

DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA



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A thesis submitted for the acquisition of a doctorate in British Civilization

Colonial Westernization in Nineteenth-Century British India

**Presented by
Mr Larbi BOUMEDDANE**

In front of Jury composed of

President: Pr Zoulikha BOUHADIBA	Professor	University of Oran 2
Supervisor: Pr Rachida YACINE	Professor	University of Oran 2
Examiner: Pr Fatiha KAID BERRAHAL	Professor	ENS, Oran
Examiner: Dr Fatiha DANI	MCA	University of Oran 1

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Dedication

To my family

To Victoria BOX CANDELA

To Amel Hlima ARIOUI

To Julien KATIVLA

“No greater glory can be handed down than to conquer the barbarian, to recall the savage and the pagan to civility.”

said the Welsh-English historian and geographer Richard Hakluyt in 1584.

Dalziel. N, 2006, Historical Atlas of the British Empire, London, Penguin Group, p. 15.

Abstract

Imperial coexistence between the Indians and the British during the nineteenth century led the former to imitate European culture on a large scale. The Indian society was increasingly submitted to the transplantation of Western thinking, spirituality, and technical science. During their long-term colonial presence in India, the British extended their domination and penetration there by means of great multifarious renovating contribution. India was persistently the scene of deliberate adaptation in both education and infrastructure after the fashion of the British metropolis in such a way as to meet the latter's interests. While a series of historians are persuaded of the regenerative quality of this colonial contribution vis-à-vis the colonized, many others view it rather as destructive vis-à-vis India's economy and moral or cultural ancestral values.

Résumé

La coexistence impériale entre les Indiens et les Britanniques pendant le XIXème siècle a conduit les premiers à imiter la culture européenne à grande échelle. La société indienne était de plus en plus soumise à la transplantation de la pensée, la spiritualité, et la science technique occidentales. Pendant leur présence coloniale en Inde, les Britanniques y-ont accru leur domination et pénétration par le biais d'une importante contribution rénovatrice variée. L'Inde était acharnement le théâtre d'une adaptation voulue d'ordre éducatif aussi bien infrastructurel à l'instar de la métropole britannique de sorte à assouvir les intérêts de cette dernière. Alors qu'une série d'historiens sont convaincus de la qualité régénératrice de cette contribution coloniale vis-à-vis les colonisés, beaucoup d'autres la voient plutôt comme destructrice à l'égard de l'économie et des valeurs morales ou culturelles ancestrales indiennes.

ملخص

التعايش الإمبريالي يبين الهنود و البريطانيين خلال القرن تاسع عشر دفع بالأوائل إلى تقليد الثقافة الأوروبية على صعيد عالي و أصبح المجتمع الهندي خاضعا أكثر فأكثر إلى التوغل الفكري والروحاني والعلمي التقني الغربي. خلال التواجد الاستعماري في الهند على المدى الطويل، قام البريطانيون بتفعيل هيمنتهم و توغلهم عن طريق مساهمة مجددة و متنوعة. كانت الهند مسرحا متعصبا لتكيف مراد ثقافي و هيكلي على سبيل مثال بريطانيا. هذه الأخيرة كانت تسعى إلى تحقيق مصالحه حيث اقتنع جمع من المؤرخين أن هذه المساهمة لها عائد لفائدة المستعمرين و أنها مخربة لاقتصاد الهند و القيم الأخلاقية و الثقافية التراثية الهندية. في حين تمسك كتاب و مؤرخون آخرون بالرأي المعاكس المدعي أن تلك المساهمة كانت مخططة لصالح الهند البريطانية فكانت حسبهم ساعية إلى ترقية هذه الأخيرة عن طريق فتحها إلى الحضارة الغربية.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

General Introduction

It may be a truism to say that long-term racial or colonial coexistence is bound to entail the borrowing of cultural phenomena by one interacting social side from another. Nineteenth-century imperial history shows that imitative interaction is due to gaps dividing the colonizer and the colonized in different domains.¹ The colonial adoption of Western modes was firmly associated to supposed metropolitan superiority or supposed colonial inferiority and coloured by a belief in racial difference.² This is seen by Powell and Sornin who claim that enduring exchange between colonizing Europe and Asian subjected countries caused the latter to be left with a rich cultural legacy.³ Anglo-Indian imperial history exemplifies the fact that the assimilation of the colonizer's culture or civilization happens only at bilateral consent. Such assimilation happens when an enthusiasm for sharing and benefiting on the part of arriving alien forceful masters combines with an inclination to receiving on the part of their non-white subjects.⁴

India, as a non-white Commonwealth Country⁵, was being significantly influenced by Western culture, particularly British culture. Meanwhile, British dominating presence there in the nineteenth century was in the main for economic reasons.⁶ This presence was characterized by the application of various westernizing strategies to maximize colonial profit therein. It is assumed that the colonial conception of capitals and the acquisition of Indian riches depended much on

¹ Bruhat. J, 2010, "Colonisation", in Encyclopaedia Universalis, CD LOGICIEL, Expert Functions, p. 1.

² Washbrook. D, 2004, "South India 1770-1840: The Colonial Transition" in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 479-516, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 481, 483.

³ Powell. V. G and Sornin. A, 2010, "Art Colonial", in Encyclopaedia Universalis CD LOGICIEL, Expert Functions, p. 1.

⁴ Walsh. J. E, 2006, A Brief History of India, New York, Facts on File, pp. 119-120.

⁵ The Commonwealth Countries were ruled by Britain and, though now politically independent, have kept recognizing the British Monarch as the head of their governments. Marx, R, 2010, "Royaume-Uni, l'Empire Britannique", in Encyclopaedia Universalis CD LOGICIEL, Expert Functions, p. 01.

⁶ Green. W. A and Deasy JR. J. P, 1985, "Unifying Themes in the History of British India, 1757-1857: An Historiographical Analysis", in Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, Vol. 17, No. 01, pp. 15-45, Portland, North American Conference on British Studies, pp. 16-17.

innovations. In spite of the far great geographical distance between British India and her metropolis, the latter succeeded not only in exporting thereto different typically-Western cultural needed elements but also in making advantageous use of them. This fact may constitute for the researcher a case study for the relationship between metropolitan ethos and colonial penetration, domination, and economic exploitation. To quote Green and Deasy, “*Britain could not hope to preserve sovereignty over so numerous and alien people unless an identity of faith, education, and manners was achieved*”⁷ India was so important in the eyes of the British that these enticed many Indians to deny their native religion of Hinduism or Islam by means of colonial educative institutions preaching and valorising Christianity as a justification to colonial rule.

Our research work will try to unveil the nature of and the rationale behind the British cultural or scientific embroilment in nineteenth-century India in accordance with different views. Our research work will try to show that the British intention was not to set up a short-term business adventure in India. The British did not merely want to shuttle back and forth between their homeland and India as successful spice or textile traders. They rather assigned themselves the duty of improving the moral and social situations of India, which they continually proclaimed as a pretext for their colonial handholding. In fact, it is said that the British bore the will to supply India with paternalistic care through civilizing innovation.⁸ They wanted, according to many historians or writers, to give an air of legitimacy to their profit-reaching command over India. Hence, one may wonder to what extent that plausible pretext was true.

Furthermore, so as to maintain their colonial foothold administratively, the British needed to make the native population more and more familiar with British ethics and culture. They were behaving in such methodological ways as to make the Indian society change to be more and more submissive to the metropolis’s own interests. In fact, it is said that the need for firm and viable westernizing

⁷ Ibid. , p. 15.

⁸ Marx. R, 2010, op. cit. , p. 10.

measures was taking over in nineteenth-century India for the sake of gradual colonial penetration, more authority, and continual economic exploitation.⁹

A great deal of literature on Britain's westernising commitment in her non-white colonies is available showing unequal distribution of efforts; these colonies were not seen as having the same importance. In the light of various accounts, one may believe that India was treated quite differently from all the other non-white colonies. Bengal¹⁰ was the object of an exceptional imperial conception in the sense that the magnitude of attention and devotion it received in terms of Western education throughout the nineteenth century eclipsed the one offered to any other same-type colony.¹¹ Furthermore, speed had its part within the whole westernising policy: citizenry-building education and modern technological infrastructures such as railways and telegraph were provided for the first time simultaneously in Europe and India.¹² This simultaneity alone may serve as an indication of the imperativeness or urgency Britain attached to her multifarious westernising intervention in her Indian periphery.

Our choice of India, as far as the British nineteenth-century overseas westernizing commitment is concerned, is justifiable by the fact that India absorbed a huge allotment in terms of money and efforts. Moreover, the particular imperial devotion to the 'jewel in the crown'¹³ makes one wonder about the rationale or motivation lying behind that. Bengal epitomizes the British-style formation of colonial native elite in the whole British Empire. Calcutta precisely was then the scene of the most advanced Western education in British India. Calcutta was ahead in raising the then new elite of India.¹⁴

⁹ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, 2006, A Concise History of Modern India, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-59.

¹⁰ Bengal, being an enormously-rich trading region in eastern India, came under British military supremacy in 1757 upon British victory at the Battle of Plassey against the native army. Ibid. , pp.51-52.

¹¹ Stein. B, 2010, A History of India, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, p. 231.

¹² Metcalf. B. D, and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 92.

¹³ The phrase 'jewel in the crown' was used by the British in the nineteenth century to refer to India as being their possession under the rule of their crown. Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 89.

¹⁴ Ibid.

It was British India that typified the nineteenth-century imperial massive transplantation of steam technology from Europe to Asia. Technology was seen as ‘*a tool of empire*’ while “*State power was used to promote technologies that served the regime’s military, economic or ideological needs*”.¹⁵ Above all the cultural aspects linking Britain to her Indian periphery “*the economic lives of both countries were profoundly, and increasingly, intertwined*”.¹⁶ Thus, an issue one may put forward is: was or to what extent was the westernising role of the British in nineteenth-century India determined by public spiritedness ?

It is claimed that as the British had attained military primacy in certain Indian territories, these witnessed increasing cultural change. While many Indians preferred to remain faithful to their ancestral education, religion, and languages, many others proved eager to switch to British standards and thought. In spite of being a mere social minority, those Indians being driven to adopt the Western lifestyle aspired to prominent careers for the sake of a better life. This Indian category was aware of the fact that the assimilation of British spirit and particularly the English language opened a door to administrative jobs though under the domination of the colonizer.¹⁷ So, one wonders whether or not this colonial temptation was exerted solely for the sake of benefiting this new Indian class or partly for the sake of making colluding Indian partnership for eventual imperial economic advantages.

Although India became politically independent of Britain more than half a century ago, today’s Indian society is strongly pervaded by Western lifestyle. One may deduce the importance of the colonial westernising measures since their outcomes are still felt or visible under the free Republic of India. The English language for example had been so widespread there that it has been recognized since the Indian Independence as one of the two national or official languages of the Indian State. The British raised after their own fashion an educated Indian class

¹⁵ Arnold. D, 2004, Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 92.

¹⁶ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 93.

¹⁷ Encyclopaedia Britannica Incorporate, 1974, Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia Knowledge in Depth, 15TH Edition, Vol. 9, Chicago, University of Chicago, p. 406.

partially broken with ancestral Indian cultural tendencies.¹⁸ The British are accredited with the dissemination of Christianity and Western thoughts in India by means of missionaries.¹⁹

From here comes another motivation justifying the choice of the theme. This research work may serve to some extent future research on the current theme of globalisation. The latter did not come at one stroke. Globalisation, which is the incessant propensity for cultural interdependence among countries, may be analysed as a movement of its own having geneses and evolution processes.²⁰ Present-day cultural international predispositions originated from the British Empire's policies.²¹ As a case in point, hundreds of millions of Indians would not have today reached a great facility of expression in spoken and written English if it had not been for British imperial initiative projects to establish and run in India English-teaching schools in the nineteenth century. English as well as Western science were officially promoted through educational institutions founded and subsidised by the colonial State or privateers.²²

Globalisation in India also includes advanced infrastructure as a key-feature to modernity. How could India's familiarity with modern European infrastructure have come about if it had not been for British colonial westernizing policies? As a case in point, the British strenuously and increasingly ventured to provide India with a new means of conveyance based on steam engineering in the second half of the nineteenth century. This pioneering work has gone into the achievement of today's thousands of kilometres of railway across India.

The first chapter will be the background section of the thesis. It will be a synthesis of the importance of the Far East, particularly India, for the English

¹⁸ Dutt. R. P, 1957, *L'Inde: Aujourd'hui et Demain*, Paris, Editions Sociales, p. 55.

¹⁹ Dalziel. N, 2006, *Historical Atlas of the British Empire*, London, Penguin Group, p. 9.

²⁰ Fischer. S, 2003, "Globalization and its Challenges", www.iie.com/fischer/pdf/fischer011903.pdf, 29TH, pp. 3-5.

²¹ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 5.

²² Dharwadker. V, 2002, "English in India and Indian Literature in English: The Early History, 1579-1834" in *Comparative Literature Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 93-119, State College, Penn State University Press, p. 102.

before any Anglo-Indian relationship began. The first chapter will include the discussion of a series of facts having aided or assured the English progressive advent to India before any form of English colonial westernisation appeared therein. The initial elements of the westernising process appeared in the late seventeenth century and could develop overtime while the English were gradually making their military primacy in parts of India. So, the second chapter will try to argue that that military predominance, acquired mostly in the eighteenth century, and nineteenth-century colonial westernisation fitted together well in the sense that the former conditionally paved the way for the latter. In fact, the second chapter will explain early interconnected circumstances and political or economic changes that laid the foundations of nineteenth-century colonial westernisation in British India. The British could have realized no westernising project in such an alien environment as India if they had not turned the political and economic master therein.

The heart of my doctorate research work analyses two major levels of colonial renovation in British India namely Western education and technical infrastructure dealt with in the third and fourth chapters, respectively. Our research question intends to put light on how and why typically-European pioneering labour was permanently focused on nineteenth-century British India, which went into altering considerably India's face. Both abovementioned levels of analysis will split on two parts : the former on Western evangelization and the dissemination of Western science whereas the latter on Western communication and land transport. Our choice of the educative and infrastructural parameters is justified by our attempt to show their effect on British colonial rule in India and Indian society and economy in the period under study.

There pertains a vivid disagreement among many critics on the aim and ultimate effect of the British westernising role on nineteenth-century India.²³ While many discount the whole commitment as being totally fruitless for the colonised, others keep claiming the pure intention of the colonizer to propagate its

²³ Arnold. D, op. cit. , p. 9.

civilization among the Indians so as to better their living standard benevolently. But, many other critics view this westernising campaign as being mostly destructive for the Indians.²⁴ This is corroborated by Arnold who claims that the European scientific and technological modalities transplanted in India entailed severe material and intellectual dislocation in the colony.²⁵ So, it will be relevant in the syntheses of chapter three and chapter four to deal not only with the facts having favoured India's westernisation but also with social, religious, economic, or political impact of this enterprise on India. It will be also worthwhile to make then some opinion comparison in an attempt to see whether or not or to what limit the westernisation in question was regenerative to the natives of the colony. Our whole synthetic answer to the research question will be based on studies some of which are recently made by Indian or non-Indian observers being scholars or historians.

²⁴ Metcalf. B. D, and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 93.

²⁵ Arnold. D, op. cit. , p. 9.

CHAPTER ONE

Background of Anglo-Indian Relationship

It would seem impossible to dissociate the foundation of Anglo-Indian relationship in the seventeenth century from a range of precluding stimulating factors. A combination of international geographical or economic situations prior to the seventeenth century heartened the English to venture in the hitherto not-well-known Far East, which would eventually lead them to the mere position of trade-makers in the Indian sub-continent.

1- The General Eastward Trade Movement

One may trace the English involvement in the Indian sub-continent back to Portugal's maritime ambition of reaching the Far East in the fifteenth century.²⁷ According to Jules Verne, the long voyages of a series of Portuguese explorers ended in bringing Europe closer to the riches of the Orient's foreign trade.²⁸ In that, two expeditions proved to be particularly complementary in finding out an all-water practical route to India.²⁹ Like Bartholomew Diaz, Vasco De Gama sailed the western African coast down to the Cape of Good Hope. Near Mozambique, De Gama was further impressed by the idea of reaching the Orient when informed by native Africans that Arabians were trading with Indians in gold, silver, drapery, spices, as well as rubies.³⁰ Unlike his predecessor Diaz whose trajectory had been limited to South Africa, De Gama kept ahead eastwards across the Indian Ocean and attained Calicut³¹ in 1498.³² Yakobson made these following words:

²⁷ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 20.

²⁸ Verne. J, 2011, Les Premiers Explorateurs, Paris, GEO Editions, pp. 149-151.

²⁹ Northrup. D, 1998, "Vasco da Gama and Africa: An Era of Mutual Discovery, 1497-1800" in Journal of World History, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 189-211, Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, pp. 189-190.

³⁰ Verne. J, op. cit. , p. 155.

³¹ Calicut, an Indian port city, was confirmed by De Gama as being a regional centre for cinnamon and ginger production and as an importer of other spices from other Asian areas. Parry. J. W, 1955, "The Story of Spices" in Economic Botany, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 190-207, New York, Springer, p. 201.

³² Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 20.

Since the days of Columbus and Vasco da Gama, sea-going Europeans had been filled with a passion to discover unknown lands and peoples. Business calculations mingled with the curiosity of the adventurer, the desire for wealth with the longing for new and untried experiences - the commercial and the sporting spirit went hand in hand on these voyages of discovery, a strange combination that, nevertheless, broadened the horizon of Europe and of humanity at large.³³

Exploring India and the Indian Ocean aimed to benefiting from them commercially, which would be at an initial stage carried out almost by one naval power.³⁴ Portugal soon gained, thanks to its fleet, an eastern trading empire centralised in Goa³⁵ and worked out in many scattered areas including Malacca³⁶ and Moluccas^{37, 38}. According to Cameron, the Portuguese acted there as interlopers aspiring to an exchange of bullion for pepper and other condiments.³⁹ For that, the Portuguese strove to mould their Far-Eastern activities into the long-existing native pattern of inter-island commerce, which straddled the Banda Islands being the only known producer of nutmeg at that time. The rarity of the latter product heightened much its price in Europe. The Banda Islands included Neira, Ai, Run, and Rozengain which all abounded in nutmeg and mace trees grown for both cooking and medicinal properties. Nutmeg and mace would now serve the Portuguese and the Europeans as unequalled seasonings for insipid food, indispensably clung to during winter while no fresh meat could be available, and as chills remedies.

³³ Yakobson. S, 1935, "Early Anglo-Russian Relations (1553-1613)" in The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 13, No. 39, pp. 597-610, London, Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, pp. 597-598.

³⁴ Stein. B, op. cit. , p. 199.

³⁵ Goa, situated on the western Indian coastline, was the capital of the Portuguese eastern empire. Goa was protected by the annexed areas of Salcete and Bardes and was becoming one of the major commercial cities of the Far East. Newitt. M, 2005, A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion, 1400-1668, London, Routledge, p. 133.

³⁶ Malacca, situated in the south east of the Indian Ocean, was not hospitable to the Portuguese who could finally impose on it a treaty of peace and commerce by means of their maritime and military relative elevation. Koek. E, 1886, "Portuguese History of Malacca" in Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. 17, pp.117-149, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, pp. 125-132.

³⁷ Moluccas were also known as the Spice Islands situated in the south east of the Indian Ocean, too. They produced and distributed for centuries cloves and mace to the world. Parry. J. W, op. cit. , p. 198.

³⁸ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 20.

³⁹ Cameron. E, 2006, The Sixteenth Century, Oxford, p. 175.

