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From the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union: Challenges of Good Governance and Development (1963-2013)

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my parents, and sisters,
Mubarka and Merbuha; may God rest their souls.

It is also dedicated to my sisters, to my wife,
and to my daughters and sons.

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After Allah, first and foremost,

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Abstract

This doctoral thesis aims at scrutinizing the African continent situation in terms of unity, development, peace, and good governance. Furthermore, it deals with the positive and negative effects of both national and international politico-economic shifts on the African countries. Although the rejection of the unfair treatment and the legal status of slavery by the Africans whether in Africa or the Diaspora was associated with slave trade and slavery, it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that the pan- African ideas could take intellectual and political shape. The post-Cold-War era has given rise to challenges on the international scene, changing the direction of trends in the political, economic and social spheres around the world. These new shifts in the globalized system have associated new structural changes in sub-regional systems and their response patterns which were brought about by the new world order itself. Moreover, it sheds light on how would the new circumstances affect the organization's shift from the principle of non-intervention to the principle of non-indifference. In this spirit of searching new solutions, Africa took over an initiative, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to highlight a process of African ownership of its development and demonstrate a willingness to change the way Africans understand their problems.

Keywords: African continent, unity, trends, development, globalization, partnership.

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ACRONYMS

- **AAF-SAP** African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs
- **ACHPR** African Commission on Human and People's Rights
- **AMNL** African Movement for National Liberation
- **APRM** African Peer Review Mechanism
- **APSA** African Peace and Security Architecture
- **ARPS** Aborigines Rights Protection Society
- **ASA** African Student Association
- **ASEAN** Association of South East Asian Nations
- **ASF** African Standby Force
- **AU** African Union
- **CEWS** Continental Early Warning System
- **ECOSOCC** Economic Social and Cultural Council
- **ECOWAS** Economic Community of West African States
- **EU** European Union
- **GPRA** Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
- **IAFA** International African Friends of Abyssinia
- **IGAD** Inter-governmental Authority on Development
- **IMF** International Monetary Fund
- **JEM** Justice and Equality Movement
- **JIPC** Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
- **LINI** League against Imperialism and for the National Independence
- **LPA** Lagos Plan of Action
- **MAP** Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme
- **NAACP** National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People

- **NAFTA** North American Trade Agreement
- **NATO** North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- **NCBWA** National Congress of British West Africa
- **NCNC** National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon
- **NEPAD** New Partnership for Africa's Development
- **OAU** Organization of African Unity
- **PAP** Pan-Africa Parliament
- **PRC** Permanent Representative Committee
- **PSO** Peace Support Operations
- **RDA** African Democratic Rally
- **REC** Regional Economic Communities
- **SADC** Southern African Development Community
- **SCAN** Service of Control and Assistance of the Natives
- **SLA** Sudan Liberation Army
- **SLOOT** Service of Liaison with the Originals of the Overseas Territories
- **SWAPO** South Western African People's Organization
- **ULDBR** Universal League for the Defense of the Black Race
- **UN** United Nations
- **UNIA** Universal Association for the Improvement of the Black
- **UNW** Union of Negro Workers
- **WANS** West African National Secretariat
- **WASU** West African Students Association
- **WB** World Bank
- **WFP** World Food Programme
- **WFTU** World Federation of Trade Unions

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General Introduction

The lack of peace and security, good governance, and economic development in the African continent are well-known problems that have desolated it for decades. Moreover, when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created on May 1963, it devoted most of its energy to the eradication of colonialism and apartheid in the Continent. One consequence of this center of attention was that the sovereignty of the African states was paramount. The cost of this state of mind was that the internal affairs of the African states were matters which concerned only their own governments. By the end of apartheid and the emergence of a democratic South Africa in the continental and world politics, the OAU had basically fulfilled its mission.

Nevertheless, the age of globalization has brought into light new development problems for Africa, especially the marginalization of it in the international community. In response to these problems, the African leaders decided to launch a new continental union; the African Union (AU), accompanied by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as a socio-economic development plan that hoped to end the political, social and economic development malaise on the Continent and place Africa in its rightful place within the international community.

Until mid-20th century, Africa was the scene of the colonial rivalry between a number of European countries, which seized and exploited its various resources. The beginning of the 1960s saw the independence of 15 countries, and this number increased until most of the African countries became independent. Since then, attempts have been made to unite these countries until the Organization of African Unity which emerged as a regional organization working on the African continent to reject African differences, end local blocs and limit the activities of organizations that were based on specific economic, artistic, or cultural fields.

It is worth noting that the awareness and consciousness amongst Africans is dated back to the period when they were confronted with the segregationist system and exploitation in the West Indies and the United States, in the nineteenth century. Consequently, the Afro-descendants founded a resistance movement based on fraternal solidarity. It is in this form of

manifestation that Pan-Africanism was born. Therefore, as we will see in each historical context, Pan-Africanism and African unity started first as a movement of emancipation.

Historians of Pan-Africanism indicate that it is Henry-Sylvester Williams (1869-1911), a lawyer registered in the English Bar, Afro-descendant of Trinidad, who marked the path on which many other militants were to follow. Pan-Africanism first appeared as the response of the black slaves of the new world to the conditions and situation of inferiority that were made to them; more than just a desire to assert their African identity and a simple desire to return to their motherland. It was an expression of an authentic African culture and civilization. Pan-Africanism refers to quite different currents depending on the era in which they are considered. It has emerged as a philosophical, racial, cultural and political movement. Paradoxically, these three spirits have sometimes been confused in the minds of their promoters.

In its philosophical sense, Pan-Africanism is linked to Garveyism (Racial Power). Influenced by the work of Booker T. Washington, Jamaican-born Marcus Garvey created the Universal Association for the Improvement of the Black (UNIA) in the United States. In 1914, he felt sure to be able to unite the black peoples of the whole world, by establishing a country and government. Garvey was infallibly devoted to the doctrine of race before anything else. From a point of view of its cultural expression, Pan-Africanism manifested itself through the movement of blackness developed by Césaire, Senghor, and others. "Negritude" is an attitude of self-defense of Negro-African society. This movement of thought emphasized the universality of black culture, and rejected cultural assimilation. In a more political sense, Pan-Africanism is a means of colonial liberation, consolidation of independence, and realization of African unity that Africans believe in a common destiny.

When in 1963 some African leaders met in Addis Ababa to found the Organization of African Unity, they believed that to liberate the Continent from colonialism and racism they had to unite. For a long time, the OAU has worked to encourage solidarity among states that have recently gained independence and to defend the idea of sovereign borders. However, burdened by debts and bureaucracy, and because of its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, the OAU has failed to prevent conflict, stop genocide or dismiss dictators.

After the end of the Cold War, the international and regional political atmosphere and the economic, political and social conditions have created a new African reality that has necessitated the creation of an African union to face global and regional challenges. A group of analysts argues that the process of regional economic and political integration requires an African union with economic and political power to conduct that process. In this context, it is worth examining the appropriateness of the current African and international reality and the appropriateness of the African Union as a political entity representing the continent in terms of objectives, policies, institutions, mechanisms of action and decision-making, and showing its ability to advance Africa from its chronic and complex crises.

Globalization has pushed the regions of the world together to form economic blocs, such as the European Union (EU) in Europe, the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Southeast Asia. The European Union was created in 1992, NAFTA in 1994 and ASEAN in 1967. The aim of these economic groupings was to promote trade by removing economic barriers in these areas and increasing free movement of labor, goods, and services. The African leaders recognized the need for Africa to move in the same direction. In 1999, the Organization of African Unity was transformed into the African Union. The transformation had to move beyond politics to integrate economic aspirations.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was fusion of two different visions; the South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki's vision in the shape of the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Program (MAP) and that of the Senegalese President Abdullah Wade's OMEGA Plan. Mbeki's MAP aimed at ending poverty through political, social, and economic development. Moreover, it called for cooperation and partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the developed world, to gain assistance to achieve African recovery. Whereas, OMEGA Plan of Abdullah Wade focused on the economic and social marginalization of the African continent over the past decades and proposed that Africa should come up with a new strategic development vision, with the goal of reaching an average annual economic growth rate of 4.7 percent.

The African leaders assumed that it would be more viable merging the MAP and OMEGA plans into one socio-economic plan. This final socio-economic plan was commended for being a local initiative to find African solution to African problems. However, scholars, and many African civil society organizations were neither enthusiastic nor optimistic because the African leaders had initiated several regional economic integration initiatives in the past, such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), in 1980 and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for socio-economic recovery and transformation (AAF-SAP), in 1989. The lack of political will and financial resources prevented both of these initiatives to get off the ground.

Regarding the philosophy of development strategy according to the documents of the African Union, it should be noted that it is based on a number of elements, the most important of which is the integration of the economies of the continent and the role of the private sector in the development process. Add to this the humanitarian role of the development process. We also emphasize the fairness of the distribution of income, which is the basis of the diversification of production rules and the fight against corruption and the administrative procedures as necessary for development. The expansion of popular control over the governing bodies and the activation of the role of civil society institutions and the increase of social infrastructure are the most important conditions of the targeted development strategy.

To promote good governance and the emergence of political dialogue culture in Africa, a consultative and open process, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was initiated by NEPAD, in 2002. It is based on two pillars that ensure its credibility, the technical competence that limits the attempts to politicize the process and the principle of inclusion, which establishes the obligation to allow participation of all national actors in the evaluations.

The APRM can be described as a new social contract in so far as it is the nature of the link between African governments and their citizens that it aims to transform qualitatively. The launching of NEPAD in 2001 was already the affirmation of the political leadership of African states anxious to forge a new partnership with the major players that are the private sector and civil society. The African Union recognizes that the private sector and civil society are central actors in governance and development, and partnerships between the state, the

private sector and civil society. The goal is to promote effective citizen participation in the crucial areas of governance and development.

Emphasizing the identity dimension of security consideration, the OAU and the AU have applied African solutions to African security problems. This attitude is derived from self-determination and self-government. It was adopted by many African leaders, who actively participated in the early phase of the liberation movement, such as Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Sekou Toure, Kenneth Kaunda, Edward Mondale, Ndabaningi Sithole, Nelson Mandela, and Tom Mboya. This is part of what Ali Mazrui described in the 1960s as a *Pax Africana*.

Africa has witnessed extensive violence and warfare in several countries since the creation of the OAU. Although violent conflicts in Africa are not new, they have drawn special attention due to the fact that they are more intense and extensive in scope, highly destructive, and produce large numbers of civilian victims and refugees. For instance, the war in southern Sudan claimed more than two million deaths. In the Rwandan genocide of 1994, an estimated one million people died. Violence in Africa has taken various forms ranging from genocide, as in Rwanda and Darfur between 2003 and 2007, to interpersonal violence. Besides their extremism in brutality, armed conflicts in Africa have also been characterized by the targeting of vulnerable groups, such as children, women and refugees, using children as soldiers, state sponsorship of violence, and war economies.

To find effective means on conflict prevention, management and resolution within the African Union, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established to be as a permanent decision-making body. The PSC shall be a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate an effective and timely response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. To achieve its goals, the Peace and Security Council is supported by the Commission, a Panel of Elders, a continental early warning system, an African standby force, and a special fund.

For several decades, Africa has experienced several development programs of all kinds. The Africans witnessed the succession of declarations and development plans, from the OAU Charter to NEPAD, through the Monrovia Declaration, the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty, etc. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the AU, another program,

Agenda 2063, was launched, to accelerate the development of Africa. This program is presented as the natural extension of NEPAD. Thus, the AU leaders provided the AU 2063 Agenda to be a source of inspiration for the development of national and regional plans for sustainable development. This program represents a collective effort and an opportunity for Africa to determine its own destiny. It aims to build an integrated and prosperous Africa, supported and led by its own citizens and a dynamic force on the world stage. The AU and NEPAD were designed to address the challenges facing the African continent. Issues such as escalating poverty levels, underdevelopment, and the continued marginalization of Africa needed a new radical intervention, spearheaded by a political will on the part of the African leaders, who intended to develop a new vision that would guarantee Africa's renewal. But are the AU and NEPAD just another attempt by African leaders to solve Africa's socioeconomic development woes that would end in failure?

The motivation for writing on this topic sprang from a personal interest in the Continent itself, the African Union, development, human rights, good governance, peace and security, and a general interest of the change in African politics after the Cold War. Moreover, the continental or regional African institutions remain largely unknown in the Algerian academic circles despite the direct link with the continent where we live. Therefore, this unpretentious research work is an attempt to provide a basic understanding to the essence of these institutions. The topic is complex, very wide, and there are several interesting aspects for a historian and/or a political scientist to look into. The historiography covered by this thesis relies within several fields of relevance for historians and political scientists today. It elaborates on topics where there are knowledge gaps.

Therefore, this research work will cover the period of time between the date of the OAU creation (1963) and 2013 which is its 50th anniversary when the AU 2063 Agenda was launched. Nevertheless, for a better understanding to the roots and process of African unity, the period prior to the establishment of the first continental African institution was also studied. It is worth identifying several events that are important to understand the history of the AU and that of its predecessor. Consequently, it aims at providing the reader with analytical perspective and understanding of the involvement of both organizations in politics, development, and peace and security questions to give him/her insight and knowledge. Since

change in policy has not taken place quickly and abruptly, the time span this thesis works with is quite long. This approach allows for more thorough understanding.

The problematic of this study is based on the question, whether the African Union as a continental organization represents a qualitative shift that puts Africa in the same course as Europe after World War II? The European Union (EU) institutions are the responsible government that brings together the state and civil society and seeks to create higher institutions that interact with international civil society institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This analytical approach requires a determination of the extent to which African realities have complicated the gradualization of the process of the Union, and the compatibility between the formal and informal dimensions, on the one hand, and regional and international ones, on the other.

Many sub-research questions stem from the research problem that the study aims to answer:

1. When did the need for unity emerge among the Africans, and in what form?
2. What are the OAU achievements and failure?
3. What are the lessons learned from the OAU experience?
4. How strong is the AU's ability to continue and achieve its objectives under contemporary economic, political and social conditions?
5. What policies, efforts and actions are necessary to integrate economic, political and social blocs on the Continent with the African Union?
6. What structural, administrative and technical reforms are needed to increase the effectiveness of the African Union?

To find appropriate and accurate answers to the problematic and the questions mentioned above, a scientific approach with two methods as tools to reach logical results, were applied. The first was the historical descriptive method, by tracking the historical evolution of the organizations and by underlining sources and presenting aspects of their content to reach a set of conclusions on the subject. Secondly, we applied a comparative method for the methodological consideration of comparing the political, economic and social approaches of the different situations, in addition to comparing the role and effectiveness of the organizations.

In this regard, this thesis is organized in four chapters; each intends to deal with a particular aspect of the evolution of the African political thought. The first chapter deals with the emergence of the Pan-African movement. It provides a review of the pioneers of the movement in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, in the Diaspora and in Africa. It, also, covers the different conferences organized and led by the African American elite from the United States and the Caribbean; in addition to, the congresses led by the African elite. Besides, it endeavors to present the reader to the political climate of the late 1950s and early 1960s which preceded the establishment of the OAU.

The second one is devoted to the establishment of the AU and its predecessor to promote Pan-Africanism and the African personality through national independence, national consolidation, transnational unity, and economic and social reconstruction. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first one deals with why and how colonial policies indirectly led to the rise of the African nationalism, and the liberation and integration policy set forth by the OAU. Then, it explores the statist nature of the OAU, especially problems related to state boundaries, sovereignty and non-intervention, and neglecting human right issues. The second analyses the political climate that led to the emergence of the AU in July 2002. Further, it examines its objectives, institutions, and the relation with other regional organizations and initiatives.

The third chapter represents the core of this thesis since it scrutinizes the main factors behind the formation of the AU, amongst were the promotion and protection of human rights, enhancing democratic structures, and encouraging good governance. These issues, as well as others such as constitutionalism and respect for the rule of law, are considered to be crucial for the pursuit of security and development as determined by its founders. Thus, this chapter discusses, in its first section, the parameters, framework, and measures that should be available to reach good governance and the rule of law. Then, the second section explores security and peace building policies in Africa. Besides, it contains a case study concerning the Darfur crisis, and the UN/AU role to put an end to it.

The final chapter of this research work deals with three main initiatives in order to create sustainable development through NEPAD as a renewed approach to development. Furthermore, the second section deals with the role of the African Peer Review Mechanism to

promote and ensure development and the rule of law, though it is a voluntary instrument that the AU member states commit themselves to as an African self-assessment mechanism. Moreover, section three considers the AU 2063 Agenda which represents the future basic development framework of the continent that aims to improve investment, and achieve social justice.

CHAPTER ONE

Historical Background: Early Forms of Pan-Africanism (Prior to Mid-20th Century)

If the word "Pan-Africanism" was born with the Pan-African Conference of 1900, the reality of Pan-Africanism is traced well before that date and can be associated with several factors and initiatives. It stemmed from a rejection of the slave trade, slavery and all their consequences on the legal status of blacks, the image of Africa in the world and the fate of great powers of the time reserved for the Africans and their continent. It was by rejecting the slavery system that Africans from Africa and the Diaspora affirmed the equality of peoples and the right of Africans to live in freedom and dignity like the other human beings.

While the African resistance to slavery began with slavery itself, this rejection began to take on intellectual and political content in the eighteenth century in philosophical and religious texts, in political pamphlets, in lawsuits brought by Africans against their real or

pretended masters. The few books published in Europe by the philosopher Anthony Amo,¹ from Guinea (1703-1759), by Ignatius Sancho² "the African Letters" (1782), by Ottobah Cuguano,³ "Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of Slavery" (1787), by Olaudah Equiano⁴ "The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano" (1789), and the trial won against his master in London in 1772 by the slave James Somerset Virginia form the solid foundation of a kind of prehistory of Pan-Africanism.

I- The -PanAfrican Movement Roots throughout the Nineteenth Century

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Pan-African idea was enriched and consolidated to take advantage of the rather difficult circumstances that surrounded the Africans of the Diaspora as well as those of the African continent. Becoming independent, Haiti had difficulty getting its sovereignty recognized by the great powers and had to undergo, like the colony of Sierra Leone, formed by the British in 1787 with African Americans repatriates, and Liberia, born of the immigration of African of the United States, the repeated assaults of racist theories that used the pretext of its difficulties to deny all Africans the right and the ability to govern themselves.⁵ In the United States, the late abolition of slavery (1865) went hand in hand with the reinforcement of segregation and racist practices and with whites' strategy of repatriation of slaves and former slaves to Africa.

¹ Anthony William Amo (c. 1703 – c. 1759) was an African from what is now Ghuinea, who became a respected philosopher and teacher at the universities of Halle and Jena in Germany after studying there. He was the first African known to have attended a European university.

² Ignatius Sancho (1729-1780) was born a slave on a ship crossing the Atlantic from Africa to the West Indies He was thought of in his age as "the extraordinary Negro", and to eighteenth-century opponents of the slave trade he became a symbol of the humanity of Africans. In recent years there has been a great deal of interest in the life and works of Ignatius Sancho.

³ Ottobah Cugoano, also known as John Stuart (c. 1757 – after 1791), was an African abolitionist and natural rights philosopher from Ghana who was active in England in the latter half of the eighteenth century. He joined the Sons of Africa, African abolitionists in England.

⁴ Olaudah Equiano (c. 1745 – 31 March 1797), His autobiography, published in 1789, helped in the creation of the Slave Trade Act 1807 which ended the African trade for Britain and its colonies.

⁵ Bogue, Anthony. Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals. New York: Routledge, 2003. pp. 15-26

In Latin America, the former Spanish colonies and Brazil, which had acquired their independence thanks to the contribution of the active slaves or free slaves, were careful not to abolish slavery (abolished in Brazil only in 1888) and to establish the equality of races. Moreover, the African land, the riches of its soil and subsoil attracted the European states that tried to conceal behind the screen doctrines proclaiming the inequality of the human races.⁶ In response to these threats, voices were raised in Africa and the Diaspora to highlight and revalue the share of Africa in the past of humanity and, on the basis of this rectified history, proclaimed the opposition of Africans to any political and all practices tending to subjugate them.

But what was meant by Africa, was it only black Africa, which had been the secular victim of slavery, or Africa as a whole continent? This debate between the two, Negro or continental contents of Pan-Africanism, which was to last until the 19th century, was born at the very birth of Pan-African ideas. Pastor Alexander Crummell (1819-1898), who traveled to the United States, Great Britain, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, for twenty years, was one of the firsts to openly speak in 1852 about Ethiopia as a generic name for all of Africa, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean, and from the Mediterranean to the Cape.

But his contemporary, Martin R. Delany (1812-1885), who had visited Liberia and southern Nigeria, pleaded for Africa to the African race and for blacks to govern it, an idea that was to be resumed after him, at least by two of the greatest figures of Pan-Africanism. Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832-1912), who came from the Danish Caribbean to settle in Liberia and shined all over West Africa, from Sierra Leone to Nigeria, and exclusively attached to defending the interests of this particular type of humanity known to the world as a Negro. Marcus Garvey (1885-1940), from Jamaica to the United States did as Blyden. He opposed W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-1963) in a violent verbal struggle which, undoubtedly, weakened the Pan-African Movement.⁷

⁶ Magubane B. The American Negro's conception of Africa: A Study in the Ideology of pride and prejudice. Los Angeles: University California. 1967. pp. 242-258

⁷ Carlisle R., The roots of black nationalism Washington, N.Y., London: Kennikat Press, 1975, pp 122-131

Defining Africa was not enough, it was still necessary to ensure defense and illustration. This was done on both intellectual and political grounds. The Haitian intelligentsia distinguished itself in the struggle against the detractors of the black race, embodied by Antenor Firmin⁸ (1850-1911), statesman, patriot and opponent to the expansionist aims of the United States. He published in 1885, at the very moment when the European powers were launching the division of Africa, an immense work *The Equality of the Human Races* (Positive Anthropology) which, directly responded to the thesis of Arthur De Gobineau Essay on the *Inequality of Human Races*, 1853-185. Antenor destroyed, at the same time, all theoretical foundations of colonial domination and racial segregation.⁹

History, as a scientific discipline, was to occupy a prominent place in the concerns of these activists, with numerous publications, both in the United States and in Western and Southern Africa. Under the pen of Blyden, Africanus Horton, and lesser-known authors such as Abbot Boilat (Senegalese Sketches, 1853), C. C. Reindorf *History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti*, 1889, A. B. Sibthorpe *History of Sierra Leone*, 1868), Samuel Johnson, *The History of the Yorubas*, 1921 or J. E. Casely-Hayford *Ethiopia Unbound: Studies in Race Emancipation, United Empire*, 1911.¹⁰

All the themes of Pan-African historiography, Africa, cradle of humanity; the anteriority and unity of Negro civilizations; the exemplar of Ethiopia through its very long history; the brilliance of the political, economic, cultural and scientific life of African states in the Middle Ages; The ravages of trafficking and slavery; the survival capacity of African

⁸ Joseph Auguste Anténor Firmin (18 October 1850 – 19 September 1911), better known as simply Anténor Firmin, was a Haitian anthropologist, journalist, and politician. Firmin is best known for his book *De l'égalité des races humaines* (English: On the Equality of Human Races), which was published as a rebuttal to French writer Count Arthur de Gobineau's work *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (English: Essay on the Inequality of Human Races). Gobineau's book asserted the superiority of the Aryan race and the inferiority of blacks and other people of color.

Firmin's work, first published in 1885, argued the opposite, that "all men are endowed with the same qualities and the same faults, without distinction of color or anatomical form. The races are equal" (pp. 450). He was marginalized at the time for his beliefs that all human races were equal.

⁹ Ackah, William B. *Pan-Africanism: Exploring the Contradictions, Politics, Identity and Development in Africa and the African Diaspora*. Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1999, p. 52.

¹⁰ Langley J.A., Pan-Africanism and nationalism in West Africa, 1900-1945, A study in ideology and social classes, London, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 17-18.

societies confronted with the most destructive intrusions; African resistance to slavery and foreign domination; the proximity between Islam and African cultures... Throughout the history of pan-Africanism, intellectual protest and cultural creativity would thus accompany the struggles that are properly political.

The theme of the independence of the African territories occupied by the power of colonialism appeared before the completion of the process of domination of Africa, with E.W. Blyden's slogan "Africa for Africans"; in the political and intellectual context of the end of the nineteenth century. Most Pan-Africanists were concerned first and foremost with denouncing, preventing and limiting the abuses of colonialism, pushing the realization of political independence to a more or less remote date. But as soon as the first attempt was made to occupy Ethiopia by the Italians, many, like the Haitian Benito Sylvain, later awarded the honorary title of "Emperor's aide-de-camp", mobilized to come to his rescue. Indeed, Ethiopia was not, in their opinion, a country like any other, has embodied the African political genius for a very long duration, and under the impulse of the Negus Menelik II, it knew an economic, cultural, political and diplomatic renaissance illustrated by his victory against the Italian troops at Adwa (1896).¹¹ This victory confirmed that pan-Africanism was not a utopia because it embodied what Crummell, Delany and Blyden had conceived of as the "African rebirth", the regeneration of Africa" and the African personality, key concepts of Pan-Africanism, coupled with Africa's desire for independence and its ability to move forward, counting on its own strength.¹²

I. Conferences, Congresses, and Civil Society

This activism could not be confined to the intellectual field and the domain of symbols alone. It was necessary to be concerned with putting in place the means of putting these ideas into practice and of changing the course of history for the benefit of the African peoples. The struggle proved to be very difficult. Indeed, pan-Africanism was hitherto the work of an elite of committed intellectuals, but few in number and dispersed among at least three continents, America, Europe and Africa. It seemed impossible to constitute a permanent organization.

¹¹ Oliver R. & Atmore A., Africa since 1800, London, Cambridge University Press, 1972. pp. 58-63

¹² Ackah, William B., *Op. cit.*, P. 63.

The idea then emerged of letting the different groups claiming pan-African actions on their own ground, on condition that they meet regularly to, together, take strong actions, proclaim demands and formulate proposals.

The choice of venues for such gatherings was to follow a precise tactic and strategy. The Pan-African message had to be brought to the very center of the imperial system, of which the African colonies were one of the links. One would thus find oneself in the great European metropolises to hear the "Voice of Bloody Africa" (E. W. Blyden). Thus was born the idea of Pan-African conferences and congresses, whose paternity remains controversial and which would mark the first half of the XX century.¹³

II.1. Pan-African Conference of 1900

It is worth understanding the double choice of the year 1900, the beginning of the last century of the second millennium, and of London, the prestigious capital of the greatest colonial empire, to organize the Pan-African Conference. After having thought of taking advantage of the Universal Exhibition in Paris to bring together scholars from around the world to prosecute racism, Benito Sylvain rallied to the project of an exclusively African meeting in London. Artisan, better known in francophone space since the publications of Professor Oruno D. Lara, was Henry Sylvester Williams. This lawyer from the London Bar was known for the effectiveness of his pleadings in favor of the Blacks of the Gold Coast and South Africa. He founded the African Association in 1897, in a context of great effervescence in the African colonies of Great Britain: impatience of the emerging middle classes, victims of racism and discrimination, especially in public employment; insurrections against the burden of burdens imposed by colonization; agitation of the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society, also created in 1897 in Gold Coast.¹⁴

¹³ Adi, Hakim, West Africans in Britain 1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan Africanism and Communism, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1998, pp. 33-41.

¹⁴ Esedebe, P. Olisanwuche, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776-1991, Washington, D.C.: Howard University, 1994, p.47.

The cultural nationalism in Nigeria expressed itself by the rejection of European names and costumes and by the appearance, as in southern Africa, of independent Christian churches. Comparable developments took place in the United States where, as a result of his moderation, Booker T. Washington (1856-1915), the founder of the Tuskegee Institute and the promoter of a progressive "integration" of the African Americans into American society, was overwhelmed by more radical militants gathered around Bishop Alexander Walters in the Negro Academy, such as William M. Trotter and WEB Du Bois.

The Conservation of the Race had launched the slogan Pan-Negroism, explaining that "If Negroes are to become a factor in the history of the world; it will be thanks to a Pan-Negro movement ... through an organization of race, solidarity of race, unity of the race." The London gathering echoed widely in Africa and the African Diaspora of the Americas, because the British capital had become, with Edinburgh, a focus of high concentration of black students, mainly from western and southern Africa, Jamaica and Trinidad. Back in the United States, African-American participants widely disseminated the findings of the conference among their brothers and among the many young people from South Africa who came to study there.¹⁵

Despite the small number of participants, to which should be added all those who, without being official delegates, participated in the debates and signed motions, the Pan-African Conference was the first truly pan-African meeting by the geographical origin of the over-representation of the Diaspora in relation to mother Africa: 11 in the United States; 10 of the Caribbean; 5 from London; 4 from Africa (Abyssinia, Gold Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone); 1 of Canada, plus one of unspecified origin. While the resolutions of the conference did not appear to be an explicit condemnation of colonization, the participants ensured that they addressed Queen Victoria and secured a solemn commitment "not to neglect the interests and well-Being of indigenous breeds "in South Africa and Rhodesia: They also adopted the famous "Address to the Nations of the World", written by W. E.B. Du Bois on the question of effective and not only formal equality between races. Du Bois was then to incarnate, until his death at Accra in 1953, the continuity of the Pan-African movement at the same time as he imprinted his mark on both the content of his doctrine and his methods of action.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 77.

II.2. Pan-African Congresses 1919-1945

Under his impulse, four pan-African congresses were held from 1919 to 1927. Deprived of conferences and congresses, the two decades from 1900 to 1919 were not a hollow period. In Africa itself, in parallel with the violent resistances often located in the traditional framework, especially in West Africa (Senegal, Gold Coast, Nigeria), Egypt and in South Africa, the manifestations of a modern political nationalism, (the National Party in Egypt (1907) or the South African Native National Congress in South Africa (1912), which later became the African National Congress), sent petitions to European officials and delegations to colonial governments.¹⁶

Between Africa and the Americas, a movement of ebb and flow continued, characterized, in particular, by the stay in the United States of young students, and intellectuals, some of whom, like the Gold-Coastian James E. Kwegyir Aggrey and South Africa's Pixley Kalsaka Seme, who were to play a leading role in the dissemination of Pan-African ideas. Aggrey was one of the inspirers of Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Kwame Nkrumah, both in terms of ideas and in their desire to go to the United States in search of the Golden Fleece; before being one of the founders of the ANC, P.K., Seme pronounced at the University of Columbia in 1906 a famous speech on the regeneration of Africa, which has remained, so far, one of the intellectuals of all Pan-Africanists.¹⁷

African nationalists were closely following the evolution of the black question in the United States: in 1912, J. Ephraim Casely Hayford (1866-1930) sent a message to the International Conference on the Negro, organized by Booker T. Washington, calling "Aborigines of the Gold Coast and other parts of West Africa to join forces with their American brothers to achieve a national aspiration and goal." On the other side of the Atlantic, the intellectual and political effervescence was no less great. In the Caribbean, a deep crisis, largely determined by the collapse of the plantation slave economy, prompted emigration to the United States of thousands of descendants of African slaves: the long

¹⁶ Walters, Ronald W., Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern Afrocentric Political Movements, Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State, 1993, pp. 55-61.

¹⁷ Ibid.

American occupation of Haiti (1915-1934) produced a similar result. All these emigrants carried with them, so to speak, a long tradition of resistance that would contribute, later on, to the radicalization of American black movements.¹⁸

Considered as the father of Harlem radicalism, Hubert Henry Harrison was one of these immigrants: born on the island of Saint Croix in 1887, arrived in New York in 1900, H. H. Harrison founded a newspaper *Voice* (1917) *For the New Negro* and was at the origin of two Black radical currents, a socialist current and the pan-negrism current of Marcus Garvey, whom Harrison was the first to host in New York. In the United States, during this period that the foreseeable rupture between the moderate black leaders, favorable to progressive integration, took place and the young radicals, demanding the immediate recognition of equal rights.¹⁹

While Booker T. Washington had been booed for the first time in 1903 in a meeting of Blacks, the Radicals, under the impetus of W. E.B. Du Bois, William M. Trotter and Carter G. Woodson, founded the Niagara Movement (1905), before 1906 at Harper's Ferry (West Virginia) where abolitionist activist John Brown had been hanged in 1859, to launch a famous "Address to the Nation", claiming the immediate establishment of social and political equality. The prestige of W.E.B. Du Bois also grew with the creation of the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People), in 1908. Launching the magazine *Crisis*, in 1910, it was intended to disseminate the ideas of the movement and its participation in the Universal Congress of Races in London, 1911. In this magazine, Du Bois and two Africans from the continent exposed the situation and aspirations of blacks in America and colonial Africa. W.E. Du Bois appeared as the principal architect of the First Pan-African Congress (Paris, 1919): largely financed by African Americans, this Congress was actually the second meeting of the Africans of the world.²⁰

The choice of Paris was justified by the meeting in the French capital of the Peace Conference, which was responsible, for deciding the future of the German colonies after the First World War, to which the Africans of the United States and the Africans had made a

¹⁸ Legum, C., Pan-Africanism: A short political guide, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, p.25

¹⁹ Ajala, A., Pan-Africanism: Evolution, progress and prospects, London: Andre Deutsch Ltd. 1973, p.138

²⁰ Ibid. p. 154

decisive contribution both in France and in Africa. The agreement of the French authorities to the holding of the meeting was obtained thanks to Blaise Diagne, first black deputy of Senegal elected in 1914 and then Commissary General of the French government in charge of the recruitment of soldiers in Africa. The congress brought together 57 delegates from fifteen countries: the United States (16), the French colonies (13), Haiti (7), France (7), the Spanish colonies (2), Abyssinia, Belgian, Egypt, Santo Domingo. The colonial countries (France, Belgium, and Portugal) ensured that the United States was present in the debates.²¹

This context explains the content of the resolutions which, in a visible concern for compromise, clearly condemned the abuses of colonization, but not its principle, and refrained from referring to the right of Africans to independence. The President of the United States, Woodrow T. Wilson, had in his Fourteen Points (1918) proclaimed the right of peoples to self-determination. Delegates declared themselves in favor of the management of the former German colonies by an international institution rather than by a particular State. But the great powers were hypocritical and agreed with the ideas expressed by General Boer Jan C. Smuts, present at the Peace Conference, in a pamphlet *The League of Nations*. As practical suggestions: He proposed that peoples who cannot yet suffice in the harsh conditions of the modern world be regarded as a sacred office for civilization and that their territory be entrusted with the status "to the European states possessing colonies. This laborious scaffold shocked many Africans who remembered it at the Manchester Congress in 1945."²²

The second Pan-African Congress, once again funded by the Afro-Americans, had the singularity of being held successively in three different imperial capitals, London, Brussels and Paris, where the Africans of the American Diasporas found more Africans than in 1919. WEB Du Bois, in his *History of the Pan-African Congress (1963)*, states that W. E. Wood, who was its dominant figure, declared that "the Pan-African movement was losing ground since 1921." This Congress, marked by profound differences, inaugurated a series of ruptures which prevented the movement from acquiring permanent organizational structures, as many wished. At the London session (27-29 August), almost exclusively Anglophones participated, including delegates from the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, as well as Saklatvala Shapurji from India, a future Labor Party House of Commons of the United Kingdom.

²¹ Langley J.A., op. cit., p., 67.

²² Legum, C., op. cit., pp.,44-53

The approaches and tone of the session were distinguished both by their radicalism in the analysis of the situation of blacks in the world, like segregation and racism, imperialism and land expropriations in Africa. This led some go so far as to suggest direct action. This radicalism is clearly reflected in the London Manifesto adopted by the congressmen at the end of their work, which, according to some observers at the time, exerted a direct influence on political organizations in Africa, such as the National Congress of British West Africa, South African Native National Congress, and the Congolese Union (Belgian Congo). The Brussels session (30 August-2 September) witnessed the presence of blacks from the French colonies, Angola and the Belgian Congo. It should be noted that, among the participants, there were also representatives of colonial administrations and missionaries who helped to moderate debates and resolutions.

Above all, Blaise Diagne rejected The Manifesto of London, accused of being of essence communist party and strongly opposed W. E.B. Du Bois, to whom he reproached not represent all blacks in the United States. After this break-up, the Paris (4-5 September) did not succeed in reconciling the points of view. It is true that the tenors, on the francophone side, Blaise Diagne and the deputy for Guadeloupe Gratien Candace, embarked on an unreserved apologia for the colonial policy of France, while W. E.B. Du Bois, not to mention independence, pleaded for the access of Africans to political power, the only way to get recognition of the African people as equal of other peoples: "No Black, in any part of the world, can be safe as long as a man can be exploited in Africa, deprived of his civil rights in the West Indies or lynched in the United States because he is a man of color."²³ For him, the French policy of assimilation was intended only to incorporate into the French bourgeoisie a tiny proportion of blacks in the colonies to reinforce the exploitation of the African and Caribbean masses.

The last two Pan-African congresses were, thus, almost exclusively the business of W. E.B. Du Bois. Sponsored by the National Association of Colored Women of the United States, the Third Congress (1923) was to some extent improvised and held two sessions, in

²³ Langley J.A., *op. cit.*, p. 98.

London (7-8 November) and Lisbon (1-2 December).²⁴ The London session adopted for the first time resolutions calling for "the development of Africa for the benefit of Africans and not only for the benefit of Europeans" and the representation of blacks in the League of Nations Mandates Commission and the International Labor Organization. For the first time, the conditions of blacks in Latin America, and especially in Brazil, were mentioned. This session also testified to a more precise knowledge of the realities of the different fields by resolutions appropriate to each case. The emancipation of the black states— Abyssinia, Haiti and Liberia— from the economic and financial tutelage of the monopolist companies and the great capitalist powers, the restoration of the independence of an enlarged Egypt in the Sudan, the establishment of responsible governments in British West Africa and the Caribbean, and the extension of the status of citizens in the French colonies.²⁵

Moreover, the Congress stated the condemnation of the brutal exploitation of the Belgian Congo, lynching's in the United States, modern slavery in the form of forced recruitment of workers in Portuguese Africa, land expropriations and the domination by racist minorities in South Africa, Rhodesia and Kenya. In Lisbon, alongside the traditionally assiduous delegates (United States, West Africa), there were numerous personalities from different parts of the Portuguese Empire (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea, Mozambique, and Sao Tome. While taking up the analyzes and proposals made in London, the session contributed greatly to making known the black question in the United States and its implications on the general situation of blacks in the world.²⁶

The Fourth Congress (New York, 21-24 August 1927) resumed, essentially, the conclusions of the third. It was on this occasion that the question was raised of the relations between the international communist movement and pan-Africanism.²⁷ Indeed, this Congress was preceded in February by the meeting in Brussels of the League against Imperialism and for the National Independence (LINI) organized by the German Communist militant Willi Münzenberg with the support of the Communist International (the Comintern,) intended to implement the policy advocated by Lenin to associate the communists and the national liberation movements in the colonies. If the British West Africa was not there, Lenin

²⁴ Vincent, T. G., Black power and the Garvey movement. San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1972, pp. 121-222

²⁵ Legum, C., *op. cit.*, pp.,88-91

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 97

²⁷ Padmore, G., Pan Africanism or communism? The struggle for Africa. London., 1961, pp.23-35

succeeded in bringing together some 180 participants from North America, the Caribbean, South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, already famous, like Albert Einstein, or called to the celebrity, like the Indian Jawaharlal P. Nehru and the Algerian Messali Hadj.

The question about Africans was the subject of a special commission and a special resolution: "to free the Negro race everywhere in the world," this was exactly in line with the demands of the Pan-African congresses to which it explicitly added the claim of the complete freedom for African peoples and peoples of African descent. At the Pan-African Congress in New York, W.E. B. Du Bois praised the policy pursued by the Russian Communists with regard to the nationalities of the former tsarist empire. Many colonialist publicists at once began to evoke collusion between Pan-Africanists and communists or an infiltration of pan-Africanists by the Communists; whereas, at that time the Communists saw in Pan-Africanism only the expression of "petty-bourgeois nationalism" Journals, associations and movements.²⁸

I I.3 Other Forms of Struggle

In addition to the above mentioned congresses, which were certainly decisive, but in which only a very small number of people participated, there were also organized movements, sometimes taking the form of mass movements that contributed to implant the pan-African idea in the minds of the majority and in close relation with the living conditions of individuals in their particular social and political contexts. All these movements are far from known and we will limit ourselves here to those that, in one way or another, have contributed to the advances of pan-Africanism.

The Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and Communities League, founded by Marcus Garvey (1887-1940), are undoubtedly the well known, if not the most famous, of all Pan African movements. From a family of slaves, from Jamaica, where he had founded the UNIA as early as 1914, Garvey was one of the many Black Caribbean immigrants to the United States and heirs of Traditions of resistance of the Caribbean slaves. But he also visited London from 1912 to 1914, where he had become somewhat familiar with Pan-African ideas in the British capital. He arrived in Harlem in 1916, when the influx of

²⁸ Ibid., p. 44

blacks of the United States and the Caribbean had driven the whites, transforming the chic neighborhood reserved for the whites in a ghetto for blacks.

As early as 1918, he launched a newspaper "The Negro World", which also included supplements in Spanish and French ²⁹ to reach the non-English-speaking black immigrants beyond the United States.

A fertile spirit in ideas and projects, a speaker, exceptional organizer of capabilities, Marcus Garvey was able to the circumstances of the Post-War Period. Maintaining segregation and the extension of racist practices in northern cities where blacks flocked fleeing the South, the economic crisis and the unemployment, the revival of the Ku-Klux-Klan and the lynching practices, made the UNIA be proud to have branches well beyond Harlem and New York, especially Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. In 1919, in Harlem, Garvey opened an immense room, the Liberty Hall, to serve as the seat of his movement.

It was there that he launched in 1920, before an enthusiastic audience of 25,000 people, his famous "Declaration of the Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World". This is an orientation of pan-Africanism, fundamentally different from that embodied in the congresses of W. E.B. Du Bois. The violence of the quarrels and public insults between the two men and the positions of George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah and Cyril did not facilitate comparisons between their two approaches. The two agreed in effect on the defense of the "black race" and on the necessary liberation of Africa as a prerequisite for the emancipation of all the blacks of the world. But the "pan-négroisme" of Marcus Garvey distinguished itself from the Pan-Africanism of W. E.B. Du Bois.³⁰

This was in an appeal to the black elite for more preference to socialism while Marcus Garvey addressed the black masses and wanted to elicit black capitalists who could compete with their Western counterparts. Marcus Garvey's anti-racist racism, his violence, overwhelming activism, he set up countless financial and technical institutions to organize the

²⁹ Vincent, T. G., Black power and the Garvey movement, San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1972, pp. 63-71.

