learning. Their difficulties in using the English language is partly due to the fact that this language does not suit the speech genre they tend to express themselves in, and which was acquired through classical Arabic. Their failure to produce good essays in such modules as American Civilisation or American literature is rooted in the fact that these subjects require the intellectual skills of critical thinking and analysis while the discursive genre through which they translate their thoughts into a written form does not allow room for criticism and analysis. It is a genre that perfectly suits matters of faith but is totally unfit for matters of science.

Another thesis is the fact that their negative attitude towards the *other* and his culture can be explained upstream as a delayed action which stems from their rejection of anything that could question their fixed beliefs, established through the life-long discursive bath they have grown in, and which brings them to react in a hostile manner towards anything that does not conform to their cultural and discursive *habitus*. Delayed action is thus a manifestation of the others' words, the mandated spokesperson's words as authoritative utterances, an expression of *otherness* (in its negative sense, i.e. as masters of thought) and a negation of what Bakhtin (ibid.: 89) calls *our-ownness*, the expression of the self in one's speech.

The monopolisation of the religious sermon as a speech genre is accordingly the first step towards the monopolisation of power over the people and students. Politicians have understood this all too well as illustrated by the MSP's continual strive to control the mosques, by any means necessary (including physical threats against imams), in a country where official records show that an average of more than 14 million people attends the Friday Prayer in mosques every week (*El Watan*, February 20th, 2006)³³. Thanks to the religious sermon, political discourse, a secondary speech genre in essence, has also become a primary speech genre. To diffuse its ideology, political discourse, as a primary genre, gets full access to the largest portion of the population that does not possess the intellectual means to understand and respond to specialised discourse used in "*complex cultural communication*" (Bakhtin 2002: 98). Within this large population, students, as the leading category of the youth, are thus attained before and during their university years, inside and outside university.

The mandated spokesperson, with the command of classical Arabic and the sermon as a speech genre, is then no more than a *rhetor*, i.e. a professional practitioner of rhetoric. Rhetoric is understood here in its pejorative meaning, a discourse technique whose main objective is to persuade people of the false by manipulating them through a beautiful, "*tendentious... emphatic, and shallow*" language (Reboul 1993: 5)³⁴. The main characteristic of this rhetoric is that it is *epidictic*, that is, amplifying and aimed at self-praising. In the epidictic," writes Reboul (ibid.: 19), "*the rhetor*

³³ On February 20th, 2006, the Algerian newspaper *El-Watan* reported that, according to the Ministry of Religious Affairs spokesman, M. Tamine, 20% of the 1500 mosques in the country were a scene for such violent threats. Official records show that in 2005 10 imams, who refused to relay messages of some religious associations under the control of the *MSP*, were either subject to violent aggressions or unjustly accused of incompetence or even such disgraceful crimes as paedophilia in order to be removed from their positions and be replaced by more conciliatory ones.

³⁴ (MOT)

is alone before a public whose only role is to applaud him."³⁵

Along with praise and amplification, the epideictic discourse includes blame of the other, and is based on the principle of *transfer*. Ideological discourse does not create beliefs. It rather transfers them onto the mandated spokesperson and his ideology. Belief in God, for instance, is transferred into belief in the mandated spokesperson who claims he is the representative of His word. Fighting for a just cause is transferred into fighting for the cause of the side which proclaims itself as its representative. *Transfer* is then a continual process that ideologues use to embezzle people's symbols and beliefs. Transfer may also function the reverse way inasmuch as particularities can be made general by transferring them from the spokesperson to the people. An illustration of this procedure is the Algerian President Bouteflika's comments after his leaving the French hospital Val-de-Grâce in April 2006. His admission to hospital followed his first provocative declaration that France undertook "*genocide of Algerian identity*" during colonisation three days earlier. The political class' indignation at this declaration and some French politicians' ironical comments about how Bouteflika could accept to get treatment in a country he outrageously criticised a few days before induced the President to say that "*France continues its attacks on Algeria*" ("Journal de l'international", *I TELE*, April 23rd, 2006). The French politicians' criticism of Bouteflika was then transferred onto the whole people of Algeria in order to involve them and induce their support. Another illustration is offered by Bin Ladin who claimed that the 'Western' embargo on *Hamas*, subsequent to their takeover as the new Palestinian Authority, is a proof of 'Western' attack on Islam (*Al-Jazeera*, April 23rd, 2006; *Le Figaro*, April 24th, 2006). Bin Ladin thus equates a political party with Islam by transferring a critical reaction towards it onto this religion.

³⁵ (MOT)

3.8. Students as the 'Third'

It is to be noted that students are not the target of ideological discourse, as an epideictic discourse, in the traditional sense of communication, where they would be the direct addressee. It is admitted here that students play the role of what discourse analysts, since the works of Bakhtin, have labelled the *third* (*tiers*). The *third* is not the directly visible participant in discourse. It is the one to whom discourse is indirectly addressed, the one whom the speaking subject attempts to convince in his confrontation to an interlocutor. The *third*, especially in political discourse, is the one politicians pretend to defend, to speak on his behalf, the one that is flattered in order to gain his support, a kind of *superaddressee* who:

... can react even when he is not asked to do so. Yet, this reaction... can only be deferred and not immediate. In any way, the presence – real or virtual – of the third has an effect on discourse, opens the possibility of modification in what is said and the way it is said. (Berruecos 2004: 148)³⁶

Ideological discourse is then made in consideration of the youth, and most particularly students, as the *third*. Its content and form are not designed only in relation to the direct addressee, but also in relation to those who are indirectly touched and from whom a delayed action is expected. When politicians, such as the president, address executives, lawyers, the nation, or any other category of society, the youth and students are there as the *third*. The meaning and effects of these discourses are completely missed if this *dialogic* dimension is not taken into account. "*Unless,*" writes Bakhtin (2002: 97-98), "*one accounts for the speaker's attitude toward the other [third] and his utterances (existing or anticipated), one can understand neither the genre nor the style of speech.*" What is meant here by the *dialogic* dimension is the fact that it is a basic feature of ideological

³⁶ (MOT)

discourses to be addressed to somebody, even when they seem monological (ibid.: 92), i.e. when the addressee is absent or not specified.

Students' status as the *third* in ideological discourse explains the extent to which they are influenced by it to the point that they become unable to have their own opinions. This situation is all the more accentuated since this status is not temporary. It is a permanent process within which they are imprisoned since their childhood thanks to the form of this discourse, i.e. its speech genre which is the religious sermon. Students are the target par excellence of ideological discourse and they are its first collateral damage, as they have been for Occidentalism. This students and people's status of the *third* is all the more politically significant inasmuch as it reinforces the politician's status of the mandated spokesperson. When people and students are brought to give up their right to speak by accepting their status of the *third*, they necessarily leave room for the politician, the preacher and the pseudo-intellectual to speak on their behalf, and they consequently mandate the latter to be their spokespeople and legitimise the usurpation of this right, or reinforce the *legitimate imposture*.

The exclusion of the youth from the public sphere of expression is of course not peculiar to dictatorships. Many democratic societies in the world have developed a consumerist relationship with their youth as young people are never invited to participate in the debate over the realisation of the national project. The youth is only fit for consuming Nikes, Jeans and Gameboys. Politics is monopolised by the old generations who, at the very best, "*maintain with the youth*," as sustained by Malek Boutih, "*a utilitarian rapport of billposting*" in political campaigns ("Mots croisés", *France 2*, April 10th, 2006). Probably, the youth's revolt against the CPE law³⁷ in France in

³⁷ The CPE (contrat première embauche), or first employment contract, was part of the "Statute on the Equality of Opportunities" law proposed by the French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin as a response to the youth riots that shook the suburbs of major

the first quarter of 2006 illustrates the French young generation's desire to re-appropriate their republican right to have their say in the decisions that determine the future of their society, reclaim the "I" status in the public debate, and reject the status of the *third* that politicians, leftists and rightists, have assigned to them.

In Algeria, Bakhtin's (ibid.: 99) three characteristics of discourse, *addressivity*, *anticipated response*, and *dialogical echoes*, establish clearly the students' status as the *third* of ideological discourse such as Occidentalism. These characteristics establish the logic of discourse in the sense that when they cannot be detected in a discourse, it becomes meaningless. When Bin Ladin's speeches, for instance, are taken as a discourse destined to the 'West', they become meaningless since the addressee, the 'West', is unable to understand them. For the first and foremost condition to understand a discourse and have the expected delayed action is to have, as an addressee, the *apperceptive background*, i.e.:

... the extent to which he is familiar with the situation, whether he has special knowledge of the given cultural area of communication, his views and convictions, his prejudices (from my viewpoint), his sympathies – because all this will determine his

cities in France in October 2005. It allowed employers to fire workers under the age of 26 without juridical motive during the first two-year-try-out period of the contract. These two measures launched hot debates among the political classes, and induced massive protests from students, trade unions (including the CGT, CFDT, FO), and left-wing parties to the streets of France, along with sudden strikes as a heavy resistance to the law in February and March 2006. The French government and law supporters' arguments for the benefits of the law in reducing the extremely high unemployment by weakening the constraints of the French job security laws did not convince the protestors to give up their main claim: the repeal of the law. With the demonstrations that drew between 1 and 3 million people, the blockade of more than 50 out of the country's 84 universities, the protestors eventually brought the government to withdraw the CPE and rewrite it by introducing new measures on April 10th, 2006 ("Huge protests against French job law, some violence", *Reuters*, March 18th, 2006; "French Protests Over Youth Labor Law Spread to 150 Cities and Towns", *The New York Times*, March 18th, 2006; "French court approves disputed youth jobs law", *Reuters*, March 30th, 2006).

active responsive understanding of the utterance.

(ibid.: 95-96)

'Westerners' are completely unfamiliar with the referents Bin Ladin makes use of to justify his actions. They are logically unable to have the relevant response to his speeches and calls. *Addressivity* (i.e. whom is he addressing?) shows that he targets the *third* when he pretends that he is addressing the 'West'. This *third* is the Muslims who possess the *apperceptive background* to understand his discourse. These Muslims are the *superaddressee* "whose absolutely just and responsive understanding is presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time" (Emerson and Holquist 2002: XVIII). As such, they are the ones who can have Bin Ladin's *anticipated response* (i.e. the purposed delayed action). Their ability to have this response stems from the fact they are familiar with Bin Ladin's referents, i.e. they are caught within *dialogic echoes* (i.e. a discursive environment in which these referents are common representations). As rightly put forward by Bourdieu, in a linguistic market, what people exchange is not language, it is discourses which are:

*... stylistically marked, both in production ... and in reception since each receiver contributes to the production of the message that he perceives and appreciates by bringing to it all his personal and collective experience.*³⁸

(Bourdieu 2001: 61)

Being part of these Muslims, students are then indirectly affected by his discourse, especially because they live in an environment quite dominated by Occidentalism, an ideology which is already hostile to Bin Ladin's *Islamic enemy number one*, the 'West'.

³⁸ (MOT)

3.9. The Intellectual

One of the questions that remain to be asked so far deals with the dramatic monolithic and conformist nature of the intellectual environment in Algeria. Why do students always hear the same version? Probably, one of the answers is the fact that the felicity conditions described above, conditions that provide the suitable environment for the success of ideological discourse in affecting students' representations and behaviour, that elevate the politician, the preacher and the pseudo-intellectual to the status of the mandated spokesperson, come also to be the failure conditions for the intellectual's discourse. Despite his physical presence in this environment, the intellectual is completely voiceless, unheard. The intellectual, in Algeria, does not possess the *skeptron*, the right to speak for the people or be listened to. His speech acts remain at the level of speech acts and never reach that of performative acts that have the necessary illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect. The absence of the right to speak, and thus the right to influence decision-making, deprives not only the political regime but also the whole society, which copes with this situation, from its legitimacy. As put forward by Habermas (1987), the legitimacy of a society is measured by the extent to which it corresponds to the model of a pure and perfect society of communication, for "*contestation and malaise*," writes Boudon (1991: 119), "*are directly proportional to the distance between the society as it is and the one people would establish if they were able to discuss freely the measures to reform it.*"³⁹

The intellectual is not listened to because he does not have the symbolic credentials that would allow him to get his *rightful* position, that of the mandated spokesperson in society. In an environment that is dominated by irrational religious discourse, he speaks rationally. In an environment where

³⁹ (MOT)

classical Arabic is the language of persuasion and conviction, he uses French, a language which is presented as being in complete opposition to classical Arabic and the values it incarnates (Miliani 1997). In an environment where the discursive form is the religious sermon, he uses argumentative genres. In an environment in which you can only preach to the converted, he finds himself turned into a voice in the wilderness because he lacks the symbolic capital necessary to have the right to be listened to.

The intellectual is all the more socially invisible as he does not benefit from the social act of institution by which the social institutions officially and publicly acknowledge his utility to society. On the contrary, these institutions, be they political (such as the government), economic (like the media and publishing houses) or educational (such as the university), converge to the same principle of social management: the intellectual is useless. They put this principle into practice by the total ostracism and devaluation of the intellectual, including financial underestimation of intellectual jobs, and the extent of interest their work attract as compared to others such as sport, music, religion or politics. Even when successful people are put in the news and publicised, these people, such as singers or sportsmen, are those who owe nothing to the school as the provider of intellectuals.

Without any social credit, the intellectual is relegated, at the very best, to the role of a buffoon who is not worth listening to, an appendix who can only play to the gallery by talking for nothing in conferences, filling newspaper columns with his incomprehensible words, or occupy unexplored national television time in so-called debate programmes that gather people who share the same dictated view. At the very worst, he is discredited as the traitor, the *hizb fransa* (حزب فرنسا), whose work is said to be destructive of all what makes our traditional values and principles, a menace to society that

needs to be muzzled, if not eliminated.

Students are not socially motivated to invest their time and effort in serious studies because the intellectual is not taken seriously by his society. An intellectual's work is not valued by the mere fact of existing. It is valued when society turns to it in order to find solutions to its problems. A society makes use of its intellectuals when its institutions, political, social or economic, call upon their expertise, as the case is, for instance, in European countries where governmental institutions and companies develop strong ties with universities which produce then functional and utilitarian research.

Intellectuals in Algeria are in a home exile, a long and dreadful process of wandering in their own place aimlessly, producing work that has no use. There is in Said's definition of exile, an exile himself, a relevant description of the intellectual's state in this country:

There is a popular but wholly mistaken assumption that being exiled is to be cut off, isolated, hopelessly separated from your place of origin. ... The fact is that for most exiles the difficulty consists not simply in being forced to live away from home, but rather, ... in living with the many reminders that you are in exile, that your home is not in fact so far away, and that the normal traffic of everyday contemporary life keeps you in constant but tantalizing and unfulfilled touch with the old place.

(Said 2000b: 370)

Although Said pictures real physical exile, this depiction corresponds to the Algerian intellectual's 'discoursal' condition of exile. The tormenting and dramatic situation of Algerian intellectuals, for some of them at least, is that they have not left their homes, voluntarily or not, and that every single day in Algeria is there to remind them of their people's urgent need of their active presence, of their imperative contribution to the making of the nation, something which provides to the intellectual his real sense of life. This is

what has probably pushed them, for those who have chosen not to leave, to stay despite molestation and mostly lack of consideration.

The social displacement of the intellectual in Algeria is not uninvolved in the dislocation of the Algerian society as the people, and students, fall short of perceiving sensible points of reference which establish the social role of every social category such as intellectuals. These intellectuals are those who are outsiders, who are at odds with their society, what Said (ibid.: 373) labels the *nay-sayers*, as opposed to those called here the pseudo-intellectuals who fit in perfectly with the Algerian society as it is, "*who flourish in it without an overwhelming sense of dissonance or dissent, those who can be called yea-sayers.*" While the pseudo-intellectuals seem to be satisfied with the society whatever its state as long as they enjoy the privileges, some power and honours the regime offers them as rewards for 'service to the country', the intellectuals keep believing in Adorno's (1951: 39) comment: "*Wrong life cannot be lived rightly*". Living by this principle requires from the intellectual to develop what Said (2000a: 223) calls *secular criticism*, in which it "*is not practicing [sic.] criticism either to validate the status quo or to join up with a priestly caste of acolytes and dogmatic metaphysicians*" This criticism affiliated to no dogmatic system, including religion, has also to be *anationalistic*, i.e. faithful to no ideology of nationalism that would treat gently the country's founding myths at the expense of truth.

The absent presence of the intellectual in the student's daily environment has deprived him from the necessary critical vision which is vital to learning, a vision which evinces the contingency of cultures, of societies, of ideologies, entities which are but "*the result of a series of historical choices made by men and women, as facts of society made by human beings, and not natural or god-given, therefore unchanged, permanent, irreversible.*"

(Said 2000b: 378) They, therefore, become mere consumers of ideas as technical commodities, and, as Boudon (1991: 123) observed, no one would check the quality of the parts of a TV set before buying it.

It has to be noted that the act of institution is important inasmuch as it opens the way to culture. Once an individual is officially given the status of the mandated spokesperson, such as that of *sheikh*, by the social institutions, like religion or the school, he is acknowledged as such by culture and thus transmitted to all members of society by means of education. For any idea to become institutionalised and grow into a political movement that attracts the people's support, it needs to be acknowledged outside the limited circle of professionals, i.e. by the general public (Bourdieu 2001: 236). Denying the intellectual the act of institution is closing the door of culture to him, i.e. depriving him from any possibility of being embraced by society.

In Algerian culture, the intellectual has of course not benefited from this act of institution, something which behoves him to resist, not only against the system, but also against culture as individuals, as Said put it, who are:

... declared out of bounds or inferior by the culture (here of course the range is vast, from the ritual scapegoat to the lonely prophet, from the social pariah to the visionary artist from the working class to the alienated intellectual.

(Said 2000a: 229)

The pernicious triad of exclusion of the intellectual from the public scene, the imposition of self-proclaimed mandated spokespeople for the whole society, and manipulation of the youth's intellectual education is definitely a long-standing process of power of a particular nature. It is not merely political power in the traditional sense of the term, i.e. exercised through political institutions, such as the government, whether democratically

(through free elections) or tyrannically (through violence). It is also and mainly symbolic as it instrumentalises all sorts of cultural, religious and political symbols for the sake of reaching the state of hegemony vital to the maintenance of the political status quo. For values which are seen as *uncontested givens* (Janks & Ivanič 1992: 306) require far less coercion to be propagated, maintained and adhered to. The maintenance of the political status quo, in which the legitimacy of the politician in Algeria is religious and historical (being a Muslim and a *moujahid*), has always considered intellect, thus the intellectual, a subversive danger which could question this system by gradually establishing another form of legitimacy based on knowledge and scholarship.

3.10. Ideology and Symbolic Power

The third characteristic of ideologies, as stated by Boudon, is very determinant in the Algerian ideological system as it considers difference vital to adherence. Algerians are reminded on a regular basis of who they are or who they are supposed to be, as if they could ever forget it, and this is always done in opposition to some other entity. They are told they are Algerians as opposed to non-Algerians, Arabs as opposed to non-Arabs, Muslims as opposed to non-Muslims. This is taken in charge by the school as, for instance, all children have to study and learn by heart Abdelhamid Bendadis' poem: "*The Algerian people is Muslim, and to Arabity it belongs, anyone who claims it deviated from its origins or it is dead would have lied.*"⁴⁰ For the ideologues, adherence to their ideology is determined by the people being conspicuous and seeing themselves different. These divisions are presented as real and objective, and thus require from the individual to take a stance, either be with one or the other. A collectivist view is imposed and the individual choice of feeling sympathy for ideas that do not belong to

⁴⁰ (MOT)

his/her group is condemned in the name of group solidarity, something which condemns, from its outset, any objection of oppositional intellectuals.

Bourdieu's notion of *market* is also important here to explain how ideological discourse is imposed, without even having recourse to violence. The relation between the speaking subject and the listener, or between the mandated spokesperson and the people, is presented by Bourdieu as an economic relation, through the use of the term *market*, because, just as in economy the two are involved in a power struggle for the capital, in the case of ideological discourse it is a symbolic capital or credit that legitimises the speaking subject's discourse to be accepted by his listener. As Bourdieu explained it:

*Discourses are not only (or exceptionally) signs meant to be understood, decoded; they are also signs of wealth meant to be evaluated, appreciated and signs of authority, meant to be believed and obeyed.*⁴¹

(Bourdieu 2001: 99)

This imposition of the idea of group solidarity is part of *symbolic power* which is defined, by Bourdieu, as follows:

*Symbolic power, as power to constitute the given through utterance, to make see and make believe, to confirm and transform the vision of the world and, thus, the action on the world, a power which is almost magical and which allows to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained by force (physical or economic), thanks to the specific effect of rallying, can only be exercised when it is acknowledged, that is to say unrecognised as arbitrary.*⁴²

(ibid.: 210)

The main feature of symbolic power is the fact that those for whom it is

⁴¹ (MOT)

⁴² (MOT)

the least profitable are those who are its most fervent protectors. It is an invisible power that is exercised with the complicity of those on whom it is exercised (ibid.: 202), i.e. with the people's full acquiescence. This is achieved through the dissimulation of violence or the *euphemisation* of the psychological and intellectual violence by closing all channels of reflection, notably by excluding intellectuals, that could lead to opposition and questioning. Because intelligence is viewed as a *contre-pouvoir* (forces of opposition), intellectuals represent, therefore, the most dangerous threat to symbolic power in the sense that they strive to raise people's consciousness and awareness of their situation of accomplices of their own social and political misery, by the demise of the collective beliefs and representations that ideologies, such as Occidentalism, mould in order to transform the people's power of mobilisation into a power of subversion. The power of subversion threatens the whole enterprise of production of sense that sustains the stability of the vision of the world that the mandated spokesperson's ideology strives to generalise as the only legitimate vision and "*division of this world*" (ibid.: 306), while it is but a distorted representation of the world constructed to suit the interests of those who detain power and the means to exercise it (i.e. symbolic power). In this sense, one of the main objectives of ideologues is to succeed in transforming ideology, which is there to serve particular interests, into myth, which is "*a collective product collectively appropriated*" (ibid.: 205)⁴³. As shown with Occidentalism, the vision and division of the world Occidentalists attempt to instil in the minds of the people induce students to reject those very ideas that call for human emancipation because they were produced by those who do not possess the symbolic capital since they are *re-presented* as belonging to the wrong side of the division, be it intellectually (*hizb fransa*) or culturally and geographically ('the 'West').

⁴³ (MOT)

One of the means implemented, for instance, for the *euphemisation* of symbolic power is the usurpation of religious authority, as stated above, by which a group of people, in the name of religious exegesis, monopolise discourse over religious matters, and by extension, over many earthly matters. With this monopoly, the preachers, in close alliance with the political regime, exercise this hidden violence over the believers, who are themselves citizens, to influence their choices in civil life. It is quite extraordinary the extent to which Kant's (1979: 217-218) description of the Church in its embezzling of religious authority applies quite perfectly to the case of the instrumentalisation of Islamic religion in Algeria. Through the rigid hierarchy of the Church, clergymen turn into high-ranked officials who "*rise in words against any pretension, yet want to be considered as the only authorised exegetes of the sacred Scriptures*", thus transforming "*service of the Church into a domination of its members*"⁴⁴.

Another means is language. As observed above, language does not contain illocutionary force nor does it have a perlocutionary effect in essence. Language, as a symbolic system such as myths, art, religion and science, can then not be an instrument of power if it is not equipped with that symbolism that would transform it into an instrument of symbolic power. "*Linguistic exchanges,*" reminds Bourdieu (2001: 59), "*which are rapports of communication par excellence, are also relations of symbolic power.*"⁴⁵ By constantly presenting classical Arabic as the language of the Koran, this language acquires the necessary symbolism that makes it the perfect channel for ideological discourse and consequently the exercise of symbolic power. Political *coup de force* is disguised by what Bourdieu (ibid.: 271) calls a *coup de forme* thanks to the exacerbated symbolism of language. Classical Arabic is filled with stereotyped expressions that function as rituals whose purpose is to produce the perlocutionary effect. This effect here is to

⁴⁴ (MOT)

⁴⁵ (MOT)

perpetuate the same vision of the world, or as put forward by Bourdieu (ibid.: 157), to impose “*a consensus over the sense of the social world which founds common sense.*”⁴⁶

This justifies the linguistic analysis of the language situation in Algeria, through colinguism, which then becomes in actual terms political criticism, and the rhetoric of the religious sermon as a speech genre a criticism of symbolic power, since language and the form of discourse, in Algeria and Arab countries, become part of the symbolism of power. In his study of the process of Arabisation in Algeria, Grandguillaume painstakingly singled out the political role classical Arabic has been given:

*Arabic has served lust for power. For those who were excluded from it by their culture, yet wanted to hold it, Arabic has been cut from its real linguistic environment, and erected as an emblem manipulated in an identification with Islam and nationalism: to carry out a full Arabisation has been a means to chase from their positions all those who ruled the country through French, without taking into account any pedagogical or economic consideration.*⁴⁷
(Grandguillaume 1998: 215-216)

Again, the maintenance of colinguism in Algeria, in which classical Arabic holds a privileged position while French is demonised, constitutes a very important manoeuvre of symbolic power that can be neutralised by questioning the status of classical Arabic as a sacred language. As symbolic

⁴⁶ (MOT)

⁴⁷ (MOT). The identification of classical Arabic with Islam and nationalism is constantly reclaimed in religious sermons. By playing on the faith of the people and all the symbols that make up their theological beliefs, the mandated spokespeople attempt to persuade the people of the sacred character of this language. Along with the sermons in mosques, such as the Friday prayer, any opportunity is used to remind people and students of this equation. A case in point is the tribute paid to a student, at the ENSET (Ecole Normale Supérieure d'Enseignement Technique), a teacher training college in Oran, who died accidentally in 2005. As a conclusion to his speech devoted to the philosophy of life and death in Islam, the preacher called upon the students to study and take great care of classical Arabic because, he insisted, it is the language of all of the Algerian people, and most importantly, because it is the language of the Koran and the language human beings will have to use to address the Angel of Death in their tomb.

systems, languages are the means of moulding new schemata and representations. As such, foreign languages, as codes referring to different socially-marked realities, represent a major threat to the political status quo as they enter into a symbolic struggle in which politicians try by all means to preserve their symbolic power through two main measures:

- Preserve the sacred status of classical Arabic in order to keep it as the only source of representations and schemata, of students and the people; these representations and schemata being the ones that guarantee the maintenance of the status quo.
- Empty foreign languages from their cultural substance which may be the source of contradictory representations and schemata. This is undertaken by emphasising the functional teaching of foreign languages in public education.

Languages encompass words which are not *neutral* or *innocent*, i.e. without an ideological base. The danger of foreign languages lies in the fact that every single word, “*every single phrase threatens to take two antagonistic meanings according to the way the speaker and listener would take it*” (ibid.: 64), thus menacing to break up into pieces the ideological consensus that keeps the people down. The concern in this work for the case of university students stems precisely from the idea that for political power to be absolute and hegemonic, it needs to be backed up by symbolic power that sustains consensus. For power to be symbolic, i.e. invisible, it needs to be merged within the values that are taught through formal education. The students' objetivisation of the ideas diffused by ideology, through their transformation into representations that underlie behaviour which takes the appearance of spontaneous and natural reaction, is one of the main and tragic effects of symbolic power in Algeria. This symbolic power is certainly one of the main desired consequences of the sacrosanct

alliance between religion and politics in Algeria.

3.11. Religion and Politics

The instrumentalisation of religion as a provider of credit for the mandated spokesperson and the political regime he is affiliated to is a common commodity in Arab-Islamic countries. The business of religion and politics permeates all spheres of power, vertically within the same country and horizontally across countries. The case of the media-mediated confrontation over the control of the Arab-Islamic public opinion between the Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat (1970 – 1981) and the Iranian cleric and political leader Ayatollah Khomeini (1979 – 1989) is an instance of the strategic use of religion as a major stake to discredit the opponent. Answering CBS News “60 Minutes” correspondent Mike Wallace’s question about al-Sadat calling him “*a disgrace to Islam and a lunatic*”, Khomeini commented that al-Sadat was “*not a Muslim because he compromised with the enemies of Islam.*” (“Larry King Live”, CNN, March 27th, 2006) Establishing one’s *Islamity* and denying the opponent’s is central to each one’s political capital in his country and in the entire Arab-Islamic world.

Probably, as far as foreign languages and cultures are concerned, i.e. concerning the definition of *otherness* and the relation to the *other*, politics activates the lever of religion in order to bring people and students to suspect and reject the foreign approach to the social world. This suspicion is based on the presentation of the foreign culture discourse as a heretic discourse. The idea of heresy, as it will be shown in Chapter Four, is essential to break up any subscribing to a subversive idea that could threaten the established order.

The nexus of religion and politics in Algeria is the people's frustrations and relevant desires and wishes. People turn to religion to find explanations and solace for their cultural, social and economic misery and religion provides them with scapegoats which are often the infidels. The infidels, i.e. the non-Muslims, are necessarily the 'Westerners' who are taken responsible for this misery, and the history of colonialism and crusades is there to prove it. The elevation of Occidentalism to the status of a real social institution can precisely be explained by the function of this institution, which is to answer people's needs to exorcise these frustrations. The genesis of Occidentalism itself has been determined by its function as an institution, i.e. a response to a social need.⁴⁸ In times of trouble, societies always try to find scapegoats, and with the influence of religion, crisis is viewed as the result of sin, the sin of not having followed the word of God. This is not peculiar to Muslims. In his outstanding play, *The Crucible* (1952), the American playwright Arthur Miller shows how this conflict between *predestination* and *original sin*, at the heart of the Calvinist doctrine, permeates American culture since the days of Puritans in the early times of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the 17th century. Miller explains the dramatic events of the Salem Witch trials in Massachusetts in 1692 and the *witch hunt* of 'communists' through McCarthyism in the 1950s as an illustration of the Americans' need to find a scapegoat, witches in Salem and communists with McCarthyism, for the disruption of their life, believed to be part of a divine plan.

With this explanation, people are promised better days when the Muslims would recover and regain their past prestige. This approach to the social world clears politics and politicians from all their responsibility for people's

⁴⁸ The genesis of any institution lies in the fact that it has the function of answering a social need, independently from the real interests or objectives of those who establish it. R. Merton (1965) has shown that the growth of the Democratic Party in the United States, for instance, into real political machinery was due to the fact that it took in charge the need for social security while the state did not do it at that time.

suffering. Representatives of official religion act as *spin doctors*, as specialists in media communication, as handlers whose job is to present the political leader in a *saleable packaging* ready for public consumption. Instead of affirming its responsibility, on the contrary, the political regime becomes part of this salvation plan, as the *ouli al-amr* (literally: those charged with authority), and to whom a good Muslim owes allegiance and obedience as long as they are Muslims on the basis of the Koranic verse: "*O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger and those charged with authority among you.*" (An-Nisāa S.4, A.59)

3.11.1. Ideology as a Religious System

By perverting the truth of political responsibility, politics ceases to be a search for solutions to social problems at the service of the people, as it ought to be, to become a mere ideology. By approving of the subjection of social and spiritual salvation to allegiance to the political leader, this ideology is transformed into a secular religion. It is religion⁴⁹ because it is presented as salutary. It is religion for it is not knowledge, thus not science (Capdevila 2004: 197), since totally based on people's faith and belief, and not on rational arguments. It is secular because it does not require an allegiance to a god, but rather to a human, a group or a regime. As Capdevila defined it:

Religion consists in worshipping the divine being as required by his essence. Consequently, all religions which do not worship in the right way the right being, i.e. which replaced God by an idol, are godless religions. Idolatry is then the theological concept of a

⁴⁹ Capdevila asserts that ideology cannot be conceived but in a religious form since ideology is the human strive to live in the best conditions. He writes: "*The quest for the hereafter and the fear of hell [i.e. religion], is but a way to live in this world [i.e. ideology].*" (2004: 193) (MOT)

*godless religion.*⁵⁰

(Capdevila 2004: 188)

Although refuted by Arendt (1990: 143), who asserts it is attributing too great an honour to ideologies to consider them as religions, Monnerot (1949: 268) justifies this equivalence by claiming that such ideologies function like religions in the sense that people identify with certain “*omnipresent, ineluctable impersonal forces.*” Occidentalism and political ideology in Algeria are perfect instances of this type of ideologies as people are overwhelmed by the omnipresence of the discursive rhetoric and rhetorical discourse, present both in the political speech and the religious sermon, of politicians, preachers and pseudo-intellectuals with whom they have developed an irrational attachment based on the pledge of a *promised day of glory* that has never come. This relationship bears the characteristics of a religious expression, as listed by Sironneau (1982: 67): *myth, rite, communion, and faith.* The myth, defined as an illusory representation of Man and the world (Godelier 1977: 276), that proposes to answer unanswered questions, lies in the fact that people believe in false things that soothe their worries; rite is all the manifestation of joy and love for the leader people have to show whenever he comes on a visit; communion refers to that faithfulness people are expected to have for their leader and that is shown in elections; faith is the only argument people have to believe in the veracity of their leader’s discourse as he has no other rational argument to provide.

By associating its ideas to religion, political ideology acquires, by virtue of the inalterability of sacred principles, the sacredness (i.e. the anonymous force that confers power) that justifies the cracking on any opposing ideas (that may question the status of a language, a religion, a revolutionary myth) in the name of a pretended purity of its values that can be stained by

⁵⁰ (MOT)

opponents.

3.11.2. Religion as an Ideological System

Religion in Algeria and the entire Arab-Islamic world, since the emergence of Islamism as a political movement, has been also transformed into an ideology. This transformation has first been necessary since religion, as transcendence, needs to have a concrete experiential manifestation in order to be embraced as a political project, by believers who become militants. This concreteness or immanence is found in political ideology. “*Faith without ideology,*” writes Segundo, “*is a dead faith*” (quoted in Gotay 1986: 240)⁵¹. The purpose of this ideology is to theologise all aspects of life so as to construct a society that not only integrates the idea of Islamism as a political theory and regime, but also protects and defends at the risk of its members' lives. This is a strategy that was borrowed from totalitarian regimes, the Soviet system being a typical case, in every social domain, ranging from economy to culture, in which “*everything was politicised, and everywhere politics expressed the ideological objectives of the State-Party*” for the effectuation of one supreme objective: the *construction and defence of socialism* (Malia 1995: 318-319).

I should note that religion is considered by many scholars as ideology in essence. S. Breton (1987: 16), for instance has equated between religion and ideology and defined them as systems of “*representations, values and behaviours*”. Yet, the conception of religion here, and according to the theoretical debate on the concept of ideology developed in Chapter Two, is that religion starts to be an ideology at the very moment it enters the realm of politics, where discourse is centred around the intention to deceive for the

⁵¹ (MOT)

preservation of the status quo, advantageous to the political regime, as is the case of official religion, or for the alteration of the status quo by the annihilation of the political regime in place and its substitution by another totalitarian one, as purposed by Islamism.

In the latter, i.e. Islamism, religion is conceived as a *theology of liberation* (see Chapter Four), i.e. a discourse on political freedom by means of religious fervour. Islamism has arisen as a counter-discourse and action against the totalitarian regimes in Arab-Islamic countries. In their social, political and economic despair, this theology of liberation has represented the only solution in a context of the complete absence of another rational counter-discourse, such as that of intellectuals. Within the intellectual vacuum, the Islamist theology of liberation has stood as the panacea.

What religion, in the form of a theology of liberation, has, and which other political movements strive hard to get, is the emotional capital and the force of persuasion necessary for rallying and support. As Bell (1960) put it, the fact that religion provides an answer to the existential human question of the fear of death has made it the “*most persuasive human institution.*” This belief in the afterlife has conferred to religion superiority over all other modern ideologies, as it is capable of bringing its fervent militant, the suicide bomber, to give his life for it with far less hesitation than would do any of the others. This explains the total rejection in Islamism of the idea of religion as a private matter. Privacy of worship leads to the impossibility to rally the group around the same cause, something which would deprive Islamism from having “*any influence on the world.*” (Capdevila 2004: 112). This influence needs ideas which are totally cut off reality, for such ideas are easily subject to manipulation (ibid.: 252).

Religion as ideology is mostly the objectivisation and rationalisation of

inner feelings, sentiments and desires which spare the ideologues the effort of argumentation. Away from conviction, which needs rational argumentation, the ideologues rely only on persuasion to attract supporters whose adherence, thanks to the religious discourse, becomes a pure act of faith, whose strength emanates, to paraphrase Freud (1971: 43), from the strength of these feelings and desires. Rational argumentation is scientific, i.e. based on objective and demonstrable principles, while the act of faith is based on exegetic and rhetorical argumentation that induces belief and seduction.

In the definition of *otherness* and the relation to the *other*, Islamism has a quite easier mission in its stigmatisation through its religious ideology. Sparing itself the bother of convincing historical and scientific arguments that would justify the hatred of the 'West' as the *other*, something which works as the Islamist *Trojan Horse* to the hearts of the people, Islamism, notably through Occidentalism, takes shortcuts and argues with Islam and Muslims' most cherished reference, i.e. the Koran. The 'West' is seen through the prism of its representation in the Koran, the image of the *al-kāfirīn* (the infidel) who is seen with much suspicion and whose existence is a threat to Islam as a world religion.

This is of course not peculiar to Islam and it is but a particular interpretation of the sacred text. Said did clearly show how Orientalism, as a Western approach of the Oriental (their *other*), based its representation of Islam and Muslims on the conflictual relationship in the Bible:

In addition, I think, the likelihood was very great that European scholars would continue to see the Near orient through the perspective of the Biblical 'origins,' that is, as a place of unshakably influential religious primacy.... Islam remained forever the Orientalist's idea (or type) of original cultural effrontery, aggravated naturally by the fear that Islamic civilization ...

continued to stand somehow opposed to the Christian West.
(Said 1995: 260)

Even worse, just as Orientalism assumed that modern Islam could not be anything but “*a reasserted version of the old*” (ibid: 261), Occidentalism and Islamism admit that the ‘West’ can be nothing more than the old crusading enemy whose daily preoccupation is how to succeed in effectuating its plot of re-appropriating Muslims’ land. It is quite amazing to realise that the very prejudiced ideology that Islamism and Occidentalism pretend to fight is nothing but its twin sister, with the exception that it was born some time before and in a different place. Paradoxically, Orientalism has been resuscitated by those who had once been its victims, and tends to be propagated among students who take its myths, its lamentable jargon, and rarely-hidden prejudice as reality. “*The modern Orient, in short*” writes Said (ibid: 325) with bitterness, “*participates in its own Orientalizing.*”

The transformation of religion into ideology, in a political movement such as Islamism, has been vital to Islamism and the political regimes in Arab Islamic countries inasmuch as it has allowed the elevation of ordinary people into the position of the mandated spokesperson by means of a process of double fetishism⁵². First, the latter transforms the original function of a preacher, a spiritual guide and comforter, into that of a prescriber of political behaviour in the name of some religious duty that people feel morally bound to *execute*, lest they jeopardise their chances of salvation. Second, the mere accessories, such as the beard or the *abaya* (man's traditional gown), confer to the person who wears them the status of *sheikh*, i.e. somebody who owns religious knowledge and thus the authority to

⁵² Fetishism is taken here in its Marxist sense. Marx (1993) speaks of fetishism which attributes to money an intrinsic value which it does actually possess. Money is valuable only as a means that allows exchange of consumable commodities, i.e. as “*a general equivalent to all the other goods*” (Capdevila 2004: 228). Fetishism attributes deceptively to money a particular social role which gives it, according to I. Roubine, a great “*power to influence people*” (quoted in ibid.: 228).

prescribe in religion, and by fetishist extension, in politics. This is a phantasmagoria that imposes respect, which Capdevila (2004: 234) calls a sociological metaphor in which a social object is constituted, not by its intrinsic qualities, but rather by "*the significations he carries*".

3.12. Conclusion

Within this context where discourse is permeated with an ideology constructed by the triadic alliance of religion, politics and pseudo-intellectualism, students are trapped within a vicious circle that offers no opportunity for intellectual emancipation necessary for the acquisition of knowledge and attainment of awareness. Symbolic of all is *yaoum al-ilm* (knowledge day, on April 16th), a day supposed to be the moment where Algeria celebrates knowledge and science. In his address on this occasion, President Bouteflika definitely seals this alliance by claiming that "*the history of democracy in Algeria can by no means be separated from the history of Islam.*" (*Al-Khabar*, April 16th, 2006) Actually, the very idea of the Algerian nation is subjected to religion and religious sentiments and fervour that Algerians presumably showed during their Revolution. In his analysis of the foundation of the Algerian school right after independence, while many researchers claim that Benbadis' *Association des Oulémas* did not call for independence (Mahsas 1979; Keddache 1980; Ageron 1993; Remaoun 2000), Harbi observes that:

*It is in this context that the spiritual heirs of the 'Association des Oulémas' (1931-1956), who took control of primary school teaching in the wake of the minister of education, Ahmed Taleb, forge a new version of the origins of the national revolution whose paternity is attributed to sheikh Abdelhamid Benbadis.*⁵³

(Harbi 1994: 41-42)

The negation of all what is not Arab and Muslim in the origins of the Algerian people, what Dourari (2004: 55) calls "*the original plurality of the historical formation of the Algerian people*"⁵⁴ and that can be observed in the denomination of simplest things like plants, herbs and birds according to Lacheraf (1998), is a discourse of denial of the real Algerian identity .To

⁵³ (MOT)

⁵⁴ (MOT)

counteract this type of discourse of disempowerment, which tends to conceal any other discourse which could question the sacrosanct myth of the *communauté-Une* (ibid.: 57), there is a need for another type of discourse, one which breaks *the cycle of reproducing domination* (Janks & Ivanič 1992: 305), an *emancipatory discourse* (see Chapter Four) whose main function is to accompany students, throughout their university years, towards greater freedom of thought and respect for *otherness*, one which would allow them to regain the *skeptron* in order to exist as students, as citizens, or simply as human beings.

3.13. Original Quotations

Page 174

... en mettant ... l'accent sur la constitution interne d'un texte ou d'un corpus de textes au détriment des conditions sociohistoriques de sa production et sa réception.

(Bourdieu 2001: 11)

Page 175

... l'exercice linguistique accompli sans considération du contenu réel des discours et des situations ressemble à l'apprentissage du solfège coupé de toute pratique musicale.

(Poirier 1983: 158)

Page 176

... tout ensemble relativement durable de relations sociales qui confèrent aux individus des formes différentes de pouvoir, de statut et de ressources.

(Thompson 2001: 18)

Page 177

... la communauté de conscience qui est le ciment de la nation.

(Bourdieu 2001: 75)

Page 179

... il y a, dans la plupart des énoncés, certains traits qui déterminent leur valeur pragmatique indépendamment de leur contenu informatif. Et ces traits ne peuvent même pas toujours être considérés comme des traits marginaux... Il s'agit souvent, au contraire, de marques imbriquées dans la structure syntaxique.

(Anscombe & Ducrot 1997: 18)

Page 180

... un énoncé performatif est voué à l'échec toutes les fois qu'il n'est pas prononcé par une personne ayant le 'pouvoir' de le prononcer, ou, plus généralement, toutes les fois que les personnes ou circonstances particulières ne sont pas celles qui conviennent...

(Bourdieu 2001: 165)

Page 181

... toute parole est produite pour et par le marché auquel elle doit son existence et ses propriétés les plus spécifiques.

(Bourdieu 2001: 113)

Page 183

Les Algériens, je pense, ont peur qu'un malheur arrive au président. Ils ont peur que son retrait des affaires du pays induise la fin complète de son programme qu'ils considèrent comme le seul moyen qui puisse les sauver de leur précarité.

("Bouteflika promet le droit pour chacun et la loi pour tous",
L'Echo d'Oran, January 2nd, 2006)

Page 184

... 'placer le kred', c'est-à-dire la 'puissance magique' en un être dont on attend protection, par suite 'croire' en lui.

(Benveniste 1969: 121)

... un acte de magie sociale qui réussit.

(Bourdieu 2001: 66)

Page 185

... l'usurpateur n'est pas un calculateur cynique qui trompe consciemment le peuple, mais quelqu'un qui se prend en toute bonne foi pour autre chose que ce qu'il est.

(Bourdieu 2001: 273)

Page 190

(Footnote 16)

Dans le cas du glissement, il y a altération et/ ou complémentarité de la cohérence discursive, mais non cohésive, par adaptation de l'item 'emprunté' aux règles de cohésion linguistiques de la langue hôte, ou matrice, et donc prolongement des règles cohésives dans l'énonciation, ce que Saville-Troïke appelle 'intrasentential switching'...

(Lakhdar Barka 2006: fn 10)

Page 192

... l'association, par l'enseignement et la politique, de certaines langues écrites faisant communiquer des partenaires légitimes.

(Balibar 1993: 7)

Page 193

C'est dans le processus de constitution de l'Etat que se créent les conditions de la constitution d'un marché linguistique unifié et dominé par la langue officielle: obligatoire dans les occasions officielles et dans les espaces officiels (Ecole, administrations publiques, institutions politiques, etc.), cette langue d'Etat devient la norme théorique à laquelle toutes les pratiques linguistiques sont objectivement mesurées.