Furthermore, nutmeg was being hailed as an efficient cure against brain disorder as well as hysterics and nervous breakdown.⁴⁰

Other news travelled to Europe about the Portuguese establishment, under the leadership of their navigator Pedro Alvares Cabral, of spice-trading factories located in Calicut, Cannamora, and Cochin on the Indian coast of Malabar.⁴¹ Moreover, in 1537, it was estimated by the Portuguese that between 1527 and 1535 Moluccan and Bandanese clove cost quintupled due to an increase in the number of Portuguese merchants in the Spice Islands. The latter tended to export in average 50 tons of cloves, 10 tons of mace, and 20 tons of nutmeg to Portugal every year.⁴² Besides, reading through Davidson's article, one may claim that the Portuguese voyages to and from India during the sixteenth century were instrumental in ingraining a new cultural taste among the Europeans. Textiles imported from India, especially for colouring bedspreads gaily, had initially been silks of Chinese manufacture and were by the end of the century Indian-made cottons making about 10 percent of the total Lisbon's imports from India. This exotic-textile taste is said to have developed over the next century as the main characteristic to the whole European imports from India.⁴³ De Jancigny confirms this Indian economic attraction in these ensuing words:

Il était de certaines circonstances qui, à ce début de l'Europe dans la carrière du négoce, jetaient un lustre particulier sur le commerce de l'Inde. Les principaux produits qu'on importait de ce pays étaient des étoffes plus belles et plus riches que toutes celles qu'on fabriquait alors dans l'Occident, sans parler des diamants, des perles, des bijoux, et des épices les plus agréables aux sens. La grande échelle sur laquelle s'y faisaient les opérations, les fortunes considérables qui s'y réalisaient de temps à

⁴⁰ Villiers, J, 1981, "Trade and Society in the Banda Islands in the Sixteenth Century" in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 723-750, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 724-726.

⁴¹ Parry, J. W, op. cit. , p. 202.

⁴² Villiers, J, op. cit. , p. 739.

⁴³ Davidson, L. S, 2012, "Woven Webs: Trading Textiles around the Indian Ocean" in Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, Vol. 09, No. 01, Sydney, UTS Press, epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/portal/article/download/2562/2880, p. 10.

autre, donnaient à ce commerce une apparence de grandeur qui ne se retrouvait pas dans le train ordinaire du commerce européen. Tout, jusqu'au mystérieux éloignement des pays sur lesquels s'exerçaient les spéculations, jusqu'à l'incertitude et à l'aventure dont elles étaient enveloppées, les rendait plus séduisantes pour l'esprit hardi et entreprenant du seizième siècle.⁴⁴

High profitability in Asian-spice trade, assured by means of African gold, aroused not only a Portuguese monopolising concern but also European imitating interests. In England, the tropical regions of the Orient were winning fame as the greatest suppliers of aromatics and precious stones.⁴⁵ It was known across Europe that at all times poor Iberians being involved in trade with India could assure personal fortunes.⁴⁶ The Banda Islands were known to be unsafe since many of those Portuguese who ventured there did not survive to sail back to their home country; nonetheless, there prevailed eagerness to run this risk in expectation of enormous profits.⁴⁷ The English were getting impressed by the gold and jewels of Ophir and by the ivory of Tarshish all being read about in Europe.⁴⁸ The Portuguese are said to be unable to keep their eastward maritime routes and skill as everlasting secrets; their maps and data ended in other searching hands.⁴⁹ Actually, the whole East-Indian spice trade became then the object of increasing European greed and conflict, which would lead to a tumultuous revision of its partnership by the Dutch and the English from the opening of the seventeenth century.⁵⁰

Another fact having stimulated the English to aim at the East and the Far East for new trade partners was English trade slowdown within Europe where

⁴⁴ De Jancigny. M. A. D, 1952, L'Univers, Histoire et description de tous les peuples, Inde, Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, p. 380.

⁴⁵ Wallis. H, 1984, "England's Search for the Northern Passages in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries" in Arctic, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 453-472, Calgary, Arctic Institute of Northern America, p. 453.

⁴⁶ Cameron. E, op. cit. , pp. 177-178.

⁴⁷ Villiers. J, op. cit. , p. 744.

⁴⁸ Wheeler. J. T, 1906, Indian History, New York, Macmillan and Co, p. 41.

⁴⁹ Newitt. M, op. cit. , p. 189.

⁵⁰ Parry. J. W, op. cit. , pp. 203-204.

other nations, especially the Dutch, were simultaneously committed to cloth commercialisation.⁵¹ Actually, the period between 1550 and 1600 corresponds for England to a foreign-demand crisis due to increasing cloth-trade rivalry in Europe.⁵² It is claimed that in the middle of the sixteenth century English wool exports slowly fell by 33 % while English economy depended much on both cloth and wool exportation.⁵³ That decline spurred English private merchants and seamen to seek new outlets out of the home continent across new sea lanes in the hope of attaining Cathay⁵⁴ which was then of mounting attraction.⁵⁵ Casimir and De Bogoushevsky testify that:

In the sixteenth century England had not become Empress of the ocean; but the enterprising spirit which mainly contributed to her pre-eminence had induced her even then to compete with Spain, Portugal, and Genoa, for the sovereignty of the seas. A favourite project of English navigators was the discovery of a direct passage through the polar seas to Cathay and India.⁵⁶

From the mid-sixteenth century, the English succeeded in marketing their cloth, especially kerseys, in Persia and Syria through Venetian and French resellers but not on an important scale.⁵⁷ This geographical trade shift from Europe to the East could not revive English cloth export which had long been flourishing on the

⁵¹ Veluwenkamp. J. W, 1995, "The Murman Coast and the Northern Dvina Delta as English and Dutch Commercial Destinations in the 16th and 17th Centuries" in Arctic, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 257-266, Calgary, Arctic Institute of North America, p. 258.

⁵² Brenner. R, 1972, "The Social Basis of English Commercial Expansion, 1550-1650" in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 361-384, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 361, 362.

⁵³ Stone. L, 1947, "State Control in Sixteenth-Century England" in The Economic History Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 103-120, New York, the Economic History Society, pp. 104-105.

⁵⁴ *Cathay* is an ancient name for China from which oriental products used to come up to Moscow. Cormack. L. B, 1994, "The Fashioning of an Empire: Geography and the State in Elizabethan England" in Geography and Empire, No. 1, pp. 15-30, Oxford, Blackwell, www.quiqui.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/CORMACK-1994-The-Fashioning-of-, p. 24.

⁵⁵ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 22.

⁵⁶ Casimir. N and De Bogoushevsky. B, 1878, "The English in Muscovy during the Sixteenth Century" in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 7, pp. 58-129, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 58.

⁵⁷ Willan. T. S, 1955, "Some Aspects of English Trade with the Levant in the Sixteenth Century" in The English Historical Review, Vol. 70, No. 276, pp. 399-410, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 402.

hands of the Merchants Adventurers⁵⁸ before the cloth and wool crisis. The latter merchant category was furthermore not even the main agent in this new trade orientation. Therefore, English overseas commerce, which now encompassed a range of new outlets, was to be organized chiefly for the importation of eastern-made products in emulation to the Dutch and Portuguese middlemen while the Merchants Adventurers were losing momentum in the commercial arena. Thus, switching to very unusual goals, English foreign trade made a marked break in membership as well as partnership essentially on the altar of such much-sought-after oriental-made luxuries as spices, silk, and pearls.⁵⁹

The English were recurrently willing to send merchant negotiators on exploring voyages in search of a route of theirs leading to the Far East.⁶⁰ Yet, they bore continuous concern for safety since any business with the East or the East Indies was then commonly reckoned a matter of entrepreneurial investment in long travelling across little-known world sea or land areas.⁶¹ Probably, the first related discouraging incident was the decease on the freezing river of Arsina in Lapland in 1554 of a whole English crew including Hugh Willoughby⁶².⁶³ The crew was found aboard three vessels all full of oriental commodities back from Russia.⁶⁴ Two years later, the Russia Company is said to have undergone another considerable loss being the sinking of three ships out of four ones returning preciously-laden from Russia. Deeper English efforts were subsequently made between 1561 and 1581 to secure a safe itinerary to other eastern areas nominally

⁵⁸ The Merchants Adventurers monopolized the richest London trade namely English-cloth exports which amounted in aggregate to 65,000 pieces annually over the three last decades of the sixteenth century. But, only a share of 10,000 pieces went to the East. Brenner. R, op. cit. , p. 365.

⁵⁹ Ibid. , p. 363.

⁶⁰ Wallis. H, op. cit. , pp. 455-460.

⁶¹ Veluwenkamp. J. W, op. cit. , p. 258.

⁶² Hugh Willoughby was one of the founding seamen of the Russia Company. He wrote in his journey journal in 1554 that he had pointed out to the Russian royal court England's aspiration for Russian friendship for traffic and trade. Shelestiuk. H. V, 2002, "Russian History Revisited: Ivan IV and the Muscovy Company", shelestiuk.narod.ru/Ivan_the_Terrible_and_the_Muscovy_Company.pdf., p. 2.

⁶³ De Jancigny. M. A. D, op. cit. , p. 381.

⁶⁴ Casimir. N and De Bogoushevsky. B, op. cit. , p. 59.

within the company's charter but in vain.⁶⁵ Brenner confirms it in these ensuing words:

The traders of the Russia Company⁶⁶ were attempting to penetrate the oriental markets. The Company was originally founded with the aim of tapping the riches of the Orient by a route free from Portuguese interference. To this end, during the 1560's and 1570's, it sent out six major voyages to Persia by way of the land through Moscow. Some of these ventures may have succeeded, but they were fraught with danger and came abruptly to an end.⁶⁷

England's worry for her merchants' safety in the East was accentuated by mounting opposition on the part of Portugal jealously trying to prevent England from taking in far-eastern navigation and De Gama's oceanic route.⁶⁸ So, other English attempts were made to find out a northern all-water route to the Far East so as to spare Spanish and Portuguese nautical confrontation.⁶⁹ Examples are the expeditions of the English navigator Martin Frobisher in 1576-8. Sailing north west, Frobisher reached Greenland and then Labrador instead.⁷⁰ Frobisher just failed to reach the Far East via the western arctic waters, which nevertheless did not shatter England's hope for far eastern exploration and trade.⁷¹

⁶⁵ Willan. T. S, 1948, "Trade between England and Russia in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century" in The English Historical Review, Vol. 63, No. 248, pp. 307-321, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 309-311.

⁶⁶ The Russia or Muscovy Company was established right after the first discovery of a northerly-eastern sea route to Russia. There, English merchants could buy oriental products. Yakobson. S, op. cit. , pp. 598-601. The English knew that Russia could be a way to India via Persia. Shelestiuk. H. V, op. cit. , p. 1.

⁶⁷ Brenner. R, op. cit. , p. 366.

⁶⁸ Baladouni. V, 1983, "Accounting in the Early Years of the East India Company" in The Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 63-80, Oxford, Mississippi, The Academy of Accounting Historians, p. 64.

⁶⁹ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 22.

⁷⁰ Wallis. H, op. cit. , pp. 461-462.

⁷¹ Rundall. T, 2010, Narratives of Voyages towards the North-West, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 30-33.

Still another major motivating circumstance of England's eastward trade trend was a severe misfortune in Europe from 1553: the dislocation of the Antwerp⁷² depot.⁷³ Anglo-Dutch trade came to a stop in 1563-4, which cast England into a recession. Previously, two-thirds of English foreign trade had been concentrated on Antwerp.⁷⁴ In this status quo, the latter centre was responsible not only for the distribution of all English exported cloth but also for the supply of almost all foreign commodities to England. However, it is estimated that by 1575 English cloth exports for example had incurred a twenty-five per cent shrinkage seasoned by two catastrophic falls of fifty per cent.⁷⁵ As a result, the English felt the necessity to decrease their dependence on European middle resellers and to travel themselves up to the original oriental sources of diverse commodities which they had already been familiar with.⁷⁶

This general eastward trade trend may be also ascribed to a demographic factor operative from around 1560 that determined new tastes and preferences among the Europeans and the English. The growth of the English middle and upper classes was concomitant with a growing demand of a miscellany of luxury items made in the Middle or Far East. A case in point is luxury cloth of which imports had been multiplied sixfold and thus rendered the largest part of English foreign purchases by the end of the sixteenth century.⁷⁷ To mention the inflating intimacy between eastern-made commodities and the European well-off classes

⁷² Antwerp is described as the sole North European centre for the redistribution of Portuguese-brought oriental spices and of England's exportation in the first half of the sixteenth century. Scammell. G. V, 1982, "England, Portugal and the Estado da India c. 1500-1635" in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 177-192, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 178.

⁷³ Bourde. A, 2009, "Elizabeth Ist" in Les Essentiels d'Universalis, Vol. 2, pp. 717-725, Paris, Encyclopedia Universalis, pp. 720-721.

⁷⁴ Stone. L, 1949, "Elizabethan Overseas Trade" in The Economic History Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 30-58, New York, Wiley, p. 35, 41.

⁷⁵ Fisher. J. F, 1940, "Commercial Trends and Policy in Sixteenth-Century England" in The Economic History Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 95-117, New York, Wiley, p. 97.

⁷⁶ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1963, "The East India Company and the Export of Treasure in the Early Seventeenth Century" in The Economic History Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 23-38, Hoboken, Wiley, p. 24.

⁷⁷ Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , p. 43, 44, 49.

before the English East India Company⁷⁸ came into existence, Cameron puts these ensuing words:

Perhaps the clearest trend of all across the early modern period is that those Europeans able to do so spent progressively more and more money on all kinds of goods. Individual people across a broadening band of the social scale spent money on clothes and their furnishings and equipment. The amount of excess resources and labour devoted to decorating all of these consumer goods increased; decorative fashions evolved and mutated with ever greater speed. The quantitative significance of luxuries imported from far corners of the world (spices, silks) from the relatively small-scale noble-oriented but still significant trade of the sixteenth century became increasingly important as the seventeenth century went on.⁷⁹

Moreover, an increasing domestic demand for clothing was a causative factor in the English constant inclination towards eastern-made cloth, and so would be this demand even after the creation of the East India Company. It is estimated that London's imports of currants from the Levant went up from more or less £ 2,800 in 1559-60 to no less than £ 5,400 in 1592 while those of fustians from around £ 25,000 in 1593 to £ 34,000 the next year.⁸⁰

It follows that European foreign trade from the second half of the sixteenth century was nothing but an urgent permanent resort to the East due to a cleavage in production between the two poles, which deeply rooted new cultural tastes in Europe devoted to eastward oceanic navigation.

⁷⁸ The English East India Company was established in 1600 by Queen Elizabeth I authorizing it to trade eastwards between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan. This company was to become the agent of English trade in India. Sherman. A. A, 1976, "Pressure from Leadenhall: The East India Company Lobby, 1660-1678" in The Business History Review, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 329-355, London, The President and Fellows of Harvard College, p. 332.

⁷⁹ Cameron. E, op. cit. , pp. 203-204.

⁸⁰ Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , p. 47.

2- The Influence of Prior English Eastern-Trade Companies

Preluding background to Anglo-Indian relationship includes a series of private-trade realizations made in the name of the English Crown.⁸¹

Royal support for eastern trade ventures began in 1553 with the foundation of the Russia Company. King Edward VI recognized in a letter sent that year to Ivan IV⁸² through an ambassador the bilateral profitability of Anglo-Russian trade as well as England's ambition to care for it as a means of national affluence.⁸³ In this, the Russia Company sought the possibility to take on any Northern sea lane to the Indian Ocean away from Spanish and Portuguese interloping.⁸⁴ King Edward is quoted as follows:

*Consenting to their petition, we have given and granted to the brave and worthy knight Sir Hugh Willoughby and his companions, our faithful and well-beloved subjects, full power and authority to travel to these unexplored regions, there to seek such articles as we lack, and thither to bring from our shores such articles as these peoples may require. And so it will be for our mutual advantage and constant friendship, and an unbroken faith will link us together; we on our part shall preciousely send from our country what is lacking in theirs. Accordingly we beseech you, kings, princes, and all in authority in these regions, to grant free passage through our dominions to these our subjects.*⁸⁵

⁸¹ Bourde. A, op. cit. , p. 724.

⁸² Ivan IV was the then king of Russia who accepted to grant the Muscovy Company several profitable monopolies. Huttenbach. H. R, 1971, "New Archival Material on the Anglo-Russian Treaty of Queen Elizabeth I and Tsar Ivan IV" in The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 49, No. 117, London, Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, p. 539.

⁸³ Gordon. E. C, 1986, "The Fate of Hugh Willoughby and his Companions: a New Conjecture" in The Geographical Journal, Vol. 152, No. 2, pp. 243-247, London, The Royal Geographical Society, pp. 243-245.

⁸⁴ Rostovsky. A. L, 1948, "Anglo-Russian Relations through the Centuries" in The Russian Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 41-52, New York, Wiley, p. 41.

⁸⁵ Casimir. N and De Bogoushevsky. B, op. cit. , p. 63.

By the inception of Anglo-Indian trade relationship, the English, though still new visitors to the whole Far East with little acquaintance of India, had acquired valuable trading and maritime skill through their connection with Russia, Turkey, Italy, and particularly the Levant⁸⁶ countries.⁸⁷ As a result, by the late Tudor epoch⁸⁸, oriental spices had already been linked both to English cooking and trade profits before the English East India Company⁸⁹ came into existence.⁹⁰

In Brenner's view, although the establishment of the Russia Company was the first major step in English eastward trade expansion, the company found little perspectives for English-made cloth export to Russia.⁹¹ In the sixteenth century, cloth was the only product England could sell at a large scale abroad.⁹² Brenner suggests that the fact that Merchants Adventurers constituted only a minority of one-third in the Russia Company is an indication that Russia, like all the other east markets including the East Indies, would be more of an exporter than an importer vis-à-vis England.⁹³ In 1587 for instance, the company fetched from St Nicholas ten vessels carrying 1151 tons of oriental goods whereas its cloth exports to Russia in that year were marginal.⁹⁴

And yet, the tiny demand for English cloth from the East was not to interrupt Anglo-Eastern trade. Stone affirms that England continued receiving a

⁸⁶ *Levant* is an ancient general name for Middle-East countries along the eastern Mediterranean coastline including Syria and Lebanon. Encyclopaedia Britannica Incorporate, 1974, Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia Ready Reference and Index, 15th Edition, Chicago, University of Chicago, Vol. 6, p. 175.

⁸⁷ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 22.

⁸⁸ The late Tudor epoch corresponds to Queen Elizabeth I's reign in which English foreign-trade expansion is qualified as dramatic resulting from diplomatic relations woven by English ambassadors with different eastern or far-eastern rulers. Sherman. W. H, 2004, "Bringing the World to England: The Politics of Translation in the Age of Hakluyt" in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 14, pp. 199-207, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 204.

⁸⁹ The English East India Company was established in 1599 to exchange silk and spices with India and its vicinities on a scale wider than those granted to the former English private trade companies. The English East India Company encountered persistent competition from the Portuguese and the Dutch. Ibid. , p. 205.

⁹⁰ Wolf. L, 1927, "Jews in Elizabethan England" in Transactions, Vol. 11, pp. 1-91, London, Jewish Historical Society of England, p. 14.

⁹¹ Brenner. R, op. cit. , pp. 363-364.

⁹² Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , p. 39.

⁹³ Brenner. R, op. cit. , p. 363.

⁹⁴ Willan. T. S, 1948, op. cit. , p. 314.

wide variety of Eastern-made products many of which could not be made locally for climate reasons.⁹⁵ For example, the Russia Company brought mostly from St Nicholas seven vessels in 1588 and five ones in 1589 carrying cargoes worth respectively over £ 6,500 and £ 3,800 according to contemporary official records called London's Port Books.⁹⁶ Those imported goods appeared in three major groups viz. food fittings including sugar, dried fruits, and spices originally from India; metallurgical products including steel, nails, and knives from Russia; and luxury cloths including satins and velvets from Italy.⁹⁷

The intervention of the Levant Company from 1581 nearly excluded English-made cloth export to the East and increased the importation of eastern-made silk, spices, and currants. In the 1580's, whereas one single shipment of Levant goods to London was estimated to £ 70,000, English-goods exports to the Levant were annually evaluated to less than half of Levant-goods imports to England.⁹⁸ Mounting imports' prices went to exceed significantly those of exports giving rise to a constant imbalance of payment as well as a certain addiction to those exotic commodities.⁹⁹ Indeed, England was during the second half of the sixteenth century having the habit of being a major buyer of eastern-made products and a minor seller of hers to the East.