³⁰ Ibid.

return to Africa, the utopian character of his political projects (such as proclamation of an "African Empire" and his self-proclamation as "Provisional President of Africa") met with only contempt, sneer or indifference on the part of WEB Du Bois and his supporters. His arrest for financial fraud in 1923 and his conviction ruined his movement. His influence extended well into the 1920s, both among blacks in the Diaspora and among those in Africa: Kwame Nkrumah, who had studied in the United States from 1935 to 1945, liked to repeat that Marcus Garvey had been one of the men who had most influenced him; he took over the famous Black Star, which had been one of the symbols of the UNIA.³¹

It was, paradoxically, among the Francophone blacks, who were in principle less affected than their Anglophone brothers, that the UNIA exerted direct and visible influence through the Universal League for the Defense of the African Race (ULDBR), founded in Paris in 1924. The radicalism of the ULDBR was linked both to Pan-negroism and Particular circumstances of the postwar period for Africans living in France. While African immigrants had been few in number before 1914, their numbers increased sharply from the First World War, following the massive recruitment of the "black force" of which most of the soldiers remained in France after the dispute. When they became workers, most of them mixed with the Maghrebins and Asians (Indochinese and Chinese), they were closely monitored by the administration that feared they would fall into communism. To this end, the Ministry of the Colonies created the SCAN (Service of Control and Assistance of the Natives), later became SLOOT (Service of Liaison with the Originals of the Overseas Territories).

It fell to Marc Kojouharian (1887-1936) to channel the energy of these Africans towards Pan-Africanism. Born out of the aristocracy of the kingdom of Dahomey and the merchant bourgeoisie of the kingdom of Porto Novo, Kojouharian had everything to be on the side of the colonizers. After brilliant studies in Dahomey and France, a seemingly successful "integration" in the upper Parisian society and a well-filled dandy life, he finally opted for anti-colonialist resistance in 1924, after having measured the ingratitude of the French authorities towards the black soldiers of the First World War and having been personally victim of racism.

³¹ Rudwick, E.M., Propagandist of Negro protest, New York: Atheneum Press, 1968, p. 112.

After the rupture of Brussels in 1921 between WEB Du Bois and Blaise Diagne, the latter had founded a Pan-African Association completely cut off from the African living forces installed in France. In a lecture given on 24 February 1924 to the Internally School of Higher Social Studies (Paris), Tovalou Houénou did not content himself with denouncing the colonial policy of France in Africa, he also drew up a vast picture of the role of Africa in the history of Europe and the disastrous living conditions of blacks in Africa and America as a result of colonial administration and racial segregation.

Tovalou Houenou was in the United States. He first participated in the second UNIA congress where on August 19 an enthusiastic audience of 5,000 blacks listened to the Prince of Dahomey expressing his views on the colonial policy of France and on the general condition of Africans in the world. But Tovalou Houenou's opposition to Blaise Diagne, accused of serving French interests, was going to drag the Dahomean militant and his paper to justice. He was not to recover from his conviction by the courts, but his ideas were to be taken up by leaders at least as radical as himself, Lamine Senghor, founder of the Negro Race Defense Committee in 1926, and after his death in 1927, Tiemoko Garan Kouyat, who conceived and founded the League for Defense of the Negro Race.³²

The British West Africa was also a hotbed of intense pan-African activity. The uniqueness of this region was that while advocating for the global unity of Africans and blacks, its militants were concerned with concretely realizing the unity of thought and action on the smaller scale of West Africa. Created in 1920, in the wake of the ARPS (Aborigines Rights Protection Society), NCBWA (National Congress of British West Africa) was born in this perspective. Active on the ground, in West Africa, this organization suffered nevertheless the multiple hindrances opposed to its action by the colonial administrations.³³

In terms of outreach, it was relayed by the WASU (West African Students Association), founded on August 7, 1925, which succeeded in bringing together African students from Africa, the Caribbean and the United States since the end of the 19th century. Attempts to regroup these students had not been lacking, as several Pan-African student organizations had been established since the beginning of the 10th century: first, the Union for

³² Panikkar, K., Revolution in Africa, Bombay, New York, 1961, p. 77

³³ Crowder, M., West Africa under colonial rule, London: Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 188-195

Students of African Descent, aimed at "strengthening the spirit of brotherhood between The sons of Africa who are studying in Great Britain "; The African Progress Union, whose leaders, Dr. Alcindor and, especially, J.R. Archer, London City Councilor and Mayor of Battersea, had been very active in the preparation and conduct of pan-African conferences and congresses since 1900, and the Gold Coast Students' Union.

One of the many initiators of WASU was the South African Pixley Kalsaka Seme, who, after his studies at Columbia University (New York), settled in Oxford before returning to South Africa in 1912. WASU owed much to the energy of Ladipo Solanke (1884-1958), the Yoruba activist born in Abeokuta in 1884, who had studied at Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, before joining the London Bar, in Britain. His project - the creation of the "United States of West Africa" as a prerequisite for African unity - received the support of many African academics and young intellectuals, as well as notables from West Africa and cadres Jasonas-Hayford, Kumasihene Prempeh I (the descendant of the king of Ashanti, demoted to the rank of "King of Kumasi" and returned from exile in 1924), the American black singer and actor Paul Robeson and Joseph B. Danquah of the Gold Coast, second president of the association. Recruiting mainly among students from the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, WASU succeeded in extending its recruitment from 21 founding members in 1921 to 252 members in 1939.³⁴

North Africa was not left behind, although most of the work devoted to the emancipation of these countries emphasized the nationalist movements deployed within the boundaries set by colonization. As with sub-Saharan Africa, North African emigration played a leading role in building awareness and cross-border organizational structures. The singularity of this emigration was that it began as early as the 19th century, following the establishment of a settlement in Algeria from 1830, and that after providing soldiers, it dragged more and more workers first from Algeria and then, to a much lesser degree, from Morocco and Tunisia. Here again, the First World War was a major turning point both in terms of the increasing numbers of people coming from North Africa and the growing awareness of North Africans.³⁵

³⁴ Ibid, p. 213

³⁵ Beling, W.A., Pan-Arabism and Labour, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs, 1960, pp. 28-35

As for the Black and Indochinese emigrants in France, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the anti-imperialist strategy of the Comintern and the tactics of the French Communists contributed to the emergence of radical movements. But North Africans were also sensitive to the power of nationalist agitation in the Arab countries, especially in Egypt and, above all, in Morocco where, between 1920 and 1926, Abd el-Krim defeated the Spanish and French during the Rif War. It was in this context that the North African Star (*ENA*) was born on March 20, 1926 under the aegis of the Inter-Colonial Union, an organization dependent on the (French Section of the Communist International).³⁶

But the *ENA* was soon to emancipate itself from the communist tutelage and to define its own line. Under the impetus of Messali Hadj (1898-1974), the *ENA* mobilized the North African workers on the basis of a program of emancipation and unity of the Maghreb. It was also associated with the Negro movements: it was thus noticed by the demonstrations of protest which it organized with the Negro movements against the fascist invasion of Ethiopia, before being dissolved by the French government on January 26, 1937. This list does not exhaust, by far, the list of Pan-African movements.³⁷

At the Brussels session of the Second Pan-African Congress (1921), the Congolese Union was created and led by Paul Panda Farnana (1888-1930). The colonial authorities were quick to impute the troubles which the Belgian Congo was then agitating, strangely accused of being at the same time "garveyist" and "communist". Similarly, the meeting of the Third Pan-African Congress in Lisbon (1923) was made possible by the *Liga Africana*, an elite movement based in the Portuguese capital and comprising several associations representing the five African colonies in Portugal.³⁸

II.4. Impact of the War of Ethiopia

The war of Ethiopia, the herald of the Second World War among the two new sociopolitical ideologies and systems of the Inter-War Period, communism and Fascism, Pan-Africanism first had relations with communism which, after the October Revolution in Russia, had

³⁶ Rodney W., How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972, pp. 62-64

³⁷ Beling, W.A., op., cit., p. 41

³⁸ Crowder, M., op., cit., p. 122

stimulated a large number of African American and African intellectuals like George Padmore and Cyril LR James. Most of them later broke, more or less openly, with communism. As for fascism, it remained totally foreign to pan-Africanism, although in a somewhat provocative statement, Marcus Garvey, exclaimed: "I was the first fascist." In fact, it was with the War of Ethiopia (1935-1936) that panafricanists were confronted with fascism and, beyond that, with international politics. Among the countries considered to be the symbols of African excellence, Ethiopia was certainly the greatest in the eyes of pan-Africanists, because of its long and brilliant history and its victorious resistance against Italian imperialism.³⁹

The attack carried out by fascist Italy was a shock to the Africans on the continent and the Diaspora. Beyond protests in metropolises and the Caribbean, some panafricanists decided to organize themselves and to establish permanent structures. Indeed, taking advantage of the presence in England of a delegation of the Gold Coast coming to protest against the policy of the colonial authorities, a handful of panafricanists created in 1935 a movement, International African Friends of Abyssinia (IAFA) whose principal leaders were Amy Ashwood Garvey, ex-wife of Marcus Garvey, Jomo Kenyatta, Cyril LR James and George Padmore, both from Trinidad. The war in Ethiopia undoubtedly politicized Pan-Africanism in the sense that it once again revealed to the Africans the hypocrisy of the great powers which left Ethiopia, a member of the League of Nations, to be assaulted and then occupied from 1936 to 1941 by another member of the League of Nations.⁴⁰

They resolved to no longer trust the great powers, whatever they might be, and not to be caught unprepared. The emperor Haile Selassie, to whom the pan-Africanists manifested their solidarity on his arrival in England for a long exile, acquired in this ordeal a prestige and a radiance which he later knew to put at the service of the realization of the African Unity. In 1937, IAFA was transformed into the International African Service Bureau, whose conferences debated the demands for democratic rights and self-determination made in the colonies of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean.⁴¹

³⁹ Ismeal, F.Y., The War in Africa: Egypt's Policy under Nasser, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1971, p.63

⁴⁰ Mazrui, A. A., Towards pax Africana: A study of ideology and ambition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, p. 119

⁴¹ Ibid.

The IASB launched its own International African Opinion, published by talented activist T.R. Makonnen from British Guiana. In 1939, the IASB partnered with other organizations to hold a Conference on the African People, Democracy and World Peace (7-9 July), which appears as a direct preparation for the 1945 Manchester Congress: the resolutions went beyond the usual demands of democratic rights to explicitly ask for the right to self-determination. In France, young African students and writers engaged in many innovative, fueled and energized activities, such as the Harlem Renaissance carried by Claude McKay or Langston Hughes, as well as the discovery by the Haitian intellectual elites of their African roots under the impetus of Dr. Jean Price Mars. It is the launch of magazines such as *Revue du Monde Noir* (1931), *Légitime Défense* (1932), whose unique number, of another magazine created in 1926 by surrealist André Breton, was marked by a more revolutionary orientation, *L'Étudiant Martiniquais* (1932) and *L'Étudiant Noir* (1935); invention "of negritude as a concept and as a literary practice during the years 1933-1935, marked by the rise of Fascism and Nazism."⁴²

As early as 1933, Tiemoko Garan Kouyate and George Padmore, were planning a Negro World Congress for 1935. An important Manifesto for the World Negro Congress was drafted. The invasion of Ethiopia by the Mussolini troops at the beginning of October 1935 prevented the realization of the project, but at the same time created a unity of action between the actors of the pan-Africanist movement. In France, it was under the banner of the Union of Negro Workers (UTN) that demonstrations were organized in August 1935, before Panafricanists integrated other civic and humanitarian initiatives against fascism. These were carried out by intellectual writers, among them the ethnologist Marcel Griaule, who accompanied Emperor Haile Selassie and the Ethiopian delegation to the League of Nations, or the surrealists whose negritude poets felt close.

The lack of firmness of the European powers in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict is stigmatized, among others, by Julien Benda and Jean Giraudoux whose famous play "The War of Troy" will not take place, will probably have been influenced by the case of Ethiopia. It is in this climate that the young poet Leopold Sedar Senghor wrote *Black Hosts*, dedicated to the African fighters of the Second World War, and explicitly evokes the Italo-Ethiopian conflict through the famous "Call to the race of Saba" in a section entitled Ethiopic:

⁴² Ibid. p.132

"For the mountain cry of Ras Desta has crossed Africa from beginning to end like a long and sure sword in the debasement of his loins,
It dominated the crackling raging rage of machine guns,
challenged the planes of the merchants.
And here is a long moan more desolate
than a long cry of mother at the funeral of a young man Deaf mines there,
in the extreme south."

The title of this poem echoes an entire "Ethiopian" imaginary transgressing the linguistic barriers.⁴³

Thus, one could read in a poem of support in English, published by Professor Asante, and included in this collection:

Ethiopia, fierce land, black man's pride,
for you, our ancestors fought and died,
Have fought so that this country forever exists;
have died for their children to live free.
The mountains and valleys are yours,
transmitted from the royal line of Saba, queen of ancient times,
as lively as Solomon, history tells us.⁴⁴

If the post-war awakening and the awareness of the civilizing problems of the black world, the rigors of war and German occupation led to slowdown activities in Pan-African activity, a pivotal period in which, as rescinded by CLR James made to WEB Du Bois, the Negro anti-colonialist movement in France was the most advanced in Europe.

II.5. Turning Point of Manchester

Until then, as George Padmore rightly acknowledges, "the idea of pan-Africanism was still, to a large extent, limited to a small circle of colonial intellectuals and politically conscious blacks residing on either side of the Atlantic ". From then on, its social base was to be

⁴³ Angelo Del Boca, *The Ethiopian War: 1935-1941*, Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 21-2

⁴⁴ Irele, Abiola, *Selected Poems of Léopold Sédar Sengho*, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1977, P. 68.

extended to new social groups, young people and workers in particular. In this sense, the Congress in Manchester (October 15 to 19, 1945), the concretization of a project conceived ten years earlier, constitutes an important breakthrough in so far as it was the last Pan-African congress gathered outside of Africa, that it also appeared as the place of passage of witness between two generations of leaders and that, finally, its program took on a frankly political character, clearly posing the question of independence, explicating the issue of unity and embracing the majority of the issues facing independent Africa.⁴⁵

The Second World War, in which African troops and black American soldiers participated actively on all fronts, contributed just as much as the first to accelerate the Pan-African process. The blacks engaged in Asia witnessed the fall of Singapore in 1942, which sounded the death knell of European hegemony on this continent, while at the same time they saw the vigor and efficiency of the Indian nationalist movement as a result of the "Quit India" launched in the same year by Mahatma Gandhi. On the western front, the signing of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 gave additional arguments to pan-Africanists.

As early as 1942, the WASU, meeting in conference, claimed the right of peoples to self-determination enshrined in the Charter to demand the immediate autonomy of the African colonies and their independence within a period of five years. The IASB joined several workers 'and students' associations and self-help groups among the Africans living in Great Britain to give birth, in 1944, to the Pan-African Federation. In the United States, blacks from Africa and the Diaspora were pushing in the same direction through organizations such as the African Student Association (ASA), of which Kwame Nkrumah was one of the leaders, and the Council on African Affairs, of which the singer and actor Paul Robeson received the presidency. On the African continent, things were moving faster.⁴⁶

During the years of war and post-war, all territories experienced great excitement and even revolts, attesting to a deeper and wider awareness. In 1943, a number of journalists led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, a famous newspaper editor and leader of the NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon), published a memorandum, the Charter of the Atlantic and British West Africa, urging the African colonies to ask for the right to choose the form of government

⁴⁵ Padmore G., op., cit., p. 63-9

⁴⁶ Nye, J. S., Pan-Africanism and East African integration, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965, p.65

they want. The Anglo-American occupation of North Africa produced similar reactions, particularly in the three Maghreb territories.⁴⁷

The year 1945 was; therefore, full of events. The first meeting of the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions), in February, which had invited many representatives of African workers, allowed George Padmore to discuss with them the urgency of convening a fifth Pan-African congress and urge them to take part in the second meeting of the WFTU, scheduled to take place in Paris, in which dates could correspond with those of the congress. In April, the Pan-African Federation sent a manifesto to the founding conference of the UN, meeting in San Francisco, demanding, in addition to recognizing the right of Africans to self-determination, a social and economic development plan under the control of the UN with the participation of Africans, and a clear timetable for the process leading to independence.⁴⁸ Following the victory of the Labor Party in the British general elections in July, Panafricanists sent the new Prime Minister Clement Attlee an open letter stating, *inter alia*, that "condemning the imperialism of Germany, Japan and Italy, while tolerating the imperialist England would be more than dishonest; it would be to betray the sacrifice and the sufferings, the labor and the fatigues of the ordinary people of this country. All imperialism is bad."

In the meantime, after ten years in the United States, Nkrumah had joined England and had begun to work actively with George Padmore in preparation for the fifth congress, both of which were to be political secretaries, while the presidency fell to WEB Du Bois. Indeed, since 1944 at least, it was also active in the preparation of a new Pan-African congress. The Congress did not confine itself to general references to Africa. During special sessions it reviewed the situation of the different regions of the continent, from Algiers to Cape Town, as well as the situation in the Caribbean. He also affirmed his solidarity with the peoples of India, Indochina and Indonesia. Of the two major long-range texts from this congress, "The Challenge to the Colonial Powers" was the work of WEB Du Bois, while the other "Declaration to the Colonial Workers, Farmers and Intellectuals" was written By Kwame Nkrumah. This passage of witness between two generations was also illustrated by the remarks that these two personages held on the subject of this congress.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Beling, W.A.op., cit., p. 122

⁴⁹ Padmore G., op., cit., p. 73

W.E. B. Du Bois, whom Nkrumah was to later host in Accra, admitted that his leadership had been "solely a leadership of ideas": "I was never, nor will ever be, personally popular. This is not only due to my particular dispositions, but to the fact that I despise the essential demagogy of personal leadership. "Nkrumah, who had been a frequent visitor to the African people, veterans, dockworkers, workers and unemployed since his arrival in England, saw in this Congress a new beginning of pan-Africanism, plus his own vision: "it threw the gradualist aspirations of our African middle classes and intellectuals and expressed the desire for a solid and realistic independence of our workers, trade unionists, farmers and peasants who were represented decisively in Manchester."⁵⁰

II. Activist Pan-Africanism

In fact, for nearly twenty years after the Manchester Congress, Pan-Africanism was more dynamic than ever, and indeed contributed not only to the emancipation of the African continent, but more to the multiple forms of regrouping that transformed its physiognomy.

Nkrumah was the first to engage in the formation of a large pan-African political grouping. Immediately after the Manchester Congress, he took over the old project of a West African union that had been fed by the NCBWA, which he himself had cherished in his youth before going to the United States. The term "West Africa" refers to British West Africa and the West African colonies of Portugal, but also to West Central Africa, particularly Cameroon and the Congo.⁵¹

In December 1945, he created the WANS (West African National Secretariat) with a handful of friends and organized numerous trips to Great Britain and France: he met in Paris the newly elected African representatives to the French Constituent Assembly, in particular Sourou Migan Apithy, Lamine Gueye, Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Sedar Senghor. WANS organized a "West African Conference" (30 August-1 September 1946) in London with the participation of elected representatives of the AOF and reaffirmed the Pan-African Federation's view that the complete and absolute independence of peoples of West Africa is the only solution to the problem. Nkrumah was impatient to act. To this end, he set up a

⁵⁰ Nkrumah, K., *Africa Must Unite*, London: Heinemann, p. 58

⁵¹ Crowder, M., op., cit., p. 188

clandestine organization, The Circle, surrounded by the rumors of the British special services and certain Africans.

In fact, this pan-African impulse was not going to last.⁵² First, Nkrumah was openly accused of Communism, insofar as WANS declared that it wanted to found a "West African Union of Soviet Union". Then, the return of Nkrumah to the Gold Coast in 1947 slowed down the Pan-African process: faithful to its convictions and to the WANS program, according to which political independence was the prerequisite for any progress in Africa, he fully invested himself in life Political independence in 1957. But when Nkrumah became Head of Government in 1951, he convened a Pan-African Congress in Kumasi (4-6 December 1953), which was not attended by delegates of nationalist Personalities, such as Nnamdi Azikiwe, invited in a personal capacity. Obviously, despite the considerable repercussions of this congress in the public opinion of the Gold Coast, the priority of all was for the individual emancipation of the territories of British West Africa.⁵³

French Africa was experiencing a different evolution. Indeed, the same aspirations gave rise to a pan-African party - the RDA (African Democratic Rally) - which, despite the vagaries, experienced a longer life than the WANS and credited to its successes undisputed successes. The RDA was born in the turbulent context of French politics in the aftermath of the Second World War, marked by the presence of African politicians in the French Parliament. The African educated elite were involved in the political game of "metropolitan" parties.⁵⁴ The initiative of the gathering came from African elected officials and their Caribbean counterparts, older in the French assemblies: in July 1946, an "intergroup of elected representatives from overseas" gathering elected representatives from Africa, the Caribbean and Asia, saw the light of day, under the impulse of Gaston Monnerville, deputy of Guyana.⁵⁵

⁵² Ibid., p. 210

⁵³ Mazrui, A. A., Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and ambition, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, p. 93

⁵⁴ A. Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, pp. 23-24.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.35.

African parliamentarians wanted to go further. A Manifesto of the African Rally, signed by most of them, expressed, in the words of Doudou Guèye, the "historical refusal of submission of the Negro" and firmly condemned the "reaction" of the colonialist circles and their opposition to the reforms which, on the other hand, did not call into question the colonial system. Linked to the left-wing parties and committed to the project of a radical transformation of society and the French State, the Africans themselves, is another difference with their counterparts in the British colonies, in a "freely consented union" with the people of France. Yet, within the tripartite majority in power in France, only the Communists supported the idea of a great pan-African party. The Socialists of the (French Section of the Workers' International) and the Christian Democrats of the (Popular Republican Movement) put in place and multiplied the obstacles to prevent the advent of such a force.⁵⁶

On the advice of their French sponsors, the African socialists, Léopold Sédar Senghor and Lamine Guèye at their head, boycotted the congress of Bamako (October 19 to 21, 1946), which gave rise to the African Democratic Rally (ADR), an attitude which L.S. Senghor later recognized as "an error". Similarly, by all sorts of maneuvers, the elected members of the (French Equatorial Africa) were prevented from participating in the Bamako assizes, but they succeeded in establishing sections in all the territories under French colonization. It was only in the colonies of the Indian Ocean, including Madagascar, where a terrible repression was going to crush the insurrection of 1947. To this limitation was added another, the acceptance of the French Union created such close ties with France that the unity of "Action with the parties of British Africa seemed impossible.

Finally, the rupture with the French Communists, decided by Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1950, provoked, within the RDA, divisions heavy with consequences, especially between the Ivorian and Guinean sections.⁵⁷

While policies were divided, intellectuals were to manifest, especially in the Diaspora, a rare Pan-African fervor. It was in Paris, in 1947, that the first issue of the *Journal Présence Africaine* appeared, which was destined to play an important role, both culturally and

⁵⁶ Ali A. Mazrui, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, Berkeley University of California Press, 1978, p. 27.

⁵⁷ Janet G. Vaillant, Black, French, and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar Senghor, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990, p. 10.

politically, among Francophones as well as Anglophones and Lusophones. Animated by a young Senegalese intellectual, Alioune Diop, founder of the African Society of Culture and incarnation of *Présence Africaine*, the magazine returned to the tradition of Negro creativity since Paris had been the seat between the two World Wars.

The *Journal*, which was initially based on the cultural field, was in fact concerned with the far wider problems of the Negro "identity" linked to the long duration of slavery and colonization and the tensions arising from war relations with communism and the jerks of political emancipation. Far from limiting itself to the Parisian environment, *Présence Africaine* took care to publish texts that came directly from Africa, notably from the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese colonies, as well as from black American authors. From 1950, the magazine became accustomed to publishing special issues, and from the cultural to the political, in particular by giving voice to young students such as Louis S. Béhanzin, Sheikh Anta Diop, Majhemout Diop, Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Abdoulaye Ly, Albert Tevoedjre, Abdoulaye Wade ... This passage from cultural to politics took place between 1955 and 1959 following the positions taken by Alioune Diop, *Cultural Colonialism and Cultural Nationalism*, 1955, the rupture of Aime Cesaire with the French Communist Party (1956), and controversies over the content of the independence of the French colonies and the nature of their future relations with the former colonizing power.⁵⁸

The first Congress of Black Writers and Artists gathered at the Sorbonne by the African Society of Culture (19-22 September 1956) gave priority to cultural and civilizational problems, while condemning racism and colonialism as obstacles to the development of cultures. Never had men of letters and culture come from so many countries and territorial groups: AEF, Angola, French Antilles, AOF, Barbados, Brazil, Cameroon, Belgian Congo, Cuba, United States of America, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, and the Union of South Africa.⁵⁹

⁵⁸Ali A. Mazrui, *Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 27.

⁵⁹ Shivji, Issa G., *Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism: Lessons of Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union*, Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2006, pp. 82-6

The quality and the height of the debates were guaranteed by the names of the sixty guests other than the French intellectuals, among them: Dr. Jean Price-Mars (Haiti), proclaimed president of the Congress, author of the famous *So Spoke the Uncle* 1928, which had brought the Haitian intellectuals back to Africa. Was also present, novelist Richard Wright (United States). The poets Aime Cesaire (Martinique) and Jacques Rabemananjara (Madagascar) also participated.

On the other hand, the second Congress, held in Rome (26 March-1 April 1959), was clearly political. It is true that, from Rene Maran to Amady Aly Dieng, it brought together several generations and several pan-African sensitivities confronted with the same question: the relations between colonization and culture, in other words between politics and culture. The Congress spoke clearly for independence and African unity.⁶⁰

Young intellectuals, on the other hand, had not ceased to position themselves openly on the political front, as they had done before and continued to do so with their counterparts from WASU in Great Britain and the ASA in North America. Given the very small number of Africans coming to study in France before the Second World War, student associations had remained few in number and were mainly concerned with mutual aid. The situation changed profoundly after 1945 when, in parallel with the increase in the number of students, political groups, religious circles, recreational and festive societies and, above all, academic associations (including students from Academy without consideration of their origins) and territorial (grouping, on the scale of France, students originating from the same territory).⁶¹

The presence of African elected representatives in Paris, their political positioning after the rupture with the Communists in 1950, the liberation struggles in the French empire and in the other colonies, all contributed to politicizing and radicalizing the student youth. In the middle of the many political cenacles, an Association of RDA Students was born in 1949, most of whose members, impressed by the rise of FEANF, were going to join the FEANF. Born in December 1950 in Bordeaux, FEANF did not just organize solidarity between African students. In a pan-African and internationalist view, it constantly took a position on the situation and problems of Africa, on the emancipation of the dominated peoples and on

⁶⁰ Nye, Joseph S., Pan-Africanism and East African Integration, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966, p.33.

⁶¹ Ali A. Mazrui, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, op.cit, p. 57.

the great problems of the world, as seen in a volume published by *Présence Africaine Black Students Speak* (1953). Judging by the FEANF magazine, *L'Etudiant d'Afrique Noire*, and by the numerous publications of its executives and activists, it was also an intellectual laboratory in which, as Africans approached independence, young Africans, visibly influenced by Marxism without being guided by any "Big Brother", carried out a fundamental, theoretical and political reflection on the stakes of the moment and on the future of the societies and the African States after the accession to sovereignty. At the same time, FEANF had its counterpart in Portugal, where overseas students, meeting in Lisbon and Coimbra, in the Casa dos Estudantes do Império, published a magazine, *Mensagem*, largely inspired by *Présence Africaine*, in which the future leaders of the liberation struggles of the Portuguese colonies expressed themselves in a nationalist and pan-Africanist approach.⁶²

There was, thus, a convergence between the different social forces to affirm the necessity of unity and independence. For example, in French Africa, the Defferre framework law was passed in 1956, the decrees were finalized for its application and the elections were repeated in 1956-1957 (elections to the French National Assembly, the two federal assemblies AEF and AOF, territorial assemblies and municipal elections) created a climate of political effervescence favorable to regroupings.⁶³

This movement first affected the trade unions, which until then had been divided into three rival confederations reproducing the divisions of French trade unionism between the General Confederation of Labor (close to the Communist Party), the French Confederation of Christian Workers.

The rupture with the metropolitan unions took place under the impulse of Ahmed Sékou Touré, who, with a determination that had an enormous impact in French Africa, founded in April 1956 the General Confederation of Workers of Africa (CGTA) The CGT and without any international affiliation. In January 1957, the delegates of the trade unions of all French Africa met in Cotonou to give birth to the General Union of Workers of Black Africa (GUBA) whose explicit aim was, by rejecting imported concepts, "Organize all African workers in unity and coordinate the action of all African trade union organizations in the

⁶² A. Adu Boahen, *African Perspectives on Colonialism*, p. 121.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

struggle against the colonial regime and all forms of oppression and exploitation of man by man, in defense of their economic and social demands, the legitimate affirmation of the human dignity of the African worker and the complete emancipation of the indigenous peoples".⁶⁴

The reclassification of political forces was to follow the trade union movement. Indeed, in opposition to the timid reformism of the framework of law and with the attitude, considered too moderate of the elected African to the French assemblies and Africans members of the French government, a group of intellectuals took the initiative on September 15, 1957. It gathered people from different backgrounds and united in their resolve to create a new party of a new type, a scientific party, an African Independence Party AIP. Far from confining itself to Senegal, the PAI claimed to extend progressively to all the territories. Wanting to stick as closely as possible to the African masses and to put an end to the secular African exploitation by imperialism, the AIP had the singularity to count among its twenty-two signatories of its first Manifesto published in October 1957 in the first issue of the newspaper *La Lutte*, not only intellectuals such as Majhemout Diop, but also people from those social forces hitherto scarcely represented in the leadership of political parties: a woman, Madame Basse, pharmacist in Thies, three students, and half a dozen workers. It was precisely these forces which, in Gold Coast, had enabled Kwame Nkrumah to prevail over British colonization.⁶⁵

III.1. Turning Point of Accra

The independence of Ghana and its consequences well ahead of all the agendas of the colonial administrations, the independence of Ghana under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah reactivated the process of African unification. It is true that the political situation in Africa had changed as well, following the overthrow in 1952 of King Farouk of Egypt by the Free Officers and the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956. The feeling of solidarity with sub-Saharan Africa was everywhere visible. At the same time, the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung (1955), followed by that in Cairo (1957), put transcontinental solidarity between the

⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 71.

⁶⁵ Furedi, F., The New Ideology of Imperialism, London: Pluto, 1994, p. 55.

emerging states of Africa and Asia on the agenda and developed an economic, social and cultural program for development, capable of establishing a solid basis for independence.⁶⁶

Thus, Jamal Abdunasser, explaining his theory of the three circles, the Arab circle, the African circle and the circle of brothers in Islam, in the philosophy of the 1953 Revolution.⁶⁷

Can we ignore the presence of an African continent where destiny has placed us? Can we ignore it when this same destiny has meant that the future of Africa is at stake in a gigantic struggle of which we are suffering, willy-nilly, the repercussions? In no case can we, even if we feel the need, keep ourselves away from the terrible battle that is raging now in the heart of the African continent and which opposes five million whites to two hundred Million Africans. We cannot stand aside for a fundamental and obvious reason: we are ourselves in Africa. It is certain that Africans will continue to turn their gaze towards us, who are the sentinels, placed at the northern gate of the continent, to us who constitute a link between the continent and the outside world. We certainly cannot, under any pretext, fail in our task. ⁶⁸

In proclaiming the independence of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah reminded the large public who came to cheer him that "Ghana's independence was meaningless if it was not linked to the total liberation of Africa." Things then went very quickly. As early as April 1958, the Conference of African Independent States convened the delegates of the eight sovereign states, divided equally between Mediterranean Africa (Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) and sub-Saharan Africa (Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia and Sudan). After having declared in his inaugural speech that this conference marked the African personality, he obtained from his peers a final declaration which moderate tone was not lacking in firmness and did not derogate from the Pan-African principles of independence and unity.⁶⁹

The independence of Guinea proclaimed after the victory of the "no" in the referendum of September 28, 1958, gave Nkrumah and Sekou Toure the opportunity to illustrate concretely their Pan-African commitment. Thus, the Ghana-Guinea Union was born, accompanied with a generous loan from Ghana to the young Guinean State, to which Mali

⁶⁶ Nkrumah, K., Africa Must Unite, London: Panaf books, 1963, p.58.

⁶⁷ Habibi, Mariam . History of Europe and the Middle East . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 314-317.

⁶⁸ Ali A. Mazrui, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, op.cit, p. .122.

⁶⁹ Nkrumah, K., Africa Must Unite, op. cit., p. 81.

was to join. In December 1958, Accra hosted a new pan-African conference, that of the African Peoples (5-13 December), which saw the leaders of the main nationalist parties and movements flock. On the strength of the resolutions of this meeting, many, like Patrice Lumumba, of which the Congolese National Movement had been created shortly before, returned from Accra completely transformed, reinforced in an uncompromising anti-colonialism. The acceleration of decolonization, between 1958 and 1960, undoubtedly owed much to the Pan-African Conference of Peoples and its repercussions.⁷⁰

In parallel with the actions taken by Ghana, initiatives favoring integration were multiplying on the African continent during the year 1958, which was definitely very fruitful. In April, the Tangiers Conference, bringing together Morocco, Tunisia and the Algerian FLN, proclaimed the unanimous will of the peoples of the Arab Maghreb to unite their destiny, convinced that the moment had come to realize this desire for union in order to enable them to play their part in the concert of nations. The approach of the referendum organized by General de Gaulle and proposing the Franco-African community aroused great excitement among the African political movements.

Indeed, from 25 to 28 July, Cotonou welcomed five hundred delegates from all the territories of French-speaking Africa to reinforce the pan-African and federalist position of the African Reunification Party, whose leader, Léopold Sédar Senghor, explained what he meant by Black Africa: When we say "Black Africa", we do not forget the West Indies, the islands of the Pacific, still less Madagascar, all territories to which we are linked by our situation as colonized, if not by the ties of blood". The delegates, including George Padmore for Ghana and delegates from Sierra Leone also applauded the themes of immediate independence, United States of Africa and a United Africa from Cairo to Johannesburg.⁷¹

In August, leaders of the AMNL (African Movement for National Liberation), most of them teachers, researchers and members of the liberal professions, called from Dakar to vote "no" to the "community" in the name of continental unity and of African socialism. Shortly thereafter, led by Julius Nyerere (Tanganyika) and Tom Mboya (Kenya), delegates from the East African nationalist movements (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar) and Southern

⁷⁰Nkrumah, K., Revolutionary Path. New York: International Publishers, 1973, p. 21.

⁷¹ Nkrumah, K., Africa Must Unite, op. cit., p. 91-5.

Africa (Mozambique, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Africa, the Belgian Congo and Ruanda) met in Mwanza (Tanganyika) to give birth to the PAFMECA (Pan-African Movement for East and Central Africa), which, in favor of unity, decided only to establish simple relations of consultation between these movements. At the same time, Barthelemy Buganda, founder and leader of the Black African Social Emancipation Movement, began to disseminate its plan for the formation of the United States of Latin Africa (AEF, Cameroon, the Belgian Congo, Ruanda-Burundi and Angola), whose premature death in 1959 was a long-lasting compromise.⁷²

The political climate of the late 1950s and early 1960s was therefore, leading to the realization of pan-African aspirations, but the obstacles proved to be no less formidable. They stemmed from discrepancies between African leaders, the maneuvers of the great powers, the effects of the Cold War, the collapse of the former Belgian Congo that divided Africa between the supporters and opponents of Patrice Lumumba.⁷³ The Algerian War and the question of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) split Africa into two opposing groups, namely the Monrovia group and the Casablanca group: antagonisms between progressives and Moderate, between adherents of the break with the Western world to build socialism and supporters of maintaining relations with capitalist states, aggravated by disagreements over the war in Algeria.⁷⁴

There was hostility between leaders, parties and personalities on the rhythm and content of unification immediate or progressive unity from regional groupings, unity from above, from states, or from below, or from people. Identified with the most radical current of Pan-Africanism, Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana seemed to be one step ahead of other states. The meeting in Accra of the First Congress of Africanists (11-18 December 1962), convened by Nkrumah, laid the foundations for its intellectual and political approach to pan - Africanism: for the first time, scientists from all over the world, Africa, found themselves in an African country to recognize the correctness of the African theses on the past of Africa and the conditions of its renaissance.⁷⁵

⁷²Ali A. Mazrui, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 127.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 141.

⁷⁴ Lacouture, J., Algérie, la guerre est finie, Brussels: Complexe, 1985, p. 12.

⁷⁵ Chenoweth, E., Give Peaceful Resistance a Chance. *The New York Times*, 10 March 2011.

Conclusion

It is in this context of divisions that more than six decades after the Conference of London, and in the ancient land of Ethiopia, the Conference of Heads of States and Governments of Africa in Addis Ababa (23-25 May 1963) was held. It was, above all, a moment and a place of compromise.

If the speeches of Kwame Nkrumah were most spontaneously and warmly applauded, that of Leopold Sedar Senghor answered the wishes of most of the leaders. The Charter adopted under the pressure of the majority of the leaders; consequently, devoted the point of view of the moderates. Having dismissed the prospect of immediate or near unification, the OAU, which was born in Addis Ababa, was to devote most of its energy to the political emancipation of the whole continent. On the other hand, the colonial frontiers which had been so sharply criticized for their artificiality, particularly at the Manchester Congress, were guaranteed by the Second OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964.

The following year, in Accra, the OAU also adopted a "Declaration on Subversion" which prohibited any intervention by one African State in the affairs of another. Disagreements soon came to light, the most serious of which was the reaction to the unilateral declaration of independence of the white settlers of Rhodesia (1965) and, from 1971 onwards, the question of dialogue with the apartheid regime in South Africa.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Lederach, J., The Little Book of Conflict Transformation Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2003, pp. 25-31

CHAPTER TWO

Transformation of the Organization of African Unity to the African Union 1963-2004

The Organization of African Unity was founded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 25, 1963 by 31 African leaders. Its principal objectives were driven by identity issues and interests, i.e. liberation and integration. On the other hand, we find that it was interested, mainly in the liberation of Africa, especially southern Africa. Thus, in terms of identity, its creation was a major achievement. Kwame Nkrumah was one of the prominent advocates of African unity on this basis that is, with a view to promoting Pan-Africanism and the African personality, was. He announced to the All-African People's Conference in Accra in 1958. That Pan-Africanism could be considered to have four main stages: national independence, national consolidation, transnational unity, and economic and social reconstruction. However, due to the emerging ideological and power struggles between newly independent African states in the early 1960s, the OAU did not embrace much of what Nkrumah advocated.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: Addressing the challenges of peace, security, and governance, Routledge, New York, NY 2007, P. 12.

Consequently, at its establishment, the OAU faced two main issues: power struggles and the fear of political uncertainty. The former that was transformed into competing sub-regional blocs had existed between Nigeria and Ghana, and involved other different countries afterwards. On the other hand, the issue of fear was transformed into a need for protection.

The OAU insisted on securing two main issues, at least: state boundaries established by colonial powers; the sovereignty of each state, which meant non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Consequently, it protected the African leaders when they violated the rights of their people, and those who felt threatened by the different legitimate opposition. Thus, the OAU often preserved dictatorial regimes. There was one exception which was in states controlled by the white minority regimes in southern Africa, Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique.

Apartheid in South Africa still lagged behind most of the OAU liberalization strategy activities. In other words, apartheid South Africa was considered as an unwelcomed guest helping to initiate and shape the debates within the OAU.

Governance in Africa was considered an internal problem and external interference was unacceptable. Without modern communication technologies, including faxes and the Internet, violations of rights and repression may go unnoticed by third parties. In addition, the interests of political leaders, the ruling party and the state have combined. Parliaments only served as rubber stamps in the politics of authoritarian leaders. It was assumed that sovereignty was close to the ruler, not the people. In these circumstances, governments systematically violated human rights, political leaders ignored the rule of law and the entire OAU defended them.

At the same time, the Organization of African Unity used the dynamic tension between governance, security and globalization. The term "globalization" was not known until the 1980s. Although Nkrumah was pioneer in discussing the issues of freedom and peace in the international framework, the majority of African leaders did not accept Nkrumah's international plans because they believed it was ambitious to lead the entire continent. Nkrumah insisted that he was ready to serve in the political union of free African states under

any African leader who could follow the appropriate leadership, but his counterparts did not believe it was true. Nkrumah insisted that he was prepared to serve in a political union of free African states under any African leader who was able to follow proper guidance, but his peers did not believe he was genuine.⁷⁸

Regarding security, although it is a serious problem for the founders of the OAU, they considered it primarily to protect the interests of the State, in particular the territorial integrity, the sovereignty of the State and the protection of the state borders. For this reason, they rejected Nkrumah's claim that "No security for African states unless African leaders realized beyond all doubt that salvation for Africa [lay] in unity."⁷⁹ In addition, the OAU, like the rest of the world, did not link between insecurity and bad governance until the nineties. In some cases, the security that the African leaders themselves sought only contributed to the insecurity of their people.

I. Colonial Policies and their Impact

This section focuses on the role played by colonial politics in the creation of African unity rather than colonialism as such. We can identify three main processes or processes through which colonialism has helped the pan-African cause: the collective humiliation of Africans, the establishment of modern political societies and the universalization of European values.

I.1. Humiliating Africans

The humiliation of the African peoples by the colonial powers and their attempts to undermine the African culture led to give them an identity. This identity demanded unity if they wanted to get rid of foreign government and foreign occupation. Therefore, the interests in the liberation of the continent and integration were closely linked to identity. Africans were insulted in different ways. In some parts of Africa, the land was taken from Africans for adoption by white settlers, which was an insult. Some Africans have abandoned the ancestral

⁷⁸ Kwame Nkrumah. *Axioms*, Panaf Books, London, 1970, p. 19

⁷⁹ Ibid p.9

tombs to make way for the white settlers and their projects. This type of colonialism and abstraction was felt in settlements such as Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Concerning the introduction of European educational systems, it was felt that they brought benefits to Africans. Though, education was part of the effort to introduce and implement European cultures into Africa, it was accompanied by attempts to discourage certain African cultural practices. This resulted in that the Africans were alienated from some of their roots. Through colonial education Africans were used to deny Africans a history. For example, Professor of History at Oxford, Hugh Trevor Roper, who had credibility in the British colonial office, claimed in the early 1960s that there was no such a thing as African history except "the unedifying gyrations of barbarous tribes."⁸⁰ He argued: "There is only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness and darkness is not a subject of history."⁸¹

These efforts to deny Africans a history was spread across ethnic boundaries and made Africans aware of their identity and that they were victims because of their color. In the end, colonialism contributed to the construction of the consciousness of Africanism. The subsequent search for identity and the adoption of concepts like the African personality, negritude, and African renaissance emerged from this sense of cultural neglect and humiliation. These concepts were designed to help people to restore dignity and provided the intellectual solid ground of Pan-Africanism.

In his speech at Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 1893, Edward Blyden made the earliest recorded efforts search for an African identity: "Honor and love your race. Be yourselves ... If you are not yourself, if you surrender your personality, you have nothing to give the world. You have no pleasure, no use, nothing which can attract and charm men, for by the suppression of your individuality; you lose your distinctive character."⁸²

To revive traditional African values, the African leaders used the African personality, negritude and African renaissance. They believed that they were based on the consciousness of possessing a commonly shared historical experience.