(Bourdieu 2001: 71)

... une forte charge symbolique pour la collectivité.

(Charaudeau & Maingueneau 2002: 204)

Page 194

... non le fait de dire le faux, le simple mensonge, mais le fait de le dire avec toutes les apparences logiques du vrai...

(Bourdieu 2001: 327)

C'est dire que la rigueur formelle peut masquer le décollage sémantique. Toutes les théologies religieuses et toutes les théodicées politiques ont tiré parti du fait que les capacités génératives de la langue peuvent excéder les limites de l'intuition ou de la vérification empirique pour produire des discours formellement corrects mais sémantiquement vides.

(Bourdieu 2001: 65)

Page 197

... au nom de quoi les protagonistes exercent leur droit à la parole. Ils parlent en tant qu'expert, témoin, ami, adversaire, supérieur, inférieur, etc. Il ne s'agit pas tant du statut, mais de ce qui spécifie le lien interpersonnel qui relie les protagonistes, lien d'agression, de consensus, d'alliance, etc. Ici aussi, les rôles peuvent être revendiqués ou contestés dans un mouvement d'exclusion ou d'inclusion.

(Charaudeau 2004: 25)

Page 198

S'appropriier les mots où se trouve déposé tout ce que reconnaît un groupe, c'est s'assurer un avantage considérable dans les luttes pour le pouvoir.... le mot le plus précieux est le mot sacré ...

(Bourdieu 2001: 303, fn 7)

Page 201

L'hexis corporelle est la mythologie politique réalisée, incorporée, devenue disposition permanente, manière durable de se tenir, de parler, de marcher, et, par là, de sentir et de penser.

(Bourdieu 2001: 25)

Les effets qu'une expérience nouvelle peut exercer sur l'habitus dépendent de la relation de 'compatibilité' pratique entre cette expérience et les expériences déjà intégrées à l'habitus sous forme de schèmes de production et d'appréciation...

(Bourdieu 2001: 121)

Page 210

Des années durant, nous avons donné le meilleur de nous-mêmes pour que s'éteigne le brasier de la Fitna ... pour que la Miséricorde divine nous vienne en aide.

(Bouteflika 2005)

... je me suis engagé devant Dieu et devant vous à ne ménager aucun effort ni aucune initiative pour éteindre le feu destructeur de la Fitna.

(Bouteflika 2005)

Page 211

Avec l'aide de Dieu, auquel nous rendons grâce, nous avons ensemble, ouvert la voie à la Concorde Civile...

(Bouteflika 2005)

La volonté des peuples n'émane-t-elle pas de la volonté de Dieu...

(Bouteflika 2005)

(Footnote 32)

...j'y ai investi, tout au long de ces dernières années, ma Foi de croyant...

(Bouteflika 2005)

...nous comptons sur Dieu et sur notre cher peuple...

(Bouteflika 2005)

Page 212

(Following Footnote 32)

Notre foi et notre croyance... est [sic.] le ciment indestructible de notre cohésion...

(Bouteflika 2001)

Ils ont créé au sein de la société algérienne de graves ruptures qui allaient tout ébranler, n'était-ce la grâce et la bonté de Dieu qui nous a guidés vers la voie de la paix, de la sagesse et de la concorde.

(Bouteflika 2006b)

Avec l'aide de Dieu, il sera ramené à 10 % à l'horizon 2009.

(Bouteflika 2006a)

Page 216

... tendancieux ... emphatique et superficiel.

(Reboul 1993: 5)

... le rhéteur est seul devant un public dont l'unique rôle est de l'applaudir.

(Reboul 1993: 19)

Page 218

... est capable de réagir, même quand on ne le lui demande pas. Cependant, cette réaction... ne peut être que différée et non immédiate. De toutes façons, la présence –réelle ou virtuelle- du tiers a une incidence sur le discours, ouvre la possibilité qu'il y ait une modification dans ce qui est dit ou comment cela est dit.

(Berruecos 2004: 148)

Page 221

... stylistiquement caractérisés, à la fois du côté de la production ... et du côté de la réception, dans la mesure où chaque récepteur contribue à produire le message qu'il perçoit et apprécie en y important tout ce qui fait son expérience singulière et collective.

(Bourdieu 2001: 61)

Page 222

Car la contestation et le malaise sont proportionnels à la distance entre la société telle qu'elle est et la société que

construiraient les citoyens s'ils pouvaient débattre sans entraves des mesures à prendre pour la réformer.

(Boudon 1991: 119)

Page 227

شعب الجزائر مسلم و إلى العروبة ينتسب . من قال حاد عن أصله أو مات
(A. Benbadis)

Page 228

... les discours ne sont pas seulement (ou seulement par exception) des signes destinés à être compris, déchiffrés; se sont aussi des signes de richesse destinés à être évalués, appréciés et des signes d'autorité, destinés à être crus et obéis.

(Bourdieu 2001: 99)

Le pouvoir symbolique comme pouvoir de constituer le donné par l'énonciation, de faire voir et de faire croire, de confirmer ou de transformer la vision du monde et, par là, l'action sur le monde, donc le monde, pouvoir quasi magique qui permet d'obtenir l'équivalent de ce qui est obtenu par la force (physique ou économique), grâce à l'effet spécifique de mobilisation, ne s'exerce que s'il est reconnu, c'est-à-dire méconnu comme arbitraire.

(Bourdieu 2001: 210)

Page 229

... produit collectif et collectivement approprié...

(Bourdieu 2001: 205)

Page 230

... s'élèvent en paroles contre une telle prétention, veulent néanmoins être considérés comme les seuls exégètes autorisés des Ecritures saintes, [et transforment ainsi] le service de l'Eglise (ministerium) en une domination de ses membres (imperium)

(Kant 1979: 217-218).

... les rapports de communication par excellence que sont les échanges linguistiques sont aussi des rapports de pouvoir symbolique...

(Bourdieu 2001: 59)

Page 231

... consensus sur le sens du monde social qui fonde le sens commun.

(Bourdieu 2001: 157)

La langue arabe a été ainsi mise au service de la soif de pouvoir. Pour ceux qui en étaient exclus par leur culture, mais souhaitaient s'en emparer, la langue arabe fut coupée de son environnement linguistique réel, elle fut érigée en emblème manipulé dans une identification étroite avec l'islam et le nationalisme : établir une arabisation totale était un moyen de chasser de leurs places ceux qui géraient le pays en utilisant la langue française, en faisant abstraction de toute considération pédagogique ou économique.

(Grandguillaume 1998: 215-216)

Page 235

La religion consiste à rendre à l'être divin le culte adéquat exigé par sa nature. En conséquence, toutes les religions qui ne rendent pas le culte adéquat à l'être divin, c'est-à-dire qui ont remplacé Dieu par une idole, sont des religions sans Dieu. L'idolâtrie est donc le concept théologique de la religion sans Dieu.

(Capdevila 2004: 188)

(Footnote 49)

La quête de l'au-delà et la crainte de l'enfer ne sont jamais qu'une manière de vivre ici-bas.

(Capdevila 2004: 193)

Page 237

La foi sans idéologie est une foi morte.

(Segundo, quoted in Gotay 1986: 240)

... tout est politisé, et partout la politique exprimait les objectifs idéologiques du Parti-Etat... la construction et la défense du socialisme.

(Malia 1995: 318-319)

Page 242

C'est dans ce contexte que les héritiers spirituels de l'Association des Oulémas (1931-1956), qui avaient pris le contrôle de l'enseignement primaire dans le sillage du ministre de l'éducation, Ahmed Taleb, forgent une nouvelle

version des origines de la révolution nationale et en attribuent la paternité au cheikh Abdelhamid Benbadis.

(Harbi 1994: 41-42)

... pluralité originale de la formation historique du peuple algérien ...

(Dourari 2004: 57)

CHAPTER FOUR

Developing a New Intercultural Pedagogy: The Third Place

4.1. Introduction.....	253
4.2. Otherness and Authentic Discourse.....	254
4.3. Otherness and Language.....	273
4.4. Facing Ideology.....	278
4.5. Islamist Discourse.....	279
4.6. The Self-mandated Spokesperson vs. the Intellectual....	283
4.7. The Need for a New Counter-culture.....	285
4.8. A New Counter-culture Through Intercultural Pedagogy.	287
4.9. Critical Discourse Analysis in Culture Studies.....	292
4.10. Towards a 'Third Culture'.....	295
4.11. Conclusion.....	302
4.12. Original Quotations.....	304

CHAPTER FOUR

Developing a New Intercultural Pedagogy: The Third Place

If we don't want to see pedagogy get bogged down in conformism, it must at all times teach the refusal to conform. Constructive pedagogy is always untamed; true pedagogy scoffs at pedagogy.

(Yves Châlon, cited in Kramsch 2001: 31)

L'histoire de la folie est l'histoire de l'Autre et de ce qui, pour une culture est à la fois intérieur et étrange, donc à exclure (pour en conjurer le péril intérieur) mais en l'enfermant (pour en réduire l'altérité)

(Foucault 1966: 15)

4.1. Introduction

Students' negative attitudes towards foreign cultures, expressed in more explicit terms in foreign language degrees, are then based on the very representations of the *other*, their subsequent definitions of both self-identity and otherness, the relationship between them, the stakes of their confrontation and the existential implications of this confrontation. Whether developing as cultural traits, or fashioned by political and religious ideologies, these representations have transformed into a widespread culture in its own right, clustering social categories of students who have not necessarily grown within the same subculture. This commonness has been the outcome of the intensive work of the ideologies described in the

preceding chapters, carried out through a discourse of conflict which has not yet faced a counter-discourse where it is supposed to find it, University.

However, as a culture, these representations and negative attitudes certainly bear the same characteristics of any culture: they grow and change. Over time, and because of, or thanks to, many influences they acquire new aspects as much as they give away old ones. This entails, on the one hand, that any description of a culture is but the description of a moment in its life, the description of “*the form and content of a cross-section carried out at a particular point of the cultural continuum*” (Linton 1968: 331)¹, something which artificially stabilises a state which is unstable by essence. On the other hand, it implies that any culture can be subjected to conscious and desired alterations, depending on the social credit and power those who intend to operate them enjoy.

4.2. Otherness and Authentic Discourse

With the development of Zavalloni’s concept of *subjective culture*, i.e. “*a cultural group’s typical ways to perceive and conceptualise its environment*” (quoted in Abdallah-Preteuille 2004a: 26)², it is admitted that in matters of representation, mainly self-representations as well as representations of the *other*, it is “*the viewpoint which creates the object*” (ibid.: 26)³. This idea leads to two main conclusions as far as foreign culture teaching and learning are concerned:

1. An individual describes his culture, which in his mind is the national culture he shares with all his fellow citizens, not necessarily as it really

¹ (MOT)

² (MOT)

³ (MOT)

is, but rather according to his own viewpoint, which varies according to his own position and role within his society. His description is then, at worse, wrong and, at best, only a part of the whole truth. As such, a foreign culture is probably not fully and accurately experienced when approached in its entirety, when reified in documents devoted to the study of a given culture, which rather circumscribe it. Such books which intend to present real culture, a kind of objective culture, end up, contrary to their pretension, advancing but a viewpoint of that culture, even when the author possesses great expertise.

Real culture is subjective culture, dynamic and pluralistic, which can then be best retrieved through the study of individual experiences, expressions and voices, which either declaim their subjectivity from the outset, such as artistic and literary works, or do not have the purpose to inform about culture, like political, legal or media documents. Both forms put forward culture through the individual, and the variety of individuals is a variety of viewpoints which make up the cultural jigsaw of a given group. The first form, art and literature, allows its author to speak, not only for himself, but also for his society, thus revealing things about himself as well as his society. He possesses what Bakhtin (2002) labels the *double-voiced discourse*, in which, according to Sheldon:

... the primary orientation is to the self, to one's agenda. The other orientation is to the members of the group. The orientation to others does not mean that the speaker necessarily acts in an altruistic, accommodating, or even self-sacrificing manner. It means, rather, that the speaker pays attention to the companion's point of view, even while pursuing her own agenda, as a result, the voice of the self is enmeshed with and regulated by the voice of the other.

(Sheldon 1992: 99)

This attention paid to the others is accentuated with a fiction writer,

with his pertinence and ambiguity (Vovelle 1982) which make his discourse, i.e. literature, probably more informative about his group than any other speaker. Thus, literature represents one of the most reliable sources to know about the *other*, and its neglect, in the name of the primacy of facts, often leads to biased views. Said (1995: 291), in his scrutiny of the American social-science attention to the Orient in the 1970's, for instance, and its avoidance of literature in its approach reduced the region and its peoples to “‘attitudes,’ ‘trends,’ statistics: in short, dehumanized.” He rightly states that

Since an Arab poet or novelist ... writes of his experiences, of his values, of his humanity,... he effectively disrupts the various patterns (images, clichés, abstractions) by which the Orient is represented. A literary text speaks more or less directly of a living reality. Its force is not that it is Arab, or French, or English; its force is in the power and vitality of words that, to mix in Flaubert's metaphor from La Tentation de Saint Antoine, tip the idols out of the Orientalists' arms and make them drop those great paralytic children – which are their ideas of the Orient – that attempt to pass for the Orient.

(ibid.: 291)

Foreign culture studies in Algerian universities without an appropriate place in the curriculum to literature is running the risk of the perpetuation of Occidentalism and its elevation to the position Orientalism enjoyed in Europe for long decades.

Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, immediate experience may not be the best way to know the *other*, especially if this experience has been unsatisfactory. Literary texts may well provide the best conditions for such an encounter, the pleasure to enjoy it being one of these conditions⁴. Knowledge about a culture through an individual

⁴ This idea is also claimed by such scholars as F.S.C. Northrop who rejects the ‘illusion’ that immediate experience provides appropriate knowledge, as he states that: “*the study of Chinese literature would be preferable to paying a visit to China in order to know it.*” (Quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 193)

experience, the writer's, is certainly particular, yet it is, as expressed by Abdallah-Pretceille and Porcher (1996: 142), a *peculiar-universal*, based on a verifiable reality. As such, literature can play a major role in the experience of *otherness* (Beacco 2000: 154), mainly in dealing with false representations.

Studies (Sherif 1971; Tapia 1973; Klineberg 1982, Byram 1989), conducted on intercultural experiences of ethnic groups that coexist within the same society, have shown that direct physical contact is not enough to eradicate false representations, prejudices and stereotypes, which often are the basis for all sorts of negative attitudes and behaviours such as racism and discrimination. Sherif (1971: 157) regretfully stated that: "*The naïve assertion that mere contiguity in an agreeable context is enough to promote harmony has sadly been refuted.*"⁵ Intercultural relations have usually required the interference of mediating institutions, what Tapia (1973) names *regulating institutions*, such as the school. In cross-cultural contacts, i.e. between communities that do not share the same closed geographical space, literature and art, along with other university subjects, can play this role of regulation that cannot be achieved with "*the sole spontaneity and good will of participants*" (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 184)⁶ in cross-cultural exchanges. Relying on the work carried out in cross-cultural psychology, Byram (1989: 103) firmly admitted that the mere exposition of individuals, and foreign language and culture learners, to the target culture without this cognitive support would "*not necessarily lead to desired educational*

⁵ (MOT). Sherif (1971) observed, in his study, that contact is not enough to modify negative attitudes and stereotypes. He rather suggested that only *common cooperative tasks* between members of different ethnic groups can help alter negative representations. Ladmiraal and Lipiansky (1989), however, claimed that the achievement of this objective depends also on the type of activity chosen. Cooperation, according to the authors, may not be sufficient as friendship and hostility between ethnic groups are *group processes* that cannot be reduced to mere variations in interpersonal relations that cooperation between individuals would change radically.

⁶ (MOT)

outcomes and indeed may be quite counter-productive.”⁷

Non-fiction documents, such as newspaper articles, do also have a great importance in informing about culture. Their purpose being far from achieving this informative objective, a society’s newspapers, legal and political documents shed light on the culture (or cultures) of those who produce them, often free from the magnifying and embellishing manners that may carry false information, something which books that are exclusively directed towards the description of a given culture may have.

2. Any modifications or alterations in a culture are and can be undertaken through the change of the viewpoint, i.e. the change of representations. The fact that ideologies, as shown in the preceding chapters with Orientalism and Occidentalism, do influence the construction of representations, stereotypes and prejudices through discourse, other types of discourse may also counteract these ideological discourses by allowing students to be aware of the existence of other viewpoints which necessarily suggest different approaches to the *other*, and different interpretations of his discourse and behaviour. While ideological discourse tends to narrow down students’ scope and vision of the *other*, university education, especially in foreign language degrees, is to widen them.

The viewpoint through which members of an ethnic group perceives members of another group is also the same through which they view

⁷ In their recommendations concerning intercultural education in Europe, the committee of ministers of member states clearly stated the following:

“The promotion of exchanges of all kinds goes through a better knowledge of peoples’ cultures and modes of life and, if need be, of their common cultural patrimony.

“The presence in schools in Europe of millions of children belonging to foreign cultural communities is a wealth and a long-term important asset on condition that educative policies that encourage open-mindedness and understanding of mutual differences be promoted” (Jones & Kimberley 1989)

themselves, i.e. their self-representation. Representation and the ideological arsenal that affects it determine not only the view of the other but conception of identity as well. Contrary to Piaget's theory of personality which established three successive stages of development (autism, egocentrism, and social consciousness) (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 37), meaning that self-identity grows separately and prior to the awareness of otherness, intercultural experiences show that otherness is part and parcel of self-identity. As Wallon (1959: 284) put it: "*Socius or the other is a perpetual partner of the self in the psychic life*"⁸. This entails that representation of the *other* is inextricably linked to self-representation, and thus an individual views himself and the *other* through the same viewpoint.

One of the main implications of such an idea is that any work on representations of the *other*, and the negative attitudes they induce, is to take into account self-representations, i.e. the group's conception of its existence as a group sharing common values and fate which distinguish them from others. Otherness and identity are then part of the same mechanisms, *osmotic mechanisms* (Tomé 1972), which are operated in intercultural relationships and which are based on the very definitions, according to each particular ethnic group, of the self and the *other*. Hunfeld pertinently pointed at this writing that one "*cannot teach an understanding of the foreign as long as the familiar has not become foreign to us in many respects*" (quoted in Kramsch 2001: 234)

Many studies on immigration (Rist 1978; Sayad 1978) and the way foreigners are viewed have shown that discourse on the *other* has actually constantly been discourse on the self. In his analysis of how the Swiss perceived the peoples of the 'Third World', Sayad concluded that:

⁸ (MOT)

*While every society thinks it deals with the others and their problems, ... while it pretends 'going out' of itself, it actually poses its own problems. Thus its discourse on the cultural personality of immigrants reveals its own tendencies.*⁹

(Sayad 1978: 2)

The integration of self-representation in a study that purposes to find remedies to the spreading of false representations of the *other*, as the only basis to approach otherness, especially in academic contexts, in replacement of real scientific methods and sources as shown in the preceding chapters, entails the reconsideration of the status and definition of culture itself, and of the difference between cultures. This difference is to be re-evaluated as a social one, and not as an ontological one. Cultural differences being thus not ontological, this entails that there can exist no cultural norms which could be universal and superior, nor can it be admitted that admitting cultural change is a denial of the past, but it is rather recognising the natural evolution of human variables, such as culture or identity, which are in constant mutation. Culture and identity, along with the relation to the *other*, are constructions which “*are always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation*” (Said 1995: 332)

Cultures often tend to elevate themselves to what Fairclough (2001) refers to as *common sense*, a state where legitimacy is attributed to traits and facts by the “*misrecognition of [their] arbitrariness*” (Bourdieu 1984). By obliterating the arbitrariness of certain cultural facts and traits, they are *naturalised* (Fairclough 2001: 76), i.e. given the status of natural attributes, and consequently the culture is erected as the norm, against which all other cultures are ‘ab-norm-al’. This puts any questioning of these facts and traits in the position of a heretic discourse which goes against the natural course of things.

⁹ (MOT)

When differences that define otherness and identity are naturalised, these latter are represented not only as fixed but also as distinct and delimited. Otherness and identity are actually intertwined inasmuch as what is considered in a certain context as the *other* may be part of the self, i.e. sharing the same identity. Depending on the criteria used to define otherness and identity (ethnic, religious, national), an Algerian himself can be represented as the *other*, while a French can be represented as somebody who possesses an Algerian identity. On the basis of religious criteria, an Algerian Christian is represented as the *other*, while a French Muslim of Algerian origin is represented as Algerian. The case of French footballer (of Algerian origin), Zinedine Zidane¹⁰, is a vivid illustration of this point. The frenzy that this sportsman induced among millions of Algerians, who showed great support for him, and for the whole French football team in the 2006 FIFA World Cup, and all along this player's long career, poses real questions as to the meaning of otherness and identity. Although Zidane has always claimed his Frenchness, this has never deterred Algerians from considering him as Algerian, and consequently, show him the same love, admiration, fervour and idolatry they would show to any successful Algerian athlete, such as footballer Rabah Madjer¹¹, or middle-distance runners Noureddine Morcelli¹² and Hassiba Boulemerka¹³. The representation of

¹⁰ Zinedine Zidane, popularly nicknamed as Zizou, has just put an end to his brilliant career as a mid-fielder in the French national football team and the Spanish club Real Madrid. Of an Algerian Kabyle origin, Zidane was born and grew in the city of Marseille, and moved to play for the first league club AS Cannes. His international career and fame were boosted by his brilliant performance in the 1998 FIFA World Cup, won, for the first time, by France. He closed his outstanding career after French loss at the final game of the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zidane).

¹¹ Rabah Madjer is a former Algerian footballer who played as striker for the Algerian national team in the 1980's and early 1990's, and for the Portuguese club FC Porto for three years between the years 1986 and 1991. He became known thanks to his famous goal in Algeria's 2-1 win over former West Germany in the 1982 FIFA World Cup. After retiring, he began a career as a football manager (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabah_Madjer).

¹² Noureddine Morcelli is a former Algerian athlete who specialised in the 1500 m. middle-distance. His best performances were his first ever Algerian gold medal in the Seville World Athletics Championships in 1991 and his title at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta (USA) in 1996. He also broke several world records in different middle distances following Moroccan Said Aouita (fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noureddine_Morcelli).

Zidane as an Algerian, i.e. as somebody who shares the same identity as the Algerians, and thus not considered as the *other*, is held by people who are most careful about national identity, most concerned by establishing categories and distinguishing individuals on the basis of nationalistic grounds, such as politicians. The Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika himself expressed it, in a letter to the sportsman, as he clearly stated that Zidane was “*not only an Algerian, but also the best player in the world*” (“Le message du Président à Zidane”, *El-Watan*, July 12, 2006).

Otherness and identity cannot be circumscribed within inherently definable characteristics, and a real step towards a serious reconsideration of self-representations and representations of the *other* would certainly require a process about which Byram commented:

Otherness within our national geographical boundaries on the other hand requires a re-definition of national identity which can be painful and may therefore be ignored for as long as possible.
(Byram 1989: 26)

Claiming universality has never been a proper characteristic of a particular culture. History shows that all societies have assumed at some time or another superiority of their values and correctness of their representations, and consequently the right to impose them on the rest of the world. Religions, most particularly, like most ideologies, are grounded on this idea of universality, especially when they are politicised. Universality is often based on two contradictory postulates:

1. that a given culture contains exceptional and superior values that

¹³ Hassiba Boulmerka, the first Algerian to win an Olympic gold medal, is a former middle-distance runner. She won her Olympic title at the 1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona in the 1,500 m. After the end of her brilliant career, she was elected to the athlete's commission of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassiba_Boulmerka).

should be extended to other cultures for their own benefit;

2. that this superior culture is considered as a systematic and pure set.

The second postulate results from an approach to cultures called, in culture studies, cultural relativism. Cultural relativism considers cultures as closed and coherent systems, free from outside influences, thus discarding all natural processes of acculturation or interculturalisation. By so doing, cultural relativism, or culturalism, “*confines itself in a fixist, rigid and mosaic conception of cultures where systems grow in parallel without any inter-penetration or inter-comprehension*” (Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 89)¹⁴. It is a quite paradoxical development of cultural relativism as this scientific approach to cultures first developed in opposition to the ethnocentric evolutionist approach of the second half of nineteenth century anthropology, which rather established certain cultures as norms and evaluated the other cultures according to these norms, thus instituting a cultural hierarchy.

At its inception, cultural relativism claimed a positivist and pluralistic view of cultures that called for decentring and the relativisation of the norm in culture studies (see Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 90), while cultural evolutionism argued that all cultures follow the same linear evolution of which Western civilisation is the most refined and accomplished stage. In this sense, the anthropologist E.B. Tylor argued that all societies go through three main cultural degrees: the ‘wild’ state, the ‘barbaric’ state, and the state of ‘civilisation’ (Cazeneuve 1990: 944). Cazeneuve comments that, through this classification, Tylor identifies ‘civilisation’, and European civilisation most particularly, with the highest degree of culture¹⁵.

¹⁴ (MOT)

¹⁵ The Spanish philosopher, Jose Ortega Y Gasset, suggests the same equation and upholds that “*civilisation is nothing but the effort to reduce coercion to be but the last resort*” (quoted in Johnson 1972: 19). Opposing Tylor’s view, O. Spengler subscribes to a different view. He rather equates ‘civilisation’ to decadent culture. Marcuse (1970: 110)

By questioning the cultural relativist approach, it is the intention of this work to claim a comeback to cultural evolutionism. It is rather, first, an observation, or a praxis based on the reality of foreign language teaching, of the course the approach to cultures in Algeria is taking, at the expense of foreign language studies. Second, it is a rejection of the yoke ideologies, whatsoever, tend to exercise on intercultural relations, mainly in the context of university studies. In Algeria, and most Arab-Islamic countries, cultural relativism has met a quite successful response. This has mostly been the case with anti-foreign ideologies such as Islamism and Occidentalism for which this theory offered the scientific argument for their claims. On grounds of culturalism, they advocate the purity of 'Arab-Islamic' culture, which is, according to these ideologies, not only self-sufficient but should be protected from outside influences, the so-called *cultural invasion* (الغزو الثقافي). A lot of customs and traditions, whatever their negative impact on some categories of the society, are kept, and even *sacralised*, in the name of cultural relativism. Such customs as excision, forced marriage, disinheritance of women are thus tolerated in the name of respect for traditional culture. Such examples are, of course, by no means peculiar to 'Oriental' cultures. Numerous voices are heard all around Europe denouncing the cruel treatment of animals in bullfighting, still kept as an ancestral tradition.

Such a protective and exclusive approach to cultures, in foreign language and culture studies, is probably an obstacle to learning and to developing, at least, a neutral and objective attitude which would allow positive and fruitful cross-cultural experiences. There is a need to *dis-ideologise* foreign language and culture studies in order to cease to view individuals only through the spectacles of the dichotomy *self/other*. Ideologies certainly

commented on Spengler's thesis writing: "O. Spengler does not conceive of the relationship between civilisation and culture as a simultaneity, but as a necessary organic succession; civilisation is the inescapable and the end of any culture." (MOT)

require having and sustaining it since power, and precisely political power, as Apfelbaum put it:

*... works as the active principle of the differentiation process Power cannot be exercised unless there is effectively two distinct groups, unless there is distinction between 'we' and 'them'. Distinguish to better spot a group of individuals and assign them a separate, distinct place constitutes the fundamental procedures of power. Branding is the first instrument.*¹⁶

(Quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 64)

Accentuation of difference is the 'fast track' to isolating the group and neutralising influence. As Europe did it with the 'Orient', through Orientalism, by representing it as exotic, primitive, only worthy of aesthetic appreciation and museum exhibition (Rist 1978: 394), Occidentalism tends to represent the 'West', the *other*, only as depraved, materialistic and exploitative. Probably teaching about similarities between peoples, as much as singling out differences, is likely to balance the approach and re-establish truth about who 'we' are and who 'they' are. In this sense, constant reference to native culture in foreign culture classes, thus establishing a systematic to-and-fro approach between the native culture and the foreign one, is likely to put, explicitly, what the two share and what they do not, and the extent to which what is held as the norm is but a special way, 'ours' or 'theirs' to manage daily life situations. Analogy and contrast between native and foreign cultures, joined together, would then form a process of *euphemisation* (Bourdieu 2001: 124) that can attenuate the cultural shock¹⁷.

Emphasising similarity does not mean hiding what cultures and peoples of the world do not share. Yet, instead of talking of difference, it is rather of

¹⁶ (MOT)

¹⁷ The *euphemisation* process in cross-cultural experiences is similar to what happens in verbal exchanges. Bourdieu (2001: 124, fn23) observed that all sorts of kidding, smiling, and gestures that accompany asking embarrassing questions is part of this euphemising effect that aims at making the questions less shocking and more acceptable.

diversity that scientific discourse speaks. Focusing on difference purposes identifying people for the sake of categorisation, exclusion, and stigmatisation of the *other*. It establishes virtual frontiers of isolation based on subjective criteria. Larger groups, such as the 'Arab world', are constructed mainly on the grounds of, for instance, a common catastrophic fate, something which makes it, essentially, a group of exclusion, i.e. against all those who are held responsible for this lot. However, acknowledging diversity is admitting the possibility of cooperation and peaceful coexistence that may cross not only geographical frontiers, but also symbolic ones, such as religion and culture.

It is not assumed here that an objective scientific approach to native and foreign culture is completely free of representations, even false representations. Behind any discourse, there is a human being who has grown within a system of representations that he can by no means totally clear himself of, whatever his expertise and professionalism are. Yet what differs is that scientific discourse elaborates new representations, of the self and the *other*, which are far more pertinent, refined, closer to reality, and more importantly, based on the postulate that they 'might be' inaccurate and are necessarily temporary. Scientific discourse, instead of claiming to discard representations from identity and otherness, something impossible to happen, rather acknowledges their arbitrariness, provisional nature and necessity to be constantly reformulated. It then reintegrates them to the historical process by rejecting what would be equated to an end-of-history thesis where all symbolic interpretations are permanent and unrelated to historical mutations.

Scientific discourse, by pointing at the share of ideology in the making of representations, and not by denying its participation, admits, contrary to what is assumed by ideological discourse, that otherness is an integral part

of identity inasmuch as the latter is actually made up of two permanently contradictory processes:

- self-identification or assimilation, which allows the individual to feel he belongs to a group;
- *identisation* (Tap 1980), “by which an individual distances himself from the other and considers himself as distinct from him” (Camilleri 1980: 331)¹⁸, i.e. his understanding of otherness.

The work of ideology is often to exaggerate the first process and exclude the second from identity as being completely irreconcilable with the first. To a natural process of acculturation, or interculturalisation, ideology erects a manoeuvre of *counter-acculturation* (Devereux 1972) as a form of resistance which takes various forms such as “*nativism, prophetism, messianism... . These are attempts to go back to the past, effort of re-tribalisation*” (Bastide 1971: 58)¹⁹. Islamism, in Arab-Islamic countries and Nazism, in Europe, are two perfect examples of such ideologies of negation, each in its own way. Devereux (1972: 212) lists three main modalities in counter-acculturation that have the purpose of struggling against what is viewed as the disorganising effects of acculturation:

1. *Defensive isolation*: It is the creation of symbolic barriers which state the sacredness of certain spheres of life, something which discards all possible influence as heresy. Family relations, the place of women, the place of religion are aspects of life which political and religious authorities, in Arab-Islamic countries, attempt to ‘protect’.
2. *Cultural selection*: Adoption of new instruments, such as technological ones, but by emptying them from their original cultural

¹⁸ (MOT)

¹⁹ (MOT)

content. Such is the case of internet. Many religious societies attempt to transform it into a means exclusively destined to proselytising, partly to deter users from taking advantage from its original cultural purpose: have full access to all sorts of information.

3. *Dissociative acculturation*: Creation, by a group, of new cultural items that clearly show their opposition to another group as a way to mark difference. The way of dressing is probably one of the most ostentatious forms of marking distinction. All attempts, through religion for instance, to convince people to adopt a way of dressing instead of another one, this latter being too westernised, draw on this process of resistance.

Students' negative attitudes towards foreign cultures can then be viewed as part of this counter-acculturation based on an over-self-identification coupled with an over-*identisation*, taken as two processes which function one against the other, while they are actually part of the same psychological process of identity. Negative attitudes towards the *other* are symptomatic of a real psychological crisis, at the level of the individual, and of a cultural crisis at the level of the group. When there is a rupture between the two processes of self-identification and *identisation*, this marks a dysfunction in the whole continuum of identity, something which brings the individual to show "*angst, the feeling of guilt, despair, indifference*" (ibidem)²⁰, all of which translate what psychologists label 'identity crisis', and which also favours the development of all kinds of "*absurd significations*" and representations in their "*confrontation with otherness*" (Zarate 1986: 24). From an identity which is, in essence, unaccomplished, the individual, who is caught within an identity crisis, has recourse to a *mechanical identity*

²⁰ (MOT)

(ibidem), fixed and rigid, that accentuates ethnicity²¹ and tends to “*reduce all modifications which can jeopardise the integrity of the individual*” (Raveau 1976: 478)²².

Students’ negative attitudes towards foreign cultures are then the expression of an identity crisis, created and sustained by all sorts of ideological discourses, religious and political, that emanate from categories of people who either do not have the right answer to such psychological/cultural problems, or for whom such a situation represents the best favourable conditions to keep the political status quo. As Maestri rightly expressed it: “*certain features of a group’s cultural identity become either dominant, or recessive for the good of the cause*” (quoted in Abdallah-Preteille 2004a: 55)²³. Recourse to the mechanical identity may be justified in times of real threats, as the case may be in a situation of colonisation, where the native part of identity is deeply menaced, but this becomes unjustified when such threats are no more than ‘Don Quixote’s windmills’ against which students are called ‘to tilt’.

Identity, being both an individual construction as much as a collective one, is sometimes regulated as strategies of defence, survival, manipulation, or domination. These strategies make call for the accentuation of a given component of identity: language, religion, territory, ethnic origin. With all these criteria involved, it becomes quite difficult for students, young and inexperienced individuals, to seize the real identity and the opinions and behaviours it implies, especially when indulging into a

²¹ Ethnicity is defined as a mode of action and representation that brings individuals to take decisions on the basis of their symbolic depiction of themselves as holders of a distinct identity. In this sense, A.P. Cohen (2000) defines it as the “*politicization of culture*”. McKay (1982) concurs to this view claiming that ethnicity is irrational inasmuch as it consists in deep-seated attachments to kin, territory or religion. Okamura (1981), sharing this idea, considers ethnicity as an ideology or “*false consciousness*” which is manipulated for sheer political and economic goals (Galkina 2000)

²² (MOT)

²³ (MOT)

cross-cultural experience such as a foreign language and culture class.

In the absence of real threats to identity, all strategies to preserve it become counter-productive, like hard treatment for an illusory disease. To take refuge in a mechanical identity, in a *racialised* culture, full of stereotypes, and false self-representations and false representations of the *other*, is to submit to an identity that reduces full individuals into mere representatives of a religion, a political movement, or an ideology, an identity referred to by Gorm as a *confusionist identity* (see Tap 1980). While this identity may be useful for a coloniser who purposes to segregate and dominate the colonised, it is certainly restrictive, penalising, and unfruitful for the group which is desperately in need of all opportunities to interact with others for its own benefits.

By being subdued to such an official identity, students are trapped into a cultural cocoon that does not really correspond to their idiosyncratic expression of individual identity, one that does not answer ideological needs, but rather existential and human ones. Within a context of interculturalisation, where they have access to all sorts of cultural expressions that have roots in all kinds of societies regardless of religion or nationality, as this can clearly be seen when they are given opportunities to express themselves whether through writing, music, or performing²⁴, students

²⁴ it is quite extraordinary to note that in cultural events, such as end-of-year parties, in which students participate by singing, reading their poetry, or performing plays, it is often almost impossible to claim *the* culture or *the* identity these students belong to as they seem to bear so many different ones, with so many influences. In the 2006 party, held at the Faculty of Letters, Languages and Arts (University of Oran), students sang in Berber, 'Algerian', Classical Arabic, French, English and Spanish. This variety is a mere linguistic one; it is actually extremely permeated with some cultural substratum that is quite far from the exclusive one claimed by official discourse. They performed plays from the English repertoire, Algerian one, and others which were written and produced by them, performed both in French and 'Algerian'. They excelled at the most traditional Algerian music genre called *Karkabou* (percussion and drum rhythmic set) as well as the very American genres like *rhythm and blues*. Theatre performance, of such intercultural richness, does not remain at the amateur level. Some of the students in this party have even established a professional company such as *Shems* or *Lagoual*.

regularly raise questions, even if they do not do it explicitly or willingly, about the gap that subsists between ideological discourse, officially claimed identity and real identity.

Referring to a virtual identity and culture, ideologically loaded and inconsistent with some of their behaviours and likings, denotes a lack of opportunities for Algerian students to express their real self, the negation of their right to hold the *skeptron*, or the right to speak, even in the place which is supposed to be the most democratic one: university. University is probably one of those 'instruments' that undergo intensive cultural selection inasmuch as while one of its main purposes is to allow the change of the individual's vision of the world, this very purpose is viewed by ideologues as a threat, as a cognitive subversion which is not less dangerous than political subversion. By preventing all sorts of discourses to find a safe haven in universities, it is denaturalising them and transforming them into mere production companies that are expected to produce 'uncultured human robots' who are only capable of performing very animal and vegetative activities.

At university, and in foreign language and culture classes, Algerian students engage in a tedious exercise that takes extreme psychological effort: the fight between cultural *habitus* and *hexis* on the one hand, as fashioned by mainstream culture and ideological discourse, and the individual idiosyncratic experience of each student, as enriched by the various intercultural interactions, through the media, reading, encounters, and for the luckiest among them, travelling. This is a case of symbolic violence where individuals find themselves forced to struggle unwillingly, and even unconsciously, against a dominant cultural and ideological dictation of 'a way of being', which is in total contradiction to what daily reality offers. This is all the more accentuated for young individuals, such as

second year students of English, who, with the difficulties posed by an introduction to a foreign language and foreign cultures in which they do not have substantial competence, they have to deal with such serious and hard subjects as identity and otherness.

The pedagogical situation of a foreign culture class becomes the stage for collective symbolic power confronting the individual's, the student, strive to exist and choose. Within this context, foreign language and culture classes become at times moments of suffering for students who react in a number of different ways:

- Swimming against the tide by taking full advantage of what is offered to them in terms of knowledge and experience;
- resisting against foreign cultures, viewed as a threat against self-identification;
- turning away from the class itself, felt as boring, tedious or hard.

In all of these cases, students find themselves in a situation where the problems and questions raised go far beyond simple didactic issues, since what is often called upon is their profound feelings about their own existence both as human beings and citizens in a specific nation called Algeria, and their relations with those who do not belong to this nation, as Bourdieu put it:

*This is what the interactionist description ignores, when treating interaction as an empire within an empire, omitting the fact that what occurs between two individuals ... in a colonial situation ... or even a post-colonial situation... owes its peculiar form to the objective relationship between languages or their corresponding uses, i.e. to the relationship between the groups that speak these languages.*²⁵

(Bourdieu 2001: 101)

²⁵ (MOT)

4.3. Otherness and Language

Identity and otherness, and their relationship to foreign language and culture teaching and learning, seem then to be closely related to the place languages hold in a particular society, and the ties members of this society develop with what they consider as the official and national language. The expression ‘linguistic phenomena are essentially social phenomena’, already used in Chapter Three, takes, therefore, its full sense as it can clearly be observed that linguistic phenomena, most particularly in countries such as Algeria, are really political, ideological and pedagogical phenomena. The position, the status and the affective consideration people attribute to a language determines not only general language management and planning in a country, but also each individual’s approach to the other languages, and their corresponding cultures, which he is in contact with, whether in a pedagogical setting, professional or a mundane one.

These ties with languages, within a context of intensive ideological agitation, are closely related to the whole power relations in society, in which languages are by no means mere objects of “*intellection*” but rather instruments of “*action and power*” (ibid.: 59). Classical Arabic, in Algeria, not as the extraordinary language which has been, for centuries, the vehicle of an outstanding intellectual production, but as the instrumentalised means of power, has much to do with students’ conception of identity and otherness.

Probably, one of the means to bring back this language to its natural position, as a cultural heritage, and thus allow students to make unobstructed steps towards foreign languages and the cultures they carry, is to release them from the suffocating linguistic straitjacket of classical Arabic as an ideological-cultural stake to be transformed into a language that serves practical life purposes as well as mark cultural belonging. As an

ideological-cultural instrument of power, classical Arabic is completely managed by two nihilist orientations:

- Reasons of State and official religion that actually serve mere sectional political purposes;
- Occidental-Islamist ideology that uses language as a means of persuasion.

It is not meant here that a language can be totally free from ideological considerations. The relations between ideology and linguistic questions are a reality in every country throughout the world. Yet, what is suggested here is the fact that language becomes an exclusively *ideologised* issue when, instead of serving social and existential interests, it is devoted to the realisation of sectional ones, in which case it does not answer social needs but rather a category's ones.

The power classical Arabic enjoys in Algeria, and in all Arab-Islamic countries, is not peculiar to this language. Any language, with its infinite capacity to generate performative discourse and illocutionary force, and consequently produce great effects on the collective representation, is a potential “*support by excellence of the dream of absolute power*” (ibid.: 66)²⁶. Yet, what is peculiar with classical Arabic is that it possesses those felicity conditions, including its sacred character as the language of the Koran, which make it an important lever of power. With its status of official and national language, it is the first language of school education. This makes it the main vehicle of the society's values and representations through which its young generations are socialised.

The example provided by the first year textbook of primary school

²⁶ (MOT)

(Bouchina & Oussif 2004) is a vivid illustration of this. The following extracts from the book show how language is used to instil in children what the dominant ideology considers as the important values and representations of the roles of men and women they should acquire:

- A schoolboy talking about his parents:

“أبي موظف قديم في الإدارة و أمي ربة بيت” (My father is a senior civil servant in the administration and my mother is a housewife).

Here the man works while his wife stays at home.

- A schoolboy talking about his mother: “وهي خياطة ماهرة” (and she is a good dressmaker).

The activities attributed to women are the traditional ones, such as dressmaking or cooking.

- “جاء أبي و أخرج سيارته” (My father came and took his car out).

It is the man who owns and drives the car.

- Talking about a man inviting his neighbour for lunch:

“دعا مصطفى جاره عمر إلى تناول الغذاء... عادا فوجدا الأكل حاضرا” (Mustafa invited his neighbour Omar for lunch... . When they arrived home they found the meal ready).

The woman, who is completely absent from the scene, is the one who prepares the meal. The man is not supposed to help.

- “قالت لي أمي هاك القفة يا مصطفى وأذهب إلى السوق” (My mother told me: “Take the basket and go to the market”).

Again, the woman stays at home as she sends her son to do the shopping.

- Describing a boy and his sister going back home from school: "خرج مصطفى من المدرسة ... وها هي أخته ليلى تسير وراءه" (Mustafa left school... and here is his sister Leila walking behind him).

This is quite extraordinary as, even at an early age, the woman is supposed to walk behind the man.

- A girl talking about what she does at home: "أساعد أمي في أعمال البيت" (I help my mother at doing the housework).

Following the steps of her mother, the daughter is the one who is supposed to help for the housework.

What contributes to the deepening of the gap between what the official ideology professes and the reality of the Algerian society is the fact that these values and representations, listed above, do not correspond to facts. While this may have been true during a given period of history in Algeria, the Algerian society has witnessed, for decades now, changes that have completely revolutionised the roles of men and women, and their styles of life. Women who work, drive and fully take part in social activities are no longer freaks.

Classical Arabic probably remains one of the last weapons dominant ideology has at hand to resist the wave of globalisation, at the cultural level more than the economic one. As Fairclough rightly advanced:

Questions of language and power are fundamental to understanding the new order and to the politics of the new order, because language is becoming increasingly important in social life. Struggles to impose or resist the new order are partly struggles over language, both over new ways of using language, and over linguistic representations of change.

(Fairclough 2001: 203-204)

Cultural, and most particularly linguistic, globalisation is one of the ways to

the globalisation of a particular vision of the world, including the view of the right place an individual should have in society, i.e. the conception of democracy. Cultural globalisation is then a discourse that may threaten the interests of those who do not find in it favourable circumstances, felicity conditions, for the maintenance of the status quo. Dominant ideology in Algeria has understood this all too well as this is illustrated by the launching of three supposedly different national channels (*Canal Algérie*, *A3*, *ENTV*), in Arabic and French, but which actually contain very little difference in terms of programmes and no autonomy at all. Despite the fact that they broadcast in two different languages, they do share the same official discourse whose main purpose is to guarantee the preservation of dominant ideology values and the protection against *representations of change*.

National television channels as well as the official and national language are of course part of those institutions that aim at the preservation of the society's most cherished values. Yet, these values are also supposed to be shared by the majority of the society, established for the exclusive benefits of all its members. At the very moment they start to be manipulated, they lose their authenticity to become mere instruments of power.