Nevertheless, the merchants of the Levant Company, many of whom would either found or integrate the East India Company as expert members or directors, did not abandon the business of exportation. They kept making some profits by commercializing various English-made items in different countries even illegally out of the Levant Company's charter. Zante, Crete, Constantinople, and Alexandretta were not included in Anglo-Levant trade statute law. And yet, they received not only English-made cloth but also tin, iron wire, black rabbit skins, sarsaparilla, plates, and wood of different types. Very shortly before the establishment of the East India Company, those markets imported from London an amount of these items valued at

⁹⁵ Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , pp. 38-39.

⁹⁶ Willan. T. S, 1948, op. cit. , pp. 314-315.

⁹⁷ Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , p. 39.

⁹⁸ Brenner. R, op. cit. , p. 364.

⁹⁹ Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , p. 44.

over £ 4,278. Around that time, Venice, included in that statute law, received from London a similar miscellany of goods worth over £ 3,240.¹⁰⁰ This is indicative of future East-India-Company members being attached to the East for the marketability of English-made products. This interest would soon motivate them to try to orientate such exports to the East Indies.¹⁰¹

The English progressive relationship with the East was also stimulated by a deficient military situation in Turkey and Russia desirous to be equipped with English-made ordnance. These two countries became major importers of cast-iron cannons¹⁰² which became the most prominent¹⁰³ items within English exportation.¹⁰³ It is said that, to Tsar Ivan IV's appeal, Queen Elizabeth sent out to Russia in 1581 thirteen ships heavily loaded with artillery and munitions in assistance to his war attacks against Poland and Sweden. The queen acted so out of fear that the Tsar would rescind the lucrative trade privileges he had bestowed upon the merchants of the Russia Company.¹⁰⁴

As preluding background to Anglo-Indian trade, one may consider the communion or overlapping in objectives and membership between four consecutive English companies chartered before 1600. It may also be pertinent to underline new elementary aspects occasionally added to English eastern trade at the succession of those companies because the more this trade extended or improved the nearer to start Anglo-Indian relationship became. It was the successes and failures of one private company that paved the way for the creation of the next-chartered one; that is to say, on the basis of positive or negative positions, furtherance could be made in the general eastward enterprise. In brief, Anglo-Indian relationship did not come out of the blue; it rather arose as the eventual stage of a whole English eastward-trade expansion process.

¹⁰⁰ Willan. T. S, 1948, op. cit. , p. 409, 410.

¹⁰¹ Markley. R, 2003, "Riches, Power, Trade and Religion: the Far East and the English Imagination, 1600-1720" in *Renaissance Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 03, pp. 494-516, New York, Wiley, p. 495.

¹⁰² English cannons at that time were the most advanced war weapons in the world. This military excellence also motivated farther-eastward English dangerous commercial journeys. Yakobson. S, op. cit. , pp. 599-600.

¹⁰³ Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , p. 45.

¹⁰⁴ Casimir. N and De Bogoushevsky. B, op. cit. , pp. 109-111.

Brenner affirms that the Turkey Company originally counted nine members from the Russia Company and purported to make a continuation of the latter's regional overland contacts especially with Persia. In the 1590s, the Levant Company¹⁰⁵, to which monopolistic currants and wine trade with Italy had been transferred from the Venice Company¹⁰⁶, had been also granted the privilege to the overland route across Asia, which was soon to be found too perilous. The English saw that overland Asian trade was too demanding and risky.¹⁰⁷ Mistakes were to be made, and lessons could be learnt. Unlike the Turkey and Levant Companies, the East India Company decided from its start not to admit Syrian intermediary.¹⁰⁸ The East India Company would have the concern about the safety and autonomy of its merchants on account of what their predecessors, belonging to prior English companies, had endured. The English determination for sailing up to the Indies for direct contact with original markets remained strong.

Hence, for reaching India and the East Indies in safer conditions, the English pathway choice would indispensably fall on the southern-hemisphere oceans being seen as the least dangerous trading route thereto.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, this all-water route had been shown by the Dutch to be the least expensive one leading to the eastern sources of spices supply.¹¹⁰ This itinerary had been praised by the traveller Antonio de Brito in 1523 in these following words:

Since this route has been discovered, I believe it is of the greatest service to us owing to its shortness and because it avoids waiting for the monsoons on the Banda route, which for carrying out any commission needs a year and a half. So one can leave Malacca and reach the Moluccas in one

¹⁰⁵ The Levant Company is said to have had a considerable career before the birth of the East India Company. For example, its cloth exports from London alone in 1597-8 were recorded to well-nigh 6,800 pieces. Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , p. 58.

¹⁰⁶ The Venice Company, like the Turkey one, was of a short lifetime. The two companies stopped existing in 1588-9 to be substituted by the Levant Company. Sherman. W. H, op. cit. , p. 204.

¹⁰⁷ Brenner. R, op. cit. , p. 370.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. , p. 367.

¹⁰⁹ Wallis. H, op. cit. , p. 470.

¹¹⁰ Brenner. R, op. cit. , p. 367.

month ... and Borneo¹¹¹ is one of the richest islands in these parts, having much gold and camphor and considerable trade with other regions.¹¹²

It is argued that the Levant Company played the largest part of influence, in comparison to the other aforementioned English companies, on the East India Company.¹¹³ One of the most prominent merchants of the latter company was the goldsmith Anthony Marlowe with years of experience in the Levant trade as a well-esteemed adept in the commercialisation of precious items such as pearls. This advantage would increase the East India Company in profitability as well as investment from 1610 upon a lucrative trade season between London and Surat.¹¹⁴ Possibly more importantly, the Levant Company ceded to the newly-chartered East India Company its governor, Thomas Smythe¹¹⁵, and seven of its officers who got now in the latter company the status of directors.¹¹⁶

Furthermore, the Levant Company may be claimed to have collected substantial capitals as well as valuable skill for future investments since it is said to have possessed the *Hercules*, a vessel, recognized as the richest in Eastern commodities, having entered England until 1588. The cargoes transported aboard the *Hercules* and four other Levant-Company vessels from the Middle East to London

¹¹¹ Borneo, situated in southeast Asia and known to be a pepper-rich large island, became disputed amongst the major European powers. The Portuguese and then the Spanish made trading relations with it early in the sixteenth century. Early in the seventeenth century, the Dutch and the English went there to break the Portuguese and Spanish trade monopoly. Encyclopaedia Britannica Incorporate, 1974, Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia Ready Reference and Index, 15th Edition, Chicago, University of Chicago, Vol. 2, p. 169.

¹¹² Villiers. J, op. cit. , pp. 744-745.

¹¹³ Bent. J. T, 1890, "The English in the Levant" in The English Historical Review, Vol. 5, No. 20, pp. 654-664, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 654.

¹¹⁴ Barbour. R, 2008, "The East India Company Journal of Anthony Marlowe, 1607–1608" in Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 255-301, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 255, 262.

¹¹⁵ Thomas Smythe (1558-1625) was an English businessman financing many trade enterprises and explorative journeys in the early seventeenth century. The fortune he had collected from the 1580's from trade and the official posts he had then held earned him the position of organizer and governor of the East India Company. Encyclopaedia Britannica Incorporate, 1974, Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia Ready Reference and Index, 15th Edition, Chicago, University of Chicago, Vol. 9, p. 295.

¹¹⁶ Brenner. R, op. cit. , p. 367.

in that year were alone officially valued at more than £ 55, 260.¹¹⁷ In fact, although English transaction with the Levant was definitely characterized by monopoly principle and membership minority, it could record in the 1580s some of the richest sea transits in England's trade history.¹¹⁸ Wealthy enough, the Levant-company members, in setting up the East India corporation, doubled the individual subscription to £ 68,373.¹¹⁹

In Baladouni's view regarding the period between 1555 and 1600, company nature itself played a part in subsequent company formation. The East India Company wanted from its very outset to copy by charter the Russia Company's model as being a joint-stock¹²⁰ corporation believed to be more powerful and efficient than any form of regulated company¹²¹. In organising themselves as such, the East India Company founding merchants sought the capacity of financing an enterprise known to be far more expensive than the previous English trade ventures to the East. In fact, the principle of commonness meant the collection from too many investing pockets of large sums of capital absolutely necessitated by the new project.¹²² Yakobson provides a hint on that in these following words:

The Muscovy Company indicated the type of the future, with a common working capital, common profit and loss account and an equal division of profits according to the amount of capital invested. This company, therefore, which was called into existence in order to carry on trade with Russia was the first English joint stock company. Here in Russia the trading spirit of the nation

¹¹⁷ Willan. T. S, 1955, op. cit. , pp. 407-408.

¹¹⁸ Brenner. R, op. cit. , pp. 369-372.

¹¹⁹ Riddick. J. F, 2006, The History of British India: A Chronology, Westport, Praeger, p. 01.

¹²⁰ A joint-stock company is one that, by charter, controlled a new branch of trade from its inauguration and whose members did not trade individually, as opposed to a regulated company. The East India Company was, like the Russia Company, a joint stock. Willan. T. S, 1955, op. cit. , pp. 404-405.

¹²¹ A regulated company had, as a principle, each of its adventurers keeping his personal independence by acting freely on his own account. Baladouni. V, 1986, "Financial Reporting in the Early Years of the East India Company" in The Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 19-30, Oxford, Mississippi, The Academy of Accounting Historians, p. 25.

¹²² Baladouni. V, 1983, op. cit. , pp. 64, 77.

created a wide field for English intelligence and commercial initiative.”¹²³

One may accredit the progress of English eastern trade as ranging from the Russia Company to the East India Company to the social standing of those who carried that trade out. According to Brenner, the latter was not in the hands of common English citizens but in those of wealthy senior businessmen not devoid of political influence. These had good connections or access to Elizabethan government. Thus, English eastern trade throughout the second half of the sixteenth century was controlled by tiny clusters of well-placed investors capable to dictate at the national level the terms and conditions of their projects. For example, the original Turkey Company included three parliamentary members and two of the main contactors between the Crown and London’s trading community viz. Richard Martin, the then coin-production director of the Kingdom, and Thomas Smythe the then customs collector of the city.¹²⁴ In his article, Stone speaks of Elizabethan social elite as follows:

L’élite foncière anglaise bénéficie aussi de sa familiarité avec le monde du gouvernement et des professions libérales. Les membres de l’élite ont à la fois assez d’obstination pour garder les rênes du pouvoir, mais assez de flexibilité pour utiliser ce pouvoir pour défendre les intérêts de la nation en général, et de la bourgeoisie commerçante en particulier. L’Angleterre était alors, et restera encore un temps, une nation d’aristocrates gouvernant pour le compte de banquiers et de négociants d’outremer.¹²⁵

Yakobson’s article makes one infer that the English had already assimilated a sense of commercial organisation before Anglo-Indian relationship began. Since its involvement with the Russians, the English stratum of company merchants had been

¹²³ Yakobson. S, op. cit. , p. 603.

¹²⁴ Brenner. R, op. cit. , p. 367-373.

¹²⁵ Stone. L, 1985, “L’Angleterre de 1540 à 1880: pays de noblesse ouverte” in Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales, No. 01, pp. 71-94, Marseille, EHESS, p. 89.

gaining experience on how to deal positively with eastern foreigners whose cultures and institutions were very different from the home ones.¹²⁶

To start with the contribution of the Russia Company, one may emphasize the importance of English intermediation and representation. Because both purchases and sales had to be enacted in Russia itself, a sense of organisation had its manifestation mainly there where a system of delegation was developed in localised agents. These could tell much more about Russia than any other Englishman in England of which far-limited acquaintance of Russia rendered indispensable the up-keeping of these delegates. The agents provided useful information about Russia's social structure and negotiated for favour and protection with the Tsar. Thus, the continuance of Anglo-Russian commercial harmony owed much to such mediation between the two nations.¹²⁷ As for the Levant Company, it used to entrust its negotiation and trading activities to an embassy situated in Constantinople and assisted by some consulates in the Ottoman Empire. The first incumbent of the embassy is William Harebone complimented on his establishment of trading factories there in the Ottoman capital city in the 1580s meanwhile Michael Loe was consul in Aleppo said to be the cornerstone of English trade in the Levant.¹²⁸

A similar organisation approach would be applied by the English East India Company in India to unveil geographical aspects of the area to the company directors, who administered only from London, and to make up official connections with native Indian rulers.¹²⁹ Watson gives the example of the embassy of Thomas Roe in India between 1615 and 1619 which proved to be highly effective in weaving harmonious webs between the English and the Mughal Emperor.¹³⁰

To that notion of organisation was added a sense of behaviourism maintaining order and concord between the two marketing sides. In Russia, the

¹²⁶ Yakobson. S, op. cit. , pp. 601-602.

¹²⁷ Ibid. , p. 601.

¹²⁸ Bent. J. T, op. cit. , p. 656.

¹²⁹ Sherman. W. H, op. cit. , pp. 203-204.

¹³⁰ Watson. B. I, op. cit. , p. 74.

agents were entitled to exert absolute power over all Englishmen working for the Company. So as to spare the natives' disagreement or suspicion, the English agents could lay down strict disciplinary rules and bans over their juniors, and any opposing deed made its author prone to sanction or ejection from Russia by the agent. As a case in point, faith was categorically dissociated from the bilateral relationship, and the Russian convictions were to be deeply respected.¹³¹ In fact, the English learnt to seek business in the East with humility, deference, and obedience to company ruling authority. Such controlling leadership would come within the habits of the East India Company concerned about the discipline of its traders in India, which is affirmed by Barbour as follows:

*An emergent multinational corporation, the East India Company, at home and abroad, devised financial, managerial, logistical, and epistemological protocols enabling the joint-stock body to find and cultivate lucrative opportunities that nourished the growth of state-sanctioned commercial power.*¹³²

In light of Yakobson's article, one may argue that by the foundation of the East India Company in 1600, the English had already grasped the notions of migration as well as adaptation.¹³³ They had been used to asking from overseas authorities for pieces of land so as to build their own settlements and elect their own judges.¹³⁴ In Russia for example, Tsar Ivan IV recurrently allowed the erection of big houses, warehouses, and offices near the main trading centres.¹³⁵ The English knew well that the Portuguese business success in India and the East Indies owed a part to the building of forts in Amboyna, Halmahera, Celebes, Ternate, and Tidore to protect Portuguese eastern-spice trade. Devotion to long-lasting navigation and sojourn, risky land search, and humble negotiation all for gainful transaction in

¹³¹ Yakobson. S, op. cit. , pp. 601-602.

¹³² Barbour. R, op. cit. , p. 256.

¹³³ Yakobson. S, op. cit. , p. 602.

¹³⁴ Casimir. N and De Bogoushevsky. B, op. cit. , p. 67.

¹³⁵ Yakobson. S, op. cit. , p. 602.

remote eastern areas of the world, of different cultures and languages, had already haunted the English mind.¹³⁶

But, migration and adaptation were known to be more demanding in the Indian sub-Continent and the East Indies than in the Levant or Russia owing to the relatively longer geographical distance. According to Newitt, the English venture in Indian-ocean trade called into play a set of primordial preparations and provisions having typically been made by the Portuguese. For the sustenance of their Indian empire, the Portuguese had been caring to make up a durable support network embracing manpower, funds, ships and overseas shipyards, as well as armaments. Indeed, the English East India Company was made aware of the necessity and prerequisite to assemble and aim resources to an enterprise harder than those carried out by the former English private trading companies. The English would in their turn typically do likewise to trade in eastern and western India from the early seventeenth century.¹³⁷

To put it in a nutshell, this design of adjustments and arrangements, expansionist measures, and apprenticeship stretching from 1555 with the birth of Anglo-Russian trade helped prepare the imminent nascence of Anglo-Indian trade.

3- The Elizabethan Navy

Elizabethan eastward-trade expansion was closely associated with the national marine put simultaneously into gradual aggrandisement from around 1560.¹³⁸

England felt the urgent need to develop her navy when the whole European foreign-trade network was being dismantled owing to the decline of the central market of Antwerp.¹³⁹ Formerly, English trading navigation had been limited to the English Channel as the national fleet included a very few ships capable to carry

¹³⁶ Parry. J. W, op. cit. , pp. 202-203.

¹³⁷ Newitt. M, op. cit. , p. 189.

¹³⁸ Bourde. A, op. cit. , p. 724.

¹³⁹ Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , p. 43.

large tonnages while large-tonnage ocean shipping between Antwerp and the Far East had been left for a long time to the Dutch, French, Italians, and the Portuguese.¹⁴⁰ Thus, England had had relatively less difficulty to procure oriental items and ipso facto no incentive to enlarge its tiny fleet. Now from the 1560s, this situation of inadequacy was being forcibly relieved for the sake of national nautical and commercial autonomy.¹⁴¹ Later in 1592, English seamen inferred that the new English vessels outshone the still-utilized Portuguese ones in terms of weatherly and sailing qualities; that is to say, the former were relatively more easily manoeuvred and more resistant to storms than the latter.¹⁴²

It may be worth mentioning here that state intervention was another determining factor to England's eastward-trade expansion. It was thought by contemporaries that the promotion of shipbuilding was incumbent upon the State in view of the new necessity of sailing eastwards independently of European intermediary to redress national foreign trade.¹⁴³ The usual English ships were fit only for short expeditions around the western European littoral line. Hence, the process of making up a series of over-one-hundred-ton ocean-going vessels was so backed by governmental subsidies that it was later recognised as the most remarkable change of all in Elizabethan England.¹⁴⁴ Elizabethan government had equally the nationalistic mindfulness to legislate against both the sale of ships and the association of non-English shipping with English foreign trade. England was in fact confining her overseas trade in her own marine.¹⁴⁵

The new English ships were seen as of the then largest size in the world. It is estimated that no less than fifty-one ships of this type were constructed between 1571 and 1576 and that the aggregate number increased from one hundred and thirty five in 1577 to one hundred and seventy seven in 1582. Other statistics put the number of such big ships entering English ports in 1571-2 to only eighty six

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. , pp. 41-42.

¹⁴¹ Stone. L, 1947, op. cit. , p. 111.

¹⁴² Oppenheim. M, 1891, "The Royal and Merchant Navy under Elizabeth" in The English Historical Review, Vol. 6, No. 23, pp. 465-494, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 482.

¹⁴³ Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , p. 43.

¹⁴⁴ Bourde. A, op. cit. , p. 724.

¹⁴⁵ Stone. L, 1947, op. cit. , pp. 110-111.

and that of those entering London alone in 1580-1 to eighty-two adding that between 1574 and 1585 England's large-tonnage ocean-going commercial marine nearly doubled.¹⁴⁶ Company merchants were then becoming long-distance pliers on the altar of exotic products.¹⁴⁷ Thus, England was becoming the second world's maritime and commercial nation after the Netherlands.¹⁴⁸ One of the earliest expressions to this improvement came between 1591 and 1594 when an English expedition under the command of Captain James Lancaster succeeded in attaining India by crossing the Atlantic and Indian oceans rounding the Cape of Good Hope. Although just one of the three Lancaster's ships could reach back home, this pirate journey, fetching much pepper and haul, was the first English incursion into the Indian-ocean trade, which meant a smash to the Portuguese monopoly in the Far East.¹⁴⁹

In light of Stone's article, one may emphasize the importance of the mutual assistance between England and Russia in terms of national infrastructure, an exchange that would later back the East India Company's voyages. Here is another link between the Russia and East India Companies. The thing is that there was kept an exchange of English-made armament for Russian-made cordage. The latter was being greatly used for the renovation of the Royal Navy which would indispensably assure English transit to India.¹⁵⁰ Yakobson affirms that the Russia Company could build its first rope-making works in Russia in 1557 and that the solid Russian ropes and cables were officially hailed in 1582 as the best. Other naval equipment used to be imported from Russia to reinforce the Royal Navy such as tackle, wax, tallow, and tar.¹⁵¹ Actually, England's trading marine was being improved by her eastern trade in preparation to Anglo-Indian ocean-involving relationship. After evaluating the aggregate supply of Russian-made cables and cordage to the State between 1593 and 1596 by the Russian Company to over £ 25,600, Willan gives to that improvement a confirmation running as follows:

¹⁴⁶ Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , pp. 51, 52.