⁸⁰ Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Rise of Christian Europe, 1963

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Cited in Ezekiel Mphahlele, The African Image, Praeger, New York, 1968, p.68

However, researchers have explained the cultural influence of colonial powers from different angles. For example, Ali Mazrui's concept of Africa's triple heritage focuses on the humiliating aspects of colonialism in addition to other dimensions, namely Islam and European values. Mazrui claims that the modern Africa is a product of three cultures: indigenous African, Islamic, and Western.⁸³ Through the concept of the triple heritage, Mazrui sought to express three types of relationships. These were the relationships between: Islamic values and African civilization; and Islamic values, and Western civilizations then, African civilizations and Western cultures. He stated that these three relationships were keys to understanding much of the African history. By exploring Africa's triple heritage, Mazrui aimed at broadening the understanding of Africa's history, and colonial past, mainly.

I.2. Establishing Modern Political Communities

Colonialism, also, laid the foundation to form modern nation-states out of various African ethnic groups. A former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, claimed that colonialism constructed out of African self-conscious group, African states. Mazrui cites Nyerere, who argued that colonialism brought the sentiment of Africa. He stated: "One needs not go into the history of colonization of Africa, but that colonization had one significant result. A sentiment was created on the African continent, a sentiment of oneness."⁸⁴

Due to colonialism, the Ewe, Yoruba, Kikuyu, and Chigger, among others, could not maintain their ethnic identities, and become Ghanaians, Nigerians, Kenyans or Tanzanians, respectively. Adu Boahen has also stated that the newly constituted modern nation-states to replace "The existing innumerable lineage and clan groups. City-states, kingdoms and empires without any fixed boundaries were one positive development."⁸⁵ As a result, state-based nationalism, which is based on identity, was also constructed by colonialism.

Not only did colonialism constitute the modern African state out of disparate ethnic groups, but it also modified the structures of some traditional societies; thus, some ethnic

⁸³ Ali A. Mazrui, The Africans: A Triple Heritage, London: BBC Publications, 1986, pp. 23-38

⁸⁴ Ali A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Abition, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, p. 46.

⁸⁵ Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1987, p. 95.

groups that enjoyed higher status were lowered while those who had with lower status were elevated to the top.⁸⁶ In some cases, ethnic groups were divided between several states. For example,

Somalis were split into four countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. The Si-Sotho speakers are found in Lesotho and South Africa, just as the Setswana speakers are found in Botswana and South Africa. In one case, colonialism created a smaller state within a bigger one: Lesotho, an independent state, is completely surrounded by South Africa. One of the fears that helped to shape the OAU was based on these artificial boundaries.⁸⁷

I.3. Introducing European Values to Africa

Among the achievements of colonialism was the spread of European values to become universal. The colonial powers did this by different means: transplanting many European ideas, and concepts, such as territorial integrity and state sovereignty in Africa and other parts of the non-European world. "By claiming that colonialism transplanted this form of sovereignty into Africa, we do not mean that Africa had no sense of sovereignty before colonialism."⁸⁸ In this respect, the type of sovereignty that went hand in hand with the transfer of African colonies into independent states was a different conception of sovereignty that was shaped by the values and conditions of Europe.

While the African states struggled for independence on the basis of the self-determination of people, the African leaders has not given much importance or focus on citizenship. It was this negative view toward democracy and human rights that shaped the African leaders' understanding of sovereignty. Furthermore, the OAU was determined to preserve and maintain this type of sovereignty.

Different interpretations of sovereignty can be distinguished: juridical, empirical, and popular. The first is based on the idea that the international law has authority over the state.

⁸⁶ Gedeon Cyrus Mutiso, Kenya: Politics, Policy and Society, Nairobi: East African Literature, 1975, pp. 33-45

⁸⁷ Samuel M. Makinda, The United Nations and Svereignty: Mechanism for Managing International Security, *Australian Journal of Political Sciences*, 33, n° 1, 1998, pp. 199-226.

⁸⁸ Jeffrey Herbst, Responding to State Failure, International Security, 21, n° 3, 1996/97, pp. 120-144.

Since the African states are members of the United Nations and other international organizations, they are subjected to international law. It is the international society that gives juridical sovereignty to states. Samuel Makinda stated that:

State's juridical sovereignty can be taken away in case the international society decides that a particular state should not remain sovereign. For example, when hegemonic powers decided, Taiwan lost its juridical sovereignty in 1971, because it was not in the interest of global security to have Taiwan as a member of the UN. It is ironical that Somalia that is unable to govern itself still occupies a seat in the UN and maintains the juridical sovereignty. On the other hand, Taiwan is not a member of the UN.⁸⁹

The empirical sovereignty is the second type. It is based on the notion that states have the right to exercise control over the people and resources, within the borders of the state. Due to the country's capacity to manage its affairs, empirical sovereignty is demonstrated. For example, Somalia lost its empirical sovereignty in the early 1990s, when no government could establish order. "Whenever states talk of their state sovereignty, they refer to juridical or empirical sovereignty, or both. Robert Jackson has referred to state sovereignty in Africa as negative or quasi sovereignty because many African countries lack the empirical dimension to sovereignty."⁹⁰

Popular sovereignty which is the third type of sovereignty is based on the understanding that "All people are equal and entitled to fundamental freedoms, and that government's exercise control over them only with their consent."⁹¹

Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General told the General Assembly in September 1999 that by popular sovereignty he meant the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties.⁹²

⁸⁹ Samuel Makinda, *Changing Concepts of State Sovereignty*, World politics Review, Feb. 16, 2009

⁹⁰ Robert H. Jackson, *Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa*, *Review of International Studies*, 12, n°4, 1986, pp. 247-264.

⁹¹ Preston King, *Toleration*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1976, pp. 199-216

⁹² UN pres release, September 20, 1999

Consequently, popular sovereignty can be understood as recognition of human rights. This leads to the fact that human rights and state sovereignty need to be in harmony. Popular sovereignty is exercised by citizens in their relationship with their rulers. Thus, it depends on the role of civil society and the existing government structure in a particular country. Popular sovereignty is determined by citizens' ability to control their governments' activities and reduce governments' power and arbitrariness. Although African countries achieved independence on the basis of self-determination, which is universally regarded as a collective right, many African leaders did not respect this aspect of the equation.

II. From Pan-Africanism to Liberation and Integration

Pan-Africans were clearly formed at the beginning of the 20th century as a movement of people of African descent. In the second half of the 20th century, African governments dominated the movement and excluded people. Thanks to the constitutive Act of the African Union, people began to slowly rehabilitate themselves, and African unity has increasingly become a movement for governments and individuals to shape the future of the continent. But what is Pan-Africanism? Like most social science concepts, Pan-Africanism has no precise definition. Colin Legum calls for "The belief in the uniqueness and spiritual unity of the blacks and the recognition of their right to self-determination in Africa and to be treated with equal dignity throughout the world."⁹³ He explains that Pan-Africanism can be seen at three levels: as part of the reconstruction of identity: the pursuit of human dignity and equality at the global level; and as a movement that will lead to self-government. In this context, the African continent has focused mainly on the issues of interest and identity on which the Organization of African Unity is based on the liberalization and integration.

Liberalization is linked to the standards of self-determination and human dignity. It will also lead to State sovereignty. That is why Nkrumah linked pan-Africanism to identity and freedom through the concept of African personality. He argued: "The spirit of a people can only flourish in freedom. When the liberation and unification of Africa is completed, the African personality will find full expression and be meaningfully projected."⁹⁴ Nkrumah also

⁹³ Kwame Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path, Panaf Books, London, 1973, p.206.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

viewed Pan-Africanism as a road to global power. He claimed that a divided Africa would remain weak, while a united Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world.⁹⁵

But when many African states gained their independence, the African Union split off its roots in the Caribbean and the United States. Ali Mazroui puts several factors that led to this. Firstly, independence changed the African unity from people's movement to the movement of governments. Second, after the independence, government of the African countries dealt with the US government instead of human rights activists and African American politicians in the United States. Thirdly, the African states were concerned about the need to establish an organization across the continent. That is why the overall African integration strategy aimed at achieving unity and continental unity distinguishes African origin from their Caribbean and American roots. Over time, independent African states became more and more African and separated from the African unity of the peoples of African descent all over the world.

According to Nkrumah, identity, which was expressed in various forms, generated the ideas, aspirations, and ambitions that animated Pan-Africanism. Nkrumah used the term African personality to assert the resilience of African traditional values, and to demonstrate to the world that Africa was committed to global peace and freedom. He, for instance, argued: "For too long in our history, Africa has spoken through the voices of others. Now what I have called the African personality in international affairs will have a chance of making its proper impact and will let the world know it through the voices of Africa's own sons."⁹⁶

In attempt to globalize the African liberation strategy, Nkrumah called on all countries around the world to participate in the liberation of southern Africa. He argued that: "As long as there were people in any part of the world who had not been liberated, there could be no genuine freedom and peace in the world. He posited that the "indivisibility of peace [was] staked on the indivisibility of freedom."⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, Panaf Books, London, 1961, xii.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p.125

⁹⁷ Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p.203

The OAU followed the African liberation strategy long after Nkrumah passed. In addition, it has been ensured that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) will focus on South Africa; in particular, South Africa is on its agenda. Due to the policies of apartheid and massive military and economic power has been the question of South Africa on a permanent basis by the OAU in the 1960s, the anti-apartheid policies of the OAU was the glue that kept the organization together.

As shown below, the OAU was the product of concessions between African nationalists who wanted to establish United Nations in Africa and those who did not want to relinquish their newly acquired sovereignty. Nkrumah expressed concern that Africa's ability to self-regulate and pacify itself is threatened by foreign interference. The appeasement was based on the desire to see Africans find African solutions to their problems. The idea of self-appeasement is a way of showing the state is responsible for protecting people and nations in Africa. That was behind the establishment of the OAU.

II.1. OAU and the Policy of Compromises

As mentioned below, the OAU Charter can be seen as a compromise between the African leaders who supported the association and those seeking a flexible partnership. By stopping efforts to create a union, those who sought a flexible partnership won the debate. The debate between the two groups showed that the OAU arose after a power struggle between independent African states rather than African activists. In its 40-year history was driven by the same fears that led to power struggles in the early 1960s, which had a major impact on state borders, territorial integrity and state sovereignty. In many of its existence, the organization acted as a protection club for the same statistical principles.

II.2. OAU Facing Colonial Heritage

At the beginning of the 20th century, most of Africa's borders were established and the forming of future states was announced. These borders, developed after the will of the colonial powers, ignored the ethnic, linguistic, religious and political realities of the African peoples. Negligence and ignorance of geographical position and traditional political divisions

have led to a series of difficulties encountered by abortion commissioners. Sometimes they take natural limits that are not impenetrable, but they can also draw straight lines and label boundaries. Lord Salisbury said: "We began to draw maps of the regions where the white man had never set foot. We have distributed mountains, rivers and lakes, barely embarrassed by this small difficulty, where we never knew exactly where these mountains, rivers, or lakes were."⁹⁸

Since the formation of regional groups that gathered less homogeneous entities, more than 177 peoples or ethnic groups were found in several states. Different boundaries have been identified and even hostile communities, and are often overloaded with more explosive forces, constantly threatened with degradation.

The subsequent movements of colonialism have created new boundaries born of division in accordance with foreign political and economic interests. It represents the maximum line, a new geopolitical reality in Africa, marked a rigid political space, as well as an exclusive brand identity management. It is now connected with an area bordered by recognized borders that have power in Africa.

Thus, colonized peoples lived the reality of dividing lines dividing consanguineous groups, removing them from their territories of rituals, culture, hunting and fishing, the colonized, especially in the French colonies, by using these delimitations to escape repression, to compulsory benefits and to the payment of taxes.⁹⁹

Because of these constraints, they deliberately ignored them in order to take refuge in the English colonies, where the system of exploitation was more flexible, and to join allies or relatives who remained in this respect according to ancient practices. Through these population movements throughout colonial history, borders have remained in many cases, data not really internalized in the face of the weight of ethnic solidarity between the populations.

⁹⁸ Transformation of the Organization of African Unity to the African Union 1963-2004, New Argumentative Essays, www.midwestcri.org

⁹⁹ Western European colonialism and colonization, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Because of the restrictions imposed, they were ignored for the purpose of resorting to colonies, where the asylum system was more flexible, and two strong partners in this regard were a very old practice. Through the population movements through colonial history, the borders were in many cases, were not really absorbed in light of the weight of ethnic solidarity among States.

During independence, new African countries faced conflicts in border disputes. The number of border disputes was impressive, about thirty-two. Aware of their fragility in their countries, limited by artificial borders and the risk of maintaining such a situation, some African leaders have launched the question of the colonial regional process. These lawyers believe in the law that post-colonial Africa will take responsibility for mistakes in the colonial arrangements. On the regional basis of the African countries born of a colonial agreement, it was not necessary to take into account the specific characteristics that strengthen unity. The condemnation of this division, which harmed the stability of African states, has placed it in front of the colonial frontiers in order of priority.

For the territorial bases of the African States, born of the colonial arrangements, did not take into account the specific characteristics that were essential to social cohesion and the strengthening of unity within them. To denounce this division which is detrimental to the sustainable viability of the African States, they have made the dismantling of colonial borders a priority concern. It is in this sense that the African leaders, in favor of questioning the borders, gathered within the Casablanca Group wanted a rethinking of the African borders in 1963. Other leaders, on the other hand, wanted to maintain the route inherited from colonization. For this second group of leaders, called the Monrovia Group, the territorial status quo had as its objective the stability of the colonial frontiers, making it possible to secure the confines of the newly independent African States.¹⁰⁰

This was to consolidate the nations and finally to transform them into nation-states. Therefore, it was prudent and careful to maintain the colonial territorial patrimony to maintain

¹⁰⁰Jean Fig. And Africa Will Shine Forth: A Statesman's Memoir. New York, International Peace Institute, 2012. p. 151.

peace between the states and the possibility of real development. This is essentially the essence of the lawyers' argument for the territorial status quo.

Figure1: Map of African National Independence



Source; Website built by Cheryl J. Mason-Middleton, BFA. 2006.

In the early years of Africa's independence, one of the greatest concerns for the founders was the question of determining the limits inherited from colonialism. The question of travelling emerged. Should the colonial path be challenged and pave the way for insecurity and instability or be accepted to keep a climate of peace in the relationship between states? In this climate of violent debate on border, the Conference of African States of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo chose respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state. To clarify this provision, a special resolution (AHG / RES resolution, known as the inviolability of the African border, July 21, 1964. The chairperson explained "solemnly declares that all Member States undertake to respect the list"

on the time of independence "consists of a ban on Member States to express certain requirements.

The challenge was to prevent conflicts because of crossing the border in Africa. According to the African leaders, this was a general concern. On the one hand, any external aggression from another, and on the other hand, any secessionist movement coming from within which could call into questioning the borders resulting from independence.

II.3. Regional Political Groups

Before the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, the independent African states were divided into three political groups: Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia. The first group consists of 12 French-speaking countries, which met for the first time in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, in October 1960: Benin (for example, Tahoma), Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville Madagascar) The meeting was celebrated by the President of Côte d'Ivoire, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who wanted to mediate in the Francophone countries in the Algerian War without antagonizing France, and under the leadership of Sikou Toure, Guinea condemned the meeting and Togo refused to attend. In Brazzaville in December in 1960. The Brazzaville Group allied with France in the Algerian conflict, against the communist intervention in Africa and wanted to stay with France. The Group also supported the United Nations policy on Congo-Kinshasa (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). This policy gave the impression that the African countries needed a rapprochement through economic cooperation, not political integration.

On the other hand, the Casablanca group met for the first time with eight countries in Casablanca, Morocco, in January 1961: Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali and Morocco. Seven other countries were invited to attend, but refused to attend: Ethiopia, Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia and Sudan. No country from Brazzaville was invited to this meeting. The Group adopted the African Charter of Casablanca, which affirmed its determination to promote the triumph of freedom throughout Africa and to achieve its unity. The Casablanca Group rejected the United Nations policy on the Congo, in particular because of the way in which Prime Minister Patrick Lumumba was treated. The group supported

Algeria's struggle for independence and called for political unity and economic cooperation. The group also supported Morocco, which submitted regional claims in Mauritania.

The Casablanca group proposed a federal government based on the mobilization of resources along socialist lines. Nkrumah insisted that "For economic unity to be effective [it] must be accompanied by political unity. He posited that the two are inseparable, each necessary for the future greatness of [the] continent, and the full development of its resources."¹⁰¹

Nkrumah repeatedly emphasized the socialist approach of Africa's development:

Full economic and social development in Africa can only be accomplished within the optimum zone of development which is the entire African continent, and under the direction of an All- African Union government pursuing policies of scientific socialism. Until then, the forces of reaction would continue to block progress which threatens the basic pillars of their positions of privilege.¹⁰²

He proposed practical ways of how to operate a government in the United States of Africa. He claimed that the sovereignty of some States will not give up in full, but some of its functions, such as foreign policy, fall within the jurisdiction of the continental government. Some African leaders saw this as a threat to the independence of their State and territorial integrity.

The third group, the Monrovia group, was consisted from 20 countries and attended a conference in the Liberian capital Monrovia in May 1961: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia. A member of the Casablanca group, Libya, attended the meeting. Sudan accepted the invitation but changed its position when it learned that Mauritania would participate. The Monrovia and Brazzaville groups had similar views on Mauritania, which they believed had the right to an independent state. They also supported the United Nations policy in the Congo.

¹⁰¹ Nkrumah, Neocolonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, Panaf Books, London, 1965, p. 30.

¹⁰² Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path, p.222.

The Monrovia Group agreed on several principles that were subsequently published as the Lagos Charter for Africa and Malagasy after a meeting in the same countries (including Congo-Kinshasa) in Lagos, Nigeria, in January 1962. It then formed the basis of the OAU. Makinda and Wafulu stated them:

1. Absolute equality and sovereignty of African states.
2. The right of each African state to exist and not to be annexed by another.
3. Voluntary union of one state with another.
4. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of African states.
5. No state to harbor dissidents from another state.

The above principles revolved around one institution: sovereignty. Other significant institutions, such as democracy and the rule of law, did not concern the protagonists.¹⁰³

Though the differences between the three sub regional groups, the OAU has become a reality because it has joined the above mentioned groups on other subjects, as proposed by the OAU Charter and its subsequent activities.

II.4. Organization of African Unity Chart

The OAU Charter was composed of 33 articles that defined its goals, principles and bodies. OAU's main bodies were the Heads of States and Governments, the Council of Ministers, and the General Secretariat; Special Committees: The Specialized Commissions, the Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, and the Liberation Committee.

The objectives set out in Article 2 (1) reflected the states dimensions of the Pan-African aspirations for liberation and integration, including the promotion and solidarity between states, defending state sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, in addition to the promotion of international cooperation in conformity with the UN Charter. However, the OAU Charter also referred to people-centered activities, such as the commitment to coordinate and intensify cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the people of Africa and to promote international cooperation in the Universal Declaration of human rights.

¹⁰³ Samuel Makinda and wafulum op. cit. p. 22

Almost any African leader observed these people-centered activities. In fact, despite the commitment to defend the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, most African states neglected respecting human rights.

The OAU, and in particular its Liberation Committee, pursued its objective of eradicating colonialism. This objective was so decisive for the survival of the OAU that, after the liberation of South Africa (end of apartheid) in 1994, the days of the organization were counted. It was fitting that its successor AU was launched in South Africa. The OAU is governed by seven statistical principles introduced in Article 3 of the Statute:

This included the sovereignty of all member states, non-participation in the international affairs of the member states, respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the indefinite condemnation of political assassination and the subversive activities on the part of the neighboring states, the totalization commitment. Liberation of all African territories and confirmation of the policy of non-alignment.¹⁰⁴

The first four principles correspond to the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and reflect the standards of international law. In total, these seven principles reflected the struggle for power and fear that existed in Africa in the early 1960s. For this reason they acted as insurance or mutual safeguards.

When the OAU summit in Cairo confirmed the principle of inviolability of borders inherited from colonial times, the protection of territorial integrity revised in 1964. At the top of the OAU in Accra in the twentieth century, Nkrumah and his supporters proposed a Pan-African executive, but those who wanted to maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Rejected it.

The fact that the OAU has devoted much of its time to condemning racial discrimination in southern Africa reflects two things: the commitment to end the humiliating the Africans and the hidden fear of South Africa. Much of the OAU's support in the struggle for liberation in South Africa was carried out through the Liberation Committee, which was

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.; p. 23

based in Dar Salam, Tanzania. The work of the Liberal Committee was mainly diplomatic and the UN Security Council approved its objectives when it met for the first time in Addis Ababa in 1972. However, many African countries did not support the Liberation Committee at all. It was closely identified with Tanzania's foreign policy, and other leading countries such as Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. As Gilbert Khadiagala has observed "The frontline states played an important role in forging African and global consensus about the end of minority rule in southern Africa".¹⁰⁵

The OAU is committed to put an end to colonialism. It set out a mechanism for resolving disputes based on negotiation, mediation, reconciliation and arbitration, which was not always efficient. As an example, in 1975, the OAU recognized Angola, but could not solve the problem of the tragedy that happened there afterwards. It is that tragedy that paralyzed the OAU. Finally, in the nineties they were treated under the auspices of the United Nations.

Among the controversial issues that damaged the OAU in the 1980s was the admission of Western Sahara (Democratic Saharan Republic) as a member of the OAU in 1980. Subsequently, the admission of Western Sahara divided the organization between pro-Morocco supporters and Polisario supporters. The summits in 1982 were aborted due to the massive boycott of Moroccan sympathizers and the withdrawal of Morocco from the Organization in 1984. This problem, that explains the fact that Morocco has not joined the AU, remains unresolved until 2017.

II.5. Regional Economic Groups

Some OAU weaknesses have been demonstrated on two levels: the fact that the Charter did not explain the OAU's relationship with sub regional organizations, officially referred to as Regional Economic Communities (REC); and the OAU's failure to meet the economic goals and principles laid down in its charter. On one side, the weakness was apparently due to the

¹⁰⁵ Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Allies in Diversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, Ohio University Press, 1994, p. xi.

supervision of those who formulated the OAU Charter. Otherwise, the weakness was evident due to the inability to fulfill the organization's mandate. These two weaknesses again showed their inability to exploit the complex relationships between globalization, security and ability to govern.

Over 40 years of its activity, the OAU existed together with the REC series, including the East African Community (EAC); The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South African Development Community (SADC), originally known as the South African Development Co-ordination Committee; and the Intergovernmental Office for Development (IGAD), originally known as the intergovernmental desertification and development office. These organizations had their own identity and interests as a result of their sub regions. One of them, EAC, existed before the emergence of OAU, but the others were created in the 70's and 80's. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa also existed before the establishment of the OAU.¹⁰⁶

Though it was in accordance with the protocol that served as a diplomatic tool for the OAU to formalize relations with the REC, the OAU Chart did not indicate its relations with the EC even if; the latter were not branches of the OAU. In addition, the EC could deal directly with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which in theory meant that it could represent the OAU in important hemispheric security initiatives. However, the OAU was formalizing the relationship with seven RECs at the time of withdrawal. (The OAU/AU/REC connections are explained in more details in the following chapter.)

The OAU Chart speaks of the organization's role in economic development. For example, the preamble to the Chart refers to the OAU's responsibility for economic development. Article 2 obliges the Member States to coordinate and harmonize their policies in the field of economic cooperation, including transport and communications. It also requires members to coordinate and harmonize their policies in the field of education and cultural cooperation, as well as in other areas such as health, sanitation and business cooperation. Considering that those who, after rejecting the idea of Nkrumah, influenced the direction of

¹⁰⁶ Samuel Makinda and wafulu. op. cit. p. 25.

the letter believed that African unity could only be achieved through economic cooperation, why does the OAU place only a small emphasis on economic problems?¹⁰⁷

The inability to deal with economic and development problems meant that the OAU was not prepared to follow globalization. This was partly due to the lack of specialized knowledge that the OAU appeared to deal with the impact of the economic decision-making process on the Court of Auditors, which, like the OAU, had its seat in Addis Ababa. Initially, competition between the OAU and the Court of Auditors occurred in the case of major economic initiatives for Africa, but after some time the OAU appeared to be guiding the main OECD route.¹⁰⁸

However, the Organization participated in negotiations on major economic initiatives, including discussions on new international economic governance and the Lomé Convention. Another important economic initiative was taken by the OAU in the late 1970s and early 1980s was the Lagos Action Plan, but did not reach its objectives. In the economic sphere, the OAU would use the dynamic tensions between globalization, security and administration, but this has not happened. Just as the OAU was the work of its day, the successor to the organization, AU, is a product of its time. Without the changes that took place after the cold war, African countries would fail to establish the AU.

III. The African Union Facing the Challenges of the New World Order (2002)

The birth of the AU in July 2002 raised a number of questions. What were the main factors for its creation? Can the UA meet the challenges of globalization, security and management? Is the organization guided by the agenda or program of statistics aimed at satisfying human aspirations and needs? The identification of problems and new interests promoted the founding of the AU. In a sense, the UA is a product of the debates of the OAU, but in another sense, it is a response to globalization and democratization that marked the changes after the Cold War in Africa and around the world. As early as 1961, Kwame Nkrumah convened a similar organization in structure and ambitions for the AU, but most other African leaders

¹⁰⁷ Samuel Makinda and Wafulu. op. cit. p. 26

¹⁰⁸ Oliver R. & Atmore A., Africa since 1800, London, Cambridge University Press, 1972. P.121.

rejected it. However, as one analyst has suggested "The tide that necessitated the construction of the AU was the end of the Cold War, globalization and the need for a fundamental change of the iniquitous international economic system." ¹⁰⁹

Nkrumah said that the weakness of Africa is referred to external manipulation. Without the foreign interventions, it can become one of the greatest forces for the good of the world if it is united. The former president of the Sahrawi Arab Republic Mohammed Abdul-Aziz affirmed that "there is no place for the weak in this new and daring world" as for Nkrumah. In response to the reality of the New World Order, the African leaders sought to recreate their identity and interests by establishing an organization with ambitious goals and structures that would require considerable skills, operational capacity and international goodwill to succeed. When the OAU was founded in 1963, the shadow of apartheid in South Africa was debated among the delegates because the main interest that unites them is liberation. The liberation of South Africa in 1994 eliminated one of the pillars on which the OAU was built.

If the struggle for power between Ghana and Nigeria formed political debates before the establishment of the OAU, there would be rivalries between the regional powers of Africa, especially in Libya. Nigeria and South Africa surrounded the UA uprising. For a detailed discussion of the issues raised at the beginning of this chapter, this analysis is divided into sections. The first refers to the records of the OAU; the second analyzes the political climate after the end of the Cold War, which gave impetus to the change. The third examines the objectives of the AU, while the fourth examines its principles. The fifth section deals with the bodies of the UA, while the last section examines the relationship between UA and REC.¹¹⁰

III.1.Legacies Bequeathed by the OAU to the AU

In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and globalization forced the African countries to recognize structural weaknesses that prevented the OAU from finding solutions to conflicts in the state. It has now become clear that Western countries and the UN Security Council do not address Africa's problems, especially security issues. For these reasons, the 1990 OAU

¹⁰⁹ See Pusch Commey, "African Union_What Next?" *New African*,1, no 410(September2002): 12-17

¹¹⁰ Jean Fig. op. cit.p.160

Summit decided to outline the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes in the world. This statement created a framework where African leaders committed themselves to cooperate on peaceful and prompt resolution of conflicts.¹¹¹

Their involvement resulted in the 1993 Cairo Declaration, which established the OAU Mechanism for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts. Thanks to this new mechanism, the OAU reacted to various conflicts, including Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopian-Eritrean War, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone. OAU's inadequacy and structural inability led to the assumption that Africa needs a new organization that could take risks and responsibilities to promote development, peace and security. In this connection, the extraordinary OAU Summit in Sirte in Libya approved in September 1999 the creation of the AU. A Constitutional Treaty establishing the Union was signed at the OAU summit in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000.¹¹²

The OAU has left many legacies to the UA, some of which are discussed here. Some of the agency's rules and objectives are completely different from the OAU principles, but others have only undergone cosmetic changes. If the liberation of the continent, completed by the transition of South Africa to democracy in 1994, is considered the most important achievement of the OAU, its balance has largely fused because it could not free Africa from poverty disease, mismanagement, and dependence on Western economic assistance.¹¹³

During the OAU period, the African countries could not only deal with dictators, but could also be used as an obsession. The African Union has the inevitable task of enforcing the law and economic policy. The problem with the disputed state is a major problem, but Morocco's position in Western Sahara is an exception. In relation to borders, the institution has the status of the internal affairs of the African Union. Article 4 (h) and 4 (j) allows the AU to intervene in a Member State "in relation to serious circumstances". According to art. 23 of the Constitutive Act, the AU may also impose sanctions on a member of the Union."

¹¹¹ Samuel Makinda and Wafulu. op. cit. p. 29

¹¹² Amani Daima, The Biggest Show in Africa: The Launching of the African Union, Smyrna, Georgia, July 11, 2002.

¹¹³ Ranjeny Munusany and Mondli Makhanya, Gaddafi Parades on Mbeki's Reign, *Sunday Times*, July 14, 2002.

The OAU protected some of the worst dictators in the world, such as Idi Amin in Uganda, who presided over the OAU from 1975 to 1976. He killed thousands of Ugandans. Other dictators served as presidents of the OAU, Mengistu Haile Mariam Ethiopia and Mobutu Sese Seko of the DRC (former Zaire), Moussa Traore Mali, Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria and Djaafar Numeiry of Sudan. The AU also inherited several unresolved internal crises, which tested the credibility of the locals and the state of reconstruction in Somalia, long-term problems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (despite the presidential elections of 2006) and the social crises in Zimbabwe.¹¹⁴

III.2. Political Climate at the Eve of African Union Establishment

Several factors contributed to the creation of the AU at the end of the WWII. At the beginning of the Cold War there were the recognition of the globalization of power, the dominance of the neo-liberal economic ideology,

The growing demand for respect for human rights and the transparency of the civil society organizations, the growing popularity of the liberals. Democratic principles and personal rivalries of some African political leaders. In view of these factors, the EU must be well equipped to apply the complex relations between globalization, security and management to achieve its objectives.¹¹⁵

There was rivalry among the three political personalities: Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, with his rediscovery of Pan-African ideals; Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, partly due to the location of political and economic land in the continent and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, also due to the location of the political and economic situation in his country, the reintegration of the African Renaissance and its economic initiatives through the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The rivalry between Nigeria and South Africa was visible because of the ambition to occupy permanent seats on the Security Council for the planned

¹¹⁴ "Impact on the Promotion of Democracy and Good Political Governance," *African Human Rights Law Journal* 7 (2), 354–388.

¹¹⁵ Olympio Francisco K.N., *Transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU): A New Vision for the 21st Century, or Political Rhetoric?* PhD. Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science. University of Trier, Germany: May 2004. pp. 250-257.

reform of the Security Council, which had greatly contributed to the establishment of the African Union and NEPAD.¹¹⁶

Gaddafi had successfully pursued several pan-Arab projects during the Cold War. He took power in 1969 after of King Idris, who participated in the group of Casablanca. Gaddafi also called for the African Political Union in the early nineties. In his 30-year term, He also aimed at building nuclear weapons. At the end of the Cold War, Gaddafi took place for maneuvers on the nuclear issue, and was considering surrendering. The implementation of the Pan-African project seemed an attractive project to control the regional powers.¹¹⁷ South Africa also tried to obtain the nuclear power in the late 1960s and developed a nuclear weapons program in the late 1980s.

But after the end of the Cold War and the renewed liberation pressures, the White Minority Government discussed whether nuclear weapons would be passed on to the black regime. Therefore, the nuclear weapons program was abolished before the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in July 1991. When Mbeki became president in 1999, South Africa had abandoned its nuclear weapons ambitions.¹¹⁸

Both Gaddafi and Mbeki emphasized the principles of Pan-Africanism and renaissance. However, Mbeki tried to satisfy the concepts of the 1960s critics of Nkrumah, who sought African unity through economic cooperation. NEPAD, with support for a peer review mechanism, has been considered a suitable management tool for indebted countries in Africa. In this context, South Africa's initiatives aim to exploit the dynamic tensions between globalization, security and governance in favor of Africa.¹¹⁹

In this political atmosphere forty-three African leaders met in the extraordinary OAU Summit in Libya in September 1999. They decided to found, in conformity with the OAU Charter and the 1999 Abuja Treaty, a new organization. The process moved quickly, and the Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted during the 2000 Lomé summit. After one year,

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ranjey Munusany and Mondli Makhanya, *Gaddafi Parades on Mbeki's Reign*. P.74.

¹¹⁸ Makinda S. and Wafulu A. Op. cit., p.69.

¹¹⁹ Rianne Teule and Fiona Musana, *The True Cost of Nuclear Power in South Africa*, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2011, pp. 5-10

another extraordinary summit was held at Sirte in March 2001. Forty African political leaders signed the AU birth.

Some analysts described the official launching of the AU in Durban on July 8, 2002, as "An array of personalities representing African ruling elite, from the reprobates to the respected, from heroes to villains, and from the eccentric to the power-drunk demagogues."¹²⁰

There was an obvious rivalry between M'beki and Gaddafi, based on the fact that South Africa is considered a regional superpower, whereas Gaddafi preferred hegemony instead of a union based on economic cooperation.

Thus, within the AU, Gaddafi sought to establish hegemony in Africa, warranted closer examination. Critics expressed Gaddafi's interest in the AU against NEPAD, which is Mbeki's initiative. Some of Gaddafi's critics, favoring South Africa, argued that for the AU to succeed, Gaddafi needed to allow a leader from a country grounded in the principles of democracy [to] pick up the mantle.¹²¹

Africa had to choose between Gaddafi's vision of a "United States of Africa" and combining NEPAD and the "African Renaissance." Analyzing the two leaders' projects, one would deduce:

That Gaddafi's dream was to see a continental government, one African military force, uniform trade and foreign policies, and one leader representing all the African states in dealing with the rest of the world. This was Nkrumah's dream. Whereas, Mbeki's mission was to create a continent ruled by like-minded African democrats who shared his goals of competitive markets, technological advancement, progressed economies, and industrious populations.¹²²

But in profound terms, both Gaddafi and Mbeki took Nkrumah's views. They were interested in making big plans for the development of the continent. Since Mbeki, organized

¹²⁰ See E. Ablorh-Odjidja, *Gaddafi Strutting his Stuff*.

¹²¹ Makinda S. and Wafulu A. *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹²² *Ibid.*

by the AU Summit, he has become President of the Union. This helped to establish a connection between the Renaissance and NEPAD. He intended to go beyond the ideas of the Casablanca, Monrovia and Brazzaville groups since the early sixties. While the independent African states adopted the pan-African economy, South Africa led the most ambitious pan-African ideas.

III.3. Western World Attitude towards the AU Creation

As an external factor, the United States played an indirect role in the creation of the AU. This procedure dates back to November 1993 when the USA helped with the provision of infrastructure to establish an African mechanism to avoid conflicts and find solutions. In addition, Washington shared the principles and standards of the OAU for peacekeeping operations. As a result, the US administration issued the conflict resolution laws in Africa at the end of 1994, "Providing for U.S. financial and technical support of the conflict resolution mechanism and authorized funding to support the OAU efforts at conflict resolution."¹²³ This support was not to last long due to the relationship between OUA and Gaddafi, who was accused of using the policy of terror and military adventures abroad.

When Libya became an enemy to the Western world, Gaddafi moved to South Africa to make alliance with the liberation movement, such as the African National Congress in South Africa. He therefore emphasized his participation in OAU. When Gaddafi began to exert greater influence, the United States responded by reducing its relationship with the organization. When the Western world sanctioned Gaddafi, the OAU was the first regional organization to oppose. In addition, former South African President Nelson Mandela played a diplomatic role in handling the Lockerbie problem. When Gaddafi had decided to pay compensation to victims of the Lockerbie bombing, sanctions were lifted in August 2003 after more than a decade. As a result, the United States and Britain did not prevent the formation of an ambitious AU.¹²⁴

¹²³ Nicolas Cook, The African Union (AU): Key Issues and U.S.-AU Relations, Congressional Research Service, www.crs.gov. 2016. P. 54.

¹²⁴ Ake, Claude Democracy and Development in Africa, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution. 1996, p.28.

The Western European countries that do rarely listen to the protests of human rights organizations in many African countries protesting against human rights violations are even beginning to support local forces that need reform based on democratic and liberal principles in these countries. The potential for successful reforms and transitions in many parts of Africa requires new African leadership to replace the OAU with more democratic and transparent organizations. Secondly, civil society organizations in the new democracies demanded responsibility from the OAU. They have been looking for organizations that respect women's rights, human rights and sustainable development.¹²⁵

III.4. Objectives and Principles of the African Union

Article 3 of the Constitutive Act establishes the objectives that articulate the agenda and emphasize the priorities of the Union. Many of these objectives require a deep use of the complex relationship between globalization, security and governance that will be carried out successfully. Unlike its predecessors, that only sought the unity between the African states, the AU is committed to building a strong and united Africa, as well as to create partnerships between governments and companies to achieve greater unity and solidarity among countries and the African people.

The institution to which this responsibility has been assigned, the Economic and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), which includes the organizations of the African civil society. It is hoped that the African people will take it through the election of the members of the Pan-African Parliament and contribute to the work of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Humanitarian Aid Commission, more influence on continental trends and policies and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). However, it remains to be seen how much power States will transfer to people through these agencies. The priorities for the operation of the structures and agencies of the AU can serve as guidance. For example, the ECOSOCC adopted its Statutes in 2004; it has not yet played an active role in representing the votes of the people in the AU who make the decisions as originally planned.

¹²⁵ Amani Daima. The Biggest Show in Africa: The Launching of the African Union. Smyrna, Georgia: July 11,2002.p.113.

The AU Constitutive Act is committed to defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Member States. The fact that the defense of the sovereignty of a State is of great importance is Article 3 (b), while the promotion of human rights and good governance at the bottom, Article 3 (h), aggravates the statistical ambitions of the UA. The AU also proposes to promote Africa's economic, social and cultural integration in accordance with Article 3 (j). The Constitutional Act also refers to the promotion and protection of the common position of Africa on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples. As a precursor, the AU is committed to promoting international cooperation in the light of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The above objectives do not essentially differ significantly from those of the OAU.¹²⁶

However, the AU also pledges to pursue other issues that would benefit the people, as opposed to the states. For instance, it aims to promote peace, security, and stability on the Continent. If the OAU organs defined peace and security primarily in terms of the protection of state boundaries, the AU approach would not differ much from that.¹²⁷ However, if the former defined peace and security primarily in terms of the protection of the people and the preservation of their values, norms, and institutions, the AU approach would be significantly different. "The way the AU approached the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan between 2003 and early 2007 suggested that state interests took priority over the responsibility to protect suffering humanity."¹²⁸

The AU is also committed to promoting democratic principles and institutions, public participation and good governance. This is a significant deviation from the OAU, which did not seriously take democratic leadership. Since its inception, the AU has assumed an increasingly important role in observation and monitoring of elections. However, there have been criticisms of the results of some election reports from the AU. One of the most unpleasant moments for the Union was in May 2005 when it refused to observe the election in Ethiopia but supported the results of the election, which was considered abuse. As a result of the Declaration of the Vice-President, who confirmed that the election was "free and fair",

¹²⁶ Soderberg Nancy, African Union Moves a Quiet Revolution, Christian Science Monitor, February 7, 2005, p.9

¹²⁷ Ibid, p.15.

¹²⁸ Makinda S. and Wafulu A. Op. cit., p. 36.

unrestrained days have pumped into Addis Ababa and caused many deaths and thousands of arrests.

The goal of promoting democracy and good governance can be of paramount importance when the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) becomes a body with full legislative powers, and lawmakers choose in ordinary adult elections, and when the APRM becomes mandatory, not voluntary. PAP has only advisory and advisory powers and consists of legislators appointed by national parliaments. However, it is expected that the PAP will take over the legal and supervisory powers for 2009. So far, this has not yet been done.¹²⁹

The following objective of the AU is to promote and protect human rights in conformity with the African Charter on Human Rights and Human Rights and other human rights instruments. However, the continuation of human rights abuses in Darfur and Zimbabwe in 2007 raised questions about the AU's ability to pursue this goal in a good manner.

In addition, the AU aims to create the necessary conditions for Africa to play a greater role in the global economy and to promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels. It also aims to promote Africa's development by promoting research in all areas, including science and technology through a department headed by a Commissioner for Human Resources, Science and Technology and through the relevant technical committees concerned. Achieving this goal is crucial for the sustainable development of Africa. In fact, science, technology and innovation are so important that Africa cannot effectively meet many of its goals without them. However, there is little evidence that Africa is investing adequately in research and knowledge creation.¹³⁰

In general, commissioners and agencies responsible for achieving the goals in the African Union can use the comprehensive relationship between globalization, security and governance. Whether it is in the interests of citizens and society as opposed to states depends on their views on security as long as they allow non-state actors to participate in decision-

¹²⁹ Karim El Sayed Abdel Razek, Le Parlement panafricain Evaluation des capacités institutionnelles et régulatrices, Perspectives Africaines, Volume 11 - édition 37.

¹³⁰ AFRICA'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONSOLIDATED PLAN OF ACTION, August 2005

making. It is very important that globalization can be controlled and controlled for the benefit of humanity.

The AU's principles, as laid out in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act, can be broadly categorized into four categories: traditional principles adopted from the OAU, good governance and social justice, peace and security, and socio-economic development.¹³¹

The traditional principles: Adopted by the OAU, such as equality between Member States, and respect for the borders that exist before independence, are based on the old-fashioned principle of sovereignty. The radical deviation, however, is that while the Member States are prohibited from meddling in internal affairs, the AU is entitled in a Member State, on the basis of a decision of the Assembly, to serious circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity to intervene, to stop committing crimes against humanity, but only the assembly can approve such interventions. The Member States also have the right to ask the Union to restore peace and security.¹³²

The failure of restoring peace in Somalia despite the massive UN intervention in 1993-1995 and the genocide estimated by a million people in Rwanda was a traumatic experience for Africa. By adopting Article 4 H and Article 4 J, the AU was the first organization in the world to have such a mandate. Article 4 H was designed to resolve the serious circumstances of collapsed states that did not have structures for the protection of civilians against the devastating nature of this collapse. Although Article 4 J should support weak states that could not protect their citizens against imminent danger. These articles were considered a radical deviation from the OAU's non-intervention principle.

The principles of governance and social justice: In relation to the participation of African people the Union actions represent a significant improvement. These principles also concern the promotion of self-esteem, gender equality and social justice. They should promote respect for democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law, good governance and the sanctity of human life. Union condemns and rejects impunity and political murder, acts of terrorism and subversion, and unconstitutional changes by governments. Through the APRM, founded

¹³¹ AU. Constitutive Act, Article 4.