Classical Arabic, with its claimed intrinsic virtues that do not reflect the real linguistic market in Algeria, is one of these instruments that continue to determine students' readiness to learn foreign languages inseparably from their cultural content. There is then an urgent need for foreign language and culture teachers to integrate these students' representations of this language in the design of their courses and their delivery. Teaching and learning would probably be far more effective if students are not taken as blank pages that come to the classroom with full readiness to be filled in. then devoting time to treatment of their representations, even at the expense of the completion of the whole syllabus, may be more productive

than being solely concerned with finishing the whole programme.

4.4. Facing Ideology

Treating these representations goes through digging up their origins. One of the main sociological principles is that phenomena can not be fully understood unless their social origins are deeply revealed (Boudon 1991: 66). For, in the case of students' self-representations and their representations of the *other*, it is mostly their growing up in ready-made situations that is more determinant than their individual experiences of life. Bourdieu (2001: 198) admits that the best way to neutralise a system is to fully know its social mechanisms of symbolic domination which tend to rationalise it. In this sense, these representations are fundamentally historical, and consequently teaching foreign languages and cultures is to be carried out by teachers who are profoundly aware of the historical/social context in which they perform their job. The intellectuals and teachers' role is to reject fatalism and defeatism by bearing in mind that:

... the social world is mostly made by agents at every single moment; but they [intellectuals] can only un-make or re-make it on the basis of a realistic knowledge of what this world is and of what they can do about it from their own position.²⁷

(ibid.: 311)

A realistic knowledge of the Algerian social environment is a deep awareness of the origins and ramifications of representations within their market of production (politics and religion) and of consumption (people in general, and students in particular).

²⁷ (MOT)

4.5. Islamist Discourse

It is to be admitted that this context is the setting for a substantial ideological discourse partly permeated by Islamist ideas. Ignoring this fact in foreign language and culture teaching is showing naivety or hypocrisy that does not help effective learning. Islamist discourse about the *other* does stop at the university campus. It does then accompany the student inside the classroom and stands as one of the filters of the scientific discourse about the *other* in foreign culture classes. The pernicious character of Islamist discourse lies in the fact that it draws heavily on what many Algerians consider as the most sacred. As Nietzsche (1990: 77) expressed it: “*The priest calls God his own will*”²⁸. Islamist discourse, by monopolising morality, thus notions such as God and Truth, inasmuch as dominant ideology monopolises notions like People, Nation, Revolution, succeeds in developing a sense of guilt in individuals who do not conform to it in their relation to the *other* who does not share the same religious beliefs.

The degree of success of this discourse relies mainly on the degree of knowledge students have of their own religion, culture and history. The less knowledge they have, the more effectiveness Islamist discourse attains. As observed in Chapter Two, Islamist discourse takes advantage of the effects of perspective, i.e. students’ position in society and their age, which do not allow them to have enough maturity and life experience to possess the necessary scope for detecting contradictions in the discourse. Despite the fact that Islamist discourse about the *other* is falsified, students are not able to perceive it as they are not aware of the ins and outs of this relation to the *other*.

Islamist discourse has also innovated as compared to traditional religious

²⁸ (MOT)

discourse. While the latter was reactionary in the sense that it was conservative, the former took the form of a *liberation theology* by combining discourse on God and political practice and activism. People and students see it as an alternative to dominant political/ideological discourse and regimes that took hold of Arab-Islamic countries since independence. What the liberation theology proposed as a thesis to explain the state of social and economic decadence is that the corrupt political regimes in Arab-Islamic countries have confiscated the freedom and wealth of their peoples, and that the only solution for these peoples to regain their wealth and liberate themselves is to re-establish the Islamic republic, a regime based on Islamic theology and law, al-sharea.

The liberation theology, an ideology that is of course not peculiar to Islam as it is also present in other religions such as Christianity (see Metz 1971; Segundo 1982; Löwy 1998; Capdevila 2004), has taken religion out of mosques to intrude it into spaces, such as university, where it can be far more effective as discourse and political action. Just as the liberation theology in Christianity has been the result of the failure of the church to meet desired response (Capdevila 2004: 124), it has also been in Islam a means to allow religious discourse to permeate all aspects of people's lives as the mosque failed to do it. By associating theology to liberty, it attempts to bring religion to all places where the question of liberty is posed, i.e. everywhere.

The first technique the liberation theology makes use of in order to be effective is to establish the postulate that religion cannot be a mere private matter; it is a societal concern that should determine all decisions about the management of society. By transferring a private issue into the public sphere, the liberation theology undertakes the *theologisation* (ibid.: 130) of life in general, politics and education in particular. Moreover, religion, being

in the hands of a religious and political oligarchy that aims at achieving a whole social project, is itself politicised and *ideologised* (ibid.: 130). The emphasis put on the idea that Prophet Mohammed had various statuses at the same time, that of a sacred being and human being, religious leader as well as a political one, counsellor in private and public matters, purposes to sustain the fact that religion, private life and public life are inseparable.

By integrating all social spaces, foreign language students are persuaded that religion does also have a place in language and culture studies, especially when they involve the study of languages and cultures that are viewed as being attributed to non-Muslims. Religion thus becomes a legitimate, reliable and unquestioned source of knowledge on the basis of which opinions, attitudes and behaviours are selected, without any distinction between belief, myth, and science.

The problem of such a transfer is that, while any other source may be subjected to doubt without any sense of guilt, religion holds a privileged place and is exempted from such doubt, mainly through the 'Sword of Damocles' represented by heresy (بدعة). It is to know that heresy in Islam plays a major role in the psychological heritage of Muslims for whom it is equivalent to apostasy. The Prophet's famous hadith, which is repeatedly taken as an argument against questioning, tells the following: "كل محدثة بدعة و كل بدعة ضلالة و كل ضلالة صاحبها في النار" (every 'modern' innovation is a heresy, every heresy is a fault, and everyone who makes fault goes to hell). By instrumentalising religion and the lever of heresy, considered as a negation of 'truth' (the ideological truth) and tradition, dominant ideology discards all forms of oppositional discourse as perverse and deviant, thus equating between a religious concept (heresy) and a political one (opposition). This is the most efficient weapon against democracy where heresy is not valid since it is a system which acknowledges plurality of

opinions and questioning.

Instrumentalisation of religion operates also in the very selective use of verses from the Koran and the Prophet's discourse. While the above hadith condemns innovation as a heresy, many exegetes claim, on the basis of the same Prophet's discourse, that Islam acknowledges the notion of good innovation with the concept of "بدعة حسنة". Concerning women's social status, while the Koran often addresses men and women equally, Islamist discourse tends to make specific verses, such as the following, more conspicuous:

"الرجال قوامون على النساء بما فضل الله بعضهم على بعض
وبما أنفقوا من أموالهم فالصالحات قانتات حافظات للغيب بما حفظ الله"

["Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard." (An-Nisāa, S.4, A.34)]

As far as imposing one's religion on others is concerned, while there is a clear verse forbidding it: "لا إكراه في الدين قد تبين الرشد من الغي" ["Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error" (Al-Baqarah, S.2, A.256)], other verses are more emphasised in order to justify compulsion, even when it is violent: "ومن يبتغي غير الإسلام ديناً فلن يقبل منه" ["If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah) never will it be accepted" (Āl-Imrān, S.3, A.85)]

There can then be no effective foreign language and culture teaching and learning, which have positive and fruitful intercultural experiences as their

main objectives, without the secularisation of education in particular, and civil life in general. Inasmuch as the separation between religion and politics has had position effects in many countries in the world, it would probably bring about the same results if Algeria operates the same separation between religion and science, religion and pedagogy, religion and otherness.

Secularism in Algeria is not of course to be an imitation of any other in the rest of the world. It is of course admitted here that secularism has had various forms and implementations in different countries, according to the cultural, social, economic and political specificities of each one. It is then imperative to think of an Algerian secularism, one that suits Algerian culture (s) and that *“participates in the quest for social coherence based on a permanent construction and not a stable and definite state.”* (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004b: 107)²⁹

4.6. The Self-mandated Spokesperson vs. the Intellectual

Within this context of confusion between discursive registers, Islamist discourse does not base its credit completely on its confrontation logic, though it fully takes profit from facts that, taken separately, seem to confirm its arguments about the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis between ‘they’ and ‘we’. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and more recently, Israeli attacks on Lebanon are all instances that flow into the logic of Islamist discourse. Yet, what seems to really help this discourse to develop a positive response among the peoples of the Arab-Islamic world, and students in particular, is rather the credit Islamist spokespeople, the self-mandated spokespeople, have been able to accumulate throughout the

²⁹ (MOT)

years, especially with the help of satellite TV channels.

Islamist discourse cannot be questioned if the self-mandated spokesperson's credit is not questioned first. As Bourdieu put it in more general terms:

*... strong ideas owe part of their credit to the credit of the person who, by advocating them, guarantees them and it is not enough to refute them, with a purely logical argumentation, but rather discredit them by discrediting their author.*³⁰

(Bourdieu 2001: 242)

The Islamist spokesperson should not be considered as a mere calculator, who is necessarily aware of the falseness of his discourse and thus purposes manipulation. It is high time now Algerian intellectuals admitted the fact that the Islamist spokesperson can be earnest and a fervent believer in his arguments. He owes his status of spokesperson, and thus his credit among people, to his devotion to the cause. Bourdieu cleverly seized the nature of this kind of sanctimonious people, whether in politics or religion:

*... it by completely cancelling his self for God or the People, that devotion becomes God or people. It is when I become Nothing – and because I am able to forget myself, to sacrifice myself, to devote myself –, that I become the Whole. I am nothing but the spokesman of God and the People...*³¹

(ibid: 269)

The intellectual, and the teacher, cannot develop a discourse capable of confronting the Islamist one unless he becomes himself devout, or more accurately committed, in the practice of his profession, somebody whose discourse about the *other* reflects his own behaviour with the *other*, starting

³⁰ (MOT)

³¹ (MOT)

from the student, the colleague, the institution as a whole. He should reduce his action to the mere enunciation of an opposite discourse, thus at best, creating a sort of new group of followers of whom he would be the spokesperson. He has rather to re-appropriate his group, the students, the people, by standing and facing the self-mandated telling him, to use Bourdieu's (2001: 270) expression: "*No. You are not the group*"³².

4.7. The Need for a New Counter-culture

Newcomb (1942), Hyman (1942) and Doise (1989) speak of the possibility for the individual to have various *groups of reference*, including those whom he does not belong to from a cultural or social point of view, that are the basis for the construction of his opinions and representations. This creates a context for intellectual and cultural competition as each group, through its ideology, attempts to influence a greater number of people, within the group and across others. Islamist discourse, for instance, has integrated this parameter very well. It is plainly observed that Islamist ideologues and Occidentalists, such as those mentioned in Chapter Two, have adopted, for instance, modern, and even 'westernised', ways of dressing so as to reach the minds of those who are not comfortable with traditional or middle-eastern ways.

Within these competitive conditions, foreign language and culture teachers, and intellectuals in general, need to struggle for becoming the students' group of reference that provides positive points of *anchoring* (see Chapter One), mainly as far as the relation to and representation of the *other* are concerned. This is likely to be one of the incentives for inducing more favourable attitudes which would be grounded on true representations

³² (MOT)

and less subjective opinions that can counteract culture, for it has become one in its own right, of suspicion and rejection towards the *other* and self-praising.

Cultures change in contact with others. To bring changes in this culture of conflict, there should be, at least at the academic level, a new counter-culture of curiosity, doubt, questioning and possible cooperation. It can no longer be admitted that the culture of conflict is the inescapable lot of Algerian mainstream culture, and university, and most particularly foreign languages departments, are probably the first institutions which can produce a change in this collective state of mind which has long normalised believing in unfounded ideas, even at places where questioning and arguing are central to learning.

Foreign culture modules are not mere university subjects that may answer immediate needs corresponding to the completion of a qualifying degree necessary to finding a job. They should rather represent those opportunities, whether in Algeria or anywhere all around the world, for the confrontation of contradictory discourses, not for the sake of confusion or brainwashing, but for the mitigation of certainty that is often the shortest way to ignorance and extremism. Foreign culture studies are to have the purpose Capdevila attributed to studying philosophy:

*Reference to philosophy, conceived as non-mythical thinking, evinces clearly that prior to a negative evaluation of the myth is not necessarily possessing truth, but rather the introduction of another kind of thinking, in a different historical context, where relativity of subscription to myth is shown and where myth is revealed as myth. For whom are religious representations illusory? Not for those who believe in them, but those who do not, or no longer, believe in them.*³³

(Capdevila 2004: 219)

³³ (MOT)

4.8. A New Counter-culture Through Intercultural Pedagogy

“*Myth is myth only for those who do not believe in it*” (Godelier 1984: 202)³⁴. The function of foreign cultures is to question what the members of the native culture take for granted. This is undertaken, first, by the fact that foreign cultures, and foreign languages as their instruments, are at times spaces where students are able to operate what might be called *cultural escapism*. It is the fact of finding a psychological leeway that allows liberating oneself from the shackles of self-censorship imposed by the integration of one’s native culture and its restrictive inhibitors, i.e. through enculturation. Experience, especially with literature teachers, shows that many students, who have writing talents, take the opportunity of studying the English language to use this language to express themselves, even when they are better users of the first language they learnt at school, i.e. classical Arabic. Students’ writings seem to be products of a compromise between the internalised cultural/social censorship and their *expressive interest* (Bourdieu 2001: 343). Recourse to foreign languages is then part of what Bourdieu (ibidem) labels *euphemisation strategies* which enable the student to find a common ground between their expressive interest and cultural/social restrictions. Euphemisation strategies are tools of escaping silence, of regaining the *skeptron* without causing scandals.

Classical Arabic and one’s native culture function as invisible and perfect forms of censorship as students accept the imposed restrictions that exclude them from communication. Foreign languages, in this sense, play often the role of weapons of struggling for the right to re-integrate the process of social communication. Foreign cultures, in general, offer students opportunities for not only destroying the shackles of cultural/social censorship but also, and probably more importantly, self-censorship which is

³⁴ (MOT)

nurtured by the internalisation of ethnocentrism, i.e. self-confinement within one's native cultural prisms.

Against the devastating effects of ethnocentrism, the remedy is certainly not the rejection or denial of one's own culture but rather the promotion of the practice of *decentration* which is defined as “*the awareness and ‘deconstruction’ of attitudes and other elements of personality which prevent accepting the other as different*” (Camilleri & Cohen-Emerique 1989: 393)³⁵. *Decentration* is the capacity to step out of one's own culture to have a critical perspective towards it as much as towards the others.

Scholars have suggested different methods for the practice of *decentration* in intercultural experiences. They vary from cultural mimetism, where the individual identifies with the *other*, to empathetic otherness, where he attempts to understand the *other* by putting himself in his place (Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 153-158). These methods have proved to be idealistic and inaccessible as learners find almost impossible to put aside their native culture. They have also been, at times, hypocritical by minimising difference (Kramersch 1987).

What may be more feasible is what Abdallah-Pretceille (2004a: 154) calls a *difference ethic*, in which students admit that the *other* exists as different and “*tolerate this existence, even if it is not understood, because it is not understood*”³⁶. This is what might be called an intercultural pedagogy that can leave a space, however small it is, for a possible sensitivity to values produced by other cultures, a pedagogy that functions as a systematic *apprenticeship of difference* (Kramersch 2001: 235). It must be acknowledged that civilisations and cultures differ in the way they view the world and, as the French philosopher, P. Ricoeur (1961: 452), cleverly expressed it: “*being*

³⁵ (MOT)

³⁶ (MOT)

*a Man, it is being capable of transfer into another centre of perspective*³⁷, i.e. capable of *decentration*.

Intercultural pedagogy does not rely exclusively on content, a syllabus, but also on an approach and a method. Foreign culture classes, such as American Civilisation, have long been places for listing facts, even if cultural ones, without a comparative approach that could bring students to see clearly the purpose of what they learn and, consequently, induce the process of questioning their own taken-for-granted values, opinions and representations. Methods, such as analogy and contrast, which confront native and foreign cultures, can help students to effectuate *decentration* by revealing the degree to which false representations and stereotypes are often the only instruments that are used to approach the *other*, instead of objective and realistic tools of analysis. Because representations and stereotypes are not merely cognitive processes and rather psychological mechanisms of interpretation, solutions to alter or correct them cannot be found in the contents of syllabi. As Abadallah-Preteuille (2004: 160) put it: *“Intercultural pedagogy is a pedagogy in action that builds and develops within confrontation, experience and analysis”*³⁸.

Accumulation of information and data about a foreign culture is a vain way to deal with representations and stereotypes. Ignorance is not the cause of false representations and stereotypes. It is their nutrient broth which favours their growth. Studies in the United States, for instance, have shown that institutional policies to struggle against prejudice in schools, through cinema and conferences, as a way to inform people, have not been effective (Bastide 1970). The real cause is rather the various ideologies, religious and political, that construct the false representations and stereotypes through the continuous discursive hype in the media and by

³⁷ (MOT)

³⁸ (MOT)

means of other social institutions like the school and the mosque. Thus, dealing with false self-representations, representations of the *other* and the subsequent stereotypes, in a foreign culture class or elsewhere, starts by showing the contradictions of the ideological discourse. Confronting false representations and stereotypes only through knowledge and reasoning is remaining at the very theoretical level, while ideology, as stated by C. Guillaumin, “*thinks nothing, believes in nothing, it claims itself*” (quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 183)³⁹.

What ideologies rely on, in their influence on students, is affect, i.e. the individuals’ psychological attachment to their own cultural values and their fear, disgust or total rejection of the *other’s*. Many regimes, now, even democratic ones, instrumentalise affective factors to convince the people to accept policies. The case, for instance, of how the American government has succeeded in maintaining the Patriot Act⁴⁰, which is in total contradiction with the most cherished American values of freedom, shows the extent to which affect can bring the individual to change his mind on some of the most tremendously important subjects.

Affect needs to be central to any pedagogy of foreign culture teaching. Taking into account the students’ prior feelings about the subject studied in the lesson preparation stage is essential to anticipating students’ negative reactions. Students’ verbalisation of these feelings becomes part of the

³⁹ (MOT)

⁴⁰ “Subtitled “*Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism*”, It [the Patriot Act] is a law enacted by American Congress in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks [on the World Trade Center] (45 days later) to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world. Very much criticised by some people inside and outside the United States as a threat against civil liberties (for example, without a warrant, the FBI now has the power to access one’s most private school or medical records), it was meant by the Bush administration as the only means to preserve innocent lives from terrorism by: allowing FBI investigators to use the tools that were already available to investigate organised crime and drug trafficking, and allowing law enforcement to use surveillance against more crimes of terror” (Nait Brahim 2005: 121-122).

lesson plan, not to say the most important part. It is in this sense that intercultural pedagogy can be learner-centred, where working in class is focused more on the prejudiced student than on the object of prejudice itself, more on the teaching process than on the teaching material (Zarate 2004: 72). Anticipation of such responses is based on the principle that the human mind is “*an active instrument, an agent of transformation which filters information by comparing it to what it already knows*” (Sherif 1971: 141)⁴¹. This implies that native culture is the filter for foreign cultures as new information and experiences, and as long as old information is not *relativised*, new information is automatically rejected if it contradicts it.

Thus, by bearing in mind students’ affective apprehension of foreign cultures, intercultural pedagogy can transform foreign culture teaching from mere intellectual upbringing into real education which can enable them to view their native culture in its entirety, to *objectivise* it (i.e. make it concrete), to view it as a human *particularism*, and not as a universal one outside of which anything else would be deemed abnormal. This is the realisation of the fact that culture is necessarily subjective, something which leads to reaching relative objectivity, at least in intention. Learning foreign cultures is learning to overcome first-hand difference that may impede going into details. It is constructing and developing a scientific mind that can initiate reflection where affect curbs it. The scientific mind allows breaking, as far as otherness is concerned, bipolarisation which always puts the individual in a simplistic relationship to the *other* as a single entity, while it is actually many, or to use Said’s (1995: 332) words: “*Each age and society re-creates its ‘Others’.*”

If information is to take a place in foreign culture modules, it has first to be about the real functioning of cultures, i.e. foreign culture teaching has to

⁴¹ (MOT)

make use of applied anthropology (including theories drawn on anthropology, ethnography and ethnology) in an intercultural perspective. By showing how culture operates, students can objectivise their own culture and analyse its processes as they would do it for a foreign one. The use of anthropology, not as a mere science of man but rather as an *ethnography of communication* used to know what is needed to “*communicate appropriately and to make sense of communicative situations*” (Saville-Troike 2001: 351), will have the purpose to distinguish between the natural and the cultural, the universal and the particular, and thus learn, for students, to put what their culture and others establish as universal norms between inverted commas. Anthropology in an American Civilisation course would make of this subject, as Porcher put it, “*not a teaching for knowledge, but ... a teaching for communication, i.e. for the learner’s effective use of what he has learned, what he has made his own*” (quoted in Zarate 2004: 6)⁴².

4.9. Critical Discourse Analysis in Culture Studies

The anthropological approach to foreign culture teaching has, above all, the purpose of making students aware of the fact that, when dealing with cultures, there are a complex range of discourses and social knowledge available, that these discourses vary from stereotypes to sociological analyses, that the accuracy of the discourse depends on the degree one relies on the first or the second, that all these discourses are subjected to different political/ideological imperatives and influences.

While for ordinary people relying on first-hand representations and stereotypes in their approach to the *other* may be understood, students need to be conscious of the fact that, at the academic level, they are bound

⁴² (MOT)

to undertake a critical discourse analysis before taking any discourse, religious, cultural, political or scientific, at face value. Critical discourse analysis starts by rejecting postulates, ground-rules on which already-made opinions about the *other* are formed. It is not denying discourse outright; it is rather re-negotiating the terms of the contract of whether to be convinced or not. As defined by Saville-Troike:

Critical discourse analysis is not an objective ‘value-free’ science, but a socially committed activity with an acknowledged political, ideological, and ethical stance. ... In contrast to the Saussurian notion of an arbitrary relation between linguistic signs and meanings ... [and because] linguistic signs are the result of social processes, linguistic features are never arbitrary conjuncts of form and meaning.

(Saville-Troike 2003: 254)

Critical discourse analysis unfolds in three steps:

- Refusing what Giroux (2001) labelled *accommodation*, i.e. “*accepting the preferred meaning, or the subject position*” (Janks & Ivanič 1992: 309).
- Opposing the discourse by being aware of the forces that lead people to accept it. This means that one needs to be aware of the ideological grounds of opinions, representations and stereotypes that form a culture’s view of another, whether his about the foreign or the foreign about his.
- Resisting by thinking differently if proof is made of the inaccuracy of the discourse. This is bringing about a new discourse, one that liberates from the ideological blinders that blur vision, a discourse that can be called an *emancipatory discourse*.

The development of an emancipatory discourse is the individual's refusal of what Althusser (1993) called *interpellation*:

Ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among the individuals, ... or 'transforms' the individuals into subjects ... by that very operation that I called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!'... the hailed individual will turn around. By this mere one hundred and eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he recognised that the hail was 'really' addressed to him, and that 'it was really him who was hailed' and not someone else.

(ibid.: 48)

When one is *interpellated* by ideological discourses and accepts the appellations attributed to people and things, without any critical response, he recognises them and becomes then a subject. He surrenders his *skeptron*, the right to speak, the right to think, and the right to name things differently. Naming, i.e. using language, is an important aspect of fashioning the vision of the world and subsequently behaviour. Emancipatory discourse is about having the right to naming things differently from the way dominant ideologies have done it, and this may probably not be more vital than it is for foreign language and culture students, whose daily concern is about the right words to use to name the right things, whether about their native culture or the foreign ones. Emancipatory discourse, for teachers, is to show clearly how ideological substratum underlies all discourses in order to show the various forms of power or power abuse through language, native or foreign.

It is probably through religious discourse that ideology is the most effective as religion has the greatest power of interpellation, showing patronising, demeaning and exclusive attitudes, where the individual is the subject of God, عبد (slave), and by extension, becomes the subject of God's

self-mandated spokespeople. It is probably in front of such a discourse that individuals and students are disempowered, and it is certainly in this context that emancipatory discourse is mostly needed, allowing students to be, more than self-asserting or self-empowering, and rather be not effaced as human beings first, as intellectuals second, to know precisely when to yield and when to resist.

In foreign language and culture studies, where the main object of study is the text (be it a text of fiction or not), the position from which the student approaches the text is essential in determining his attitude towards it. When he feels interpellated, as a subject, i.e. as a person who does not have the right to have an opinion, to criticise, he acquiesces to any thesis presented in the text as truth. Whereas when he feels in an empowered position, as somebody who can formulate a view, he is able to criticise, to have a choice, i.e. a person who needs to be convinced with sound arguments. Instilling this idea in the student's mind is part of *critical language pedagogy* (Kramsch 2001: 244) that will teach him to have a critical attitude inside and outside the classroom, towards his cultural assumptions or the *other's*, towards religious, political or any other type of discourse. This, of course, behoves the teacher to have a great ability to listen, not only to "*the linguistic form or the propositional content of students' utterances*", but also, and mainly, to their "*silences and to their ... implicit assumptions and beliefs*" (ibid.: 245).

4.10. Towards a 'Third Culture'

Adopting an intercultural pedagogy, on the part of the teacher, and developing an emancipatory discourse through a critical discourse analysis of all available discourses, on the student's, is to enable the latter to be

aware of his potential to make new meanings, especially through the use of the foreign language they learn. This is probably one of the most advantageous outcomes of foreign language learning: the possibility to make thoughts, in the target language, that were not available in the native one, a phenomenon described by Britton et al. as “*shaping at the point of utterance*” (quoted in Kramsch 2001: 105).


Learning a foreign language and experiencing a foreign culture are together opportunities for exercising “*both a social and a personal voice*” (ibid.: 233) that may not be allowed to express itself in the native language and culture. This is what pro-status-quo ideologies fear in foreign cultures, viewed as breakers of social invisible censorship. Breaking censorship may lead to questioning traditional social practices by penetrating, on the one hand, a new speech community that makes available new meanings not present in the one’s speech community.

On the other hand and most importantly, it is also integrating a new discourse community that can provide the discursive means to criticise and form new opinions different from the ones advocated by dominant ideologies. This is possible because a discourse community is formed by a group with “*similar social characteristics and/or academic or professional orientations, as well as a shared set of rhetorical norms and conventions*” (Saville-Troike 2003: 145)⁴³. As such, foreign language and culture learning offers the opportunity to be part of an intellectual, and mostly an ethical group, intellectuals, regardless of ethnic, religious or national considerations. Being part of such a group, because of common concerns, gives birth to a *group crossing* (Ladmiral & Lipiansky 1989) in which

⁴³ On the basis of Mesthrie’s (2000: 323) definition of discourse as “*different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practices*” or “*systems of rules implicated in specific kinds of power relations*”, Saville-Troike (2003: 255) suggests another definition of discourse community as “a group of people who share ways of thinking, believing, behaving, and using language which are embodied in particular social roles...”

individuals belonging to different social categories rediscover each other and overcome false representations and stereotypes, something impossible to happen when ethnic or religious interests are more valued than human ones.

Foreign language and culture learning is a formidable opportunity for group crossing, and it is also for such a reason that foreign cultures are viewed by conservative regimes as carriers of subversive discourse. Where intellectuals see change and evolution, these regimes see subversion as this change is the first threat to the status quo. Contact with foreign cultures necessarily brings alterations in self-representations or representations of the *other*, something which, in its turn, induces change in taken-for-granted opinions about vital institutions such as political ones:



Struggling against objective intercultural experiences is, according to Kramsch, struggling against:

... the opportunity for personal meanings, pleasures and power. From the clash between the familiar meanings of the native culture and the unexpected meanings of the target culture, meanings that were taken for granted are suddenly questioned, challenged, problematized.

(Kramsch 2001: 238)

What then learning a foreign language and experiencing a foreign culture offer is crossing the cultural, national and ideological boundaries that confinement within one's speech community does not allow. Language being "a major factor in inequalities of access to knowledge" (ibid.: 266), mastering a foreign language is having access to the means to break the control imposed by the lack of competence in classical Arabic in the case of

Algerian students. By crossing symbolic boundaries, in case they are free from false representations and stereotypes, i.e. free from ideological inhibitors, students indulge into the process of creating a new culture, different from their native one and distinct from the target one, a culture Kramsch (2001) refers to with the expression *third culture*.

It is certainly not an easy matter to be part of a discourse community like the intelligentsia in societies where this community lacks recognition or a symbolic capital. As it has been advanced in Chapter Three, in an ideologically-loaded environment, words do not carry, in essence, the illocutionary force necessary for inducing a perlocutionary effect (i.e. initiate corresponding action); it is society that attributes this force to words by attributing authority and the power to speak for it to people who become its mandated spokespeople. Within unfavourable conditions, due to political and religious stigmatisation, intellectuals fall short of gaining this power that would enable them to have some influence in the discursive market, and consequently on people's opinions and representations. Being part of this community becomes then a great challenge for students who would feel that they integrate a social minority, not quite appreciated by the rest of society.

The third culture, however, is not the feeling of being "*betwixt and between, no longer at home in their original culture, nor really belonging to the host culture*" (ibid.: 234), it is bringing about change in one's culture by integrating, from the foreign culture, what makes the individual feel himself an agent within his social environment, capable of thinking, speaking, and in no need of a self-mandated spokesperson. It is speaking out oneself through whatever linguistic means suitable. This is the culture that can rehabilitate intellectuals within the Algerian intellectual and social market.

This is actually not a new situation to create in Algeria. It is rather a re-

creation of state that writers, such as Mouloud Mammeri, Kateb Yacine and Mohammed Dib, for instance, have experienced and lived on a daily basis by appropriating the French language to express the most profound Algerian sentiments.⁴⁴

The third culture is to be the space where the rhetorical⁴⁵ relationship, between *rhetor* (speaker) and audience, between discourse and students, would change. That relationship of master to disciple, of dictator to executor, would become a relationship of somebody who suggests and someone who considers, decides, and acts accordingly. If classical Arabic, the instrument of power that has long been used to maintain this rhetorical relationship in Algeria, is to get a place in a balanced public debate, it must cease to be a stake, transforming a linguistic legitimacy and competence into a political one, in the hands of politicians and religious representatives.

Classical Arabic has been associated with highly demanding fields, religion and politics. This has raised generations of Algerians who have acquired the habit of accepting without questioning, either because it is forbidden, sinful, or exclusively reserved for experts. What classical Arabic can gain from students' experience with foreign languages and cultures is to become, within the third culture, part of their tools of expression, reflection, and debate, i.e. become a means at the service of communication instead of ideology.

Access to the third culture is blocked by the lack, on the part of teachers

⁴⁴ Algerians' appropriation of the French language has long questioned the official status of this language. Despite the wide use of French in all aspects of life, it is still considered by Algerian official discourse as a foreign language. Experts, whether in Algeria or elsewhere, have formulated various opposite views about this case, to the point that Byram (1989: 40) himself acknowledged the existence of Frenches, as varieties of French, among which Algerian French.

⁴⁵ Rhetoric is understood here, beyond the traditional definition of "*artful and skilled use of language ... for persuasive purposes.*" (Saville-Troike 2003: 145), as discursive strategies used for the regulation of power relationships.

in foreign language degrees, of working on representations. Zarate (2004: 75) spoke of the necessity to undertake a diagnosis of initial representations before starting any programme in foreign culture teaching. The advantage the Algerian teacher teaching in Algerian universities has is that he is aware of these representations well in advance. This spares him the time he would waste in detecting them and gives enough scope to anticipate students' responses to themes studied in foreign cultures subjects such as American or British Civilisation. He is able to adapt the programme which is designed at a given moment according to the events that may alter representations and thus necessitate other types of approaches, methods, and teaching materials. It is probably not wise to think that the introduction of new technological means, such as internet, into the classroom is enough to deal with representations. Technology is not pedagogy; it can only be at its service. What is certainly needed is opening the students' eyes before their cultural assumptions and confront them with the *other's*. In this connection, Zarate sees that history should hold an important place in culture studies. The history of the relations between various cultural groups allows observing the evolution of representations over time:

*The description of outdated cultural practices offers a great interest for a work of distancing from the present. It allows a distant examination of relations of symbolic domination ... the historical document permits to find how meaning was constructed, to restore the diversity of interests which first were at stake.*⁴⁶

(ibid.: 39)

Representations have often been determined by daily events that may bring groups closer together or separate between them. Algerian relations, and Arab countries' relations in general, to France have been, these last years, oscillating between the first and second kinds according to the French position in conflicts and affairs involving Arab-Islamic interests.

⁴⁶ (MOT)

Representations of the French people have also followed this oscillation continuously over short intervals of time. Deconstruction of representations through a historical line is essential to avoiding the restrictive and blurring immediate vision of events and relations to the *other*.

As already hinted at in the Introduction, studying a foreign culture is necessarily involving private and personal aspects of one's life, since it is ways of life, as experienced by individuals, which are discovered. Personal involvement in the course and reference to students' individual experiences are welcome. They can only reveal the truth about the representations that may be the cause for the negative attitudes towards the *other*. In front of personal uncovering, the teacher will certainly be more effective if he avoids a moralistic discourse, in one way or another, which may have a counter-productive effect and induce repression instead of discussion and correction.

4.11. Conclusion

Foreign culture teaching in Algeria, as part of foreign language teaching, has often expressed three main orientations among teachers, according to the teacher's ideological stance and his conception of the role and objectives of foreign culture studies:

1. Stigmatisation of the foreign culture and over-praising of the native one leading to the belief in an all-positive 'we' and a 'they' as a scapegoat responsible for the life hardships of the 'we'. This tends to be the stance of teachers who, because they consider that Algerian culture is under threat when in contact with foreign cultures, feel the need to protect students from acculturation/interculturalisation in order to preserve the outcome of enculturation. This orientation exasperates negative attitudes and stands, willingly or unconsciously, as a relay for the dominant ideological discourse.
2. Over-praising of the foreign culture and total neglect of the native one. This is the attitude of teachers who enshrine foreign cultures (mainly 'Western') as models that their students should look up to. This prevents students from appreciating the positive aspects of their culture and from viewing the foreign one in its real form.
3. Exposition of the two cultures as two separate equal entities without any influence of one over the other. This is the approach of teachers who prefer to avoid confrontation and keep the pace of syllabus steady without any hindrance.

In the three directions, students are not invited to have their own say and are rather geared towards frames of opinions to which they are bound to

conform. Without even stating it in explicit terms, the fact of valuing one culture at the expense of the other, or claiming a clear-cut distinction is implicitly advocating possession of absolute truth and dissuading students from expressing views.

There must then be a fourth direction, that of a third culture which acknowledges the ineluctable interaction between cultures, an interculturalisation that takes place at the smallest occasion of contact, be it direct or indirect. Bringing students to be aware of this phenomenon and its full understanding and practice is probably one of the main objectives of the didactics of culture teaching, expressed in clear terms by Byram and Zarate:

*Learning how to conceptualise a reference (relate an opinion with the medium which conveys it, with the position of dominant or dominated of the one who claims it, with the historical period it belongs to), learning how to link historical references to a generation.*⁴⁷

(Byram and Zarate 1997: 21)

This fourth direction will call upon students' critical understanding of both their native values and the *other's* by looking at present situations as moments of history subject to alteration and evolution. It will also bring them to take a stance on grounds of personal research and analysis, an approach that can be described as *political-action orientated* (Byram 1989: 60). This may probably be a suitable disposition for students who intend to integrate the new university system, the LMD system.

⁴⁷ (MOT)

4.12. Original Quotations

Page 254

... c'est la forme et le contenu d'une coupe transversale opérée en un point particulier du continuum culturel.

(Linton 1968: 331)

... les manières typiques d'un groupe culturel de percevoir et de conceptualiser son environnement.

(Zavalloni, quoted in Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 26)

... c'est finalement le point de vue qui crée l'objet.

(Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 26)

Page 257

L'assertion naïve selon laquelle la simple contiguïté dans un contexte agréable suffit à promouvoir l'harmonie a été tristement réfutée.

(Sherif 1971: 157)

... la seule spontanéité et bonne volonté des participants.

(Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 184)

Page 259

... le socius ou l'autre est un partenaire perpétuel du moi dans la vie psychique.

(Wallon 1959: 284)

Page 260

Alors que chaque société croit traiter des autres et de leurs problèmes (...), alors qu'elle feint de 'sortir' d'elle-même, elle ne se pose en réalité que les problèmes qui sont les siens. C'est ainsi que le discours qu'elle tient sur la personnalité culturelle des immigrés ne révèle en fait que ses propres tendances.

(Sayad 1978: 2)

Page 263

... s'enferme dans une conception fixiste, rigide et mosaïque des cultures où les systèmes évolueraient parallèlement sans inter-pénétration et inter-compréhension.

(Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 89)

(Footnote 15)

O. Spengler ne conçoit pas le rapport entre la civilisation et la culture comme une simultanéité, mais comme 'une succession organique nécessaire' ; la civilisation est le destin inéluctable et la fin de toute culture.

(Marcuse 1970: 110)

Page 265

... le principe actif du processus de différenciation... Le pouvoir ne peut s'exercer que s'il existe effectivement deux groupes différenciés, s'il existe une distinction entre 'nous' et 'eux'. Différencier afin de mieux repérer un ensemble d'individus et de pouvoir leur assigner une place déterminée, séparée, constitue donc des procédures fondamentales du pouvoir. Le marquage en est le premier instrument.

(Apfelbaum, quoted in Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 64)

Page 267

... par lequel l'individu prend distance par rapport à l'autre et se saisit comme distinct de lui.

(Camilleri 1980: 331)

... nativism, prophetism, messianism Ce sont des essais de retour en arrière, des efforts de retribalisation.

(Bastide 1971: 58)

Page 268

... l'angoisse, le sentiment de culpabilité, le désespoir, l'indifférence.

(Devereux 1972: 212)

Page 269

... réduire toutes les modifications capables de mettre en péril l'intégrité du sujet.

(Raveau 1976: 478).

... certains caractères de l'identité culturelle d'un groupe deviennent soit dominants, soit récessifs selon les besoins de la cause.

(Maestri, quoted in Abdallah-Preteceille 2004a: 26)

Page 272

C'est ce qu'ignore la description interactionniste qui traite l'interaction comme un empire dans un empire, oubliant que ce qui se passe entre deux personnes... en situation

coloniale... ou encore en situation postcoloniale... doit sa forme particulière à la relation objective entre les langues ou les usages correspondants, c'est-à-dire entre les groupes qui parlent ces langues.

(Bourdieu 2001: 101)

Page 274

... le support par excellence du rêve de pouvoir absolu.

(Bourdieu 2001: 66)

Page 278

... le monde social est, pour une grande part, quelque chose que les agents font, à chaque moment; mais ils n'ont de chances de le défaire et de le refaire que sur la base d'une connaissance réaliste de ce qu'il est et de ce qu'ils peuvent sur lui en fonction de la position qu'ils y occupent.

(Bourdieu 2001: 311)

Page 279

... le prêtre appelle Dieu sa propre volonté.

(Nietzsche 1990: 77)

Page 283

... participe à cette recherche de cohérence sociale qui repose sur une construction permanente et non sur un état stable, défini une fois pour toutes.

(Abdallah-Preteille 2004b: 107)

Page 284

... les idées-forces doivent une part de leur crédit au crédit de la personne qui, en les professant, les garantit et qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement de les réfuter, par une argumentation purement logique, mais les discréditer en discréditant leur auteur.

(Bourdieu 2001: 242)

... c'est en s'annulant complètement au profit du Dieu ou du peuple, que le sacerdoce se fait Dieu ou Peuple. C'est lorsque je deviens Rien – et parce que je suis capable de devenir Rien, de m'annuler, de m'oublier, de me sacrifier, de me dévouer -, que je deviens Tout. Je ne suis rien que le mandataire de Dieu ou du Peuple...

(Bourdieu 2001: 269)

Page 285

... 'tu n'es pas le groupe' ...

(Bourdieu 2001: 270)

Page 286

La référence à la philosophie, conçue comme pensée non mythique, montre bien que le préalable à l'évaluation négative du mythe n'est pas nécessairement la possession de la vérité, mais l'avènement d'un autre type de pensée, dans un autre contexte historique, où se montre la relativité de l'adhésion au mythe et se révèle le mythe comme mythe : 'ce qui illusoire en elles ... [dans les représentations religieuses] l'est pour qui ? Non pour ceux qui y croient, mais pour ceux qui n'y croient pas ou plus...'

(Capdevila 2004: 219)

Page 287

... un mythe n'est un mythe que pour ceux qui n'y croient pas.

(Godelier 1984: 202).

Page 288

... la prise de conscience et 'déconstruction' des attitudes et autres éléments de la personnalité qui empêchent de prendre en compte l'autre dans sa différence.

(Camilleri & Cohen-Emerique 1989: 393)

... d'en supporter l'existence, même incomprise, parce qu'incomprise.

(Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 154).

... être homme, c'est être capable de transfert dans un autre centre de perspective.

(Ricoeur 1961: 452)

Page 289

La pédagogie interculturelle est une pédagogie en acte qui se construit et se développe dans la confrontation, l'expérience et l'analyse.

(Abdallah-Pretceille 2004: 160).

Page 290

... pense rien, et ne croit rien, il se pose.

(Guillaumin, quoted in Abdallah-Pretceille 2004a: 183).

Page 291

... l'esprit humain est un instrument actif, un agent de transformation ... [qui] filtre l'information ... [en] la comparant à ce qu'il connaît déjà...

(Sherif 1971: 144)

Page 292

... pas un enseignement pour la connaissance, mais ... un enseignement pour la communication, c'est-à-dire pour l'usage effectif, par l'apprenant, de ce qu'il a appris, de ce qu'il s'est approprié.

(Porcher, in Zarate 2004: 6).

Page 300

La description des pratiques culturelles périmées présente un grand intérêt pour un travail de distanciation par rapport au présent. Elle permet l'examen, avec recul, des relations de domination symbolique... le document historique permet de retrouver comment le sens s'est construit, de restaurer la diversité des intérêts qui étaient alors en jeu.

(Zarate 2004: 39)

Page 303

... savoir conceptualiser une référence (mettre en relation une opinion avec le média qui la porte, avec la position de dominant ou de dominé de celui qui l'expose, avec l'époque historique à laquelle elle se rapporte), savoir associer des références historiques à une génération.

(Byram and Zarate 1997: 21)

GENERAL CONCLUSION

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APPENDICES

1. APPENDIX I: Questionnaire.....	348
2. APPENDIX II : President Bouteflika's Speeches.....	352
3. APPENDIX III: Mohamed Amara's Articles.....	384
4. APPENDIX IV: Mohamed Khalil's Article.....	403
5. APPENDIX V: Mohamed Reda's Article.....	405

1. APPENDIX I

Questionnaire

1. Questionnaire

This questionnaire is concerned with determining your views of your culture and American culture.

1. Circle the relevant suggested word (you can choose more than one option or none). You can add any commentary you feel like making, in any language you wish.

1. Which of these qualifiers would you apply to the American government:
enviable – good – detestable - disgusting

2. Which of these qualifiers would you apply to the American people:
enviable – good – detestable – disgusting

3. Which of these qualifiers would you apply to American culture:
enviable – good – detestable – disgusting

4. Which of these countries you feel closer to your culture?
Morocco – Saudi Arabia – Iraq – Palestine

5. Which of these countries you feel closer to your culture?
Morocco – Iran – Afghanistan – Indonesia

6. Which of these countries you feel closer to your culture?
the United States – France – Britain – Sweden

7. Which of these countries you feel closer to your culture?
the United States – Saudi Arabia – France – Iran?

8. Which of these people do you think personify your most cherished values:
Martin Luther King – Abbé Pierre – Gandhi – Abraham Lincoln

9. Which of these people do you think personify your most cherished values:
Bin Laden – Amr Khaled – Arafat – Ibn Badis

10. Which of these historical figures do you have admiration for:
Salah Eddine Al Ayoubi – Thomas Jefferson – Houari Boumedienne –
Gamel Abdenasser

11. Which of these sources do you think is closer to Truth:
the Bible – scientific books – novels – newspapers

12. Which of these sources do you think is closer to Truth:
the Koran – the Bible – scientific books – novels

13. Which of these countries do you think you are in conflict with:
Morocco – Libya – Egypt – France

14. Which of these countries do you think you are in conflict with:
the United States – Israel – France – Morocco

15. Which of these countries do you consider as foreign:
the United States – France – Morocco – Nigeria

16. Which of these media types do you consider as the most reliable source
of information: radio – television – press – internet

17. Which of these TV channels do you consider as reliable:
Algerian TV – Iqraa – Al Jazeera – Al Arabya

18. Which of these TV channels do you consider as reliable:
CNN – BBC – Iqraa – Algerian TV

19. Which of these countries do you hold responsible for the evils of the
world:
the United States – Israel – Iran – Syria

20. Which of these peoples do you hold responsible for the evils of the
world:
Jews – Muslims – Christians – atheist

21. Which of these countries do you think is the best representative of the
Arabic language: Algeria – Saudi Arabia – Egypt – Iraq

22. Which of these countries do you think is the best representative of the
English language: The United States – Britain – Nigeria – India

II. Circle 'yes' or 'no' in each of the following questions. You can add any
commentary you feel like making, in any language you wish.