¹⁴⁷ Oppenheim. M, op. cit. , p. 473.

¹⁴⁸ Velumenkamp. J. W, op. cit. , p. 258.

¹⁴⁹ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 01.

¹⁵⁰ Stone. L, 1949, op. cit. , pp. 47, 55.

¹⁵¹ Yakobson. S, op. cit. , p. 602.

Though Russia provided a market for some English cloth and metals, its chief value for England was as a source of essential materials for the navy. That value was real for the fleet that defeated the Spanish Armada¹⁵² was largely rigged with Russian cordage and cables, and the ships that pioneered the East Indian trade were partly rigged from the same source.¹⁵³

In a few words, one may claim that by the seventeenth century the English navy had been fairly developed before Anglo-Indian relationship began. England was on her way of realizing what the Indian Ocean trade required.

4- Anglicist Narratives

The English growing eastern-trade ambition in the second half of the sixteenth century did not materialize solely in the riches of the East being insatiably imported home but also in a certain home written literature that may be reckoned as an exponent of Anglicism.

The Principal Voyages and Navigations of the English Nation republished between 1589 and 1600 by Richard Hakluyt¹⁵⁴ is deemed a piece of propaganda for English global expansion, economy, and foreign prestige. This piece of work, listing the voyages and discoveries of Englishmen in the East, increased English nationalism assigning the English People the leadership of worldwide exploration

¹⁵² The Spanish Armada was a huge naval expedition sent in July 1588 by King Philip II to the English Channel to combat England partly because of her growing aggressive commercial ambition overseas. Instead, it was the English Royal Navy that fought more skilfully and triumphed thanks to its ships being less heavy and better steered than those of Spain. Bourde. A, op. cit. , p. 723.

¹⁵³ Willan. T. S, 1948, "Trade between England and Russia in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century" in *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 63, No. 248, pp. 307-321, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 320.

¹⁵⁴ Richard Hakluyt was a Welsh-English priest and member of Westminster. He rose as the most prominent Elizabethan cosmographer and then as an advisor to the English East India Company. His aforementioned book was ordered to be placed in the main English factories in India so as to invigorate the spirits of the Company's servants. Taylor. E. G. R, 1947, "Richard Hakluyt" in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 109, No. 4/6, pp. 165-171, London, Wiley and Geographical Society, pp.165-170.

and trade.¹⁵⁵ Together with *Faerie Queene* and *Britannia*, published in 1590 by Edmund Spencer¹⁵⁶ and William Camden¹⁵⁷ respectively, Hakluyt's narrative made the English mariner and merchant think proudly of themselves by providing a series of impressive geographical and explorative descriptions. These were provided in such a vibrant and theatrical style that heartened the nation to go ahead in her pursuit of economic glory overseas in challenge to danger and risk.¹⁵⁸

Yet, according to Sherman, the English were aware of their belatedness in the whole continental project of exploring and mapping the Far East in comparison to their neighbour rivals. England's lagging behind these ocean powers in geography and navigation alongside the fruitlessness of her many expeditions to find out a free all-water route, away from those rivals, leading to India gave her no choice but to resort to her competitors' findings. Therefore, so as to fill in the gap and voice an air of maritime and mercantile English pre-eminence to the national audience, such Elizabethan travel writings, typified by Hakluyt's book, are said to have made use of exaggerated rhetoric in praising the notion of Englishness. It is claimed that this use of overstatement proved to be effective in increasing English aspiration for India though it was really known in England that the Portuguese and Dutch were heading up European eastward trade expansion. And, what was indicative of the great influence of Hakluyt's book over his compatriots is the fact that, like the other same-type English-published Elizabethan writings, it met with profuse domestic marketability and readership.¹⁵⁹

Moreover, so as to stir up English avidity for oriental riches, Hakluyt implicitly instigated piracy and violence against England's rivals telling about repeated English interceptions of Portuguese expeditions coming from the Far

¹⁵⁵ Burrage. H. S, 1959, Early English and French Voyages, New York, Barnes & Noble, Inc, pp. XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, 129, 207, 368, 379.

¹⁵⁶ Edmund Spencer (1552-1599) was an English poet known for his allegorical glorifying of the English language. Encyclopaedia Britannica Incorporate, 1974, Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia Ready Reference and Index, 15th Edition, Chicago, University of Chicago, Vol. IX, p. 414.

¹⁵⁷ William Camden (1551-1623) is said to be a distinguished English antiquary who provided the first comprehensive topographical overview of England in his *Britannia*. Ibid. , Vol. II, p. 479.

¹⁵⁸ Cormack. L. B, op. cit. , p. 21.

¹⁵⁹ Sherman. W. H, op. cit. , p. 201, 203, 205.

East.¹⁶⁰ According to Newitt, England and Portugal were at intermittent sea confrontation from the 1580s partly owing to their trade interests, which occasioned the English seizure of ship treasures coming from India.¹⁶¹ Pepper booty, for example, rose so much in amount that it, together with other pepper amounts legally imported, inundated the English markets and consequently went redundant.¹⁶²

In this respect, Hakluyt's descriptions included the plunder in 1587 of the *Sao Felipe's* freight worth £ 100,000 and equal in value to around 10 per cent of England's then yearly imports. Not only did the *Sao Felipe's* looters confirm the true magnitude of Far-Eastern natural richness but they also unveiled Portugal's naval weaknesses.¹⁶³ English marine was multiplying its offensives against both Portuguese coast and shipping.¹⁶⁴ So, Hakluyt reported that Portuguese vessels could be easily subdued in the offing, which would reduce the apprehension of the English and increase their self-confidence at ocean waters to and back from India. Two other similar pillages were played out in 1592 first on the *Santa Cruz* being forced ashore in the Azores¹⁶⁵ and its crew being coerced into revealing valuable information on other Portuguese watercrafts coming from the Indian Ocean. Thus, the next capture was the *Madre de Deus* ransacked of jewels, spices, and silks evaluated in all at £ 500,000 in equivalence to half England's then yearly imports.¹⁶⁶

One may stress on the reliability of Hakluyt's reedited handbook in describing such adventurous facts because it is said that these, being narrated in his own style, could help emotionally the English to move eastwards. Being read by commoners and merchants alike, those international facts raised England's ambition of expanding her trade from the Levant to India as well as the East Indies.

¹⁶⁰ Scammell. G. V, op. cit. , pp. 177-179.

¹⁶¹ Newitt. M, op. cit. , p. 166.

¹⁶² Scammell. G. V, op. cit. , pp. 177-179.

¹⁶³ Ibid. , pp. 179-180.

¹⁶⁴ Newitt. M, op. cit. , p. 189.

¹⁶⁵ Azores, situated in the north Atlantic ocean, are a Portuguese archipelago where the English exercised piracy on Portuguese and Spanish treasure-carrying ships. Encyclopaedia Britannica Incorporate, 1974, Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia Ready Reference and Index, 15th Edition, Chicago, University of Chicago, Vol. 1, p. 700.

¹⁶⁶ Scammell. G. V, op. cit. , pp. 179-180.

Moreover, Hakluyt's description strongly suggested to the English reader that still much more wealth and information on the targeted aim were to be gained by English marine. Hakluyt told about the captured *Madre de Deus* offering the English, in addition to those aforementioned oriental goods, a range of maps, correspondence, a report on China and its riches, and above all a writing entitled *the Portuguese Register of the East Indies*. The latter document was said to contain a series of jealously-hidden secrets about China and its trade with the Portuguese.¹⁶⁷ Hakluyt became a prominent professional luminary paid to make maps and writings indicating Indian and East Indian areas where trade could successfully be carried out.¹⁶⁸ Ash's version agrees with Ogborn's one as follows:

*Hakluyt was a prominent amateur geographer, who used his many contacts in nautical circles to gather and disseminate useful information regarding trade in all corners of the world. He made it his business to be as well informed as possible about the natural resources available in distant lands, the arts practiced and goods produced by the peoples there, and their most pressing needs and desires which might be met by English commodities.*¹⁶⁹

But, the abovementioned anglicist writings sounded still louder than that: they developed the idea of English imperialism by preaching the patriotic value of English Protestant hegemony over Far Eastern areas regarded, in fact, as future English trading colonies. Hakluyt's publication did not fail to make the English mind conceive of its homeland as being autonomously separate of the remainder of Europe and due to exploit foreign peoples and their riches. Indeed, Hakluyt's narrative rooted in the English mentality a sense of national superiority as well as a stereotype about the Far East as being a ceaseless source of wealth-raising

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 181.

¹⁶⁸ Ogborn, M, 2002, "Writing Travels: Power, Knowledge, and Ritual on the English East India Company's Early Voyages" in *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 155-171, London, Wiley, p. 162.

¹⁶⁹ Ash, E. H, 2002, "A Note and a Caveat for the Merchant: Mercantile Advisors in Elizabethan England" in *The Sixteenth-Century Journal*, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 1-31, New York, The Sixteenth-Century Journal, p. 12.

goods.¹⁷⁰ Besides, Spencer lauded English civility as being the capacity of the Englishman, raised in England, to subdue outer barbarism through colonial subordination to English monarchical rule acclaimed as the fairest and the most concordant system for the English.¹⁷¹ The crucial character of such epic literature, also based on the translation of Portuguese and Dutch geographical writings, is corroborated by Sherman's ensuing words:

Elizabethan travel books — and particularly the epoch-making anthologies of Richard Hakluyt — have been seen and celebrated as evidence of England's first great age of maritime expansion. The nation had grown conscious of its cultural inferiority to the Continent, and suddenly burned with the desire to excel its rivals in letters, as well as in ships and gold. The translator's work was an act of patriotism. He, too, as well as the voyager and merchant, could do some good for his country: he believed that foreign books were just as important for England's destiny as the discoveries of her seamen, and he brought them into his native speech with all the enthusiasm of a conquest.¹⁷²

In short, epic facts and rhetorical art combined purposefully in Elizabethan anglicist writings as a driving force for the Anglo-Far Eastern trade trend.

5- The Trading New Christians

Though England was lagging behind her European competitors in the whole eastern trade trend, she had turned out by the late sixteenth century to be outstandingly supported by a particular immigrating trading class invited to come increasingly onto her soil.

¹⁷⁰ Cormack. L. B, op. cit. , p. 22.

¹⁷¹ Roy. A, 2005, Civility and Empire, Literature and Culture in British India, 1822-1922, New York, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 10.

¹⁷² Sherman. W. H, op. cit. , p. 199.

As a source of information about the *Estado de India*¹⁷³, Hakluyt's reedited book *The Principal Voyages and Navigations of the English Nation* was intended essentially for the broad English audience. As for the Elizabethan royal court, statesmen, and magnates taking part in eastern trade, they could watch the European-Indian scene through local and foreign complicity coloured by cunning and dissimulation. They kept procuring mainly during the 1580s and 1590s useful news about Iberian-Indian relationship by means of a particular circle of spying agents.¹⁷⁴ The latter were so revealing that by the foundation of the East India Company in 1600, London had gleaned important guiding knowledge on how and where to make its contacts with the Far East. It was neither by accident nor by random choice that the company started its trade business in the East Indies and not in India. The company deemed it judicious to select the East Indies as its first main trading partner in the Indian Ocean because it had been well-informed about the Portuguese position being much weaker there than in India.¹⁷⁵

That circle of spies, working as international merchants, were so needed for English overseas trade that their assimilation into the Tudor society became a matter of state intervention.¹⁷⁶ Being Portuguese and residing in or trading with Portugal, they had been given admittance to England by Henry VII and made up a community of expert oriental-goods traders booming in number and wealth, fluent in the Portuguese and Spanish languages, and strongly connected to most of the biggest world's commercial and financial centres.¹⁷⁷

Those spies, responsible for the redistribution of oriental products in London where most of them dwelled, were increasingly willing to serve Protestant England, not Catholic Iberia on account of their past worsening citizen situation in

¹⁷³ *Estado de India*, a phrase borrowed from the Portuguese language, refers to the Portuguese empire beyond the Cape of Good Hope, under the authority of a viceroy in Goa. This empire included fortresses in India namely those of Diu, Bassein, Goa, Cochin, Colombo, and Damao. Newitt. M, op. cit. , pp. VIII-XII.

¹⁷⁴ Scammell. G. V, op. cit. , pp. 182, 183, 184, 186.

¹⁷⁵ Newitt. M, op. cit. , p. 190.

¹⁷⁶ Prior. R, 1990, "A Second Jewish Community in Tudor London" in *Jewish Historical Studies*, Vol. 31, pp. 137-152, London, Jewish Historical Society of England, p. 148.

¹⁷⁷ Scammell. G. V, op. cit. , p. 183.

Portugal.¹⁷⁸ Known as New Christians, these were Portuguese refugees of Jewish descent.¹⁷⁹ Although dragooned into Catholic baptism in Iberia, they had encountered there renewed oppression from the Spanish who imposed between 1537 and 1540 anti-Jewish discriminating measures called the Inquisition. This systematic repression together with the Dutch King Charles V's entitling of the New Christians to come and reside in his country entailed their migration to the Netherlands where Antwerp had just recently risen as Northern Europe's main trade depot. In parallel, Antwerp was also serving as the European centre of oriental-spices commerce monopolised by a handful of Portuguese New Christians.¹⁸⁰ Later on began the influx of this minority into Elizabethan England due to the tightening Spanish subjection of the Netherlands put under persecuting anti-semitism, too.¹⁸¹ In all that, the Portuguese, constituting one of the major commercial European powers opposing and rivalling the English, were consequently the losers in terms of the eastern-trade enterprise.¹⁸²

Thus, in the second half of the sixteenth century, England had among its highest capitalists a growing number of veterans having become prosperous in and familiar with Far-Eastern trade.¹⁸³ Enjoying solid ties with their fellow Jews positioned in Goa and Surat, this English category included the *marranos*¹⁸⁴ accredited with the elaboration of a network in Iberia for the shipment to London of goods and news originally from India. William Holliday, William Resould, Hector Nunez, Pero Freyle, Bernardo de Luis, Richard May, and Jeromino Pardo were, among many others, attached to Elizabethan service providing their hostcountry, mainly in the 1590s, state secrets in opposition to the anti-semitic tyrannizer King

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. , pp. 182-183.

¹⁷⁹ De Silva. C. R, 1974, "The Portuguese East India Company 1628-1633" in Luso-Brazilian Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 152-205, Madison, Wisconsin University Press, pp. 153-154.

¹⁸⁰ Wolf. L, op. cit. , p. 3.

¹⁸¹ Scammell. G. V, op. cit. , p. 183.

¹⁸² De Silva. C. R, op. cit. , pp. 153, 154.

¹⁸³ Wolf. L, op. cit. , pp. 2-3.

¹⁸⁴ *Marranos*, also known as Crypto-Jews, publicly upheld Christianity while privately clinging to Judaism for security reasons. This strategy enabled them to lead serene lives as traders. Campos. E. V, 2002, "Jews, Spaniards, and Portugales: Ambiguous Identities of Portuguese Marranos in Elizabethan England" in ELH, Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 599-616, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, pp. 602-603.

of Spain Phillip II¹⁸⁵. For this, they travelled regularly to Iberia under royal licence and sent from Lisbon, on the sly and as Portuguese traders, cargos containing bullion as well as coded messages.¹⁸⁶ Therein, their Jewish fellows and collaborators included the Ximenes de Aragao family ranking as one of the main investors in Portuguese-Indian trade of which a big portion was in fact ably assured by a small group of New Christian kinfolds.¹⁸⁷ Campos confirms the particularity of the New Christians within the Elizabethan society as follows:

Iberian connections that made London marranos ideal intelligencers for the English government also had the effect of making them objects of cultural resentment, for these same lines of information served them doubly as commercial links. The multiple trajectories of the Iberian diaspora had strung a network of trade and information lines linking diasporic Jewish communities in London, Antwerp, Constantinople, and Lisbon for the distribution of products from the Levant and the East and West Indies that accumulated in the entrepots of Iberian ports.¹⁸⁸

Elizabethan New Christians were not merely royal spies but also important contributors to English economy. According to Scammell, their plutocratic style was seen in the amount and value of the cargoes they shipped from India via Portugal. By way of illustration, in 1585, Hector Nunez and his brother were the recipients of 3,000 tons of pepper, 68.3 tons of cinnamon, and 198 loads of callacout cloth and silk. Two years later, a similar arrival fetched him 2,000 tons of pepper, 25.7 tons of cinnamon beside 323 ounces of pearls.¹⁸⁹ Indeed, Elizabethan New Christians added in the economic well-being of the nation by importing and reselling Far-Eastern products before the creation of the East India Company.

¹⁸⁵ Phillip II had had his Spanish Armada defeated in 1588, which heartened the English to keep aspiring to Indian-Ocean navigation and trade. Stein. B, op. cit. , pp. 199-200.

¹⁸⁶ Scammell. G. V, op. cit. , pp. 183, 185.

¹⁸⁷ Newitt. M, op. cit. , p. 163.

¹⁸⁸ Campos. E. V, op. cit. , pp. 607-608.

¹⁸⁹ Scammell. G. V, op. cit. , p. 184.

Prior partly links the richness and usefulness of the Elizabethan New Christians to their being closely connected with state monetarism; in fact, they held high functions in the English Mint as did the Bassanos family. So, “*Elizabeth’s employment of men like Hector Nunez, Rodrigo Lopez and the Anes family was not due to mere chance or their availability*”.¹⁹⁰ They were selected on the strength of their intelligencing and business operations. That was the case of Dunstan Anes who, by virtue of his administration of the Agency of Indian Produce, founded by his father, and his freemanship in the English Grocers’ Company, was appointed Purveyor and Merchant for the Queen’s Majesty’s Grocery trading with Lisbon.¹⁹¹ Probably more important was that the creation of the joint-stock English East India Company was largely financed by those New Christians.¹⁹²

To round up the preluding background of the early Anglo-Indian relationship, one may conclude that the English had fulfilled a certain apprenticeship in overseas eastern trade throughout the second half of the sixteenth century. This achievement had made them poised by the next century to expand their business scope further eastwards up to the Indian Ocean.

¹⁹⁰ Prior. R, op. cit. , pp. 147-148.

¹⁹¹ Wolf. L, op. cit. , p. 14.

¹⁹² Newitt. M. op. cit. , p. 193.

CHAPTER TWO

Laying the Basis of the Westernisation of British India

As being the basis of the westernization of nineteenth-century British India, the evolution of English presence therein since the seventeenth century was marked by many changes in the Anglo-Indian relationship, leading to British colonial hegemony over there.