¹³² Du Plessis, L and M. Hough, Managing African Conflicts: The Challenge of Military Intervention, Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council, 2000, p. 33

by NEPAD, African leaders have volunteered to see their performance in "policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and faster regional integration on the continent." It is based on the principle that the African leaders at the first session of the AU summit are committed to adopting the principles and core values of democracy and political, economic and corporate governance.

The peace and security principles: Relate to the "establishment of a common defense policy, peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states, and the prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among member states."¹³³ With the establishment of the AU as a replacement for the OAU, African leaders realized that the resolution of conflicts in Africa represents a major obstacle to the continent's socio-climatic development and peace, security and stability which are requirements prior to Africa's development and integration agenda. The idea of linking the security agenda with socio-economic development suggests that security was not created primarily by tradition. However, it is not clear if the AU has the means and commitment to implement this comprehensive security approach. As will be seen later in the implementation of the peace and security agenda, the AU has focused its resources and efforts, in particular, on conflict management and not on conflict prevention and post-conflict peace.

The principle of the AU's socio-economic: Development is contained in Article 4, of the Constitutive Act. However, the Constitution takes little account of the socioeconomic problems and claims that balanced economic development is sought by promoting social justice. This principle, however, is more important in the NEPAD initiative, which is expected to be adopted as an AU development plan.¹³⁴

In addition to its complex architectural structure and ambitious objectives, the UA differs from the OAU by assigning a prominent role to civil society organizations and women in their affairs. For example, does the PSC have a provision that recognizes civil society organizations as key elements of the AU's peace and security architecture, encouraging them to participate actively in efforts to promote peace, security and stability in Africa? It also encourages civil society organizations to work with the Commission to make the warning

¹³³ Quoted in Makinda S. and Wafulu, p.62.

¹³⁴ Ibid, p. 693.

system work effectively. Civil society organizations have also been involved in the implementation of the AU's agenda through organizations such as the ECOSOCC and mechanisms such as the APRM. This is important because the role of civil society organizations is included in the Constitutive Act to ensure that the AU differs from the OAU.

III.5. AU Attitude towards Gender Issue

The AU is more serious about gender equality, gender equality and mainstreaming than OAU and most Member States. The Constitutive Act's preamble states that AU creation was governed by the need to strengthen the relationship between governments and all sectors of civil society, especially women, youth and the private sector, solidarity and cohesion among the African peoples. One of their principles (Article 4 [1]) is the promotion of gender equality. Article 3 has also been amended to ensure the effective participation of women in the decision-making process, especially in the political, economic and social spheres. However, the Constitution does not emphasize instruments such as the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in Article 3 (e), and establishes a Special Committee on Gender.

However, gender equality and the importance of women are recognized in order to promote the AU's goals in various articles of association and practice. For example, the Statute of the AU Commission states (Article 18 [a]) that the principle of gender equality is maintained in the recruitment of staff and those women constitute half of the original 10 commissioners (Article 6). 3] and 13). The Statute (Article 12 [2]) defines the Office of the President of the Commission and the gender mainstreaming, as this is a cross-section. PSC Protocol. Article 20 recognizes women's role in promoting peace and security agenda AU and calls on women in NGOs to contribute to the *operation of the PSC*.

However, more efforts need to be made to mainstream gender at all levels of the AU, including the Assembly. As Article 6(1) of the Consecutive Act states that those attending the Assembly sessions ought to be heads of state and government or their accredited representatives, the Assembly can easily facilitate more female participation in this supreme organ. Arrangements can be made for every session to have a certain number of females

participating. By suggesting this, we do not imply that more women in the Assembly would lead to qualitatively different types of decisions.¹³⁵

Gender mainstreaming should not be based on assertions that women qualitatively receive different types of decisions. It's basically about equality and representation. Our concern about the composition of the assembly is that it speaks logic of an organization that claims to be seriously concerned with gender mainstreaming to exclude women from the highest decision-making bodies.

V. Institutions of the African Union

To accomplish important government tasks, the AU works with eighteen institutions, but this section only examines what are being created to demonstrate how the Union deals with the challenge of governance in a globalized world. The seven bodies reviewed are the Assembly, the Executive Council, the PAP, the African Human Rights Court, the ECOSOCC and the Commission. Each institution is discussed in terms of meeting its objectives and complying with the principles set out in the Constitutive Act. An attempt has also been made to see if these institutions have the potential to offer broader leadership on the continent.¹³⁶

V.1. AU Assembly

It is the highest institution of the AU, which includes heads of state and government or their representatives. Some of them were democratically elected, but others are not, but theoretically they still have the same level of authority. In this sense, the AU Assembly is similar to the OAU. The chairman of the Assembly, elected by Heads of State and Government, plays a one-year term, which may be renewed under certain circumstances, as was the case of President Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, who served from July 2004 to January 2006. This institution meets twice in year (in January and July) to make decisions by other agencies. It may, however, be convened during an extraordinary session at the request of a Member State and approved by at least two-thirds of its members. The assembly makes a


¹³⁵ Makinda S. and Wafulu A. op. cit., p.102.

¹³⁶ Olympio Francisco K.N., op.cit., pp. 166-173.

decision by consensus: when this is not possible, it requires two-thirds of Member States. However, only a simple majority is needed for procedural matters.¹³⁷

Under the Constitutive Act, the Assembly has tremendous power. It defines AU rules, accepts new members, adopts the budget, appoints the President of the Commission and his/her deputy and other Commissioners and decides on intervention in other countries. The Assembly may make recommendations to the Executive Board on conflict management, war and other crises and the restoration of peace.¹³⁸

Figure 2: AU Assembly Architecture



Although the Constitutive Act gives great strength to the Assembly, it does not provide the control of this authority, nor does it have any means to examine the suitability of its proceedings. The African Union was founded at a time when the African government demanded the participation of states and non-state actors in Nevetheles, the Constitutive Act did not provide individuals, civil society organizations to directly support the assembly. In fact, the Assembly disagreed with the requirements of democracy, accountability and popular participation in 2007. According to Article 9 (2) of the Constitutive Act, however, "the Assembly may delegate any of its competences and functions to any Union body. Through this delegation, some of the activities of the Assembly were dealt with by the authorities seeking consultations with specialists and civil society organizations."¹³⁹

¹³⁷ NSONGURUA J. UDOMBANA, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE AFRICAN UNION: A Legal Analysis, California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33 [2002], No. 1, Art. 3, Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2002.

¹³⁸ Olympio Francisco K.N., Transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU): A New Vision for the 21st Century, or Political Rhetoric? PhD. Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science, Universität Trier, Germany, May 2004. P.52.

¹³⁹ Olympio Francisco K.N., Op. cit., p.73.

The Assembly's record for African crises and conflicts since its inception in 2002 has been mixed. The first test case was the political crisis in Madagascar during the 2002 summit in which had to choose between Didier Ratsiraka, a head who refused to accept electoral defeat and Marc Ravalomanana, the former mayor of the capital who had claimed the electoral victory, and demanded recognition. The AU did not choose any and left the country of Madagascar empty for a year. Since then, the Assembly has taken into consideration and made many decisions during each meeting on how to address African problems, mainly conflicts. At each meeting, the Assembly receives reports on the implementation of previous Commission decision.¹⁴⁰

Concerning the rules of procedure, the Assembly determines how to make a decision. If issued, as a rule or directive, it will be binding on the Member State and all actions will be taken to ensure its implementation in 30 days. But if the decision is taken as a recommendation, the resolution or opinion will not be binding because the aim is to guide and harmonize the views of member states. One of the gray areas in the Assembly's regional decision-making process is related to making decisions about interference under Article 4 (j) and 4 (h) if the Assembly must decide on interference, it must be carried out in an extraordinary session, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the majority of Member States and 15-day notice. The meeting will only take place if at least 36 member countries respond to requests for extraordinary meetings.

However, it is clear that the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly went to extremes to determine, in accordance with Regulation 37, the process of sanctioning the constitutional changes of the government, but it was not silent how decisions would be taken in response to dangerous circumstances. Despite the failure of Zimbabwe's internal government system, serious security deterioration, economic and social situation, the Assembly has not taken significant action. The Assembly's first president in 2002 was South African President Thabo Mbeki, who was fully aware of the conditions in Zimbabwe, but even under his leadership, the Assembly did little to improve the situation.

It is the Assembly which has to deal with the option of exemption of member states of the Union that violate the principles of the AU. It also develops a reconciliation program for

¹⁴⁰ Harbom Lotta, *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

these countries, which must be carried out within a certain period. In addition to deportation, Member States that do not comply with Union decisions and policies may be subject to other penalties, such as refusal of transportation and communication of relations with other member states, and other measures of decisive political and economic nature. Although sanctions for violations of the aims and principles of AI are clearly established, their implementation will require not only the political will of the leaders, but also the cooperation of all member countries and the good intentions of the African people.¹⁴¹

V.2. Executive Council

It consists of the Minister of Foreign Affairs appointed by the Member States. It is similar to the OAU Council of Ministers. Therefore, the Management Board is filled with members of the Congregation who are appointed and responsible before the Meeting. It meets at least twice a year in regular sessions, but it can happen. Like the Assembly, the Executive Council makes a decision by consensus, if it is not possible, it will require two-thirds of its members. However, in terms of procedures, a simple majority is enough.¹⁴²

The Executive Council has the power to take decisions on issues such as trade, science and technology, transportation and communications, environmental protection, humanitarian activities, education, culture, food, water, energy and mineral resources. It is hoped that some of its powers and functions will be delegated to specialized technical committees. The Executive Council is also responsible for overseeing the implementation of the policies formulated by the Assembly. For example, the Executive Council does not have the power to decide on intervention in Member States, but once the Assembly has taken such a decision, the Executive Council should implement it.¹⁴³

Civil society organizations have the possibility to influence the Executive Council program through specialized technical committees for which the Council delegates part of its responsibilities. In fact, civil society organizations and expert panels played an important role

¹⁴¹ As an example, Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC calls on civil society to play a role in promoting peace and maintaining security in Africa. CSOs are also assigned key roles in NEPAD's ARPM.

¹⁴² Olympio Francisco K.N., Op. cit., p. 101.

¹⁴³ Jakkie Cilliers and Prince Mashele, The Pan-African Parliament: A Plenary of Parliamentarians, *African Security Review*, 13(4), 2004.

in matters of security, science and technology. For example, the African high-level panel on Modern Biotechnology, co-chaired by Professor Calestous Juma (from Kenya) from Harvard University and Dr. Ismail Serajeddin (from Egypt) from the Library of Alexandria prepared the report "Freedom of Innovation": Biotechnology for the development of Africa, which became the main topic of the African Union summit in January 2007.¹⁴⁴

V.3 Pan-Africa Parliament (PAP)

The PAP, one of the main institutions of the AU, was inaugurated on 18 March 2004 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Its purpose is to act as a continental advisory body serving as a common platform for all African peoples and grassroots organizations to engage more in discussions and decisions on the issues and challenges affecting Africa. Based in Midland, South Africa, the PAP is made up of five nominee legislators from each state that has ratified the founding law. At the beginning of 2007, there were 235 parliamentarians from the 47 states that ratified the law. Legislators are expected to work half-time in two 30-day sessions each year.¹⁴⁵

However, the PAP has only a function of advising and advising in relation to the other institutions of the UA. However, it is expected that it will eventually become a body with legislative powers and play a key role in the implementation of the objectives and principles enshrined in the founding law of the AU, the protection of human rights, the strengthening of popularization of democratic institutions and the promotion of good governance, as well as transparency, peace, Security and stability in Africa. With limited powers and without substantial legislative and oversight powers to participate in key decisions at the AU on the organization's budget, the PAP cannot assume the supervisory role in the AU system. Limited powers to investigate discuss and express all aspects, such as human rights, the strengthening of democracy and the promotion of peace, stability, good governance and the rule of law in Africa.

¹⁴⁴ Calestous Juma and Ismail Serageldin, Freedom to Innovate Biotechnology in Africa's Development: Report of the High-Level African Panel on Modern Biotechnology, (nepadst.org), August 2007.

¹⁴⁵ Emeka Amadi, The Pan-African Parliament (PAP): Issues, Challenges and Prospects, International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Research Vol. 2 No.1 2016, www.iiardpub.org

The PAP annual budget is a part of the AU regular budget and is prepared in accordance with the AU financial regulations and is approved by the Assembly while exercising its legislative powers. This means that the PAP can issue opinions and make recommendations for budget proposals submitted to the Assembly and cannot prepare its own independent work plan according to its priorities. Given the role that is expected to promote AI goals, this is a miracle, as it is managed with a budget of \$ 6.4 million in 2007.¹⁴⁶

Because the current AU structure is different from the European Union, PAP shares several features with the European Parliament. The PAP is the same as the deputies, namely five legislators (at least one of them is a woman) who are elected from each member country representing their national parliament. This means that PAP members are elected or appointed by their respective national parliaments or other advisory bodies of member states from their statutory provisions.¹⁴⁷

However, the composition of PPA creates certain difficulties and dilemmas. One of them is the adoption of the representation principle with the same number of legislators from each Member State, regardless of its population. Nigeria complains that despite a population of 120 million people, the same number of legislators in PAP has Sao Tome and Principe, which is home to 100,000 people. It seems to ensure fair and fair representation taking into account the population size of the Member States should be one of the issues that should be addressed.

PAP is also faced with practical challenges to ensure that different political views are represented in the continental legislature. When writing this dissertation, there are no general procedural rules used by the national parliaments upon the appointment of its legislators to the PAP. In fact, in most countries there is no clear adaptation of political power with ideological lines, but with ethnic and religious lines.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ Emeka Amadi, op, cit.

¹⁴⁷ Tsegaye Demeke, op. cit.

¹⁴⁸ Gumisai Mutume, Pan-African Parliament now a reality, From *Africa Renewal*, April 2004.

This protocol is also silent on how the PAP deals with other institutions, especially those responsible for promoting good governance, the rule of law, peace and security. However, the protocol as the establishment of the Council of Peace and Security, the African Court of Human and Community acknowledges the role of the PAP in promoting human rights and peace in Africa, respectively. Since its inception, PAP has been exposed to a number of challenges, which appear to be a general trend with the formation and operation of the AU structure. PAP, like other institutions in the AU, was established despite the continent's weak capacity and significant economic consequences of movements as at both national and continental levels. For example, the protocol determines that members of the PAP grant will be paid to cover the costs of carrying out their duties, but nothing about the sources of funding.

V.4. African Human Rights Court

The idea of an African court of human rights goes back to 1961, when a meeting of African lawyers in Lagos, Nigeria, presented an example of this type. However, it was not until 1981 that the Nairobi Summit adopted the African Charter on Human Rights and Human Rights.¹⁴⁹ It also created the African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights (ACHPR). With limited advisory powers to interpret and promote the letter, to ensure compliance with the objectives and investigate the state reports. The main shortcomings of the Charter and the Commission are that they do not have measures and implementation mechanisms to promote and guarantee that the State respects the decisions of the Commission. The failure of the Commission was demonstrated in January 2006, when the Assembly of the adopted and approved the Charter in accordance with Article 59, the publication of the Report of the 19th African Commission on Human Rights and Human Rights and its annexes.¹⁵⁰

However, the weakness of ACHPR emerged in the 1990s, arousing strong feelings among experts and human rights activists that the protection of human rights in Africa requires stronger mechanisms.

¹⁴⁹ J. C. Church: Human Rights from a Comparative and International Perspective, *H Strydom*. 1st ed, UNISA, 2007.

¹⁵⁰ Mangu, Mbata André, "The Changing Human Rights Landscape in Africa: Organisation of African Unity, African Union New Partnership for Africa's Development and the African Court." *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* (23), 2005, pp. 379–408.

This led to the OAU summit in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, which adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the establishment of the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights in June 1998, the fifteenth ratification of the Comoros on January 25, 2005.¹⁵¹

The Court, located in Arusha, Tanzania, is composed of 11 elected judges who elect the Executive Council and approved by the Assembly in January 2006. The judges serve six years and may have one year extension. The court has both judicial and advisory powers and met for the first time on 2 May 2006. It has competence in the interpretation and implementation of the Charter, the Protocol and other human rights instruments.¹⁵²

V.5. Peace and Security Council

Concerning peace establishment and security building, this is the main body of the AU, which is responsible for the responsibility or promotion of peace, security and stability. With regard to a means of promoting African collective security, the PSC consists of 15 elected members. Five are elected to three-year terms, and ten to two-year terms. Among the criteria for PSC membership is a country's contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa, and respect for constitutional governance and the rule of law amid human rights. The protocol that established the PSC was ratified in December 2003 and the first meeting of the PSC at ministerial-level took place in March 2004.¹⁵³

The tasks of the PSC include the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. Predicting conflicts and attaining preventive diplomacy: building peace through good services, mediation, mediation and research. The PSC can also support peace measures (Peace Support Operations - PSO) and carry out interventions under Article 4, j of the Charter to engage in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian operations and disaster management. It cannot impose sanctions if government unconstitutional changes take place in a Member State, as opposed to the Algiers decision and the Lomé Declaration. The

¹⁵¹ See the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

¹⁵² See PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, January 25, 2005

¹⁵³ See Protocol on the Statute of the African Peace and Security Council, December, 2003.

PSC is also mandated to promote and implement the Common African Defense and Security Policy. The Convention on the Prevention of and Fight against Terrorism and international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament. It may also take appropriate measures to defend the national independence and sovereignty of a Member State prone to assault, such as mercenaries or terrorist organizations.

V.6. Economic, Social and Cultural Council

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council, set up in Addis Ababa on 29 March 2005, aims to give African CSOs a role in decision-making and decision-making at AU level. It consists of 150 members, professional groups, NGOs, social groups, community organizations, workers, religious and cultural groups. It is an AU advisory body. In the opening speech of ECOSOCC, President of AUA Alpha Konare argued that this institution was created as an instrument against dictatorial regimes, hostile foreign interventions, and the negative effects of globalization.¹⁵⁴

ECOSOCC aimed at providing a solid ground for democracy, and the promotion of the rule of law and human rights, and good governance. The inclusion of ECOSOCC in the AU mechanism is of great importance, the former aims to provide a solid foundation for democracy and the promotion of the rule of law and human rights as well as good governance. ECOSOCC's participation in the AU mechanism is of particular importance in terms of giving an African civil society organization a role in the development of the continent and the popularity of participation as outlined in the 1990 Arusha Population Charter. This is a radical change in the vision of the AU when civil society is considered important in the sense that it gave a role to the African CSO in the continent's development, and popular participation stated in the 1990 Arusha Charter on Popular Participation. It represents a radical change of the OAU view when civil society was considered as an enemy.¹⁵⁵


¹⁵⁴ Maindi Grace Wakio, The African Union's Economic, Social and Cultural Council: An evaluation of its mandate of facilitating civil society participation in the African Union, LLM Thesis, Faculty of Law, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, 2006, pp. 14-20.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 26-30

V.7. AU Commission

The AU centralized power and decision in the Commission which is an administrative structure that organizes the summits. It is the permanent secretariat of the union and its leading department. This differs from the the AU secretariat because the President of the Commission supports the alternatives representing eleven sub regions on the continent and eleven commissioners. At the 2007 Summit in Addis Ababa, it was decided to create three new posts for the commissioners.

Figure 3: AU Commission



7. Structure of the African Union Commission

There is a general feeling among the Member States that the Commission wants to run the AU.¹⁵⁶ As the Commission has provided PSC with secretarial support, its members address the invited participants. The Commission set a timetable for the PSC, proposed its agenda, prepared a draft report and prepared a communication, which was usually presented a few

¹⁵⁶ The African Union Commission, Departments and Officials, Centre for Citizens' participation on the African Union, August 2011.p.7.

minutes before the meeting and was to be considered and adopted. The PSC also showed little commitment to technical issues related to the creation and analysis of facts. Ideally, the countries of the PSC must have full-time ambassadors in the Council during their term, not the current arrangements in which ambassadors serve at the same time the AU, the UN, Ethiopia and other countries in the region.

Due to the weaknesses of PSC members, the Commission plays a leading role in the implementation of the AU peace and security program, including the management of the resources allocated to its implementation. There were also cases where the Commission had taken a decision that PSC should have taken. For example, during the 50th session of the PSC, members believed that they were faced with the facts needed to send AU forces to Eastern DRC to disarm the groups operating in the region without penalty.¹⁵⁷ Although the Commission argued that the PSC Member States should have acted quickly in the face of the deteriorating security situation, the Commission considered that such an important operation requiring intense action had a clear mandate and should be carried out after consultation with the governments. On another occasion, the Commission did not ask South Africa to send additional soldiers to support the Comoros elections in April 2006 to the African Union mission.¹⁵⁸

The above indicates serious errors in the organizational structure. Ideally, the Commission should be the administrative arm of the Union, not the decision-making body. It should only implement decisions from other agencies. Serving as the guardian of AU documents and as the creator and interpreter of principles, procedures and rules, he gained unlimited and overwhelming power. Organizations like the PSC are also at the mercy of the Commission because they control the portfolio.

The Commission also has concerns about the preference of one department by donors, while others are virtually unnoticed. For example, the section on political issues, which also deals with issues of political stability, human rights and humanitarian aid, is usually ignored,

¹⁵⁷ Naldi, GJ and Magliveras, K '*The African Union-A new dawn for Africa*', 51 *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 415, 2002.

¹⁵⁸ AFRICAN UNION (AU), 2011, *AU in a Nutshell*, Available at <http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell>. Accessed in 17 Jan 2012.

even when it comes to humanitarian crises such as Darfur. The PSC protocol usually ignores this important section, although its work is important for the PSC function.¹⁵⁹

It is also clear that, in addition to the interests of donors, fighting for power is crucial for the creation of the organs, structures and mechanisms of the AU. Those who control political power and wallets seem to be starting from the beginning to the institutions. For example, firstly identifying the needs and priorities of Africa, the development of strategies to build them up created structures and assigned their tasks later. Although many structures and mechanisms are already set at home, they will not be developed until they are launched due to the launch of the most recent executable structure. This body is trying to go down and define its role in promoting development, stability and peace in Africa. It only shows how effective the human rights court is if it works. ECOSOCC must also be a forum for civil society organizations that has an impact on the African development program, but it must meet expectations.

To sum up, UA is a modern, ambitious like the European Union model that has evolved over the past four decades although the creation of the African Union was in 2002. "new organization, new ideals, new objectives, new leaders, and a new era for Africa, in the final analysis, it is the political will, money and a new mindset that will determine whether the AU succeeds or remains another African experiment."¹⁶⁰

VI. AU Relations with other Organizations and Initiatives

Although the African leaders tried to put their identities and interests in line with the new world order as the Constitutive Act states in (Article 3[e]) "encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations,"¹⁶¹ it is not clearly mentioned how state this collaboration would work. However, Article 17 of the PSC Protocol affirms that:

¹⁵⁹ AFRICAN UNION (AU), 2011, *AU in a Nutshell*, op, cit.

¹⁶⁰ Kwame Nkrumah Speech, 'We must unite now or perish', *NEW AFRICAN MAGAZINE*, May, 2013.

¹⁶¹ AU Constitutive Act, Article 3[e]

In fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore, it states that the PSC shall also cooperate and work closely with *other relevant international organizations on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa.*¹⁶²

The Constitutive Act also recognizes the importance of the RECs to achieve the objectives and tasks of the African Union (Article 3 (1)) to coordinate policies between the existing RECs and the future. Coordination and harmonization were the main topics of discussions among Africans.

VI.1. Towards Effective Regionalism

The efforts of Africa to reconcile and organize the African RECs began in 1976, when the OAU Council of Ministers called for the establishment of regional foundations of five regions: North, South, East, Central and West.¹⁶³ The Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 and the 1999 Abuja Agreement (Article 6.2 (a)) require the strengthening of existing regional economic communities as a basis for the African integration. In 1987, the OAU Council invited the Secretary-General of the OAU, the Executive Directors of the ECA, and the African Development Bank to work with ECOWAS and the other regional organizations to harmonize their strategies to achieve unity.

This, however, did not stop the creation of uncontrolled renewable energy sources has led to serious inefficiencies, duplications, accidental coincidences and even increased efforts and scarce resources that need to be created.

VI.2. Multiplicity of African RECs


The spread of RECs must be understood by the fact that African leaders saw the decade following the end of the cold war as a definite period for peace, security and development.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ See Appendix I, the OAU Charter.

First, the nature of the conflict has changed and has become regionalized. This has not only led to a reconceptualization of peace and security at the sub regional level, but also to advanced sub regional powers, particularly in South and West Africa, and prompted RECs to establish mechanisms to promote peace, security and stability.¹⁶⁴ Secondly, during this time, the RECs realized that insecurity undermined development and regional integration initiatives. In other words, they found a strong correlation between security and development.¹⁶⁵

Figure 4: Spread of Regional Economic Communities



Source: International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences. Vol. 3, No. 5, 2015, pp. 417-425.

¹⁶⁴ Muhabie Mekonnen Mengistu. Multiplicity of African Regional Economic Communities and Overlapping Memberships: A Challenge for African Integration. *International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences*. Vol. 3, No. 5, 2015, pp. 417-425. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20150305.12

¹⁶⁵ See Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities.

VI.3. Consolidating Relations with RECs

The process of deepening OAU/AU relations with RECs has been strongly followed since the 1990s, especially since African leaders have come to the conclusion that problems of continual conflict, underdevelopment, poverty and globalization can be better addressed with integration. As a result, the formation of ERCS was motivated by the belief that peace, security and stability were necessary conditions for implementing the agenda of development and integration. NEPAD architects also concluded that security, democracy and good governance, human rights and economic management are the prerequisites for sustainable development. Therefore, the task in question was to establish a close working relationship between the AU and RECs to promote peace, security, stability and development. The PSC protocol recognizes the importance of regional mechanisms as the core components of its architecture for peace and security as well as it has been prepared to develop labor relations and determine responsibilities between AU and RECs.

As part of ongoing efforts to deepen the relationship between OAU / AU and RECs, the OAU Summit in Lusaka in July 2001 adopted a resolution that reaffirms the status of RECs as building blocks of AU. The African leaders also stressed the need for close involvement of RECs in the formulation and implementation of all AU programs. The conference also urged the Secretary-General of the African Union to take steps to examine the implications of the relationship between AU and RECs to change the existing protocol between the African Economic Community (AEC) and RECs.¹⁶⁶

These decisions reflect the fact that several regional economic groups have developed their mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and the experience gained in the African Union in the application of the architecture of continental peace and security. For security in particular, the Economic Community of West African States has had experience in supporting peace in operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone and was developed to prevent, manage and resolve peace and security and rescue conflicts, such

¹⁶⁶ See Ofeiba Quist-Arcton, "AU Interim Boss Essay Struggle to Shed OAU Legacy," *allAfrica.com*, July 23, 2002.

as defense mechanisms. Security Council, Mediation and Mediation, Council of Elders and Peace and Security Council. Early Warning and Alert System and ECOWAS Fire Watch Group.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has carried out, in Article 7 of the Charter, promoting the priorities of peace and stability. To achieve this goal, it established a mechanism to resolve disputes with institutions, the Council of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers. IGAD also put an early warning and conflict mechanism in 2002.¹⁶⁷

While the countries of Southern Africa have been working together in defense and security since 1970, when the leading countries to support the fight against liberalization, it was not until 1998 that politics, defense and security agencies were created in the SADC as a mechanism for prevention, management and conflict resolution.¹⁶⁸

It was not surprising, when the AU was launched, its founders were well aware that RECs already had a comparative advantage in adopting certain peace initiatives. In this sense, they emphasized the relationship between AU and RECs in the protocol that established the PSC. However, concerns remain that cooperation between the AU and the PSC on peace and security issues has not been organized or coordinated. This underlines the need for clarity, coherence and structure of the AU and encourages cooperation on peace and security matters.

Since 2005, interest in streamlining the current REF has increased. For example, in October 2005, an advisory meeting was held for the central areas to the north and west of Accra, Ghana, a similar meeting for the East and South region took place in Lusaka in Zambia in March 2006, I chose this question, the PAP in May 2006 and the AU summit in Banjul, July 2006.¹⁶⁹ Among the proposals was the preservation of the current state, the adoption of a sectoral approach or the merger of the organization.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ See Decision AHG/Dec. 1 (XXXVII) of July 2001, Lusaka, Zambia, adopted OAU Assembly. It was considered to accelerate the implementation of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community which provided for six stages towards the achievements of an effective African economic community over 34 years.

¹⁶⁹ BANJUL RESOLUTION, Banjul, The Gambia, 27 June 2006.

Conclusion

The success of the African Union will depend to a large extent on several factors. The first is to what extent its members are willing to unite their sovereignty in the interests of the continent. Only on one side of Africa can issues of common interest, such as debt, unfair conditions for international trade, environmental problems and the HIV / AIDS pandemic.

Secondly, the integration process must be guided by inspiring, coherent and political leadership that is fully confronting the unification of Africa. Libya, South Africa and Nigeria have provided initial leadership, but should be expanded to include other countries of the future.

Third, AU needs goodwill and support for Africans. The Union will continue to be questioned in terms of democracy, accountability and transparency if some of its members continue to receive low ratings in terms of good governance. So far, governments have been running the AU, but the Union has been expanding its interaction with Africans, regularly.

Fourth, the AU must ensure that it has sufficient funds to create institutions and support activities. Five of the 42 poorest countries in the world are in Africa. Due to the weak financial base, AU relied heavily on donors to implement its programs and projects. This, in turn, revealed the organization to the donor agenda, which in some cases differed from Africa. Support for the AU, like the Darfur mission, was also the most welcome, but it also raised some concerns about the Union's dependence on external support.

Finally, the AU must act quickly to adopt and implement a common continental policy. A good policy alone does not matter if there are no competent people to implement it. In the end, the mandate of the AU as a new organization with new ideals, objectives and leaders will be determined by a strong political will, the availability of money and a new way of thinking. That is what rebuilds your identity and interests.

CHAPTER THREE

African Union Strategy for Democracy, Development, and Peace

One of the key factors in founding the AU was the recognition of its founders in improving democratic structures and promoting good governance. They felt that these issues, like others, such as constitutionalism and respect for the rule of law, are crucial to security and development. The AU constitutive Act have adopted these ideals as some of their goals and principles in addition to popular participation, gender equality and social justice.

By this time, the AU was in the process of adopting the Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance (hereinafter the "Charter for Democracy").¹⁷⁰ The main objectives and principles of the Charter are the elements of democracy in the Constitution. The Charter of Democracy also seeks to eradicate corruption, incorporate a culture of peace and create a favorable climate for democratic consolidation, including opposition parties. It also seeks to

¹⁷⁰ See Draft on the Charter on Democracy, N° 11/Rev. 3 adopted by the AU Assembly in January 2007.

promote the separation of powers and controls and balances, representative government through free and fair elections and civil control over the security sector (Article 3).¹⁷¹

Achieving these goals requires collaboration with various actors, AU, RECs, African states, civil society organizations and the donors. In theory, this is a normative leap from the state-centered nature of OAU to people-centered processes and activities. If successful, this can be a transition from a culture of impunity to a responsibility for the protection of vulnerable populations.

However, the essential goal is to make the decision makers and the people involved in the decision-making process. Given the various factors, the current situation requires a significant change. African countries have different political and legal systems, lack of awareness of the local population of the AU and the fact that some African rulers still believe that they are not responsible to the people they govern.

This chapter discusses, in its first section, the parameters, framework, and measures that should be available to reach good governance and the rule of law. Whereas, the second section explores security and peace building in Africa, and it contains a case study about Darfur crises.

I. Towards Good Governance and the Rule of Law

As above mentioned, governance is exercised at different levels of social activity. The African Commission on Global Governance has stated that governance is "A continuing process through which conflicting and diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken."¹⁷² Regarding this perspective, good governance would be reflected in different institutions, and structures, to manage their affairs. It has also been used to describe formal and informal sets of arrangements. For example, Goran Flyden defined governance as

¹⁷¹ See Draft on the Charter on Democracy.

¹⁷² *Our Global Neighborhood*, Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.2.

"The conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the Public realm."¹⁷³

Moreover, it implies the involvement of the different components of civil society in the management of mega-policy issues such as the environment, security. Consequently, development cannot be left to governments alone. Thus, local associations, organizations, ethnic networks, and other NGOs may be involved in decision-making processes.¹⁷⁴ Government decisions gain legitimacy, partly from civil society policy. Therefore, management works with local, national and international networks. Therefore, this system is very important or useful because it involves institutional development.

I.1. Good Governance

It is possible to distinguish three different forms of government: poor governance, corporate governance, and good governance. The term good governance has been used since the 1980s by the IBRD and the IMF to designate certain types of political and economic orders imposed by the neoliberal ideology.¹⁷⁵ In 1999, it was included in their definition that it requires state transparency and accountability, increasing public participation in the policy-making process to build democratic structures.¹⁷⁶ Hence, the IBRD and the IMF, state that good governance is tightly linked with the spread of liberal democracy.¹⁷⁷

However, the version of good governance introduced by the IBRD and the IMF has undesirable characteristics that caused significant suffering to Africans. This type of good management involves serious ethical questions. For example, is it morally possible for African politicians to offer grains for export to receive foreign currency, a priority over food crops (for consumption)? Is it a good debt for poor African countries to spend most of their

¹⁷³ Cited in S.H. Eriksen, Shared Rivers and Bassins in Africa: Challenges of Cooperation, Ecology N) 10 (Nairobi: Africa Center for Technology Studies), p.8.

¹⁷⁴ For interesting case studies of governance, see Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, NGOs and the UN and Global Governance (Boulder CO. Lynn Rienner, 1966.)

¹⁷⁵ James R. Vreeland, The International Monetary Fund Policy of Leading, London, Routledge. 2007, p.33.

¹⁷⁶ Joel Barkan, Protracted Transitions Among Africa's New Democracies, *Democratisation* 7, N° 3, 2000, p.242.

¹⁷⁷ Samuel M. Makinda, Democracy and Multy-party Policies in Africa, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34, N° 4, 1966, p.556.

income on paying off debt? Why do the new generations in Africa pay large debts that can be attributed to the African leaders and the international financial institutions? Only with the help of Knowledge and democracy enable the African people to give answers to such questions.

I.2. Consent and Majority Rule

It simply refers to the fact that the power of government comes from the people, and that is the only source of explanation and justification. "Popular participation" ¹⁷⁸ must be implemented through free elections. Voters should not be required to make a specific decision about the procedures that govern the process within their community. Although the majority rule can be defined as a decision made after more than half of the electorate has been taken. On the other hand, the rights of minorities must be protected. Therefore, it is not surprising that most can be developed as a second simple alternative, a necessary alternative to the excellent lack of agreement in all orders. The unanimous claim would be to grant everyone the right to veto the decision and make it virtually impossible to make decisions in large groups. This practical justification for the unanimous replacement of the majority as a discrete method of decision-making is common in modern political thought.¹⁷⁹

Universal suffrage is specifically recognized by the Charter of Democracy (Article 4 (2)) as "the absolute right of the people". This chapter is used to refer to conditions that most Africans need to express their views, to participate in policies and decisions that govern them. Pay attention to legality, equality before the law, and access to right information through free and honest means of communication. The conditions under which free elections are held are set out in Chapter 7 of the Democratic Charter, with particular attention to the AU Declaration on the principles of democratic elections in Africa.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ The notion of political participation covers all activities through which citizens can individually or collectively influence the functioning of the political system. These forms are multiple and varied and range from the most conventional forms (voting, membership of a party ...) to the most unconventional, such as protesting, etc.

¹⁷⁹ Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, Préliminaires de la constitution française, Paris, 1789, p. 38.

¹⁸⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transition from the Authoritarian Rule, Volume 3: Tentative Conclusions about Democracies, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p.6

I.3. Accountability and Democratic Consolidation

Accountability in this context means the existence of a mechanism in which those who exercise power, in particular the African leaders should justify their actions against the voters. This means that political leaders will continue to agree to the government. Accountability can only be made when African citizens learn their rights, responsibilities and opportunities. Some African countries, that are considered to be democratic, do not show approval, public participation and accountability. It could also explain why these countries were attacked by violence and human rights violations. The Charter of Democracy seeks to fight against these practices by attracting African countries to promote democracy, rule of law and human rights. It also urges African countries to provide fundamental freedoms and human rights to citizens who recognize universality, interdependence and indivisibility.

On the other hand, democratic consolidation concerns the situation in which the authoritarian phase is over. The introduction of democratic ideals and practices in society, which has been living in the repressive regime for many years, is a real challenge. As some critics claim, authoritarian rule is one of the transitions that exist "Interval between one political regime and another...delimited, on one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy."¹⁸¹

In other words, a transition takes place when wholesome change has taken place in a political system and "not just in the individuals holding positions of political power." This change has to take place also" in the assumptions and methods of the political system, in how the system legislates, formulates, and implements policies, and in the ways in which individuals gain access to power.¹⁸² Such a transition can be influenced by a number of factors, such as the length of time the authoritarian regime was in power, the methods it employed to exercise power, and the level of knowledge people have about their rights and responsibilities. In a country like the DRC, where Mobutu's dictatorship lasted more than three decades, democratic consolidation is likely to be a slow process. According to Juan Linz

¹⁸¹ Marry Ellen Fischer, Introduction in Establishing Democracies, ed. Marry Ellen Fischer, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1966, p.5

¹⁸² Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Towards Consolidated Democracies, *Journal of Democracy*, 7, N° 2, 1996, pp. 14-33

and Alfred Stephan: "A society would have consolidated its democracy when there is broad consensus among its members that democratic practice is the only acceptable type of rule or "the only game in town."¹⁸³

Democracy combines the strengthening of democratic norms and institutions and the emergence of new regimes "does not have the perverse elements undermining [democracy's] basic characteristics."¹⁸⁴ Adam Przeworski contends that: "for democratic structures to last they must be fair by giving all the relevant political forces a chance to win from time to time, and make even losing under democracy more attractive than losing under non-democratic alternatives."¹⁸⁵

In the current international context, corruption, external interference and the fight against terrorism tend to undermine the consolidation of democracy in Africa, which accuses some governments of violating the rule of law.¹⁸⁶

I.4. Rule of Law

The rule of law is predicated on a number of factors, including the assumption that the law must be universally heeded, obeyed, and accomplished with. According to Ismail Mohammed:

The rule of law implies five assumptions. First, the law is sovereign over all authorities, including the government. Second, the law must be clear and certain in its content, and accessible and predictable for the subjects. Third, the law must be general and universal

¹⁸³ Samuel J. Valenzuela, Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Setting: Notions, process, and Facilitating Conditions, Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and Samuel J. Valenzuela, Notre Dame University of Notre Press, 1992, pp. 57-104.

¹⁸⁴ Adam Perworski, Democracy and Market, Cambridge University, Cambridge Press, 1991, p.26.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ James Gibsonad Amanda, Supportof the Rule of Law in the Emerging South African Democracy, International Social ScienceJournal, N° 52, 1997, p. 174.

in its application. Fourth, the judiciary must be independent and accessible to every aggrieved person, whatever his/her status. Fifth, the law must have procedural intellectual content.¹⁸⁷

Depending on this, it can be said that the rule of law is achieved in Africa when, in certain cases, there is a clear separation of the judicial, executive and judicial authorities from individual cases of political pressure.¹⁸⁸ A former Chief Justice of Tanzania, Francis Nyalali, stated: "Independence of the judiciary, impartiality of adjudication, fairness of trial, and integrity of the adjudicator are so universally accepted that one may reasonably conclude that these principles are inherent to any justice system in a democracy."¹⁸⁹ He further observed: "There is no doubt that these same principles are part of the African dream, resulting from the liberation struggle against colonial and racial oppression." These are the states that emerged when our countries became politically independent. The Charter of Democracy defines constitutional law (Article 10) as a way of universalizing democratic principles. Furthermore, the principles of equality before the law and the equal protection of the law are considered the basis for a just and democratic society. (Article 10 [3])

The military coups and unconstitutional changes of the government have significantly diminished since the adoption of the Lomé Declaration of 2000, the unconstitutional changes of the government and the founding law that condemns and denies this practice. However, the 2005 military coup in Mauritania and Togo showed that it was necessary to strengthen the existing mechanisms. Therefore, the Regulation on Democracy (Chapter 8) determines the measures to be taken in such cases.

While the above concepts and issues are included in the Constitutive Act, they need political will to establish structures, strategic leadership and African norms, which can lead to the liberation and empowerment of the African population. This depends on the existence of an environment free from corruption.

¹⁸⁷ Jennifer A. Winder, Building the Rule of Law, Francis Nyululi and the Road to Judicial Independence in Africa, New York W. W. Northon & Co., 2001, p.28.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 29

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

II. Preventing and Combating Corruption

Africa's opportunities to turn globalization into a force of social, economic and political reforms in pursuit of peace and security must keep pace with good governance. However, the latter is never associated with corruption. Nevertheless, corruption enjoyed benefits from the free markets and involved more activities such as money laundering and arms smuggling. These latter are being used by terrorists and the "mafia" at the expense of African people. There is a connection between corruption and poverty and insecurity. As a result, African states should address the relationship between globalization, security and governance to fight corruption.

According to John Githongo, former senior anti-corruption official in Kenya states: "corruption in particular grand corruption and looting of the kind that has tangible economic implications is at the epicenter of the failure by many African countries to achieve economic objectives"¹⁹⁰ In 2002, it was estimated that the cost of corruption in African countries was approximately \$148 billion per year, which represents approximately 25 percent of Africa's GDP.¹⁹¹

In this context, the AU Assembly adopted in July 2003 the Convention on Prevention and Combat Corruption, which aims to introduce effective measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and commit corruption.¹⁹²

II.1. Understanding Corruption in Africa

Different causes lead to the emergence and proliferation of corruption in Africa. Chief of these is the personal greed, the misconception that politics is the way to wealth, lack of good political will and free media.

The theft of the Congolese, Liberian, and Sierra Leonean economies by Mobutu Sese Seko, Charles Taylor, and Foday Sankoh, respectively, was mainly due to personal greed. On

¹⁹⁰ John Gitango, Corruption is the Bane of African Countries, *East African Standard*, April 15, 2005.

¹⁹¹ See BBC News, September 18, 2002: *The Economist*, September 19, 2002.

¹⁹² Jean-Francois, Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hebou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa, Oxford, James Currey, 1999, xvi.

the other hand, to undertake illegal activities, those leaders exploited the circumstances when people believed it was "acceptable" to steal from the state.

The internalization of bad habits, which means the existence of a culture of corruption, cannot be eliminated by the overthrow of a ruler, or the jailing of a corrupt minister or a judge.

Corrupt practices have shaped the identities and interests of individuals and social groups to the extent that some of them cannot tell the difference between wrong and right actions. People acquire bad habits through schools, football clubs, social groups, and the recruitment to political party and government offices this form of corruption is produced by, and helps to generate, vices such as nepotism, cronyism, patronage, and tribalism. It also helps to buttress other criminal activities, such as drug and arms smuggling, and the plundering of national economies.¹⁹³

It is these activities that continue to undermine good governance, democracy, and the rule of law. These vices are likely to make it difficult for some states to benefit from the dynamic tension between globalization, security, and governance.