1. Do you find any thing interesting in American culture?
YES NO

2. Do you find any American cultural influence in your culture?
YES NO

3. Do you think you have anything interesting to learn from American culture?

YES

NO

III. Answer the following questions. You can add any commentary you feel like making, in any language you wish.

1. List the first three words that come to your mind when you hear the word American:
2. List the first three words that come to your mind when you hear the word Jewish:
3. List three of your most favourite TV channels:
4. Name your most favourite book:

2. Appendix II

President Bouteflika's Speeches

2. President Bouteflika's Speeches

I. DISCOURS DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE A L'OCCASION DE LA SEMAINE NATIONALE SUR LE CORAN

(Alger, 27 mai 2001)

(http://www.waac.info/library/documents/bouteflika5-27-01_fr.html)

Depuis que l'Islam illumine les quatre coins de l'Algérie, que les Algériens se sont imprégnés de ses préceptes de tolérance, qu'ils ont adopté la langue du Coran comme langue du savoir et de la culture, et que les comportements individuels et collectifs se sont inspirés des nobles valeurs musulmanes.

L'Algérie a contribué à l'enrichissement de l'éminente civilisation musulmane, voire de la civilisation humaine, par l'apport remarquable de ses penseurs et savants émérites qui se sont distingués dans tous les domaines du savoir et de la connaissance. La contribution de l'Algérie à cette renaissance scientifique, o combien féconde, a été rendue possible par son inébranlable unité religieuse et nationale, cette unité qui n'a jamais fléchi et qui ne s'est jamais démentie même aux plus sombres tournants de notre histoire, l'Algérien ayant de tout temps veillé, avec un soin jaloux, sur cette unité religieuse nationale qui lui est sacrée.

C'est par la grâce de tous ces facteurs, que l'Algérie n'a jamais connu de fanatisme idéologique étroit, de luttes ethniques ou de passions confessionnelles. L'Algérie est restée, et restera par la grâce de Dieu une entité civilisationnelle incarnant fidèlement les propos de Dieu le tout-puissant "parmi ses signes, la création des cieux et de la terre et la différence de vos langues et de vos sortes en quoi résident des signes pour ceux qui savent".

La société algérienne a un tissu social et culturel riche et dense à l'image de son immense variété géographique et économique, c'est dans cette diversité que réside le secret de sa force, de sa cohésion et de son équilibre. Sa diversité est de celles qui sont synonymes de richesse, de complémentarité et d'unité, de celles qui excluent les divergences, les exclusions et les séparations. Ne dit-on pas que les troncs les plus vigoureux, et les racines les plus profondes se reconnaissent à leurs branches lourdes et nombreuses qui tirent leur substance d'une terre fertile arrosée de la sève de l'unité ?

C'est par l'union, la cohésion et l'harmonie de ses rangs, que l'Algérie a pu conserver sa souveraineté entre les mains de ses enfants, malgré l'importance des secousses et la terrible réalité des périls et des épreuves qu'elle a endurés.

En ces circonstances douloureuses, où l'Algérie est traîtreusement poignardée alors qu'elle cherchait à alléger son fardeau, et où elle fait face à un complot ourdi de l'intérieur et de l'extérieur visant à déstabiliser le peuple Algérien tout entier, et poursuivant des visées criminelles qui alarment et inquiètent les martyrs d'hier et d'aujourd'hui.

Notre foi et notre croyance, au moment où nous nous apprêtons à commémorer l'anniversaire de la naissance du prophète Mohamed, le sceau des messagers de Dieu sur terre, est le ciment indestructible de notre cohésion et notre bouclier protecteur contre lequel viendront s'échouer toutes les ondes néfastes et qui réduira à néant toutes les tentatives vaines et futiles.

Notre foi inébranlable a été notre source d'inspiration pendant la longue nuit coloniale jusqu'à notre libération. Elle le restera tant qu'il y aura un ciel au-dessus de nos têtes et de la terre ferme sous nos pas. Dieu n'a-t-il pas uni nos cœurs et ne nous a-t-il pas armés d'une foi inébranlable pour nous protéger de la division. Le très haut n'a-t-il pas dit : "puisque'il a mis entre leurs cœurs tellement d'affinités, qu'au prix de tous les trésors de la terre, tu ne pourrais les lier ainsi, mais c'est bien Dieu qui les rend affinitaires, lui tout-puissant et sage..."

L'homme ne saurait défaire ce que Dieu a uni, car sa volonté s'impose à tous. L'Algérie bien que blessée aujourd'hui, demeurera, par la grâce du tout-puissant, sous sa très haute protection. Nul doute que sa miséricorde habitera le cœur de chaque citoyen, qui unit dans une même ferveur l'amour de Dieu et de son pays, et qui fait le bien envers sa société et ses concitoyens, car Dieu protège les âmes charitables et bienfaisantes.

Messieurs,

Par delà, les résultats bénéfiques qui en sont attendus, une rencontre scientifique et religieuse de ce type, offre l'occasion d'un examen de conscience critique éloigné de toute complaisance.

L'occasion de dresser un bilan de nos actes, en nous armant des principes de notre religion, et en transcendant la réalité actuelle pour tenter de nous rapprocher des nobles enseignements et du comportement constructif idéal.

Nous devons rectifier notre perception de la réalité de notre civilisation et prendre la mesure de ce qui doit être fait pour améliorer cette situation. Nous sommes une société résolument tournée vers le progrès et, en tant que telle, nous nous devons de tenir compte de la vitesse étourdissante à laquelle évolue le monde qui nous entoure.

Nous ne devons pas oublier, un seul instant, que nous sommes parties prenantes d'une lutte de civilisation inégale, et rester profondément conscients que la mondialisation est une réalité incontournable. Nous devons tenir compte de sa logique et de lourdes pressions qu'elle exerce, sans pour autant nous détourner de notre quête, celle qui recherche des moyens d'interaction positifs sur l'autre, une saine ouverture vers l'autre afin de tirer un profit judicieux de ses précieuses possessions, en nous armant de patience et en persévérant dans la défense de notre bien, de notre bon droit qui n'admet ni discussion ni négociation.

Notre siècle des technologies et de la planification scientifique en toutes choses et pour tout, ne laisse nulle place au doute, à l'hésitation et à l'improvisation là où il s'agit de dresser des ambitions et des plans pour l'avenir.

Il y a lieu toutefois, de tenir compte d'une réalité fondamentale, en l'occurrence que notre attachement à notre foi et la fierté légitime que nous tirons de notre héritage

culturel et de notre civilisation, ne sauraient, en aucune manière, être synonymes de rigidité, d'inertie, de repli sur soi et d'isolement pas plus que d'aveuglement ou de laisser aller. Notre conviction qu'il faut s'adapter à la logique du siècle ne signifie pas ignorer notre être profond et le laisser se dissoudre dans l'autre ou accepter de douter de la vérité de Dieu sur terre. Un grand penseur Fukuyama a annoncé la fin de l'histoire et l'inéluctable rencontre des sociétés humaines au terme de leur destin et de leur évolution selon le modèle de civilisation occidentale, et que toutes les philosophies, croyances et systèmes allaient sombrer dans l'oubli.

Ces prédictions sont restées sans effet sur nos convictions et notre croyance, à nous autres musulmans, en la nécessité d'œuvrer à faire triompher les principes de justice, de liberté, d'égalité, de sécurité et de paix entre tous les peuples du monde dans un climat de coopération, d'échange, de dialogue entre civilisations humaines, conformément au verset "humains, nous vous avons créés d'un mâle et d'une femelle. Si nous avons fait de vous des peuples et des tribus, c'est en vue de votre connaissance mutuelle. Le plus digne au regard de Dieu, c'est celui qui se prémunit davantage".

Cet examen de conscience scrupuleux peut nous révéler des contradictions à la base de notre réalité civilisationnelle et nous inciter à les dépasser. Quiconque prend la peine d'examiner la situation des musulmans en général, constatera des contradictions affligeantes à plus d'un titre et dans des domaines divers. Les sociétés occidentales s'emploient intelligemment et adroitement, au jour d'aujourd'hui, à dépasser leurs vives divergences historiques, qui se sont nourries, des siècles durant, de rancœurs, de haines et de disputes. Elles s'emploient résolument à fortifier la cohésion de leurs rangs pour se doter de la force nécessaires pour asseoir leur domination. Les sociétés musulmanes, par contre, se replient, au nom de la religion et de l'histoire, sur tous les vecteurs d'union et de force.

Ce faisant, elles mettent à jour une contradiction criante entre d'une part, l'élévation de leurs croyances religieuses, leur force numérique, la vastitude de leur territoire, la richesse de leurs ressources et d'autre part, leur sous-développement et leur faiblesse.

De surcroît, ces sociétés sont tiraillées entre l'authenticité et la modernité, et donc entre le respect des convictions, de l'héritage et de l'appartenance civilisationnelle, et la nécessité de s'amarrer au développement, à l'évolution et au renouveau imposés par la logique de notre siècle.

Il est certain que cette conciliation nécessaire entre l'authenticité et la modernité peut aisément trouver son expression au plan théorique, la société musulmane peut rester attachée à l'Islam, ses valeurs constantes et ses principes pérennes comme le faisaient nos ancêtres, tout en vivant à l'air de son temps et au rythme de ce siècle marqué par les changements et les évolutions successives générées par la science et la technologie, en planifiant son présent et son futur aussi précisément que les autres nations développées.

En d'autres termes, il s'agit pour cette société de faire, en toute lucidité, une distinction entre les constantes et les variables dans le cours de son existence. Elle doit rester fermement attachée aux sources originelles en veillant avec un soin jaloux aux constantes aussi pérennes que la croyance qui les a engendrées. Elle doit, dans

le même temps, s'ouvrir, en souplesse, aux variables en considérant qu'il s'agit simplement de pratiques, modalités et moyens que doit acquérir toute génération désireuse de s'exprimer avec son époque et son temps.

Bien évidemment, cette conciliation n'est réalisable aussi aisément qu'en théorie. La société appelée à la concrétiser ne part pas, en effet, d'une situation civilisationnelle appropriée mais d'une réalité chargée d'une part, des séquelles du sous-développement et d'autre part, de la logique imposée par la lutte pour la croissance et l'accomplissement de l'être.

La sagesse est l'objet de la quête du croyant, il la cueille partout où elle se trouve. Ce sage hadith a été adopté par les premiers musulmans comme précepte éducatif fondamental dans l'attitude à l'égard des talents et des génies. L'oeuvre de création humaine, en général, loin de tout complexe ou appréhension. Ils ont pris connaissance du savoir et des connaissances de l'autre musulman par un esprit d'ouverture, le sens de la modestie et de nobles valeurs morales, celles-là mêmes que recommande notre religion. En effet, la transmission du savoir est un principe cardinal en Islam qui rejette tout monopole ou enfermement. Il appartient donc aux musulmans de chercher à bénéficier du savoir et du talent de leurs enfants ou qu'ils se trouvent.

Messieurs,

Nul n'ignore que les jeunes sont les premiers concernés par les résultats de ces colloques, car ils sont les architectes et les défenseurs de l'avenir. Une telle réunion est l'occasion de leur rappeler que l'Algérie est leur patrie et que l'édification de leur pays ne peut se faire que par le savoir et le travail, que la croyance religieuse, quelle que soit sa vitalité et sa force, ne saurait suffire à elle seule et qu'elle doit reposer sur une pensée éclairée par le savoir et la sagesse.

L'Islam est un climat civilisationnel sain, où s'épanouit la générosité du cœur, où se fortifie la morale, où l'être se purifie et où le sens civique se nourrit en permanence de la pensée qu'éclaire de livre saint et les préceptes du prophète que le salut de Dieu soit sur lui.

Il m'est agréable d'être parmi vous à l'occasion de ce colloque qui rend hommage à ceux qui ont bien du mérite, nos honorables cheikhs qui président aux destinées des zaouias et des écoles Coraniques, que Dieu leur rende au centuple leurs bienfaits, qu'il leur prête longue vie et rehausse leur mérite. Elle est également l'occasion de récompenser les étudiants émérites, qui ont appris le Coran, et qui se sont distingués dans cet art difficile.

L'Algérie a, de tout temps, accordé une attention particulière au Coran et aux gens du Coran, elle, qui dès les premiers pas du message du prophète a été un espace de rayonnement islamique fécond où les sciences du Coran et de la sunna ont prospéré, elle, qui a de tout temps enseigné à ses enfants les sages préceptes et les valeurs pérennes de notre Coran.

Cette authenticité religieuse a été, à chaque étape et à travers les générations qui se sont succédées, approfondie et affermie par les éminents oulémas algériens, qui ont

gagne la considération et le respect des oulémas de l'orient et de l'occident, grâce aux écoles de renom qu'ils ont créées et qui ont donné à l'Algérie une place de choix.

Pour conclure, j'ai le plaisir d'annoncer la création du prix algérien de récitation du Coran et de revivification du patrimoine musulman, la création d'un institut Islamique des sciences des lectures Coraniques, pour exprimer la fidélité des algériens à l'Islam, qui a transmis le message de Dieu par le sceau de ses prophètes, cette religion à laquelle les fidèles ont adhéré sous la poussée de la foi sans nulle hésitation ou réserve. Ils ont participé à sa diffusion sur terre ils en ont fait un bouclier protecteur, dans leur lutte et leur résistance et ils ont triomphé dans un passé récent. Ce bouclier, qui renforcera leur unité et préservera leur intégrité et assurera l'équilibre de leur évolution à la lumière des principes de liberté, de justice et de concorde.

Mais les termes de justice, de liberté et de concorde eux-mêmes n'ont plus beaucoup de sens alors qu'une patrie importante du pays vit une douloureuse épreuve d'ou la justice, la liberté et la concorde sont absentes. C'est la jeunesse algérienne toute entière qui souffre, tant il est vrai que le cœur des enfants d'un pays, aussi grand soit-il, bat toujours au même diapason.

La jeunesse de Kabylie, si fière si valeureuse, si dévouée et intrépide à la fois, est une partie importante de l'Algérie dont elle ne peut se passer et qui ne peut se passer d'elle. Dieu a dit "nous vous éprouvons au point de reconnaître parmi vous ceux qui font des efforts et les patients". Nous avons enduré la dure épreuve du terrorisme, et voici qu'un autre malheur vient s'abattre sur nous cause directement ou indirectement, publiquement ou secrètement. Nous nous en remettons à la justice divine au nom des martyrs d'hier et tout récents d'hier.

J'ai annoncé la création d'une commission d'enquête nationale présidée par le Dr Mohand Issad, qui est totalement indépendante. Il est libre de choisir les membres de la commission, libre de la gérer comme il l'entend, il jouit de toutes les prérogatives nécessaires, il peut convoquer et interroger qui il veut, au moment ou il le souhaite, la ou il le désire et comme il l'entend. Il peut s'aider et s'appuyer sur toutes les institutions de l'état, son rapport sera rendu public dans son intégralité afin que les instances judiciaires et légales prennent toutes les mesures qui s'imposent à l'encontre des auteurs qui ont allumé et attisé la flamme de la discorde, des sanctions rigoureuses en rapport avec les dépassements, quelle que soit leur origine, seront appliquées.

Pour ce qui est de la commission parlementaire, qui relève du pouvoir législatif, nous ne doutons ni de son intégrité ni de sa crédibilité. En ma qualité de garant de la constitution, je veillerai à ce qu'il soit tenu compte de toutes les mesures proposées par les deux commissions, nationale et parlementaire.

Par ailleurs, il appartient à la justice de jouer le rôle fondamental qui lui échoit, dans toute sa plénitude. Les responsables nationaux, chacun, dans son domaine de compétence, doivent suivre les secteurs en prise directe sur les événements, les suivre directement et veiller à la rectitude du comportement, dans la gestion et le soutien des familles affligées, la santé pour les questions sanitaires, l'enseignement dans le domaine éducatif, la solidarité en matière de solidarité, et toutes autres mesures pénales et administratives propres à rétablir la confiance et restaurer la quiétude.

Il n'y a pas lieu de s'étonner ou d'hésiter un seul instant devant ce que nous dicte la conscience, la constitution, la souveraineté populaire et l'unité nationale.

L'Algérie appartient aux Algériens, à tous les Algériens. Ils y ont des droits et elle a envers eux des obligations. Le respect des droits et obligations ne saurait exister l'un sans l'autre.

Je me suis engagé solennellement, et je ne suis pas de ceux qui renient leurs engagements, à ce que les questions culturelles et linguistiques soient prises en considération dans le cadre d'une révision constitutionnelle. En disant cela, je reste convaincu que le référendum risque d'être injuste en ne prenant pas en compte l'ensemble des aspects que soulève la question identitaire.

La constitution, qui est la loi fondamentale du pays, prendra toutefois en considération, les divers aspects de cette question et les traitera de manière à préserver toutes les spécificités des Algériens, et à garantir, dans le même temps, la cohésion sociale et la consolidation des constantes nationales.

Toutes les autorités concernées doivent protéger les personnes intègres qui se présenteront devant ces commissions, pour témoigner en toute confiance, sincérité et loyauté. Les victimes seront prise en charge, leurs familles seront soutenues et nous réfléchirons dans le cadre de nos coutumes, et les lois de la république aux moyens de réparer les dommages et les préjudices subis.

En ce qui concerne l'examen du baccalauréat, que ceux qui se sentent en mesure d'affronter les épreuves des examens le 9 juin prochain, le fassent, quant aux autres, ceux qui ont subi les atteintes de ces tristes événements, et Dieu est clément et miséricordieux, ils auront l'occasion de le faire, à titre exceptionnel au mois de septembre, à une date qui sera convenue directement avec les intéressés pour qu'il soit possible à l'université d'accueillir les lauréats dans les meilleures conditions possibles.

Cette session spéciale, ne concerne naturellement que les régions touchées par les événements douloureux, qui ont meurtri chaque Algérien jaloux de son pays, qu'il soit à l'est, à l'ouest, au nord ou au sud. Certes, nous mettons l'accent sur certaines décisions, notamment celles concernant les commissions d'enquête, mais qui oserait mettre en doute la crédibilité d'un Mohand Issad et jeter la suspicion sur son intégrité et sa volonté de parvenir rapidement à la vérité quoiqu'il en coûte.

Des torrents ont déferlé sur l'Algérie, des rumeurs ont été distillées, des forces malveillantes ont été mobilisées à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur pour exacerber les sentiments, attiser les émotions, semer la discorde et la confusion. Il faut dénoncer les intermédiaires, il faut que cesse de couler le sang des Algériens, qu'ils soient simples citoyens ou agents de l'état. Il faut que prévale le respect de la loi, si nous aspirons à un état de droit. Il ne sert à rien de dégrader les biens publics qui sont ceux de la collectivité nationale, ceux du peuple tout entier.

Toutes les solutions sont possibles, rien n'est impossible aux bonnes volontés lorsque s'unissent les efforts des hommes et des femmes désireux de mettre un terme à une tragédie révoltante qui attire sur notre pays la raillerie, la joie maligne et le sarcasme des autres.

Ne voyez-vous que certains désirent porter atteinte à l'unité nationale, l'unité du peuple et l'intégrité territoriale?

Ne voyez-vous pas tous les jours que certains mettent à profit des circonstances confuses pour commettre toutes sortes de vols, de pillages et de rackets?

Ces événements ont pris un cours qui véhicule à l'extérieur, l'image d'un pays qui ne réjouit pas les regards, et qui, à l'intérieur, plonge les enfants de ce pays dans les affres d'un désarroi o combien profond, après que tous, hommes et femmes vous ayez pu réunir les conditions d'une concorde civile, voire d'une réconciliation nationale, et que vous avez tous participé, les femmes comme les hommes, dans une très large mesure, au retour des choses à la normale, pour que l'Algérie reprenne sa place dans le concert des nations. Vous vous êtes mobilisés pour un nouveau saut qualitatif à portée sociale et économique de nature à redonner vigueur et à faire renaître l'espoir.

Nous sommes Algériens, nous avons nos spécificités dont les racines remontent loin dans le passé. Nous aspirons à la modernité et à la modernisation. Si nous sommes résolus à régler nos problèmes nous-mêmes. Nulle force ne pourra entamer notre résistance et notre capacité à prendre notre envol et à nous élever et nous imposer partout où nous le voudrions et quand nous le voudrions.

Je ne doute pas un seul instant que la colère cédera le pas au nationalisme, que Dieu étendra sa vaste miséricorde sur la peine et la souffrance des victimes et que nous parviendrons à les surmonter en nous aidant les uns et les autres.

Jeunesse d'Algérie, il n'y a pas place au désespoir et à la crainte de l'avenir, l'avenir du pays est prometteur, il sera comme vous le voudrez, prospère si vous le désirez, triomphant si vous le voulez, résistant à toutes les épreuves et en sortant à chaque fois plus fort et plus déterminé.

Je ne tiendrais pas un langage aussi direct, à la place qui est la mienne, si je n'étais conscient de la gravité de la situation, de la sensibilité des événements et de la difficulté de l'heure. Mon Dieu soyez témoin que j'ai dit ce que je savais, que j'ai fait tout ce que je pouvais pour tenir mes engagements, mon Dieu soyez témoin en ces moments douloureux et troublants, que je resterai fidèle aux engagements que j'ai pris devant vous envers le peuple, et que je ferai la lumière, toute la lumière sur la vérité, toute la vérité, dès que les données auront toutes été réunies et que le flou aura été dissipé.

Jeunesse d'Algérie, votre patrie vous interpelle de toutes ses blessures, de toutes ses victimes, soyez à la hauteur des événements avec l'engagement, la sérénité, la sagesse, la tolérance qui vous caractérisent.

Que Dieu nous assiste pour le bien du peuple et du pays. En disant cela, je prends à témoin le peuple algérien tout entier, de Tebessa à Maghnia, d'Alger à Tamanrasset, de Bejaia et Tizi-Ouzou à Adrar, Ouargla et Djanet, et je prends à témoin l'opinion publique internationale, que j'ai pris en considération toutes les revendications raisonnables, que je me suis engagé à sanctionner tous les dépassements, et que je suis résolu à mettre un terme à toutes les provocations.

II. DISCOURS A L'OCCASION DE LA CONFERENCE DES CADRES

(Alger, Dimanche 14 août, 2005)

(www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/pol/amnistie/discours_bouteflika.htm)

Au Nom de Dieu, Le Clément, Le Miséricordieux,

Mes chers compatriotes,

Le drame que nous venons de vivre avec l'enlèvement de nos deux diplomates à Bagdad et leur exécution par une bande de terroristes vient s'ajouter au cauchemar dans lequel notre pays a été plongé depuis une quinzaine d'années, marquées par le déchaînement d'une violence et d'une barbarie étrangères à nos mœurs et à nos traditions.

L'Algérie a failli ainsi sombrer dans la tourmente du terrorisme. Son Etat a vacillé, son peuple a été déchiré. Des enfants d'une même famille se sont entretués ; des frères, habitants de mêmes villages, de mêmes villes, se sont retrouvés opposés dans une lutte fratricide qui tentait vainement de se dissimuler derrière l'Islam, religion de paix, de tolérance, et de fraternité.

C'est grâce au courage et à la mobilisation de tous les Algériens que la Patrie a survécu. C'est grâce aux sacrifices de nos forces de sécurité, à leur tête l'Armée Nationale Populaire, digne héritière de l'Armée de Libération Nationale, appuyées par tous les patriotes, que l'Algérie a pu repousser l'hydre du terrorisme.

L'Algérie a versé pour sa survie un tribut très lourd : des dizaines de milliers de morts, plus de vingt milliards de dollars de destructions, une coûteuse entrave au développement et une régression de notre position sur la scène internationale. Des années durant, nous avons donné le meilleur de nous-mêmes pour que s'éteigne le brasier de la Fitna, pour que nous cessions enfin d'enterrer et de pleurer nos victimes, pour que la Miséricorde divine nous vienne en aide.

En votre nom à tous, je m'incline de nouveau aujourd'hui avec ferveur et respect à la mémoire des martyrs du devoir national et à celle de toutes les victimes du terrorisme abject. Leurs sacrifices n'auront pas été vains puisque la République Algérienne est restée debout, plus que jamais fidèle au glorieux message du 1er Novembre 1954.

Dès que vous m'avez investi de votre confiance en 1999, je me suis engagé devant Dieu et devant vous à ne ménager aucun effort ni aucune initiative pour éteindre le feu destructeur de la Fitna, condition première de la reconstruction nationale et de la restauration du crédit de l'Algérie sur la scène internationale.

Avec l'aide de Dieu, auquel nous rendons grâce, nous avons ensemble, ouvert la voie à la Concorde Civile, que vous avez appuyée massivement et dont nous avons ensemble recueilli les fruits inestimables dans le rétablissement de la sécurité.

Hier égarés sur la voie de la violence et de la destruction, des Algériens ont retrouvé la voie de Dieu qui bannit l'effusion du sang de musulmans par d'autres musulmans. Ils ont retrouvé leurs foyers et leur place dans notre société qui a su dépasser sa douleur en s'appuyant sur les préceptes de notre religion divine.

En particulier, les familles de tous nos martyrs et des victimes du terrorisme ont fait preuve d'un haut niveau de noblesse et de nationalisme en puisant dans leur foi le courage nécessaire pour se rallier, dans leur très grande majorité, à la Concorde

Civile, chacune affirmant ainsi son souci d'éviter à une autre famille algérienne de connaître les mêmes souffrances et les mêmes pertes.

A toutes ces familles, je tiens à dire que l'Algérie n'oubliera jamais ses martyrs et qu'elle sera toujours aux côtés d'elles, reconnaissante et solidaire.

Mes chers compatriotes,

La sécurité restaurée grâce à la politique de Concorde Civile, la Nation a de nouveau libéré ses énergies pour se consacrer à la construction nationale.

Désormais, les Algériens et les Algériennes ont retrouvé leur légitime aspiration à rebâtir leur Patrie, à accéder eux aussi au bien-être, et à garantir l'avenir de leurs générations montantes.

Cependant, notre plaie nationale est encore loin d'être guérie. Et cela n'est pas seulement dû au terrorisme qui persiste, même avec une intensité réduite, et dont nous sommes résolu à faire cesser les crimes par tous les moyens.

Cette plaie résulte également des graves conséquences de la tragédie nationale. Outre les familles de nos martyrs et des victimes du terrorisme, de nombreuses familles sont encore éplorées par la disparition des leurs. D'autres familles, aussi nombreuses, dont des proches se sont retrouvés entraînés dans la spirale infernale du terrorisme, sont livrées au dénuement. Toutes ces familles, sans distinction, sont des familles algériennes avec lesquelles nous partageons la même Patrie et la même Foi.

Nos orphelins se comptent par centaines de milliers, les uns parce que leurs parents sont tombés en défendant la Patrie, les autres parce que leurs parents ont pris les armes contre cette même Patrie, d'autres encore plus nombreux, se sont retrouvés seuls et abandonnés du fait de la démesure terroriste. Cependant, la Nation algérienne est la grande famille de tous ces orphelins. Elle saura en prendre soin et assurer leur avenir, mais elle devra aussi veiller à éloigner de leurs cœurs innocents les germes mortels de la haine et de la vengeance.

Voilà quelques-unes des raisons qui m'ont poussé à agir et à plaider, des années durant, pour que nous ayons ensemble le courage d'avancer vers une réconciliation nationale véritable, en tenant compte des résultats positifs de la Concorde Civile et des espoirs qu'elle a fait naître.

La réconciliation nationale constitue un défi de haute élévation morale interpellant notre foi et notre patriotisme ; il faut donc nous y préparer. Pour ma part, j'y ai investi, tout au long de ces dernières années, ma Foi de croyant, mais aussi ma fidélité à mes compagnons, les glorieux chouchous de la libération avec lesquels j'ai fait le serment non seulement de reconquérir notre indépendance nationale, mais aussi et surtout de construire l'Algérie dont ils ont rêvé et pour laquelle ils se sont sacrifiés. Je remercie Dieu le Tout Puissant de voir le peuple algérien partager cette même volonté qui nous permettra de réaliser effectivement la réconciliation nationale.

Cette volonté ne signifie pas l'oubli de nos souffrances, ni la négation de nos sacrifices. Elle représente sous sa forme la plus noble notre aspiration à la paix et notre cohésion nationale garante de notre unité, cette unité hors de laquelle notre avenir national restera toujours compromis et exposé à des périls certains.

Mes chers compatriotes,

Nous devons tirer les enseignements de l'immense tragédie nationale que nous venons de vivre.

L'Algérie, qui a toujours démontré sa solidarité avec les autres peuples, et qui demeure déterminée à soutenir les causes nobles et justes dans le monde, a découvert dans l'épreuve cruelle qu'elle vient de vivre, qu'elle ne devait compter que sur elle-même et sur ses propres moyens. Dans sa très grande majorité, le monde a assisté sans réaction et souvent même sans compassion, au martyr de notre peuple face à l'hydre du terrorisme que nous combattons et que nous dénonçons déjà comme un fléau qui ignore les frontières.

Ce silence s'est trop souvent paré hypocritement des vertus de la démocratie et des droits de l'homme. Des voix ont même poussé l'indécence jusqu'à s'interroger sur « qui tue qui » en Algérie. Sans haine et sans rancœur, nous ne devons pas oublier cela, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de consolider notre propre avenir national.

Nous assistons aujourd'hui à une mobilisation internationale contre le terrorisme, et nous sommes sincèrement partie prenante dans cette lutte contre un fléau dont nous avons été victimes. Nous sommes cependant en droit de veiller à ce que cette lutte ne s'appuie pas sur des critères qui diffèrent suivant les pays et les circonstances et qu'elle ne confonde pas la violence terroriste avec les enseignements de notre religion ou avec la lutte légitime des peuples pour leur liberté et leur dignité.

Soyons désormais convaincus que le devenir de notre pays dépend exclusivement de notre volonté et de notre engagement. En cela, l'exemple nous a été légué par nos aïeux à travers leurs résistances, leurs défaites et leurs triomphes qui, tout au long de notre Histoire, ont forgé notre personnalité nationale.

Face au défi de la paix et de la réconciliation nationale, c'est au peuple souverain qu'il revient aujourd'hui de faire son choix pour déterminer le cours de notre destin national.

A la veille du 43ème anniversaire du recouvrement de notre indépendance nationale, j'avais annoncé que le peuple algérien serait bientôt appelé à se prononcer lui-même sur la réconciliation nationale.

Aujourd'hui, conformément aux Pouvoirs que vous m'avez conférés, j'ai le privilège de vous convier, avec l'Aide de Dieu, à vous prononcer dans le cadre du référendum qui se déroulera le Jeudi 29 Septembre prochain sur le projet de Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale qui vous est soumis.

Mes chers compatriotes,

Votre choix se doit d'être fondé sur une claire compréhension de ce que désire le peuple souverain pour l'avenir de l'Algérie. C'est pour cela que ce projet de Charte sera très largement diffusé. Il fera également l'objet d'une large campagne d'explication. Je veux cependant, puisque j'en ai l'occasion aujourd'hui, vous en exposer dès ce soir, les grandes lignes.

En premier lieu, et à travers ce projet de Charte, vous êtes conviés à souligner pour l'Histoire et pour les générations futures, la nature véritable de la grave crise que notre pays a vécue, une crise qui a failli emporter les structures de notre Etat, une crise qui ne s'est pas limitée à une question de rhétorique ou d'idéologie, une crise dont l'enjeu a été et demeure la paix et la sécurité pour chaque citoyen et pour chaque citoyenne, ainsi que la pérennité de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire dans la fidélité au message du 1er Novembre 1954. Ce faisant,

l'occasion vous est offerte de proclamer sans haine et souverainement « plus jamais ça ! ».

Dans le même temps, vous aurez l'occasion de matérialiser cette volonté de paix et de réconciliation qu'il me semble percevoir comme un appel pressant de la majorité de la Nation, convaincue que sans consolidation définitive de la paix par la réconciliation nationale, nulle démarche de développement économique et social, nul effort de modernisation de notre pays ne sauraient produire les résultats que nous en attendons.

En second lieu, et à travers ce même projet de Charte, vous êtes conviés à marquer solennellement un vibrant hommage aux martyrs du devoir national et aux victimes du terrorisme, ainsi que notre solidarité collective envers leurs familles.

En troisième lieu, l'occasion vous est également offerte d'exprimer notre reconnaissance à tous ceux qui se sont sacrifiés pour préserver nos citoyens de la barbarie meurtrière et sauvegarder la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire. Je veux parler de notre Armée Nationale Populaire, de nos forces de sécurité et de tous les patriotes qui ont opposé leur courage et leur résistance au terrorisme, et qui continuent encore de lutter avec détermination pour la sécurité des biens et des personnes et pour préserver l'honneur de nos familles.

Ce faisant, le peuple algérien exprimera, souverainement, et avec toute son énergie, son rejet de toute instrumentalisation interne ou extérieure de notre tragédie nationale ainsi que son refus de toute tentative de porter atteinte aux institutions de notre pays, de fragiliser notre Etat, de nuire à l'honorabilité de ses agents, ou de ternir l'image de l'Algérie sur le plan international.

En quatrième lieu, et tout en restant unis dans la lutte implacable que nous continuerons à mener contre le terrorisme et pour votre sécurité, le projet de Charte vous propose les mesures concrètes suivantes, qui répondent à votre profond désir de faire cesser l'effusion de sang et de rétablir la paix :

— Tout d'abord, l'extinction des poursuites judiciaires pour tous ceux, et ils sont nombreux, qui ont déjà mis fin à leurs activités armées et se sont rendus aux autorités, depuis le 13 janvier 2000, date de forclusion des effets de la loi portant Concorde Civile, pour autant qu'ils ne soient pas impliqués dans des massacres collectifs, des viols ou des attentats à l'explosif dans des lieux publics ;

— Ensuite, l'abandon des poursuites judiciaires contre les personnes recherchées en Algérie ou à l'étranger ou condamnées par contumace, qui décideront de se présenter volontairement devant les Autorités, pour autant qu'elles ne soient pas elles aussi responsables des faits limitatifs évoqués plus haut, ainsi que l'extinction des poursuites contre les personnes impliquées dans des activités de soutien au terrorisme et qui se déclareront aux autorités compétentes ;

— De plus, la grâce pour les personnes condamnées ou détenues pour des actes de terrorisme autres que les massacres collectifs, les viols et les attentats à l'explosif dans des lieux publics ;

— Enfin, des commutations et des remises de peines pour tous les autres individus condamnés définitivement, détenus ou recherchés pour actes terroristes, qui ne sont pas concernés par les mesures de grâce et d'extinction de poursuites énoncées ci-dessus.

Mes chers compatriotes,

Le projet de Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale, sur lequel vous êtes appelés à vous prononcer, comprend également des mesures destinées à établir et à consolider la réconciliation nationale.

D'une part, il s'agit de la levée définitive des difficultés et des contraintes que continuent de rencontrer les personnes qui ont choisi d'adhérer à la politique de concorde civile, et placé ainsi leur devoir patriotique au-dessus de toute autre considération, refusant toute instrumentalisation de la crise vécue par l'Algérie par les milieux hostiles de l'intérieur ou de l'extérieur.

D'autre part, il s'agit de mesures devant permettre la normalisation définitive de la situation sociale des personnes qui ont fait l'objet de mesures administratives de licenciement, dans le cadre de leurs activités au service de l'Etat.

Tout en témoignant ainsi de votre mansuétude et de votre générosité, vous aurez également l'occasion de dire que vous n'entendez pas oublier les tragiques conséquences de l'odieuse instrumentalisation des préceptes de l'Islam, religion de l'Etat, ainsi que votre détermination à empêcher la répétition de cette dérive.

Partant de cette conviction que je partage avec vous, le projet de Charte prévoit l'interdiction de tout exercice d'une activité politique, sous quelque forme que ce soit, aux responsables de cette instrumentalisation de notre religion, de même que l'interdiction de toute activité politique, à quiconque ayant une part de responsabilité dans la conception et dans la mise en œuvre de la politique prônant le pseudo « djihad » contre la Nation et les institutions de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire.

Mes chers compatriotes,

Ainsi que je le soulignais il y a un instant, le projet de Charte soumis à votre libre choix est destiné à hâter le retour définitif de la sécurité et de la paix dans notre pays, mais il est destiné aussi à nous mener vers la réconciliation nationale et vers le renforcement de notre cohésion nationale. De ce fait, il se devait également d'apporter des réponses aux drames douloureux que vivent encore des familles algériennes.

Il en est ainsi de la tragique question des personnes disparues dans le sillage de la tragédie nationale, qui a affligé des milliers de nos familles et qui, de surcroît, est exploitée par des milieux hostiles à notre pays, non point par solidarité envers ces familles, mais dans le seul but de nuire à l'Algérie. Ce dossier sur lequel l'Etat n'a ménagé aucun effort, nous interpelle collectivement et il nous faut y faire face avec courage et avec un sens élevé des responsabilités, dans l'intérêt national.

Nous partageons la douleur des familles des disparus, car les victimes sont nos compatriotes et les familles qui souffrent sont les nôtres. J'espère que dans notre foi et dans notre attachement commun à la réconciliation nationale, ces familles aux côtés desquelles nous nous tiendrons, sauront trouver le réconfort nécessaire pour panser leur blessure et dépasser leur douleur.

En ce qui nous concerne collectivement, nous la grande famille algérienne, le projet de Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale propose les mesures suivantes sur cette douloureuse question :

— Tout d'abord, l'Etat se substituera en responsabilité pour le sort de toutes les personnes disparues dans le contexte de la tragédie nationale, et il prendra les mesures nécessaires en connaissance de cause ;

- Ensuite, l'Etat prendra toutes mesures appropriées pour permettre aux ayants droits des personnes disparues de transcender cette terrible épreuve dans la dignité ;
- Enfin, les personnes disparues seront considérées comme victimes de la tragédie nationale et leurs ayants droits auront droit à réparation.

A travers ces propositions, c'est à un devoir de solidarité nationale que je vous invite, mes chers compatriotes, aux côtés de nos frères et de nos sœurs, membres des familles des disparus, en priant Dieu le Tout Puissant qu'Il les soutienne de Son réconfort.

Mes chers compatriotes,

La tragédie nationale a affecté l'ensemble de notre peuple sans exception. Notre volonté de paix et de réconciliation nationale nous dicte donc le devoir de n'exclure aucune victime, de quelque bord qu'elle se soit retrouvée dans cette terrible épreuve. Voilà pourquoi nous ne devons pas oublier également le drame des familles dont des membres ont pris part à l'action terroriste.

Notre religion de clémence et de fraternité nous enseigne que chacun ne peut être responsable que de ses propres actes. Les parents, les veuves et les orphelins de ceux qui ont rejoint les rangs des terroristes ne peuvent être tenus pour responsables de leurs actes ni surtout être repoussés par notre société.

C'est pourquoi le projet de Charte propose que l'Etat prenne des mesures de solidarité nationale au profit de ces familles qui sont démunies et qui, elles aussi, ont été éprouvées par le terrorisme à travers l'implication de leurs proches.

Mes chers compatriotes,

En vous rendant aux urnes le 29 Septembre prochain pour exprimer librement et souverainement votre décision sur le projet de Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale, c'est un choix décisif que vous effectuerez pour l'avenir de l'Algérie et pour celui de nos enfants.

Certains pourraient accueillir ce projet comme une provocation face à leur douleur encore vive. C'est un sentiment que nous respectons mais qui invite aussi à des interrogations : Combien de victimes faudra-t-il encore, après les 100.000 victimes que nous avons déjà enregistrées, pour apaiser la douleur de ceux qui ont perdu des êtres chers ? Quel tribut plus tragique devons-nous encore payer ensemble pour des aberrations politiques qui ont démontré leurs sanglantes conséquences ? Quel futur voulons-nous offrir à nos jeunes générations qui ont ouvert les yeux dans la tourmente de la tragédie nationale et qui sont déjà profondément traumatisées par la violence inouïe au milieu de laquelle elles ont grandi ?

Ayant personnellement placé, ma vie durant, l'Algérie au-dessus de toute autre considération, et appartenant à une génération qui a tout sacrifié pour la Patrie, je cultive la conviction qu'une large majorité de notre peuple se reconnaîtra dans le contenu de ce projet de Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale, car ce projet est porteur des attentes de nos concitoyens, de ceux qui ont souffert durement de la tragédie nationale, de ceux qui ont vécu la peur, la mort de proches, d'amis et de voisins, de ceux qui, à ce jour, sont exposés aux crimes des résidus du terrorisme.

Des voix connues ne manqueront pas de s'élever pour tenter de s'opposer à cette attente populaire légitime, à notre désir profond de paix, à notre quête de

réconciliation nationale pour que l'Algérie retrouve la force de son unité nationale qui lui a permis de s'opposer à ses adversaires à travers les siècles.

Ces voix seront sans aucun doute les mêmes que celles qui, à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur, ont assisté hier silencieuses aux horribles tueries qui nous ont frappés dans notre chair et dans notre âme. Ce silence coupable hier les a disqualifiés de s'ériger aujourd'hui en censeurs de la volonté du peuple souverain, comme elles se sont retrouvées disqualifiées déjà, dans leurs vaines tentatives de se dresser contre la Concorde Civile.

Le peuple algérien qui a chèrement reconquis sa liberté et qui a versé un très lourd tribut dans la solitude, à la lutte contre le terrorisme avant que la communauté internationale n'en mesure le menace et les effets destructeurs, a, légitimement, le droit de vivre enfin dans la paix et dans la réconciliation avec lui-même.

L'enlèvement et l'exécution de nos diplomates à Bagdad relèvent de ces tentatives de s'opposer à notre politique de réconciliation nationale et qui veulent que notre société continue à vivre dans cette atmosphère de peur et d'insécurité instaurée par le terrorisme. La réconciliation nationale nous permettra non seulement de renforcer notre cohésion et de ramener la paix dans nos villes et dans nos campagnes ; elle nous permettra également d'isoler encore davantage les acteurs du terrorisme que nous pourrons alors combattre avec toujours plus d'efficacité et de détermination.

Si la politique reste l'art du possible, la Réconciliation nationale que je vous propose représente le seul compromis autorisé par les équilibres nationaux et qui, à l'instar de la concorde civile, ramènera la sérénité dans les esprits et dans les cœurs, et balisera le chemin pour les solutions définitives de demain.

Il est temps pour chacun d'élargir sa vision pour comprendre que si les plaies sont encore béantes chez beaucoup d'entre nous, la facture nationale est lourde, très lourde, car la criminalité enregistrée sur le plan national comme la banalisation de la mort dans des milieux de notre jeunesse ne présagent pas pour demain une société de bonheur et de prospérité.

Tout ceci, toute cette violence, tout ce vandalisme, toute cette barbarie, sont la conséquence de l'épreuve terroriste que nous avons vécue.

C'est aujourd'hui la responsabilité de tous et de chacun d'œuvrer au changement, à la paix, à la réconciliation. Pour cela, il faudra accepter de payer un tribut lourd mais inévitable à la paix et à la sécurité pour tous.

La Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale nous offre l'occasion de canaliser l'apport de chacun dans le renforcement de l'unité nationale, la promotion et la consolidation de la personnalité et de l'identité nationales et la perpétuation des hautes valeurs de la Déclaration du Premier Novembre 1954. C'est maintenant à vous, Algériennes et Algériens, de lui apporter votre adhésion massive et enthousiaste pour qu'elle puisse devenir l'instrument de notre renaissance et assurer la gloire de notre Patrie.

Chers compatriotes,

Comme à l'accoutumée, je m'adresse à vous directement et en toute franchise pour vous exposer sincèrement et clairement mon point de vue, et vous consulter en toute liberté et responsabilité. Je reste convaincu que votre opinion est un engagement et votre libre choix un gage entre nous.

J'ai proposé auparavant, une initiative de concorde civile qui a été, par deux fois, adoptée par le parlement, et je ne me suis guère arrêté là mais suis allé vers un referendum populaire sanctionné par un résultat spectaculaire, jamais réalisé depuis le referendum populaire sur l'indépendance de l'Algérie en juillet 1962. J'ai choisi la paix et la concorde pour lesquelles un lourd tribut a été versé, celui de la citoyenneté et du patriotisme. Je suis tout aussi persuadé que vous n'y renoncerez point surtout après que ce dernier se soit enraciné tout au long de ces années d'efforts, de construction et de persévérance soutenues.

Il est temps de poursuivre ce que vous avez entamé par le sang et la sueur, et d'atteindre votre noble objectif en réalisant une paix globale et durable qui tournera à jamais, une page horriblement ensanglantée et ce, en vous exprimant librement d'une haute et intelligible voix . Je suis convaincu que votre voix sera celle du droit, de la justice, et du bien et votre attitude ne sera qu'une caution louable à cette démarche que nous avons ensemble entamée et à travers laquelle nous recherchons le bien de ce pays et de ce peuple en restant profondément convaincus que la tolérance, l'indulgence et la fraternité sont des vertus prônées par l'Islam, de grandes qualités nationales, un comportement civilisé et une voie incontournable pour mettre fin à un cycle infernal de violence , à une ère faite de mort, de destruction et de désolation.