1. Early English Pretension in India

Although India glittered as a trade-promising ground for the English, it had in store for them a series of disturbing facts calling into play actions and interactions for preserving the English interests. Indeed, the latter survived many mishaps and denoted an on-going increase in the pretension of the English East India Company.¹⁹³

1.1- The Early Existence of the English East India Company

The early history of the English East India Company recorded a chain of failures and misfortunes offset by a range of accomplishments progressively leading to its mutation from an uncertain attempting association to an assertive trading hulk.¹⁹⁴

The English initiated their contact with the Indian sub-continent and the East Indies just as traders.¹⁹⁵ Their going and proliferating there in the seventeenth century bore no conquering intention.¹⁹⁶ Although their commercial determination is said to have grown over time, the English kept abstaining themselves from directly interfering in Indian politics and occupied only the ground on which their

¹⁹³ Foster. W, 1918, "English Commerce with India, 1608-1658" in Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, Vol. 66, No. 3413, pp. 361-372, London, Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce, p. 361.

¹⁹⁴ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660-1760, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 20.

¹⁹⁵ Stein. B, op. cit. , p. 13.

¹⁹⁶ Viollis. A, 1930, L'Inde contre les Anglais, Paris, Editions des portiques, p. 33.

workshops were built.¹⁹⁷ In other words, their initial quest was much more for economics than glory.¹⁹⁸

Anglo-Indian trade may be traced back to the inauguration of the English East India Company in 1600 as a joint-stock corporation given the monopoly of all Anglo-Asian trade by Queen Elizabeth I and headquartered in London by twenty-four annually-selected officers.¹⁹⁹ Named *the Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies*, this union was to become later on the tool of British colonial activity in India.²⁰⁰ The company is said to owe much of its strength to its organised board of directors, archives recording, and its staffing of specialised servants.²⁰¹ Another asset feature to the company was its functioning as a joint-stock association of various wealthy folks including judges, dukes, earls, knights, and countesses willing to mobilize large funds for the venture that they knew to be highly costly.²⁰²

Indian Emperors had long been siding with the Portuguese in return for sea escort between Surat and Mecca for the Muslim Pilgrimage, but the year 1612 saw an English sea victory over the Portuguese and thus a change in favour of the English. Having been fascinated by the English triumph at several sea battles in Surat's harbour, Emperor Salim Nouredine Jahangir vested that escorting task in the English company designating it as his new maritime partner. What looks impressive for Riddick in that victory is the ability of the English fleet, composed only of two ships, to vanquish a fleet highly superior in number.²⁰³ Jehansir, like his successor, would show from then a certain partiality for the English so as to counterbalance the preponderance of the Portuguese in India.²⁰⁴ The English triumph

¹⁹⁷ Williamson. J, 1994, Great Britain and the Empire, A Discursive History, London, Adam and Charles Black, p. 68.

¹⁹⁸ Thiessen. J, 1994, "Anglo-Indian Vested Interests and Civil Service Education, 1800-1858: Indications of an East India Company Line" in Journal of World History, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 23-46, Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, pp. 25, 26.

¹⁹⁹ Sherman. A. A, op. cit. , p. 332.

²⁰⁰ Ramaswamy. M, 1956, "Constitutional Developments in India 1600-1955" in Stanford Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 326-387, Stanford, Stanford Law Review, pp. 326-327.

²⁰¹ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 44.

²⁰² Baladouni. V, 1983, op. cit. , p. 65.

²⁰³ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 02.

²⁰⁴ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 45.

made the company earn in Surat a stronger position which would be still stronger a decade later after an offence against the Portuguese fortress of Ormuz near the Red Sea.²⁰⁵

The English company realised gradual diplomatic development since its early settlements in India, which only followed official bilateral agreements implying protection as well as concession on the part of Mughal emperors.²⁰⁶ Through the English ambassador Thomas Roe, sent for a mission to the Mughal Court between 1615 and 1617 by King James I, was issued a convention with Emperor Jahangir who granted the company the right to reside and build posts at selected Indian ports including Surat. Here again, what was influential behind the attribution of that right was the English naval capability of which the Mughal Emperor was in awe while possessing no navy of his.²⁰⁷ Under the terms of the agreement, the company was, in return, to supply the Emperor with goods from Europe. In this context, Devonshire textiles, called Kerseys or Perpetuanos dyed in red or green colours, reached the imperial courts at Agra and Berhampur.²⁰⁸ Hasan mentions a view common among historians accrediting the eventual commercial success of the English in India to such trading privileges conferred by the imperial Mughal court upon the English company in the Kingdom of Gujarat²⁰⁹.²¹⁰ Hence, by 1615, the English company had established four commercial posts in Mughal India.²¹¹ Years later, the English company gained entitlement to trade in Bengal as a reward from Emperor Shah Jehan whose daughter had had her burns cured by an English practitioner from Surat.²¹²

²⁰⁵ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , p. 77.

²⁰⁶ Farhat. H, 1991, "Conflict and Cooperation in Anglo-Mughal Trade Relations during the Reign of Aurangzeb" in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 351-360, Leiden, Brill, p. 351.

²⁰⁷ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 47.

²⁰⁸ Maloni. R, 2008, "Europeans in Seventeenth-Century Gujarat: Presence and Response" in Social Scientist, Vol. 36, No. 3/4, pp. 64-99, New Delhi, Social Scientist, p. 77.

²⁰⁹ Gujarat is reckoned as a highly-energetic region in the seventeenth century on the strength of its agricultural and industrial wealth, especially its textile production, and its seaports being the most operative ones in India such as Surat. Ibid. , p. 65.

²¹⁰ Hasan. F, 1993, "The Mughal Fiscal System in Surat and the English East India Company" in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 711-718, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 711.

²¹¹ Roy. M, 1994, " "Englishing" India: Reinstating Class and Social Privilege" in Social Text, No. 39, pp. 83-109, Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, p. 85.

²¹² Wheeler. J. T, op. cit. , p. 44.

Further Anglo-Indian cooperation would favour the gradual building of many trading posts in the Bengali areas of Balasore, Harlharpur, Hughli, Dacca, Kasimbazar, Patna, and Malda which all offered reliable sources of saltpetre as well as fine-cotton textiles. Each of those posts was known as a factory²¹³ and headed by a factor.²¹⁴ According to Roy, the company factories had risen to the number of twenty-three by 1647.²¹⁵ The location of almost all the early English factories in or in proximity to Indian towns or cities did not come by accident but rather purposefully owing to the different economic advantages present in urban India. Urban India encompassed industrial handicrafts as well as financial serviceability, which gave facility to the marketability of her products.²¹⁶

Among the early achievements of the English company on the Indian soil was the acquisition of numerous privileges from the English Crown or the Mughal government.²¹⁷ In 1639, the company got another foothold in the southeast of India by buying in annual instalments an area in the port city of Madras from the then King of Golconda.²¹⁸ The English attached so much importance to Madras that they achieved its development as their main base in the Indian sub-continent.²¹⁹ It is stated that, with a royal assent, the company endowed Madras with a new administrative structure in 1687. In this design, Madras was rendered a corporation comprising a mayor, ten alder advisors, a class of one hundred and twenty bourgeois, and other municipal agents.²²⁰ In fact, from a village entered with state permission, Madras was rendered a modern city under English sway.²²¹ Company land purchase was made in 1687 for Tegnapatam, too. This town, being situated on the southeast Indian coast, presented the strategic significance of being near the

²¹³ The word 'factory' meant at that time a warehouse stocking goods under the incumbency of a resident, called a factor, till their shipment. Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 45.

²¹⁴ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 13.

²¹⁵ Roy. M, op. cit. , p. 85.

²¹⁶ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 46.

²¹⁷ Hejeebu. S, 2005, "Contract Enforcement in the English East India Company" in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 496-523, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 503.

²¹⁸ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 09.

²¹⁹ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 17.

²²⁰ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 10.

²²¹ Stein. B, op. cit. , p. 200.

rivalling French settlement of Pondicherry, which offered the English company a position for alert and supervision.²²²

By 1690, the English company had established another big trading centre situated in the extreme east of India namely Calcutta in Bengal.²²³ This centre was eight years later enlarged with the purchase of the nearby villages of Sutannati and Govindpur from the Bengali ruler who vested the English company with tax collection, called *zamindari*, therein.²²⁴ By the end of the seventeenth century, all of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta became tenable as presidencies²²⁵ securing future company inland extension.²²⁶

According to Watson, company right acquisition was not only in terms of trading residency but also in English institutions. The English could have their property rights confirmed in the scattered areas they were allowed to occupy alongside their entitlement to apply their own laws and practise their religion in their settlements.²²⁷ Besides, from the 1660s, the company was empowered by King Charles II to make currency and exert entire jurisdiction over all English people residing in its settlements.²²⁸ English jurisdiction in company settlements was invigorated in 1683 when King Charles II issued a charter founding at Surat a maritime court, the *Admiralty Court for the East Indies*, authorised to establish subordinate courts wherever necessary in India.²²⁹ The aim of these governmental elements was to deter disorder and indiscipline within company settlements and to help resist foreign assaults on them.²³⁰ Historians claim that the English company

²²² Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 10.

²²³ Virmani. A, 2012, *Atlas historique de l'Inde du VI^e siècle av. J.-C. au XXI siècle*, Paris, Editions Autrement, p. 55.

²²⁴ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 13-14.

²²⁵ The status of company presidency was devised in 1614 after the company had elaborated its trade and administration in India. The company felt at that date the need to put each of its main Indian regional centres under the control of a president also called a governor. Ibid. , p. 02.

²²⁶ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 47.

²²⁷ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , p. 81.

²²⁸ Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , p. 101.

²²⁹ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 08.

²³⁰ Ramaswamy. M, op. cit. , p. 327.

became, as a result, an extension of the English State under a different appellation.²³¹ Chaudhuri confirms that in these ensuing words:

*..... it had established a number of trading settlements which possessed semi-sovereign status, distinguished by an elaborate procedure of government, courts of law, a municipal system, and a military force. In these circumstances it is not surprising to discover that the Company's organisational structure and bureaucratic apparatus shared many of the attributes of a great department of state.*²³²

As far as early Anglo-Indian trade is concerned, one may find it convenient to grasp the link existent between India itself and the East Indies precisely a region called the Spice Islands. So as to get spice goods from this archipelago, the early English company traders had to operate as barterers in both fronts.²³³ Systematically, those spice-producing Indonesian islands required, in exchange, Indian-made products mainly cotton fabric, muslins, and calicoes whereas the latter items were swapped for bullion.²³⁴ Actually, gold and silver shipped by company merchants to Mughal India permitted the purchase of textile goods highly demanded by the Spice Islands; these offered in return considerable amounts of their aromatics to be re-exported to European markets at high profits.²³⁵ This triangular network was markedly sustained by an English factory established on the eastern Indian coast in 1611, called Masulipatam of which chintzes and calicoes supply played a major part in that exchange trade.²³⁶

Throughout the seventeenth century, the English East India Company incurred incessant trouble in the Far East disputed by enemy European powers.²³⁷ One of these was the Dutch East India Company trying to wipe out the English presence

²³¹ Thiessen. J, op. cit. , p. 23.

²³² Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 20.

²³³ Foster. W, op. cit. , p. 362.

²³⁴ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 80.

²³⁵ Markley. R, op. cit. , p. 501.

²³⁶ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 9.

²³⁷ Baladouni. V, 1983, op. cit. , p. 64.

there. The English incursion in Indonesian spice trade played against the interests of the Dutch who wanted to preserve their already-established monopoly.²³⁸ After the Dutch had discarded the Portuguese from the Spice Islands, they succeeded in making exclusive trade treaties with local rulers, which progressively gave rise to Dutch rule there.²³⁹ The Dutch were to impose their military control on the Spice Islands after annihilating the English base there in 1623 at the killing of Ambon.²⁴⁰ In fact, it is confirmed that the southeast Asian spice trade fell then almost wholly on the Dutch hands.²⁴¹ This monopoly distracted the English focus from the East Indies to India as the new trading partner of the English Company. But, unlike the East Indian islands, India produced no spice except pepper.²⁴²

So, the history of the early English in India is not solely that of commercial exchange but also that of European rivalry and opposition.²⁴³ The Portuguese, the Dutch, and later the French had their own private east India companies resolved to ply the oceans for Indian and East Indian products, too.²⁴⁴ One fact exemplifying this common interest is the importation to Europe in 1621 of black pepper worth in aggregate £ 7 million.²⁴⁵ That rivalry was partly caused by the Mughal authorities which imposed customs dues to swell India's state income.²⁴⁶ It is said that these European contending companies made over time many active settlements in India and applied themselves to their protection.²⁴⁷ The companies even manifested a zeal for market information secrecy, withholding details on local commercialisation.²⁴⁸

²³⁸ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 45.

²³⁹ Davidson. L. S, op. cit. , pp. 8-9.

²⁴⁰ Sherman. A. A, 1976, "Pressure from Leadenhall: The East India Company Lobby, 1660-1678" in The Business History Review, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 329-355, London, The President and Fellows of Harvard College, p. 333.

²⁴¹ Sen. S. P, 1962, "The Role of Indian Textiles in Southeast Asian Trade in the Seventeenth Century" in Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 92-110, London, Cambridge University Press, p. 95.

²⁴² Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 45.

²⁴³ Pécastaing-Boissière. M, 2015, Annie Besant (1847-1933) La lutte et la quête, Paris, Editions Adyar, pp. 217-218.

²⁴⁴ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 17.

²⁴⁵ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 78.

²⁴⁶ Maloni. R, op. cit. , p. 82.

²⁴⁷ Stein. B, op. cit., p. 13.

²⁴⁸ Maloni. R, op. cit. , p. 74.

Furthermore, in the 1660s, the French company took possession of areas in Surat, Pondicherry, and Calcutta as its centres.²⁴⁹ According to Dalziel, confrontation proved so strong between these European powers that for over one hundred and fifty years the English enjoyed no stability in the Indian sub-continent.²⁵⁰ For instance, in the 1620s, losses inflicted on the English company by the Dutch one went heavier in terms of lives and material including £ 2,000,000 in commodities.²⁵¹ That instability illustrated itself again between 1652 and 1654 when the Dutch hostilities meted out to the English company serious naval damage estimated to £ 85,000.²⁵²

As an alternative to the East-Indian spice trade, Indian trade proved to be very much profitable for the English company, too, hastening the opening up of outlets in Europe for a miscellany of Indian-made items particularly indigo, saltpetre, and different good-quality textiles.²⁵³ In this frame, all of Russia, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the Levant became patrons to the English company.²⁵⁴ It is explained that from around 1660 the latter Indian product went in increasing amounts to England so as to meet a higher consumer demand. It is estimated that all the company re-exports of Indian-made commodities to Europe had risen from £ 360,000 in 1670 to £ 1,080,000 by 1700.²⁵⁵ Besides, one may argue that the significance of the company exports of Indian-made products did not come solely from the volume of those exports but also from their variation. Chaudhuri affirms that those exports were so different from each other that their enumeration in an inventory, called the *Ledger Book*, exceeded 200 pages.²⁵⁶ The English Company could now pay out dividends fluctuating between 100 and 250 per cent.²⁵⁷

²⁴⁹ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 78.

²⁵⁰ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 17.

²⁵¹ Sherman. A. A, op. cit. , p. . 333.

²⁵² Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 04.

²⁵³ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 45.

²⁵⁴ Fisher. J. F, 1950, "London's Export Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century" in The Economic History Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 151-161, New York, Wiley, p. 160.

²⁵⁵ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 45.

²⁵⁶ Chaudhuri. K. N, op. cit. , p. 45.

²⁵⁷ Shelvankar. K. S, 1940, The Problem of India, New York, Penguin, p. 146.

Among those miscellaneous exported items was Gujarati-made cotton thread needed in Europe for candlewick-making and silk intermixture. Moreover, whereas indigo was much demanded in Europe for wool industry, saltpetre for war industry. It is affirmed that the latter product rose as a basic element in gunpowder-making.²⁵⁸ Huge profits could be made during the 1640's English Civil War opposing King Charles I and his parliament both purchasing much Indian saltpetre shipped from Patna.²⁵⁹ But, cotton cloth exports showed relatively more quantification than the other exports.²⁶⁰ Cotton cloth exports were partly and increasingly meant for West Africa to buy slaves for plantation in the West Indies.²⁶¹ The company directors are said to have made in 1682 a one-third augmentation to the company fleet by sending to Surat twenty-four additional vessels with the aim of swamping the English market with Indian-made goods.²⁶² Chaudhuri claims that company trade found in the different continents of the world favourable outlets without which it could not have lasted for any time.²⁶³ Irwin's conclusion tallies with these facts as follows:

*Ousted from much of Southeast Asia, the English were forced to divert their trade toward India. Once established in India, the English were exceedingly well positioned to capitalize on what soon became the much more profitable and more rapidly-growing cotton textile trade. In this trade they achieved pre-eminence toward the end of the seventeenth century and thereafter.*²⁶⁴

What is more, that English reorientation from the East Indies to India did not end the company spice trade now concentrated just on pepper being profusely produced in the southwest Indian coast namely the Malabar Coast. It is claimed

²⁵⁸ Maloni. R, op. cit. , p. 75.

²⁵⁹ Wheeler. J. T, op. cit. , p. 44.

²⁶⁰ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 48.

²⁶¹ Parthasarathi. P, 2005, "Cotton Textile Exports from the Indian Subcontinent, 1680-1780", www.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/Research/GEHN/GEHNPdf/PADUAParthasarathi.pdf, pp. 1, 6.

²⁶² Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 08.

²⁶³ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 12.

²⁶⁴ Irwin. D. A, 1991, "Mercantilism as Strategic Trade Policy: The Anglo-Dutch Rivalry for the East India Trade" in *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 99, No. 6, pp. 1296-1314, Chicago, The University of Chicago, p. 1313.

that in 1682 the English company seized the factory of Tellicherry, having been abandoned by the French, and permitted its development as its main pepper supplier on that coast.²⁶⁵

In seventeenth-century India, the English could not act with complete freedom for they were one military power there among other ones be them European or Asian. Rivalled mainly by the Dutch and controlled by native authorities, the early company traders had rather to seek compromises with rulers and chieftains around. Being not yet supreme in India, the English had occasionally to ingratiatingly negotiate terms and treaties with the Indians.²⁶⁶

In his article, Brenner sees that the newly-chartered English East India Company progressed fairly speedily as England's biggest commercial entity putting over £ 2,500,000 in different investments over the first thirty years of its activity. The directors of the company soon rose as the strongest London mercantile organism in possession of increasing wealth and experience due to their simultaneous belonging to the Levant Company. Brenner adds that between 1600 and 1619 between one-fourth and one-third of the whole East India Company invested capitals came from Levant-Company members.²⁶⁷ This shows that English trade with the Levant continued to smooth the way for English trade with India even well after the foundation of the East India Company.

Courtesy of its principle of non-intervention in Indian politics and its humble manner of making ties with native merchants and bankers, the English company grew greatly prosperous.²⁶⁸ This success was also due to fruitful negotiations between the English factors and the Mughal authorities who allowed them to move freely across India and to settle in most of the biggest Indian cities. Emperor Jahangir for instance bestowed a grant in 1612 for the foundation of the Bombay

²⁶⁵ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 08.

²⁶⁶ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 45.

²⁶⁷ Brenner. R, op. cit. , pp. 367-373.

²⁶⁸ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 17.

factory.²⁶⁹ Pepper from the Malabar Coast, silk, saltpetre, calicoes, and muslins were increasingly freighted to Britain.²⁷⁰ An estimation reveals that between 1600 and 1620 the company resold in Europe at £ 1,914,600 imported goods purchased at only £ 356,288.²⁷¹ Broadberry and Gupta confirm the swelling exportation of Indian-made cotton textiles to Britain throughout the seventeenth century.²⁷² Statistics put the cotton annually-exported pieces at 139,677 between 1665 and 1669 and at 967,784 between 1680 and 1684.²⁷³ Having its chief factories in Bombay, Madras, and then Calcutta, the English company set up a large trade network vital to its home country's affluence and public expenditures.²⁷⁴ In this respect, the English had made, by the mid-seventeenth century, India their salient supplier of oriental goods meant for re-exportation to Europe and America.²⁷⁵

The Anglo-Indian commercial relationship was significantly maintained not only by the Royal Navy itself but also by the way the latter was to act. There was in play a national strategy vigorously imposed by English Parliament. England was increasingly protectionist in an epoch coloured by international economic rivalry characterizing the system of mercantilism²⁷⁶ which sought to shatter the economic dependency of one nation on the other.²⁷⁷ England stood among a range of European competitors all seriously attached to the Far East; hence, she had the concern of restricting all her foreign trade transit to her national navy in an

²⁶⁹ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 78.