In Africa, a political office, or a senior civil-service position, has served as the way to wealth for who occupy them. Exploiting the state for personal matters has led to corruption. According to Jeremy Pope, the founding executive director of Transparency International: "Most corrupt governments have hopelessly corrupt political elite—a political class across the spectrum that simply sees politics as a way of becoming wealthy."¹⁹⁴ Pope warns that it would be difficult to combat corruption in Africa as long as politics is seen as the path to wealth. Bayart, Ellis and Hibou have observed that while countries in other parts of the world have been tainted with corruption, "In Africa, the interaction between the practice of power, war, economic accumulation and illicit activities ... forms a particular political trajectory."¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ Samuel Makinda and Wafulu. op.cit. p. 66

¹⁹⁴ Quoted in Virginia Gidley-Kitchen, "Corruption Getting Worse in Africa" BBC News, February 11, 2005.

¹⁹⁵ Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa, xiv.

Private exploitation of the state weakens the state structure. William Calema, a member of the Commission for Africa set up by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, claimed that one of the reasons why corruption is widespread in Africa is the governmental structures are too weak to function properly, This is what Aminatta Forna¹⁹⁶ claimed: “Corruption is not as is often hinted, some sort of cultural weakness even if it has, sadly, become the norm. Africa’s problem is that the structures designed to provide checks and balances on the leadership are often neither sufficiently strong nor independent.”¹⁹⁷

Fighting corruption in Africa is the responsibility of Africans and other countries and organizations as well. Multinational corporations, international organizations, Western countries, and increasingly China, have to play a part. So far, China was not interested. The West has frequently expressed concern about the effects of corruption and demanded that the Africans adhere to certain standards of behavior, but none of the G8 governments has ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption.¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, the West has sometimes paid no attention to “The criminalization of the state in Africa. For example: Western government officials have connived with African leaders who have illegally permitted Western chemical industries to dump toxic waste on the continent. Moreover, Western companies have not only continued to bribe African public officials, but also continue to deduct these bribes from their taxes.”¹⁹⁹

II.3. AU and NEPAD Anti-Corruption Measures

To fight corruption, The Anti-Corruption Convention and the NEPAD Action Plan were issued by the African Union and the NEPAD, respectively. Still some African leaders, who still benefit from corruption, will not join the fight.

While the AU Anti-Corruption Convention was adopted in Maputo, Mozambique on 11 July 2003, it entered into force on 5 August 2006. On May 2018, the number of signatories reached 55. Some of the main objectives of the convention are to:

¹⁹⁶ Aminatta Forna, OBE (born 1964) is a Scottish and Sierra Leonean writer.

¹⁹⁷ Quoted in Makinda and Wafulum p.67.

¹⁹⁸ The following African countries have ratified it: Algeria, Benin, Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Tanzania, and Uganda.

¹⁹⁹ Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa, xiv.

- "- promote and strengthen the development of mechanisms to prevent, detect, punish, and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors;
- promote, facilitate, and regulate cooperation among states of effective measures and actions to eradicate corruption and related offences;
- coordinate and harmonize the policies and legislation among African states that would eradicate corruption;
- promote socio-economic development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights, and establish the necessary conditions to foster transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs."²⁰⁰

To eradicate corruption, the NEPAD Action Plan calls for specific actions. In the short term, efforts will be made to facilitate the evaluation of the financial sector; International support for training in the fight against money laundering and the return of stolen assets at the highest level to the global agenda.²⁰¹

In the medium term, the NEPAD Plan calls on African countries to adopt relevant international conventions, standards and practices; by allowing international legal assistance to the LEA on the basis of accepted international law standards, laws regulating the duties and responsibilities of financial institutions; strengthening laws that deal with anti-corruption measures and the ability of prosecutors to adopt a national law that regulates the criminalization of money laundering and terrorist financing and to improve co-operation in Africa and beyond to help recover funds illegally acquired through corruption and crime, which are subsequently stored abroad.

In the long run, NEPAD encourages African countries to develop and strengthen judicial powers in order to increase international independence and trust, strengthen access agreements to courts and investigative institutions, particularly in developed countries, and to create regulatory authorities and intelligence reliable and powerful,

Behind the creation of NEPAD was the aim to promote good governance in return for aid, investment, and relief from heavy debts. The African rulers, who wanted poverty-

²⁰⁰ Aminatta Forna, "The West Must Own up to its Part in African Corruption", *Independent*, March 9, 2005.

²⁰¹ A Summary of NEPAD Action Plans, Paragraph 8. See www.nepad.org/2005/files/41.pdf.

reduction initiative, believed that African progress in development can be reached only if internal governance is on solid grounds, and external trade and investment conditions are transformed.

The APRM reflects NEPAD's commitment to good governance. This is an instrument to promote good governance, improve efficiency and effectiveness and build trust in target countries for technical and financial assistance and investments.²⁰²

APRM is a mechanism to test and help progress in the performance of member states in their quest for democracy, and human rights. Peer review reports are released publically; thus, they gain strength. The latter has a chance to suggest areas that need correction. Makinda and Wafulu stated:

Among the indicators on which countries are assessed are their ratification and implementation of international codes, including the African Union anti-corruption code, and the enactment and enforcement of collective anti-corruption and anti-money laundering laws. Of the four countries that had agreed to undergo the first “peer review” as of this writing, only Rwanda had ratified the AU Anti-Corruption Convention, and only Kenya had ratified the UN Convention against Corruption.²⁰³

II.4. Possible Ways of Tackling Corruption

The approach and mechanisms to fighting corruption proposed by AU and NEPAD has not been attempted anywhere else in the world. Because of the nature of corruption in Africa, this approach seems unsuccessful. In addition, many African leaders are unwilling to dismantle the political system that creates corruption.

Corruption has been internalized in the minds of people from childhood. Consequently, consolidating democracy requires the promotion of certain values through time, eliminating corruption requires the spread of certain values and norms over a long period of time.

²⁰² See W.L. Nkuhla, The New Partnership of Africa's Development The Journey So Far, NEPAD Secretariat, Juin 2005, .nepad.org/2005/files/41.pdf.

²⁰³ Samuel Makinda and Wafulu, op cit, p. 211.

Still, corruption can be overcome by other means. In fact, some African leaders have taken steps to show they are serious about corruption. For example, in May 2005, South African President Thabo Mbeki resigned as Vice-president Jacob Zuma after dealing with a corrupt business. Ironically, Zuma replaced Mbeki few years later. In Nigeria, that was considered the second most corrupt country on the Transparency International 2005 list, President Olusegun Obasanjo dismissed senior officials, amongst education and police ministers, for they were involved in corruption.

However, anti-corruption efforts cannot be achieved by shooting some high-level corrupted officials. Strong leaders should be backed by a high public awareness, citizen participation in the fight against corruption, as Ray Matikinye noted: "Studies indicate that governments lacking a strong framework of good governance, the rule of law and adequate banking regulations while clinging on to unsound investment decisions, provide fertile grounds for corruption to thrive."²⁰⁴

The AU and NEPAD must take anti-corruption approach to manage national strategies such as strengthening processes, improving public service practices, strengthening the culture of building positive public service areas. Effective Governance and accountability frameworks can endure corruption.²⁰⁵ The anticorruption strategy will work best if it is managed by public responsibility and engages political leadership. The primary responsibility for eradicating corruption needs the commitment of the educated people.

II.5. Strategic Leadership

AU's success will depend on Africa's strategic leadership. It can be said that every country has a leadership role. Strategic in this context means the ability to create a clear vision to mobilize human, financial, scientific and social resources. This latter requires creative thinking, a good vision, and citizens' contribution.

²⁰⁴ Ray Matikinye, *Corruption Gnaws Away at Body Politics*, *Zimbabwe Independent*, April 15, 2005.

²⁰⁵ See Willy Mamah, *Nepad, Good Governance, and the Rule of Law*, a paper presented at the Nigerian Civil Society Conference on the New Partnership of Africa's Development, held at the Airport Hotels, Ikeja, Lagos, April 2002.

Three basic principles are embodied in the Constitutive Act of the AU, good standards of living, security and social justice. In the context of the AU, strategic leadership means achieving greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and communities to establish and consolidate democracy, and promoting sustainable development and science and technology, the strengthening of peace and security and the arrest of corruption.

Since the 1950s and 1960s, when the African countries started to gain their independence, they have established different types of leadership. For example, Ali Mazrui has identified at least "Four traditions in the old-fashioned leadership in Africa: the elder tradition, like that of Jomo Kenyatta, 1963-1978; the warrior tradition, like that of Idi Amin, 1971-1979; the sage tradition, like that of Julius Nyerere, 1961-1985; and the monarchical tendency."²⁰⁶

The charisma and the personality cult of some African leaders which were considered a necessity while struggling for liberation, formed obstacles in front of the democratic rule and strong governmental structures, and paved the way for authoritarianism. Mazrui, who respects Nkrumah's organizational skills, accuses Nkrumah for his dictatorial policies. Mazrui claims that "while Nkrumah strove to be Africa's Lenin, he also sought to become Ghana's Czar."²⁰⁷

Although some traditions and types of leadership would be conceived on the basis that their values and principles are similar to those of the African Union, they came up with mixed results. For example, Idi Amin's warrior tradition style led the elite moving out of Uganda. Uganda turned into a worse social and economic situation behind its neighbors because Amin destroyed institutions of learning, and expelled the elite.

On the other hand, Julius Nyerere's political experience with socialism attracted the leftists, but Western hostility has slowed the economic development of Tanzania.

²⁰⁶ Ali A. Mazrui, Political Leadership in Africa: Seven Styles and Four Traditions, in Hans d'Orville (ed.), Leadership for Africa: In Honor of Olusegan Obasanjo on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, New York: African Leadership Foundation, 1995, pp. 161-164.

²⁰⁷ Ali A. Mazrui, Nkrumah: The Leninist Czar, *Transition* (Kampala) 6, N° 26, 1966, pp. 9-17.

Leadership is also about giving a model. Does Nigeria or South Africa serve as an example for Africa? So far, none of these documents had the authority to serve as a model. Since the transition to democratic government in 1999, Nigeria has made great efforts to show its democratic credentials. It has also played a key role in PSOs in West Africa for more than a decade. However, Nigeria was not a sufficient democracy to demonstrate democratic government. In addition, the efforts of President Olusegun Obasanjo and his supporters to manipulate the constitution for having the opportunity to be reelected for the third term of 2007. This shows that Nigeria is still a weak model.²⁰⁸

Will South Africa be a good model? Since its transition to democratic rule in 1994, it has had an important place in African politics. However, South Africa is a democracy with a multi-party system. One of the peculiarities that could have become a matter of democratic practice in South Africa is the social tendency towards one-party governments. Although the state is constitutionally multi-party, society seems to prefer the principle of one party.

Moreover, South Africa and Nigeria are considered as role models mainly because they have dominated debates due to their wealth, whereas, the AU seeks the promotion of the rule of law, and the idea that all countries are equal regardless their wealth. A major question is raised. Can South Africa or Nigeria be considered mainly because they are wealthy? While the former to protect its citizens' interests, South Africa's aim is to guarantee markets.

The idea of the model should not be limited to states, but people such as President Nelson Mandela can serve as role models for future leaders in Africa. Contrary to the old belief that leaders are born leaders, and are not created, it has been proven that the opposite is true. Consequently, AU bodies should be used to train continental leaders. Policy-makers should also seek to identify young people who can be effective leaders and give them opportunities to develop leadership skills. Thanks to such measures, the African Union and its Member States can use the complex relations between globalization, security and governance for the benefit of their citizens. Indeed, initiatives such as the NEPAD are based on the assumption that Africa will have strategic leaders.

²⁰⁸ Ebere R. Adigbuo, Nigeria's Leadership Role Quest: The Race of the Crippled, *Journal of Global Analysis*, Summer Issue, July 22, 2017, www.secran.org.

III. Security and Peace Building

The creation of the African Union has raised hopes that African governments and civil society organizations will be able to resolve issues related to insecurity faster and more effectively. However, ongoing problems in Somalia and the Darfur region and in Sudan have led to growing disillusionment with the AU's willingness to bring about rapid change.

Since the 1980s, Africa has witnessed wars, conflicts, and crises. Within and between countries. Due to the weak control of African country boundaries, some domestic conflicts have crossed borders and put pressure on neighboring countries. For example, the conflict in Rwanda hit Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Burundi hard. The Somali conflict continues to affect Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. African countries are experiencing a different level of terrorism, both locally and transnational.

Insecurity in Africa results from different factors, including ethnic struggles, poor governance, ethnic rivalry, the struggle for natural resources, non-compliance with the rule of law, lack to access to education. To deal with the insecurity problems an effective way, it would need to involve civil society organizations and adopt a multilateral approach that identifies the effects of globalization and governance on individuals.

Africa witnessed other wars and conflicts and in the 1980s and 1990s which continued in the 21st century. As example, we take the cases of the civil war in southern Sudan, which started in 1983, and was not put to an end until early 2005. Another conflict broke out in Darfur in the 2003, and civil war in Somalia, which began in the 1980s and has not been resolved till the writing of this paper. Algeria, violence erupted in 1992, when the army intervened in politics and annulled parliamentary elections. It would last until. 1999. Therefore, many wars, conflicts and crises have survived in the OAU period.

The AU was created in part to find a solution to these problems and the similar issues. Article 3 (f) of the Constitutive Act states that one of the Union's objectives is to "promote peace, security and stability." Additionally, art. 4 (e) states that one of the principles of the AU is a "peaceful resolution of conflicts between members." Moreover, the Act under Article 4 (h) gives the Union the right to intervene in the Member States, in difficult conditions,

namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity." Consequently, the AU has the mandate to resolve intra-community and intra-state conflicts, dealing with terrorist threats and engaging in peacekeeping.

III.1. Peace and Security from an African Perspective

What is the opinion and position of the AU and its member states about security? What is its approach for solving African problems? How do Africans understand peace?

In the introduction to the concept of security, it is clear that all security, not only human safety, must touch human needs, aspirations and dignity. The state bears the primary responsibility for ensuring people's safety. But some countries still ignore and even violate human rights and the democratic process in ensuring national security. It is therefore necessary to define security as a protection of people, as well as to maintain these norms, principles, values, institutions, aspirations and resources for military and non-military threats.

After the independence of the African countries, the OAU dealt with security through a traditional framework. Their view of security was state-based for it concentrated on state survival, territorial integrity, and preserving the interest of the ruler. They pursued a traditional way by using force when dealing with problems that do not necessitate the use of force like dealing with political opposition groups. As a result, in many cases, this approach led to militarizing the opposition.

Though, after the end of the Cold War, the OAU began to change its view to security by encompassing non-military issues, it still offer no big importance to CSOs and or the gender issue. We take as an example Kampala Summit in 1991.

A Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation, stated that "the security of a nation must be constructed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom, and enjoying all fundamental human rights."²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹ See OUA, CSSDCA Solmen Declaration, AHG/Decl.4(XXXVI) 2000, www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/ahsg/ahsg5.doc.

This approach of security was adopted by the AU's Common Africa and Security Policy (CADSP). It claims that:

Security includes human rights, the right to fully participate in the process of governance, the right to development, education and health, and the right to protection against poverty, marginalization, and natural disasters. This evolving understanding to security provides space to the AU to utilize the dynamic tension between security, globalization, and governance.²¹⁰

Meanwhile, the AU has insisted on the fact that security is universal and indivisible. In May 2004, the Chairperson of the AU's Commission, Alpha Omar Konare, underlined this view. He stated: "An Africa at peace cannot stand without a world at peace. Our security policy must be focused on the notion of collective and general security."²¹¹

On the other hand, to finance AU programs concerned with the establishment of peace and security, the Africans asked for the help of the Group of Eight (G8) and other Western countries.²¹²

III.2. War, Conflicts and Insecurity

Since Africa has witnessed many conflicts, security issues have become a priority. Security is an (individual and collective) entity that believes that it is not threatened or that it can respond to real or anticipated threats. The weakness of the police, the army and the judiciary, is an unsecured public situation for citizens, ensuring respect for civil and political rights. Uncertainty refers to various forms, the most extreme of which are armed conflicts. These vary according to intensity, duration and spatial range. You can have international, international or regional coverage. It has become a continent where the number of victims of armed conflict is the largest in the world, although the conflicts have been reduced to some extent.

²¹⁰ Peter Vale, Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension, Boulder CO., Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp. 7-27.

²¹¹ Ali A. Mazrui, Towards Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, pp. 3-20.

²¹²Statement of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Occasion of the Solemn Launching of the Peace and Security Council, Adis Ababa, May 25, 2004.

Since 1990, there have been 19 major conflicts in 17 African countries, amongst only one "classic", i.e. between two countries (Ethiopia-Eritrea). Between 1991 and 1997, the number of major conflicts declined from 11 per year to 5 per year as was in 2001. However, in 2006, conflict clashes continued to haunt the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ivory Coast, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Darfur. It was also expanded to Chad's. This was explained by backwardness and exclusion, insecurity and underdevelopment factors.²¹³

The Africans has lived different catastrophes such as hunger, HIV/AIDS, warfare, political instability, social and economic problems. This led to insecurity that the AU faces. Consequently, the African leaders founded a conflict resolution mechanism which included mediation, and arbitration. Nevertheless, the interference of international powers due to the lack of adequate resources prevented the African leaders and institutions from finding solutions.

Thus, during the Cold War, African security issues were generally explained in terms of the US-Soviet rivalry. This was the case with many wars and conflicts, regardless their nature. For example:

The Shaba uprisings in the DRC in 1977 and 1978 were not understood in terms of bad governance under President Mobutu Sese Seko and the interests and identity of the people of Shaba province, instead, they were addressed in terms of how the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies would gain or lose influence.

The same can be said about some of the views of African and Western leaders about the liberation of Namibia and South Africa. Like the Civil War in Angola. Namibia's security problems accelerated the colonial government which deprived South Africa, the 1919 colonial power, of the basic civil and political rights of the Namibian people. Although the International Court of Justice ruled in 1966 that South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal, it ignored the sovereignty of the South African Government and then the United Nations resolution. The main liberation movement in Namibia. The Southwest African

²¹³ Keen D., The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, London, OUP for IISS, 1998, pp. 12-35.

People's Organization (SWAPO) was supported by the Organization of African Unity and received several weapons from the Soviet bloc. The reason why Western powers were ready to liberate Namibia from South Africa was that they see the South African government as a stronghold against communism.²¹⁴

An important feature of the Cold War is that good governance is not a main concern for political leaders in Africa and their overseas supporters. Human rights were abused, multi-party systems were banned, and citizens from various African countries were deprived of the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. In this sense, Western countries, such as their Communist counterparts and African dictators, increase mistrust in Africa. This prompted former US President Jimmy Carter to call his predecessor in May 1977:

Being confident about our own future, we are free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in our fear. For too many years we have been willing to adopt the flawed principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our values for theirs. We fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better fought with water.²¹⁵

This gave hope for those who believed that the US could conduct a foreign policy based on human rights. However, at the end of his term, Carter returned to the tactics of his predecessor to deal with fire by fire.

After the end of the Cold War, especially in the early 1990s, Western and international organizations, especially the World Bank and the IMF, imposed certain political and economic conditions that African states must meet before receiving support. Some of these conditions, called structural adjustment programs, were very wrong and unfair to the poor, causing so much suffering, instability and distrust.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, the United Nations played a more important role in solving wars in Africa than before. They confirmed that African crises do not have the same priority as in Europe. At the time, the UN Security Council decided to

²¹⁴ Christopher Clapham, *Gurellas*, Oxford, James Currey, 1998, pp. 25-51.

²¹⁵ See President Jimmy Carter, *A Foreign Policy Based on America's Essential Character*, *Department of State Bulletin*, 76, N° 1981, June 13, 1977, p. 662.

implement Resolution 435, which in 1989 led to the independence of Namibia. This resolution, which authorizes the United Nations to assume the legal responsibility of the transition to the independence of Namibia, was adopted by the Security Council in September 1978, but there was no political will to pursue it until the end of the Cold War. After Namibia, the United Nations participated in several other peacekeeping missions in Africa, including Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Some of these activities were humanitarian interventions that saved many lives, but only provided bandwidth solutions for chronic security problems.

The majority of wars in Africa were intra-state ones. The period immediately after the end of the Cold War was marked by both local and international demands for good governance. Globalization, right after the communication revolution. In fact, the rapid response to many African wars is the "CNN effect", which is a symptom of globalization.

In 1999, the OAU summit in Algiers adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (hereafter the Algiers Convention). Support for the Algiers Convention also partly stemmed from the fact that al-Qaida agents had carried out simultaneous terrorist attacks against American diplomatic missions in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar Salam (Tanzania) in August 1998. By committing itself to fighting terrorism in the 1990s, the OAU took a major step in enhancing security in some countries, but the genesis of this initiative was the Algerian government's move in early 1992 to undermine security by nullifying the general elections. The Algerian authorities feared that had the general elections gone ahead, they would have been won by an Islamist party FIS (Front Islamique de Salut) or (Islamic Salvation Front).²¹⁶

In 1999, the OAU summit in Algiers adopted The Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. It gained African and Western support when the agents of Qaida in August 1998 simultaneously carried out terrorist attacks in US diplomatic missions in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar Salaam (Tanzania).

²¹⁶ Stephen Ellis, *Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence*, *African Affairs*. 94, 375, 1995, pp. 165-97.

Following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001 and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, African countries have to take measures against terrorism. Some African countries, such as Algeria and Egypt, have faced terrorism problems for many years, but can be explained in terms of government structures and policies in these countries. However, the anti-terrorist strategies of these countries were integrated into the global "war on terror". Al-Qaeda has committed several transnational terrorist attacks in Africa. There is no doubt that Kenya and Tanzania are transnational in 1998 and target Americans, not local authorities.

African countries, as well as foreign powers, have used the "war on terrorism" in an effort to change the nature of security issues. The effect of distorting the problem of African security through the global reason of the "war on terrorism" is that sometimes harms rather than leads to security.

When the Darfur crisis broke out in 2003, the AU was required to lead negotiations between the Sudanese government and rebel groups, the Movement for Justice and Equality and the Movement for the Liberation of Sudan. The AU's efforts ended in the Agreement on Humanitarian ceasefire in April 2004 and the deployment of 60 ceasefire monitors and 300 soldiers for protection. This defense force was increased to more than 7,000 by the end of 2006. It was not until May 2006 that the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed. The then Darfur situation was considered to be as test for the attainment of the AU to be a regional force for peace. Wars and conflicts have caused disaster in many African areas:

It destroyed homes, damaged the environment, disrupted social, educational and health services; killed, maimed and traumatized the population; destroyed the economic and physical infrastructures; interrupted government operations; and displaced large groups of people from their homes and farms tendering them dependent on humanitarian assistance.²¹⁷

In addition, in January 2005, the International Investigation Mission in Darfur reported that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed by a state-sponsored militia called Janjawid. The Prosecutor of the ICC has appointed a Sudanese minister and a militia

²¹⁷ Clyton A., Frontiers-men: Warfare in Africa Since 1950, London, UCL Press, 1999, p.112.

leader as war crimes officers. The following case study explains why Darfur's problem persists.

IV. Case Study of International Conflict: Darfur²¹⁸

Many critics believe that the African Union does not prove to be entrusted with the mission of maintaining peace and stability, especially since it does not claim that the situation in Darfur is "Dangerous Situation" The situation in Darfur has three aspects: the weak AU intervention mechanism. The African Union did not learn from previous peacekeeping operations (PSOs) and diplomatic skills of Sudan.²¹⁹

Figure 6: Map of Darfur in Sudan



Source: United to End Genocide, 2016.

²¹⁸ Darfur: location and physical features:

Darfur, which means 'land of the Fur', is a region in western Sudan comprised of three federal states: West Darfur, South Darfur and North Darfur (Figure 1). Darfur has international borders with Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic

²¹⁹ Till 2011, Sudan was the largest country in Africa, and the 10th largest in the world. The country has been in internal (and sometimes external) conflict for long periods of time since its independence from Britain in 1956. In 2010 the population of Sudan was estimated at 43.2 million. The population composition is:

- 52% non-Arab
- 39% Arab
- 6% Beja
- 2% foreign
- 1% other

70% of the population are Muslim, but there are also Christians and others who hold indigenous beliefs. The current government, the National Congress Party led by President Omer al-Bashir, took power in a military coup in 1989. Despite significant oil and other natural resources, the vast majority of Sudan's people live in poverty, and its government has been described as one of the most repressive regimes in the world.

IV.1- Roots of the Conflict in the Darfur Region

In the Darfur region, the conflict between the Fur and the Dinkamul tribes, which relied on the pasture and fishing areas, was deepened. During the bilateral rule, the Closed Areas Act 1922 was issued prohibiting the descent of northern Western tribes to the line 10° north of the Equator; the southern black tribes were also prevented from moving northward this line only by order of the Governor General or his representative. This law created a geographical, human and psychological separation between the northern and southern Arab tribes. In 1924, the border between the Fure, the Dinkamul and the Rizeigat was demarcated under an agreement that recognized the historical Rizeigat's right to be present in the spot of the land extending south of the Arabian Sea by 14 miles. At the same time, the Dinkamul has the right to have access to Bahr al-Ghazal.²²⁰

Once again, this law created a geographical, human and psychological separation between the Arab North tribes and the Negro or non-Arab elements. At the same time, the Dinkamul were given the right to access to the Arab Sea and fishing in it. In 1931, officials in Bahr el Ghazal called for a review of the agreement for political reasons, while the governor of Darfur refused to do so in the interest of the Rizeigat interests. In 1939 there were riots between Masalit House and Fur tribes; followed by, in 1941, kidnappings of children. In 1947, thefts increased as a result of water scarcity, lack of work and increased unemployment. Thus, people began migrating to the south in 1949 where tribal disputes between Habayneh and Rizeigat broke out.²²¹

IV.2 Causes of Conflict in the Darfur region

In fact, the deterioration of the situation in the Darfur region is due to various reasons and multiple factors, internal and external, and will be detailed in the following about the most important of these reasons and factors:

²²⁰ Slim, Hugo (2004) "Dithering over Darfur A preliminary review of the international response", in *International Affairs*, October 2004, vol. 80, no. 5, pp. 811-828.

²²¹ M.A. Mohamed Salih, Understanding the Conflict in Darfur, Centre of African Studies University of Copenhagen, 2005; pp. 5-24

1. Economic Reasons: that the economy is the main driver of events at all times and places. The economic conditions of Darfur are the main causes of drought in Darfur. Agriculture and grazing were the most important aspects of economic activity. In the sense of development, despite the large number of natural resources of the region and its area of 51% total area of Sudan, there are no agricultural or industrial development projects in Darfur.

2. Canceling the Local Civil Administratio : The abolition of the civil administration was one of the reasons led to the conflict in the Darfur region. During the period of bilateral rule, the English applied the indirect rule whereby the white man does not manage and rule the black African population, but uses the African tribal leader to manage their affairs and carry out his orders to the so-called civil administration, where tribal leaders remained not only in the management of regions, but in solving the problems that arise through the councils of elders or the councils of the Aujawid.

The call for the abolition of civil administration began in 1964, a demand adopted by some intellectuals who do not know the social reality of some areas of Sudan, including Darfur. President Nimeiri has strengthened the local administration of the provinces. Since the new administration has used weak police, the absence of army forces, the absence of state authority, tribalism and violence started to emerge. The drought and famine have led to more disputes over limited resources. In Darfur, in 1994, the Darfur region was re-organized administratively. Several positions were assigned to the Arab groups in the new authority, which the Marsalis and Fure tribes considered as ignoring or compensating their historical tribal role in the region.

3. Tribal Conflicts in the Darfur Region

The Darfur region has a variety of ethnic, social and tribal, which is a miniature model of the State of Sudan, which explains the existence of common tribes and diverse with neighboring countries, which led to a series of tribal fighting between the various tribes in the region. The most important fighting was between the Zermatt tribes and Olalla, in 1968, and between Zermatt and the Koror in 1990. All of these cases were followed by tribal conflicts that were caused of the alliance of the Arab tribes against the African Zargat tribe, as well as the absence of effective authority of the Sudanese government in the Darfur region.

4. External Intervention

Global attention to agriculture in the Darfur region is not solely humanitarian, but there are ambitions by the major powers, which are spearheaded by international pressure to establish hegemony, by supporting them in the struggle against racism In Darfur, which comes in the forefront of the United States of America, and some European countries on the one hand. On the other hand, neighboring countries such as Chad, Libya and Eritrea have a large role in fueling the conflict, and this is due to the richness of the region of natural resources and variety of the most important mineral wealth. The Iron Mountains, which have a purity of up to 180 % and the estimated oil of the sea to 45 % in addition to copper, which made the region attract global attention.

IV.5. AU/UN Attitude

Darfur was considered as the peripheral region of Khartoum in the period following the independence. This means that the region had a poor infrastructure and was neglected. The lack of investment in health and education created a feeling of resentment among people in this region. Consequently, Fractions in Darfur began to be armed in the 1990s. Khartoum financed the Arab Janjaweed militia to face Darfur one, non-Arab Africans, the Liberation Army of Sudan and the Movement for Justice and Equality. The struggle is considered racial rather than a religious one because Muslims constituted the majority in both sides.

The main phase of the Darfur conflict was initiated when the SLA and JEM targeted government as early 2003, claiming that Khartoum was conducting segregation in favor of Arabs. As a result of the conflict, an estimated number of 75.000 refugees escaped to Chad and more than 1.000.000 people needed humanitarian aid.

Janjaweed attacks raised tension between Chad and Sudan. The former had accused Janjaweed militias of numerous cross-border raids. "Figure 7 illustrates the horrors faced by the civilian population from attacks by the Janjaweed militias. The NGO Human Rights Watch said that many Janjaweed attacks were purely economic, but sub-groups within the militias were also motivated."


Figure 7: Account of violence in Darfur

Janjaweed Attacks

The attacks by the Janjaweed on isolated villages, as described by witnesses, have exhibited similar characteristics. In the early morning government aircraft flew overhead. Not long afterwards the Janjaweed arrived on camel, horseback and in pickup trucks to kill, rape, pillage and burn the villages. Those who survived fled into the desert.

A UN official accused Janjaweed militias of conducting a 'scorched earth' campaign, and ethnic cleansing against Darfur's black African population. Consequently, the UN called on Khartoum to stop supporting Janjaweed militia, and be neutral. In June 2004, the UN put into effect a plan through: "UNICEF began a campaign to vaccinate 2 million children against measles, and at least 100,000 children against polio. The UN WFP (World Food Program) appealed for \$200 million to feed two million people in Darfur, saying another \$30 million was needed to help Sudanese refugees in Chad." Human rights abuses surfaced on a large scale, including the slaughter of civilians in Darfur villages.

Figure 7: Location of Refugee Camps in Both Chad and Sudan according to USAID.



Source: Wikimedia commons. Darfur refugee camps map.png

AU strength is not effective in the field. Furthermore, another factor influencing the direction of the conflict in Darfur was Sudan's diplomatic capability. Sudan is a member in the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and one of the most powerful Union members when deciding on Darfur. Furthermore, the AU Constitutive Act 4 (h) and 4 (j) are clear in such a situation.

Sudan is one of the top ten contributors to the Union's budget and has seasoned representation to the AU that has been able to push through the country's positions, even those that are contradictory to the Constitutive Act. As a result of Sudan's influence in the organization, the AU has not made decisions that would displease Khartoum undertaken actions without Sudan's consent. Thus, the AU is a partial broker for peace in Sudan.²²²

Early in 2004, the African Union helped resolve the Darfur crisis when the Sudanese government joined the Abeyi and N'Djamena negotiations in early April of the same year. Following a ceasefire in May 2004, a parliamentary session was held in Sudan to

²²² Thomas G. Weiss and David A. Korn, International Displacement Conceptualization and its Consequences, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 88.

unanimously vote on an agreement on the entry of African troops into Darfur, as foreseen in the Protocol of the African Peace Council. Michael Clough stated that:

The idea of African solutions for African conflicts is an old one. Unfortunately, policymakers in the United States and other major powers have often used it as an excuse for their own inaction. In Darfur, the U.N. has sought to place most of the burden of carrying out the goals contained in Security Council resolutions 1556 and 1564 on the shoulders of the nascent African Union.²²³

Another weakness of the AU was that 7,000 African force was not enough to protect civilians in region like Darfur. According to General Romeo Dallaire, who headed the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda in 1994:

An appropriate force for Darfur would need up to 44,000 troops" Moreover, the force must be robust enough to disarm the Janjaweed, and protect vulnerable populations in both the camps and rural areas. Other factors that needed to be taken into consideration include "the proper equipment (such as helicopters, remotely piloted vehicles, and night-vision devices) and a security agreement that includes a no-fly zone, safe passage routes for returnees and displaced populations, disarmament of Janjaweed militia, and protection of humanitarian workers and convoys.²²⁴

In May 2006, Khartoum and SLA signed a peace agreement. In March 2008, Sudan and Chad signed another separated one to put an end to five-year hostility between the two countries. This was followed in November 2008, by the Sudanese President Bashir declaration of a ceasefire in Darfur. However, the two rebel groups put a condition that Khartoum government had to share power and prosperity in the region. In August 2009, the UN military commander in the region said that the war had ended in Darfur, in March 2010, the rebel movement in Darfur, signed a peace agreement with the Khartoum.²²⁵

²²³ Michael Clough is currently serving as Africa advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. Africa Division colleagues Georgette Gagnon, Leslie Lefkow, and Jemera Rone contributed to the preparation of this essay, as did Iain Levine, program director at Human Rights Watch.

²²⁴ Makinda and Wafulu, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87.

²²⁵ United Nations (2004) Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, 25 January, 2005. New York: United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.

IV.4. International Dimension and Final Toll

Apart from the United Nations and the African Union, Qatar, the Arab League and Chad have all helped to arrange peace talks at various stages over the past few years. Other countries such as China, Russia and France have also urged opposing groups to talk. The US envoy to Darfur has been instrumental in trying to get rebel groups to agree a common position to enable a realistic peace talks to occur.²²⁶

Michael Clough stated that: Even though President Basher argues that the death toll was about 10,000, and that the impact of the conflict has been exaggerated, the UN estimates that more than 300,000 people died as victims of the combined war brutalities. People in Darfur still suffer from famine and diseases as a result of the conflict.

There can be no doubt that accurate figures have been difficult to research as has been the difficulty in distinguishing between those dying as a result of violence and deaths due to starvation and disease in the camps and elsewhere. As much accuracy as possible will be needed to successfully press charges of genocide against those responsible.²²⁷

V. AU Peace and Security Mechanisms

The AU policy and mechanisms for peace and security evolve the PSC. Article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act which stresses that promoting peace, and security in the Continent is one the AU's main objectives. In 2004, based on Article 5(2) of Constitutive Act, the AU Assembly adopted the protocol that created the PSC. Chapter 2 of the Protocol states the Council's powers and structures. It states the necessity for the creation of mechanisms to work with the PSC.

The first one is the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), to anticipate and make recommendations to prevent conflicts. This latter works with regional mechanisms, UN agencies, research centers, NGOs.²²⁸ Reports are to be transmitted to the Chairperson of the

²²⁶ Paul Guinness, Geofile for AQA, April 2011.

²²⁷ Michael Clough, Darfur: Whose Responsibility to Protect?, Human Rights Watch,

²²⁸ See Article 12 of the PSC Protocol.

Commission who, in turn, will use them "To advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action."²²⁹

The second mechanism is a genuine African innovation (a group of African Union Wise men), established in 2002 and started to function in 2008. It was formed to support the efforts of the PSC and the UN Security Council and the people of the African Union.

The third mechanism is the African Reserve Force ASF, created in accordance with Article 13 of the PSC. The main role of ASF is prevention and humanitarian aid. In other cases, it may interfere with Articles 4h and 4j of the Constitutive Act. The Protocol on its Establishment provides broad powers in the field of prevention, management and conflict resolution.

The effectiveness of the Peace and Security Agenda in the AU will be the implementation of mechanisms already established under UN resolutions and various AU institutions.

V.1. Functions of Peace and Security Council

The PSC benefits from a wide range of powers derived from the provisions of its protocol of creation and those of the Constitutive Act of the Union. Out of these two basic texts, it provides rules that grant exclusive authority to the Council without any conflict management. Therefore, the functions performed exclusively by the Council in accordance with Article 6 of that Protocol are the following:

- The role of the Council is to promote peace, and security in Africa, which means that the Council must strive to develop a culture of peace for all African citizens; this attribute occupies too much space in (Article 6.)

- The Council deals with the functions of early warning and preventive diplomacy (Article 6 al.1b). These early warning functions consist of an intelligence mission, observation to allow

²²⁹ See Article 12 of the PSC Protocol.

a quick reaction of the operational structure or to open any negotiation. Experience has always shown that the crisis can be resolved more easily when initiatives are taken from the beginning, and solutions are traditionally discussed, negotiations, round tables, which can lead to the signing of an agreement to prevent the escalation of violence. All these processes are called preventive diplomacy because they serve to prevent the spread of conflicts.

- It assumes peacekeeping functions including mediation, and investigation (Article 6.1c.) In its peacekeeping mission, advice is provided for the peaceful settlement of disputes defined by these principles in Article 4a of the Protocol. These means consist of ways to resolve conflicts that are not jurisdictions which are listed above in the provisions of Article 6.²³⁰

The UN Charter in Art. 2 paragraph 3, explains the peaceful means to settle disputes. These peaceful means are enumerated in the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter.

V.2. AU's RECs Partnership for Peace

On another hand, the AU can utilize the relations between globalization, security, and governance to attain its objectives. Prior to signing the Protocol PSC met at AU summit in Durban in 2002 in Addis Ababa, a meeting was held in May. The resolution of the meeting was experiencing the cooperation under the framework the OAU, as well as the goal of the planned cooperation between the regional mechanisms and PSC basically. For example Article 7(j) of the Protocol calls for "close harmonization, co-ordination and co-operation between Regional Mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa."

Furthermore, Article 16 of the PSC Protocol states that "regional mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union". It shows the mechanism of coordination and harmonization of activities in order to ensure effective relations and to take into account "any comparative advantage and the given circumstances." Since its inception in 2004, the Political and Security Committee has been keeping records.

²³⁰ See Article 13 of the PSC Protocol.

Figure 8: African Peace and Security Architecture Diagram (2011)




Figure 1: African Peace and security architecture diagram (Maasdorp 2011)

Source: Yoh, J. G., Institutional Role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Conflict Resolution in Africa. University of South Africa. 2008.

V.3. AU/UN Partnership for Peacekeeping

The African Union (AU) has developed a continental architecture of peace and security, the financing of which represents a major challenge. In the face of increasing demand, the shortage of predictable and sustainable resources, combined with critical operational constraints, severely limits the AU's ability to deliver on its peacekeeping and security commitments on the continent.²³¹


Since 1989, the African Union and the African sub regional organizations have launched eight peacekeeping operations, four of which have led to the implementation of UN missions, and that is still ongoing, has become a hybrid UN operation. These experiences have led to the conclusion that there is a need for operational support to send missions with adequate resources and in a timely manner. In support of this request, the Security Council, in its resolution 1809 of 16 April 2008, endorsed the Secretary-General's proposal to appoint a

²³¹ Cedric de Coning, The Emerging UN/AU Peacekeeping Partnership, *Conflict Trend*, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, www.accord.org.za

group of experts from the African Union and the United Nations to study support measures for peace-support operations in Africa under UN mandate.²³²

In this resolution, the Council recognizes the need to make funding for regional organizations more predictable, sustainable and flexible in organizing UN peace missions. The African Union / UN Expert Group formed on 12 December 2008 formulated conclusions and recommendations aimed at strengthening relations between the two organizations and enabling them to work together effectively in matters of common interest, especially in terms of sustainable financing mechanisms. In September 2009, the UN responded to this report.

Figure 9: Uniformed Personnel Deployed by African Union Member States in UN and AU Missions (Annual)



Source: Partnership peacekeeping: Challenges and opportunities in the United Nations–African Union Relationship, Oxford University Press, 2014

V.4. Recommendations of the Group of Experts

The expert group must consider how UN peacekeeping operations can be supported and, in particular, as the UN and the AU can make more flexibility and flexibility, with the timely

²³² Raheemat Momodu, *African Integration: Resetting the AU-REC Relationship – Policy Options Beyond the Kagame Reform*, *African Peacebuilding Network*, Social Science Research Council, www.ssrc.org

distribution of well-stocked contingents and the effectiveness of their work and structure Partnership between the countries and the AU. With the aim of strengthening cooperation between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council and the secretariat of both organizations. The recommendations focus mainly on the redistribution of relations between the two organizations and the financing of a UN mandate within the UN mission.²³³

V.5- AU/UN Strategic Relations

Through such a relationship the strategic commitment needed to support a common approach to be achieved. In fact, relations between the two organizations suffer from a clear framework of cooperation and, consequently, a lack of clear relations between the Security Council and the CPS. The group concludes there is a need for clear strategic relations between the United Nations and the African Union.²³⁴ Such a relationship requires:

To clarify the relationship between the Security Council and the PSC, as well as between the UN Secretary-General and the African Union Commission, so that responsibilities are clearly defined and the two organizations can benefit from their respective comparative advantages:

- to clarify the relationship between the Security Council and the PSC and between the UN Secretary-General and the African Union Commission, so that responsibilities are clearly defined and the two organizations can profit their respective comparative advantages;
- Jointly conduct a strategic assessment to identify issues of mutual interest that underlie their relationship.
- Exchange of personnel, in particular for departments responsible for financial and logistics management. For this purpose, the AU will have to develop a list of training priorities, particularly in the areas of financial management, logistics and administration.²³⁵

²³³ See Final Reprt of the Security Coubcil, S/2008/647 of 11 November, 2008.

²³⁴ Paul D. Williams and Arthur Boutellis, Partnership peacekeeping: Challenges and opportunities in the United Nations–African Union Relationship, *African Affairs*, Volume 113, Issue 451, 1 April 2014, p.p 254–278.

²³⁵ African Union, AU document, PSC/PR/2.(CCCVII), 9 January 2012, p. 12.

V.5. Financing AU Peacekeeping Missions

For the UN, two funding mechanisms are proposed:

Proceed the assessment of obligatory contributions to finance specific operations. This mechanism aims at reinforcing the pre-eminent role of the Security Council while allowing a wide latitude of action to the regional organization. The case-by-case assessment would support, in kind, for a maximum of six months AU peace operations authorized by the Security Council.²³⁶ Support could include troop transport, troop cost, transmissions and various forms of logistical support. This financing requires that two conditions be met: the approval by the Security Council and the General Assembly and the agreement between the two organizations on the transfer of the operation to the UN within six months.²³⁷

Also the creation a multi-donor trust fund funded by voluntary contributions and placed under African control to finance the African Union's peacekeeping capabilities. This fund would pool funding from various sources and mobilize additional resources on the model of the European Union's financial instrument for peace. The resources mobilized in this framework would be for AU activities related to early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, and institution building.