Comme votre adhésion était remarquable, votre soutien franc et résolu au projet de la concorde civile, c'est rempli d'optimisme que je souhaite que le projet de la réconciliation nationale puisse bénéficier du même appui assuré que je suis de votre compréhension, de votre clairvoyance, de votre mûre réflexion, de vos grandes valeurs et de votre nationalisme sincère. La volonté des peuples n'émane-t-elle pas de la volonté de Dieu, le Clément, le Miséricordieux?

Chers compatriotes,

Le référendum auquel je vous invite aujourd'hui est un référendum démocratique, transparent et régulier et votre libre décision sera souveraine et impérative. Je la respecterai et j'œuvrerai à son application quoiqu'il en coûte.

La démocratie prend en compte l'avis de la minorité mais implique aussi que celle-ci se plie à l'avis de la majorité. Ceci étant, je souhaite que la majorité écrasante soit, sincèrement et fermement, attachée à l'esprit de réconciliation, d'entente et de tolérance.

C'est là un appel du cœur au cœur, débordant d'amour et de bonté, convaincu que l'Islam est paix, que la civilisation est quiétude et que la patrie est citoyenneté pour la coexistence, la solidarité et l'entraide.

C'est là un appel de la raison à la raison consciente et avisée, à la conscience éclairée et responsable, à l'esprit qui agit avec discernement et sagesse dans la voie de la réussite, du bonheur et de la quiétude.

L'Algérie avec laquelle vous avez rendez-vous aujourd'hui et demain est sûre d'elle et de ses capacités.

L'Algérie aspire à un avenir radieux qui se réalisera, grâce à Dieu, grâce à votre réconciliation et votre cohésion, grâce à vos efforts et vos sacrifices, grâce à votre fidélité et votre adhésion autour de votre Etat et de vos dirigeants.

La détermination et le génie des hommes procèdent de la volonté et de la grandeur des peuples. Nous avons appris de la glorieuse Révolution de Novembre comment se

réalise la fusion de toutes les potentialités dans le creuset du nationalisme créateur pour accomplir des merveilles et relever les défis.

Nous, nous comptons sur Dieu et sur notre cher peuple, conscients du poids de la responsabilité, avec la foi en la capacité de notre peuple à assimiler l'appel et avec la certitude qu'il sera au rendez-vous de l'Histoire comme il l'a toujours été et le sera encore.

Puisse Dieu, Tout Puissant, préserver notre chère patrie, guider notre peuple dans son choix et bénir sa marche vers le parachèvement du processus pour réaliser davantage de progrès et de prospérité. Puisse-t-il lui permettre de vivre dans la dignité, la quiétude et la prospérité.

Puisse Dieu nous armer de sagesse, de force et de patience pour accomplir dans la fidélité au serment, les responsabilités qui m'incombent et être à la hauteur de la confiance de mon grand peuple pour mener notre chère patrie au plus haut rang de la dignité et de la réussite.

Gloire à l'Algérie,

Gloire à ses martyrs, ses héros et son grand peuple.

Je vous remercie.

III. Discours du Président de la République à l'occasion de la Journée Mondiale de la Femme (8 mars 2006)

(www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/discours /2006/ 03/D080306.htm)

Chères sœurs,

Mes chers compatriotes,

Comme chaque année en ce 08 mars, la Journée Mondiale de la Femme permet d'évaluer les progrès réalisés dans la promotion des femmes à travers le monde.

Pour le peuple algérien, cette journée est d'abord une occasion de redire notre solidarité avec tous les peuples dont les femmes et les hommes luttent encore pour la liberté, l'indépendance, et la paix.

Je voudrais, aujourd'hui, saluer plus particulièrement le peuple palestinien, qui continue à verser un lourd tribut pour le rétablissement de ses droits légitimes et inaliénables et faire prévaloir son droit de disposer librement de ses choix et de son destin.

J'adresse un vibrant hommage à la femme palestinienne pour l'admirable leçon de courage, de patriotisme et de dignité qu'elle offre au reste du Monde, et pour la preuve concrète qu'elle apporte chaque jour, que dans la civilisation arabomusulmane objet de tant d'outrages aujourd'hui, la femme occupe toute sa place aux côtés de l'homme, et qu'elle prend sa part entière dans les luttes et les sacrifices imposés à son peuple.

La femme sahraouie mérite également tout notre respect non seulement pour sa contribution active à la lutte du peuple sahraoui, mais également pour son rôle dans la gestion des camps de réfugiés et pour le réconfort moral qu'elle prodigue au sein des familles déracinées. Son action au sein du POLISARIO est digne de tous les éloges et témoigne qu'au Sahara Occidental également, la femme a su conquérir sa place et démontré qu'elle pouvait égaler sinon surmonter en courage et en efficacité ses compagnons.

Chez nous en Algérie, la célébration de la journée de la Femme est aussi une occasion de nous incliner avec respect et ferveur à la mémoire de celles des nôtres qui tout au long de plus d'un siècle d'oppression et d'occupation coloniales et durant notre longue lutte de libération nationale, ont consenti le sacrifice suprême pour la Patrie, aux côtés de leurs pères, de leurs époux et de leurs frères.

Nous voulons aujourd'hui renouveler notre reconnaissance à nos moudjahidate et moussabilate, ainsi qu'à ces millions de femmes algériennes qui, aux côtés de millions d'Algériens, ont aidé à reconstruire l'Algérie indépendante, et ont concouru à sa sauvegarde durant la tragédie nationale.

Nous pouvons être fiers de rappeler, en cette Journée Mondiale de la Femme, que dans l'Algérie libérée, la femme algérienne a vu ses droits consacrés dès l'aube de l'indépendance.

Alors que dans de nombreux pays, les femmes ont attendu des décennies pour conquérir leur égalité citoyenne, en Algérie ce droit a été reconnu aux Algériennes dès les élections de 1962. Si à ce jour, dans de nombreux pays développés, l'égalité des salaires entre les travailleuses et les travailleurs demeure encore un objectif à réaliser, en Algérie c'était un droit acquis par la femme algérienne dès la restauration de notre souveraineté nationale.

De même, si à ce jour, la Communauté internationale se mobilise pour garantir l'égalité d'accès des filles à l'enseignement, l'Algérie relève avec fierté que sur plus de sept millions de ses enfants qui se rendent chaque matin à l'école, près de 50 % sont des filles, et que celles-ci constituent 59 % des effectifs du palier du secondaire. Sur plus de 800.000 étudiants que compte notre pays, 58 % sont des jeunes filles, tout comme 34 % du personnel enseignant universitaire sont des femmes.

Dans le domaine législatif, les dernières révisions du Code de la Famille et du Code de la nationalité, placent l'Algérie au rang des Nations les plus avancées tout en sachant que notre peuple est et demeurera farouchement attaché à ses valeurs civilisationnelles immuables et non négociables.

Ces quelques réalités montrent que l'Algérie n'a de leçon à recevoir de quiconque en ce qui concerne la place de la femme dans la société algérienne.

Nous devons également rappeler ces mêmes réalités chez nous pour que chacun puisse mesurer le chemin parcouru depuis que notre peuple s'est affranchi du joug de l'oppression et de la domination étrangères et qu'il s'est libéré de l'ignorance et de la misère de l'ère coloniale.

Les femmes algériennes doivent s'imprégner de ce passé et de ces progrès pour se mobiliser encore plus aujourd'hui aux côtés des hommes algériens pour contribuer au redressement national et construire une Algérie digne, fière et forte, en reconnaissance à nos martyrs et pour assurer un avenir de paix et de prospérité à nos générations futures.

Plus que jamais, notre Patrie attend beaucoup de ses enfants pour que nos retards soient rattrapés et que nos erreurs soient réparées, pour que, dans la paix qui revient et dans l'espoir qui renaît fortement, chacune et chacun apporte sa participation à l'œuvre de reconstruction nationale dont les défis sont aussi nombreux que complexes.

Chères sœurs,

Mes chers compatriotes,

Je voudrais tout d'abord vous entretenir du rôle que je souhaiterais voir assumer par la femme algérienne dans l'entreprise de réconciliation nationale.

Le 29 Septembre dernier, le peuple algérien a massivement approuvé la Charte pour la Paix et la Réconciliation Nationale. Conformément au mandat que la Nation souveraine m'a conféré, je viens de promulguer, il y a quelques jours, des décrets pour la mise en œuvre fidèle et intégrale de ce choix stratégique national. Le moment est donc venu pour la Nation tout entière de s'atteler activement à concrétiser les principes de cette Charte en vue de la réconciliation des Algériens et des Algériennes avec eux-mêmes et avec leur Patrie.

Personne ne doit douter que cette œuvre est une œuvre de longue haleine, car la tragédie nationale a laissé des blessures profondes dans la chair et dans la conscience de chaque algérienne et de chaque algérien.

La paix et la sécurité sont revenues dans notre pays. Elles seront parachevées grâce aux mesures que nous venons de promulguer mais aussi, grâce à la détermination de l'Etat aujourd'hui plus forte que jamais, à réduire par la force de la Loi tous ceux qui continueraient à s'attaquer à leur peuple et à leur propre pays.

Mais si nous avons déjà parcouru l'essentiel du chemin vers la restauration de la sécurité et de la paix, la réconciliation nationale véritable est un chantier que nous venons d'ouvrir après avoir réussi, grâce à Dieu, à restaurer la concorde nationale.

Cette œuvre interpelle les mémoires, les consciences et les cœurs de tous les Algériens et de toutes les Algériennes. C'est en nous-mêmes que nous trouverons les réponses attendues pour prémunir l'Algérie des méfaits de la haine et de la discorde. Et en cette noble tâche, les Algériennes ont, encore une fois, beaucoup à offrir à leur Patrie et aux jeunes générations.

Certes, les institutions de l'Etat ont une importante mission à assumer, et elles le feront pleinement, pour panser les blessures, bannir toute exclusion, et pour préserver l'Algérie de toute atteinte et de toute nouvelle dérive. Mais, il est certain que les citoyens détiennent eux-mêmes l'essentiel des solutions attendues, et tout particulièrement les femmes algériennes qui, dans la tragédie nationale ont versé le

plus lourd tribut, à travers la perte d'êtres chers et à travers les larmes qu'elles n'ont que trop versées.

Voilà pourquoi, au nom de l'Islam, au nom de l'Algérie qui est et restera notre seule patrie, j'appelle les femmes algériennes tout comme l'ensemble de la Nation, à se mobiliser et à promouvoir les vertus de l'entente, de la réconciliation et de la fraternité, pour panser nos blessures et relever nos ruines. C'est en premier lieu dans les familles, dans les villages, dans les quartiers que doit s'affirmer ce choix national approuvé par notre peuple, il y a de cela quelques mois à peine.

J'appelle également les femmes algériennes à entourer nos orphelins, tous les orphelins de la tragédie nationale, de leur affection irremplaçable et à les élever dans les valeurs de notre Foi, dans la culture du pardon, afin de mettre notre pays à l'abri des germes mortels de la haine.

J'appelle enfin les femmes algériennes à assumer pleinement leur rôle, qui est un rôle majeur dans l'éducation de nos enfants et dans la restauration de nos valeurs sociales et civiques.

Nous assistons aujourd'hui à l'explosion de maux sociaux nouveaux au sein de notre société, qu'il s'agisse de drogue, de perversions outrageantes à nos mœurs, d'anarchie, de banditisme, et même de crimes crapuleux. C'est sans doute l'un des effets dramatiques de la tragédie nationale que notre pays a traversée. C'est aussi le fruit amer de la perte des repères traditionnels de notre société, de la réalité sanglante dans laquelle nos enfants ont grandi durant plus d'une décennie, et enfin du déracinement auquel ont été contraintes des centaines de milliers de familles algériennes.

Nul doute que la reprise de notre économie contribuera fortement à éradiquer les motifs de désespoir, que l'État qui se renforce chaque jour davantage, veillera au respect de la loi par tous et au profit de tous, et que notre système éducatif qui a un rôle important à assumer dans le redressement de cette situation, sera mieux armé pour le faire grâce aux réformes que nous sommes en train d'y introduire.

Mais c'est par la réconciliation nationale, la réconciliation des Algériens et des Algériennes avec eux-mêmes et avec leur Patrie, par le respect de la chose publique, des valeurs et des vertus d'une société apaisée et réhabilitant sa propre civilisation que nous restaurerons ensemble la quiétude dans nos cités et dans notre pays.

D'autres pays ont connu des tourmentes semblables à celle que nous avons vécue et ont su les surmonter par le courage et la discipline de leurs peuples. L'Algérie elle aussi est à même de dépasser les séquelles de notre tragédie nationale, à condition de nous y engager toutes et tous dans un même élan et dans le cadre d'un devoir national.

Dans cette entreprise, la cellule familiale occupe une place exceptionnelle, par tout ce qu'elle représente comme exemple pour inculquer aux enfants les vertus et les valeurs de notre culture ancestrale et de notre identité nationale, et pour réhabiliter à leurs yeux l'esprit civique.

Chères sœurs,

Mes chers compatriotes,

Vous avez certainement un grand rôle à jouer dans la gigantesque œuvre de développement national dans laquelle nous nous sommes engagés, et, le terme gigantesque n'est guère excessif pour ce que nous avons entrepris pour rattraper nos retards et construire l'avenir, l'avenir de notre jeunesse.

J'ai longuement exposé ce sujet, il y a quelques jours devant nos travailleuses et nos travailleurs que je salue de nouveau ici. Si je l'aborde de nouveau brièvement du haut de cette tribune, c'est pour que chacune et chacun s'imprègne encore davantage des enjeux de cette grande bataille.

Je disais que cette œuvre de développement national est un chantier gigantesque et, de fait, nul autre qualificatif ne convient mieux à ce que nous avons programmé et à ce que nous allons réaliser tout au long de cette décennie qui va de 1999 à 2009.

Durant cette période, nous avons décidé de consacrer un montant total de près de 8.000 milliards DA aux dépenses publiques d'investissement, soit plus de 100 milliards de dollars.

Pour donner une illustration de ce que cela représente, ce sera pour la fin de cette période un total de près 2 millions de logements, l'ouverture de plus de 2.000 écoles fondamentales, 800 lycées, plus de 3.000 cantines et demi-pensions et près de 800 internats.

Ce sera également 900.000 places pédagogiques et plus de 500.000 places d'hébergement au niveau de nos universités. Ce sera enfin l'amélioration de la santé de la population, grâce à l'ouverture de près de 60 hôpitaux, 140 polycliniques et près de 1.000 salles de soins.

Dans le même temps, nous avons toutes les raisons d'espérer la poursuite du recul du chômage qui a longtemps rongé notre société, car il n'a cessé de croître à partir des années quatre-vingt. Le chômage qui frôlait la barre des 30 % au début de 1999 a déjà reculé à près de 15 % l'année dernière. Avec l'aide de Dieu, il sera ramené à 10 % à l'horizon 2009.

Cependant, si nous voulons assurer à notre pays un développement durable pour les générations futures, nous ne pouvons pas nous contenter de satisfaire nos besoins immédiats. Nous devons toujours avoir présente à l'esprit notre expérience au cours de laquelle notre pays a traversé deux décennies de développement et de prospérité avant de connaître une tragique régression dont nous commençons seulement à nous relever aujourd'hui.

Réaliser un développement économique et social marqué du sceau de la durée, c'est aussi nous armer pour affronter les enjeux de la mondialisation et de la compétitivité, c'est également réaliser des réformes indispensables, notamment celle fondamentale de nos mentalités, c'est enfin, réhabiliter dans sa noblesse l'effort persévérant, les vertus de la sagesse et celles du civisme qui se manifeste dans l'exercice des droits mais aussi dans le respect des devoirs de chaque citoyenne et de chaque citoyen sans exception.

Les progrès que nous avons déjà réalisés doivent nous encourager à nous mobiliser encore davantage pour l'édification d'une Algérie répondant aux attentes de toutes les Algériennes et de tous les Algériens.

Pour cela, j'appelle les femmes algériennes à y prendre la part qui leur revient, et à éduquer notre enfance et notre jeunesse dans nos valeurs et nos vertus nationales pour la préparer à assumer la responsabilité de garantir à l'Algérie sa place et son rang dans le Monde contemporain.

Parlant de la Patrie et de son environnement mondial, je voudrais en dernier lieu aborder un sujet qui me tient à cœur, qui nourrit mes plus fortes appréhensions, et sur lequel, j'ai parfois l'impression de ne pas être assez compris de mes compatriotes : il s'agit de la préservation de notre personnalité et de notre identité nationales.

Chères sœurs,

Mes chers compatriotes,

Durant 132 longues années d'occupation et d'oppression, le colonialisme nous a dépossédés de beaucoup de biens précieux : notre liberté, nos droits, et notre terre. Mais, alors qu'il n'ait jusqu'à notre existence en tant que peuple et en tant qu'État reconnu et respecté bien avant l'occupation, ce même colonialisme n'a pu nous déposséder de notre personnalité, qui a pu trouver refuge dans la mémoire de notre peuple et surtout dans l'éducation prodiguée par nos mères. Le colonialisme a néanmoins, par une démarche génocidaire, profondément miné notre identité en altérant à la fois notre langue, notre religion, notre culture et notre histoire.

Mais c'est malheureusement dans la régression que nous avons subie du fait de la crise et de la tragédie nationales, qu'une menace plane de nouveau et, peut être, d'une manière plus insidieuse et plus périlleuse encore sur notre personnalité et sur notre identité nationales.

Certains pourront trouver excessif mon propos, mais je les invite à méditer les réalités que nous renvoie notre environnement immédiat, méditation que nous devons avoir le courage d'entreprendre dans le plus grand respect dû à notre peuple et à chacun de nos compatriotes.

Notons la dégradation de la langue que nous utilisons dans nos échanges quotidiens et dans laquelle il est quelquefois difficile de retrouver notre langue nationale ou même notre langage dialectal.

Méditons également cette fragilisation de la personnalité nationale qui la rend sensible à toutes les influences extérieures, qu'elles viennent d'Orient ou d'Occident, au point de nous faire abandonner graduellement nos costumes traditionnels, de pervertir nos usages sociaux, et même de modifier la manière de parler de certains de nos concitoyens.

Méditons enfin cette méconnaissance de notre histoire nationale par laquelle nos enfants, qui sont souvent capables de réciter l'histoire des autres peuples, ignorent autant les repères de notre passé que les pages de la glorieuse Révolution du 1er Novembre 1954.

Ne nous étonnons pas alors qu'il nous arrive quelquefois d'entendre certains affirmer que la période coloniale était peut-être préférable à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté nationale dont ils jouissent aujourd'hui. Ne nous étonnons pas également de voir certains de nos jeunes auxquels nous n'avons pas su inculquer les vertus de notre culture nationale et l'amour de leur patrie, tentés par l'exil devant les difficultés qu'ils rencontrent chez eux. Ne nous étonnons donc point enfin, de voir des esprits aigris parmi les anciens colonisateurs oser aujourd'hui soutenir que le colonialisme qui nous a privés de notre liberté et exploité notre peuple et nos richesses, a pu représenter un bienfait pour les colonisés.

Certains pensent que l'acculturation et la dépersonnalisation rampantes, ne se manifestent que dans certains milieux urbains, alors que l'Algérie profonde en est bien à l'abri. Il me semble qu'il n'en est pas moins inquiétant que notre peuple, à la culture plusieurs fois millénaire, soit victime d'une telle dérive. Devons-nous attendre que le mal soit incurable et présent partout pour réagir ?

Notre élite s'est malheureusement, et dans une large proportion, trop engagée dans des débats idéologiques, s'éloignant par là de la préoccupation première qui doit être et demeurer la préservation de notre algérianité, de notre identité et de notre personnalité nationales faites d'Islam, d'arabité et d'amazighité, mais aussi de notre Histoire et de notre culture. Il s'avère donc urgent que notre société se ressaisisse dans son ensemble avec pour la femme algérienne un rôle vital à assumer.

La femme algérienne a su et a pu sauvegarder hier, sous la domination coloniale, notre identité et notre personnalité nationales ; elle doit aujourd'hui prendre pleinement conscience du danger réel qui menace à nouveau notre identité et notre personnalité. Elle peut participer à la prévention de ce danger dans son rôle de mère et d'éducatrice, et également par son influence au sein de notre société.

La réconciliation nationale serait éphémère si nous n'apportons tout notre soin à la marquer du sceau de notre identité et de notre personnalité nationales. La construction nationale à laquelle nous sommes attelés serait vaine elle aussi, si en définitive, nous bâtissons un pays prospère pour le livrer à des influences étrangères et à de nouvelles formes de dépendance et de domination.

L'indépendance et la souveraineté nationales jalousement défendues par notre peuple seraient demain vidées de toute signification, si notre âme et notre algérianité perdaient leur originalité et si, au fil des décennies, nous perdions notre identité et notre personnalité nationales.

Voilà pourquoi, je lance un appel à tous les Algériens pour qu'ils se ressaisissent à temps, pour que toutes les institutions du pays et en particulier notre système éducatif, nos médias, nos intellectuels, nos zaouias et tous nos acteurs sociaux s'investissent pleinement dans cette œuvre de renaissance, de sauvegarde et d'épanouissement de notre identité et de notre personnalité nationales. Voilà pourquoi j'appelle plus spécialement les femmes algériennes à s'investir une nouvelle fois, comme le firent leurs aînées, dans cette cause fondamentale, pour que nous soyons tous fiers de ce brassage qui nous distingue, nous unit et fait de nous un peuple amazighe dans ses racines, fondu dans l'arabité par la grâce de l'Islam, un peuple en quête de modernité certes, mais aussi et surtout un peuple attaché à son passé et à ses valeurs, un peuple jaloux de son indépendance, mais aussi un peuple fidèle à

l'héritage de celles et de ceux qui ont restauré notre souveraineté et réaffirmé notre dignité.

Gloire à nos Martyrs,

Vive l'Algérie,

Je vous remercie de votre aimable attention.

IV. Discours du Président de la République à l'ouverture de la Conférence Nationale des Avocats

(23 mars 2006)

(www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/discours/2006/03/D230306.htm)

Excellence, Monsieur le président de l'Union des barreaux d'Algérie,

Mesdames et messieurs, Honorable assistance,

Il m'est particulièrement agréable de répondre à votre aimable invitation, et d'être aujourd'hui présent parmi vous à la Conférence nationale des avocats dont vous m'avez fait l'honneur d'en présider l'ouverture. Je considère cette conférence comme une étape importante qui s'offre à celles et à ceux qui exercent cette profession pour exposer leurs préoccupations et oeuvrer à la réalisation de leurs aspirations dans le cadre de la loi régissant la profession d'avocat.

Cette conférence vous permettra, sans nul doute, d'examiner les questions d'ordre professionnel, juridique et organisationnel à même de promouvoir la profession et consolider les droits de la défense. Ces questions sont, en effet, intimement liées aux concepts de droit, de liberté, d'égalité et de justice.

Elles sont également liées aux intérêts et autres devoirs que ces principes supposent, car directement rattachés à l'existence humaine dans ce qu'elle a de plus précieux.

Si ces droits et principes doivent être défendus par tout citoyen conscient de ses responsabilités, l'avocat, de par sa position, est d'autant plus tenu d'assumer un rôle leader en vue de consacrer et de préserver les principes de droit et de justice, car étant le défenseur des droits et des libertés légales et juridiques.

Mesdames et Messieurs,

La tenue de cette conférence coïncide avec un événement historique de l'Algérie révolutionnaire qu'est le martyr le 23 mars 1957, du militant Maître Ali Boumendjel, que Dieu lui accorde sa sainte miséricorde. Cela est, ma foi, un profond témoignage de loyauté, exprimé par l'Union des barreaux à l'égard d'hommes et de femmes qui, dévoués à leurs chère patrie, lui ont offert ce qu'ils avaient de plus précieux.

Maître Ali Boumendjel fût parmi ceux, nombreux que la famille des avocats a sacrifiés sur l'autel de la liberté et de l'honneur. Il fût un modèle pour l'Algérien libre, refusant de voir son peuple abaissé et humilié sous l'oppression du colonialisme. Mu par sa fierté et sa bravoure, il n'hésita point à renoncer à la vie de faste et de luxe que lui

accommoda son statut social. Il refusa tout compromis avec les colonisateurs, en rejoignant les premiers rangs dans la lutte sacrée.

Un tel sacrifice n'est nullement étrange aux membres de la famille de la défense qui fût, de tout temps, à l'avant-garde de la lutte des sociétés pour la concrétisation de la liberté, de la justice et de la paix. Ce qui explique le soutien, avec courage et abnégation, d'honorables avocats étrangers qui ne reconnaissaient que la justice comme gage de droiture et d'honnêteté, à la cause algérienne, pendant la guerre de libération. Certains payèrent de leur vie ces nobles positions humaines, d'autres sont encore vivants.

Certains d'entre eux sont aujourd'hui dans cette salle, auréolés de la lumière du droit et du scintillement des joyaux de l'équité et de la probité. Je leur exprime mes sentiments de respect et de considération, et les félicite de leur fidélité à leurs principes et positions au service du droit et de la justice qui permettent à l'Homme de se concilier avec les valeurs humaines que sont la noblesse, l'honneur et la dignité.

Je rends un vibrant hommage à tous les avocats qui plaidèrent, pendant la Révolution nationale, la cause des victimes de la tyrannie et de l'oppression, payant cher le prix de leur courage et hardiesse.

Je salue aussi tous les avocats qui, parallèlement à l'accomplissement de leur devoir professionnel, furent davantage militants qu'avocats. Gloire aux algériens et étrangers qui furent victimes de leur intégrité et de leur abnégation dans la défense du droit et de la justice.

Noble et séculaire est la mission de l'avocat au sein des sociétés humaines depuis que les litiges et les différends entre les hommes ont donné naissance à cette profession. Religions révélées, législations humaines et hommes doués de sagesse et de raison en toute nation ont, depuis les lois Hammourabi en passant par la philosophie grecque et la jurisprudence romaine, plaidé pour la défense du droit et la lutte contre l'injustice par tous les moyens.

Vint alors la Chariâa islamique tolérante qui accorda à la défense du droit un intérêt particulier, avec pour devise "Prôner le bien et prohiber le mal".

"Meilleure des nations étiez-vous en prônant le bien et en prohibant le mal" a dit Dieu Tout-Puissant dans un verset coranique commenté et expliqué à la faveur des traditions prophétiques et de la jurisprudence islamique.

Bien que libérale et indépendante, la profession d'avocat demeure partie intégrante du corps de la magistrature. Aussi les avocats sont-ils les mieux placés pour défendre et restituer au citoyen ses droits fondamentaux bafoués par quelque partie que se soit, car nul ne peut être au dessus de la loi ou en faire fi.

Ce n'est que de la sorte que les avocats contribueront à édifier un Etat de droit dont l'emblème ne saurait être hissé haut, sans la consécration de la justice, le bannissement de l'injustice et la soumission de tous à l'autorité de la justice.

Cette tâche demeure, certes, difficile mais noble. Elle est tout aussi séculaire que la magistrature, aussi indispensable que la justice, aussi noble que la vertu. Elle est imprégnée de hautes valeurs morales en toute ère et dans toute société.

La législation de l'empereur romain Justinien ne stipulait-t-elle pas que "le mérite des avocats qui résolvent des affaires ardues par la force de l'argument et l'éloquence du plaidoyer, qui défendent les droits menacés, n'est pas moindre que celui des défenseurs de la patrie ...". Le roi Louis XII n'a-t-il pas dit "N'étais-je roi de France, j'aurais embrassé une carrière d'avocat."

L'avocat ne saurait accomplir sa noble mission qu'en s'armant de bravoure et de courage en plaidant la cause de son mandant. Il doit être convaincu de la justesse de cette cause, faire preuve de fidélité à ses principes, se parer d'arguments irréfutables et d'un raisonnement sain consacré par des propos mesurés et un verbe propre et intègre. Il doit être guidé par le sens du respect, de la sagesse et une largesse d'esprit.

Mesdames, Messieurs,

La mission dont vous avez été investis est des plus nobles car elle a trait à la concrétisation d'un des plus importants droit de l'Homme: le droit de la défense.

Etant consacré par la Constitution, ce droit constitue un des critères garantissant un procès équitable en contribuant à la réalisation de la justice, au respect du principe de souveraineté de la loi et en assurant la défense des droits et libertés du citoyen.

La profession d'avocat est une responsabilité qui doit être appréhendée en tout lieu et en toute circonstance, car l'avocat contribue à faire prévaloir la primauté de la justice en défendant le droit et en consacrant la souveraineté de la loi.

Ainsi il est impératif pour le bon fonctionnement de l'action judiciaire, de renforcer les droits de la défense, et de réunir les conditions idoines à la pratique de la profession d'avocat dans les meilleures circonstances.

Conscient de l'importance du rôle dévolu à l'avocat, l'Etat, à travers le programme de réforme de la justice, a tenu à mettre en place les conditions garantissant la consolidation des droits de la défense, qui, au delà des spécificités, gagneraient à s'élargir à l'information et l'orientation des justiciables, ainsi qu'à l'assistance judiciaire à fournir à qui de droit.

Les réformes engagées dans le secteur de la justice appellent, de par la nécessaire adaptation à la réalité socio-économique de la société algérienne, la promulgation d'une nouvelle législation régissant la profession d'avocat qui tiendrait compte d'abord des questions liées directement à l'exercice des libertés et droits fondamentaux du citoyen, notamment la promotion des droits de la défense, conformément aux principes constitutionnels, chartes et traités internationaux adoptés en la matière.

Ce projet de loi, en cours d'élaboration, devra réglementer cette noble profession, à même de la conformer aux normes internationales en vigueur garantissant les bases d'un procès juste. Le recours à ces normes constituent le fondement essentiel et la référence qui doit constituer le postulat pour tout traitement des questions

fondamentales et internationales, d'autant plus que notre pays oeuvre à s'insérer dans l'économie mondiale.

Ce sont là autant de facteurs qui imposent de revoir la profession d'avocat conformément aux nouvelles exigences de la société, en vue de l'adapter aux normes de l'économie de marché et aux impératifs de la globalisation, en assurant, notamment, une meilleure prise en charge des litiges internationaux induits par la politique d'ouverture, et en garantissant une défense hautement compétente, qualitativement spécialisée, alliant droiture, intégrité et références claires.

Et c'est parce que l'avocat incarne l'exercice du droit à la défense que la nouvelle législation doit tenir compte de la prise en charge des préoccupations, à la fois, du collectif de défense, des magistrats et des justiciables.

Une justice efficace et crédible ne saurait se concrétiser que si tous les intervenants s'engagent à la rendre plus performante en procédant à une révision permanente des types de formation en la matière. Devant l'augmentation, sans cesse croissante, des effectifs intégrant le corps des avocats, ce principe constitutionnel, qu'est le droit à la défense, devrait être impérativement renforcé, et ce, à travers la création, à l'instar des pays développés qui nous ont précédés sur ce registre, d'un Centre national de formation des avocats, regroupant une pléiade de candidats et candidates, dont le cursus de formation devra être ponctué par un Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle d'avocat.

Pour une meilleure représentation de la profession d'avocat, les organes la régissant devraient être issues d'élections crédibles. Il s'agira également de redynamiser le rôle du Conseil de l'union des barreaux pour consacrer la concertation entre les différentes organisations des avocats, rapprocher les vues, coordonner les actions, combler les lacunes enregistrées sur le terrain, voire promouvoir, préserver et protéger l'éthique professionnelle de toute atteinte ou déviation.

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Si les efforts déployés jusque là dans le cadre de la réforme du secteur de la justice dont nous avons fait une priorité nationale, ont franchi des étapes considérables dans la mise en place d'un système judiciaire moderne répondant aux normes contemporaines, l'un des axes majeurs de cette réforme a été la révision d'un ensemble de textes juridiques rendue nécessaire par les profondes mutations sociales, économiques et politiques.

Une révision qui a été également induite par la nécessaire conformité avec les dispositions de la Constitution et les principes des droits de l'Homme ainsi qu'avec les chartes et traités internationaux que notre pays a ratifiés ou auxquels il a adhéré, d'une part, et par la nécessité de faire face aux fléaux sociaux et aux graves crimes qui menacent la sécurité de la société, l'intégrité des personnes ainsi que les richesses du pays, d'autre part.

Les amendements et les enrichissements que la législation algérienne a connus au cours des dernières années méritent d'être salués, tout particulièrement en matière de renforcement des garanties relatives aux droits et libertés politiques fondamentaux du citoyen qui débouchent sur la protection des droits de l'Homme en général et les

droits de la défense en particulier à travers une batterie de dispositions juridiques conférant à l'avocat de larges droits lors de l'accomplissement de ses missions de défense et de représentation des justiciables.

Parmi ces dispositions plusieurs revêtent une grande importance, en premier lieu, la présomption d'innocence qui renforce les garanties octroyées au suspect lors de son arrestation et lui permet de faire appel à son avocat lors de sa présentation devant le procureur de la République

Ces dispositions portent également sur la réforme de l'enquête judiciaire à travers l'introduction d'éléments garantissant un équilibre entre les différentes parties afin d'amener le juge d'instruction à rechercher toutes les preuves aussi bien celles corroborant une accusation que celles la récusant.

Elles portent en outre sur la révision des conditions de détention préventive et la limitation du recours à cette mesure, ainsi que sur la consécration du droit au dédommagement en cas d'erreur judiciaire et de détention préventive injustifiée et la révision des dispositions de l'assistance judiciaire

L'évolution qu'a connue le volet législatif s'est accompagnée d'importantes réalisations en matière de promotion des ressources humaines, de formation et de modernisation du secteur en le dotant de moyens technologiques modernes afin qu'il puisse accomplir comme il se doit ses missions.

Certes, tout cela nous rassure quant au déroulement du processus de réforme de la Justice car les étapes franchies sont éminemment importantes

Néanmoins, nous considérons que ce secteur sensible nécessite davantage d'efforts de la part de ses femmes et de ses hommes sincères. Nous avons grand espoir et une volonté ferme pour croire que ce sont les principes de justice qui régiront la vie des Algériennes et des Algériens et pour que l'injustice soit bannie à jamais.

Mesdames, Messieurs,

L'économie algérienne connaît un développement extrêmement important et de grandes mutations se sont opérées au sein de la société, dans le cadre du passage d'une économie dirigée et centralisée à une économie libre basée sur le principe de la liberté d'initiative et de la concurrence loyale.

Dès lors, il était impératif d'adapter notre système législatif aux exigences de l'économie de marché en vue d'encourager le secteur privé et drainer l'investissement étranger pour relancer notre économie et réduire sa dépendance vis-à-vis des hydrocarbures, ressource non renouvelable, et, ce faisant, oeuvrer à créer une richesse nationale basée sur des ressources diversifiées à même de garantir à notre peuple son droit au progrès et à la prospérité.

L'intégration de l'Algérie dans l'économie mondiale, à travers la signature de l'accord d'association avec l'Union européenne (UE), et sa prochaine adhésion à l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), conduira, sans nul doute, à la fin de l'état de monopole et plus précisément la fin du droit absolu d'être protégé par le droit national. Elle conduira également à la consécration du principe selon lequel le contrat

est la seule et unique référence régissant les rapports entre contractants. Ces derniers auront, dans ce cadre, recours à des instances d'arbitrage privées, institutionnelles ou conventionnelles pour le règlement de leurs litiges.

A la lumière de cette orientation, je vous convie aujourd'hui à oeuvrer à adopter de nouveaux critères d'exercice, prenant en compte les développements accélérés dans les différents domaines, tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur, pour que votre honorable instance puisse être prête à faire face aux nouveaux défis, dictés par les conjonctures de l'époque actuelle.

Pour ce faire, il importe d'analyser les lacunes identifiées et réformer les conditions d'organisation, de gestion et d'exercice de la profession, conformément aux normes internationales en vigueur et à l'éthique qui doit toujours caractériser la profession.

La profession d'avocat constitue le cadre optimal qui garantit l'exercice du droit de la défense. Au regard du rôle important de l'avocat dans la défense et la représentation des justiciables devant les différentes juridictions et de l'aide apportée aux magistrats pour remplir leurs fonctions en toute transparence et clarté, l'effort de réforme doit comprendre la promotion de l'activité de tous les partenaires du secteur de la Justice. Cet effort doit viser en particulier l'instance de défense, et ce, conformément aux exigences actuelles à travers une formation et une spécialisation de qualité.

Mesdames, Messieurs,

La crise profonde qui a affecté notre pays, durant plus d'une décennie, a eu de graves conséquences sur le tissu social qui, fragilisé, est devenu une proie facile pour la pensée extrémiste et intégriste, étrangère à nos fondements culturels et religieux séculaires. Ces fondements ont de tout temps constitué un rempart face aux tentatives de division, de désintégration et de rupture.

Vous n'ignorez point les conséquences de cet extrémisme sur la société dans laquelle les antagonismes, la haine et les rancœurs nourris ont failli tout anéantir. Ils ont créé au sein de la société algérienne de graves ruptures qui allaient tout ébranler, n'était-ce la grâce et la bonté de Dieu qui nous a guidés vers la voie de la paix, de la sagesse et de la concorde.

Le peuple algérien qui, dans son ensemble, a adhéré à la politique de concorde civile et les résultats satisfaisants réalisés grâce à elle s'est mobilisé, à maintes reprises, pour soutenir cette démarche.

Ces mesures n'étaient toutefois pas suffisantes pour un pays qui recouvre sa santé et panse encore ses blessures. Un pays qui aspire en toute légitimité à reconstruire son économie, à réaliser son progrès et sa prospérité, à assurer l'avenir des générations montantes et à jouir d'une vie calme et paisible.

C'est dans ce contexte que la Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation, venue compléter cette démarche, a été approuvée par l'écrasante majorité du peuple algérien lors du référendum du 29 septembre 2005.

C'est alors que fût promulguée l'ordonnance portant mise en oeuvre de cette Charte, venue concrétiser, par ses textes d'application, la volonté du peuple, par la prise en

charge de l'ensemble des situations et séquelles de la tragédie nationale, en vue de les régler de manière équitable, totale et définitive, en éradiquant les causes et les aspects de cette tragédie, afin de faire régner la sécurité et à la stabilité à travers tout le pays et se tourner résolument vers la relance du processus de développement et de progrès.

Les textes de cette Charte visent à régler la situation des personnes qui ont choisi la paix, qui ont volontairement mis fin aux actes de violence et se sont rendues aux autorités compétentes ainsi que des personnes condamnées définitivement ou qui font encore l'objet de poursuites judiciaires, pour avoir perpétré des actes terroristes ou de sabotage.

Ces textes visent également à soutenir les familles des victimes et des disparus, en garantissant leur prise en charge matérielle et morale, par devoir d'entraide et de solidarité entre les citoyens et en resserrant leurs rangs pour faire face aux différentes épreuves, car procédant d'un haut sens de civisme et de valeurs humaines qui prônent l'intérêt suprême de la communauté et placent l'intérêt de la nation au dessus de toute autre considération.

Nous aspirons et oeuvrons sans relâche à l'édification d'une société solide et équilibrée, attachée à ses principes et idéaux, fière des composantes de son identité nationale et civilisationnelle, une société éprise de modernisation et de savoir et ouverte sur les cultures humaines.

Une société qui fait preuve de cohésion civilisationnelle et d'entraide sociale, qui s'arme de foi inébranlable et de développement scientifique et intellectuel avancé, une société qui appelle à la paix et la réconciliation, qui oeuvre à promouvoir la culture de la fraternité entre ses citoyens, qui concilie authenticité et modernité, sciences et foi.

Autant de valeurs et de vertus qui consacrent le progrès et le bien-être, conformément à la nature de cette société qui, tout au long de son parcours historique, a fait montre de modération dans ses pensées et ses attitudes.

Une société qui n'admet ni aliénation ni déviation, et qui n'accepte point l'hétérodoxie, sous couvert de renouveau et de modernisation, qui s'interdit tout repli ou esprit sclérosé au nom de la religion ou de traditions dépassées. Une société qui ne souffre ni excès ni manquements, et dont la religion qu'elle pratique depuis 15 siècles ne reconnaît ni monachisme ni extrémisme.

Bien que confrontée à de dures épreuves et à des difficultés extrêmes, durant sa longue marche, cette société a su résister avec bravoure et vaillance pour se réconcilier avec elle-même et avec son histoire.

Nous oeuvrons aujourd'hui dans le cadre de la concorde et la réconciliation, de la réforme et l'ouverture, au redressement et à la consolidation des fondements de cette société pour la préparer à affronter les défis de l'avenir.

Nos approches, démarches et décisions ne tendent nullement à privilégier une pensée, une catégorie ou une partie donnée au détriment d'une autre, mais notre seul

souci est de servir l'Algérie et son peuple, dans le cadre d'un projet de société ou sera bannie toute forme de fléaux et d'extrémisme.

C'est au peuple algérien souverain de décider en dernière instance. Sa décision, déjà prononcée, est réaffirmée à chaque échéance, réitérée dans chaque tribune à travers son soutien à des mesures tangibles et des lois claires. Son objectif, au travers d'une telle décision est de consacrer l'option de la paix et la réconciliation nationale, consolider l'esprit de groupe, éveiller la conscience collective en faveur de la cohésion nationale et vivre dans la dignité et l'honneur.

Sa démarche qui se réfère aux lois de la Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale et qu'il veut conforme à l'esprit de cette Charte pour consacrer l'équité et l'égalité, découle de son choix stratégique judicieux.

La réconciliation nationale procède, en effet, de notre culture et de l'attitude de notre société musulmane. La consécration de cette attitude civilisationnelle en appelle à un effort bien particulier des artisans de la pensée, dans différents domaines, à leur tête les hommes de loi.

Il s'agit, en effet, d'une action qui requiert autant de compétences et de savoir que de pondération et de sens de responsabilité, d'autant que c'est à la justice, en sa qualité de protectrice de la société et son rempart dans les épreuves, qu'est revenue la noble mission de veiller à l'application de la majeure partie des textes et dispositions de la Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale avec l'esprit de responsabilité et la célérité requise.

Le moment est donc venu pour mettre en application les mesures décidées dans le cadre de cette Charte. Aujourd'hui, nous vous sollicitons pour apporter vos contributions à la concrétisation de cette revendication du peuple pour une relance effective qui permettra à l'ensemble des citoyens d'apporter leur soutien à l'édification d'une Algérie stable et prospère.

Pour ce faire, vous êtes appelés, élite du pays, à éclairer les membres de la société et mettre en exergue l'importance des mesures devant être prises pour répandre la culture de réconciliation à travers l'explication, autant que faire se peut, des objectifs et dimensions de cette Charte et des retombées positives de leur application sur la vie quotidienne du citoyen.

Dès lors, et grâce à votre bienveillance et aux efforts de toutes les franges de la société notamment les intellectuels, l'Algérie transcendera sa crise et verra l'instauration d'un climat propice au développement global tant souhaité. Aussi, la voie sera-t-elle libre devant ceux qui désirent exprimer leur volonté de contribuer au progrès et au développement de cette patrie, par les voies légales, loin de toute manœuvre dilatoire.

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Les conférences qui seront animées par des enseignants en droit, des avocats et des experts ainsi que les interventions et débats prévus dans le cadre de cette conférence viendront éclairer la voie que vous avez empruntée et lèveront les ambiguïtés concernant certains aspects pratiques et contribueront à établir les priorités en vue de

promouvoir cette profession et lui conférer la place prestigieuse qui lui revient pour en faire le gage de la crédibilité de la justice dans notre pays.

Savez-vous ce que représente la crédibilité de la justice dans un pays? C'est le pilier central dans l'édification d'un État de droit. Une fois cet édifice érigé, le pays prospérera et sa stature n'en sera que plus grande.

Ne restera, alors, que la contribution de notre pays aux efforts de l'humanité visant à réprimer le mal où qu'il soit et à répandre le bien et l'amour parmi les hommes.

Je vous remercie pour votre attention et souhaite plein succès à vos travaux

3. APPENDIX III

Mohamed Amara's Articles

3. Mohamed Amara's Articles

المسلمون امام حرب العولمة ..عسكرية وقيمية محمد عمارة

في الحوار التالي مع المفكر الإسلامي الدكتور محمد عمارة الأكثر إطلاعا على كتابات الغرب وفهما لمشروعه ومخططاته الحالية طرحنا السؤال "هل ما نعيشه حاليا حرب دينية أم مجرد مازق تاريخي نستطيع التغلب عليه؟..الدكتور عمارة كان أكثر صراحة حيث أكد أن ما يحدث حاليا لا يخرج عن كونه حربا دينية ينبغي أن يعترف المسلمون بها ويتعاملون مع الآخر على أساسها، وعلى المسلمين إزاء هذه الحرب إما "الخنوع" والقبول بما يفرضه الآخريين عليهم أو المواجهة والحفاظ على دينهم وثقافتهم.