²⁷⁰ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 17.

²⁷¹ Irwin. D. A, op. cit. , pp. 1299-1300.

²⁷² Broadberry. S and Gupta. B, 2005, "Cotton Textiles And the Great Divergence: Lancashire, India and Shifting Competitive Advantage, 1600-1850" , grammatikhilfe.com/.../Conf6_BroadberryGupta.pdf, pp. 1-2.

²⁷³ Ibid. , p. 33.

²⁷⁴ Hejeebu. S, op. cit. , pp. 498, 501.

²⁷⁵ Markley. R, op. cit. , p. 508.

²⁷⁶ Mercantilism emerged in the second half of the sixteenth century as a theory applied by all European trading powers. Systematically emphasizing on economic nationalism, mercantilism came as an exaltation of the belief in the efficiency of state intervention in economic arena in face of external warfare threat. Actually, the common application of mercantilism was a way of reducing dependence upon foreign countries as there inherently prevailed fear of trade dislocation in wartime. Thus, this political trend recommended that the English navy be frequently and intensively equipped so as to ward off trade disruption likely to be caused by continental belligerence. Stone. L, 1947, op. cit. , pp. 110-111.

²⁷⁷ Leng. T, 2005, "Commercial Conflict and Regulation in the Discourse of Trade in Seventeenth-Century England" in *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 933-954, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 933, 947, 948.

attempt to monopolise her foreign economic activity. This protectionist policy was embodied by the Navigation Act issued in 1651 for counterbalancing neighbouring trade evolution mainly that of the Netherlands. As a result, there followed three Anglo-Dutch wars ending with England's victory in 1674 and thus with her rise as the world's leader of the mercantile ideology.²⁷⁸ Consequently, the Navigation Act came as a parliamentary stimulation for the development of the national navy and navigation.²⁷⁹

Other than protectionist and expanding, flexible was a further word-qualifier to the English vessels trading in the Indian Ocean. Watson stands testimony to the fact that the English marine was militarily equipped enough to assure other major functions unavoidably imposed by the perils of long-distance overseas trade. The English trading vessels could combat their European rivals and dazzle and frighten local rulers such as the Sultan Khurram in Surat. In addition, the English trading vessels could serve as private conveyances to the Mughal Court between Surat and the Red Sea, which effectively acted as a groundwork for bilateral diplomacy which included the Mughal award of trade concessions to the company.²⁸⁰

Another major persistent obstacle that the English company effectively coped with was the payment modality imposed by the Indians.²⁸¹ The thing is that Indian goods could not be got unless with precious metals in exchange.²⁸² At that time, England had no product being desired by the Indian markets. The then almost unique English exportable manufacture was woollens which met with no demand in India.²⁸³ The Indian market was rather familiar with light, brightly-coloured, and ornamented cottons as well as compactly-made silks.²⁸⁴ So, one salient characteristic to the East India Company was the constant problem of the affordability of Asian

²⁷⁸ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 16.

²⁷⁹ Farnell. J. E, 1964, "The Navigation Act of 1651, the First Dutch War, and the London Merchant Community" in The Economic History Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 439-454, New York, Wiley, p. 439.

²⁸⁰ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , pp. 74-75.

²⁸¹ Maloni. R, op. cit. , p. 77.

²⁸² Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 45.

²⁸³ Fisher. J. F, 1950, op. cit. , pp. 156-157.

²⁸⁴ Davidson. L. S, op. cit. , p. 7.

products and not the marketability of English ones in Asia.²⁸⁵ The solution was a tendency for precious-metals exportation from America and Africa where the English had the capacity to plunder.²⁸⁶ The English management of that difficulty is corroborated by Chaudhuri as follows:

*With the deepening experience of Asian trade, the English learnt that the American silver was indispensable for its full development. In the seventeenth century, the two separate developments, the expansion of Europe westward to the American continent and the establishment of commercial relations around the Indian Ocean, fused together under new leadership to form a powerful force in the integration of world economic exchanges. silver struck in the mints of Mexico City, Lima, and Potosi found their way into all the major trading towns of India.*²⁸⁷

According to Sperling, bullion amount exported by the English company to India fluctuated between £ 250,000 and £ 1,000,000 per annum throughout the seventeenth century.²⁸⁸ And, the bulk of the seventeenth-century company exports to India consisted of bullion treasure.²⁸⁹ In this respect, Surat received much bullion to the point of being dubbed *the Babylon of the East* since it never allowed its gold and silver to leave.²⁹⁰ This condition is said to have created a constant sharp imbalance between company exports and imports.²⁹¹ Meanwhile, London bore at that time the mercantilist belief that precious metals were the only real riches of any national economy.²⁹² Figures put the aggregate bullion export to India by the English company during the first twenty-three years of the seventeenth century to

²⁸⁵ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1963, op. cit. , p. 24.

²⁸⁶ Dutt. R. P, op. cit. , p. 58.

²⁸⁷ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , pp. 6, 7.

²⁸⁸ Sperling. J, 1962, "The International Payments Mechanism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" in *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 446-468, New York, Wiley, p. 466.

²⁸⁹ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1968, "Treasure and Trade Balances: The East India Company's Export Trade, 1660-1720" in *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 480-502, Hoboken, Wiley, p. 482.

²⁹⁰ Maloni. R, op. cit. , p. 77.

²⁹¹ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1963, op. cit. , pp. 25-26.

²⁹² Dutt. R. P, op. cit. , p. 58.

76.84 metric tons of silver.²⁹³ Another estimating account indicates that company bullion exportation swelled from £ 51,329 in 1659-60 to £ 135,218 in 1662-63 then from £ 203,504 in 1670-71 to £ 609,162 in 1681-82.²⁹⁴ This situation went unchanged during the first half of the eighteenth century whereby bullion percentages to the total company exports to the Presidencies of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta were respectively 57, 84, 74.²⁹⁵ So, there kept being in England a concern on the part of statesmen complaining about the resultant injury inflicted on the home economy.²⁹⁶ This situation would not cease until 1757 when the English company at last attained military primacy in eastern India.²⁹⁷

Early Anglo-Indian trade was so beneficial and increasingly attractive for both sides.²⁹⁸ But, this success gave rise to an unexpected long problematic situation that would retard the ascendancy of the English company as a militarily-fortifying power in India. Adversity faced by the English company was not to come only from the Indian sub-continent or the East Indies but now also from homeland where other ambitious wealthy merchants led by William Courteen rose in challenge to the privileges of the company.²⁹⁹ From the start, it had been on the basis of a royal charter granting the company exclusive access to all oriental markets that this corporation had implemented its investment.³⁰⁰ Actually, the monopolistic rights of the company had been fundamentally preconditioned by its capitalistic members for their participating commitment.³⁰¹ Instead, the rivalling Courteen Association³⁰² came, alongside the Dutch competition, to cast the company

²⁹³ Moosvi. S, 1987, "The Silver Influx, Money Supply, Prices and Revenue-Extraction in Mughal India" in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 47-94, Leiden, Brill, p. 63.

²⁹⁴ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1968, op. cit. , p. 497.

²⁹⁵ Datta. K. K, 1959, "India's Trade with Europe and America in the Eighteenth Century" in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 313-323, Leiden, Brill, p. 315.

²⁹⁶ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 5.

²⁹⁷ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 52.

²⁹⁸ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , p. 74.

²⁹⁹ Bogart. D, 2015, "There Can Be no Partnership with the King: Regulatory Commitment and the Tortured Rise of England's East Indian Merchant Empire", eml.berkeley.edu/~webfac/seminars/bogart_211seminar.pdf, pp. 9-10.

³⁰⁰ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 44.

³⁰¹ Brenner. R, op. cit. , p. 376.

³⁰² The Courteen Association offered in 1635 a gift of £ 10,000 to the Crown in return for a charter recognizing the association as a contender for Indian trade, with authorization to transact

into long years of alienation and uncertainty.³⁰³ From the 1630's, opposition from the Courteen Association to the privileges of the company drove the latter to the verge of collapsing as years of rivalry discouraged the company shareholders to advance decently-enough capitals for the company administrative needs.

This depressing situation did not end until 1657 at the reestablishment of the company charter and the confirmation of its monopoly with additional powers and privileges.³⁰⁴ Oliver Cromwell, as the head of the English State, gave a permanent joint-stock subscription to the company, which would act as a revitalising basis for Anglo-Indian trade.³⁰⁵ The company members, being re-encouraged by that edict, raised a total subscription of £ 786,000 to launch a new business.³⁰⁶ Consequently, unlike the first sixty years of the company existence, the upcoming company activity was marked by a permanent flow of investing capital.³⁰⁷ Chaudhuri testifies that the aftermath of that governmental regularisation included a phenomenal upsurge in Anglo-Indian trade.³⁰⁸ Actually, only after the confirmation of the company monopoly did the company members agree to widen their investment in a manner as to embark upon a stronger career line. The English company would from now onwards put more efforts setting up a certain gradual unprecedented economic and political weight in India still under Mughal sovereignty and the English crown. The latter, too, went supporting the chartered institution as the sole English trade-maker beyond the Cape of Good Hope.³⁰⁹

So, it would appear that the early hardship met by the English East India Company during the seventeenth century was compensated for by its consolidation as a diplomatic residential more-recognized organism. In fact, England could then have for the first time in history a stable more-legalized community there.³¹⁰ But,

at any Indian area where the East India Company did not possess a trading post. Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 3-4.

³⁰³ Foster. W, op. cit. , p. 372.

³⁰⁴ Sherman. A. A, op. cit. , pp. 346, 347.

³⁰⁵ Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , p. 101.

³⁰⁶ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 4-5.

³⁰⁷ Baladouni. V, 1986, op. cit. , p. 19.

³⁰⁸ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , pp. 14-15.

³⁰⁹ Sherman. A. A, op. cit. , pp. 346, 347.

³¹⁰ Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , p. 101.

still another major making to this stability was itself an aspect to that early hardship namely fortification.

1.2- The Fortification Policy

Not always humble towards the Mughal Emperors and their subjects, early company merchants were operating in such a military way as to preserve their profitable position and submit the Indians.³¹¹

Reading different authors, one may infer that the political consolidation of English presence in India before the nineteenth century acted as the basis of the westernising mission being ahead. González and Hsu, analysing anglicist higher education in nineteenth-century British India, trace back the British capacity to assume this westernising charge partly to the English rise as a fortifying military power in pre-colonial India.³¹²

The English still did not enjoy full liberty in India but resolved on the strength of their marine capacity to make use of a psychological strategy that characteristically marked their early relationship with the Indians.³¹³ The exhibition of gunship potency for the infliction of fear was seen as necessary to obtain trade concessions from the Mughal authorities.³¹⁴ It is claimed that on the favour of the latter entirely depended the company trading activities.³¹⁵ But, it was mainly the English constant feeling of insecurity aroused by occasional Indian attacks that created the indispensability of engraining apprehension in the Indian minds on the altar of lucrative coexistence. In fact, profit and safety were being perceived by the company merchants as joint aims to be attained by means of terror. Thus, violence and frightening were becoming a key aspect to the English presence in India, which is asserted by Ogborn's ensuing passage:

³¹¹ Bogart. D, op. cit. , p. 7.

³¹² González. C and Hsu. F, 2014, "Education and Empire: Colonial Universities in Mexico, India and the United States", escholarship.org/uc/item/85k111gh, pp. 7, 8.

³¹³ Maloni. R, op. cit. , pp. 82-83.

³¹⁴ Shelvankar. K. S, op. cit. , p. 147.

³¹⁵ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 47.

*The Company had to provide for themselves the means of violence—cannon, shot, powder, small arms, swords, armour, and the fighting men who could use them—to protect their ships and to attack others or take hostages where dictated by the interlocking logics of trade and politics. This transformed the geography of power. On the international scale, armed trade was a radical departure from the normal commercial practices followed in contemporary Europe.*³¹⁶

For that objective, what was seen as central was not only displaying military force but also increasing it. In 1608, the English became aware of the utility to fortify their position in infrastructural terms after the example of the Portuguese and the Dutch.³¹⁷ This attitude came about as a theory combining self-protection and aggression. In naval terms, fortification came with the construction between 1608 and 1639 of seventy-six vessels specifically for the company usage. Thirty of them varied in weight between three and four hundred tons.³¹⁸ The *Mary*, for example, weighed 800 tons and had 42 guns.³¹⁹ Dalziel confirms that by the eighteenth century, the Royal Navy had become the world's outstanding trading fleet.³²⁰ But, in terms of fort building, the matter rather showed signs of hesitation due to the company direction board being uncertain to keep on investing in face of the opposition and rivalry of the Courteen Association at home and those of the Dutch at the Indian Ocean. It was not until the 1660s, after two native assaults on the English settlement in Surat, that the conversion of factories into fortresses could at last begin. Fortification was to become an outstanding English policy in pre-colonial India.³²¹

Without being an assertion of full sovereignty, the insistence of the company residents upon fortifying their settlements in India went hand in hand with the principles of mercantilism dominating an age that saw international trade as more

³¹⁶ Ogborn. M, op. cit. , p. 162.

³¹⁷ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , pp. 71-72.

³¹⁸ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 02.

³¹⁹ Maloni. R, op. cit. , p. 84.

³²⁰ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 17.

³²¹ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 47.

profitable only when accompanied by arms.³²² A case in point took place in 1623 when Thomas Rastell, President of Surat, advocated a sea attack against Mughal shipping so as to oblige the Surati authorities to redress company complaints. Dissension ended with a compromise in which the ruler, *nawab*, of Surat was compelled to confirm company trade right as subject to no money or tax extortion.³²³ Another illustrating case came in 1679-80 when the company naval forces, having made 600 dead among the Marathi mariners near Bombay, dragged Sivaji, the Marathi ruler, to a compromise favourable to the company position in the region. This agreement stipulated the cessation of Anglo-Marathi hostilities and Marathi interference with company trade shipping to and from Bombay. It also specified the release of captured English ships and prisoners, and the defrayal of all the company expenditure on that naval fighting.³²⁴ So, one may argue that the English were seeking semi-sovereignty in India, which comes in Chaudhuri's ensuing words:

*The continual search for commercial concessions at home and in Asia and the attempt to establish semi-independent territorial strongholds overseas, from which trade could be carried on in greater security, were expressions of the East India Company's effort to control and influence its environment and render it more predictable.*³²⁵

However, the company direction board was meanwhile so concerned for the profitability of the company activities that it insisted on a principle opposed to fortification namely failure risk minimisation. According to Brenner, while the risk of failure was inevitably present in the fact that substantial funds were invested in remote and little-known overseas areas, the company directors were against the insecurities of investing in aggrandisement or colonization.³²⁶ In this frame, the directors coined "*Profit, not grandeur, which is our end in trading*" as a motto to

³²² Watson. I. B, op. cit. , p. 70.

³²³ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 03.

³²⁴ Ibid. , p. 08.

³²⁵ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 39.

³²⁶ Brenner. R, op. cit. , p. 376.

the company settlements.³²⁷ In fact, the company directors, whose aim was not glory, showed constant parsimony and objection to any expenditure that did not promptly yield payments.³²⁸ In Dharwadker's vision, the rise of the Dutch as the first power at the Indian Ocean during the first half of the seventeenth century was partly behind the fact that London refused to invest much in company infrastructure, making the company settlements in India precarious until about 1660.³²⁹

The company residents in India were afraid enough of native attacks, occasionally made against them, to keep disagreeing with the company directors administering peacefully in London.³³⁰ The English at Madras hastened to endow themselves with Fort St George after their settlement there in 1639.³³¹ It is said that at recommendations emanating from the company directors in the 1670s to the settlement of Bombay to make savings, the English residents responded with their urgent need for defensive and offensive fortification. This mounting need was mainly in concomitance with the mounting civil conflict between the Mughal Empire trying to sustain its entirety and the Marathas warring for their secession.³³² Chaudhuri's words almost tally with Watson's ones as follows:

*There was a marked difference between the trading methods adopted by the Company in Europe and those followed in Asia. In Europe the Company saw little reason to set up a trading network directly under its own corporate control. The economic and political environment was perfectly familiar to the managerial committees and they could use the existing commercial institutions without any hazards. But, Asia offered no such security. This fact explains the growth of the 'factory' system and the eventual rise of the fortified settlements.*³³³

³²⁷ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , pp. 71-72.

³²⁸ Mitter. P, 1986, "The Early British Port Cities of India: Their Planning and Architecture Circa 1640-1757" in Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 95-114, Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 101.

³²⁹ Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , p. 101.

³³⁰ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , p. 77.

³³¹ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 09.

³³² Watson. I. B, op. cit. , pp. 71-72.

³³³ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 45.

Marathi threat and control did not miss the English commercial operations in Surat and on the Malabar Coast in the 1670s. Marathi threat against the Presidency of Madras grew over time so that in 1677, when the Marathas had conquered the Mughal region of the Carnatic, insecurity induced the Presidency to offer the Marathi leader, Sivadji, gifts as a way of ingratiating. And yet, that Marathi conquest caused inhibition to the company trade of pepper, gingham, and calico. This antagonistic atmosphere soon reached the Presidency of Bengal which, owing to Afghan forays into it, obtained from the Bengali Nawab the permission of raising Fort William at Calcutta.³³⁴ As a result, the company budget on its forts had gone up to one million pounds by 1698.³³⁵ Chaudhuri's version matches with these above facts as follows:

*The foundation of Mughal rule in Bengal was suddenly shaken by a serious local rebellion in 1696. The military danger from the rebel forces induced the Mughal governor to allow the European Companies to erect some fortification to protect their factories. Out of this 'large liberty' came the walls of Fort William.*³³⁶

The awkwardness presented by company fortification was chiefly economic. Maintaining the balance between trade profits and fortification charges became increasingly problematic. It is estimated that factory necessities and talks with the Indian authorities set the company back £ 300,000 in 1681 while the building of forts and castles with the provision of military material absorbed £ 100,000 annually.³³⁷ One may argue that this financial imbalance was rendered more critical from 1680 by a Mughal rise in the company customs dues on imported commodities. It is said that Emperor Aurangzeb increased these dues from two to three and half per cent.³³⁸

³³⁴ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 10, 13.

³³⁵ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , p. 73.

³³⁶ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 53.

³³⁷ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , pp. 72-73.

³³⁸ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 08.

English fortification equally helped the development of a sense of mutual solidarity as well as collaboration in favour of English presence. Being targeted by that Indian civil war in the 1660s and 1670s, the company enjoyed courtesy of its dispersed highly-armed forts a certain native alignment. The applied strategy was offering safety and protection to Indian merchants being persecuted by the rising Marathas.³³⁹ It is claimed that many of those who had solicited the English forts for the salvation of their souls and estates had it.³⁴⁰

This strategy was limited as most Indian merchants facing that danger preferred not to join the English but to assume the consequences of Mughal-Marathas conflict; however, those who resorted to and sided with the English added in the strength of the company.³⁴¹ Militarily speaking, the company found allies against her local enemies, such as the *Parsis* resisting the Mughal General Sidi Yakut Khan who attempted to invade the city of Bombay in its early time.³⁴² Economically speaking, Chaudhuri observes that native industrialists were definitely concerned by company fortification since the improved security afforded by the English company caused the development and concentration of their activities mainly in the English-fortified urban areas. There, too, all the English factories and the whole Indian industrial commercial network cooperating with the English were situated.³⁴³ It is claimed, as a case in point, that the fortified city of Madras, which owed its existence to the presence therein of the Tamil weaving caste, had this native social category, specialised in the production of chintz, coming and settling down there. It may be argued that these facts supported the economy of Madras since chintz was then the main export commodity of the region.³⁴⁴

What increased the confidence of these native refugees in the company was the English company's constant denial of any evangelizing planning contrarily to the Dutch and the Portuguese. Actually, to gain social support, the English company

³³⁹ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 47.