An effort is also requested from the African organization, which is invited to establish a system for financing its peacekeeping operations through mandatory contributions to its peace fund. It must thus have a comprehensive plan for the establishment of a permanent peace capacity financed by the multi-donor trust fund and managed by a board of directors composed of representatives of the AU and the UN and donors. In addition, the improvement of the financing mechanisms must be accompanied by a strengthening of the financial management organs of the African Union.

²³⁶ Article 53 of the UN Charter states: 'no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council'.

²³⁷ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and guidelines*(DPKO/DFS, New York, NY, 2008), pp. 49–51.

V.6. Logistical Support to AU/UN Peacekeeping Missions

It is proposed:

- That the African Union can benefit from the UN's logistical support base in Brindisi (Italy);
- to establish a close working relationship between the logisticians of the two organizations, including staff exchanges and the transfer of know-how from the United Nations to Africa;
- to organize comprehensive training programs for AU staff and African sub-regional organizations.²³⁸

V.7. Report of the UN Secretary-General of 18 September 2009

The United Nations Secretary-General's assessment of the Panel's recommendations reveals a shift in the search for a more strategic relationship between the United Nations and the African Organization. It notes the steps already taken to implement the recommendations for the financing of peacekeeping operations. However, shortcomings are noted, some of which are the prospects for improvement.

The implementation of good governance, democracy and the rule of law are the objectives of the AU. Without these, the Union would not be different from the OAU. In presenting these values and principles, African leaders made it clear that they were willing to rebuild their identities or to transform from dictators to democrats. However, implementing these principles requires a corruption-free environment at several levels; local, national and continental. Unbridled corruption is likely to harm the ability of the AU to pursue its principles and objectives effectively. Unfortunately, the top-down approach that the AU and NEPAD have adopted to fight corruption is unlikely to eliminate the problem. The task of combating corruption requires cooperation between the AU, African states, international organizations, myth corporations, CSOs and the peoples of Africa.

238 MADELEINE ODZOLO, LA COOPÉRATION ENTRE L'ONU ET L'UNION AFRICAINE SUR LES OPÉRATIONS DE PAIX, RESEAU DE RECHERCHE SUR LES OPERATION DE PAIX, UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL, NOVEMBRE 2009.

In addition, combating corruption requires strategic leadership. Without this leadership, the African states and the AU may not be able to persevere in their principles and objectives, contain corruption and make good use of the complex relations between globalization, security and governance, African states and the leaders of the AU needs. They are ready to work with the business sector and with CSOs to improve good governance. The organs of the Union also play crucial roles in terms of the objectives of the AU and the application of its principles. These bodies also demand strategic leadership. For this reason, the future of the AU depends on its ability to train those who would provide strategic leadership.

Conclusion

Implementing good governance, democracy, and security are main goals of the AU. It's kind of a congress of the OAU. In presenting these values and principles, African leaders have made it clear that they are ready to turn from dictators to democrats. However, the application of these principles requires an environment without corruption at multiple levels, Local, national and continental. The fight against corruption requires cooperation between the AU, African countries, international organizations, CSOs and the people of Africa.

In addition, to attain objectives, a strategic leadership is required. Without this leadership, the AU would not be able to preserve its principles and goals, contain corruption, and use well the complex relationships between globalization, security and governance. The African states and leaders are willing to work with the business sector and civil society organizations to improve good governance. For this reason, the future of the AU depends on its ability to train those who provide strategic guidance.

For peace and security, the African Union has developed a comprehensive approach that includes both military and non-military elements. However, Africa continues to suffer from wars and crises, mainly because of inadequate AU mechanisms to address these issues, and the African civil society organizations are weak. Despite all, the AU's security structure relies on external sources, allowing foreigners to form an African security agenda. Several lessons came from African intervention in Burundi and Darfur. Firstly, African Union troops

faced difficulties since most of the involved member states do not have specialized groups for peace and security operations. Secondly, the African Union has limited capacity to plan, implement and operate peaceful activities²³⁹

Since security and peace issues remain on the continent, AU and its PSC and other security agencies need to review their goals, methods and resources. The African Union must do more to normalize its relations with RECs to make or persuade its members to pay their dues in a timely manner and to involve more civil society organizations in their security and peace-keeping activities. Without these, the aim of finding African solutions to African problems will not be attained.

²³⁹ Douglas H. Johnson, The Crisis in South Sudan, *African Affairs*, Volume 113, Issue 451, 1 April 2014, pp. 300–309.

CHAPTER FOUR

NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism, and 2063 Agenda for African Development

While governance issues were rooted in the structural adjustment program imposed on African countries in the early 1980s, it was only at the 1990s that the African leaders began to openly acknowledge that it was essential, not just due to external powers. It is well known that what happens at the national level in the state and how governments organize and approach their citizens is essential for peace, development, growth and prosperity, and that Africans themselves must own and direct this process a number of new institutions, including the African Union, the PAP, the NEPAD and the APRM. "The ultimate instrument, mutual learning and self-confidence of good governance developed on the continent are already mature."²⁴⁰

²⁴⁰ Samuel Makinda, *African Thinkers and Global Security Agenda*, in *Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective*, ed. Makumi Mwajiru and Okello Okulli, Nairobi, Heinrich Boll Foundation, 2006.

I. NEPAD: A Renewed Approach to Development

Africa's development is a major problem, and efforts to overcome it have not been achieved. African countries, since their independence in the 1960s, have been confronted with chronic and emerging challenges and problems, and if chronic poverty is known and shortened in the triad of poverty, underdevelopment and diseases. The twentieth century, after globalization dominated the international scene, created an urgent need for economic blocs and the formation of an integrated economic and political entity to promote development. Hence, the NEPAD initiative expressed a united and clear African position on the pressing issues of the continent.

The African countries have embarked upon a new initiative stemming from the conscience of their leaders, based on a collective vision and shared conviction that they have an urgent duty to eradicate poverty and put their countries on the path of development, especially if the continent is rich in its vast natural and human resources that guarantee progress and prosperity. An integrated system of harmonious frameworks and policies to promote the continent that lived under the yoke of colonialism that drained its wealth and enslaved its sons.

I.1. Definition of NEPAD

It is a strategic initiative to restructure Africa and rid it of underdevelopment, promote independent development, promote the economy and invest in the African people, and face the current challenges facing the African continent, which are growing poverty, underdevelopment and continued marginalization. Thus, the OAU in Zambia July 2001, the Heads of Founding States or the so-called Big Five (Egypt, Algeria, Senegal, Nigeria and South Africa) designed an integrated structure for the socio-economic development of the continent. The initiative passed several stages and developments until it took its current form, initially Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa launched what they called the Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery (MAP) in late 2000 in Algiers during the 36th OAU Heads of State and Government Conference. In order to solve the problems of the African continent, the "OMEGA" plan, which aims to achieve development in Africa and work to create

continuous development for the peoples of the continent and fight the causes of underdevelopment, began on four pillars: strengthening the infrastructure including information and communication, The two initiatives were then presented to the extraordinary Sirte summit in one initiative - coinciding with the idea of activating the OAU and turning it into the African Union - and was widely accepted by African leaders and called for their integration into one initiative to be presented to international partners.²⁴¹

I.2. Failure of Previous Development Strategies

In the 1960s, the newly free African countries decided to put an end to the economic dependence of the colonial era and to organize for their development. They adopted a self-centered model, based on the paradigm of national modernization, which advocates state intervention in the socio-economic field, industrialization by substitution for imports and the use of international aid.²⁴² However, the strong growth achieved in the early 1970s did not continue in the following decade, which was punctuated by the debt crisis and macroeconomic imbalances. The 1960s were also marked by the rise of regional integration and cooperation and the need to bring the continent together and to be present on the world stage. Few countries ready to found "United States of Africa". The Organization of African Unity was founded on the principles of respect for sovereignty, the territorial integrity and independence of States and non-interference in internal affairs.

If the OAU succeeded in combating colonialism and denounced the apartheid regime in South Africa, it did not play a major role in resolving African economic problems. Its ambitious projects have achieved only modest results. The Lagos Plan of Action was to contribute to the establishment of " a new world economic order and aimed at a socio-economic development of Africa based on self-sufficiency and economic cooperation and integration. Though it raised great hopes, it was rejected by the World Bank and lack of resources, it was not successful. Thus, in 1991, the Treaty of Abuja established the African

²⁴¹ Ali Mazrui, Technological Underdevelopment in the South: The Continuing Cold War, in Principal World Politics: The Challenge of Normative International Relations, ed. Paul Wapner and Lester E. J. Ruiz, Lanham, 2000, p. 275.

²⁴² Calestous Juma, Science, Technology and Economic Growth: Africa's Bio-policy Agenda in the Twenty-first Century, UNU/INRA Annual Lectures on Natural Resources Conservation and Management in Africa, Tokyo and Accra, 2000, p.49.

Economic Community for 2025, a common market on a continental scale based on the regional economic communities.

The lack of African governments in the management of public affairs, the lack of political will, the lack of OAU powers and resources, and inadequate support from donors have defeated these African attempts to organize the development of the continent.

Since the 1980s, reflection on development has been led by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. To solve the crises of developing countries, these institutions have introduced a new strategy based on the paradigm of structural adjustment, advocating economic liberalization, disengagement from the state and openness to international integration into the global economy. Imposed in Africa in the mid-1980s, structural adjustment plans failed to lift these countries to fragile economies, causing an increase in debt and poverty. From the point of view of encouraging and selecting the beneficiaries, the donors have submitted the granting of their aid to the respect of political conditions: democracy, the rule of law and human rights have become rules of basis of their cooperation policies.²⁴³ These externally imposed strategies have kept the South economically dependent and have generally failed due to a lack of internal management and donor coordination and, above all, lack of relevance to African realities and needs of populations and ownership by beneficiaries.²⁴⁴

In a search for aid effectiveness, new thinking on development was carried out in the late 1990s to enable all developing countries (DCs) to take advantage of globalization. Donors then base their so-called anti-poverty strategies on the establishment of a new partnership based on the "appropriation" of their development by the developing countries and the sharing of responsibilities between them, the industrialized countries and the institutions international organizations.²⁴⁵ In 2000, the international community set eight Millennium Development

²⁴³ Robert Cox, *Social Forces, State and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, in Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p.207.

²⁴⁴ Philip Nel and Patrick J. Mc Gowan, eds., *Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Textbook for Africa*, Cape Town, Cape Town University Press, 1999, p. 211.

²⁴⁵ Bigsten, A. and A. Shimeles, *Can Africa Reduce Poverty by Half by 2015? Development Policy Review* 25(2), 2007, pp147-166.

Goals (MDGs) to be achieved to reduce poverty by 2015 (8) and is committed to addressing Africa's special needs and support its efforts to overcome underdevelopment.²⁴⁶

I.3. African Vision of Development

In this spirit of searching new solutions, Africa takes over its development. In 1999, it launched the reform of the OAU to create a true political unity on the Continent and in 2000, in Lomé, Togo, the leaders of fifty-three countries created the AU.²⁴⁷ It is presented as a more ambitious pan-African organization than the OAU and guarantees a less fictitious process of political, economic and social integration on the Continent. It is thus charged with addressing the challenges of globalization and the new millennium and allowing the continent to play an effective role in the global economy. It is also more demanding in its mission to promote democracy, human rights, peace and security on the continent. However, to succeed, it must not be merely an "OAU bis".²⁴⁸

As part of this reform, NEPAD is simultaneously promoted and based on the same idea of freeing the continent from conflict and underdevelopment: it can be considered as its ideological driving force. It is essentially inspired by the MAP (Millennium Africa Program) of the South African President Thabo Mbeki and the OMEGA Plan of Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, who were joined by the Algerian Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika, the Nigerian Olesgun Obasanjo and the Egyptian Hosni Mubarak. These plans were merged into the New African Initiative (NAI), which was adopted by the OAU Summit in Lusaka in July 2001 and officially became the new Africa Common Framework for Development in October 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria, and has been renamed NEPAD.²⁴⁹

It is based on a new state of mind in relation to previous plans, in that it affirms the political will of Africa to find resolutions to its problems and its aspiration to no longer be marginalized. Thus, the impulse and inspiration are entirely African: NEPAD is "a promise

²⁴⁶ Adedeji, Adebayo, From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African Development and from the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither Africa? Keynote Address prepared for the African Forum for Envisioning Africa. Nairobi, Kenya 26-29 April 2002.

²⁴⁷ Gibb, R., Hughes, T., Mills, G. and Vaahtoranta, Charting a new course: globalisation, African Recovery and the New Africa Initiative. Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2002.

²⁴⁸ Bond, P., Fanon's Warning: a civil society reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development, Trenton, Africa World Press, 2002.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

made by African leaders, based on a common vision, as well as a firm and shared conviction that it is their urgent duty to eradicate poverty, to place their countries, individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, while actively participating in the world economy and political life "(§ 1). In addition, put back to the center of development issues, Africans are responsible for its implementation: it is anchored "in the determination of Africans to extirpate themselves and their continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and the exclusion of a planet in the process of globalization" by African standards of liberalization and good governance advocated by donors. Some wonder whether it is actually a new form of the "Washington consensus".²⁵⁰ The alter globalists consider that it "must distinguish itself from the neo-liberal model, which is one of the main causes of the impoverishment of Africa."²⁵¹ Finally, it insists in an original way on the necessity of a renewed partnership between all economic, social, state and non-state actors at national, regional and international levels.

This African response to international demands has satisfied the industrialized countries, which have echoed it in the other plans (see below). Paradoxically, this initiative has not been unanimous on the African continent, where it was originally marked by an opposition between Anglophone and Francophone countries and divergences between the liberal conception of President Wade and that of President Mbeki, who called for a new Marshall plan. Many, not having been associated with its development, also saw the expression of the ambitions of South Africa and Nigeria. Similarly, the population felt little involved in this umpteenth initiative: while civil society was consulted for the elaboration of the AU, NEPAD remained confined from the beginning in the sphere of the executive.²⁵²

²⁵⁰ World Bank, Comprehensive Development Framework (Brochure), *World Bank*, Washington DC., 2000.

²⁵¹ Bhagwati, J. Poverty and Public Policy, *World Development* Vol.16, No.5, 1996, pp.539-555.

²⁵² Limao, N, and A. Venables , Infrastructure, Geographical Disadvantage,Transport Cost and Trade, *World Bank Economic Review*, **15**, 2001, pp. 451-479.

I.4. NEPAD as African Initiative

The text of NEPAD opens with the Declaration of Intent of Heads of States which confirms that:

The degradation of Africans to extract themselves, as well as their continents, from a sense of discontent over underdevelopment and the exclusion of a planet in the context of globalization. NEPAD is not part of the traditional approach to insisting on foreign aid, on the contrary at the heart of these strategies, African leaders and people must be actors in their history.²⁵³

NEPAD, therefore, highlights a process of African ownership of its development and demonstrates a willingness to change the way Africans understand their problems. Based on direct ownership of economic and social development by the countries concerned, the new partnership expresses the desire of these countries to define their own strategies independently of the Breton Woods institutions and other international partners.²⁵⁴

This initiative, although promising and globally supported by the international community, could nevertheless suffer from a lack of credibility due to similar past attempts that have proved unsuccessful (failure to implement the Lagos Plan, blocking the 1991 Abuja Treaty.) This is why the African heads of state, who are the authors of the NEPAD project, emphasize that they are driven by a strong desire to bring about change.²⁵⁵ To this end, they highlighted some new developments, such as the continued spread of democracy on the Continent and the emergence of circumstances conducive to the realization of development programs. These include the potential benefits of the global technological revolution, which will depend, however, on the ability to tackle the "digital divide" and the emergence of new concepts within the framework of international relations such as the right to development and the eradication of poverty.

²⁵³ African Union, Integration of NEPAD into the Structures and Processes of the African Union: A joint Proposal by the African Union Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat, African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 2007.

²⁵⁴ Gelb, S., NEPAD: Opportunities and Challenges, in R. Gibb, T. Hughes, G. Mills and T. Vaahtoranta, eds., *Charting a New Course: Globalization, African Recovery and the New Africa*, 2002.

²⁵⁵ Mkandawire T., Thinking about Developmental States in Africa, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, Vol. 25, 2001, pp.289–313.

What is the content of the initiative? AU member states, through their commitments under NEPAD, have set a common goal of enabling Africa to catch up with the developed regions of the world. The aim of the program is to put an end to the marginalization of the continent and to allow African economies to enter the world economy. This integration will be reflected in economic growth, job development, diversification of production activities, enhanced international competitiveness, increased exports, and reduced poverty and inequality.²⁵⁶

To achieve this goal, the new partnership is based on an economic policy that focuses on the private sector and the market economy. As a development plan, NEPAD seeks first and foremost the development of Africa's markets and their integration into global markets, with very close involvement of the private sector. To this end, it envisages the creation of a healthy environment favorable to local entrepreneurs and proposes to develop micro-enterprises and SMEs. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade must be promoted. The promotion of the market economy must be achieved through an action program (presented below) to achieve a number of goals specifically identified in the NEPAD text:

- Achieving average annual growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by more than 7 per cent and remain there for the next 15 years. This target refers to the target of halving by 2015 the percentage of extreme poverty (less than US \$ 1 income per capita per day) of which it is the necessary prerequisite. Despite the fact that, according to economists, the condition is essential for at least a catch-up process to take place in view of population growth (2.8%), continuous growth of 7% per year appears to some as excessively ambitious. Such a level of growth on the continent presupposes that financing capacities are difficult to mobilize at present.
- Ensuring that the continent achieves the agreed international development goals

The International Development Goals (IDG) defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which were the subject of a as part of the United Nations Millennium Declaration 7 in September 2000, constitute the other goals of the signatory states of NEPAD:

²⁵⁶ Arthur, K., NEPAD and African Development: The Musings of an Academic Pessimist, paper presented at the 14th Biennial Congress of the African Association of Political Science (AAPS), Durban, 2003.

- Reduce by half, from 1990 to 2015, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty.
- Ensuring the schooling of all children of primary school age by 2015.
- Progress towards gender equality, including the elimination of disparities in enrollment in primary and secondary education by 2005.
- Reducing infant and child mortality rates by two thirds from 1990 to 2015.
- Reducing maternal mortality rates by three quarters from 1990 to 2015
- Ensuring that all those in need have access to reproductive health services by 2015.
- Implementing, from 2005, regional strategies for sustainable development; so that, the loss of ecological resources was offset by 2015.²⁵⁷

I.5. New Partnership with Developed Countries

While the New Partnership for Africa's Development is an African-inspired initiative, it is not limited to intra-continental cooperation. On the contrary, the implementation of NEPAD is part of an open dialogue with the continent's many partners.²⁵⁸

The project is seen as an opportunity to establish new cooperative relations based on the principle of accountability with regard to development objectives. There are two major arguments. First, the signatories of the project, while acknowledging the lack of African leadership in the face of development challenges, invite developed countries to accept their own responsibility, which stems from their historical participation in the impoverishment of Africa.²⁵⁹ The authors of NEPAD insist on the legacy of colonialism in which they see the cause of the continent's hemorrhaging of resources and their non-use for development. They also assert that the colonial phenomenon manifested itself at the time of independence by a

²⁵⁷ Bigsten, A. and A. Shimeles , *Op. cit.* pp. 81-102.

²⁵⁸ Karingi, S., N. Oulmane, M. Sadni-Jallab, R. Lang, and R. Perez ,*Assessment of the Impact of the Economic Partnership Agreement Between ECOWAS Countries and the European Union*, *African Trade Centre Working Paper* No. 29, ECA, 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

²⁵⁹ Fields G., *Distribution and Development: A New Look at the Developing Countries*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2001.

shortage of qualified professionals and a virtual non-existence of the capitalist class leading to the weakening of the accumulation process.²⁶⁰

Structural adjustment programs during the post-colonial period are also identified as one of the factors of the growing economic marginalization of the African continent. Moreover, NEPAD justifies the obligation of solidarity it wishes to impose on the international community by presenting Africa as "an indispensable resource base that serves all mankind". These resources are grouped into four components:

- A rich complex of mineral, oil and gas deposits, its flora and fauna and its vast natural habitat still intact, which provide the basis for mining, agriculture and tourism
- The ecological 'lung' provided by the continent's tropical forests and the minimal presence of environmentally harmful emissions and effluents
- Paleontological and archaeological sites, which contain evidence of the evolution of the land, human life and species, natural habitats, which contain a wide variety of flora and fauna, and unoccupied open spaces.
- The richness of African culture and its contribution to the variety of the cultures of the universe. ²⁶¹

On the basis of this usefulness and the resulting accountability of the global community, NEPAD states that Africa's partners need to engage more deeply in the continent's development and consider a series of obligations for developed countries and multilateral institutions. Examples include the obligation to accelerate the reduction of the decline in ODA flows to Africa, and the need to ensure access to markets in developed countries in more equitable conditions for products from developing countries.²⁶²

²⁶⁰ Abimbola Agboluaje, Europe's global ambitions and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD): of what relevance is the *Politique Africaine*? Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 5, 2005.

²⁶¹ NEPAD: A Program of the African Union, African Union, Abuja, Nigeria, October 2001.

²⁶² African Union, Integration of NEPAD into the Structures and Processes of the African Union: A joint Proposal by the African Union Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat, African Union, 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

In concrete terms, the new partnership must be translated into a refocusing of aid policies towards national programs drawn up by African countries. The essence of the new partnership is to provide assistance to enable Africans to carry out the projects they themselves have undertaken. This rebalancing in the dialogue will be manifested by the adoption of the principle of symmetry, which implies in particular the part of the donors to submit their methods of development aid to the criticism of the partners and beneficiaries of Africa. The concept of partnership presupposes that the discussion between actors takes place on an equal footing. In this respect, a mutual monitoring mechanism is considered to be of primary importance.

Finally, NEPAD raises the question of its interaction with existing initiatives and the risks of inconsistency that may result.

The European Union has already committed itself through numerous instruments of cooperation. The Cairo Summit (1999) between the EU and Africa resulted in the definition of an action plan with its own monitoring mechanism. The Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000 and being ratified, provides its own answers for the ACP countries. For North Africa, the EU intervenes in the framework of the Barcelona process and the MEDA program. It also adopted a specific approach for LDCs with the Everything but Arms initiative.²⁶³

The United States has also developed its own development assistance strategy with the US Growth and Trade Act. Japan proposed the Tokyo Plan of Action in consultation with the United Nations and the World Coalition for Africa. In addition, the lack of cohesion between NEPAD and the approach favored by the Breton Woods institutions under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) should be noted. The two initiatives are based on logics that are not necessarily in phase. Although they are both focused on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the methods used to achieve them differ in several respects. The clearest contradiction lies in the opposition between the regionalized approach of NEPAD and the country approach endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank.

²⁶³ Ian Taylor, Governance and Relations between the European Union and Africa: the case of NEPAD, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 31, 2010-Issue 1: *Governance, Development and the South: contesting AU policies*.

The new partnership for the development of Africa is also part of the long-term (achievement of the objectives by 2015) and contrasts this with PRSPs, which, although renewable, are three-year documents. Finally, of the five NEPAD countries, only two benefited from the PRSP approach (Senegal and Nigeria). In this context, the integrated management of the two initiatives seems rather difficult.²⁶⁴

Thus, despite the willingness of African States to establish links and synergies between NEPAD and other instruments of cooperation, the adoption of this new partnership will necessarily involve reflections on the rationalization of the various approaches.

In order to achieve this new partnership and to achieve the objectives set, African Heads of State are relying on an action program entitled "African Strategy for Sustainable Development in the 21st Century".

I.5. Lack of Strategy Programs

The NEPAD document is more of a political vision than a vision of development and the question of its translation into operational terms arises. In the current state of the plan, the practical arrangements remain imprecise and do not make it possible to discern specific priorities in the investments to be made. The NEPAD program of action does not yet reveal a true strategy, but is rather a package of needs, elements, sequenced or rationalized.²⁶⁵

However, the evolving nature of the action plan must be emphasized. The New Partnership for Africa's Development does not claim to be a finalized project. Rather, it is a process in progress. The technical modalities are intended to be determined as and when the consultation between the Member States of the African Union on the one hand and between them and their international partners on the other hand.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Hope S. and Kempe R., Prospects and Challenges for the New Partnership for Africa's Development: Addressing Capacity Deficits, *Journal of Comparative African Studies*, **24** (2), May, 2006, pp. 203-228.

This program first presents the conditions required for achieving sustainable development and a list of sectoral priorities. It then focuses on resource mobilization and the implementation of the new partnership.

I.7. Prior Conditions and Sectoral Priorities

The NEPAD text identifies three prerequisites for successful take-off in Africa.

I.7.1 Establishing and Maintaining Peace and Security

The first of these conditions concerns the assurance of peace and security on the continent. African States affirm their intention to take responsibility for the promotion of security in their territories and insist on this in four key areas in which efforts must be made. These include conflict prevention and resolution, research and peacekeeping, reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction, and combating the illicit proliferation of small arms and landmines.²⁶⁶

Preventing conflicts that have been one of the main obstacles to development in the past is absolutely essential to enable African and foreign investors to invest in the continent. From a practical point of view, the effort must be reflected in the reactivation of the organs responsible for the prevention and resolution of conflicts. The aim is to strengthen the capacity of African mechanisms to promote peace and security on the continent.²⁶⁷

A subcommittee chaired by South Africa and dealing specifically with this issue was established within the Implementation Committee.

NEPAD does not propose concrete measures to implement the peace and security initiative. It is expected that these will be developed within six months of the establishment of NEPAD. Thus, despite strong political commitment in favor of this first condition, the implementation modalities and sources of funding remain to be determined.

²⁶⁶Sunday Okello and Mesfin Gebremichael, *African-centered Solutions: Building Peace and Security in Africa*, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, 2016, pp.21-47.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.* pp.51-7

I.7.2. Good Political and Economic Governance

The issue of governance is a major aspect of NEPAD. Problems related to governance often lead to dysfunctions in terms of aid inefficiency and the unattractive investment climate. The document explicitly mentions that Africans must meet the challenges of political and economic governance.²⁶⁸

At the political level, the main objectives are to respect global standards of democracy (political pluralism, periodic organization of free, fair and transparent democratic elections). Respect for human rights and the rule of law are also highlighted.

On the economic front, NEPAD intends to "promote tangible, time-bound programs to improve the quality of economic management and public finance and corporate governance in all African countries" 10. Tangible measures have been taken to this end, notably through the adoption of eight codes and standards of good economic governance (codes and standards for Economic and Corporate Governance for Africa).²⁶⁹

The NEPAD text makes it necessary to respect the objectives of good governance to strengthen the political and administrative framework of the participating countries. The African project cannot be achieved without improving the political and economic management capacities of States. Capacity building begins with the adoption of a series of institutional reforms. These should be aimed at strengthening parliamentary control, promoting direct and participatory democracy, combating corruption and reforming the civil service and administration. On the other hand, the creation of a mechanism for reciprocal monitoring is foreseen and has already been the subject of a proposal for a report in the framework of the Implementation Committee. This mechanism assumes that the policies of each state can be subject to peer review (African Peer Review Mechanism.)²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ David Mehdi Hamam, Improving Africa's governance, before it's too late, *AfricaRenwal*, 15 December, 2011.

²⁶⁹ Arthur, K., NEPAD and African Development: The Musings of an Academic Pessimist, Op.cit.p 112.

²⁷⁰ Harald Heubaum, Making the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Work, *Working Paper FG 6, 2005*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, 2005.

The peer review approach involves regular consultations in order to take stock of macroeconomic and structural policies. The introduction of such a mechanism, therefore, requires the resuscitation of the existing regional and sub-regional structures within which control can be carried out. Within the framework of NEPAD, African States undertake to create and strengthen national, regional and continental structures that support good governance.²⁷¹ They are also fully aware that the credibility of the future monitoring mechanism implies that the management of the related technical aspects should be entrusted to an independent African institution separate from the political bodies.

I.7.3. Regionalization of Development

The issues of governance discussed above and the solutions proposed by NEPAD bear witness to the importance of the regional dimension of the plan.

But this regional approach is manifested above all by the objective of economic integration of the different African spaces. NEPAD recognizes that African countries need to pool their resources and promote regional cooperation and regional economic integration in order to improve their competitiveness at the international level. A logic of organizing African solidarities must be established through the strengthening of regional economic integration agreements. This is the third requirement for the continent's marginalization to be halted. Such integrated development management must, among other things, make it possible to combat the "balkanization" of the continent, to ensure the implementation of economies of scale and to initiate a dynamic of diversification of production.²⁷²

However, this initiative raises the issue of the legitimacy and capacities of organizations to support the process of regionalization of development. NEPAD plans to consolidate the Continent's five regional economic groupings: West Africa, North Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Madagascar. The difficulty arises from

²⁷¹ African Peer Review Mechanism, *Country Review Report of the Republic of Ghana*, NEPAD Secretariat, Midrand, South Africa, 2005.

²⁷² Grimm S & E Gyimah-Boadi, Regional organisations and incentives to improve governance: The APRM experience, with particular reference to Ghana, Overseas Development Institute Working Paper, 4. London: ODI, April 2008.

the fact that the integration processes, which are very unequal, have not been carried out according to this geographical breakdown. Moreover, within these large groupings there are multiple regional organizations that compete. This is the case in West Africa, where UEMOA and ECOWAS overlap. Problems of overlap are also found at COMESA, SADC and EAC.²⁷³

A rationalization of the institutional framework of economic integration is, therefore, necessary. If NEPAD calls for such rationalization, it does not define the modalities of implementation. The action plan finally proposes that special efforts be made to improve the management capacities of the regional institutions.

I.8. Sectoral Priorities

The NEPAD document lists several priority areas for focus on African countries and their international partners. These priorities are not hierarchical and, therefore, do not constitute the different stages of a development strategy. NEPAD presents itself as an enumeration of the continent's needs in different key sectors. However, it stresses the need for intervention in the area of infrastructure and human capital. The issue of infrastructure is undoubtedly the major focus of NEPAD. Considered as essential parameters of economic growth, infrastructure needs to be developed to bridge the gap that exists between Africa and the developed countries.

1.8.1. Infrastructure

The issue of infrastructure is undoubtedly the major focus of NEPAD. Considered as essential parameters of economic growth, it needs to be developed in order to bridge the gap that exists at this level between Africa and the developed countries.²⁷⁴

NEPAD argues in terms of "gap" in infrastructure provision in African countries. To remedy this situation, four objectives have been identified:

²⁷³ OAU (Organisation of African Unity), The New Partnership for Africa's Development: The African Peer Review Mechanism. Durban: OAU, 8 July 2002, paras. 1–3, p. 1.

²⁷⁴ Tawfik, R. and Kajee, A., NEPAD and APRM: Can They Deliver on Good Governance and Development in Africa, paper presented at the 15th AAPS Biennial Conference, Cairo, 2005.

- Improving access to infrastructure and make it more affordable and reliable for both businesses and households.
- Improving regional cooperation and trade through better cross-border infrastructure connections (it should be mentioned that NEPAD is committed to focusing on regional or continental infrastructure)
- Increasing investment in infrastructure by reducing the risks that private investors face.
- Building the right skills base in technology and engineering to install, operate and maintain solid infrastructure networks in Africa.²⁷⁵

In addition to these general objectives for basic infrastructure, the action program includes sector-specific development strategies. The first step is to fight the digital divide by investing in information and communication technologies. With the new partnership, African countries are hoping to double the density of telephone lines by the year 2008.²⁷⁶ In terms of energy, NEPAD aims, in particular, to integrate electricity transmission networks and gas pipelines to facilitate cross-border flows of energy or exploit the hydroelectric potential of river basins in Africa. The planned development of transport infrastructure should make it possible to reduce the delays in cross-border movement of people, goods and services. In terms of water management, the establishment of new infrastructures is considered essential in order to ensure its sanitation and sustainable access, address the climate threat efficiently or increase irrigated and rain fed agriculture.

All the needs expressed by NEPAD in terms of infrastructures raise questions about their financing. The action program recognizes that, in the face of inadequate aid and credit, the improvement of African infrastructure will have to be based on foreign private financing. It appears that the approach advocated by NEPAD leads to an over-estimation of needs in relation to the financial capacities of African countries and also raises the question of the maintenance of the infrastructures put in place. Assuming that half of the infrastructure needs are met, the current level of development on the continent would not ensure coverage of

²⁷⁵ Christian Kingombe, Hard and Soft Infrastructure Development in Africa: Implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in Africa, Multi-year Expert Meeting, Geneva, 1-3 July 2014.


²⁷⁶ World Bank, *World Development Report, 2007*, World Bank, Washington DC., 2007.

equipment maintenance costs. There is therefore a risk of high recurring charges for the implementation of infrastructure.²⁷⁷

I.8.2. African Development Bank (ADB) Project Portfolio in Support of Regional Integration

Total approvals amounted to AU 956.2 million (over 25 percent of total investment and including AU 812.0 million for loans and grants, AU 133.6 million for private equity and AU 10.6 million for special funds in 2012, with a sizeable private sector component (14 percent). The loan and grant component saw a 10.4 percent increase between 2011 and 2012. Among low income RMCs, the demand for monitoring projects exceeds the resources available under the African Development Fund (ADF). Nevertheless, a substantial amount of ADF-XIII resources was allocated to monitoring projects, amounting to AU 683.1 million (AU 310.8 million in grants and AU 372.3 million in loans) (ADB, 2013).²⁷⁸

Figure10: AfDB Total Approvals Project Portfolio in Support of Regional Integration



Source: Kingombe and Hodkinson. 2013.

²⁷⁷ Ernest Harsch, *NEPAD: Le temps de l'action*, *AfricaRenewal*, January, 2010.

²⁷⁸ **Regional integration** is a central pillar of the Bank's TYS and as such, over the last five years the AfDB has undertaken a total of 70 regional projects, with a combined value of UA 2.9 billion (USD 4.5 billion). Nonetheless, while this is a considerable sum, it remains less than 10% of the Bank's total operations portfolio over the same period, holding roughly constant year on year.

I.8.3 Human Capital Development

Africa is characterized, among other things, by the low level of human capital accumulation. To remedy this situation, NEPAD is considering several actions. First, multilaterally defined poverty reduction objectives in the framework of the Comprehensive Development Framework are reaffirmed. African states also announce their intention to take specific account of the problem of poverty among women. Another initiative for strengthening human capital is at the level of education.²⁷⁹ African Heads of State are aware that education is a prerequisite and a prerequisite for the development process. That is why NEPAD advocates a sustained effort in favor of education infrastructures to overcome the inadequate facilities and training systems. The international goal of development aimed at achieving universal primary education by the year 2015.²⁸⁰ The reversal of the tendency to brain drain is also a major issue. NEPAD hopes that strategies will be developed to retain the human capacities needed for Africa's development on the continent.²⁸¹

Finally, given the conviction that it will be impossible to truly develop the continent's human resources as long as communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS or malaria are not eradicated, NEPAD makes health a priority. It encourages African countries to increase the place of health care in their budgets and also supports the process of obtaining medicines at affordable prices.²⁸²

²⁷⁹ Zipporah Mizau, [Africa grapples with huge disparities in education](#), *AfricaRenewal*, 28 December, 2017.

²⁸⁰ Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, [25 Years of Human Development, an African Perspective](#), United Nations Development Programme, 2015.

²⁸¹ Ihuoma Atanga, [Naija Beta: A look at diaspora Africans finding their place back home](#), *AfricaRenewal*, 3 AUG 2017.

²⁸¹ Matshidiso Moeti, [We can improve health systems in Africa](#), *AfricaRenewal*, Dec 2016.

²⁸² Rekha Mehra and Mary Hill Rojas, [Women, Food Security and Agriculture in a Global Marketplace](#), *International Center for Research on Women*, Asia Regional Office, www.icrw.org

I.8.4. Other Priority Areas

Because of the rural character of the majority of the populations of Africa, there are special considerations for agriculture.²⁸³ NEPAD draws attention to the disaffection of international aid in the agricultural sector and hopes to reverse this negative trend. The Action Plan stresses the need to increase the purchasing power of rural populations in order to stimulate growth dynamics. Improving the productivity of the agro-industrial sector must also be sought. In the short term, efforts must focus on the problem of food security.

The development of rural infrastructure, particularly irrigation infrastructure, is NEPAD's main response to all these challenges. In terms of environmental protection, eight priority interventions are listed, including combating desertification and invasive alien species, protecting wetlands, organizing coastal management and creating cross-border protection zones of the environment. Culture, science and technology are the other sectors for which interventions are deemed priorities by NEPAD.²⁸⁴

The African project, therefore, proposes a considerable field of action. Its implementation will be all the more difficult since the participating states in NEPAD will have to find common ground on all the areas mentioned. The priorities it contains are also not prioritized and therefore should be treated on an equal footing. This has strong implications in terms of resource mobilization since the resources made available will have to cover all the stated needs.

²⁸³ Jenny Clover, Food Security in sub-saharan Africa, *African Security Review*, January, 2003, pp.5-15.

²⁸⁴ Fraser, A. and Mousseau, F., The Time is Now: How World Leaders Should Respond to the Food Price Crisis, *Oxfam Briefing Note*. 3 June, The World Bank 2008

I.8.5. Resources Mobilization and Capital Flow

The project shows that the mobilization of resources must be made on the one hand through incentives for capital flows and on the other hand by working for better access to markets.

The NEPAD document states that the continent alone needs to fill an annual deficit of \$64 billion for the international development goals alone. This figure, although it does not correspond to an evaluation of the funding to be collected, makes it possible to better understand the importance of the efforts to be undertaken.

Several resources are identified that can be grouped into two categories. Resources required in the short or medium term. This is primarily debt reduction. NEPAD "seeks to achieve debt relief that goes beyond current levels, which still impose debt service payments that contribute significantly to the deficit". It should be noted that the document leaves priority in this area to pre-existing initiatives such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) mechanism. The objective of the initiative is to negotiate with creditor governments to improve the HIPC process. One way forward would be to set the debt service ceilings as a proportion of budget revenues.

All 36 countries that have reached decision point under the HIPC Initiative have now reached the completion point. In April 2015, Chad became the latest country to reach the completion point and qualified for irrevocable debt relief.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁵ For further details, see "Chad: Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative - Completion Point Document and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative" May 13, 2015.

**Figure 11: List of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(As of end-September 2015)**

Afghanistan	Congo,	Dem. Rep. of the Haiti
Niger		
Benin	Congo,	Rep. of Honduras
Rwanda	Bolivia	Côte d'Ivoire
Sao Tomé and Príncipe		Liberia
Madagascar		Burkina Faso
Gambia,	Senegal	Ethiopia
Cameroon	The Malawi	Burundi
Tanzania	Ghana	Sierra Leone
Mauritania		Mali
Guinea-Bissau	Central African Republic	Guinea
Comoros	Togo	Chad
Zambia	Mozambique	Uganda
	Guyana	Nicaragua
3 Pre-Decision-Point HIPC^{2/}		
Eritrea		Somalia
Sudan ³		
1/ Countries that have qualified for irrevocable debt relief under the HIPC Initiative.		
2/ Countries that are eligible or potentially eligible and may wish to avail themselves of the HIPC Initiative and the Multi-Partner Fund.		

NEPAD also aims to "obtain an increase in the flow of official development assistance in the medium term and to transform the delivery system so that these resources can be used more efficiently by the countries of Africa benefiting from it."²⁸⁶ At the level of the measures to be implemented, it is planned to create a "Forum of the APD" through which could be negotiated with the donor institutions the elaboration of a charter. This charter would serve as a basis for the development partnership. Funding for development in the short to medium term must also be based on the development of internal resources. The draft states the intent of

²⁸⁶ Ernest Harsh, Foreign Investments on Africa's Agenda: NEPAD Aims to Attract a Larger Share of Global Capital Flows, *Africa Recovery*, Vol.17/2, 2003,

countries in Africa to initiate reforms to improve the collection of tax revenues (the tax base is steadily declining as a result of the phasing out of tariffs).²⁸⁷

NEPAD also emphasizes the crucial role of national saving. The inadequacy of the latter, hampers investment in local markets. In this respect, priority is given to the fight against capital flight. To encourage nationals to conserve their wealth on the continent, several measures are recommended. These are the same as those aimed at attracting foreign direct investment and, thus, increasing private capital inflows. Private capital flows, resources for the long term. For the long term, NEPAD considers that Africa will only be able to ensure its development through the foreign direct investment it has been able to draw. The action program states that "the first priority will be to address the perception of Africa by investors as a "high-risk "continent".²⁸⁸

Minimizing risks and associated insecurity can be achieved through "credit guarantee schemes", as well as by consolidating regulatory and legislative frameworks for investment. Securing goods, people and transactions will be the trigger for foreign investment.

The strengthening of private capital flows could also be based on the development of partnerships between the private sector and the public authorities.

Finally, the text provides for a rationalization of domestic financial markets through harmonization and integration across borders.

I.8.1 Access to Markets

NEPAD relies on a liberal vision of development and sees market access as a key issue. Several actions are envisaged in different economic sectors such as agriculture, extractive industries, manufacturing, services and tourism. It emphasizes the diversification of

²⁸⁷ Asiedu, E, Foreign direct investment to Africa: The role of government policy, governance and political instability, Department of Economics, University of Kansas, 2003, <http://people.ku.edu/>

²⁸⁸ Naudé, WA and Krugell, WF, "Foreign investment in Africa: Do institutions and geography matter?", Paper Presented at the Conference of the Economic of South Africa, September 2003, Somerset West.

production. To penetrate markets, African economies have to diversify, relying in particular on the production of capital goods with high value added.²⁸⁹

NEPAD also calls for assistance to strengthen Africa's national and regional capacities in the area of multilateral trade negotiations. An increased partnership in the technical regulations of the developed countries is also advocated. These regulations are often felt to be unnecessarily complicated by many African countries.

Finally, export promotion is seen as vital to improving market access both at the continental and global levels. On the continent, intra-African trade must be sought and regional trade agreements strengthened. At the international level, NEPAD seeks to develop facilitation agreements on access of African products to markets around the world. Moreover, African Heads of State are calling for the elimination of non-tariff barriers, which constitute a major obstacle to the entry of competitive African products (this concerns mainly the agricultural sector) in the markets of the developed countries.²⁹⁰

I.9. Political Dialogue with the International Community

In order to succeed in a satisfactory assistance relationship, NEPAD advocates the establishment of a genuine partnership with industrialized countries and multilateral institutions based on the sharing of responsibilities for the achievement of development objectives (§ 185). In the post-9/11 world context, poverty appears to be one of the causes of terrorism, and from then on "a lasting ignorance of the difficulties of a region can only be at the peril of rich countries".²⁹¹ The struggle for development has thus become a global priority and NEPAD, "the framework within which the international community, and in particular the

²⁸⁹ James Gathii, A Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa's Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development, *Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 179, Spring 2003. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=556787>

²⁹⁰ T.C. Venkat Subramanian, Promoting Export Diversification in Africa: Traditional Financing Techniques and Innovative Options, Afreximbank, Cairo, 2008, pp. 17-29, www.afreximbank.com

²⁹¹ Roadmap 2014-2017, Fourth EU-Africa Summit, 2-3 April 2014, Brussels.