تطبيق عملي

* هل تعتقد أن ما يحدث في العالم اليوم هو من تداعيات انفجارات نيويورك وواشنطن في الحادي عشر من سبتمبر 2001؟

لا بل اعتقد أن تداعيات وثمرات ونتائج ما وقع في الحادي عشر من سبتمبر 2001 تمثل التطبيق العملي لمرحلة العولمة التي تعني بالمنظور الغربي عملية اجتياح الغرب وخاصة الأمريكي للآخر وهو هنا العالم كله سواء في الجانب الاقتصادي عن طريق فتح كل الحدود أمام الشركات متعددة الجنسيات أو في الجانب السياسي بتكريس حق التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية للدول الوطنية والقومية وتهميش المنظمات الدولية وإحلال الهيمنة الأمريكية محلها، أو في الجانب القانوني والتشريعي بجعل الكونجرس الأمريكي يشرع للعالم سواء في الأقليات أو التجارة أو العقوبات..بل وحتى في تغيير نظم الحكم فمثلا عندما يسن الكونجرس الأمريكي قانون لتغيير النظام في العراق ويعتمد ميزانية لذلك فإن هذا يعتبر لونا من ألوان التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية للدول.

أو في عولمة القيم وإحلال منظومة القيم الغربية من خلال صياغتها في وثائق خاصة بالمرأة والطفل والسكان ثم تعميمها وفرضها على العالم..أو العولمة العسكرية التي جعلت حلف الأطلنطي يخرج من النطاق الأوروبي والغربي لأن ميثاقه الصادر عام 1949 كان يجعله قاصرا على الدفاع عن أراض الدول المشتركة فيه، لكن عندما عقد مؤتمر حلف الأطلنطي في العيد الخمسيني له في أبريل 1999 طورت صيغة حلف الأطلنطي وبدلا من الدفاع عن أراض الدول المشتركة فيه أصبحت للدفاع عن مصالح الدول المشتركة فيه، وبالتالي بدأ الحديث عن القوات متعددة الجنسية والانتشار السريع للتدخل في مناطق الأصولية والتطرف وأسلحة الدمار الشامل.

إذن خلال الفترة الأخيرة أصبحت هناك عولمة عسكرية وعولمة سياسية واقتصادية وقيمية..كل هذا تمت صياغته والحديث عنه منذ سقوط الاتحاد السوفيتي وانفراد أمريكا بالهيمنة ووحدة قبضة الحضارة الغربية وزوال التناقض الذي كان قائما بين شقيها الليبرالي والشمولي.

الذي حدث بعد 11 سبتمبر هو دخول هذا المخطط في التطبيق، الحرب في أفغانستان والتي ستكون لها نماذج أخرى في عدد من البلاد الإسلامية والضغوط التي تتم الآن على باكستان والتدخل في تغيير مناهج التعليم الديني والحديث عن ضرب الصومال واليمن والعراق، كل هذه الممارسات بعد أحداث سبتمبر هي نوع من العولمة العسكرية والعولمة السياسية وتطبيق التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية الذي هو انتقاص لسيادة الدول.

وهذه العولمة كما أنها اجتياح غربي وأمريكي خاصة للعالم الآخر فهي أيضا تطبيق لنظرية صراع الحضارات لأن هذه النظرية كما عرضها هانتنتغتون لم تكن اختراعا منه ولا تبشيرا بصدام الحضارات لكنها كانت كاشفا عن واقع صدام الحضارات الذي يمارسه الغرب ضد الحضارات الأخرى، وهو في هذا التخطيط تحدث عن ضرورة البدء بالحضارة الإسلامية والصينية مع تحييد الحضارات الأخرى ثم بعد الفراغ من الحضارتين الإسلامية والصينية تعود الحضارة الغربية إلى احتواء الحضارات الأخرى.

ولكن لأن الصين حققت مشروع نهضوي كبير وأصبحت قوة، لذلك صارت نقاط الضعف موجودة أساسا في الحضارة الإسلامية..كما أنها تعتبر مخيفة بالنسبة للمشروع الغربي أكثر من الصين التي رغم امتلاكها عوامل القوة إلا أنها تبقى حضارة محلية مثل اليابانية والهندية، في حين تمتلك الحضارة الإسلامية مشروع بقطة ولديها إمكانيات عطاء شديدة خارج الحدود وبالتالي فهي منافسة للحضارة الغربية.

غزوة الأحزاب

وفي اعتقادي فإن اللحظة الراهنة تعيد إلى الأذهان صورة غزوة الأحزاب في عصر رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم، حين كانت القبائل العربية تعيش على الصراعات فيما بينها وهي قبائل مشركة واليهود أهل توحيد وكل هؤلاء بينهم تناقضات شديدة إنما في مواجهة الإسلام اتحد الجميع..والذي حدث الآن أن الصليبية الغربية مع اليهودية الصهيونية مع الأرثوذكسية الروسية مع الكونفوشيسية الصينية والبوذية اليابانية مع الهندوسية الهندية..كل هذه القوى لها مصالح في تحجيم الظاهرة الإسلامية والمد الإسلامي ولها مشكلات مع المسلمين في تركستان الشرقية وروسيا والقوقاز والشيشان والهند وكشمير وأماكن أخرى..ولذلك أتفق العالم على اختلاف تناقضاته ومصالحه في مواجهة المد الإسلامي واليقظة الإسلامية. وهذا المشهد يعيد إلى الذاكرة محاولة نهضة محمد علي، لأنه في مواجهة مشروع محمد علي الذي كان بمثابة تجديد الدولة

العثمانية وتجديد الشرق الإسلامي اجتمعت روسيا القيصرية مع فرنسا وإنجلترا وألمانيا وكل هذه الدول التي كانت تتصارع دينيا وقومية ضد هذا المشروع النهضوي. وبكل تأكيد فأنتي أنظر للمرحلة الحالية باعتبارها مرحلة عنفوان الهيمنة الغربية في مواجهة الظاهرة الإسلامية.. هذا الموقف الغربي هو موقف لا يعترف بالأخر لأن الغرب على المستوى الديني يريد تنصير المسلمين، وعلى مستوى المشروع الغربي والنظم الغربية والسياسات الغربية يريد احتواء العالم الإسلامي وتحقيق تبعية العالم الإسلامي سياسيا واقتصاديا وقيميا في المنظومة والمشروع الغربي.. وبالتالي فإن فكرة الأخر غير موجودة والنزعة المركزية في الحضارة الغربية لا تعترف بالأخر بل تعتبر الحضارة الغربية هي الحضارة الإنسانية والعالمية الوحيدة.. إذن فكرة العولمة هي فكرة الأمركة وفكرة تعريب العالم واجتياح العالم، وهذا كله من منطلق عدم الاعتراف بالنموذج الإسلامي.

صحة إسلامية

* عفوا، لكن مقارنة ما يحدث اليوم بواقع المسلمين وقت غزوة الأحزاب ومشروع محمد علي هل تجوز! -المسلمون اليوم من الوهن الشديد بحيث لا تجوز مقارنة أوضاعهم بأي من العصور السابقة؟
اعتقد أن شدة الضربات الغربية في العالم الإسلامي تدل على أن العالم الإسلامي يستيقظ، العالم الإسلامي في حالة استضعاف مادي.. لكن من الناحية القيمية والروحية ستجد عودة إلى الإسلام من قبل المسلمين.. نحن في حالة صحة إسلامية حقيقية.

* هذا التفسير عكس المشاع من أن الثمانينات كان عقد الصحة الإسلامية التي يرى البعض أنها تشهد تراجعا منذ نهاية العقد التاسع من القرن العشرين؟

-لا هذا ليس صحيحا، أنا أدعو إلى تأمل المحطات التي نهبت الغرب أخيرا إلى ما يسمى بالخطر الإسلامي من وجهة النظر الغربية.. مجلة شؤون دولية التي تصدر في كمبريدج نشرت ملفا في يناير 1991 فيه دراستين، الأولى عن الإسلام والمسيحية والثانية عن الإسلام والماركسية وعللت لماذا اتخذ الغرب الإسلام عدوا بعد سقوط الاتحاد السوفيتي وقالت لأن الإسلام هو الثقافة الوحيدة من بين ثقافات الجنوب القادرة على تحدي الثقافة الغربية!
* لماذا؟

ذكرت دراسة مجلة شؤون دولية أن العلم الحديث والتصنيع جعل الإيمان الديني يتراجع في كل المجتمعات، لكن الغرب اكتشف أن الإسلام استثناء وحيد ومددهش جدا من هذه القاعدة.. فالإسلام مستعص على العلمنة وهو الآن أقوى في قلوب أبنائه عن مائة سنة سابقة، وثبت أنه يمتلك مواهب للتجديد والتحديث الداخلي وبالتالي ليس مضطرا أن يقف ذليلا أمام النموذج الغربي وأن يستعيره!

إذن اكتشف الغرب أن الإسلام لم يتآكل بسبب المجتمعات الصناعية والعلم الحديث، وإنما بالعكس أصبح يستيقظ والناس تتعاطف نحوه وتتعلق به أكثر مما كان يحدث في القرون الماضية؟

* أنت تؤكد إذن أن الضعف الذي يكاد يعصف بالعالم الإسلامي ليس إلا ضعفا ظاهريا؟

-ضعف في الجوانب المادية، أنت عندما تشاهد منظومة الأسرة ومنظومة القيم في العالم الإسلامي وقارنتها بمثيلها في العالم الغربي تجد أن لدينا غنى شديد، والتدين نفسه الفروقات فيه كبيرة بيننا والغرب، لدينا الناس مؤمنة بكل جوارحها وروحها وهم الغالبية في المجتمعات الإسلامية بينما الذين يؤمنون بوجوده لا تتعدى نسبتهم 14% في المجتمعات الغربية، والذين يذهبون إلى الكنائس (بموسيقى الجاز والرقص) لا تتجاوز نسبتهم 10%.. كما أنك عند المقارنة مع الغرب ستجد أن أعلى نسبة للعنف ضد النساء في الغرب، وأعلى نسبة للاغتصاب في الغرب، وأعلى نسبة للقلق والانتحار لديهم أيضا.. المواطن الغربي العادي عندما يعلم بالإسلام يعتقد أنه أصلا لم يكن له دين، العلمانية قتلت فيه الدين. عندما ترى هذا الواقع في الغرب وما لدينا في العالم الإسلامي تجد أن الأمة الإسلامية بالفعل أمة تستيقظ، رغم أن هناك عشرات المشكلات والعقبات والرواسب والموروثات وخصوصا في النظم والحكومات والتبعية للغرب، فكل هذه مشكلات موجودة أمام الصحة التي ما زالت قوية لكنها في حالة ثبات.

بالإضافة إلى ما سبق ستجد أن محطة الثورة الإيرانية كانت من ضمن المحطات المؤثرة فيما يتعلق باكتشاف الغرب لهذه الحقيقة، وأذكر مما قرأته من الكتابات الغربية عقب الثورة الإيرانية أنهم قالوا "لقد فوجئنا بأن الإسلام لا يزال حيا وأنه القادر على تحريك الجماهير وعلى بناء دولة" ذلك أنه قبل الثورة كان الغرب يعتقد أنه بعد حوالي القرنين من الاستعمار فقد المسلمون القدرة على بناء دولة!

وأذكر أيضا من القراءات عندما كتبت دراسة عن المؤتمر الذي عقد في أميركا عام 1978 لتنصير المسلمين وجدت أن من دواعي عقد المؤتمر واختراع أساليب جديدة للتنصير المظاهرات التي قامت في مصر تطالب بتطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية، وكان ذلك في منتصف السبعينات وقبل قيام الثورة الإيرانية، وأيضا من العوامل التي دفعتهم للإسراع في تنصير المسلمين اتجاه باكستان لتطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية.

فكرة الإسلام كدين ودولة فاجئت الغرب لأنهم كانوا قد تصوروا أن الإسلام دجن وأن المسلمين قبلوا بفصل الدين عن الدولة وأن الإسلام صار لونا من النصرانية.. كان يعتقدون أن المسلمين قد تركوا الدنيا وانكفوا على العبادة فقط، لكنه فجأة اكتشف حيوية الإسلام كدين ودولة.

وعندما كتب هنري كيسنجر "انتهزوا الفرصة" في أواخر الثمانينات قبيل سقوط الاتحاد السوفيتي وعرف ما يسمونه بالأصولية فقال هي التي تريد بعث الحضارة الإسلامية.. تطبيق الشريعة الإسلامية.. أن الإسلام دين ودولة.. وهم ثوار

وليسوا محافظين لأنهم ينظرون إلى المستقبل ويستلهمون الماضي ولكنهم لا يريدون العودة بالعربية إلى الماضي. إذن مشكلة المشروع الغربي مع الإسلام في كون الإسلام دين ودولة وأنه استعصى على العلمنة وبالتالي فإن عقيدة المسلم تريد تحرير عقيدته، الأرض والثروة وأن يجعل الدنيا للمسلمين أيضا.

حرب دينية
* إذن في ضوء ما عرضته.. هل ما يحدث بيننا والعالم الغربي حاليا حرب دينية أم مجرد مأزق تاريخي من الممكن تفاديه أو التعامل معه؟

نعم، هذا ينقلنا إلى زاوية جديدة ذلك أن البعض يشكك في عداة الغرب و عداة أمريكا للإسلام، ويقول أنه ليس عداة للإسلام وليست حربا على الإسلام وإنما هي حرب مصالح.. وهذا صحيح لأن الغرب براجماتي ونفعي ودينه هو المال والمصالح، لكن دائما وأبدا عبر التاريخ وفي كل المجتمعات والحضارات سنجد أن المصالح لا تنفصل عن الأفكار.. وعلى سبيل المثال عندما كانت الدولة الرومانية تحتل مصر حاربت المسيحية واضطهدت المسيحيين المصريين طوال ستة قرون لأن المسيحية كانت تمثل ذاتية مصر وعامل من عوامل تحررها وكان قهر هذه المسيحية هو تحقيق لمصالح الدولة الرومانية في مصر.. أيضا الحروب الصليبية وقد كانت تريد احتلال الشرق إلا أنها تمثلت بالدين واستخدمت غطائه. وفي العصر الحديث كان الهجوم على الدولة العثمانية وعلى فكرة الخلافة سبيل لتقسيم العالم الإسلامي واحتوائه، بل إن الحرب على حركات التحرر الوطني في العالم العربي أخذت شكل الهجوم على القومية العربية.. إذن كانت المصلحة دائما ما ترتبط بالفكر.. الغرب عندما حارب الشيوعية كان في ذلك يدافع عن النظام الرأسمالي لكن حربه كانت ضد أيديولوجية. ووفقا لتلك الأحداث التاريخية ستجد أن الذين ينكرون وجود حروب دينية هم بلا شك مخطئون.. صحيح نحن ضد الحروب الدينية لكنها موجودة وتمارس ضد المسلمين، مثلما نحن ضد الحروب بصفة عامة إلا أن ذلك لا يلغي وجودها بل ويفرض علينا القتال كما يقول الله في القرآن "كتب عليكم القتال كما كتب على الذين من قبلكم" فالمسلمين لا يريدون أن يقاتلوا إلا إذا اعتدي عليهم أو على دينهم.. هناك فارق دون شك بين ما نريد وما هو واقع وموجود.. نحن لا نريد صدام حضارات، لكنه موجود.

إذن هناك استخدام للدين في الصراعات وتحقيق المصالح، فمثلا وفي إطار الحضارة المسيحية.. أمريكا الشمالية تعتبر أمريكا الجنوبية هي الفناء الخلفي لها، والأرجنتين دولة كاثوليكية لكن أميركا البروتستانتية تبشر بمذهبها هناك واستطاعت تحويل أكثر من 30% من أهل الأرجنتين إلى المذهب البروتستانتية.

أمريكا تريد التبشير أيضا في روسيا والكنيسة الروسية جعلت البرلمان الروسي (مجلس الدوما) يصدر قانون ديني يمنع التبشير بالمذاهب الغربية.. إذن حتى في داخل الحضارة الغربية يستخدم الدين في تحقيق المصالح لأنه ليست هناك مصالح عارية، ولا تتحقق الأموال والثروات بدون أفكار ولذلك فقد أرتبط الغزو الثقافي الأوروبي بالغزو الاستعماري.. الغرب والاستعمار في حاجة إلى إقناع المستعمرين بتأييد هذه التبعية وهذا النهب. ومن خلال تجارب التاريخ نتعلم أيضا أن احتلال الأرض لا يمكن أن يتم إلا باحتلال العقول وجزء من احتلال العقول هو الدين والفكر الديني.. والغرب في صراعه ضد الإسلام ينظر إلى الدين الإسلامي باعتباره الجامع الموحد للأمة والطاقة المحركة لها وأنه يجب أولا أن يعمل على تفكيك هذا الجامع حتى يحقق هدفه في شرذمة المسلمين وهزيمتهم واستسلامهم. والحديث على أن الصراع هو صراع مصالح وليس صراع أفكار وأديان هو حديث وهمي.. الغرب لا يريد الصراع ضد الإسلام لأنه يريد إدخال المسلمين جنة النصارى، إنما هو يريد مصالح في العالم الإسلامي ويعادي الإسلام لأنه سباج للمصالح الذاتية والقومية والحضارية والنهضوية للأمة.

جنة الغرب

* الغرب وجد إذن أن مشروعه في العولمة الاقتصادية لن يتحقق إلا بعولمة الآخرين ثقافيا أيضا؟
نعم العولمة الثقافية والدين جزء أساسي من هوية الأمة.. الدين واللغة والتاريخ ثالث يعادي دائما الهيمنة الاستعماري، وهذا ما فطنت إليه فرنسا خلال احتلالها الشمال الأفريقي حيث غيرت وبدلت في عناصر الهوية هذه من لغة ودين والشريعة.. الحرب على الإسلام إذن ليس هدفها إنقاذ المسلمين من الكفر وإدخالهم الإيمان والجنة، ليس في المسألة حبا في خلاص المسلمين وإنما هي حب في ثروتهم وفي الهيمنة عليهم ومحاولة ضرب السياج الفكري والعقدي الذي يحمي المصالح الإسلامية والطاقة التي تحرك الأمة في معارك التحرر الوطني.

لذلك ينبغي التمييز بين موقف الغرب من الإسلام في نقطتين، الأولى تتعلق بموقف الإنسان الغربي من الصراع، والثانية هي المشروع الغربي الذي يعادي الآخرين.. الإنسان الغربي ضحية للإعلام الغربي.. ولذلك مشكلتنا ليست معه وليست مع العلوم الغربية لأنها علم عام يجب أن نسعى إليه ونتعلم عليه.. مشكلتنا مع المشروع الغربي ومنه المشروع الديني الذي يتلخص في بناء الكنائس والتنصير والتي تطمح لاجتثاث الإسلام كله من أساسه، الإسلام كحضارة وعقيدة وشريعة وقيم لأنها تريد إحلال المسيحية مكانه وهذا الطموح في التغريب وفي العولمة ذو سقف عال.

أما الحكومات الغربية فهي لا تريد الحرب على العقيدة ولا على الشعائر أو العبادات الإسلامية، إنما تريد تحويل الإسلام إلى صيغة مشابهة للنصرانية لا علاقة لها بالدنيا، فهي تتركنا لنصلي كما نريد ونصوم كما نحب ونتدروش إذا شئنا، لكن على أن تبقى دنيانا تابعة لهم لياخذونها، فالمراد أن تبقى لنا الآخرة شريطة أن يأخذوا الدنيا ومن فيها وما بها.. ولذلك فإنه في الأيام الأخيرة ستجد أن هانتغتون وفوكوياما وضعوا القضية في وضعها الحقيقي وقالوا أنه لا بد أن يقبل المسلمون الحداثة والعلمنة التي هي فصل الدين عن الدولة، هذا هو الهدف بالنسبة للمشروع السياسي الغربي والحكومات الغربية.

وإذا كانت النصرانية الغربية والكنايس تعادي العقيدة الإسلامية فإن الحكومات الغربية والأميركية، قد لا يهمنها هذا كثيرا إنما الذي يهمنها هو وأد الإسلام كشرعية وجهاد مقاوم للغرب والمصالح الغربية، فهذا هو العدو الذي يجب أن تشن عليه الحرب وتجيش ضده الجيوش.

كما أنني أريد أن أضرب مثلا بالحرب التي يشنها الغرب ضد واحد من الأنظمة العربية المعتدلة لأنه تعدى الحدود المسموح بها وصارت له مداخلات خارج حدود العقيدة.. فعندما كان دوره محصورا في ضرورة إطالة اللحي وتقصير الثوب لم تكن هناك مشكلة مع الغرب، لكن عندما بدأ يتحدث عن الجهاد وتحرير الأرض فقد تحدثت بذلك عن الدنيا ولهذا صار الغرب يعاديا ويتهمها بتفريخ الإرهاب وذلك ما لم يكن يحدث عندما كانت تغيب الدنيا بل كانت موضع ترحيب. لا بد أن ندرك ما يحاك لنا، فالجهد ليس على مطلق التعليم الديني إنما على الموقف من شارون واليهود وما حواه القرآن والسنة، وكذلك قصص الغزوات ضد اليهود والجهاد لتحرير الأمة.. إنما الإسلام العبادي والشعائري ليس هو ما تريد رأسه أمريكا، بل تريد رأس الإسلام المجاهد والمقاوم.. الإسلام الطاقة المحررة للأمة الذي يبحث عن التميز الحضاري والعزة الحضارية والاستقلال. يجب أن نفص الاشتباك الوهمي بين الذين ينكرون صراعات فكرية وحضارية وبين الذين يقولون بوجودها قبل أن نحدد مواطن الخلاف.

المعركة التي تدور الآن هي معركة المشروع الغربي والنظام الأمريكي ضد كون الإسلام رافض للعلمنة، وهذا ما ذكره حرفيا فوكوياما في مقالة الأخير المنشور بعد أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر، حيث قال أن الفاشية الإسلامية، كما سماها، رافضة للحداثة ولبدأ العلمنة لأنه يعتبر أن الديمقراطية الغربية هي ثمرة للمسيحية لأنه يعتبر الديمقراطية للشعب وليس للشريعة في ظل مبدأ فصل الدين عن الدولة.. الغرب إذن واضح في تحديد مقاصده، لكن للأسف الشديد نحن لا نقرأ وإن قرأنا لا نفهم.

ما أريد التأكيد عليه أن النزعة الصراعية جزء من مكونات الحضارة الغربية، فالنظريات الأساسية التي صنعت الحضارة الغربية قائمة على الصراع، سواء عند داروين (صراع الأحياء والأقوى هو الأصلح)، أو في الحياة الاجتماعية حيث صراع الطبقات ولا بد أن تزيج طبقة الأخرى حتى تترث المجتمع، حتى في التاريخ عند هيجل سنجد أن الحداثة تنسخ ما قبلها وكل عصر ينسخ ما قبله.. الحضارة الغربية إذن حضارة صراعية وعندما اجتاحت العالم واستعمرته كانت تعتبر أنها تقوم برسالة حضارية، عندما يتم تغريب العالم وإزالة الموروث الثقافي للمسلمين وغير المسلمين يعتبرون أن ذلك أمر طبيعي لأنه تمدن ولأنه يأتي في إطار نظرية البقاء للأقوى لأنه الأصلح.. ولذلك عندما يفرضون علينا منظومة القيم المنحلة التي تتبعهم يعتبرون أن ذلك تمدنا ويتعجبون لعدم قبولنا هذه المنظومة.

1000 كتاب

* كيف إذن نتعامل مع الآخر وما هو الخطاب الأمثل الذي يجب أن نتحدث به؟ نحن مطالبون بتبليغ الدعوة وإقامة الحجة وإزالة الشبهة، كما أننا في حاجة إلى تقديم الإسلام بشكل منظم وموضوعي، لذلك اقترح عمل مشروع ألف كتاب إسلامي ويتم اختيار هذه الكتب من فكر الإحياء والاستنارة على مدى القرنين الماضيين بحيث نكون مكتبة تستطيع أن تجيب على علامات الاستفهام والأسئلة التي تملأ الفراغات الموجودة سواء كانت في العقيدة أو السيرة والسنة.

* هل لديك خطة لتنفيذ هذا المشروع؟

ليت المعنيين بصورة الإسلام في الغرب يقللوا من الندوات التي لا تضيف شيئا ويتبنوا مثل هذا المشروع، وأتصور لو أن هناك مؤسسة تبنت مثل هذا المشروع وطبعت هذه الكتب وقدمتها للدعاة والمثقفين وطلاب العلم في بلادنا، ثم ترجمت إلى اللغات المختلفة فإنها سوف تلعب دورا رئيسيا في تقديم الصورة الحقيقية للإسلام في الغرب الذي رغم ما حدث فإن دخوله إلى الإسلام يتزايد هذه الأيام بعدما بدأ يقرأ عنه نتيجة تزايد الهجوم عليه حديثا.

ردود فعل

* هل تعتقد أننا في هذه الحرب التي أطلقت عليها الصبغة الدينية سنظل خاسرين على طول المدى؟

-بالعكس اعتقد أن الصلف الأمريكي والهيمنة الأمريكية ستضر بها، الأمريكيون ليسوا أمة وليسوا شعب له تاريخ.. ما يفعلونه اليوم لا يخرج إلا من عقلية رعاة البقر، وهم يتصرفون الآن في العالم كله بمنطق رعاة البقر.. وفي الحقيقة أنه لا يكفي أن تكون هناك قوة فرعونية ووفرة قارونية لكي تكون هناك حضارة وقبول في العالم كله.. الأمريكيون في الحقيقة مجرد رعاة بقر يمتلكون قوة فرعون ووفرة قارون، وهذه ليست مؤهلات لحكم العالم.. ونحن لو رتبنا البيت العربي من الداخل نستطيع أن نكسب العديد من القوى التي تحالفت بشكل مؤقت مع المصالح الأمريكية لأن التناقضات بينهم أعمق من هذه المصالح.. في رأيي فإنه يجب تهدئة الصراع بين المسلمين وهذه القوى في سبيل مواجهة الخطر الأكبر الذي يأتي من الهيمنة الأمريكية، وأتمنى من المنظمات العربية والإسلامية أن تعي مثل هذا وأن تسعى إلى تحقيقه

وردود الفعل للتصرف الأمريكي سواء داخل العالم الإسلامي أو خارجه ستكون حادة والقواعد الثلاثة عشر التي يقال أنهم أقاموها في منطقة وسط آسيا لن تحمي القوات الأميركية.. ما أخشاه أن يولد ما تفعله أمريكا حاليا تطرفا أكثر.. فالتدخل في التعليم الديني ضرب في العظام واختراق وتجاوز للخطوط الحمراء، وهذا سوف يولد رد فعل عنيف ضد الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، وهذا ما لا نتمنى حدوثه سواء الفعل أو رد الفعل.

اعترافات الدكتور محمد عمارة حول حوار الأديان ! ..

فتن بعض المسلمين خلال سنين مضت بقضية " الحوار مع الأديان الأخرى " أو مع " الغرب " بغية الوصول إلى تعايش سلمي - كما يقال - من خلال نبذ الصراعات والاعتراف المتبادل بين الجميع ، مغترين بالجهود الحثيثة التي يبذلها الآخرون بدعوى الوصول لهذا الهدف ؛ عن طريق إقامة المؤتمرات الحوارية واللقاءات .

وكان هذا البعض ينتقد كل من يحذره من هذه الدعوات واللقاءات المشبوهة المخادعة المخالفة لسنة الله الكونية والشرعية ، التي يستغلها الآخرون لاستدراج المسلمين لباطلهم ، أو دفعهم للتنازل عن شئى من دينهم ؛ كما قال تعالى {ودوا لو تُدْهِن . } متغافلين عن إخبار الله تعالى بأن الصراع بين الحق والباطل مستمر إلى قيام الساعة ، وعن قوله {ولا يزالون يقاتلونكم } ، وقوله { ولئن أتيت الذين أوتوا الكتاب بكل آية ما تبعوا قبلتك . وما أنت بتابع قبلتهم . وما بعضهم بتابع قبلة بعض ولئن اتبعت أهواءهم من بعد ما جاءك من العلم إنك إذا لمن الظالمين . } وقوله { ولن ترضى عنك اليهود ولا النصارى حتى تتبع ملتهم . }

إلا أن العقلاء منهم اكتشفوا بعد جهد ضائع زيف هذه المؤتمرات ودعوات الحوار ؛ عندما وجدوها لا تختلف كثيراً عن المؤسسات التنصيرية ! رغم التضليل الخارجي المتخفي خلف الشعارات .

وأسوق هنا اعتراف فارس من فرسان هذه الحوارات واللقاءات ؛ هو الدكتور محمد عمارة ؛ الذي كان في يوم ما مخدوعاً بها ، مؤملاً عليها أمالاً كثيرة ؛ إلى أن اكتشف في النهاية أن أماله تتبخر مثل السراب بعد كل مؤتمر يحضره أو يشارك فيه .

ولعل في نشر اعترافه - الذي يشهد لشجاعته - عبرة لمن لازالوا يؤملون أن يجنوا من الشوك العنب .

يقول الدكتور في مقدمة كتبه " مأزق المسيحية والعلمانية في أوربا " (ص 5-14) : (مع كل ذلك، فتجربتي مع الحوارات الدينية - وخاصة مع ممثلي النصرانية الغربية- تجربة سلبية، لا تبعث على رجاء آمال تُذكر من وراء هذه الحوارات التي تُقام لها الكثير من اللجان والمؤسسات، وتُعقد لها الكثير من المؤتمرات والندوات واللقاءات ، ويُنفق عليها الكثير من الأموال .

وذلك أن كل هذه الحوارات التي دارت وتدور بين علماء الإسلام ومفكره وبين ممثلي كنائس النصرانية الغربية، قد افترقت ولا تزال مفتقدة لأول وأبسط وأهم شرط من شروط أي حوار من الحوارات ؛ وهو شرط الاعتراف المتبادل والقبول المشترك بين أطراف الحوار، فالحوار إنما يدور بين "الذات" وبين "الأخر"؛ ومن ثم بين "الأخر" وبين "الذات"، ففيه إرسال وفيه استقبال، على أمل التفاعل بين الطرفين، فإذا دار الحوار - كما هو حاله الآن- بين طرف يعترف بالأخر، وآخر لا يعترف بمن "يحاوره"، كان حواراً مع "الذات"، وليس مع "الأخر"، ووقف عند "الإرسال" دون "الاستقبال"، ومن ثم يكون شبيهاً -في النتائج- بحوار الطرشان .. !

موقف الآخرين من الإسلام والمسلمين هو موقف الإنكار، وعدم الاعتراف أو القبول، فلا الإسلام في عرفهم دين سماوي، ولا رسوله صادق في رسالته، ولا كتابه وحي من السماء، حتى لتصل المفارقة في عالم الإسلام إلى حيث تعترف الأثرية المسلمة بالأقليات غير المسلمة، على حين لا تعترف الأقليات بالأغلبية ! فكيف يكون، وكيف يثمر حوار ديني بين طرفين، أحدهما يعترف بالأخر، ويقبل به طرفاً في إطار الدين السماوي، بينما الطرف الآخر يصنفنا كمجرد " واقع"، وليس كدين، بالمعنى السماوي لمصطلح الدين؟ !

ذلك هو الشرط الأول والضروري المفقود، وذلك هو السر في عقم كل الحوارات الدينية التي تمت وتتم رغم ما بُذل ويُبذل فيها من جهود، وأنفق ويُنفق عليها من أموال، ورُصد ويُرصد لها من إمكانات !

أما السبب الثاني لعزوفي عن المشاركة في الحوارات الدينية -التي أدعى إليها- فهو معرفتي بالمقاصد الحقيقية للآخرين من وراء الحوار الديني مع المسلمين، فهم يريدون التعرف على الإسلام، وهذا حقهم إن لم يكن واجبهم، لكن لا ليتعايشوا معه وفقاً لسنة التعددية في الملل والشرايع، وإنما ليحذفوه ويطووا صفحته بتنصير المسلمين !

وهم لا يريدون الحوار مع المسلمين بحثاً عن القواسم المشتركة حول القضايا الحياتية التي يمكن الاتفاق على حلول إيمانية لمشكلاتها، وإنما ليكرسوا -أو على الأقل يصمتوا- عن المظالم التي يكتوي المسلمون بناها، والتي صنعتها وتصنعها الدوائر الاستعمارية التي كثيراً ما استخدمت هذا الآخر الديني في فرض هذه المظالم وتكريسها في عالم الإسلام .

فحرمان كثير من الشعوب الإسلامية من حقها الفطري والطبيعي في تقرير المصير واغتصاب الأرض والسيادة في القدس وفلسطين والبوسنة والهرسك وكوسوفا والسنجق وكشمير والفلبين .. إلخ .. إلخ .. كلها أمور مسكوت عنها في مؤتمرات الحوار الديني .

بل إن وثائق مؤتمرات التدبير لتنصير المسلمين التي تتسابق في ميادينها كل الكنائس الغربية، تعترف -هذه الوثائق- بأن الحوار الديني -بالنسبة لهم- لا يعني التخلي عن "الجهود الفسرية والواعية والمتعمدة والتكتيكية لجذب الناس من مجتمع ديني ما إلى آخر" بل ربما كان الحوار مرحلة من مراحل التنصير !

وإذا كانت النصرانية الغربية تتوزعها كنيسة كبريان، الكاثوليكية، والبروتستانتية الإنجيلية، فإن الفاتيكان الكاثوليكية -الذي أقام مؤسسات للحوار مع المسلمين، ودعا إلى كثير من مؤتمرات هذا الحوار- هو الذي رفع شعار: "إفريقيا نصرانية سنة 2000م"، فلما أوف الموعد، ولم يتحقق الوعد، مد أجل هذا الطمع إلى 2025م !!

وهو الذي عقد مع الكيان الصهيوني المغتصب للقدس وفلسطين معاهدة في 30-12-1993م تحدثت عن العلاقة الفريدة بين الكاثوليكية وبين الشعب اليهودي، واعترفت بالأمر الواقع للاغتصاب، وأخذت كنائسها في القدس المحتلة تسجل نفسها وفقاً للقانون الإسرائيلي الذي ضم المدينة إلى إسرائيل سنة 1967م !!

بل لقد ألزمت هذه المعاهدة كل الكنائس الكاثوليكية بما جاء فيها، أي أنها دعت وتدعو كل الملتمزمين بسلطة الفاتيكان الدينية -حتى ولو كانوا مواطنين في وطن العروبة وعالم الإسلام- إلى خيانة قضاياهم الوطنية والقومية !

وباسم هذه الكاثوليكية أعلن بابا الفاتيكان أن القدس هي الوطن الروحي لليهودية، وشعار الدولة اليهودية، بل وطلب الغفران من اليهود، وذلك بعد أن ظلت كنيسته قروناً متطاولة تتبع صكوك الغفران !

أما الكنيسة البروتستانتية الإنجيلية الغربية، فإنها هي التي فكرت ودبرت وقررت في وثائق مؤتمر كولورادو سنة 1978م :

"إن الإسلام هو الدين الوحيد الذي تناقض مصادره الأصلية أسس النصرانية، وإن النظام الإسلامي هو أكثر النظم الدينية المتناسقة اجتماعياً وسياسياً، إنه حركة دينية معادية للنصرانية، مخططة تخطيطاً يفوق قدرة البشر، ونحن بحاجة إلى مئات المراكز تؤسس حول العالم بواسطة النصارى، للتركيز على الإسلام ليس فقط لخلق فهم أفضل للإسلام وللتعامل النصراني مع الإسلام، وإنما لتوصيل ذلك الفهم إلى المنصرين من أجل اختراق الإسلام في صدق ودهاء !!!"

ولقد سلك هذا المخطط -في سبيل تحقيق الاختراق للإسلام، وتنصير المسلمين- كل السبل اللا أخلاقية- التي لا تليق بأهل أي دين من الأديان- فتحدثت مقررات هذا المؤتمر عن العمل على اجتذاب الكنائس الشرقية الوطنية إلى خيانة شعوبها، والضلوع في مخطط اختراق الإسلام والثقافة الإسلامية للشعوب التي هي جزء وطني أصيل فيها، فقالت وثائق هذه المقررات :

"لقد وطدنا العزم على العمل بالاعتماد المتبادل مع كل النصارى والكنائس الموجودة في العالم الإسلامي، إن النصارى البروتستانت في الشرق الأوسط وإفريقيا وآسيا، منهمكون بصورة عميقة ومؤثرة في عملية تنصير المسلمين. ويجب أن تخرج الكنائس القومية من عزلتها، وتفتح بعزم جديد ثقافات ومجتمعات المسلمين الذين تسعى إلى تنصيرهم، وعلى المواطنين النصارى في البلدان الإسلامية وإرساليات التنصير الأجنبية العمل معاً، بروح تامة من أجل الاعتماد المتبادل والتعاون المشترك لتنصير المسلمين ."

فهم يريدون تحويل الأقليات الدينية في بلادنا إلى شركاء في هذا النشاط التنصيري، المعادي لشعوبهم وأمتهم !

كذلك قررت "بروتوكولات" هذا المؤتمر تدريب وتوظيف العمالة المدنية الأجنبية التي تعمل في البلاد الإسلامية لمحاربة الإسلام وتنصير المسلمين، وفي ذلك قالوا :

"إنه على الرغم من وجود منصرين بروتستانت من أمريكا الشمالية في الخارج أكثر من أي وقت مضى، فإن عدد الأمريكيين الفنيين الذين يعيشون فيما وراء البحار يفوق عدد المنصرين بأكثر من 100 إلى 1، وهؤلاء يمكنهم أيضاً أن يعملوا مع المنصرين جنباً إلى جنب لتنصير العالم الإسلامي، وخاصة في البلاد التي تمنع حكوماتها التنصير العلني!"

كذلك دعت قرارات مؤتمر كولورادو إلى التركيز على أبناء المسلمين الذين يدرسون أو يعملون في البلاد الغربية، مستغلين عزلتهم عن المناخ الإسلامي لتحويلهم إلى "مزارع ومشاتل للنصرانية"، وذلك لإعادة غرسهم وغرس النصرانية في بلادهم عندما يعودون إليها، وعن ذلك قالوا :

"يتزايد باطراد عدد المسلمين الذين يسافرون إلى الغرب؛ ولأنهم يفتقرون إلى الدعم التقليدي الذي توفره المجتمعات الإسلامية، ويعيشون نمطاً من الحياة مختلفاً— في ظل الثقافة العلمانية والمادية— فإن عقيدة الغالبية العظمى منهم تتعرض للتأثر .

وإذا كانت "تربة" المسلمين في بلادهم هي بالنسبة للتنصير "أرض صلبة، ووعرة" فإن بالإمكان إيجاد مزارع خصبة بين المسلمين المشتتين خارج بلادهم، حيث يتم الزرع والسقي لعمل فعال عندما يعاد زرعهم ثانية في تربة أوطانهم كمنصرين!"

بل إن بروتوكولات هذا المؤتمر التنصيري لتبلغ قمة اللا أخلاقية عندما تقرر أن صناعة الكوارث في العالم الإسلامي هي السبيل لإفقاد المسلمين توازنهم الذي يسهل عملية تحولهم عن الإسلام إلى النصرانية! فتقول هذه البروتوكولات :

"لكي يكون هناك تحول إلى النصرانية، فلا بد من وجود أزمات ومشاكل وعوامل تدفع الناس، أفراداً وجماعات، خارج حالة التوازن التي اعتادوها. وقد تأتي هذه الأمور على شكل عوامل طبيعية، كالفقر والمرض والكوارث والحروب، وقد تكون معنوية، كالنفرة العنصرية، أو الوضع الاجتماعي المتدني. وفي غياب مثل هذه الأوضاع المهيئة، فلن تكون هناك تحولات كبيرة إلى النصرانية ..

إن تقديم العون لذوي الحاجة قد أصبح عملاً مهماً في عملية التنصير! وإن إحدى معجزات عصرنا أن احتياجات كثير من المجتمعات الإسلامية قد بدلت موقف حكوماتها التي كانت تناهض العمل التنصيري ؛ فأصبحت أكثر تقبلاً للنصارى ! "

فهم — رغم مسوح رجال الدين- يسعون إلى صنع الكوارث في بلادنا، ليختل توازن المسلمين، وذلك حتى يبيعوا إسلامهم لقاء مأوى أو كسرة خبز أو جرعة دواء! وفيما حدث ويحدث لضحايا المجاعات والحروب الأهلية والتطهير العرقي —في البلاد الإسلامية- التطبيق العملي لهذا الذي قرره البروتوكولات، فهل يمكن أن يكون هناك حوار حقيقي ومثمر مع هؤلاء؟! "

تلك بعض من الأسباب التي جعلتني متحفظاً على دعوات ومؤتمرات وندوات الحوار بين الإسلام والنصرانية الغربية، وهي أسباب دعمتها وأكدها "تجارب حوارية" مارستها في لقاء تم في "قبرص" أواخر سبعينيات القرن العشرين، ووجدت يومها أن الكنيسة الأمريكية —التي ترعى هذا الحوار وتنفق عليه- قد اتخذت من إحدى القلاع التي بناها الصليبيون إبان حروبهم ضد المسلمين، "قاعدة" ومقرراً لإدارة هذا الحوار ؟ !

ومؤتمر آخر للحوار حضرته في عمان —باطار المجمع الملكي لبحوث الحضارة الإسلامية- مع الكنيسة الكاثوليكية في الثمانينيات وفيه حاولنا —عبئاً- انتزاع كلمة منهم تناصر قضايانا العادلة في القدس وفلسطين، فذهبت جهودنا أدراج الرياح! على حين كانوا يدعوننا إلى "علمنة" العالم الإسلامي لطى صفحة الإسلام كمنهاج للحياة الدنيا، تمهيداً لطى صفحته —بالتنصير- كمنهاج للحياة الآخرة !

ومنذ ذلك التاريخ عذمت على الإعراض عن حضور "مسارح" هذا "الحوار"! .

الاستنارة بين الذات والآخر.. مقاربة قرآنية لاستشفاف الضرورات

محمد عمارة

تمثل "الاستنارة": حالة كيفية ونوعية من "الوعي _ الفاعل" بحقيقة الذات و "الواقع" و "المحيط" .. فلا بد فيها من الوعي "بالذات الحضارية والثقافية" والمعرفة الواعية "بالآخر الحضاري والثقافي" أيضاً.. والذين تقف ثقافتهم عند موروثهم الفكري لا تتعداه، هم _ في أحسن الأحوال _ كمن ينظر بعين واحدة، فلا يبصرون إلا ذاتهم، أو كالأعمى الذي لا يدرك من الوجود غير جسده الذي يحسسه بيديه! وكذلك حال ثقافة الذين ضربت عقولهم في "المصانع الفكرية" للحضارات الأخرى، الذين جهلوا مواريتهم، وهوية أمتهم، وثقافة الحضارة التي يحملون أسماءها، وإلى شعوبها ينتسبون.. إنهم مستنبطون.. لكن استنارتهم لا ترى غير الآخر، ولهم وعي، لكن وعيهم لا يدرك الذات الحضارية التي يستظلون بعنوانها العقدي والوطني والقومي والثقافي.

ومن هنا، كانت الاستنارة الكاملة الفاعلة هي الوعي الحقيقي "بالذات الحضارية" و "بالآخر الحضاري"، وإدراك وإعمال قوانين الأخذ والعطاء، والتفاعل الصحي بين تيارات الفكر الإنساني، وثمرات العقول في مختلف الثقافات والحضارات..

فالذين يكتفون "بذاتهم" الثقافية والحضارية. لا بد وأن يقودوا هذه "الذات" إلى الذبول والاضمحلال، مثلهم في ذلك كمثل المضرب عن الطعام، يعيش على الذات حتى يستهلك مكوناتها!

وكذلك الذين يتجاهلون أو يجهلون "الذات" الثقافية والحضارية لأمتهم، ويتقمصون "ذوات" الآخرين، لا بد وأن تنتهي هذه "الذات" _ التي فرطوا فيها _ إلى الذبول والاضمحلال!..

فمعرفة النفس لا تغني عن معرفة الآخرين.. والعكس صحيح..

ولا يحسبن أحد أن هذا المنهاج _ في الاستنارة الحقيقية _ هو وليد الواقع المعاصر، وما شهد ويشهد من تسارع وتعاضم في ثورة وسائل الاتصال.. فمن القرآن الكريم نتعلم المنهاج الذي يدعونا _ بعد الوعي بالذات، واليقين بالحق الذي نؤمن به، وننتمي إليه، ونجاهد في سبيله _ .. يدعونا هذا المنهاج القرآني إلى التعرف على الآخرين.. بل والتأمل فيما يقولونه عنا، والتدبر في "صورة ذاتنا" لدى هؤلاء "الآخرين".