³⁴⁰ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , pp. 82-83.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Mitter. P, op. cit. , p. 102.

³⁴³ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 46.

³⁴⁴ Mitter. P, op. cit. , p. 96.

highly vocalised its intention not to interfere in the Indian convictions and kept debarring Christianising missionaries from residing in its settlements.³⁴⁵ As such, the English company could tactically get an economic advantage over its European rivals by preserving its opportunities for profit while the Portuguese power in India was declining due to its Christianizing character.³⁴⁶ As this religious-liberty restriction was maintained, it increasingly caused the attraction of indigenous Hindu traders to the English settlements and thus favoured English pre-eminence in Indian trade as the English, and later the British, were reckoned as trustful.³⁴⁷ Newitt confirms the utility of this preventive policy in these following words:

*As the English had no intention of trying to spread their religion, they were not initially seen by Asian rulers as subversive of local loyalties and were able to build up a network of political and commercial alliances which successfully challenged the established networks of the Portuguese.*³⁴⁸

Probably more important was the precedent whereby the English company became in position to collect taxes and customs for the purpose of fortification and protection from the natives in Bombay and Madras, and later on in Calcutta being toughened with Fort William.³⁴⁹ So, availing themselves of that growing internal anarchy, the English began affecting the traditional pattern of the Mughal society by acting as a hired bodyguard challenging both central and regional authorities for popular alliance and finance.³⁵⁰

Having some Indian people as allies, the English company could exploit them as a continual money resource for fortifying provisions in all its major Indian settlements. Although fortification expenditure tended to exceed the funds collected

³⁴⁵ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 47.

³⁴⁶ Strong. R, 2007, Anglicanism and the British Empire c. 1700-1850, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 121.

³⁴⁷ Ames. G. J, 2003, "The Role of Religion in the Transfer and Rise of Bombay, c. 1661-1687" in The Historical Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 317-340, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 318.

³⁴⁸ Newitt. M, op. cit. , p. 190.

³⁴⁹ Mitter. P, op. cit. , pp. 96, 102.

³⁵⁰ Watson. I. B, op. cit. , pp. 82-83.

from the Indian ratepayers, these swelling funds became of crucial importance mainly during company crises. Reported figures reveal that Fort George had accumulated £ 2,903 by 1679 and £ 16,285 by 1697 meanwhile Fort David in Cuddalore had gathered £ 11,996. As for Bombay, it had amassed £ 6,490 by 1667, £ 8,983 by 1675, and £ 12,717 by 1686. Between 1694 and 1703, revenues raised by Fort William grew from £ 165 to £ 1,940.³⁵¹

In brief, the English armed-fortification policy in pre-colonial India developed in defence of English-trade interests and in offence against the Indian State. That policy signified an aspect of English semi-sovereignty there, which was achieved with the help of local autochthons.

1.3- Early Indian Cooperation and Company Anglicization

Alongside all aforementioned Indian cooperation with the English company went on other forms of native cooperation adding much to English influence in pre-colonial India. The company is claimed to have met with crucial responsiveness from different elements of the Indian society, which favoured the initiation of English westernisation therein.³⁵²

According to Chaudhuri, that cooperation occurred in terms of mediation and coordination between company traders, Indian industrial or agrarian producers, and Indian marketers acting as investing financiers.³⁵³ In this respect, an Indian merchant body came to assure the provision of local goods for the company and the sale of company-imported ones.³⁵⁴ The company permanent reliance on this mediation was due to three gaps in the company's competency viz. its ignorance of the Indian languages, its lacking of direct contact with local supply sources, and its regular shortage of cash. The company is said to have recruited *dubhashis* being polyglot interpreters using English and Portuguese with the company traders and Persian or

³⁵¹ Ibid. , pp. 84-85.

³⁵² Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , pp. 103-104.

³⁵³ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 7.

³⁵⁴ Stein. B, op. cit. , p. 201.

an Indian language with their fellow citizens.³⁵⁵ The company benefited from those local investing financiers as lending bankers whose loans were earmarked for the procurement of spices and textiles, at an initial period, and cotton, indigo, and opium at a later stage. Besides, within the whole coordinating circle operated clusters of weavers, craftsmen, and village headmen supervising the cultivation of needed raw materials.³⁵⁶ Chatterjee agrees with this as follows:

The introduction of English education into India illustrates two civilizations coming into contact, one acting on, the other acted upon. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, when the topic of introducing English education into India became an important issue in England, a native elite already existed in India, speaking English and, by virtue of a knowledge of English, working in the offices, factories, and warehouses of the East India Company. For them, English was not an unknown language, but was, rather, an exciting new language that afforded them intellectual as well as commercial contacts with the British. Their numbers were increasing rapidly.³⁵⁷

Chaudhuri states that Anglo-Indian transaction was lying on a complex Indian cycle stretching lengthily from the producing points to the supplying ones, which manifested the Indian will to make favourable arrangements and give specific services.³⁵⁸ In his discussion of the diversity of this Indian cooperation with the English in Gujarat, Maloni puts these ensuing words:

The system of production and distribution involved a large number of interdependent functionaries. A multitude of Indians, ranging from royal notables and administrative officials to interpreters and transporters were connected

³⁵⁵ Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , p. 103.

³⁵⁶ Stein. B, op. cit. , p. 201.

³⁵⁷ Chatterjee. K. K, 1975, "The Renaissance Analogy and English Education in Nineteenth-Century India" in The Journal of General Education, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 309-319, State College, Pennsylvania, Penn State University Press, p. 309.

³⁵⁸ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 46.

*with commercial activities. A balance of forces was constructed. Multi-cultural exchange was already a fact of life in the Indian Ocean.*³⁵⁹

According to Datta, the Indian cooperates of the English company in Bengal inherently included brokers, known as *dalals*, to whom money was advanced being called *dadni* in reference to the *dadni* system³⁶⁰. Thus, company merchants could buy Indian commodities on the basis of a contractual right to their reception from Indian intermediaries.³⁶¹ Maloni confirms the advantageousness of this interaction as follows:

*Contact with artisans was largely through brokers who arranged matters and established links with a wide network of inland production centres. For the Europeans, these agents were indispensable as they could procure commodities of the right quality, at the right price and at the right time. The collection of piece goods for export required an elaborate organization. To ensure a steady supply, money was advanced to the weavers which was the broker's function. The English paid a commission of approximately 3 per cent on all sales and purchases.*³⁶²

According to Roy, the first social Indian category to learn and practise English was such collaborators vital for the company's success as a commercial institution. For *dadnis*, going between the company and the local producers of muslins and calicoes, *dobhassis*, acting as interpreters, and *munshis*, serving as secretaries and clerks, English was not only a language of enlightenment but also

³⁵⁹ Maloni. R, op. cit. , pp. 64-65.

³⁶⁰ The *dadni* system was developed by the English in Bengal as elsewhere in India for about one hundred years. This system rested on a contracted convention according to which an Indian merchant being given a deposit would manage the purchase, conveyance, and delivery to the British company of precise amounts of Indian-made goods to be procured from one manufacturing centre. This system was replaced in 1753 by the *gomasta* one under which a *gomasta*, being a company broker too, was to fetch such goods from different producing centres locally known as *aurangs*. Chaudhury. S, 1988, "Merchants, Companies and Rulers: Bengal in the Eighteenth Century" in *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 74-109, Leiden, Brill, jstor.org/stable/3631766, pp. 75, 85.

³⁶¹ Datta. K. K, op. cit. , p. 313.

³⁶² Maloni. R, op. cit. , pp. 78-79.

the preferred vehicle of daily communication. In 1673 only, James Rennell, the company's Surveyor-General, put the approximate number of company *dobhassis* in Bengal alone to one thousand. Furthermore, it was from the mid-nineteenth century that the company began recruiting English-speaking *gomastas*, which significantly widened Indian participation in company affairs. Company *gomastas* assumed a series of responsibilities including collecting land revenues, keeping financial records, negotiating terms with Mughal authorities, and even taking care of households.³⁶³

One may claim that the English company was wise in its recruitment of all those English-speaking agents. It is said that they were selected on account of recognised education among rural natives who, rich or not, preferred access to the British institution centralised in cities as Calcutta and Madras.³⁶⁴

But, the early Indian support of the British did not play out only on the commercial ground but also on the military as well as domestic ones whereby early Anglicization in India was also to operate. Actually, from the early eighteenth century, so many Indians either in the soldierly or housekeeping service of the British company fell into British acculturation and became Anglophone for practical purposes. It is acknowledged that by 1750 Anglicisation in pre-colonial India had spanned four generations of native maids and militias being under the employment of the company.³⁶⁵ In Barbour's opinion, the genesis of this acculturation, which would develop over time in the nineteenth century, is to be spotted in 1607-08. The author claims that the London expedition to India in that period exported thereto the English canon which would end as an instrument in the process of English colonisation and Anglicisation.³⁶⁶

Though English was not to become an official language to India's commerce and administration until around the mid-nineteenth century, company Anglicisation

³⁶³ Roy. M, op. cit. , p. 90.

³⁶⁴ Ibid. , pp. 88, 90.

³⁶⁵ Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , pp. 104-105.

³⁶⁶ Barbour. R, op. cit. , pp. 255-256.

is said to have been developed well before then. The English company showed its earliest determination to introduce English education to its Indian settlements and presidencies at the issuance of the Charter of 1698 vesting the project in special private evangelist groups. The intention of that was to spread the Christian faith by means of the English language, which would turn out to be a success especially in Madras and Bengal where respectively the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and the Baptist Missionaries Society founded schools.³⁶⁷

From around the mid-eighteenth century, it was those anglicised native militias, constituting crown brigades, who were responsible, together with white regiments, for the formation and holding of Britain's Indian empire.³⁶⁸

Throughout the eighteenth century, a tendency towards Anglo-Indian personal relationship was gathering momentum, cordiality having been shown in employing Indian labour.³⁶⁹ Friendship between the two peoples developed within and outside the context of business and armed forces, going even to the point of inter-marriage. In Mc Dowell's view, the Indian citizens were generally not antagonistic to the English but rather submissive accepting them just as an element within their non-homogeneous Hindustani culture.³⁷⁰ That friendship, brought into being by the indispensable English need for hiring native hands and heads and a certain native dependency on the company for safety and protection, created a breeding space for acculturation. The latter phenomenon was also aided by Indian writers whose much-read literary productions in English and Western-intellect growth were animated by their avowed penchant for the English culture.³⁷¹

The Anglicisation of eighteenth-century India was enacted as a planned project of its own. Dharwadker notes that the Indians were assimilating the English language and culture courtesy of English, Scottish, Irish, and American missionaries whose task was not without strong durable impact on the learners. Furthermore,

³⁶⁷ Roy. M, op. cit. , p. 88.

³⁶⁸ Stein. B, op. cit. , p. 202.

³⁶⁹ Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , pp. 109-110.

³⁷⁰ Mc Dowall. D, 2008, An Illustrated History of Britain, Essex, Longman Group, p. 110.

³⁷¹ Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , pp. 109-110.

later in the nineteenth century, it would be for the schools and colleges established by those early missionaries to rank as the most influential English-using institutions in the colonial education of British India.³⁷²

For the sake of company trade interests, English pre-colonial westernisation in India came not only in terms of English-language teaching but also in urbanizing ones still through local participation. It is noted that the Anglicisation of India between 1640 and 1757 involved the conception of port cities being typically European in style but entirely Indian in stone working. Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta were of English devising but of Indian hand constructing, a union of masterminds that went into making defence the primary amenity of those growing cities.³⁷³

This section only goes to show that company anglicising efforts could not suffice on their own to make economic success. Indian willingness to serve the English commercially, administratively, and militarily and to espouse the English culture was decidedly conducive to advancement in English business in pre-nineteenth-century India.

2. The Rise of British Hegemony in India

Reading different writers, one may deduce that the progressive political, military, and economic reinforcement of English presence in India before the nineteenth century acted as the basis of the westernising mission being ahead.

2.1- Inducing Circumstances

By virtue of its fortification policy, the British company was not only to fall into the practice of defence and offence but also into the continual aspiration for

³⁷² Ibid. , p. 109.

³⁷³ Mitter. P, op. cit. , pp. 95, 96, 102.

uncontrolled gain of power in north eastern India, which went into other bilateral frictions and eventual resolutions.³⁷⁴

Prior to 1757, the British company felt the growing need for political command over India so as to make Indian goods more easily affordable and to curb long-lasting rivalry emanating from the other European peoples. The Dutch and the French were active traders in the Indian market, too.³⁷⁵ The British would in general show no retreating before Indian or European antagonism as their economic interests and military power overwhelmingly grew over time.³⁷⁶ For instance, whereas the French imports from India between 1728 and 1740 rose ten times in value amounting to £ 880,000, the British ones reached then £ 1,795,000.³⁷⁷

According to Stein, many historians hold a consensual view that the rise of British hegemony in north eastern India was necessitated by a political disorder that endangered British presence therein.³⁷⁸

That political disorder had its roots in the rule of the deceased Mughal emperor Aurangzeb.³⁷⁹ Being a dictator, Aurangzeb is said to have dragged the Indian Empire into constant multi-sided belligerence at the cost of its administrative and economic stability.³⁸⁰ His aspiration for keeping under his umbrella the Deccan, the Marathas, and the southern Muslim kingdoms drove him to long ruining fighting involving despotic depredation against the Hindus.³⁸¹ For instance, the Hindus are said to have been unfairly taxed, being obliged to pay the *Jizya*³⁸², which made them pay twice as much as the Muslim Indians did on the

³⁷⁴ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , pp. 52-53.

³⁷⁵ Spear. P, 2000, Robert, Lord Clive, and India, New York, Bell and Howell Information and Learning Company, pp. 39-40.

³⁷⁶ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 1.

³⁷⁷ Spear. P, op. cit. , p. 40.

³⁷⁸ Stein. B, op. cit. , p. 196.

³⁷⁹ Shelvankar. K. S, 1940, The Problem of India, New York, Penguin, p. 147.

³⁸⁰ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 88.

³⁸¹ Nicolle. D and McBride. A, 1993, Mughul India 1504-1761, London, Reed International Books Limited, pp. 4-6.

³⁸² The Jizya was a poll tax described as unjust since levied only on Hindus. Its collection piled millions of Rupees extorted from farmers. Johnston. C, 1909, "The English in India", in The North American Review, Vol. 189, No. 642, pp. 695-707, Iowa, University of Northern Iowa, p. 706.

same goods.³⁸³ Aurangzeb's reimposition and promotion of the *Jizya* from 1679 escalated the hostility of Hindu kingdoms such as the Rajputs and the Marathas. As a result, a Hindu revolt was taking place against the Mughal centralized government.³⁸⁴

Aurangzeb's policies of regional annexation and discrimination against the Hindu community entailed widespread unrest within his empire, going into many tumultuous rebellions. Several states under the imperial umbrella were claiming their independence from Delhi. Aurangzeb kept taxing his subjects and fighting the dissenting factions. Consequently, a large part of the Indian population was not only discontented but also pauperized.³⁸⁵

The link between this whole anarchical situation and the British company was that the resulting gradual decline of the Mughal Empire, particularly from Aurangzeb's death in 1707, would jeopardize Anglo-Indian trade. The English company, which had been maintaining its profitable presence in the Indian sub-continent as the *protégée* of the Indian supreme ruler since the early seventeenth century, fell now dependent on the local regional chiefs and kings.³⁸⁶ These southern military powers would avail themselves to free and extend their states combating each other for supremacy and Islamisation.³⁸⁷ In fact, a new internal geography was to appear with the emergence of new principalities including Mysore, Hyderabad, Sind, and Punjab hostile to the British company.³⁸⁸

Johnston reports that the Maratha Confederacy in the south and the Sikhs in the north, being mostly discordant with the Mughal union, were barbarically protesting against the Muslim Indians. It is stated that those dissenting provinces

³⁸³ Encyclopaedia Britannica Incorporate, 1974, Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia Knowledge in Depth, 15th Edition, Vol. 3, Chicago, University of Chicago, pp. 372-373.

³⁸⁴ Chandra. S, 1969, "Jizyah and the State in India during the 17TH Century" in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 322-340, Leiden, Brill, pp. 322, 331.

³⁸⁵ Bayly. C. A, 1988, The New Cambridge History of India, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire, Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, pp. 7, 8.

³⁸⁶ Webster. A, 2007, The Richest East India Merchant-The Life and Business of John Palmer of Calcutta 1767-1836, New York, The Boydell Press, p. 6.

³⁸⁷ Washbrook. D, op. cit. , pp. 500, 501, 504.

³⁸⁸ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 36.

bore no sense of humanism or co-existence; in that, while the Marathas, led by Sivaji, gained a notoriety as the homeland of robbers, the Sikhs, led by Banda, were being dubbed a killing-machine.³⁸⁹ So, the British were constantly afraid this civil instability would affect or stem their trading activities, which impelled them to take part in the competition for political power in India.³⁹⁰ According to Brown, it was against their volition that the British now saw forcible territorial acquisition as the means of providing security to their profitable business.³⁹¹ Marx sums up the whole situation as follows:

The power of the Viceroy was broken by the Mahrattas. The power of the Mahrattas was broken by the Afghans, and while all were struggling against all, the Briton rushed in and was enabled to subdue them all. A country not only divided between Mahomedan and Hindoo, but between tribe and tribe, between caste and caste; a society whose framework was based on a sort of equilibrium, resulting from a general repulsion and constitutional exclusiveness between all its members. Such a country and such a society, were they not the predestined prey of conquest? ³⁹²

That political disorder following Aurangzeb's demise brought a series of changes against the British company. For instance, in 1740, being xenophobic towards the Europeans, Alivardi Khan, Governor of Bengal, was no longer willing to apply in full the *Farman*³⁹³ principles. The latter, having been attributed by Emperor Farrukhsiyar in 1717, included the privilege of company officials to declare through written recommendations, known as *Dastacks*, British goods free from control and taxation within Bengal. And in return, company officials were

³⁸⁹ Johnston. C, op. cit. , pp. 5, 6.

³⁹⁰ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 36.

³⁹¹ Brown. R, op. cit. , p. 23.

³⁹² Marx. K, 1853, "The Future Results of British Rule in India" in The New-York Daily Tribune, Vol. 12, No. 856, p. 217, New York, MECW, p. 217.

³⁹³ *Farmans* were official permissions sold by the Mughal Emperor or a king of a regional state for foreigners to be present and trade somewhere in the empire of India. Adams. N. L and Adams. D. M., 1971, "An examination of some forces affecting English educational policies in India 1780–1850" in History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 157–73, Hoboken, Wiley, p. 159.

required to pay 3000 Rupees annually to the emperor. Although this privilege had been officially repealed by Alivardi Khan, British merchants could still spare taxes and make profits by bribing the local authorities.³⁹⁴

From here rose another causative factor to the coming on of English hegemony in north eastern India. According to Metcalfs, mounting dissension between the British and the Indian authorities was due to increasing abuse from around 1740 on the part of the British company. Being so attached to their economic ambitions, company officials kept angering the Bengali authorities spurring them into a reaction that would entail drastic consequences from 1757.³⁹⁵ The eventual British appropriation of Indian governance in 1757, involving violence, negotiation, and cunning, is said to have come about out of self-defence stirred up by a desire for vengeance.³⁹⁶

In 1756, the company was blamed by the newly-enthroned *nawab* of Bengal, Siraj Ud Daula, for its recent extension of its fortification in Calcutta and systematic abuse of its traditional trade privileges.³⁹⁷ In that, the company was found guilty of selling free trade passes to Indian favourites trading in grain and other goods.³⁹⁸ Regarding these acts as a flouting to his authority, Ud Daula required the company to reduce its fortification in the city on the ground that company officials were conspiring against both the Bengali and imperial governments. He also accused the company of giving refuge to a dissident member of the Bengali *nawab* family hostile to the Islamic Mughal rule.³⁹⁹

These circumstances and the British noncompliance with Ud Daula's request are said to have had an echo that triggered off heavy confrontation leading to a radical change in the nature of British presence in Bengal. Ud Daula seized

³⁹⁴ Hejeebu. S, op. cit. , p. 516.