United Nations system, must concentrate its efforts on the development of Africa." The international financial institutions and the developed countries have adopted many measures to support the development of the continent. For example, the American Growth and Trade Act (AGTA) or the dialogue with the European Union, which was launched in 2000 in Cairo, continues through various instruments of cooperation (the Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership with North Africa, the Everything but Arms initiative for the least developed countries.) To avoid inconsistencies, NEPAD will have to articulate with these initiatives.²⁹²

The priorities of the African program are the subject of regular consultations with the international community. Since the Summits of Okinawa in 2000 and Genoa in 2001, its main support is that of the Group of Industrialized Countries (G8), led here by France and Japan. In 2002, the Kananaskis Summit endorsed NEPAD and adopted an Africa Action Plan establishing a framework for development cooperation and partnership. The G8 countries are committed to supporting the political, economic and social objectives of NEPAD for which they can provide added value. This plan of action is not a "Marshall Plan for Africa", but a political agreement. The industrialized countries are committed to implementing "strengthened partnerships" with peer-reviewed African countries for their progress in terms of good governance, making Africa fear the use of NEPAD as a new instrument of conditionality.²⁹³ By focusing the first chapter of their plan on the issue of promoting peace and stability on the continent, they highlighted what they saw as the best interests of NEPAD, its security component. In June 2003, the Evian Summit, under the French Presidency, gave impetus to NEPAD in this area, insisting on the necessary technical and financial strengthening of African peacekeeping capacities in Ivory Coast, or in the Democratic Republic of Congo, through a multinational force under UN mandate and French command, have intervened militarily in support of African and UN operations. In 2004, € 250 million

²⁹² Adams Oloo, The Place of Africa in the International Community: Prospects and Obstacles, *Open Access Library Journal*, Vol.03 No.04(2016), Article ID:69185, <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

²⁹³ Alemazung, J.A. Post-Colonial Colonialism: An Analysis of International Factors and Actors Marring African Socio-Economic and Political Development, *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 3, 2010, pp. 16-25.

from the European Development Fund should be earmarked for the EU's "African Peace Facility" to support operations under the AU.²⁹⁴

Nevertheless, answers to Africa's inquiries are still insufficient. The Evian Summit reviewed the actions undertaken in support of NEPAD; apart from peace and a budget for the fight against AIDS, it has reaffirmed in particular the commitments already made in international forum on the many subjects dealt with. Concrete actions reflecting the promises of the industrialized countries to Africa are still difficult to obtain. Thus, after a steady decline in the ODA of rich countries to the developing countries, the end of the Cold War and the East-West opposition made them lose their strategic interest. G8 members committed to allocating to NEPAD Africa at least half of the additional US \$12 billion a year by 2006. As the main donor to developing countries, the European Union must raise its ODA to 0.39% of its GDP for 2006 and the EU devoted 41% of its total aid to Africa in 2001. If the spirit is there now, this goal must become a reality instead of a political and moral reference, for all the rich countries and not only for some of them."²⁹⁵

Sub-Saharan Africa's total external debt is now US \$ 335 billion, some of which is criticized for its illegal nature by African leaders like President Wade. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, strengthened in 1999, must restore the solvency of the beneficiaries by canceling part of their debt against economic reforms: since the Kananaskis summit, twenty-two poor countries have benefited from a reduction of \$ 32 billion, but the question of the effectiveness of this initiative arises today. If countries such as France and Japan adopt bilateral cancellation measures, civil society demands the total cancellation of the debt, accusing it of being "one of the major obstacles to the development of the countries of the South, depriving the resources necessary to meet the basic needs of their populations."²⁹⁶

²⁹⁴ Abouharb, M.R. and Cingranelli, D., Human Rights and Structural Adjustment: The Impact of the IMF and World Bank, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.

²⁹⁵ Limpach, S. and Michaelowa, K., The Impact of World Bank and IMF Programs on Democratization in Developing Countries, University of Zurich, Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS), 2010.

²⁹⁶ Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, Maria Teresa Guin-Siu, & Luc Leruth, Debt relief and public health spending in heavily indebted poor countries, *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 2002, pp. 151-157.

The developed countries are accused of subsidizing their agriculture to the tune of \$300 billion a year, thus distorting trade and preventing Southern exports from entering their markets. In 2001, at the World Trade Organization, under the Doha Development Agenda, rich countries pledged to reduce all forms of export subsidies "with a view to their phasing out". However, in September 2003, in Cancun, the US and European proposal to phase out export subsidies on products sensitive to poor countries was rejected by developing countries. In particular, led by South Africa, the latter are calling for more equitable trade to emerge from poverty; Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad specifically called for the total elimination of subsidies on cotton. Agriculture, an essential economic sector for Africa, remains the main subject of tension with the North. Having placed Africa at the heart of its priorities, France advocates the cause of this continent in international forum in 2003. It then proposed to the G8 an initiative, taken over by the European Union, to elaborate "a new strategy for the development of African agriculture" within the framework of the Doha Round and NEPAD.²⁹⁷

II. African Peer Review Mechanism to promote African Good Governance and Development

Despite the challenges in developing its rules and systems, the APRM has evolved as an essential component of governance architecture in Africa and has achieved many notable successes. Although quality must count more than quantity, more than half of African states have committed themselves, nine have completed their initial assessments and real political changes have gradually taken place.²⁹⁸

This section examines the two facets of this developing mechanism. First, how is the APRM linked to its authors, the AU and NEPAD, and to other governance initiatives beyond the continent, within this evolving governance architecture? Then, what is the visible progress and the value added of this exercise?

²⁹⁷ Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull out of Talks over World Trade, *The New York Times*, 15 Sept, 2003.

²⁹⁸ Kempe Ronald Hope, Toward Good Governance and Sustainable Development: The African Peer Review Mechanism, Governance, *An Institutional Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, 17 March, 2005, www.doi.org.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an instrument voluntarily adhering to the African Union's member states as an African self-assessment mechanism.

II.1. Mandate of the APRM

The mandate of the African Peer Review Mechanism is to ensure that the policies and practices of States Parties are consistent with agreed values in the field of political, economic and corporate governance, as well as codes and standards of the Declaration on Democratic, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. The APRM is an instrument mutually accepted by States Parties for their self-evaluation.²⁹⁹

II.2. Objective and Principles of the APRM

The basic objective of the APRM is to encourage the adoption of policies, norms and practices to promote political stability, high economic growth, and sustainable development and accelerated sub regional and continental economic integration through sharing experiences and the strengthening of best practices and achievements, including identification of gaps and needs assessment in the area of capacity building.

Any assessment undertaken under the Mechanism should be based on technical expertise and should be credible and free from political manipulation. These should be guiding principles of the Mechanism.³⁰⁰

III. 3. Participation in the African Peer Review Process

All Member States of the African Union may participate in the process. Following the adoption by the African Union of the Declaration on Democratic, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, countries wishing to participate in the APRM may notify the Chairman of the Committee of Heads of State and Government responsible for the

²⁹⁹ African Peer Review Mechanism: Organisation and Processes, 6th Summit of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Impimentation Committee, 9 March 2003 Abuja, NIGERIA.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

implementation of NEPAD. Through this notification, the Member States concerned undertake to undergo periodic peer reviews, to facilitate such assessments and to be guided in this regard by the agreed parameters for good political, economic and corporate governance.³⁰¹

Even if the AU has taken the decision to establish the APRM, not all AU member states are strong supporters of the process. The APRM is not yet deeply rooted or universally accepted. Its voluntary aspect is poorly adapted to the "many AU programs and processes that generally encompass all countries" as noted by analyst Francis Ikome. Although this selectivity can become its greatest strength, if it can be developed on shared values and bold actions, the mechanism is the target of fierce criticism. Some of the non-participating leaders like Libya and Zimbabwe have openly rejected the APRM as bending to the whims of donors, a process invented simply to please the rest of the world.³⁰² "The APRM was invented by Africans for Africans to advance democracy, governance, peace and security on their own terms and at their own pace through a "peer-learning process." This is fundamental to any analysis or interpretation of what the APRM addresses. It deals definitively with national responsibility as opposed to external accountability.

Although this argument is plausible and admirable, given the widely divergent nature of the many regimes that have now joined the APRM - from sincere reformers to hardly democratic states that have joined the club hoping for more donor support, and many others between these two extremes - this is not the only motivation for accession. As stated by Sven Grimm and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, some states considered that the APRM represented an opportunity to obtain benefit, rating from donors for their governance agenda, citing Wade, whose OMEGA Plan dealt with infrastructure (and thus incoming donors' aid) and much less governance, as the main example of a president with dual reasons.³⁰³

³⁰¹ Ashraf Rashed, African Peer Review Mechanism: Its Role in Fostering the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goals, UN High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), New York, 30 June 2015.

³⁰² Tawfik, R. and Kajee, A., NEPAD and APRM: Can They Deliver on Good Governance and Development in Africa, Op.cit.

³⁰³ Ibid.

Many countries that face problems such as Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo and Senegal were among the first to adhere to it, without real considerations of the consequences. There was political pressure to show some momentum in favor of the APRM by bringing together new signatories. A classic example: when the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) was in Malawi to conduct a study for the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development on the consequences of joining the APRM in mid-2004. The newly elected President, Bingu wa Mutharika, joined the APRM during the AU summit before the SAIIA³⁰⁴ report was presented. Some foreign ministers joined the APRM on behalf of their Heads of State, who have so far participated in no EAP forum meetings.

Even Botswana, although well governed but always cautious, adopted an attitude of "wait and see" and did not adhere to the mechanism, stating that it had nothing to gain since it was already attracting investment, prudently managed its economy and had low levels of corruption. However, critics have also pointed out that Botswana may risk losing its aura of model democracy if it is subjected to closer scrutiny.

II. 4. Leadership and Management Structure

Michelo Hansungule³⁰⁵ states that: "the APRM is considered to be the most ambitious piece of democratic innovation to have come out of Africa since decolonization,"³⁰⁶ is proposed that the activities of the APRM be directed and managed by a group of 5 to 7 eminent personalities. Members of the Group must be Africans with proven experience in the APRM's fields of competence. Moreover, the members of the Group must enjoy high level of moral integrity and have demonstrated their commitment to the ideals of pan-Africanism. The members of the Group shall be nominated by the States Parties, which shall be pre-selected by a ministerial committee. Their appointment shall be made by the Heads of State and Government of the States Members.

³⁰⁴ Steven Gruzd, The African Peer Review Mechanism: Assessing Origins, Institutional Relations and Achievements, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), PAPER 29, 2009.

³⁰⁵ Professor at the Center for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria.

³⁰⁶ Michelo Hansungule, The Role of the APRM in Strengthening Governance in Africa: Opportunities & Constraints in Implementation, *International Journal of Arts and Commerce Vol. 3 No. 1 January, 2014*.

In addition to the criteria mentioned above, the Heads of State and Government will ensure that the Group has the appropriate technical expertise in the areas of political governance, macroeconomic management, public finance management and governance. The composition of the Group will also reflect regional balance, equality between men and women, and cultural diversity. The terms of office of the members of the Group shall be for a term not exceeding four years. Their replacement will be on the basis of rotation.³⁰⁷

One of the members of the Group shall be appointed by the Heads of State and Government of the States Parties. The term of office of the President shall be a maximum of 5 years. The criteria for appointment to the office of president will be the same as those for the members of the Panel, except that the candidate for the position of President shall be a confirmed officer in one of the following areas: Government, Public Administration, Development and Private Sector.³⁰⁸

The Group will oversee the evaluation process and will pay particular attention to the integrity of the process. Its tasks and responsibilities will be defined in a Charter which will also specify the modalities of submission of reports to the Heads of State and Government of the States Parties. The Charter will guarantee the independence, objectivity and integrity of the Group.

The Group will be supported by a competent Secretariat³⁰⁹ with the appropriate technical capacity to carry out the analytical work required for the peer review process and to comply with the APRM principles. The Secretariat will be responsible for: setting up a database on the political and economic situation in all states' parties, develop background documents for peer review teams, propose the performance indicators and monitor the performance of each country. The Secretariat may, with the approval of the Group, have recourse to the services of the African institutions and experts it considers competent and appropriate in the implementation of the peer review process.

³⁰⁷ African Peer Review Mechanism: Organisation and Processes, Op.cit.

³⁰⁸ See Ross Herbert, Influencing APRM: A Checklist for Civil Society, SAI/A, 2002.

³⁰⁹ APRM Secretariat, APRM Annual Report 2013. Midrand: APRM Secretariat, 2013, pp. 72–73.

II.5. Types and Process of Peer Review

In the formal accession to the peer review process, each State must clearly formulate a program of action with a precise timetable for the implementation of the Declaration on Democratic, Political, Economic and Social Governance of enterprises, including periodic evaluations.³¹⁰

There will be four types of evaluation: The first assessment carried out in a country is the baseline assessment that takes place within 18 months of a country's accession to the APRM process. Then there are periodic evaluations that are done every two or four years. In addition, a member country may, for personal reasons, request an evaluation that is outside the scope of the normally scheduled periodic evaluations; Early signs of a persistent political and economic crisis in one Member State are also sufficient grounds for undertaking an assessment. The Heads of State and Government of the States Parties may request such an assessment in order to assist the Government concerned.

The process focuses on the periodic evaluation of the policies and practices of States Parties to ensure progress in achieving the agreed objectives and respect for the values of political, economic and corporate governance and codes and standards of the Declaration on Democratic, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.³¹¹

The peer review process will lead countries to seriously analyze the impact of national policies not only on political stability and economic growth in each country but also in neighboring countries. It will promote mutual accountability and the replication of best practices.

Bearing in mind the fact that African countries are at different levels of development, when joining the Mechanism, each country will be assessed (the baseline assessment) and a specific timetable (action program) will be established to monitor progress in achieving agreed standards and targets, taking due account of the particular circumstances of that country.

³¹⁰ Ross Herbert, *Influencing APRM: A Checklist for Civil Society*, Op. cit.

³¹¹ See Core APRM Documents, *APRM: Organization and Process* EISA, 2007, aprm@eisa.org.za

II.6. Phases of the Peer Review Process

The process of the APRM should be in six steps:

II.6.1. Preliminary Preparation Stage

It consists of the country assessed to identify and register civil society organizations, to set up the national structures (the Focal Point, the National Commission). It is assisted in this task by a support mission of the APRM, which defines a "road map" jointly with the national authorities, and the secretariat, which disseminates the basic documents serving as guidelines.³¹²

II.6.2. Step 1 - Self-Assessment

On the basis of a questionnaire sent by the secretariat, the country undertakes a self-assessment, prepares a first "diagnosis" and a Preliminary Program of Action to address identified weaknesses. At the same time, the secretariat is preparing a substantive study, including historical background and all pertinent and up-to-date information on the country. From these three documents, the secretariat draws up a list of the major problems of the country, which will serve as a guide for the visit.

II.6.3. Step 2 - The National Assessment Visit

Under the guidance of one of the members of the Steering Panel, the evaluation team visits the country concerned and undertakes as wide a series of consultations as possible with the government, political parties, parliamentarians, civil society, the press, academia, trade unions, business and the business community. The objective is to check the validity and timeliness of the elements identified in the country's self-assessment report and to amend it if necessary.

³¹² Ibid. P. 13.

II.6.4. Step 3 - Joint Finalization of the Evaluation and the National Program of Action

The evaluation team prepares a report taking into account the commitments made in the Preliminary Program of Action and proposing - in discussion with the government concerned - of amendments to this program. "The Team's draft country review report is first discussed with the Government of the country. These discussions will be designed to ensure the accuracy of the information and to provide the Government with an opportunity both to react to the accuracy of the information and the Team's findings and to put forward their own views on how to address the identified shortcomings, including modifying the draft Program of Action. The responses of the Government will be appended to the APR Team's report."³¹³

II.6.5. Step 4 - Presentation and Adoption of the Evaluation Report

The final evaluation report and the National Action Plan are presented to the Forum of Heads of State and Government: the "peer review". If the government demonstrates an obvious willingness to rectify the weaknesses, it will receive the necessary assistance. In the absence of a clear will, the participating countries will have to engage the State in a constructive dialogue. If the dialogue fails, the Heads of State and Government could "give advance notice of their common intention to apply appropriate measures."

II.6.6. Step 5 - Publicizing the Evaluation Report

Six months after Phase 4, the report is formally and publicly presented to key regional and sub regional structures such as the Regional Economic Community to which the country belongs, the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and the Peace and Security

³¹³ Ibid., p.14.

Council and the ECOSOC of the African Union. In addition, the country undertakes to send a report on the implementation of the Action Plan to the secretariat for review at the Biannual Heads of State Forums. This evaluation cycle is scheduled to be repeated every two or four years.

II.7. Technical Credibility of the Diagnosis

While criticism of the implementation of the APRM Action Plans is critical, most analysts agree to praise its diagnostic capacity. The final evaluation report, when it does not raise some particularly sensitive issues (security forces in Algeria, AIDS in South Africa or trafficking in second-hand cars in Benin), has the merit of drawing up a report places, to gather together in a single document the major problems of a country. This credibility relies heavily on the quality of the work of the research institutes mobilized within each country from the beginning of the process. These institutes administer the responses to the evaluation questionnaire distributed widely in the country by the APRM secretariat and collect the results of opinion polls, the conduct of which was established at the time of the self-assessment. They, thus, provide the government with the raw material for the self-assessment report, at the same time as they are the scientific guarantor of the process.³¹⁴

III. 8. Pan-African Panel: Guarantees the Political Independence of the Process

A Panel of seven "eminent personalities" was established at the continental level to ensure the strategic steering of the process. Each national assessment is entrusted to one of these seven personalities, who direct the mission. The Panel is responsible for reviewing and reporting on the evaluation report. It thus plays the role of the preceptor, the moral authority freed from national political constraints and contingencies, able to propose reforms according to the shortcomings identified by the evaluation team.³¹⁵

³¹⁴ Terence Corrigan & Yarik Turianskyi , A Good Governance Driver: Is the African Peer Review Mechanism Up to it?, SAHIA?, July 2015.

³¹⁵ Core APRM Documents, APRM: Organization and Process EISA, 2007, Op. cit.

During the first five years of the process, the original Panel was able to institute rules for the credibility of the process, due to the significant room for maneuver left by the founding texts and the Forum of Heads of State. The stature of some of the members of this Panel has allowed the principle of non-interference, on the one hand vis-à-vis the donors, on the other hand towards the heads of State, to be rooted at the heart of the mechanism. The central, though ambiguous, role of the Panel is well illustrated by the establishment of the APRM in South Africa.³¹⁶

If the Government of the country concerned demonstrates a tangible desire to fill the identified gaps, it will be incumbent on States Parties to provide the assistance required, within their means, and to invite Governments and institutions donors to also provide assistance to the country concerned. However, if the Government concerned does not demonstrate the necessary political will, States Parties should first endeavor to engage in constructive dialogue, offering technical assistance and other appropriate assistance. If the dialogue does not lead to a satisfactory result, the Heads of State and Government of the States Parties may then inform the government concerned of their collective intention to take appropriate measures within a specified period. This deadline should allow the Government to identify gaps in a constructive dialogue. All in all, such measures should be used only as a last resort.³¹⁷

Six months after its consideration by the Heads of State and Government of States Parties, the report should be formally and publicly presented to regional and sub regional structures, such as the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human Rights, the proposed Peace and Security Council, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (CESC) of the African Union. This is phase 5, the final phase of the process.³¹⁸

³¹⁶ UN Economic Commission for Africa, Draft Agenda_2063_document, http://www.uneca.org/sites/19.03.2014_rev1.pdf.

³¹⁷ APRM (African Peer Review Mechanism), <http://aprm.org/apr-forum>, accessed 10 April 2015.

³¹⁸ African Peer Review Mechanism: Organisation and Processes, Op.cit.

Concerning the duration of peer review, the evaluation process in a country should not be longer than 6 months from the date of the start of phase 1 until the date on which the report is submitted to the Heads of State and Government, for exam.

III. 9. Funding of the Peer Review Mechanism

Problems related to the financing of the implementation of the APRM (evaluation and implementation of the program of actions) and the appropriation of the program by the States parties to the mechanism.³¹⁹

As a tool, the APRM is planned to be financed in its active phase (evaluation and self-evaluation) by the financial contributions of the member states of the Union. That raises questions, when one knows that one of the reasons for the dysfunction of the AU is the irregularity of the contributions, it is curious to ask whether these problematic contributions would be insufficient for the realization of the APRM?

Moreover, taking as an example the exercise of Benin, one finds that the contribution which was difficult to obtain is that of the Benin State showing somewhere that the internal contributions of the States parties are often insufficient and arrive late to be used to ensure proper conduct of the exercise.³²⁰

After the evaluation phase and the drafting of the action program there is a need for funding. The documents are formal on this, this funding will come from the development partners. So again, recourse will be made to the debt, the financial accompaniment, etc.³²¹

Benin has taken a major step forward by officially launching the report and on this occasion invited Ghana. What future, however, will be given to the report when the public knows its

³¹⁹

³²⁰ Jay Kubler, Strengthening the mechanisms of competitive research funding and peer review in Africa, European Union's ACP S&T Program and Research Africa, Cape Town, 2013, pp. 2-19

³²¹ National APRM Secretariat, General Report to the Government of Benin and the UNDP, Cotonou, 2007, p. 112.

exemplar to make great studies and dispose them to the rational intelligence and reflection of rats and cockroaches.

Legitimate questions search for answers. Amongst, will the program of action resulting from the evaluation find favor in the programs of action government? What are the problems related to the harmonization of the methodology of the conduct of the process and the dissemination of the experiences of governance?

On another note, the APRM is traced by another difficulty related this time to its methodology and to the diffusion of the experiments. All the evaluating actors recognize that the operation of 12 February 2008 is a first. The process, which is scheduled to last 18 months, was completed in 26 months. It is already clear that the deadline is unrealistic and needs to be reviewed by the Forum in order to allow the evaluators to properly integrate the exercise into a dynamic of participation by the populations and all the stakeholders. An experience-sharing framework (as agreed by members of the Ghanaian and Beninese committees) was to be established during the exchange visit of the Ghanaian Commission to Benin in February 2006. This sharing and convergence framework methodologies will ensure the contextualization of methodological approaches in order to guarantee the success of future exercises, limiting the obstacles of communication, payment of the quotations from the States, etc.³²²

II.10. UN Support

Even if African leaders want the APRM to be free from foreign influence, they also recognize that the mechanism needs external support. The UN is already assisting the AU in several areas, says Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Information Peter Launsky-Tieffenthal³²³. The Office of the Africa Adviser to the Secretary-General is carrying out a major outreach work for the AU. ECA, through NEPAD, coordinates regional commitments, and the United Nations collaborates with individual countries.

³²² African Union and APRM, Review Report on Governance, Republic of Benin, January 2008, p. 46.

³²³ Peter Launsky-Tieffenthal served as the Under-Secretary-General for Public Information at the United Nations from August 2012 to January 2015, succeeding Kiyotaka Akasaka. He is also the United Nations Coordinator for Multilingualism, a position in which he coordinates the issue of multilingualism throughout the UN Secretariat.

Mr. Launsky-Tieffenthal added that an office also intervened to assist the African Union in its activities. "Our role is to provide strategic advice on information and public awareness of APRM activities across Africa." He said that the APRM could also benefit from awareness-raising campaigns conducted by United Nations information centers across Africa. In any case, the APRM is in full swing and should mobilize more resources in the future. Especially since African leaders are proud of their creation and are determined to see it succeed.³²⁴

I.11. Challenges of the Future

Before proposing an answer to this thorny question, we would like to recall here a quotation from Frantz Fanon:

So, comrades, let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions and societies which draw their inspiration from her. Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature. If we want to turn Africa into a new Europe, and America into a new Europe, then let us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us. But if we want humanity to advance a step farther, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries. If we wish to live up to our peoples' expectations, we must seek the response elsewhere than in Europe. Moreover, if we wish to reply to the expectations of the people of Europe, it is no good sending them back a reflection, even an ideal reflection, of their society and their thought with which from time to time they feel immeasurably sickened. For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man."³²⁵

³²⁴ Ralph D. Christy and Vicki L. Bogan, Financial Inclusion, Innovation, and Investments: Biotechnology and Capital Markets Working for the Poor, World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 2011, pp. 238-52.

³²⁵ Dominic Tweedie, "Les damnés de la terre by François Maspéro éditeur in 1961", Chapter 6, Macgibbon and Kee, London, 1965.

In this sense, as an approach to solving these different difficulties around the APRM, we suggest: a harmonization of the viewpoints of the stakeholders of the vision around the APRM. Next, a redefinition of stakeholder strategies, to this end, the government must as a main actor adopt an approach of dialogue and consultation with other actors of the State; the private sector in Africa has now to seize the boom that the State offers to invest in production projects, better to save in order to strengthen the Public Private Partnership, the only guarantee for an endogenous development of Africa. Because African countries now have to rely on their private sector instead of remaining in a constant assistantship.³²⁶

Finally, civil society must mobilize, take responsibility and stop reaching out to donors before fulfilling their duty as citizens. Someone said, "Who holds you by the belly, holds you to respect. ". It can draw inspiration from the actions of the civil society of the countries of the North which is part of a production process to draw the necessary resources to carry out their mission.

It is urgent for the Union's bodies to set up a framework or measures for the evaluation tool, in particular in the process of periodic evaluation of the implementation of the action program binding or coercive. The latter, if established, will encourage States parties to the process to further respect their commitments in implementing the recommendations of the Peer Advisory Opinions.

Furthermore, the AU leaders put forward an agenda that should be a source of inspiration for the development of national and regional plans for sustainable development. This program represents a collective effort and an opportunity for Africa to determine its own destiny. It aims to "build an integrated and prosperous Africa, supported and led by its own citizens and a dynamic force on the world stage".

IV. AU 2063 Agenda

The African Union's 2063 Agenda represents the basic development framework of the Continent, which aims to improve the investment, and achieve social justice. National committees have been established in each African country to implement the Agenda, adopted

³²⁶ Adams Oloo, Op. cit.

by the Heads of state and government of the member states in 2015. Fifty years since the establishment of the African Union at the May 2013 Summit, the Union issued the solemn declaration, which includes eight basic goals for the Continent: the identity of Africa, the right to self-determination, combating discrimination and racism, peace, democratic government, African destiny, and Africa's place in the world.³²⁷

In order to achieve the objectives of the Union, the 2063 Agenda was established for a period of 50 years with the aim of developing a strategic plan for the Continent's future, supported by the African peoples.³²⁸ African countries have promoted the ambitious agenda of the Union, which reflects a serious commitment from the Union and will lead to a tangible transformation within the Continent in terms of overall development.

III.1 Strategic Axes of Agenda 2063

According to the AU, the choice of fifty years must be taken symbolically. In operational terms, Agenda 2063 could be divided into short-term (10 years), medium-term (10-25 years) and long-term (25-50 years) plans.³²⁹ Agenda 2063 is a logical and natural extension of NEPAD and other initiatives, such as the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty to meet new challenges on the continent. It is seen as a new step in the efforts of Africans to catalyze the development of the Continent and strengthen African unity, building on the experiences and achievements of past efforts.

Agenda 2063 aims to translate this vision into concrete steps and objectives that will enable Africa to focus on the ideals envisioned in a changing world.³³⁰ This new perspective for planning Africa's long-term development is timely, as the changing global context through globalization and the information technology revolution has provided unprecedented opportunities for countries and regions with adopted good policies to achieve meaningful

³²⁷ 21st Ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, at Addis Ababa, on 26 May 2013

³²⁸ Kaithlyn De Ghetho, Jacob Gray & Moses N. Kiggundu, The African Union's Agenda 2063: Aspirations, Challenges, and Opportunities for Management Research, *Africa Journal of Management*, Volume 2, 2016- issue 1, pp. 93-116.

³²⁹ Agenda 2063: The Africa we Want, African Union Commission, April 2015.

³³⁰ Kaithlyn De Ghetho, Jacob Gray & Moses N. Kiggundu, Op. cit, pp. 120-125.

socio-economic progress and transformation. Africa today is full of important investment opportunities for development.³³¹

Many African countries are experiencing significant growth, stemming from the exploitation of raw materials and the implementation of macroeconomic policies, and economic conditions. The Continent has significant mineral resources (gold, iron, oil, gas, bauxite, titanium, copper, uranium, diamonds, ..) and natural resources (forests, water, fish resources, 60% of the arable land of the planet..³³² The rational management of the Continent's resources could be a key driver of its socio-economic transformation and an important milestone in its industrialization.³³³

Africa is evolving, promising prospects are opening up. The continent enjoys a significant growth rate, with average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 5.2% over the 2003-2011 period. In 2012, 8 of the world's 10 best performing economies were African. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts growth of 5.4% for 2014 and 5.8% for 2015, for sub-Saharan Africa. These figures are significantly higher than the global growth projections of 3.4% for 2014 and 4% for 2015. The prospects for a growing middle class, combined with a high proportion of young people able to act as catalysts for continued growth, especially in consumer sectors and services, are visible. The increase in the African population continues at a steady pace, according to the Population Reference Bureau, it is expected to increase from 1.1 billion in 2013 to 2.4 billion in 2050. If these figures are confirmed, Africa will remain the "Youngest" continent of the world.

This demographic boom is also an opportunity for Africa to take advantage of the demographic dividend. This therefore requires Africa to be part of a long-term strategic planning process, to make the most of it, in order to provide the means to finance its own development, and reduce the reliance on external assistance. Economic stabilization and the reduction of the external vulnerability of African economies require the establishment of a robust agenda of regional integration. In this perspective, the AU and Member States have

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Trencé McNamee, Mark Oearson and Mark Pearson, Africans Investing in Africa: Understanding Sector by Sector, Mcmillan Publisher, Ney York 2015, pp.

³³³

committed to accelerate the regional integration agenda, through the creation of a common market by 2017, with a view to achieving economic integration in Africa.³³⁴

In addition, the Continent displays, a significant reduction of conflicts. New transnational threats and conflicts involving non-state actors are on the rise. To this end, the Heads of State and Government set out, in the declaration on the fiftieth anniversary, human security as a priority and set 2020 as the year of the silence of arms in Africa. In terms of democratic governance and consolidation of regional institutions, progress is being made. The sub regional institutions of Africa and the eight Regional Economic Communities (CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC and UMA) formally recognized by the AU are now political and economic institutions, bases on which Agenda 2063 can build in its formulation and optimal implementation.

In their solemn declaration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary, AU Heads of State and Government pledged to make progress in eight key areas constituting strategic axes of the socio-economic transformation of the continent:

- Pan-Africanism and the Renaissance of Africa;
- Fight against colonialism and the right to self-determination of peoples still under domination;
- Regional integration agenda;
- Agenda for social and economic development;
- Agenda for peace and security;
- Democratic governance;
- Mastery of Africa's destiny;
- Affirmation of Africa's place in the world.³³⁵

These eight strategic axes target all areas of development in Africa. The AU Summit pledged to take them into account in the development of the 2063 Agenda and to integrate them into national development plans.

³³⁴ Jesus Gonzalez-Garcia and Juan Trevino, IMF Survey: Africa Set for Faster Growth amid Changes in Global Trends, IMF African Department, April 24, 2014.

³³⁵ Agenda 2063: The Africa we Want, African Union Commission, April 2015, Op. cit., p. 2.

In the current state of its formulation, the Agenda 2063 project can be seen as an encouraging starting point. It proposes tools to translate declarations and political commitments into mechanisms and concrete actions. It defines the approach to be followed, the general means to be mobilized and instruments for verifying progress and providing corrective measures. In its development and implementation, Agenda 2063 incorporates specific milestones and targets. It provides for the inclusion of all actors on the continent, especially women and youth, while taking into account the diversity of Africa.³³⁶ With regard to the monitoring and evaluation phase, priority is given to a gender mainstreaming approach. results-based with concrete, precise and measurable objectives that can be monitored and monitored at different levels of governance.

In addition to the practical approach, based on the development of a planning program for the socio-economic development of Africa, Agenda 2063 has an idealistic dimension based on the promotion of Pan-African values, to promote and consolidate hope, and the promises of the founding fathers of a rebirth of Africa. In this respect, the Agenda 2063 wants to carry out a certain idea of "African Dream".³³⁷ It advocates a change in values, and attitudes in order to inculcate new generations of good African values (discipline, determination, honesty, integrity, work ethic, etc. Therefore, Agenda 2063 would like to adequately combine the promotion of African values and the demands of modernity in Africa. From a theoretical point of view, the draft Agenda 2063 contains original ideas and an ambitious goal of effective transformation of Africa.

However, in recent decades, Africa has experienced other development programs as ambitious as Agenda 2063. But these have not been able to achieve the desired goals. Africa still faces poverty and underdevelopment. It therefore seems appropriate to analyze this new program with hindsight, in the light of the current reality of the African continent and the impact of previous development programs.

³³⁶ Agenda 2063: The Africa we Want, African Union Commission, April 2015.Op.cit.p.5.

³³⁷ Ngugi wa Thiong'o, After 50 years, Unity is still an African Dream, *The Guardian*, 23 May, 2013.

III.2. Agenda 2063 Facing the Reality of the African Continent

Despite economic progress in recent years, Africa remains one of the poorest regions in the world. Indeed, thousands of Africans are affected by famine, although the continent holds 60% of arable land in planet. Underdevelopment, precariousness and inequalities persist between regions of the continent and within countries. Major pandemics such as malaria, AIDS and Ebola hemorrhagic fever continue to plague the continent without a real control program or a large pan-African research laboratory to eradicate them. Several parts of Africa (Sahel, West Africa, Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa ..) are plagued by armed conflict, terrorism, large-scale arms trafficking, maritime piracy and violence gender-based threats to human security, peace and development.³³⁸

Women continue to die giving life.³³⁹ Children suffer from malnutrition, rights to education, primary health care and clean water are not yet a reality on the continent, in line with the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child adopted in 1990. Young people face endemic unemployment, lack of access to education, quality training and project funding opportunities, in line with the African Youth Charter (AYC) adopted in 2006.³⁴⁰ The worrying unemployment of African youth is often paralleled by the continent's rapid economic growth. According to the African Development Bank (AFDB), the unemployment rate in sub-Saharan Africa is 6%, while 8 of the world's 10 fastest growing economies are in this region. This rate may not seem very high compared to the world average of about 5%. But in most African countries, youth unemployment "is at least twice as high as that of adults," says the AFDB.

According to the World Bank, young people represent 60% of all unemployed Africans. "This is an unacceptable reality for a continent with such an impressive pool of talented and creative young people," says Mthuli Ncube, chief economist of the AFDB. Alexander Chikwanda, Zambian Minister of Finance, sums up the situation in these terms:

³³⁸ Oladele Arowolo, Towards AU Agenda 2063, Human Sciences Research Center, 6 March 2014, p.13.

³³⁹ Ubi, Efem N. , The Feminist Model of Political Economy and Women Empowerment in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, Paper Presented in a Conference on "Nigeria Beyond 2007: Issues and Perspectives", held At the University of Illorin, 27th- 28th February 2007.

³⁴⁰ Tickner, J, A. Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001.

"Youth unemployment is a time bomb", which now seems dangerously close to the explosion. It intends to draw attention to the consequences of such a high youth unemployment rate on a continent where every year nearly 10 to 12 million young people enter the labor market. According to Africa's economic outlook, more than 70 percent of African youth on average live on less than \$ 2 a day, the internationally defined poverty line.³⁴¹

Yet, faced with the crucial issue of youth employment in 2009, African leaders gathered in Addis Ababa to try to stem youth unemployment. They proclaimed the "Decade of African Youth" (2009-2018) and decided to mobilize resources, including those from the private sector, for the promotion of youth. Their plan of action emphasized the need to fight both unemployment and underemployment. Two years later, in Equatorial Guinea, they promised once again the "creation of safe, decent and competitive jobs for young people."³⁴²

Today, the effect of these statements on the youth unemployment rate leaves something to be desired. The inaccessibility to quality training, employment, funding to enable them to reach their full potential, makes young Africans lose hope. As a result, thousands of young people are referred to the criminal networks of drugs, trafficking in human beings, organized crimes, or end up in the ranks of extremist armed groups. A survey conducted in 2011 by the World Bank showed that about 40% of those who join rebel movements say they are motivated by the lack of jobs. Ahmad Salkida, a Nigerian journalist who was one of the few to have been able to approach the activists of the Boko Haram group, told Africa Renewal that, although the motivation of the sect is mainly ideological, the omnipresence of unemployment in the north of Nigeria facilitates the recruitment of young people. Moreover, despair and lack of visibility towards a better horizon, leads thousands of

³⁴¹ Romola Adeola, The African Youth Charter and the role of regional institutions in an age of Africa rising, *AfricLAW*, 6 July 2015.

³⁴² Youth Employment Interventions in Africa: A Mapping Report of the Employment and Labour Sub-Cluster of the Regional Coordination Mechanism (RCM) for Africa, International Labour Organization, 2012, www.ilo.org/Africa

young Africans in search of a better life, to borrow the circuits of illegal immigration.³⁴³ For 20 years, crossing the Mediterranean has been the most deadly journey for irregular migrants.³⁴⁴ In the first ten months of 2014, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded the death of 3,072 migrants in the Mediterranean. Since 2000, more than 22,000 migrants have lost their lives in the Mediterranean. For the Mediterranean, "2014 is the deadliest year", far ahead of the peak of 2011, when 1,500 deaths were recorded.³⁴⁵

At the same time, Africa is famous for the record held in illicit capital flow, valued at 854 billion USD between 1970 and 2008, a figure that could reach 1800 billion USD, according to President M. Jinnah. According to the Global Financial Integrity Report, 60 to 65% of these funds evaporate through multinationals. Tasked by the Economic Commission for Africa, Thabo Mbeki, Chairman of the High-Level Personalities Group against Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, said between \$50 billion and \$60 billion are illegally transferred out of the continent each year. Worse, with the strong economic growth of the past decade, driven by the rise in raw materials, the illicit transfer of capital has taken unprecedented proportions: Africa would have lost nearly 54 billion dollars a year on average during this period. In December 2008, Global Financial Integrity released its groundbreaking analysis of Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006:

We estimated such flows at \$859 billion to \$1.06 trillion a year. We are pleased now to release our analysis of Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development. This study examines the 39-year period from 1970 through 2008. Utilizing accepted economic models, namely the World Bank Residual Method and IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, we estimate that such flows have totaled \$854 billion across the period

³⁴³ Martin Ewi and Uyo Salifu, A key reason youths join Boko Haram, Institute for Security Studies, Feb 2017.

³⁴⁴ International Organization for Migration, *Fatal Journeys. Tracking Lives Lost during Migration*, Switzerland, Edited by Tara Brian and Frank Laczko, 2014, 211 P., p. 18.

³⁴⁵ African migrants flock to Europe, whatever the risk, *AFRICA*, 13 June 2017, Johannesburg, South Africa.

examined. This estimate is regarded as conservative, since it addresses only one form of trade mispricing, does not include the mispricing of services, and does not encompass the proceeds of smuggling. Adjusting the \$854 billion estimate to take into account some of the components of illicit flows not covered, it is not unreasonable to estimate total illicit outflows from the continent across the 39 years at some \$1.8 trillion.³⁴⁶

The accumulation of these amounts since 2001, represents twice the external debt of the continent. "These illicit flows deplete the continent," said Thabo Mbeki, and would be made possible by the weakness of tax regimes in some countries of the continent. It therefore stresses the importance of putting in place efficient mechanisms to combat this phenomenon. Globalization is continuing apace, natural resources are decreasing, climate change is increasing and the population is increasing, which contributes to further pressures on the growth capacity of African economies. Behind political statements lies a troubling reality that contrasts with economic indicators. Therefore, if good macroeconomic policies are not implemented for optimal management of our resources and promote real inclusive growth in the long term, the demographic boom could turn into a time bomb and hinder the development potential of the region.³⁴⁷

Africa, continent in perpetual quest of effective strategies of ascent towards its development, never tires of producing new initiatives, always presented as unique and promising. The 2063 Agenda generates the same euphoria and risks having the same historical cycle as the previous initiatives, if a concrete program adapted to the reality of the Continent, is not adopted. In addition, new political, security, climate, health and technological challenges are emerging over time, Africa's development planning agenda over the next 50 years should incorporate these parameters, without which Agenda 2063 could appear as a disproportionate ambition of an institution that is already struggling to uphold its own principles (or to enforce the most basic rules such as human rights) and to face the current challenges (evidenced by the slow pace of the AU on some issues like, the recent case

³⁴⁶Raymond W. Baker, Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resources for Development, *Global Financial Integrity*, Dec 2008, www.gfip.org

³⁴⁷ Mark Curtis, The New Colonisation: Britain's scramble for Africa's energy and mineral resources, London, 2016, pp. 3-21.

of Ebola). In view of the above, one could rightly wonder about the relevance for the organization to have a plan over fifty years for 54 heterogeneous states.

I.3. Challenges for a Successful 2063 Agenda

A return to the past and the impact of the previous "major development plans" would undoubtedly encourage little more modesty. That said, to meet the ambitious challenge of Agenda 2063, it seems necessary to insist on a number of important elements to avoid the mistakes of the past.³⁴⁸

The first challenge concerns the inventory of fixtures. Before embarking on planning for the next fifty years, it is essential to begin with a true inventory of previous development programs and a comprehensive review of AU leadership in their conduct, in order to clearly identify successes and failure.

The second challenge is peace and security, which remain crucial for any development project; particularly, in the Great Lakes, Horn, Sahel and West and Central Africa, and North. The effective implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with permanent capacities could contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. The main pillar of APSA is the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is supported in the fulfillment of its mandate by various structures, namely: the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Group of Wise Men, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund, as well as civil society organizations. The Architecture covers a broad agenda for peace and security in Africa, focusing on: early warning and conflict prevention, the restoration of, and support for, peace, as well as peace building, reconstruction and post-conflict development; promoting democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights, and humanitarian action and disaster management to be noted for good planning of Agenda 2063.

³⁴⁸ African Union Commission (AUC), Agenda 2063 Framework Document, September, 2015.

The third challenge is related to the production and control of reliable statistics. Planning as complex as Agenda 2063 requires reliable statistical data to make good extrapolations. The mastery of statistical data in all sectors in Africa is an important challenge.

The fourth challenge relates to the issue of funding. The capacity of African States to finance Agenda 2063 is one of the major conditions for its effectiveness. Many programs have been dependent on their funding gap or the false premise that they can be financed through development aid. From this point of view, Agenda 2063 must change paradigm by providing for the financing of Africa's development by Africa itself.