إن عالمية الإسلام تفرض على أمتة _ كي تحقق القيام بفريضة الدعوة إليه _ تحقيق مستويات ثلاثة في الدعوة إلى هذا الدين:

- 1 _ تبليغ الدعوة الإسلامية إلى الآخرين.
 - 2 _ وإقامة الحجة، بصدق الإسلام، على هؤلاء الآخرين.
 - 3 _ وإزالة الشبهة، عن الإسلام، لدى هؤلاء الآخرين.
- وبدون المعرفة بالآخر، والوعي بما لديه من عقائد و "أيديولوجيات" ومواريت فكرية وثقافية، يستحيل إنجاز هذه الأركان في فريضة الدعوة إلى الإسلام..
- وليس كالقرآن كتاباً اعتمد "المقارنة" منهاجاً في إثبات الحق الإسلامي، عندما عرض هذا الحق مقارناً بما لدى الشرك والوثنية والإلحاد والتحريف من دعاوى ومواريت.. (قالَ أَعْبُدُونَ مَا تَحْتُونَ وَاللهُ خَلَقَكُمْ وما تَعْمَلُونَ).
- وفي تقرير صفات الكمال للذات الإلهية، ينساب المنطق القرآني إلى العقول والقلوب عندما يأتي في معرض المقارنة مع بضاعة الآخرين: (واذْكُرْ فِي الْكِتَابِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ إِذْ كَانَ صَدِيقًا نَبِيًّا إِذْ قَالَ لِأَبِيهِ يَا أَبَتِ لِمَ تَعْبُدُ مَا لَا يَسْمَعُ وَلَا يُبْصِرُ وَلَا يُغْنِي عَنْكَ شَيْئًا).
- وليس كالقرآن كتاباً سعى إلى استنطاق الآخرين كل ما لديهم من "حجج وبراهين" على ما يعتقدون: (وقالوا لَنْ يَدْخَلَ الْجَنَّةَ إِلَّا مَنْ كَانَ هُودًا أَوْ نَصَارَى تِلْكَ أَمَانِيُّهُمْ قُلْ هَاتُوا بُرْهَانَكُمْ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ صَادِقِينَ).. (سيقولُ الَّذِينَ أَشْرَكُوا لو شاءَ اللهُ ما أشركنا ولا أبأؤنا ولا حرّمنا من شيء كذلك كذب الذين من قبلهم حتى ذاقوا بأسنا قل هل عندكم من علم فتخرجوه لنا إِنْ تَتَّبِعُونَ إِلَّا الظَّنَّ وَإِنْ أَنْتُمْ إِلَّا تَخْرُصُونَ).. (قل أرايتم ما تدعون من دون الله اروني ماذا خلقوا من الأرض أم لهم شرك في السموات انتوني بكتاب من قبل هذا أو أثارة من علم إِنْ كُنْتُمْ صَادِقِينَ).
- وليس كالقرآن كتاباً اهتم "ببضاعة" الآخرين _ العقديّة والفكرية _ على ما بها من سقم ووج وتهافت.. فهو يثبت ما تحدثوا به عنه _ وهو المعجز المتحدى _ عندما قالوا: (... إِنْ هَذَا إِلَّا أَسْاطِيرُ الْأَوَّلِينَ).. (بل قالوا أضغاث أحلام بل افتراءه بل هو شاعرٌ فليأتنا بآية كما أرسل الأولون)..
- ويثبت ما وصفوا به الصادق الأمين (ص) عندما قالوا عنه: (هذا ساحرٌ كذابٌ).
- ويثبت الفلسفة الدهرية _ على بؤسها _ عندما تعلقوا بحبالها: (وقالوا ما هي إلا حَيَاتِنَا الدُّنْيَا نموتُ ونحيا وما يُهْلِكُنَا إِلَّا الدَّهْرُ وما لهُم بِذَلِكَ من علم إِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَظُنُّونَ).
- ويخلد "منطقهم" العجيب، الذي انحاز للشرك، متعجباً من التوحيد! (أَجْعَلِ الْآلِهَةَ إِلَهًا وَاحِدًا إِنَّ هَذَا لَشَيْءٌ عَجَابٌ).

يتتبع القرآن الكريم "مقالات" الآخرين، فيفندها، ثم لا يطوى صفحتها متجاوزاً إياها، وإنما يثبتها آيات في سورة نتلوها ونتعبد بها، ليرسي دعائم هذا المنهاج في مقارنة العقائد والفلسفات والأفكار.

بل إننا نتعلم من هذا المنهاج القرآني، أن الذين يصادرون الفكر الآخر، ويغلقون دونه الأسماع والأبصار إنما كانوا هم المشركين.. فتجاهل الفكر الآخر، والصد عن سماعه وتأمله وتدبره ليس منهاج أهل الإيمان.. والمشركون هم الذين يُلَهون ويصرفون أنفسهم وذويهم عن القرآن: (وَمِنَ النَّاسِ مَن يَشْتَرِي لَهْوَ الْحَدِيثِ لِيُضِلَّ عَن سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ بِغَيْرِ عِلْمٍ وَيَتَّخِذَهَا هُزُوًا أُولَئِكَ لَهُمْ عَذَابٌ مُّهِينٌ).. فلقد رفعوا شعار التعمية على هذا الذي خالف ما وجدوا عليه آباءهم وكبراءهم: (وقال الذين كفروا لا نسمعوا لهذا القرآن والغوا فيه لعلكم تغلبون).. فلقد حسبوا أن الراحة والغلب في التعمية على هذا الذي لم يأفوه، والكتمان لهذا الذي لا يهوون، والمصادرة لهذا الذي لا يريدون!..

هذا هو المنهاج القرآني في التعامل مع الفكر الآخر _حتى عندما كان شركاً صريحاً وكفراً بواحاً ووثنية جاهلية ودهرية حيوانية، مصادمة للفطرة السوية التي فطر الله عليها الإنسان في الإيمان..

واليوم.. ونحن نعيش واقعاً عالمياً، إن هدأت فيه أدوات القتال الدامي حيناً، اشتدت فيه آليات التدافع الفكري، بل والغزو الثقافي، والاجتياح الإعلامي، في كل الأحيين.. في هذا الواقع، نرى فكر الآخرين يفتح على عقولنا وقلوبنا حتى مخادعنا التي نستكن فيها!.. وكذلك يتاح لفكرنا _هو الآخر _ أن يصل إلى الآخرين في عوالمهم، الأمر الذي أحدث تغييراً نوعياً في المواقع الفكرية على خارطة الواقع المعاصر.. فلم يعد الفكر الآخر خارج الحدود، ولا حتى مترتباً ومتلصصاً على النوافذ والأبواب، وإنما غداً في داخل حصوننا، قامت وتقام له المراكز والمؤسسات والجامعات والصحف والمجلات.. بل إنه يطرنا صباح مساء وأثناء الليل وأطراف النهار من أقماره الصناعية السابحة في سماواتنا بلا حواجز أو حدود!..

كما أصبحت لنا _نحن أيضاً _ رغم حالة الاستضعاف وقلة الإمكانيات _ مراكز إشعاع فكري في ديار الآخرين، توتي بقوة الحق الإسلامي، وجاذبية الفطرة فيه _ من الثمرات ما يعوض سلبيات الاستضعاف وقلة الإمكانيات!..

لقد اثمر هذا الواقع الجديد _الذي أحدثته ثورة وسائل الاتصال _ لوناً من "التلاحم الفكري" العالمي، الأمر الذي يفرض ويفرض على مختلف فرقاء التدافع الفكري الوعي بما لدى الآخرين.. فلقد أصبح هذا الوعي ضرورة للقبول وللرفض على حد سواء!..

وإذا كانت القضية، بالنسبة لنا، تتعدى حدود "المغالبة الدنيوية" في عالم الأفكار، إلى حيث هي فريضة دينية _أيضاً _ لإبلاغ الدعوة إلى الإسلام، وإقامة الحجة على صدقه، وإزالة الشبهة عن عقول المشتبهين فيه.. فإن الوعي بما لدى الآخرين عن "ذاتهم" وعنا يصبح _هو الآخر _ فريضة إسلامية على الذين انتدبوا أنفسهم للرباط الفكري على ثغور الإسلام _الدين.. والحضارة.. والأمة.. والديار _ هذه الشريحة من أهل العلم، الذين تحدثت عن رسالتهم هذه رسول الله (ص) عندما قال: "يحمل هذا العلم من كل خلف عدوله، ينفون عنه تحريف الضالين وانتحال المبطلين".

الشريعة ووقتيّة الأحكام .. قراءة في أفكار العشماوي

د. محمد عمارة

في موقف المستشار عشماوي من الشريعة الإسلامية: اتحد المقصد، وهو إلغاؤها وإهدارها وصرف الناس عن السعي إلى تقنينها والاحتكام إليها .. مع تعدد في السبل التي سلكها الرجل إلى تحقيق هذا المقصد الواحد! .. فمرة: إنها ليس لها إلا المعنى اللغوي للمصطلح .. أي الطريق .. أي طريق! .. ومرة: إنها الفقه - أي الفكر البشري - الذي لا إلزام فيه! .. ومرة: هي «رحمة» .. وليس فيها قانون! ..

ومرة: إن أحكامها ليست مطلقة، لأنها نسبية، استدعتها أسباب وانقضت بانقضاء هذه الأسباب! .. والآن يصل المستشار عشماوي على درب مشروعه لإلغاء الشريعة الإسلامية إلى التصريح بأن أحكام هذه الشريعة .. وخاصة في السياسة والمعاملات والعمران - أي في غير الشعائر العبادية - هي «أحكام مؤقتة»، تجاوزها الزمن .. و «تاريخية»، أصبحت في ذمة التاريخ! ..

فب وفاة الرسول (ص) حكم المستشار عشماوي - وهو الذي عمل لسنوات قاضياً لأمن الدولة - حكم بعزل الذات الإلهية عن الشرعية في كل شؤون السياسة والحكم والمعاملات .. وانتهاء عهد الشرعية الإلهية في تشريع الأحكام .. وانتهاء عهد الحكم بما أنزل الله في المعاملات .. فكل ذلك - عنده - كان مؤقتاً بحياة الرسول (ص). كما قرر - بناء على ذلك - بأن الذين ظلوا متمسكين بالشرعية الإلهية - بعد وفاة الرسول - في الخلافة والإمامة والرياسة والوزارة والتشريع والأوامر والأحكام، سواء من الخلفاء أو الفقهاء، هم جميعاً قد غمّ عليهم الأمر، عندما ظلوا يسندون هذه الشرعية إلى الله زوراً وافتراءً وبهتاناً .. بينما هذه الشرعية - في رأي عشماوي - قد انتقلت من الله إلى الناس .. ولم يعد الله، سبحانه وتعالى، شأن في هذه الشرعية على الإطلاق!! ..

وبالفاظ المستشار عشماوي: «فإن قبول المؤمنين للتشريع - (على عهد الرسول (ص)) - انبنى أساساً على الإيمان بالله - سلطة التشريع - .. وبعد وفاة النبي (ص) انتهى التنزيل .. مع انعدام الوحي .. ووقف الحديث الصحيح، فسكنت بذلك السلطة التشريعية التي آمن بها المؤمنون، والتي كانت الأساس في قبولهم للتشريع .. وبعد ذلك، كان من اللازم أن يفهم الخلفاء ويدرك الفقهاء أن الشرعية انتقلت إلى الأمة (الجماعة) الإسلامية، فأصبحت هي أساس الشرعية في الخلافة والإمامة والرياسة والوزارة والتشريع والأوامر والأحكام. وقد بدا من الخلفاء الراشدين، وبخاصة أبو بكر وعمر، ما يفيد أن الأمة (الجماعة) الإسلامية هي الأساس الشرعي لولايتهم أمر المسلمين، وبالتالي للحكم والتشريع .. ثم اضطربت هذه الفكرة .. وغمّ على الخلفاء والفقهاء أمر الشيعة، وظلوا يسندونها إلى الله - زوراً وافتراءً وبهتاناً - أو ينحلونها - (ينسبونها كذباً) - إلى النبي (ص) ..!»

تلك هي فكرة المستشار عشماوي عن «توقيت» الشرعية الإلهية - في الخلافة والإمامة والرياسة والوزارة والتشريع والأوامر والأحكام - بحياة الرسول .. وعن انتهاء توقيت هذه الشرعية الإلهية بوفاة الرسول، لأن «التنزيل انتهى .. والوحي انعدم .. والحديث الصحيح وقف .. فسكنت بذلك السلطة التشريعية الإلهية» وكان من اللازم انتقال الشرعية من الله إلى الناس .. لكن الخلفاء والفقهاء بعد أبي بكر وعمر، غمّ عليهم فكر المستشار عشماوي فظلوا متعلقين بالشرعية الإلهية، زوراً وافتراءً وبهتاناً!! ..

وإذا كان الكشف الكامل عن «العورات الفكرية» قد بريح أحياناً من عناء الفضح لخبائها .. فإننا - ونحن نستهدف عقل القارئ - سنقف وقفات موضوعية مع ما في آراء العشماوي هذه من ادعاءات .. إننا نعلم أن المراد، أساساً، بالوحي: هو القرآن الموحى به .. والمراد أساساً بالتنزيل: هو القرآن الكريم .. لكن العشماوي، كي يصل إلى إلغاء القرآن كمصدر للشرعية والشريعة الإلهية، نراه بدلاً من أن يستخدم تعبير «ختم الوحي» يقول «انعدام الوحي»!! .. وبدلاً من أن يقول «اكتمال التنزيل»، يقول: «انتهاء التنزيل» .. وذلك ليصل إلى قوله «فسكنت بذلك السلطة التشريعية»! ..

فهل سكتت السلطة التشريعية الإلهية بوفاة الرسول (ص)? .. أم اكتمل نطقها، ووضح منطقتها? .. وهل عندما أوحى الله إلى رسوله، وأنزل على أمته: (اليوم أكملت لكم دينكم) كان يعني اكتمال الدين عقيدة وشرعية، أم انعدام الدين، وتوقف الدين بهذا الدين؟! ..

وهل صحيح ما ادعاه العشماوي من أن أبا بكر الصديق - ومن بعده عمر - قد نقلوا الشرعية من الله إلى الناس? .. أم أن الإسلام - الذي طبقه أبو بكر وعمر - هو الذي يجعل السيادة للشرعية الإلهية، وسلطة الخلافة - خلافة الأمة وخلافة الدولة - لها سلطة الاستخلاف عن شارع هذه الشريعة، سبحانه وتعالى، دونما مقابلة ولا تناقض بين الشرعية الإلهية وسلطة الأمة وخلافة دولتها؟! ..

إن أبا بكر هو القائل، في خطاب توليه الخلافة: «أطيعوني ما أطعت الله ورسوله، فإن عصيت الله ورسوله فلا طاعة لي عليكم» فأين في حديثه هذا عن حاكمية الشرعية الإلهية استبداله شرعية الأمة بشرعية الله؟! .. وأبو بكر هو الذي «كان إذا ورد عليه الخصم، نظر في كتاب الله، فإن وجد فيه ما يقضي بينهم قضي، وإن لم يكن ي

الكتاب، وعلم من رسول الله (ص) في ذلك الأمر سنة قضى به، فإن أعياه خرج فسأل المسلمين، وقال: أتاني كذا وكذا، فهل علمتم أن رسول الله (ص) قضى في ذلك بقضاء؟ فربما اجتمع إليه نفر كلهم يذكر من رسول الله فيه قضاء، فيقول أبو بكر: الحمد لله الذي جعل فينا من يحفظ على نبينا. فإن أعياه أن يجد فيه سنة من رسول الله، جمع رؤوس الناس وخيارهم فاستشارهم، فإذا اجتمع رأيهم على أمر قضى به».

فأين في هذا الجمع - والترتيب - بين الكتاب، والسنة، وشورى الأمة .. أي بين سيادة الشرعية الإلهية وبين سلطة الأمة - أين في هذا ما صوره العشماوي استبدالاً لشرعية الأمة بالشرعية الإلهية، من أبي بكر وعمر؟! ..

بل ألم تكن هذه هي الحال حتى على عهد رسول الله (ص)؟ سيادة الحاكمية الإلهية والشرعية السماوية، وشورى رسول الله (ص)، والأمة في إطار الشرعية الإلهية؟ .. ألم يكن هناك قضاة للدولة وعمال على ولاياتها يجتهدون في إطار حاكمية الشرعية الإلهية؟ .. وماذا يعنيه حديث رسول الله (ص) مع قاضيه على اليمن معاذ بن جبل:

- «كيف تصنع إن عرض لك قضاء؟»
 - قال: أقضي بما في كتاب الله.
 - قال: «فإن لم يكن في كتاب الله؟»
 - قال: فبسنة رسول (ص).
 - قال: «فإن لم يكن في سنة رسول الله؟»
 - قال: أجتهد رأيي لو آلو.
 - قال معاذ - فضرب الله (ص) صدري - ثم قال:
 - «الحمد لله الذي وفق رسول رسول الله لما يُرضي رسول الله».

فحتى في عهد رسول الله (ص) كانت الدولة - الإمارة والولاية والقضاء والسياسة والسلم والحرب - شورى بشرية محكومة بالشرعية الإلهية .. لم تعرف «المقابلة - المتضادة» بين ما هو لله وما هو للناس! ..

إن حديث العشماوي عن انتقال الشرعية من الله إلى الأمة، هو حديث عن دولة وسلطة كهنوتية، لا سلطان فيها للأمة .. انتقلت الشرعية منها إلى شرعية بشرية لا سيادة فيها للشرعية الإلهية .. وهذا ما لم يعرفه الإسلام ولا دولته ولا خلافته، لا في العهد النبوي، ولا بعد وفاة الرسول، عليه الصلاة والسلام ..

* * *

ومن هذا «التأسيس العشماوي» لنظرية عزل الذات الإلهية عن الشرعية في شؤون الدولة والسياسة والعمران الإسلامي، تتوالى الخطوات والوقفات ..

1 - فهو يرى أن الشريعة كان لابد أن تكون أحكامها وقواعدها - في المعاملات - مؤقتة، لا استمرار لها ولا خلود، لأن هذه الأحكام إما أن تكون قد جاءت لتغيير الواقع، فهي مؤقتة بزم تغييرها له، تطوى صفحاتها بعد هذا التغيير! .. وإما أن تكون قد جاءت لحكم الوقائع الجارية وتنظيم المعاملات اليومية، وفي هذه الحالة لا بد وأن تكون أحكامها مرتبطة بالظروف والمناسبات، تتغير بتغير هذه الظروف والمناسبات .. أي أنها في كل الحالات مؤقتة لا استمرار لها ولا خلود!

يعرض العشماوي أفكار هذه، فيقول:

« .. فالقاعدة القانونية - سواء كانت حكماً للمعاملات أو حكماً تشريعياً - إنما تهدف أساساً إلى أحد أمرين: إما إلى تعديل أوضاع عامة أو تغيير علاقات قانونية أو تبديل روابط اجتماعية، وإما إلى حكم الوقائع الجارية وتنظيم المعاملات اليومية. فإذا كانت القاعدة تهدف إلى تعديل أوضاع عامة أو تغيير علاقات قانونية أو تبديل روابط اجتماعية، فإن كل أثر لها ينتهي بمجرد حدوث التعديل أو تمام التغيير أو اكتمال التبديل، وتصيح من ثم حكماً تاريخياً ليست له أية قوة ملزمة أو أي أثر فعال .. وأوضح مثل لهذه القواعد القاعدة التي نص عليها القرآن بإعطاء نصيب من الصدقات إلى المؤلف قلوبهم ... وإذا كانت القاعدة - من جانب آخر - ترمي إلى حكم الوقائع الجارية وتنظيم المعاملات اليومية، فإنها عادة ما تكون حكماً مناسباً لظروف وضعها وزمان تطبيقها، ثم يحدث بعد ذلك أن تنشأ وقائع جديدة أو تقع ظروف مستحدثة تضيق عنها القاعدة فلا يمكن لها أن تحكم موضوعها أو تضبط إجراءاتها .. ».

ونحن نسأله: لم لا تظل القاعدة القانونية - المستهدفة للتغيير - قائمة لتحرس التغيير الذي أحدثته، ولتغير الارتداد عليه؟ .. وهل حدوث التغيير - الذي يحل العدل محل الظلم مثلاً - وهو موقف نهائي، يمنع عودة القديم، أو ما هو مماثل أو أسوأ - في الظلم - من القديم؟ .. إن مسيرة الاجتماع الإنساني، عبر كل العصور، وفي كل الحضارات، هي دورات من التدافع والصراع بين الخير والشر، والحق والباطل، والعدل والجور .. ورسول الله (ص) يعلمنا هذه السنة من سنن الله في الاجتماع والعمران فيقول: «لا يلبث الجور بعدي إلا قليلاً حتى يطلع، فكلمنا طلع من الجور شيء ذهب من العدل مثله، حتى يولد في الجور م، لا يعرف غيرهن ثم يأتي الله، تبارك وتعالى بالعدل، فكلمنا جاء من العدل شيء ذهب من الجور مثله، حتى يولد في العدل م لا يعرف غيره» ..

وإذا كانت هذه هي سنة الله في الاجتماع والمجتمعات، فلا بد من بقاء قواعد العدل حارساً للعدل من الانقلاب عليه .. لا أن نقول لها - كما يقول العشماوي - اذهبي إلى «المتحف» فلا حاجة لنا بك، بعد أن تم التغيير! .. ثم هل التغيير الذي تحدثه أي قواعد قانونية، في أي مجتمع من المجتمعات، يكون كاملاً الكمال الذي يجعل هذا المجتمع مستغنياً عن القواعد التي أحدثت هذا التغيير؟ أم أنه يكون نسبياً تتفاوت نسبته بتفاوت خيرية الناس؟ .. ثم، إذا غيرت

القواعد القانونية حياة جيل الآباء، أفلا يكون بقاءها ضرورياً لتغيير حياة جيل الأبناء، وهكذا؟ .. أم أننا نحيلها إلى «الاستيحاء» بعد أول نجاح لها في التغيير؟! ..

والقواعد الخاصة بالحفاظ على «الثوابت»، مثل الضرورات التي مثلت المقاصد الكلية للشريعة الإسلامية - الحفاظ على الدين، والنفس، والعقل، والنسل، والمال - هل ينقضى أجل القواعد القانونية الحارسة للضرورات والمقاصد الثابتة؟ أم أن ثبات المحفوظ يقتضي ثبات الحافظ له كي لا يضيع؟! .. وهو ضروري لإعادة الحياة إلى هذه الثوابت كلما عدا عليها العادون! ..

وهل تطبيق الأمة للدستور والقانون، وتحويلهما إلى واقع يعيشه الناس، يؤدي إلى تاريخيتهما وتجاوزهما واستبدالهما؟ وهل إذا أصدرنا قانوناً لمحاكمة الوزراء، نلغيه بمجرد محاكمة الوزراء الذين صدر لمحاكمتهم بواسطته؟! .. وهل إذا لم نجد من نعطيم الزكاة، نلغي فريضة الزكاة؟! ..

إن حال «فكر» المستشار عشاوي مع العقل والمنطق حال غريب .. فقط يريد الرجل أن يطوي صفحة القواعد الشرعية الإسلامية، ويحيل الشريعة الإسلامية إلى «متحف التاريخ»، ويعزل الذات الإلهية عن الشرعية والحاكمية التشريعية بوفاء الرسول (ص) قائلًا: إن هذه القواعد قد أصبحت «حكماً تاريخياً ليست له أية قوة ملزمة أو أي أثر فعال» .. «وإن أحكام المعاملات ليست دائمة، لكنها أحكام مؤقتة ومحلية، تنطبق في وقت محدد وفي مكان بعينه» .. دون أن يميز بين «الشرعية» الوضع الإلهي الثابت، والقواعد الخالدة، وبين الاجتهادات الفقهية، المتطورة مع متغيرات الزمان والمكان والعادات والمصالح والأعراف .. بل إن حديثه عن «التاريخية» و «الانتقال» منصب على «الشرعية الإلهية» بوجه خاص! ..

2 - وإذا كان الله، سبحانه وتعالى، قد جعل الشورى صفة من صفات المؤمنين (والذين استجابوا لربهم وأقاموا الصلاة وأمرهم شورى بينهم ومما رزقناهم ينفقون). .. وفريضة حتى على رسوله (ص) (فاعف عنهم واستغفر لهم وشاورهم في الأمر).

وأجمع علماء الأمة على أنها من قواعد الشريعة وعزائم الأحكام، وشرط بقاء الحكام في مناصبهم .. فقالوا: «إن الشورى من قواعد الشريعة وعزائم الأحكام. ومن لا يستشير أهل العلم والدين فعزله واجب. وهذا مما لا خلاف فيه - القرطبي (الجامع لأحكام القرآن) ج 34 ص 249!!

فإن العشاوي - جريا على مذهبه في «التاريخية» التي تُوِّقت وتلغى كل القواعد الشرعية، خرج علينا بدعوى أن الشورى كانت خاصة بالرسول (ص) .. فقال: «هناك نصان عن الشورى، أحدهما نزل في مكة والثاني (وشاورهم في الأمر) قيل إنه خاص بالنبي وغير ملزم»! ..

ولم يسأل الرجل نفسه: كيف تكون الشورى خاصة بالنبي، وهي، في ذات الوقت، صفة لكل مؤمن؟! .. وألم يطبقها الخلفاء بعد وفاة الرسول؟! .. وما وجه اختصاص الشورى بالرسول؟! .. هل كان أحوج إليها من غيره من المسلمين؟! ..

3 - والميراث، الذي فصلت فرائضه نصوص قرآنية قطعية الدلالة والثبوت .. يسحب المستشار عشاوي عليه سيف «التاريخية» و «التوقيت»، ويراه مناسباً لمجتمعات البداوة القبلية العشائرية البائدة، وغير ملائم لعصرنا الحديث .. فيقول: «فهل كان يستمر حق الأخ في أن يرث أخاه، فيقاسم ابنته التركة - لكل منهما نصفها - مع أن هذا الأخ قد يكون مهاجراً في أمريكا أو أستراليا لا يعرف ابنة أخيه ولا يلتزم حيالها نفقة أو مراعاة - كما كان الحال في عصر المدينة وفي نظام القبائل والعشائر؟! ..»

فهل نظام وأحكام الميراث الإلهي مؤقت بعصر المدينة، لا يناسب إلا النظام القبلي العشائري؟ ولا يلائم العصر الحديث الذي يسافر فيه ورثة إلى أمريكا وأستراليا؟! ..

إن الإسلام يربي أسرة متراحمة لا تقطع الأسفار وشائج الرحمة بين أعضائها .. ثم إن أسفار العصر لا تحول بين التراحم، بل هي تهيب له بأكثر مما كانت أسفار الزمن القديم!! وكان الناس في العصور الإسلامية الأولى يسافرون، بل ويهاجرون، دون أن تمنع أسفارهم وهجراتهم الوشائج التي تقيمها التربية الإسلامية ودون أن يعترض معترض على توريث المسافرين ..

ثم، إن الدين الذي جعل المسافر إلى أستراليا يرث في مصر، هو الذي جعل من بمصر يرث المسافر إلى أستراليا ويأخذ نصيبه من تركة لم يسهم في الإنفاق على تاركها! ..

وهل علة الميراث هي ما بذله الوارث من جهد في تربية المورث والإنفاق عليه؟! .. إن الابنة الرضيعة - التي قد لا تميز صورة أبيها - ترث منه أكثر مما يرث أبوه الذي تعب فيه وأنفق عليه ورباه .. ومعايير التفاوت في أنصبة الوارثين ليست هذه التي يقيس بها المستشار عشاوي .. إنها درجة القرابة .. وموقع جيل الوارث - مضيئاً .. أو استقبالياً (أصولاً .. أو فروعاً) - والأعباء المادية التي يكلفه بها الإسلام في الإنفاق .. إلخ ..

4 - ولأن عمر بن الخطاب (رض) أوقف تنفيذ حد السرقة في عام الرمادة - أي في عام واحد .. وحيث كانت الرمادة - المجاعة - قد منعت توافر شروط أعمال الحكم - فإن المستشار عشاوي يقفز من فوق هذه الواقعة طالباً من الفقهاء أن يؤسسوا عليها نظرية «توقيت الأحكام» ..

وهو في حديثه هذا يدعي أن عمر «وقف حد السرقة .. وفقاً شاملاً وعماماً .. وأن لذلك دلالة خاصة تتصل بالعقوبة ذاتها، ولا تتعلق بشروط تطبيقها .. فما فعله عمر كان في الواقع وفقاً للعقوبة ذاتها .. ومن بعد عمر، فإن التاريخ الإسلامي لا يقدم وقائع متكررة متوافرة عن تطبيق حد السرقة، لأن الفكر الإسلامي عموماً تأثر بمبدأ وقف العقوبة وفقاً وعماماً وشاملاً»

.. ثم يمضى المستشار عشاوي، فيعيب على فقهاء الأمة أنهم لم يفقهوا مغزى وقف عمر لحد السرقة وفقاً عاماً وشاملاً «ولو أن الفقهاء ملكوا قدرة التنظير .. لوصلوا إلى نظرية عامة في وقتية الأحكام .. لكنهم لم يفعلوا .. فافتقد الفقه روح التنظير وملكة التعميد».

ويستشهد المستشار عشاوي لأرائه بقول الفقيه الحنفي ابن عابدين (1198 - 1252 هـ، 1784 - 1836 م): «كثير من الأحكام يختلف باختلاف الزمان لتغير عرف أهله ولحدوث ضرورة وفساد الزمان بحيث لو بقي الحكم على ما كان عليه لزم منه المشقة والضرر بالناس ولخالف قواعد الشريعة الإسلامية المبنية على التخفيف ورفع الضرر ..». ونحن لما مع هذه الدعوى، التي عرضها المستشار عشاوي، ووقفت .. فالمروى أن عمر بن الخطاب أوقف تنفيذ حد السرقة في واقعة بعينها قام في واقعتها ما يدرأ الحد، فلم تتوافر شروط تنفيذ الحكم، فكان الإيقاف .. ولم يصدر عمر أمراً عاماً وشاملاً بوقف الحد للساقرين في كل ديار الإسلام .. وإلا فهل كان الحد موقوفاً بمصر، حيث لا مجاعة؟ .. لقد كان الحد نافذاً، حتى في عام المجاعة - عندما وأينما توافرت شروط تنفيذه وتطبيق حكمه .. وكان وقف تنفيذه مرهوناً بتخلف شروط التنفيذ .. فلا علاقة لذلك بنظرية العشاوي في «وقتية الأحكام» - النابعة عنده من «وقتية الشرعية الإلهية»! ..

- وغريب أن يزعم العشاوي - ليستدل على عموم وشمول وقف حد السرقة - أن هذا الحد لم يطبق بعد عهد عمر، وأن الفقه الإسلامي قد أخذ بنظرية «الوقف العام والشامل للعقوبات» .. غريب هذا الادعاء .. فالفقه الإسلامي - الذي تبلور علماً مدوناً بعد عصر عمر - نصت جميع مذاهبه على إقامة حد السرقة على اللصوص، وامتألت كتب الفقه بالتفاصيل عن تعريف السرقة .. والسارق .. والمسروق .. وتفصيل كيفية إقامة الحد .. ولو كان هذا الحد قد أوقف، منذ عهد عمر، وفقاً عاماً وشاملاً، لما دعت الحاجة إلى أن يكون له مكان، بهذا الحجم والتفصيل في مصنفات الفقه ومدونات الفقهاء! .. أما تنفيذ الدولة لأحكام القضاء في حد السرقة، فشواهد في صفحات كتب التاريخ لا يماري فيها حتى الأميون، الذين وقف بهم العلم بالتاريخ عند قصص الرواة وملاحم الشعر الشعبي! .. فكيف ينكر العشاوي على الدول الإسلامية أنها طبقت حد السرقة، مع أن الذي ينكره عليها المنكرون أنها ربما أسرفت في هذا التطبيق وفي الحالات التي ما كانت هي الأولى بالتطبيق؟! ..

- والعامل الفاعل في استدعاء تغيير الأحكام ليس مجرد «مرور الزمن»، وإنما هو توافر شروط إعمال الحكم في الواقع .. فالحكم الواحد قد تتوافر شروط إعماله في واقع، وتتعدم شروط إعماله في واقع آخر بذات الزمن. وقد تتخلف شروط إعماله في الواقع بالزمن الحالي، ثم تعود فتتوافر شروط الإعمال بزمن قادم .. واعتبار «الزمن» - على نحو ما يقوله عشاوي من جعل زمن وفاة الرسول (ص) حداً فاصلاً بين شرعيتين - وجعل عهد عمر حداً فاصلاً بين إعمال عام وشامل لحكم، والوقف العام والشامل له - .. هذا الاعتبار «للزمن» في تغيير الأحكام، يعني تجاوز كل الأحكام التي جاءتنا من أزمنة سابقة - إلهية كانت أو وضعية - .. وينقض هذا الرأي: اعتبار الإسلام «شريعة من قبلنا شريعة لنا ما لم تنسخ»، أي ما لم يجد واقع تتخلف فيه شروط إعمال أحكامها .. بل لقد تعامل الإسلام بهذه الروح وبهذا المنطق مع شرائع كانت سائدة في الجاهلية العربية .. فلم توقف «لحظة» انبثاق الوحي وشريعته كل ما قبلها ..

ثم .. لماذا يتخطى الزمن - في رأي العشاوي - صلاحية القواعد والأحكام الإسلامية؟ .. ولا يتخطى - في رأيه - قوانين الرومان؟! ..

والنص الذي استشهد به العشاوي من ابن عابدين - لو فقهه العشاوي - لوجده شاهداً عليه، لا معه! .. فابن عابدين يتحدث عن تغيير «الأحكام»، عندما يجعلها الواقع المختلف لا تتسق مع «القواعد الشرعية» .. بينما العشاوي لا يقف عند طلب تغيير «الأحكام» وإنما يتحدث، أيضاً عن تغيير «القواعد»، بل وإلغاء «الشرعية الإلهية»! .. فتغيير الأحكام، الذي يتحدث عنه ابن عابدين، إنما يتغيا إعمال «القواعد» والاتساق معها، لا إلغاءها - كما هو مطلب العشاوي -! ..

ثم إن ابن عابدين يتحدث - في أسباب تغيير الأحكام - عن «اختلاف الزمان» وعن «فساد الزمان»، وليس عن مجرد «مرور الزمان»!! .. ويتحدث عن «تغير العرف» و «حدوث الضرورة»، أي عن متغيرات في الواقع لا تتوافر معها شروط إعمال وتطبيق الحكم .. ومن ثم، فإذا ارتفعت هذه المتغيرات، وتوافرت شروط إعمال الحكم ثانية عاد الأمر إلى حال الإعمال والإقامة والتطبيق للأحكام .. وليس الأمر أمر «مرور زمن» يطوي - مجرد مروره - شرعية إقامة الأحكام الثابتة والحدود التي نص عليها القرآن .. وذلك فضلاً عن «القواعد» الحاكمة .. و «الشرعية الإلهية» التي يريد العشاوي عزلها عن عرش الحاكمية في القواعد والأحكام! ..

5 - ويتقدم العشاوي على درب «توقيت الأحكام القرآنية» و «التشريعات الإلهية»، ليدعو إلى أن لا تلتزم المرأة المسلمة بما نصت عليه الآيات القرآنية من ستر عورتها بالخمار والحجاب .. رابطاً هذا التشريع الإلهي بوقت لم تكن فيه منازل المسلمين بالمدينة تحتوي على «الكُف والمراحيض»، فكانت النساء يخرجن لقضاء حاجتهن في الخلاء .. وكان بعض الفجار يتعرضون للإماء أو العاهرات بما تتأذى منه الحرائر، فطلب الإسلام من النساء الحجاب والاختمار ليميزن عن الإماء، حتى لا يتعرض لهن أحد بما يؤذيهن. وأما وقد أصبحت في البيوت مراحيض، فقد زالت علة التشريع، ولا بأس على النساء المسلمات من سفور يكشف بعض العورات!! ..

يقدم المستشار عشاوي «اجتهاده» هذا فيقول:

«وقد كانت عادة العربيات التبذل، وكن يكشفن وجوههن كما يفعل الإمام والعاهرات، وكان ذلك داعية إلى نظر الرجال إليهن. وكن يتبرزن في الصحراء في عهد التنزيل - (لاحظ ربط التنزيل بالتبرز في الصحراء!!) - قبل أن تُتخذ الكنف (دورات المياه). فكان بعض الفجار يتعرضون للمرأة أو الفتاة من المؤمنات على مظنة أنها أمة أو عاهر، فشكوا ذلك إلى النبي (ص)، ومن ثم نزلت الآية: (يا أيها النبي قل لأزواجك وبناتك ونساء المؤمنين يدنين عليهن من جلابيبهن ذلك أدنى أن يعرفن فلا يؤذين) .. فالقصد من الآية ليس فرض زي إسلامي، ولكن التمييز بين الحرائر منج انب والإماء والعاهرات من جانب آخر. فالزي - من ثم - كان إجراء مؤقتاً، لعدم وجود دورات للمياه في المنازل، واضطرار الحرائر المؤمنات إلى الخروج إلى الصحراء بعيداً عن المدينة لقضاء الحاجة، وتعرض بعض الفجار لهن، مما اقتضى تمييزهن عن الإمام والعاهرات بزي معين (لكي يعرفن) فلا يؤذين أحد.

وإذا كان الفقهاء يقولون: إن الحكم يرتبط بالعلة وجوداً وسبباً، فإن زوال العلة في الحكم السابق - ووجود دورات مياه في المنازل، وعدم التعرض لأنثى بناء على زي أو غير زي ت ذلك مما يعني زوال الحكم بزوال سببه. فهو حكم وقتي مرتبط بظروف معينة، ومنوط بوضع خاص، ومتى زال الوضع وتغيرت الظروف تعين وقف الحكم ... وأما ما جاء في الآيات: (قل للمؤمنين يغضوا من أبصارهم ويحفظوا فروجهم ذلك أزكى لهم إن الله خبير بما يصنعون) * وقل للمؤمنات يغضضن من أبصارهن ويحفظن فروجهن ولا يبدين زينتهن إلا ما ظهر منها وليضربن بخمرهن على جيوبهن)، من الضرب بالخمر على الجيوب، فهو تأكيد لفكرة التمييز بين الحرائر والإماء والعاهرات من جانب آخر .. «. إن الحوار مع هذا «الكلام العشماوي» واجب بياناً للناس، ودعوة للرجل كي يثوب إلى الرشاد! .. ولذلك نقول:

- إنه إذا كان المراد بأية الحجاب: هو مجرد «التمييز في الزي» بين الحرائر والإماء .. فهل يصح أن يكون التمييز بأي وسيلة محققة له؟ .. ومنها، مثلاً، زيادة مساحة العري عند الحرائر عن الإمام؟! وفي العري عند البعض مزيد من «الحرية» ربما لاعتد الحرائر وميزتهن أكثر من الإمام!! أو التمييز، مثلاً ببطاقة هوية؟! .. أم أن للأمر والعلة علاقة بالفضيلة، التي تستلزم ستر المفاتن وحجب العورات؟! .. فالستر هو الواقى من الأذى، ومن ثم فأحكام الحجاب معللة بعلة دائمة. لا علاقة لها بوجود مؤقت للإماء، ولا بوضع محلي ومرحلي، مثل التغوط خارج البيوت! .. وليست العلة مجرد «التمييز» بين الحرائر والإماء ..

- وهل كانت علة الحجاب هي خروج المرأة من منزلها إلى مكان الغائط؟! .. أم الخروج من منزلها الذي لا يقتحمه عليها غريب، إلى حيث غير المحارم؟! .. وألم تؤمر المرأة بالحجاب وستر العورات، حتى وهي ذاهبة إلى المسجد؟ وبالحجاب حتى وهي في منزلها إذا حضر غير محرم؟! .. وألم يضع الإسلام نظاماً لهذا الأمر حتى في داخل البيوت؟! فالمرأة الأنصارية، ذهبت إلى رسول الله (ص) تقول: يا رسول الله، إني أكون في بيتي على حال لا أحب أن يراني عليها أحد، وإنه لا يزال يدخل عليّ رجل من أهلي وأنا على تلك الحال، فكيف أصنع؟ .. فنزلت الآية (يا أيها الذين آمنوا لا تدخلوا بيوتاً غير بيوتكم حتى تستأنسوا وتسلموا على أهلها ذلك خير لكم لعلكم تذكرون) .. فالتشريع هو للحجاب وستر عورات النساء، عن غير المحارم - حتى من الأهل - في داخل البيوت .. فما هذه «العلة المرحاضية»، التي «اجتهد» المستشار عشماوي ليربط بها تشريعات القرآن الكريم؟! .. وكيف يتصور عقل عاقل نسخ حكم الحجاب بإقامة دورات المياه في البيوت؟! ..

- والسنة النبوية، التي هي البيان النبوي للبلاغ القرآني، والتي جاء فيها قول رسول الله (ص)، لأسماء بنت أبي بكر، وقد دخلت عليه وعليها ثياب رقاق، فأعرض عنها، وقال لها: «يا أسماء، إن المرأة إذا بلغت المحيض لم تصلح أن يرى منها إلا هذا وهذا» - وأشار إلى وجهه وكفيه.

هذه السنة تتحدث إلى امرأة داخل المنزل .. ولم تقل: إذا لم يكن في منزل المرأة «كنيف»!! .. ثم .. هل يشرع الإسلام لعري الإمام، وعرض عوراتهن على الكافة، حتى يكون الحجاب مجرد تمييز في الزي للحرائر عن الإمام .. إن رسول الله (ص) يتحدث عن «المرأة» - مطلق المرأة - إذا بلغت المحيض. والآيات القرآنية تتحدث عن (نساء المؤمنين)، وليس عن الحرائر منهن فقط .. وفرض الخمار على النساء واجب توجه التكليف به إلى (المؤمنات)، وليس إلى الحرائر وحدهن .. والسياق القرآني لأية الخمار يقطع بأن العلة هي العفاف وحفظ الفروج، وليس تمييز الحرائر فقط، وفي الطريق إلى دورات المياه خارج البيوت على وجه التخصيص! ..

فالسباق القرآني يبدأ بالحديث عن تميز الطبيين والطيبات عن الخبيثين والخبيثات .. وعن آداب دخول بيوت الآخرين، المأهول منها وغير المأهول .. وعن غض البصر .. وحفظ الفروج، لمطلق المؤمنين والمؤمنات .. وعن فريضة الاختمار، حتى لا تبدو زينة المرأة - مطلق المرأة - إلا لمحارم حددتهم الآية تفصيلاً. فالحديث عن الاختمار حتى في البيوت، إذا حضر غير المحارم .. ثم يواصل السياق القرآني الحديث عن الإحصان بالنكاح (الزواج) .. وبالاستعفاف للذين لا يجدون نكاحاً حتى يغنيهم الله من فضله:

(الْخَبِيثَاتُ لِلْخَبِيثِينَ وَالْخَبِيثَاتُ لِلْخَبِيثِينَ وَالطَّيِّبَاتُ لِلطَّيِّبِينَ وَالطَّيِّبَاتُ لِلطَّيِّبِينَ أُولَئِكَ مُبَرَّءُونَ مِمَّا يَقُولُونَ لَهُمْ مَغْفِرَةٌ وَرِزْقٌ كَرِيمٌ * يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَدْخُلُوا بُيُوتًا غَيْرَ بُيُوتِكُمْ حَتَّى تَسْتَأْنِسُوا وَتُسَلِّمُوا عَلَى أَهْلِهَا ذَلِكَ خَيْرٌ لَكُمْ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَذَكَّرُونَ * فَإِنْ لَمْ تَجِدُوا فِيهَا أَحَدًا فَلَا تَدْخُلُوهَا حَتَّى يُؤَدِّنَ لَكُمْ وَإِنْ قِيلَ لَكُمْ ارْجِعُوا فَارْجِعُوا هُوَ أَزْكَى لَكُمْ وَاللَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ عَلِيمٌ * لَيْسَ عَلَيْكُمْ جُنَاحٌ أَنْ تَدْخُلُوا بُيُوتًا غَيْرَ مَسْكُونَةٍ فِيهَا مَتَاعٌ لَكُمْ وَاللَّهُ يَعْلَمُ مَا تُبْدُونَ وَمَا تَكْتُمُونَ * قُلْ لِلْمُؤْمِنِينَ يُغْضُوا مِنْ أَبْصَارِهِمْ وَيَحْفَظُوا فُرُوجَهُمْ ذَلِكَ أَزْكَى لَهُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَبِيرٌ بِمَا يَصْنَعُونَ * وَقُلْ لِلْمُؤْمِنَاتِ يَغْضُضْنَ مِنْ أَبْصَارِهِنَّ وَيَحْفَظْنَ فُرُوجَهُنَّ وَلَا يُبْدِينَ زِينَتَهُنَّ إِلَّا مَا ظَهَرَ مِنْهَا وَلْيَضْرِبْنَ بِخُمُرِهِنَّ عَلَى جُيُوبِهِنَّ وَلَا يُبْدِينَ زِينَتَهُنَّ إِلَّا لِبُعُولَتِهِنَّ أَوْ آبَائِهِنَّ أَوْ

آبَاءُ بُعُولَتِهِنَّ أَوْ أَبْنَائِهِنَّ أَوْ أَبْنَاءَ بُعُولَتِهِنَّ أَوْ إِخْوَانِهِنَّ أَوْ بَنِي إِخْوَانِهِنَّ أَوْ بَنِي أَخَوَاتِهِنَّ أَوْ نِسَائِهِنَّ أَوْ مَا مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُهُنَّ أَوْ التَّابِعِينَ غَيْرِ أُولِي الإِرْبَةِ مِنَ الرِّجَالِ أَوِ الطِّفْلِ الَّذِينَ لَمْ يَظْهَرُوا عَلَى عَوْرَاتِ النِّسَاءِ وَلَا يَضْرِبْنَ بِأَرْجُلِهِنَّ لِيُعْلَمَ مَا يُخْفِينَ مِنْ زِينَتِهِنَّ وَتُوبُوا إِلَى اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا أَيُّهَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ * وَأَنْكَحُوا الأَيَامَى مِنْكُمْ وَالصَّالِحِينَ مِنْ عِبَادِكُمْ وَإِمَائِكُمْ إِنْ يَكُونُوا فُقَرَاءَ يُغْنِهِمُ اللَّهُ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ وَاللَّهُ وَاسِعٌ عَلِيمٌ * وَلَيْسَتَعَفُوفَ الَّذِينَ لَا يَجِدُونَ نِكَاحًا حَتَّى يُغْنِيَهُمُ اللَّهُ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ وَالَّذِينَ يَبْتَغُونَ الكِتَابَ مِمَّا مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُكُمْ فَكَاتِبُوهُمْ إِنْ عَلمْتُمْ فِيهِمْ خَيْرًا وَأَتَوْهُمْ مِنْ مَالِ اللَّهِ الَّذِي آتَاكُمْ وَلَا تُكْرَهُوا فَتِيَاتِكُمْ عَلَى البِغَاءِ إِنْ أَرَدْنَ تَحَصُّنًا لِتَبْتَغُوا عَرَضَ الحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا وَمَنْ يُكْرِهِنَّ فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ مِنْ بَعْدِ إِكْرَاهِهِنَّ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ).

بل إن ذات السورة - (النور) - تستأنف التشريع لسر العورات داخل البيوت - نصاً وتحديداً - فتقول آياتها الكريمة: (يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَيْسَتَأْذِنُكُمُ الَّذِينَ مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُكُمْ وَالَّذِينَ لَمْ يَبْلُغُوا الحُلُمَ مِنَ الظُّهيرةِ وَمِنْ بَعْدِ صَلَاةِ العِشاءِ ثَلَاثُ عَوْرَاتٍ لَكُمْ لَيْسَ عَلَيْكُمْ وَلَا عَلَيْهِمْ جُنَاحٌ بَعْدَهُنَّ طَوَافُونَ عَلَيْكُمْ بَعْضُكُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ كَذَلِكَ يُبَيِّنُ اللَّهُ لَكُمْ الآيَاتِ وَاللَّهُ عَلِيمٌ حَكِيمٌ * وَإِذَا بَلَغَ الأَطْفَالُ مِنْكُمُ الحُلُمَ فَلْيَسْتَأْذِنُوا كَمَا اسْتَأْذَنَ الَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ كَذَلِكَ يُبَيِّنُ اللَّهُ لَكُمْ آيَاتِهِ وَاللَّهُ عَلِيمٌ حَكِيمٌ * وَالْقَوَاعِدُ مِنَ النِّسَاءِ اللَّاتِي لَا يَرْجُونَ نِكَاحًا فَلَيْسَ عَلَيْهِنَّ جُنَاحٌ أَنْ يَضَعْنَ ثِيَابَهُنَّ غَيْرَ مُتَبَرِّجَاتٍ بِزِينَةٍ وَأَنْ يَسْتَعْفِفْنَ خَيْرٌ لَهُنَّ وَاللَّهُ سَمِيعٌ عَلِيمٌ).

وهلا سأل المستشار العشماوي نفسه، وبناء على «منطقه»:
- أيستوي خروج المرأة إلى الأسواق .. والمساجد .. ودور العلم .. والأسفار - مع خروجها إلى «مراحيض الخلاء» - فيجب عليها الاختمار وستر العورات؟؟ ..

6 - إن من «فضائل» المستشار عشماوي أن الرجل لا يموه على الناس مقاصده .. وذلك على الرغم من تهافت المنطق والسبل والآليات التي يتوسل بها لتبرير هذه المقاصد والغايات ..

فالرجل كان واضحاً حين دعا إلى الانتقال من «الأساس الإلهي للشرعية» - في الخلافة والإمامة والرياسة والوزارة والتشريع والأوامر والأحكام - إلى «الأساس البشري للشرعية» في كل هذه الميادين بدعوى أن وفاة الرسول (ص) قد مثلت انتهاء التنزيل وانعدام الوحي ووقوف الحديث الصحيح وسكوت السلطة التشريعية الإلهية .. !

وهاهو ذا يصارحنا بدعوته إلى رفض الحكم بكتاب الله، لأن الآيات القرآنية التي طلبت من الرسول (ص) الحكم بما أنزل الله، هي آيات خاصة بشخص الرسول .. وتخصه شخصياً .. فالحكم بما أنزل الله على رسوله «مؤقت» بحياة الرسول .. ومن ثم فالناس - الذين انتقلت إليهم أسس الشرعية التشريعية بوفاة الرسول - غير مكلفين بالحكم بهذا الذي أنزل الله! .. يصارحنا العشماوي بهذا «المقصد»، الذي يمثل الغاية من كل مشروعه الفكري، فيقول: «إن تيار تسييس الدين يستشهد دائماً بأيتين من القرآن الكريم (فلا وربك لا يؤمنون حتى يحكموك فيما شجر بينهم ثم لا يجدوا في أنفسهم حرجاً مما قضيت ويسلموا تسليماً)، و (إنا أنزلنا إليك الكتاب بالحق لتحكم بين الناس بما أراك الله) ..» .

ثم يعلق العشماوي، فيعلن عن مقاصده:

«وهذا الاستشهاد خطأ وخطر .. فهاتان الأيتان من الآيات التي تخاطب النبي (ص) وحده، وتختص به دون غيره. فأولاهما: تنفي صفة الإيمان عن لا يحكم النبي في أي شجار بينه وبين آخر ثم يرتضي حكمه، وهذا أمر واجب بالنسبة للنبي نفسه، حتى تستقر الأمور في مجتمع المؤمنين، ولما كان له من حفظ بالوحي .. فهي ولاية خص الله بها النبي .. أما الآية الثانية، فهي - كذلك - من الآيات التي تخاطب النبي (ص) وحده، وتختص به دون غيره .. فهي خطاب للنبي، فضلاً عن أنها تفيد أن حكمه - أو قضاءه - هو بالرؤية التي وهبها الله له» .

وأمام هذه «الصرحة - العارية» لمقاصد المستشار عشماوي .. نسأل:

- أين، في الأيتين أدلة تخصيصهما برسول الله (ص) وحده دون غيره من الناس؟ .. إن الآيات تطلب من الرسول - بحكم الرسالة - الحكم بين الناس بما أراه الله - أي بما «مثله له وأنزله عليه» - أي بالوحي، الذي أنزله الله عليه ليبلغه للناس، لا ليختص به هو دون غيره من الناس .. وهي تطلب من الناس التحاكم إلى الرسول كرسالة - والوحي والرسالة خالداً وحاكمان دائماً وأبداً وليس خصوصية موقوتة بحياة الرسول (ص) ..

- وإذا كان على الرسول أن يحكم بالكتاب .. أفلا يكون حكمه بالكتاب - في كل الحالات - الأسوة التي دعانا القرآن إلى التأسى بها؟ .. والمتبوع الذي دعانا القرآن إلى اتباعه؟ .. والمطاع الذي دعانا القرآن إلى طاعته؟ .. بل وأوجب علينا طاعته، لأنها طاعة لله؟ ..

- والآيتان تفيدان أن تحكيم النبي هو تحكيم يحكم فيه بالقرآن، فالاحتكام، في كل الحالات، - سواء أكان القضاء للنبي أم لغيره ت هو إلى القرآن .. وخلود القرآن، وعموم التكليف به يفيان أية خصوصية للرسول (ص) في هذا الأمر. وبعد النبي، فإن الاحتكام هو إلى القرآن، يقضي بمرجعيته وأحكامه وشرعيته بشر غير معصوم ..

- بل إن «قضاء» الرسول (ص) في المنازعات - وهو قضاء لا يماري العشماوي في ن شرعيته وشرعيته كانت القرآن - لم يكن قضاء معصوماً، تميزه العصمة عن قضاء غيره من الناس بشرعية وشرعية القرآن. فالحديث النبوي يقول: «إنما أنا بشر مثلكم، وإنكم تختصمون إليّ، ولعل بعضكم أن يكون ألحن من بعض، فأقضي له بشيء من حق أخيه فلا يأخذ منه شيئاً، فإنما أقطع له قطعة من نار» .

والعشماوي نفسه، يعلق على هذا الحديث، فيقول: «إن حكم النبي «أي قضاءه» في المنازعات هو حكم له، ورأي وفتوى لبشر، وليس حكم الله» .

فمن أين جاء العشماوي باختصاص الرسول (ص) بالقضاء بالقرآن وبما أنزل الله فيه خصوصية شخصية لا يشاركه فيها أحد سواه، حتى لينتهي وقت الحكم بما أنزل الله بوفاة الرسول؟! ..

- وهل لم يحكم بما أنزل الله، وبما أرى الله رسوله أي «مثله له وأنزله عليه» - أحد غير الرسول، في حياة الرسول، حتى يقول العشماوي إنه ليس لأحد، بعد وفاة الرسول، أن يدعو إلى الحكم بما أنزل الله، مستشهداً بهذه الآيات؟! ..
لقد تولى القضاء - إلى جانب الرسول .. وفي حياته - قضاة كثيرون، وتحدد لقضائهم منهاج رضى عنه الرسول (ص) وذكرته كتب السنة في حديث معاذ بن جبل: - القضاء بكتاب الله .. فإن لم يوجد فيه .. فبسنة رسول الله .. فإن لم يوجد فيها فبالاجتهاد .. فبكتاب الله كان يقضي قضاة، مع رسول الله، وفي حياته .. منهم: معاذ بن جبل، وعلي بن أبي طالب، وعمر بن الخطاب، وعمرو بن العاص، وزيد بن ثابت، وعبدالله بن مسعود، والعلاء بن الحضرمي، ومعتل بن يسار، وعقبة بن عامر، وحذيفة بن اليمان العبسي، وعتاب بن أسيد، وأبو موسى الأشعري، ودحية الكلبي، وأبي بن كعب .. الخ

..
فما الذي يمنع من قضاء الناس - بعد وفاة الرسول - بما أنزل الله، كما كانوا يقضون به في حياة الرسول (ص)؟! ..
- وهل إذا سنت السلطة التشريعية قانوناً، وطلبت من «وزير العدل» - ممثل السلطة القضائية - أن يجعل الاحتكام إليه، والقضاء به، نقول إن تحكيم هذا القانون خصوصية لهذا الوزير وحده، دون سواه ممن يلي الوزارة بعده؟!
- وإذا كان هذا الذي أراه الله، سبحانه وتعالى، لرسوله (ص) هو الوحي - الذي «مثله له وأنزله عليه» - فإنه موجّه إلى الأمة، دائماً وأبداً - بحكم ختامه للوحي السماوي، وختمه للشرائع الإلهية - ومن ثم فليس خاصاً بالرسول دون غيره» ..
فما أراه الله لرسوله - أي «مثله له وأنزله عليه» - ليس هبة خاصة به، عليه وحده طاعتها، فما جاء الرسول إلا ليطاع من الناس، لا أن يطع هو وحده دون الناس!! .. فالله أراه - أي أنزل عليه الوحي - ليبلغ ما أنزل عليه، ليطاع فيه (وما أرسلنا من رسول إلا ليطاع بإذن الله).

- وإذا كان الله، سبحانه وتعالى، قد جعل استنباط الأحكام من القرآن الكريم - في حياة الرسول وزمن التنزيل - غير موقوف على الرسول (ص) ولا خاصاً به وحده .. وإنما شرع الاستنباط للأحكام من القرآن لعموم ولاة الأمر من المسلمين (ولو رده إلى الرسول وإلى أولي الأمر منهم لعلمه الذين يستنبطونه منهم) .. فما هي حكمة استنباط الأحكام - بواسطة أولي الأمر - من القرآن، إذا لم تكن هذه الحكمة هي الحكم بهذه الأحكام؟! ..

- وحتى «الإنذار بالدين» .. لم يجعله القرآن «خصوصية نبوية» فهو، وإن بدأه الرسول (ص) إلا أنه ليس وفقاً عليه .. وإنما هو رسالته التي يحملها الفقهاء، بنص القرآن الكريم (فلولا نفر من كل فرقة منهم طائفة ليتفقهوا في الدين ولينذروا قومهم إذا رجعوا إليهم لعلهم يحذرون).

فالحكم، استنباطاً من القرآن .. والإنذار بالدين بواسطة الفقهاء، تكليف قرآني للأمة وليس وفقاً على شخص الرسول، وخاصاً بحياته، حتى يقال إن الشرعية تغيرت بوفاته، وانتقلت من الله إلى الناس! ..

- وأخيراً .. فما الفرق بين «حكم» الرسول بالكتاب الذي أنزل الله، وبين «دعوته» لذات الكتاب الذي أنزل الله؟! ..
فإذا جعل العشماوي «حكم» الرسول بالكتاب خصوصية له، موقوتة بحياته .. فلم لا يقول إن «دعوته» إلى الكتاب هي خصوصية له، وموقوتة بحياته، وأنا غير مطالبين بالاستجابة إلى «دعوته» هذه بعد وفاته، فتكون رسالته موقوتة - هي الأخرى - برمتها، ومنسوخة بكاملها؟! ..

وهلا ثاب العشماوي إلى الحق، وقال مع أهله: إن الدعوة خالدة .. والشريعة باقية .. والشرعية الإلهية - في المعاملات كالعبادات - مستمرة .. وإن الدعوة إلى الدين كله يحملها العلماء العدول، ورثة الأنبياء .. «إن العلماء هم ورثة الأنبياء» .. ورثة علم الدين - بعقيدته وشرعيته - «يحمل هذا العلم من كل خلف عدوله، ينفون عنه تحريف الضالين وانتحال المبطلين وتأويل الجاهلين» .. كما أن الحكم بالشرعية الإلهية هو مهمة قضاة الإسلام .. كل ذلك بقيادة الأمة، المستخلفة عن الله، والدولة التي تفوضها الأمة في حراسة الدين وسياسة الدنيا بهذا الدين ..

وإذا أبى المستشار عشاوي أن يثوب إلى قول الحق وأهله .. فهل له أن يسترشد بقول المستشرق اليهودي «برنارد لويس» الذي يقول فيه:

«وعند موت الرسول (سنة 11هـ - سنة 632م) كانت إرادة الله قد أوحى بها كاملة إلى البشرية. ولن يكون بعد ذلك نبي أو وحي آخر.

وإذا كانت المهمة الروحية قد انتهت، فلا تزال هناك مهمة دينية أخرى يجب تحقيقها، ألا وهي الحفاظ على الشرعية الإلهية والدفاع عنها وإخضاع بقية البشرية إلى الدين.

ولقد تطلب إنجاز مثل هذا العمل ممارسة قوة سياسية عسكرية أو باختصار: «ممارسة سيادة داخل دولة»!

* سقوط الغلو العلماني

تحرير المرأة من منظور إسلامي محمد عمارة

اليهودي يشكر الله الذي لم يخلقه امرأة، وقسيس يعتبر المرأة ذكر ناقص

بالمقارنة بين النموذج الغربي والإسلامي ندرك المزايا التي حصلت عليها المرأة في الإسلام قياساً بما اكتسبته لدى الحضارات الأخرى التي لوبحثنا عن صورة المرأة فيها نجد أنهم يلصقون كل مشكلات البشرية فيها منذ الخليفة.. فمن وجهة نظرهم حواء استسلمت للشيطان ودفعت آدم لشجرة التفاح فهبطت بالبشر من السماء إلى الأرض... أما في الشريعة اليهودية فالمرأة إذا توفي زوجها لا يمكنها أن تتزوج إلا بعد الحصول على موافقة ذوي الزوج المتوفى.. ومن شعائر اليهودية أن يصلي اليهودي كل يوم صلاة شكر لأنه لم يخلق عبداً ولا وثناً ولا امرأة!!!... كما اشتهرت مقوله أحد القسيسين ونصها (لا وجود في الحقيقة إلا لجنس واحد.. الرجل والمرأة ذكر ناقص).

فرنسا التي أصدرت مرسوماً في عام 1793 بعد الثورة الفرنسية تعتبر فيه أن المرأة تتساوى مع فاقد الأهلوية – المجانين – والأطفال والمجرمين الذين ليس لهم حقوق تجاه الحكومة.

في عام 1903 طلبت سيدة مصرية ببيع حصتها من أسهم قناة السويس التي كانت تملكها فرنسا وكان رد الشركة الفرنسية بأن المرأة ليس من حقها أن تبيع لأنها ليس لها ذمة مالية وحسب نصوص القانون الفرنسي لا يجوز لها التصرف في أموالها وكتبت السيدة للشيخ محمد عبده مفتي الديار المصرية في ذلك الوقت والذي أكد لها أن الشريعة الإسلامية منحت المرأة ذمة مالية مستقلة عن زوجها ومن حقها أن تدخر وتستثمر وتتفق مالها دون تدخل من الزوج.

المرأة وأمريكا

إذا كان بعض المثقفين في العالم يلوحون بأوراق أمريكا في الحرية فإننا لا بد أن ندرك أن الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية حتى عام 1920 كانت تساوي بين المرأة والعبيد وتحرمها الحقوق السياسية بالكامل كما أن الكونجرس الأمريكي لا تتواجد فيه المرأة إلا بنسبة 14%.. وهناك 8 سيدات من بين 675 قاض يعملن في القضاء في أمريكا.

المرأة والفلاسفة

فلاسفة الغرب مثل أفلاطون وسقراط لم تكن كتاباتهم في صالح المرأة فالفيلسوف اليوناني أفلاطون كان يشعر بالضيق لأنه ابن امرأة والفيلسوف الألماني نشتيا كانت له المقولة (إذا قصدت النساء احمل معك السوط).

إذا أردنا أن نحلل المفهوم الغربي للحرية سنجد أن الغرب يشجع الحرية في الأمور الشخصية التي تتعارض مع القيم الأخلاقية والفضيلة الإنسانية مثل الزنا والشذوذ والبغاء ويعتبر تلك الأمور رمزاً للحرية الشخصية كما يصور للمرأة بأن جسدها ملكاً لها تعبر عن حريتها من خلاله بممارسة أشكال الجنس ولو اتخذت الشذوذ سبيلاً... والرد على ذلك نجده في مقال كتبه عبدالله النديم عام 1892م ذكر فيه أن الحرية الحقيقية هي طلب الحقوق والوقوف عند الحدود.. وحقوق الإنسان محكومة بالحلال والحرام.

المواثيق العالمية

الرؤية الغربية لحرية المرأة لا يتناسب مع المرأة في العالم الإسلامي حيث تحكمها أخلاقيات وقيم ومعايير مختلفة... ولهذا يبرر الرفض الذي واجهته بعض المواد التي أثيرت في المؤتمرات العالمية في عام 1994 و1995 في مؤتمر بكين ووثيقة المؤتمر الدولي للسكان حيث رفضت العديد من الدول العربية ومنها مصر التوقيع على بنوده التي تتعارض مع الشريعة الإسلامية.

لقد غاب على الذين طالبوا بتفعيل نصوص المؤتمر أنها طالبت الحكومات والمنظمات الحكومية ومؤسسات التنمية بإلحاح إلى إعطاء أولوية للبحوث الحيوية لكي توفر المعلومات للمراهقين والمراهقات عن الجنس الآمن حتى يكون بوسعهم ممارسته.. ولم تتطرق بنود المؤتمر إلى الجنس الشرعي!!!

أرقام وإحصائيات

في فرنسا 51% من النساء يلدن أطفال قبل الزواج... وفي السويد حوالي 95% من الفتيات لهن تجارب جنسية قبل الزواج... وفي إنجلترا 59% من حوادث الطلاق بسبب العنف الذي يمارسه الرجل بحق المرأة... ويوضح أنه في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية تكشف الإحصائيات المعلنة أن أكثر من 80% من الفتيات في المدارس قد فقدن غشاء

بكاره.. وهو الأمر الذي جعل الحكومة الأمريكية تدعو لجان العفة للتدخل وإقناع الطلبة والطالبات في المدارس الثانوية بتأجيل ممارسة الجنس إلى ما بعد الزواج.

الحقوق مع الإسلام

الإسلام قد أنصفها ومنحها حقها بالعدل لقوله تعالى (ولهن مثل الذي عليهن بالمعروف). أصبحنا نفسر النصوص خارج سياقها بل ونردد النصوص ولا نطبقها علماً بأنها ليست مجرد كلام نظري بل هي تطبيق وهذا ماتميزت به الشريعة الإسلامية، فعندما تم اختيار سيدنا محمد عليه الصلاة والسلام كأول العظماء المائة أكد الكاتب العربي أن الرسول هو الوحيد من الأنبياء الذي استطاع أن يجعل الدين الإسلامي تطبيقاً ومنهج حياة يناسب البشر حتى يرث الله الأرض ومن عليها.

إذا أردنا أن نلمس تكريم الإسلام للمرأة واعترافه بدورها ومكانتها فإننا لا بد أن نتوقف عند صور أهمها أن أول من آمن بالله كانت امرأة وهي السيدة خديجة بنت خويلد رضي الله عنها.. وهي التي أقيم عام الحزن عند وفاتها عام 3 هجرية حدادا على رحيلها... كما كانت أول شهيدة في الإسلام امرأة... وحافظة سر الهجرة النبوية هي السيدة أسماء بنت أبي بكر... أما السيدة عائشة رضي الله عنها فكانت تراجع علماء الفقه والحديث في علوم الدين.. وفي بيعة العقبة وهي التي تعتبر الجمعية التأسيسية لإقامة الدولة الإسلامية كان هناك 73 من أهل المدينة ومعهم امرأتان... وفي المدينة ولي رسول الله سمراء بنت نهى ولاية سياسية فكانت بمثابة وزيرة للتجارة كما تولت الشفاء بنت عبد الله حسبة السوق في عهد عمر بن الخطاب رضي الله عنه... وعندما توفي الرسول عليه الصلاة والسلام كان عدد من دخل في الدين الإسلامي 124 ألف منهم 8 آلاف هم الصفوة المسلحة بالعمل وحفظ كتاب الله ومن بين هذه الصفوة ألف امرأة من القيادات الإسلامية.

لنكتشف للعالم الغربي أن الإسلام أعطى للمرأة حقوقاً عجزت الحضارات المعاصرة عن منحها إياها، يؤكد تاريخنا أن أعلى نسبة للريادة النسائية كانت في بداية الدولة الإسلامية لمدة 23 عاماً وقد أثبتت الدراسات أن النساء كانوا أصدق من الرجال في رواية الحديث عن الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم.

الإسلام يحترم الكفاءة إذا توفرت لرجل أو امرأة

الحرية في الإسلام للمرأة لا تلغي أنوثتها ولا تحجب دورها في الأسرة وقيامها بواجبات المنزلية.. وإذا كان البعض يرفض تولي المرأة مناصب قيادية فإننا أرى أن ذلك من الأخطاء التي وقعنا فيها في العصر الحديث خاصة وأن تاريخنا الإسلامي ذاخر بقصص البطولات النسائية الخالدة التي تكشف عن شجاعة وبسالة المرأة المسلمة ومن أنصعبها قصة أم عمار التي دافعت عن الرسول في غزوة أحد وظلت تحارب مع جيش المسلمين حتى قطع ذراعها... فالإسلام يحترم الكفاءة سواء كانت متوفرة لدى رجل أو امرأة.

الإسلام ونظام المواريث

في العديد من الحالات يكون نصيب المرأة المسلمة أكثر من الرجل، أما التفاوت فيعود إلى ثلاثة أمور أولها درجة القرابة، وثانيها لحكمة إلهية حيث نجد أن نصيب الطفل الصغير أكبر من غيره، وثالثها وهو ما يمنح الذكر مثل حظ الأنثيين لأن الإسلام قد كفل للمرأة حق النفقة على زوجها ووليها... وبالتعمق في نظام المواريث نجد أن المرأة المسلمة ترث أكثر من الرجل في 30 حالة وترث أكثر من نصف التركة في 4 حالات.

ظلموا قاسم أمين

كتاب قاسم أمين كان للرد على أحد كتاب فرنسا في هجومه على المرأة العربية... كما أن الكتاب تضمن أربع فصول كتبها الإمام محمد عبده عن حرية المرأة في الإسلام والمزايا التي حصلت عليها. قاسم أمين ظلم من بعض الأقلام. لم يدعو إلى سفور المرأة.. بل دعى إلى خروجها من أجل التعليم والمشاركة في الحياة العامة وأنه لم يقصد خلع الحجاب كزى ترديه النساء بل طالب برفع الحجاب عن حقوق التعليم والعمل والمشاركة في الحياة والمجتمع.

4. APPENDIX IV

Mohamed Khalil's Article

4. Mohamed Khalil's Article

محمد عمارة: الغرب يتخذ من الأصولية ذريعة لتبرير هجومه على الإسلام

محمد خليل

فند الدكتور محمد عمارة عضو مجمع البحوث الإسلامية في مصر الأبعاد المختلفة لمصطلح «الأصولية»، واستقصى عمارة في كتابه الصادر حديثاً «الأصولية بين الغرب والإسلام» جذور هذا المصطلح وكيف اتخذ مفكرو الغرب أداة لخلط المفاهيم والرؤى لتشويه صورة الإسلام، وتعميق الكراهية للمسلمين.

وأكد المؤلف أن هناك الكثير من المفاهيم والمصطلحات الشائعة عن الإسلام في الغرب تختلف في معناها ومدلولاتها في الفكر الغربي عنها في الفكر الإسلامي..

وأشار إلى أن بعض المصطلحات التي استخدمها الغرب لتبرير هجومه على الإسلام مثل الأصولية التي هي مصطلح غربي النشأة، غربي المضمون وأصله العربي ومعانيه الإسلامية مضامين ومفاهيم أخرى مغايرة لمضامينه الغربية التي يقصد إليها الآن متداوله. ويوضح الدكتور عمارة أن هذا الاختلاف في المضامين والمفاهيم مع الاتحاد في المصطلح أمر شائع في العديد من المصطلحات التي يتداولها العرب والمسلمون ويتداولها الغرب مع تغاير مضامينها في كل حضارة وهو أمر يحدث الكثير من اللبس والخلط في حياتنا الثقافية والسياسية والإعلامية المعاصرة التي خلطت فيها وسائل الاتصال مصطلحات كثيرة تحدث في اللفظ مع اختلافها في المضامين والخلفيات والإيماءات.

ويكشف الدكتور عمارة أن الأصولية في المحيط الغربي هي في الأصل والأساس حركة بروتستانتية التوجيه، أميركية النشأة، انطلقت في القرن التاسع عشر الميلادي من صفوف حركة أوسع هي «الحركة الألفية» التي كانت تؤمن بالعودة المادية والجسدية للمسيح عليه السلام ثانية إلى هذا العالم، ليحكمه ألف عام تسبق يوم الدينونة والحساب. ويوضح أن الموقف الفكري الذي ميز ويميز هذه الأصولية هو التفسير الحرفي للانجيل وكل النصوص الدينية المورثة والرفض الكامل لأي لون من ألوان التأويل لأي نص من هذه النصوص.

ويؤكد د. عمارة أنه عندما أصبحت الأصولية مذهباً مستقلاً بذاته في بداية القرن العشرين تبلورت لها عبر مؤتمراتها ومن خلال مؤسساتها وكتابات قساوستها مقولات تنطلق من التفسير الحرفي للانجيل داعية إلى مخاصمة الواقع ورفض التطور ومعاداة المجتمعات العلمانية بخيرها وشرها على السواء. أما عن مصطلح الأصولية في المنظور العربي والمفهوم الإسلامي، يقول الدكتور عمارة لا يوجد في معاجمنا القديمة - لغوية كانت أو كشافات لمصطلحات - ذكر لهذه النسبة - «الأصولية» - وإنما نجد الجذر اللغوي - «الأصل» - بمعنى أسفل الشيء وجمعه أصول وفي القرآن الكريم «ما قطعتم من لينة أو تركتموها قائمة على أصولها فبإذن الله»، كذلك القرار «إنها شجرة تخرج في أصل الجحيم» والجذر، «ألم تر كيف ضرب الله مثلاً كلمة طيبة كشجرة طيبة أصلها ثابت وفرعها في السماء»، ويطلق الأصل على القانون والقاعدة المناسبة المنطبقة على الجزئيات وعلى الحالة القديمة كما في قول علماء أصول الفقه.

الأصل في الأشياء الإباحة والطهارة، والأصول المبادئ المسلمة وعند علماء «الأصول»، يقال: الأصل في هذه المسألة الكتاب والسنة، وثانيتها القاعدة الكلية، وثالثها: الراجح الأولى والأخرى، هكذا خلا ويخلو تراث الإسلام وحضارته وتخلو معاجم العربية وقواميسها من مصطلح «الأصولية»، ومن المضامين التي عرفها الغرب لهذا المصطلح وليس من بين مذاهب الإسلام القديمة من وقف تماماً عند حرفية النصوص رافضاً التأويل حتى يمكن إطلاق مصطلح الأصولية بالمفهوم الغربي عليه. ويضيف الدكتور عمارة أن بعض الكتاب الغربيين الذين أطلقوا مصطلح «الأصولية» على الصحوة الإسلامية المعاصرة نراهم وهم يتحدثون عن علاقة هذه الصحوة بالماضي الإسلامي يجعلون موقفها هذا من الماضي والتراث على العكس من موقف الأصوليين الغربيين من ماضيهم وتراثهم النصراني، فعلى حين تنسحب «الأصولية» بمعناها الغربي إلى الماضي مخاصمة الحاضر والمستقبل نجد الصحوة الإسلامية المعاصرة بشهادة هؤلاء الكتاب الغربيين تتخذ من العلاقة بالماضي ومن النظر إليه موقفاً مختلفاً، فهي تريد بعث الماضي لا على النحو الذي تفعله التيارات الجامدة وإنما بعث ينظر إلى هذا الماضي ليتخذ منه هداية للمستقبل.

5. APPENDIX V

Mohamed Reda's Article

5. Mohamed Reda's Article

عمارة يكشف مواقف الغرب التاريخية الحاطة بكرامة النساء

أ. محمد رضا

القاهرة: أكد المفكر الإسلامي الدكتور "محمد عمارة" أستاذ التاريخ الإسلامي أن الإسلام يحترم المرأة، ويعطي من قيمتها وأنه ليس من حقها تولي الولاية العظمى، ولكن يمكن توليتها الولايات القطرية مثل أن تكون محافظة أو والية على إحدى الولايات الداخلية في أي دولة.

وأشار في الندوة التي عقدتها لجنة الحريات بنقابة الصحفيين المصريين تحت عنوان: "حول مفهوم التحرير الإسلامي للمرأة" الأحد أن "الاهتمام العالمي بقضية المرأة شيء طيب، ولكن هذا الاهتمام يحتاج إلى الرؤية الموضوعية، وأنه لدينا نوعان من الغلو تجاه المرأة؛ غلو تفريط وغلو إفراط، والأول يجعل من المرأة مشكلة العالم، وهو غلو يمثل بلاء على الأمة وبخاصة من عملاء الغرب، والثاني هو نظرة بعض من ينتسبون للإسلام ممن ينكرون دور المرأة الذي حدده لها الإسلام".

وأشار عمارة إلى أن "الرؤية الغربية فرضت نفسها علينا عند مناقشة أي قضية تعن لنا كمسلمين والسبب كما يقول هو أن الغرب في الماضي كان بعيداً عنا والآن أصبح جزءاً من الذات بالإضافة إلى وجود وكلاء له في بلادنا".

وأوضح د. عمارة أن الرؤية الغربية طغت عند من ينقدون شعار "الإسلام هو الحل"، فعند حديثنا عن الدولة الإسلامية يخرجون علينا بأننا نريد دولة الكهنوت التي قامت في الغرب ولم تكن نموذجاً يحتذى، وعند الحديث عن قضية المرأة يصبح أمامنا اضطهاد الغرب للمرأة والنظرة المسيحية واليهودية لها من خلال كتبهم المحرفة".

والمح إلى أننا لا نستطيع إدراك عظمة وعبقرية النظرة الإسلامية للمرأة إلا إذا رأينا ذلك في ضوء الآخر - يقصد المنهج المقارن مع الرؤية الغربية - ولا يمكن أن نرى الآخر إلا من خلال وجهة النظر الإسلامية.

واستعرض عمارة صورة المرأة في العهد القديم - على أنه منطلق لفهم الغرب للمرأة كما أن القرآن منطلق لفهم الرؤية الإسلامية - حيث وضع كل مشكلات البشرية على حواء وحملها كل الخطايا، و"الخطيئة كما يقول العهد القديم مؤبدة وعلى مر العصور مستشهداً بما جاء في سفر التكوين (سأل الرب آدم هل أكلت من الشجرة التي نهيتك وزوجك عنها؟، قال آدم: إنها المرأة التي أغوتني.. وقال الرب لحواء: أكفر عنك تكفيراً بأوجاع مخاضك، وتنجبي بالآلام أولاداً، وإلى زوجك يكون اشتياقك وهو يتسلط عليك)".

وأشار إلى أن "اليهودي يصلى شكراً لله أن الله لم يخلقه عبداً أو وثنياً أو امرأة!

وأن الشريعة اليهودية تحرم على اليهودي الزنا في اليهوديات وتبيحه في غيرهن باعتبار أن غير اليهوديات عاهرات!".

وقال: "إن فساد الجذور استتبعه فساد عند مفكري الغرب المعاصرين والقدامي وإنه تمت عملية غش في تعليمنا وثقافتنا، وكمثال أن من ترجم عن الماركسية لم يخبرنا أن الماركسيين أيدوا الاستعمار الفرنسي للجزائر، كما

أيدوا الاستعمار الإنجليزي للهند".

وأضاف أنهم "أغفلوا أن الثورة الفرنسية - المعروف عنها أنها ثورة الحريات - أعدت "ماري كوز" داعية حقوق النساء ومن مبادئ تلك الثورة أن الأطفال والنساء وفاقدي العقل والمحكوم عليهم بعقوبات شائنة لن يكونوا مواطنين".

وقال: "منعت فرنسا في 1903 امرأة مصرية شريك في أسهم قناة السويس من التصرف في أموالها بحجة أنه ليس من حق النساء التجارة ورد الشيخ محمد عبده بأن المرأة في الإسلام لها ذمتها المالية الخاصة بها وأنها حرة التصرف فيها بالبيع أو التجارة".

وأكد عمارة أن "أمريكا حديثاً التي تدعو اليوم إلى حرية المرأة حظرت على المرأة والعبيد الاشتغال بالسياسة, وأنه حتى الآن في أمريكا 25% من النساء يتقاضين أجوراً أقل من الرجال الذين يتشابهون معهن في المؤهل وعدد ساعات العمل والإنتاج, وأن نسبة تمثيل المرأة في الكونجرس الأمريكي 14% في حين أن نسبة النساء بالبرلمان في رواندا 46%, وأن أمريكا فيها 675 قاضياً فيدرالياً ليس فيهم سوى 8 نساء".

واستكمل الدكتور عمارة أن "مما لم ينقل لنا عن رؤية الغرب ومفكره للمرأة أن سقراط كان يقول أن للرجال السياسة وللنساء البيت, أما أفلاطون فكان شاذاً جنسياً وكان يأسف لأنه ابن امرأة وأن الجمال المبهج هو في الشبان, ونيثشة كان يقول إذا قصدت المرأة خذ السوط معك, وفرويد يقول إن الرجل كامل الإنسانية والمرأة تمثل نصف رجل كامل الإنسانية لا تستطيع أن تقوم بما يقوم به الرجل, أما سيمون دي بوفوار فكانت ترى أن الزواج هو السجن الأبدي للمرأة, وأنه مؤسسة لقهر المرأة يجب إلغاؤها ونسفها, وأن المرأة مالكة لجسدها وأنها حرة فيه, تتصرف فيه كيفما تشاء سواء كان ذلك بالتخلص من جنينها بالإجهاض أو الاستمتاع بالسحاق أو بممارسة البغاء"!.

وأوضح أن هذه الأفكار السابقة صيغت في البداية في مؤتمر السكان الذي عقد في مصر 1994، "وجاءت وثيقة المؤتمر لتصوغ منظومة الانحلال الغربية وأرادت فرضها على العالم من خلال الأمم المتحدة".

وقال الدكتور محمد عمارة: "شهادة أمام الله أن الموالين للغرب أرادوا تمرير الوثيقة الختامية على مصر ورفض الأزهر تمريرها حتى أنهم حدثوا رئيس الجمهورية وهاجم الراضين للوثيقة في مؤتمر بالإسكندرية وكان حاضراً شيخ الأزهر الشيخ جاد الحق وبعد المؤتمر أخذ الشيخ جاد الحق من يده وسأله لماذا رفضتم الوثيقة أنتم لم تقرأوها؟ ورد شيخ الأزهر نحن قرأناها 12 مرة وكلها مخالفة للإسلام وشريعته- وفيها يضعون نصوصاً عانمة لا يفهمها إلا من خبر تياراتهم الأنثوية ومن بنودها تغيير هياكل الأسرة بمعنى أن تكون علاقة قانونية بين رجل وآخر أو امرأة وأخرى, ومن بين البنود أيضاً الرعاية الجنسية الآمنة والإيجابية للمراهقين، وتوجيه الخدمات الصحية لهم على أن المراهقين النشطون جنسياً يحتاجون إلى دعم خاص من أسرهم خلال فترة الحمل والحمل المبكر"!.

وأشار الدكتور عمارة إلى أن "الغرب اعتبر في هذا البند أن الزواج المبكر جريمة والزنا المبكر لا شيء فيه"!.

وأضاف أن ذلك "أفرز 40% من الطفولة في المجتمعات الغربية غير شرعية، وتفصيلاً 51% من فتيات فرنسا تلد المولود الأول قبل الزواج، و95% من الجنسين في السويد لديهم تجارب قبل الزواج، و59% من أسباب الطلاق في النمسا سببه العنف المنزلي، وخلال السنوات العشر الأخيرة تضاعفت نسبة الطلاق في إنجلترا 23 ضعفاً، حتى أن الإحصائية العامة بلغت 60 مليون امرأة تحاول الإجهاض كل عام، بما يعني 60 مليون قتيل بلا حرب، وأن الإنفاق العالمي على الدعارة هو الثالث بعد السلاح والمخدرات وبلغ 20 تريليون دولار".

ثم عاد عمارة للحديث عن مفهوم تحرير المرأة في الإسلام من المنطلق القرآني "الذي حمل آدم وحواء المسئولية منذ البداية بل ولام على الرجل أكثر من المرأة"، مشيراً إلى أنه "لا يوجد لدينا مجتمع ذكوري وآخر أنثوي، وللمرأة كما للرجل المشاركة في مناشط العمل العام تحت فريضة الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر؛ يقول الله عز وجل: (والمؤمنون والمؤمنات بعضهم أولياء بعض يأمرون بالمعروف وينهون عن المنكر) على عكس ما قاله "بولس" في العهد الجديد "المرأة من الرجل وليس الرجل من المرأة".

وأكد أن للمرأة مكانتها في الإسلام "فأول من آمن به كان امرأة وظلت أم المؤمنين خديجة المؤمنة الوحيدة لفترة، تعين الإسلام ببدنها ومالها وعقلها وعندما توفيت سمي العام الذي رحلت فيه بعام الحزن، كما أن أول شهيدة في الإسلام سمية بنت خباط، ولأسماء بنت أبي بكر دورها العظيم في هجرة رسول الله، ونسبية بنت كعب أم عمارة تجاهد وتقاتل مع رسول الله في أحد، وتظل في كل غزواته حتى تستشهد في اليمامة أمام مسيلمة الكذاب".

وقال عمارة إنه ليس هناك دين يأتين المرأة على أمر أمانة الدين غير الإسلام، ومنذ البداية كانت بيعة العقبة وهي الجمعية التأسيسية لبيان الولاية السياسية، وبإيع النبي فيها 73 رجلاً وامرأتان، وقال لهما النبي: (ثنصرن الإسلام بما استطعتن وأطقتن)، وفي المدينة ولّى رسول الله سمراء بنت نهى ولاية سياسية بأن كانت وزيرة التجارة كما كانت شفاء بنت عبد الله متولية حاسبة السوق أيام عمر بن الخطاب".

وأشار إلى أن بعض المؤلفات أحصت 8 آلاف امرأة من القيادات النسائية الإسلامية منذ بعثة رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وحتى وفاته.

ورأى الدكتور عمارة أن الإسلام لا يحظر على المرأة أن تتولى الإفتاء أو حتى مشيخة الأزهر أو القضاء أو حتى الولاية السياسية العامة وليس العظمى ومنها رئاسة الجمهورية في دولة الخلافة.

وعن حديث رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم (ما أفلح قوم ولوا أمرهم امرأة) أشار إلى أنه خاص بابنة كسرى التي تولت الحكم بعد أبيها، فقال فيها رسول الله ذلك القول خاصاً بها.

وقال إن الفقهاء قالوا إن الإمامة العظمى لا تتولاها المرأة ولكن ولاية الإمارة القطرية مباحة.

وأكد أن الإسلام يحترم الكفاءات، ويقدر العلماء رجالاً ونساءً، شرط أن تكون الولاية السياسية في إطار الحفاظ على حياء الأنتى وكرامتها، وعدم تكليفها بما لا تطيق كما بايع رسول الله.

RÉSUMÉ

L'enseignement de la culture étrangère, faisant parti de l'enseignement des langues étrangères à l'université algérienne, a toujours été assujéti à un contexte pédagogique ayant des liens étroits avec le contexte social dans lequel étudiants et enseignants évoluent. En effet, les pratiques d'apprentissage des étudiants sont souvent déterminées par des attitudes négatives à l'égard des cultures étrangères, plus particulièrement celles qui sous-tendent la langue anglaise. Ces attitudes, qui se présentent comme de réels obstacles contre lesquels butent le processus d'apprentissage correspondant aux objectifs de la formation diplômante en langue étrangère, sont dues au processus psychologique de la représentation qui amène les étudiants à percevoir l'Autre, tout celui qui ne partage pas leur culture, comme un adversaire irréconciliable dont la culture est incommensurablement antithétique de la leur.

Cette fausse représentation de l'Autre ne peut être prise comme simple résultante d'un processus culturel négationniste. Elle est plutôt construite, façonnée et nourrie par une idéologie de confrontation, une idéologie qui instrumentalise les symboles religieux, nationaux et politiques les plus importants afin de garantir la pérennité des conditions favorables au statut quo social et politique. Cette idéologie, appelée ici Occidentalisme, au-delà de ses effets néfastes au plan social et politique, pose de sérieux problèmes pédagogiques en sens qu'elle entrave le bon fonctionnement du processus central de la formation universitaire : l'interculturalisation. Ainsi, les étudiants, qui sont sensés optimiser leur socialisation dans leur propre communauté culturelle et leur inter-socialisation au-delà des limites de leur communauté, se retrouvent emprisonnés, par un système de cloisonnement intellectuel et symbolique, dans un carcan qui leur donne l'illusion de l'autosatisfaction, manquant par la même occasion toute chance de s'ouvrir sur le monde en se mettant rarement en question.

Face à cette idéologie de rejet, ce travail, qui se propose de comprendre les origines des attitudes négatives envers la culture étrangère chez les étudiants de langue étrangère dans l'université algérienne à travers l'analyse du fonctionnement de l'Occidentalisme, note le besoin urgent de développer une pédagogie adaptée à ce contexte sociale et pédagogique particulier, une pédagogie interculturelle capable de permettre à ces étudiants d'acquérir les moyens intellectuels nécessaire à toute rencontre interculturelle réussie, i.e. une rencontre dans laquelle les partenaires en sortent plus enrichis, plus tolérants et plus humanistes. Cette pédagogie aura pour objectif principale, dans une université en pleine mutation avec la réforme LMD, de repenser les notions d'identité et altérité, et de les dénuder de toutes leurs fritures idéologiques afin de rendre à l'université algérienne sa vocation de base : la production d'une intelligentsia libre et humaniste.

MOTS-CLES

Acculturation
Altérité
Analyse critique du discours
Attitude
Auto-identification
Autre
Capital symbolique
Catégorie du discours
Choc culturel
Colinguisme
Conditions de félicité
Contre-culture
Culturalisme
Culture
Culture tiers
Déculturation
Discours
Discours émancipatoire
Effet de communication
Effet de disposition
Effet de perspective
Effet de position
Effet de situation
Effet épistémologique
Effet perlocutoire
Endoculturation
Ethnocentrisme
Force illocutoire
Habitus
Humanisme
Identisation
Identité
Idéologie
Idéologisation
Intellectuel
Interculturalité
Interculturation
Motivation
Motivation oppositionnelle
Occidentalisme
Orientalisme
Pédagogie interculturelle
Politique
Porte-parole autoproclamé
Pouvoir symbolique
Relativisme culturel
Religion
Représentation
Schèmes culturels
Skeptron
Stéréotype
Théologie de libération
Théologisation
Tiers
Violence symbolique