The fifth one is that the Agenda must be accompanied by concrete instruments of sanctioning in order to bring the different parties into effective compliance with their commitments and to prevent certain Member States from taking action to the contrary, which would hinder the proper implementation of the Agenda 2063, as has been the case in the past.³⁴⁹

In addition, to succeed in the Agenda for integration, the AU could draw inspiration from some successful models of the EU, of which it partially copied the institutional architecture. Ladjji Ouattara³⁵⁰ claimed that: "Integration is the culmination of an important process, based on a pragmatic approach, and the establishment of strong political and economic institutions, connecting sub-regional markets where goods, capital and people move more easily beyond borders, to impulse the dynamics of integration." The AU could also adopt programs to support, for example, teaching, research and reflection in the field of

³⁴⁹Ladjji Ouattara, *Agenda 2063: Opportunité et Défi pour l'Afrique*, Institut de Recherche et d'Enseignement sur la Paix, Jan 2015, www.thinkingafrica.org

³⁵⁰ Ladjji Ouattara is a PhD student in History at the Institute of European Studies and Master of Political Science at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium). His doctoral thesis is on the theme: "Intangibility of borders and minorities in Africa. The Tuareg question. His Master's thesis was on "Political Cooperation between the European Union and the African Union". These centers of academic interests are: international relations, border conflicts in Africa, African integration, political cooperation between the European Union and the African Union.

African integration studies and the AU worldwide (EU "Erasmus+ Jean Monnet" program),³⁵¹ and supporting intra-African youth mobility projects, students, researchers, entrepreneurs, artists, etc to share experiences and strengthen the "pan-African vision" among citizens. In this respect, the harmonization of educational standards and the mutual recognition of academic and professional qualifications could contribute to strengthening the process.

The seventh challenge, to be taken into account in the Agenda 2063, is that of research and technological innovation. Africa needs to develop by itself the technologies and means of transforming raw materials to support development. High productivity, particularly among young people (who are the main actors of the program) in creativity, scientific innovation and technology is indispensable in a knowledge society. To this end, education and training must be a key sector of Agenda 2063. Efforts to improve its quality and performance must be important to enhance Africa's competitiveness.³⁵²

Lastly, Agenda 2063 should be attentive to the evolution of the international scene and the action of external actors in Africa. The world is interdependent, the goal of the actors is to pursue their own interests, to satisfy their needs and to increase their own power. Africa has important resources that fuel a lot of greed and are the object of strategic interests. States and Regional Economic Communities should develop good policies for a reshaping of Africa's external cooperation strategy, so that the continent's resources are a source of stability and inclusive development for Africa's populations. African states must act collectively and speak with one voice to defend their interests and enable Africa to take its place in global governance.

In sum, Agenda 2063 is an important program for economic take-off and sustainable development in Africa. Through this, Africa wants to set an ambitious course in a changing world. Its success requires establishing a good diagnosis, taking into account the real

³⁵¹ The Jean Monnet Actions are aimed at promoting the excellence of higher education in Europe, focused on European studies. They help to create links between academics, researchers and European policymakers. Jean Monnet's actions focus on research and research in the field of European integration and focus on understanding occupied by Europe in the era of globalization. They are organized and implemented by higher education institutions, but if you work in such an institution, you may be interested in the different possibilities offered.

³⁵² Lawalley Cole, Key issues on Agenda 2063 and their relevance to the education sector in Africa, *The Global Partnership for Education*, January 30, 2017.

aspirations of all the components of the continent, to carry out a good planning of actions, to act in a transparent way. Unlike previous development programs, Agenda 2063 needs to be accompanied by mechanisms of sanctions to ensure that all parties respect their commitments. The successful operation of Agenda 2063 also requires the establishment of institutional frameworks and dynamic functioning mechanisms, with the capacity to evaluate performance, correct boundaries and overcome potential obstacles. This device must be accompanied by a strong leadership of the AU, capable of creating a favorable global environment.

Conclusion:

NEPAD is a bold and unpredictable political vision of development: its success depends on respect for the main development conditions and the adherence of the entire continent. It must now articulate the needs and priorities of the population, which must be truly involved in the development, implementation and monitoring of development programs. It is now important that NEPAD provide concrete responses to Africa's key challenges and become a genuine strategy for the development of societies and the continent. The debates in African civil society are increasing today in Africa and abroad, which is already one of the merits of NEPAD. The latter is the priority of the AU's work until its next summit in 2004 in Addis Ababa. In order to establish a less asymmetric partnership between Africa and the developed world, its support must be expressed in coherent international cooperation policies that give Africa a global response and the means of its objectives. France and Japan seek to convince their partners: in autumn 2003, Japan organized the Third Tokyo International Conference on the Development of Africa under the sign of NEPAD (35) and France opened, in Paris, the first meeting of a new "Forum for Partnership with Africa", which will be a framework for regular dialogue on the implementation of NEPAD between African countries and all donors. The next presidencies of the G8, American in 2004, British in 2005, would strongly support NEPAD and the African continent. The commitments should not remain at the stage of the speeches because, as Thabo Mbeki points out: "It is clear that it will be very difficult for Africa to achieve economic and social renewal without the support of France and of the rest of the western world."³⁵³ Most African countries are unlikely to meet the Millennium

³⁵³ James R. Cochrane. Globalisation, African Renaissance and Contested Identities, Paper given at the Fifth International Philosophical Conference on Civilizations in Conflict: East and West, People's Friendship University of Russia. April. 2001, Article N°: 5740.

Development Goals by 2015. However, the African Union and NEPAD are hopeful that the twenty-first century will finally come to Africa.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the indicators show good growth prospects in Africa. States have the will to initiate a real development, as evidenced by the emergence programs underway in several countries (Ivory Coast, Senegal ...) Agenda 2063 can help consolidate the progress that is being made and ensure a good socio-economic transformation of Africa in the next fifty years, if a concrete program adapted to the reality of the continent is adopted. Africa is yet to make radical progress in a number of areas and remain alert to the challenges that persist or in the next transition.

Africa must break with conformity and any complexities that annihilate any impetus towards development. We have an obligation to believe in Africa and to rely on Africans. The APRM, which is the fruit of Africans, must integrate African values. Already the principle of non-indifference which he preaches is already a giant step. But our criticisms and reflections must participate in the perfect. This is the only way for Africans to pleasantly surprise humanity.

General Conclusion

On the basis of this study, a number of conclusions may be reached. First, the researcher believes that the objectives of the Union are ambitious in a way that is not commensurate with the political, economic and social reality prevailing in the continent. In other words, the Union needs to be gradual in the process of institutional building and rationalization to be realistic and represent the EU line in this field. The aspiration of Africa is the desire to reach political, economic and social benefits along the lines of the European Union, without looking at what the latter has taken to reach the stage of political and institutional maturity without distinguishing between the African and European realities. In general, it can be concluded that the Union needs to review its objectives that are not commensurate with the contemporary reality, especially those related to the application of monetary union and the application of the supreme legislative powers in the Pan-African Parliament in the given time period.

Secondly, the Constitutive Act of the African Union benefited from the experience of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), while reserving its objectives, which created a real opportunity for the continuation of the Union as a regional entity in the light of globalization. One manifestation of that advantage is the attempt by the authors of the institutional law of the Union to harmonize the mechanisms of the institutions of the Union, although they have not been very successful in reconciling those mechanisms with those of the Union. It can be concluded that the weak adherence to the OAU agreements was largely due to several factors: the unwillingness to sacrifice national independence in exchange for strengthening regional power, the weakness of national institutions in most African countries and reliance on the "mood" of leaders in terms of enthusiasm or apathy for issues Certain.

Thirdly, a comprehensive and adequate review of the political entities and regional economic blocs within the continent should be carried out, with the aim of eliminating some of them because most of their activities are within the Union's organs and programs. The biggest test of the success of any economic or political bloc is the existence of institutional mechanisms capable of containing differences and resolving the problems that are expected to occur. Thus, the greatest lessons learned from the African regional economic and political blocs will be to strengthen the institutional orientation of the African Union so that it has an independent political and regulatory entity active in the mechanisms of industry and decision-

making. There is a conviction among the researcher that some of these entities and blocs will solve themselves automatically once the signs of the success of the Union in achieving its goals and confidence in its institutions, after completion and work as an integrated system.

Fourth: From the perspective of international politics, the African Union enjoys wide political support from the international community for several reasons, most notably the unwillingness of international actors to intervene directly in the continent because of unfavorable experiences in the past. Economically, rich countries promised partial funding for some of the EU's programs and activities, but the EU faces complex problems with the forces of globalization such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Fifth: Some proposals have been reached to activate the role of the African Union by proposing the following reforms:

Non-repetition of the establishment of the organs of the African community which are equivalent in the Union such as the Summit, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Commission, the Secretariat and the Technical Committees. Institutional repetition is not only a waste of time, money, and effort; it may involve conflicting decisions and conflicts between those similar bodies.

Reconsidering the areas of competence of the technical commissions, the African Commission and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council because of the great discrepancy in the terms of reference. Each of these bodies undertakes studies in the same economic and social fields. We suggest limiting these tasks to the Economic, Social and Cultural Council and the organizational and administrative restructuring of other bodies in line with this context. As a result of this proposal, other devices will be merged, eliminated and renamed.

We believe that the organizational and administrative structure of the Union is huge and shaky and needs to rationalize the number of its organs and reconsideration of the existence of a number of determinants, economic and financing, which limit the ability to manage efficiently and effectively and ensure continuity.

Most of the continent's problems are due to the weakness of the institutional and political structure of most of the countries of the continent. One of the approaches to strengthening the African Union is to strengthen the state institutionally and politically as the nucleus of the Union.

Despite the existence of clear provisions in the articles of the Constitutive Act (see Appendix II) and the principles and objectives of the organs of the Union to clarify how to deal with violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, most of the countries of the continent are still witnessing these violations without effective intervention by the Union to correct the situation.

The researcher attributed the weak effectiveness of the Union in this area to several reasons, first of all the African culture, which depends on the preference for friendly negotiation and delaying confrontation. The second is due to the geographical political blocs in Africa and the cultural and tribal links between these countries, such as the people of East Africa, the Swahili language, the spread of the Hausa tribe in Western African countries, and the Arabic culture in North Africa. The third reason is the existence of personal interests and ties among many leaders of African countries, which leads them to defend their interests as a single bloc because criticizing the corrupt policies of one is a criticism of all corrupt regimes. The fourth reason is the urgent desire to ensure solidarity and unity of the African ranks and to avoid any split of the nascent African Union and to ensure its success because it is the golden opportunity for the countries of the continent to get out of their crises.

The research agenda can be expanded by raising several questions, the most important of which are:

- Has institutional rigidity become the problem of the Third World after its absence was the fundamental problem of these systems?
- Is political will more important than institutionalization in the process of political development in Africa?
- Can Western expertise be useful in this context? If so, what are the determinants of taking advantage of that experience?

- What is the difference between the ambition expressed by the charters and treaties and the reality of these texts in practice?

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Appendices

Appendix A: OAU Charter

We, the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,

Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny,

Conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples,

Conscious of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in all spheres of human endeavor,

Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and cooperation among our states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences,

Convinced that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained,

Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neocolonialism in all its forms,

Dedicated to the general progress of Africa,

Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the Principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among States,

Desirous that all African States should henceforth unite so that the welfare and wellbeing of their peoples can be assured,

Resolved to reinforce the links between our states by establishing and strengthening common institutions,

Have agreed to the present Charter.

Article I: ESTABLISHMENT

1. The High Contracting Parties do by the present Charter establish an Organization to be known as the ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.
2. The Organization shall include the Continental African States, Madagascar and other Islands surrounding Africa.

Article II: PURPOSES

1. The Organization shall have the following purposes:
 - (a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
 - (b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
 - (c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
 - (d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
 - (e) To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2. To these ends, the Member States shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in the following fields:
 - (a) Political and diplomatic cooperation;
 - (b) Economic cooperation, including transport and communications;
 - (c) Educational and cultural cooperation;
 - (d) Health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation;
 - (e) Scientific and technical cooperation; and
 - (f) Cooperation for defense and security.

Article III: PRINCIPLES

The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:

- 4 1. The sovereign equality of all Member States.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring States or any other States.
6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.
7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

Article IV: MEMBERSHIP

Each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to become a Member of the Organization.

Article V: RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBER STATES:

All Member States shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties. Article VI The Member States pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the present Charter.

Article VII: INSTITUTIONS

The Organization shall accomplish its purposes through the following principal institutions:

1. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
2. The Council of Ministers.

3. The General Secretariat.
4. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

Article VIII

THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall be the supreme organ of the Organization. It shall, subject to the provisions of this Charter, discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the Organization. It may in addition review the structure, functions and acts of all the organs and any specialized agencies which may be created in accordance with the present Charter.

Article IX

The Assembly shall be composed of the Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives and it shall meet at least once a year. At the request of any Member State and on approval by a two-thirds majority of the Member States, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session.

Article X

1. Each Member State shall have one vote.
2. All resolutions shall be determined by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the Organization.
3. Questions of procedure shall require a simple majority. Whether or not a question is one of procedure shall be determined by a simple majority of all Member States of the Organization.
4. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Organization shall form a quorum at any meeting of the Assembly.

Article XI

The Assembly shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure.

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Article XII

1. The Council of Ministers shall consist of Foreign Ministers or other Ministers as are designated by the Governments of Member States.
2. The Council of Ministers shall meet at least twice a year. When requested by any Member State and approved by two-thirds of all Member States, it shall meet in extraordinary session.

Article XIII

1. The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall be entrusted with the responsibility of preparing conferences of the Assembly.
2. It shall take cognizance of any matter referred to it by the Assembly. It shall be entrusted with the implementation of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall coordinate inter-African cooperation in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly conformity with Article II (2) of the present Charter.

Article XIV

1. Each Member State shall have one vote.
2. All resolutions shall be determined by a simple majority of the members of the Council of Ministers.
3. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Council of Ministers shall form a quorum for any meeting of the Council.

Article XV

The Council shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure.

GENERAL SECRETARIAT

Article XVI

There shall be a Secretary-General of the Organization, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Secretary-General shall direct the affairs of the Secretariat.

Article XVII

There shall be one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the Organization, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

Article XVIII

The functions and conditions of service of the Secretary-General, of the Assistant Secretaries-General and other employees of the Secretariat shall be governed by the provisions of this Charter and the regulations approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each member of the Organization undertakes to respect the exclusive character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

COMMISSION OF MEDIATION, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION

Article XIX

Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and, to this end decide to establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the composition of which and conditions of service shall be defined by a separate Protocol to be approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Said Protocol shall be regarded as forming an integral part of the present Charter.

SPECIALIZED COMMISSION

Article XX

The Assembly shall establish such Specialized Commissions as it may deem necessary, including the following:

1. Economic and Social Commission.
2. Educational, Scientific, Cultural and Health Commission.
3. Defense Commission.

Article XXI

Each Specialized Commission referred to in Article XX shall be composed of the Ministers concerned or other Ministers or Plenipotentiaries designated by the Governments of the Member States.

Article XXII

The functions of the Specialized Commissions shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the present Charter and of the regulations approved by the Council of Ministers.

THE BUDGET

Article XXIII

The budget of the Organization prepared by the Secretary-General shall be approved by the Council of Ministers. The budget shall be provided by contribution from Member States in accordance with the scale of assessment of the United Nations; provided, however, that no Member State shall be assessed an amount exceeding twenty percent of the yearly regular budget of the Organization. The Member States agree to pay their respective contributions regularly.

SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF CHARTER

Article XXIV

1. This Charter shall be open for signature to all independent sovereign African States and shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

2. The original instrument, done, if possible in African languages, in English and French, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all independent sovereign African States.

3. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia, which shall notify all signatories of each such deposit.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

Article XXV

This Charter shall enter into force immediately upon receipt by the Government of Ethiopia of the instruments of ratification from two-thirds of the signatory States.

REGISTRATION OF CHARTER

Article XXVI

This Charter shall, after due ratification, be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations through the Government of Ethiopia in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARTER

Article XXVII

Any question which may arise concerning the interpretation of this Charter shall be decided by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization.

ADHESION AND ACCESSION

Article XXVIII

1. Any independent sovereign African State may at any time notify the Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede to this Charter.

2. The Secretary-General shall, on receipt of such notification, communicate a copy of it to all the Member States. Admission shall be decided by a simple majority of the Member States. The decision of each Member State shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General, who

shall, upon receipt of the required number of votes, communicate the decision to the State concerned.

MISCELLANEOUS Article XXIX

The working languages of the Organization and all its institutions shall be, if possible African languages, English and French, Arabic and Portuguese.

Article XXX

The Secretary-General may accept, on behalf of the Organization, gifts, bequests and other donations made to the Organization, provided that this is approved by the Council of Ministers.

Article XXXI

The Council of Ministers shall decide on the privileges and immunities to be accorded to the personnel of the Secretariat in the respective territories of the Member States.

CESSATION OF MEMBERSHIP

Article XXXI

Any State which desires to renounce its membership shall forward a written notification to the Secretary-General. At the end of one year from the date of such notification, if not withdrawn, the Charter shall cease to apply with respect to the renouncing State, which shall there by cease to belong to the Organization.

AMENDMENT OF THE CHARTER

Article XXXII

This Charter may be amended or revised if any Member State makes a written request to the Secretary-General to that effect; provided, however, that the proposed amendment is not submitted to the Assembly for consideration until all the Member States have been duly notified of it and a period of one year has elapsed. Such an amendment shall not be effective unless approved by at least two thirds of all the Member States.

IN FAITH WHEREOF, We, the Heads of African States and Governments have signed this Charter.

Done in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 25th day of May, 1963

Appendix B: CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION

We, Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Organization of African Unity (OAU):

1. The President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
2. The President of the Republic of Angola
3. The President of the Republic of Benin
4. The President of the Republic of Botswana
5. The President of Burkina Faso
6. The President of the Republic of Burundi
7. The President of the Republic of Cameroon
8. The President of the Republic of Cape Verde
9. The President of the Central African Republic
10. The President of the Republic of Chad
11. The President of the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros
12. The President of the Republic of the Congo
13. The President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire
14. The President of the Democratic Republic of Congo
15. The President of the Republic of Djibouti
16. The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
17. The President of the State of Eritrea
18. The Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
19. The President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea
20. The President of the Gabonese Republic
21. The President of the Republic of The Gambia
22. The President of the Republic of Ghana
23. The President of the Republic of Guinea
24. The President of the Republic of Guinea Bissau
25. The President of the Republic of Kenya
26. The Prime Minister of Lesotho
27. The President of the Republic of Liberia
28. The Leader of the 1st of September Revolution of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

29. The President of the Republic of Madagascar
30. The President of the Republic of Malawi
31. The President of the Republic of Mali
32. The President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
33. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Mauritius.
34. The President of the Republic of Mozambique
35. The President of the Republic of Namibia
36. The President of the Republic of Niger
37. The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
38. The President of the Republic of Rwanda
39. The President of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
40. The President of the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe
41. The President of the Republic of Senegal
42. The President of the Republic of Seychelles
43. The President of the Republic of Sierra Leone
44. The President of the Republic of Somalia
45. The President of the Republic of South Africa
46. The President of the Republic of Sudan
47. The King of Swaziland
48. The President of the United Republic of Tanzania
49. The President of the Togolese Republic
50. The President of the Republic of Tunisia
51. The President of the Republic of Uganda
52. The President of the Republic of Zambia
53. The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe

INSPIRED by the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States;

CONSIDERING the principles and objectives stated in the

Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community;

RECALLING the heroic struggles waged by our peoples and our countries for political independence, human dignity and economic emancipation;

CONSIDERING that since its inception, the Organization of African Unity has played a determining and invaluable role in the liberation of the continent, the affirmation of a common identity and the process of attainment of the unity of our continent and has provided a unique framework for our collective action in Africa and in our relations with the rest of the world.

DETERMINED to take up the multifaceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples in the light of the social, economic and political changes taking place in the world;

CONVINCED of the need to accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community in order to promote the socio-economic development of Africa and to face more effectively the challenges posed by globalization;

GUIDED by our common vision of a united and strong Africa and by the need to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among our peoples;

CONSCIOUS of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda;

DETERMINED to promote and protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law;

FURTHER DETERMINED to take all necessary measures to strengthen our common institutions and provide them with the necessary powers and resources to enable them discharge their respective mandates effectively;

RECALLING the Declaration which we adopted at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of our Assembly in Sire, the Great Socialist

People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on 9.9. 99, in which we decided to establish an African Union, in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the Charter of our Continental Organization and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Definitions

In this Constitutive Act:

“Act” means the present Constitutive Act;

“AEC” means the African Economic Community;

“Assembly” means the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union;

“Charter” means the Charter of the OAU;

“Commission” means the Secretariat of the Union;

“Committee” means a Specialized Technical Committee of the Union;

“Council” means the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the Union;

“Court ” means the Court of Justice of the Union;

“Executive Council” means the Executive Council of Ministers of the Union;

“Member State” means a Member State of the Union;

“OAU” means the Organization of African Unity;

“Parliament” means the Pan-African Parliament of the Union;

“Union” means the African Union established by the present Constitutive Act.

Article 2: Establishment

The African Union is hereby established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Article 3: Objectives

The objectives of the Union shall be to:

(a) achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;

(b) defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;

(c) accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of

the continent;

(d) promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;

(e) encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(f) promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;

(g) promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;

(h) promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;

(i) establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;

(j) promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies;

(k) promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;

(l) coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;

(m) advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology;

(n) work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

Article 4: Principles

The Union shall function in accordance with the following

principles:

- (a) sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union;
- (b) respect of borders existing on achievement of independence;
- (c) participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union;
- (d) Establishment of a common defense policy for the African Continent;
- (e) peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly;
- (f) prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union;
- (g) non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;
- (h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;
- (i) peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security;
- (j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security;
- (k) promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union;
- (l) promotion of gender equality;
- (m) respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;
- (n) promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development;
- (o) respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities;

(p) condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.

Article 5: Organs of the Union

1. The organs of the Union shall be:
 - (a) The Assembly of the Union;
 - (b) The Executive Council;
 - (c) The Pan-African Parliament;
 - (d) The Court of Justice;
 - (e) The Commission;
 - (f) The Permanent Representatives Committee;
 - (g) The Specialized Technical Committees;
 - (h) The Economic, Social and Cultural Council;
 - (i) The Financial Institutions;
2. Other organs that the Assembly may decide to establish.

Article 6: The Assembly

1. The Assembly shall be composed of Heads of States and Government or their duly accredited representatives.
2. The Assembly shall be the supreme organ of the Union.
3. The Assembly shall meet at least once a year in ordinary session. At the request of any Member State and on approval by a two-thirds majority of the Member States, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session.
4. The Office of the Chairman of the Assembly shall be held for a period of one year by a Head of State or Government elected after consultations among the Member States.

Article 7: Decisions of the Assembly

1. The Assembly shall take its decisions by consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States of the Union. However, procedural matters, including the question of

whether a matter is one of procedure or not, shall be decided by a simple majority.

2. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Union shall form a quorum at any meeting of the Assembly.

Article 8: Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

The Assembly shall adopt its own Rules of Procedure.

Article 9: Powers and Functions of the Assembly

1. The functions of the Assembly shall be to:

- (a) determine the common policies of the Union;
- (b) receive, consider and take decisions on reports and recommendations from the other organs of the Union;
- (c) consider requests for Membership of the Union;
- (d) establish any organ of the Union;
- (e) monitor the implementation of policies and decisions of the Union as well ensure compliance by all Member States;
- (f) adopt the budget of the Union;
- (g) give directives to the Executive Council on the management of conflicts, war and other emergency situations and the restoration of peace;
- (h) appoint and terminate the appointment of the judges of the Court of Justice;
- (i) appoint the Chairman of the Commission and his or her deputy or deputies and Commissioners of the Commission and determine their functions and terms of office.

2. The Assembly may delegate any of its powers and functions to any organ of the Union.

Article 10: The Executive Council

1. The Executive Council shall be composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or such other Ministers or Authorities as are designated by the Governments of Member States.

2. The Executive Council shall meet at least twice a year in

ordinary session. It shall also meet in an extra-ordinary session at the request of any Member State and upon approval by two thirds of all Member States.

Article 11: Decisions of the Executive Council

1. The Executive Council shall take its decisions by consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States.

However, procedural matters, including the question of whether a matter is one of procedure or not, shall be decided by a simple majority.

2. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Union shall form a quorum at any meeting of the Executive Council.

Article 12: Rules of Procedure of the Executive Council

The Executive Council shall adopt its own Rules of Procedure.

Article 13: Functions of the Executive Council

1. The Executive Council shall coordinate and take decisions on policies in areas of common interest to the Member States, including the following:

- (a) foreign trade;
- (b) energy, industry and mineral resources;
- (c) food, agricultural and animal resources, livestock production and forestry;
- (d) water resources and irrigation;
- (e) environmental protection, humanitarian action and disaster response and relief;
- (f) transport and communications;
- (g) insurance;
- (h) education, culture, health and human resources development;
- (i) science and technology;
- (j) nationality, residency and immigration matters;
- (k) social security, including the formulation of mother and child care policies, as well as policies relating to the disabled and the handicapped;
- (l) establishment of a system of African awards, medals and prizes.

2. The Executive Council shall be responsible to the Assembly. It

shall consider issues referred to it and monitor the implementation of policies formulated by the Assembly.

3. The Executive Council may delegate any of its powers and functions mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article to the Specialized Technical Committees established under Article 14 of this Act.

Article 14: The Specialized Technical Committees

Establishment and Composition

1. There is hereby established the following Specialized Technical Committees, which shall be responsible to the Executive Council:

- (a) The Committee on Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters;
- (b) The Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs;
- (c) The Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters;
- (d) The Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment;
- (e) The Committee on Transport, Communications and Tourism;
- (f) The Committee on Health, Labor and Social Affairs; and
- (g) The Committee on Education, Culture and Human Resources.

2. The Assembly shall, whenever it deems appropriate, restructure the existing Committees or establish other Committees.

3. The Specialized Technical Committees shall be composed of Ministers or senior officials responsible for sectors falling within their respective areas of competence.

Article 15 Functions of the Specialized Technical Committees: Each Committee shall within its field of competence:

- (a) Prepare projects and program of the Union and submit it to the Executive Council;
- (b) ensure the supervision, follow-up and the evaluation of the implementation of decisions taken by the organs of the Union;
- (c) ensure the coordination and harmonization of projects and Program of the Union;

(d) Submit to the Executive Council either on its own initiative or at the request of the Executive Council, reports and recommendations on the implementation of the provisions of this Act; and

(e) carry out any other functions assigned to it for the purpose of ensuring the implementation of the provisions of this Act.

Article 16: Meetings

Subject to any directives given by the Executive Council, each Committee shall meet as often as necessary and shall prepare its Rules of Procedure and submit them to the Executive Council for approval.

Article 17: The Pan-African Parliament

1. In order to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and economic integration of the continent, a Pan-African Parliament shall be established.

2. The composition, powers, functions and organization of the Pan-African Parliament shall be defined in a protocol relating thereto.

Article 18: The Court of Justice

1. A Court of Justice of the Union shall be established;

2. The statute, composition and functions of the Court of Justice shall be defined in a protocol relating thereto.

Article 19: The Financial Institutions

The Union shall have the following financial institutions whose rules and regulations shall be defined in protocols relating thereto:

- (a) The African Central Bank;
- (b) The African Monetary Fund;
- (c) The African Investment Bank.

Article 20: The Commission

1. There shall be established a Commission of the Union, which shall be the Secretariat of the Union.

2. The Commission shall be composed of the Chairman, his or her

deputy or deputies and the Commissioners. They shall be assisted by the necessary staff for the smooth functioning of the Commission.

3. The structure, functions and regulations of the Commission shall be determined by the Assembly.

Article 21: The Permanent Representatives Committee

1. There shall be established a Permanent Representatives Committee. It shall be composed of Permanent Representatives to the Union and other Plenipotentiaries of Member States.

2. The Permanent Representatives Committee shall be charged with the responsibility of preparing the work of the Executive Council and acting on the Executive Council's instructions. It may set up such sub-committees or working groups as it may deem necessary.

Article 22: The Economic, Social and Cultural Council

1. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council shall be an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the Member States of the Union.

2. The functions, powers, composition and organization of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council shall be determined by the Assembly.

Article 23: Imposition of Sanctions

1. The Assembly shall determine the appropriate sanctions to be imposed on any Member State that defaults in the payment of its contributions to the budget of the Union in the following manner: denial of the right to speak at meetings, to vote, to present candidates for any position or post within the Union or to benefit from any activity or commitments, therefore;

2. Furthermore, any Member State that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the

Article 24: The Headquarters of the Union

1. The Headquarter of the Union shall be in Addis Ababa in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

2. There may be established such other offices of the Union as the

Assembly may, on the recommendation of the Executive Council, determine.

Article 25: Working Languages

The working languages of the Union and all its institutions shall be, if possible, African languages, Arabic, English, French and Portuguese.

Article 26: Interpretation

The Court shall be seized with matters of interpretation arising from the application or implementation of this Act. Pending its establishment, such matters shall be submitted to the Assembly of the Union, which shall decide by a two-thirds majority.

Article 27: Signature, Ratification and Accession

1. This Act shall be open to signature, ratification and accession by the Member States of the OAU in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.
2. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the OAU.
3. Any Member State of the OAU acceding to this Act after its entry into force shall deposit the instrument of accession with the Chairman of the Commission.

Article 28: Entry into Force

This Act shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the Member States of the OAU.

Article 29: Admission to Membership

1. Any African State may, at any time after the entry into force of this Act, notify the Chairman of the Commission of its intention to accede to this Act and to be admitted as a member of the Union.
2. The Chairman of the Commission shall, upon receipt of such notification, transmit copies thereof to all Member States. Admission shall be decided by a simple majority of the Member States. The decision of each Member State shall be transmitted to the Chairman of the Commission who shall, upon receipt of the required number of votes, communicate the decision to the State concerned.

Article 30: Suspension

Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union.

Article 31: Cessation of Membership

1. Any State which desires to renounce its membership shall forward a written notification to the Chairman of the Commission, who shall inform Member States thereof. At the end of one year from the date of such notification, if not withdrawn, the Act shall cease to apply with respect to the renouncing State, which shall there by cease to belong to the Union.

2. During the period of one year referred to in paragraph 1 of this

Article, any Member State wishing to withdraw from the Union shall comply with the provisions of this Act and shall be bound to discharge its obligations under this Act up to the date of its withdrawal.

Article 32: Amendment and Revision

1. Any Member State may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Act.

2. Proposals for amendment or revision shall be submitted to the

Chairman of the Commission who shall transmit same to Member States within thirty (30) days of receipt thereof.

3. The Assembly, upon the advice of the Executive Council, shall

examine these proposals within a period of one year following notification of Member States, in accordance with the provisions

of paragraph 2 of this Article;

4. Amendments or revisions shall be adopted by the Assembly by

consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority and submitted for ratification by all Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. They shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification with the Chairman of the Commission by a two thirds majority of the Member States.

Article 33: Transitional Arrangements and Final Provisions

1. This Act shall replace the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. However, the Charter shall remain operative for a transitional period of one year or such further period as may be determined by the Assembly, following the entry into force of the Act, for the purpose of enabling the OAU/AEC to undertake the necessary measures regarding the devolution of its assets and liabilities to the Union and all matters relating thereto.

2. The provisions of this Act shall take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions of the Treaty

establishing the African Economic Community.

3. Upon the entry into force of this Act, all necessary measures

shall be undertaken to implement its provisions and to ensure the establishment of the organs provided for under the Act in accordance with any directives or decisions which may be adopted in this regard by the Parties thereto within the transitional period stipulated above.

4. Pending the establishment of the Commission, the OAU General Secretariat shall be the interim Secretariat of the Union.

5. This Act, drawn up in four (4) original texts in the Arabic, English, French and Portuguese languages, all four (4) being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the OAU and, after its entry into force, with the Chairman of the Commission who shall transmit a certified true copy of the Act to the Government of each signatory State. The Secretary- General of the OAU and the Chairman of the Commission shall notify all signatory States of the dates of the deposit of the instruments of ratification or accession and shall upon entry into force of this Act register the same with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE have adopted this Act.

Done at Lome, Togo, this 11th day of July, 2000.

**CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION
ADOPTED BY THE THIRTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE
ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
11 JULY, 2000 – LOME, TOGO**

1. People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

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2. Republic of Angola

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3. Republic of Benin

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4. Republic of Botswana

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5. Burkina Faso

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6. Republic of Burundi

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7. Republic of Cameroon

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8. Republic of Cape Verde

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9. Central African Republic

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10. Republic of Chad

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11. Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros

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12. Republic of the Congo

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13. Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

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14. Democratic Republic of Congo

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15. Republic of Djibouti

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16. Arab Republic of Egypt

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17. State of Eritrea

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18. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

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19. Republic of Equatorial Guinea

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20. Republic of Gabon

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21. Republic of The Gambia

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22. Republic of Ghana

- 23. Republic of Guinea
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- 24. Republic of Guinea Bissau
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- 25. Republic of Kenya
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- 26. Kingdom of Lesotho
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- 27. Republic of Liberia
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- 28. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
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- 29. Republic of Madagascar
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- 30. Republic of Malawi
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- 31. Republic of Mali
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- 32. Islamic Republic of Mauritania
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- 33. Republic of Mauritius
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- 34. Republic of Mozambique
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- 35. Republic of Namibia
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- 36. Republic of Niger
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- 37. Federal Republic of Nigeria
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- 38. Republic of Rwanda
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- 39. Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic

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40. Republic of Sao Tome and Principe

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41. Republic of Senegal

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42. Republic of Seychelles

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43. Republic of Sierra Leone

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44. Republic of Somalia

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45. Republic of South Africa

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46. Republic of Sudan

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47. Kingdom of Swaziland

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49. Republic of Togo

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50. Republic of Tunisia

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51. Republic of Uganda

52. Republic of Zambia

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53. Republic of Zimbabwe

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**CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE
AFRICAN UNION**

CERTIFIED COPY

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Signature

OAU Legal Counsel

Appendix C:

NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD)

Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance

Preamble

1. We, the participating Heads of State and Government of the member states of the African Union (AU), met in Durban, South Africa, at the inaugural Assembly of the African Union and considered the report of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee established at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001.

2. In the general context of our meeting, we recalled our shared commitment underlying the establishment of NEPAD to eradicate poverty and to place our countries, individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic on equal footing. We reaffirm this pledge as our most pressing duty.

3. In reviewing the report of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee and considering the way forward, we were also mindful of the fact that, over the years, successive OAU Summits have taken decisions aimed at ensuring stability, peace and security, promoting closer economic integration, ending unconstitutional changes of government, supporting human rights and upholding the rule of law and good governance. Among these decisions are:

- a. the Lagos Plan of Action, and the Final Act of Lagos (1980);
- b. the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples. Rights (1981);
- c. the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990);
- d. the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990); and
- e. the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990).
- f. the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (1991);

- g. the 1993 Cairo Declaration Establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution;
- h. the Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples. Rights (1998);
- i. the 1999 Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights;
- j. the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (adopted at the 2000 OAU Summit in Lome, Togo, and based on the earlier decision of the 1999 Algiers OAU Summit); and
- k. the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA) Solemn Declaration (2000); and
- l. the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000)

4. We, member states parties to the aforementioned instruments, reaffirm our full and continuing commitment to these and other decisions of our continental organization, as well as the other international obligations and undertakings into which we have entered in the context of the United Nations. Of particular significance in this context are the Charter of the United Nations and the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights and all conventions relating thereto, especially the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Beijing Declaration.

5. Africa faces grave challenges and the most urgent of these are the eradication of poverty and the fostering of socio-economic development, in particular, through democracy and good governance. It is to the achievement of these twin objectives that the NEPAD process is principally directed.

6. Accordingly, we the participating Heads of State and Government of the member states of the African Union have agreed to work together in policy and action in pursuit of the following objectives:-

- Democracy and Good Political Governance
- Economic and Corporate Governance
- Socio-Economic Development
- African Peer Review Mechanism

Democracy and Good Political Governance

7. At the beginning of the new century and millennium, we reaffirm our commitment to the promotion of democracy and its core values in our respective countries. In particular, we undertake to work with renewed determination to enforce

- the rule of law;
- the equality of all citizens before the law and the liberty of the individual;
- individual and collective freedoms, including the right to form and join political parties and trade unions, in conformity with the constitution;
- equality of opportunity for all;
- the inalienable right of the individual to participate by means of free, credible and democratic political processes in periodically electing their leaders for a fixed term of office; and
- adherence to the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of effective parliaments.

8. We believe in just, honest, transparent, accountable and participatory government and probity in public life. We therefore undertake to combat and eradicate corruption, which both retards economic development and undermines the moral fabric of society.

9. We are determined to increase our efforts in restoring stability, peace and security in the African continent, as these are essential conditions for sustainable development, alongside democracy, good governance, human rights, social development, protection of environment and sound economic management. Our efforts and initiatives will also be directed at seeking speedy peaceful solutions to current conflicts and at building Africa's capacity to prevent, manage and resolve all conflicts on the continent.

10. In the light of Africa's recent history, respect for human rights has to be accorded an importance and urgency all of its own. One of the tests by which the quality of a democracy is judged is the protection it provides for each individual citizen and for the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Ethnic minorities, women and children have borne the brunt of the conflicts raging on the continent today. We undertake to do more to advance the cause of human rights in Africa generally and, specifically, to end the moral shame exemplified by the plight of women, children, the disabled and ethnic minorities in conflict situations in Africa.

11. In Africa's efforts at democracy, good governance and economic reconstruction, women have a central role to play. We accept it as a binding obligation to ensure that women have

every opportunity to contribute on terms of full equality to political and socio-economic development in all our countries.

12. To fulfill these commitments we have agreed to adopt the following action plan:

13. In support of democracy and the democratic process

We will:

- ensure that our respective national constitutions reflect the democratic ethos and provide for demonstrably accountable governance;
- promote political representation, thus providing for all citizens to participate in the political process in a free and fair political environment;
- enforce strict adherence to the position of the African Union (AU) on unconstitutional changes of government and other decisions of our continental organization aimed at promoting democracy, good governance, peace and security;
- strengthen and, where necessary, establish an appropriate electoral administration and oversight bodies, in our respective countries and provide the necessary resources and capacity to conduct elections which are free, fair and credible;
- reassess and where necessary strengthen the AU and sub-regional election monitoring mechanisms and procedures; and
- heighten public awareness of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, especially in our educational institutions.

14. In support of Good Governance

We have agreed to:

- adopt clear codes, standards and indicators of good governance at the national, sub-regional and continental levels;
- accountable, efficient and effective civil service;
- ensure the effective functioning of parliaments and other accountability institutions in our respective countries, including parliamentary committees and anti-corruption bodies; and
- ensure the independence of the judicial system that will be able to prevent abuse of power and corruption.

15. To promote and protect human rights

We have agreed to:

- facilitate the development of vibrant civil society organizations, including strengthening human rights institutions at the national, sub-regional and regional levels;

- support the Charter, African Commission and Court on Human and People's Rights as important instruments for ensuring the promotion, protection and observance of Human Rights;
- strengthen co-operation with the UN High Commission for Human Rights; and
- ensure responsible free expression, inclusive of the freedom of the press.

Economic and Corporate Governance

16. Good economic and corporate governance including transparency in financial management are essential pre-requisites for promoting economic growth and reducing poverty. Mindful of this, we have approved eight prioritized codes and standards for achieving good economic and corporate governance.

17. These prioritized codes and standards represent those fundamental, internationally, regionally, and domestically accepted codes and standards that all African countries should strive to observe within their capacity capabilities. In other words, they are the codes and standards that need to be complied with as a Minimum requirement, given a country's capacity to do so.

18. We believe the eight prioritized and approved codes and standards set out below have the potential to promote market efficiency, to control wasteful spending, to consolidate democracy, and to encourage private financial flows - all of which are critical aspects of the quest to reduce poverty and enhance sustainable development. These codes and standards have been developed by a number of international organizations through consultative processes that involved the active participation of endorsement by African countries. Thus, the codes and standards are genuinely global as they were agreed by experts from a vast spectrum of economies with different structural characteristics. They are the following:

- a. Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies;
- b. Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency;
- c. Best Practices for Budget Transparency;
- d. Guidelines for Public Debt Management;
- e. Principles of Corporate Governance;
- f. International Accounting Standards;
- g. International Standards on Auditing; and the
- h. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.

19. We have also approved other key codes and standards in transparency and financial Management. These include

- a. Principles for Payment Systems;
- b. Recommendations on Anti-money laundering and;
- c. Core principles for securities and insurance supervision and regulation

Socio-Economic Development

20. We believe that poverty can only be effectively tackled through the promotion of:

- democracy, good governance, peace and security;
- the development of human and physical resources;
- gender equality;
- openness to international trade and investment;
- allocation of appropriate funds to social sector and ;
- new partnerships between governments and the private sector, and with civil society.

21. We reaffirm our conviction that the development of Africa is ultimately the responsibility of Africans themselves. Africa.s development begins with the quality of its human resources. We, therefore, undertake to work towards the enhancement of our human resources through the provision of more and better education and training, especially in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and other skills central to a globalising world; and better health

care, with priority attention to addressing HIV/AIDS and other pandemic diseases.

22. The marginalisation of women remains real despite the progress of recent years. We will, therefore, work with renewed vigour to ensure gender equality and ensure their full and effective integration of women in political and socioeconomic development.

23. Globalisation and liberalisation does not mean that there should be no role for government in socio-economic development. It only means a different type of government. We, therefore, undertake to foster new partnerships between government and the private sector; a new division of labour in which the private sector will be the veritable engine of economic growth, while governments concentrate on the development of infrastructure and the creation of a macroeconomic environment. This includes expanding and enhancing the quality of human resources and providing the appropriate institutional framework to guide the formulation and execution of economic policy.

24. The regional economic communities remain the building blocks for Africa's economic integration. We will, therefore, continue to strengthen them in every way practicable and to relate their evolution more closely to the development of the African Union.

25. We welcome the strong international interest in and support for NEPAD. It is our intention to build on this promising foundation, working with our development partners and the wider international community to:

- forge new forms of international co-operation in which the benefits of globalisation are more evenly shared;
- create a stable international economic environment in which African countries can achieve growth through greater market access for their exports; the removal of trade barriers, especially non-tariff barriers and other forms of protectionism; increased flows of direct foreign investment; debt cancellation; a meaningful increase in ODA; and the diversification of their economies. Africa's prosperity will be a multiplier in world prosperity.

26. NEPAD is founded on a hardheaded assessment of the political and socioeconomic realities in Africa today. We do not, therefore, underestimate the challenges involved in achieving NEPAD's objectives, but we share a common resolution to work together even more closely in order to end poverty on the continent and to restore Africa to a place of dignity in the family of nations.

27. No African country is a replica of another and no African society is a mirror image of another. However, we believe that the variety within our oneness can be enriching. It is part of the purpose of this Declaration to mobilise all those enriching qualities to build African unity, in respect of the specific of our countries.

African Peer Review Mechanism

28. We have separately agreed to establish an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on the basis of voluntary accession. The APRM seeks to promote adherence to and fulfillment of the commitments contained in this Declaration.

The Mechanism spells out the institutions and processes that will guide future peer reviews, based on mutually agreed codes and standards of democracy, political, economic and corporate governance.

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