³⁹⁵ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , pp. 51-53.

³⁹⁶ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 92.

³⁹⁷ Spear. P, op. cit. , p. 42.

³⁹⁸ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T, op. cit. , p. 51.

³⁹⁹ Johnston. C, op. cit. , p. 700.

Calcutta, forced its British governor to flee, robbed British treasure, and for the Black Hole⁴⁰⁰ rendered himself accountable.⁴⁰¹

As a result, the British would rise in arms under the leadership of Robert Clive⁴⁰² to restore the status quo. Coming with troops from Madras, he succeeded by a treaty not only in reinstating the company's trading privileges in Bengal but also in getting permission from the nawab to keep fortifying the city and to coin money.⁴⁰³

However, not content with this settlement, Clive set planning another action against Ud Daula due to the unstable situation the company was in. The company servants were dispirited, the nawab's power was precarious, and the French still held a powerful base in Chandernagar not far from Calcutta. Clive feared the French would combine with the nawab to oppose the company.⁴⁰⁴ So, the colonel resolved to overthrow the *nawab*, which called into play further native collaboration.⁴⁰⁵ Clive made his conspiracy with the help of Indian statesmen opposed to Ud Daula including influential bankers from the Jagat Seths family.⁴⁰⁶ The company had reached in mid-1757 a compromise with an aspirant to the nawabi throne, General Mir Jafar, according to which his troops would capitulate prematurely and even shoot the anti-British troops. In return, Mir Jafar would accede to the Bengali throne, and his soldiers would receive bribes. It may be noteworthy to mention that Clive's army, consisting only of 800 European men,

⁴⁰⁰ The Black Hole is an incident that occurred in besieged Calcutta in 1756, in which most of a hundred and forty six company residents imprisoned by the officials of Ud Daula in an eighteen-foot square room during a hot summer night were found the following day dead of suffocation. The British saw themselves victimized by this act which they regarded as barbarous and deserving sanction. Meiklejohn. M. J. C, 1902, The British Colonies and Dependencies, London, Holden, p. 24.

⁴⁰¹ Spear. P, op. cit. , pp. 42, 45.

⁴⁰² Robert Clive (1725-1774) was a British key-figure in the rise of British hegemony in north eastern India. Having led the company armed forces to triumph at the battle of Plassey in 1757 and to the conquest of Bengal, he then assumed the governorship of the latter province. Lenman. B and Lawson. P, 1983, "Robert Clive, the 'Black Jagir', and British Politics" in The Historical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 04, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, jstor.org/stable/2639285, pp. 802, 803.

⁴⁰³ Spear. P, op. cit. , p. 42.

⁴⁰⁴ Sanyal. S, 2008, The Indian Renaissance, India's Rise after a Thousand Years of Decline, Singapore, World Scientific, pp. 203, 204.

⁴⁰⁵ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 92.

⁴⁰⁶ Bayly. C. A, op. cit. , p. 50.

was supported by 2,200 native men.⁴⁰⁷ This fact is a further indication of the existence of military association between the British and the Indians before nineteenth-century British westernisation in India began.

To round up, by the eighteenth century, the British had become so committed to Bengal's trade that they would care at any cost for their interests in that richest province of India no matter how hostile the political environment was.⁴⁰⁸ Combined together, British military superiority, Indian central and regional political infirmity, and European rivalling ambitions for power and profit around there offered the British company an impetus to attain supremacy in north eastern India.⁴⁰⁹

2.2- The Aftermath of the Plassey Victory

The British triumph at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 marked a milestone in the Anglo-Indian relationship, bringing about for the British company first-time advantages affecting the traditional political pattern of Mughal India and enlarging the scope of nineteenth-century colonial Anglicisation.⁴¹⁰

Before that victory, the company had already had many successes to its credit. Between 1608 and 1611, did it not guarantee high trade profitability by making Surat a trade transit point and the Bengali town of Machilipatam its first factory ? On account of its victory at Swally in 1612 and the inception of the Anglo-Indian diplomatic relationship in 1615, did it not go on gaining territorial footholds in mainland India, which went into the establishment of other trading posts in Madras in 1639 ? And in 1727, did it not lay the foundations of a pre-colonial judicial system by establishing the *Mayor Court* for civil litigation in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras ?⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁷ Riddick. J. F. op. cit. , p. 15.

⁴⁰⁸ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 55.

⁴⁰⁹ Thiessen. J, op. cit. , pp. 26, 27.

⁴¹⁰ Bryant. G. J, 2004, "Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India" in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 431-469, Lexington, Society for Military History, p. 448.

⁴¹¹ Hejeebu. S, op. cit. , p. 504.

But, one may argue that the British victory at Plassey in 1757, with little bloodshed in the British side, was crucially higher than all these above achievements. This victory came as an episode in which the British permanently established their military primacy in the north east of India.⁴¹² Besides, the state-monopolized trade in a range of valuable goods, including salt, betel nut, tobacco, and saltpetre, was soon transferred from the Bengali nawab to the British company.⁴¹³ Furthermore, that victory raised the British, under Clive, to the position of king-maker in the region: they had been able to coronate Mir Jafar in 1757 and could dethrone him three years later in favour of another puppet called Mir Kassim, the latter being comparatively more supportive to their colonial cause.⁴¹⁴ Yet, before his dethronement, Mir Jafar had enlarged the company's territorial possession by ceding to it the nearby region of the Twenty-Four Parganas in 1758.⁴¹⁵ British supremacy was further confirmed two years later when the Dutch attempted to destabilize the British successful position in Bengal. Taking Mir Jafar's dependence on Clive as an opportunity to collude against the British company, the Dutch sent from Batavia, in the East Indies, to Chinsura a military expedition that Clive reduced to wreckage. As a result, the Dutch were doomed to disappear from Indian politics for good.⁴¹⁶ British primacy is corroborated by Chaudhuri's words running as follows:

*The Battle of Plassey and the revolution of 1757, which changed a company of merchants into a powerful territorial force with unexpected swiftness and settled once for all the question the chief minister of the nawab of Bengal had rhetorically put before the English Council at Calcutta twelve years earlier: who should govern the province – the English or the nawab.*⁴¹⁷

⁴¹² Webster. A, op. cit. , p. 7.

⁴¹³ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 53.

⁴¹⁴ Bryant. G. J, op. cit. , pp. 432, 448, 450.

⁴¹⁵ Travers. T. R, 2004, "The Real Value of the Lands': The Nawabs, the British and the Land Tax in Eighteenth-Century Bengal" in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 517-558, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 526.

⁴¹⁶ Spear. P, op. cit. , p. 44.

⁴¹⁷ Chaudhuri. K. N, 1978, op. cit. , p. 20.

Actually, caring for its capitalist interests, the British company stopped being a mere concession-begging organism and rose as a colonizer capable to dictate its own economic and political wishes on Bengal.⁴¹⁸ According to Mitter, the British victory at Plassey entailed a radical change in Anglo-Indian relationship; in that, it announced the foundation of the British empire in India.⁴¹⁹ This was to trigger off an enduring process of exploitation that would increasingly enrich both the company's home country and the company's servants through exaction and plunder. In other words, that victory was to permit the making of both public and private wealth.⁴²⁰ In this context, just between 1765 and 1769, the Royal Exchequer benefited from £ 2 million, which made British India much more profitable than British America.⁴²¹ As for private wealth, it was the swelling pockets of the *nabobs*⁴²² including Clive and his high officials.⁴²³

Moreover, the 1757 victory would bring about a constant increase in the exportation of British-made items to India, too.⁴²⁴ And so would be the case for the company exportation of Indian-made products to Britain, which meant an increase in company profits. Estimates put the cost of company cargoes shipped from India or China at £ 911,039 in 1764 and at £ 1,841,838 in 1770.⁴²⁵ The company textiles exports from India grew in pieces from over 470,192 in 1759 to over 928,429 in

⁴¹⁸ Robinson. F, 1989, The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of India, Sydney, Cambridge University Press, pp. 110, 111.

⁴¹⁹ Mitter. P, op. cit. , p. 95.

⁴²⁰ Lenman. B and Lawson. P, op. cit. , p. 803.

⁴²¹ Marshall. P. J, 1987, The New Cambridge History of India, Bengal: The British Bridgehead, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 121.

⁴²² *Nabobs* were servants or shareholders to the British East India Company, who blatantly became rich through plunder and bribe-receiving after the company subjugation of north eastern India in 1757 such as Lord Clive and Lord Sandwich. The latter, for example, was getting Indian diamonds he brought to the British king. Philips. C. H, 1948, "Clive in the English Political World, 1761-1764" in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3/4, pp. 695-702, London, Cambridge University Press, pp. 695, 696.

⁴²³ Fisher. M. H, 2007, "From India to England and Back: Early Indian Travel Narratives for Indian Readers" in Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 153-172, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 906-907.

⁴²⁴ Bowen. H. V, 2002, "Sinews of Trade and Empire: The Supply of Commodity Exports to the East India Company during the Late Eighteenth Century" in The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 466-486, Hoboken, Wiley, pp. 466, 469.

⁴²⁵ Marshall. P. J, op. cit. , p. 122.

1771.⁴²⁶ In the following passage, Datta claims that the British company became the mistress of Bengali trade:

The nature of India's European trade was different from that of the pre-Plassey period. The political triumphs of the English in India over their European rivals, the French and the Dutch, and their successes in Bengal and elsewhere between 1757 and 1765, placed this trade to a large extent under their control. Growing political supremacy of the English in Bengal and some other parts of India placed them in a position highly favourable to the establishment of their monopolistic control over India's trade, industry, and economic resources.”⁴²⁷

The consequences of the British victory at Plassey added much to the feasibility of the forthcoming westernisation of the colony. González and Hsu, analysing the promotion of Western higher education in nineteenth-century British India, attribute the capacity of the British to fulfil this mission to the former English fortification works as well as to the British victory at Plassey, followed by the rise of British military hegemony in north eastern India.⁴²⁸

According to Shelvankar, India was thereafter rendered a major financier to Britain's industrial capitalism, guaranteeing high exportable fortunes while the metropolis was being the scene of the Industrial Revolution⁴²⁹ calling profusely for funds.⁴³⁰ Consequently, Bengal, being now under British rule and freed from French

⁴²⁶ Broadberry. S and Gupta. B, op. cit. , p. 33.

⁴²⁷ Datta. K. K, op. cit. , pp. 315-316.

⁴²⁸ González. C and Hsu. F, op. cit. , pp. 7, 8.

⁴²⁹ The Industrial Revolution is an economic process beginning in England around 1765 and characterized by the gradual promotion of machinery in all the manufacturing sectors of the country. Technical innovations, an increase in the use of both raw material brought from India and local manpower, industrial specialisation and concentration, and fuel utilization were all supported by capital investment. In the nineteenth century, Britain rose consequently as the supreme economic power of the world. Asselain. J. C, 2009, “Révolution industrielle” in Les Essentielles d'Universalis, Economie et société, Vol. 19, pp. 531-546, Paris, Encyclopædia Universalis, pp. 531-535.

⁴³⁰ Shelvankar. K. S, pp. 148, 150.

and Dutch intervention, would keep acting as a magnet attracting workers and servants from Great Britain on a larger scale.⁴³¹

In this respect, the company would gradually expand its Indian territorial footholds in north eastern India and ultimately appropriate supreme authority to extort money at an unprecedented scale.⁴³² That was the case of the Bengali districts of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong seized by 1760 by treaty with the Bengali *nawab*.⁴³³

One of the main advantages the company realized thanks to Clive's 1757 victory was the deletion of the long-lasting silver trade system.⁴³⁴ It was no longer necessary for England to export bullion to Bengal in order to pay for Indian items apart from some marginal amounts.⁴³⁵ From 1765 onwards, nearly all British payments would be effected rather by means of territorial-tax revenues.⁴³⁶ Indeed, it is said that in 1765 the company obtained from the declining Mughal imperial government the *dewani*⁴³⁷ of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa—the official power of gathering land taxes in these three provinces.⁴³⁸ Johnston implies that the advantage of that acquisition resided precisely in the large population number of these regions being then around 30.000.000 in aggregate.⁴³⁹ Walsh puts the profitability of Bengal's land revenues alone at 30 million rupees per annum, which ably

⁴³¹ Mc Dowall. D, op. cit. , pp. 109-110.

⁴³² Bowen. H. V, 1989, "Investment and Empire in the Later Eighteenth Century: East India Stockholding, 1756-1791" in The Economic History Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 186-206, Hoboken, Wiley, pp. 187, 193.

⁴³³ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 16.

⁴³⁴ Bayly. C. A, op. cit. , p. 49.

⁴³⁵ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 94.

⁴³⁶ Marshall. P. J, op. cit. , p. 122.

⁴³⁷ *Diwani*, the right to regional land revenue collection, was taken over from the Indian authorities upon the battle of Buxar in which Clive had defeated the Mughal army of Emperor Shah Alam in 1764. That settlement together with the military supremacy of the British company in north east India since its victory at Plassey meant that the company became now the fiscal controller of the area. As for the *nawab* of Bengal, he was reduced to a puppet ruler responsible for native justice and order. Mukherjee. M, 2005, "Justice, War, and the Imperium: India and Britain in Edmund Burke's Prosecutorial Speeches in the Impeachment Trial of Warren Hastings" in Law and History Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 589-630, New York, American Society for Legal History, pp. 603-604.

⁴³⁸ Vella. S, 2000, "Imagining Empire: Company, Crown and Bengal in the Formation of British Imperial Ideology, 1757-84" in Portuguese Studies, Vol. 16, pp. 276-297, London, Modern Humanities Research Association, p. 276.

⁴³⁹ Johnston. C, op. cit. , p. 702.

covered a variety of company costs.⁴⁴⁰ As for the yearly land revenues from the three regions as a whole, they are estimated to something varying between 2 and 4 million pounds sterling.⁴⁴¹ Besides, it is stated that those land-tax revenues were not only meant for the British payment of Indian goods and services but also collected at British-fixed rate.⁴⁴²

Thus, one infers that the company, being offered such a multitude of ratepayers, was now to act as the fiscal representative of central government in north eastern India. What came to consolidate this new financial position is that Clive, becoming governor of Bengal, ratified, under the terms of the 1765 peace negotiations following the battle of Buxar, the company power of appointing the Bengali nawab.⁴⁴³ A century later, the company administrator John Stuart Mill would affirm that those land tax revenues, going also to colonial public expenditures, made up nearly two-thirds of all the incomes of British India.⁴⁴⁴ Actually, by the end of the nineteenth century, Indian land taxation had been so developed that it became one of the two most important financial sources of the colony.⁴⁴⁵ This profitability is acknowledged by Marshall as follows:

*Robert Clive signed the treaty of Allahabad by which the Mughal emperor transferred the diwani and with it effective possession of the huge province of Bengal to the East India Company. No one could doubt the scale of what had been acquired in so short a time in terms of land, people or resources. The Bengal peasant had up to one-third or even more of the yield of his land extracted from him in taxation. This was the famous revenue of Bengal.*⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁰ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 94.

⁴⁴¹ Bowen. H. V, 1989, op. cit. , p. 187.

⁴⁴² Desousa. V, 2008, "Strategies of Control: the Case of British India" in Sociological Viewpoints, Vol. 24, pp. 61-74, Edinboro, Pennsylvania Sociological Society, pasocsociety.org/article5-desousa.pdf, p. 63.

⁴⁴³ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , pp. 93-94.

⁴⁴⁴ Mill. J. S, 1858, Memorandum of the Improvements in the Administration of India during the Last Thirty Years, and the Petition of the East India Company to Parliament, London, Allen & Co, p. 20.

⁴⁴⁵ Winther. P. C, 2003, Anglo-European Science and the Rhetoric of Empire, Malaria, Opium, and British Rule in India , 1756-1895, Lanham, Lexington Books, p. 26.

⁴⁴⁶ Marshall. P. J, op. cit. , pp. 111, 120.

What rendered more advantageous the political ascendance of the British company in Bengal is the economic ascendance of the region.⁴⁴⁷ The company became the supreme ruler of the then wealthiest Indian province.⁴⁴⁸ Both Metcalfs state that the Bengali participation in all Anglo-Indian trade went so high to account for 75 per cent of all company-purchased Indian-made commodities by 1750.⁴⁴⁹ Actually, before the British victory at Plassey, there had occurred a change in the localisation of British economic activity in India since Bengal had supplanted other Indian economic centres such as Gujarat, Bombay, and Madras. Comparative statistics on Indian-made textiles exports to Britain give some examples. In 1759, whereas Madras and Bombay together provided over 162,000 textile pieces, Bengal alone over 307,000 textile pieces. Besides, in 1771, whereas Madras and Surat together sent Britain over 276,000 textile pieces, Bengal alone over 652,000 such pieces.⁴⁵⁰ Indian-made exported cloth had its quality dictated by European popular fashion increasingly desirous of the Bengali textiles being finer than the Gujarati ordinary cotton fabric known as *baftas*.⁴⁵¹ Thus, Calcutta was destined to headquarter the whole British government in India, eclipsing economically the other British trading posts in India.⁴⁵² Bayly confirms the new importance of Bengal for the British in these ensuing words:

*The growth of the export of textiles from Bengal between 1690 and 1740, and the burgeoning profits to be made on the triangular trade between India, China and Britain, had gradually built up the importance of Calcutta at the expense of its Mughal counterpart, Hugly. The English Company was much more heavily capitalised than its nearest rival, the French, and was usually able to beat the competition in the Bengal textile market.*⁴⁵³

⁴⁴⁷ Meena. H. K, 2016, "An Overview of Indian Economic Structure under British Rule" in International Journal of Management and Social Sciences Research, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 33-39, irjournals.org/ijmssr/Mar2016/6.pdf, p. 34.

⁴⁴⁸ Hejeebu. S, op. cit. , pp. 498, 501.

⁴⁴⁹ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 51.

⁴⁵⁰ Broadberry. S and Gupta. B, op. cit. , p. 33.

⁴⁵¹ Maloni. R, op. cit. , p. 75.

⁴⁵² Strong. R, op. cit. , p. 120.

⁴⁵³ Bayly. C. A, op. cit. , p. 49.

Bengal's economic outshining by the mid-eighteenth century, offering a better serving to the British market needs, together with the company's power to levy land duties therein made Bengal the stage of the largest part of the whole British activity in India. Metcalfs bear witness to the fact that on the strength of these two advantages the British company gained a wider resource base that would enable it to build a larger army for a more capable colonial-state structure.⁴⁵⁴ As for Hejeebu, he asserts that Bengal was at the time turning out as the main input market to the British company. This is to say, Bengal received more attention from Britain than the other company presidencies in India in terms of civil servants recruited to come thereto.⁴⁵⁵ Marshall concurs with Metcalfs as follows:

*The East India Company, which could impose taxes on its subjects, was at the same time creating a new British-Indian state and armed forces. More and more eager and talented young Scots, Irish Protestant gentry or younger sons of English landed families were serving abroad in the army, the navy or in administration and professional positions in India. The grip of such people on the good things of empire, provided for them by the Indian tax payer, was to be an enduring legacy.*⁴⁵⁶

There exists further literature telling that the rise of British hegemony came as the basis of the coming westernisation of British India. Whitehead testifies that the role of colonial government as a fiscal manager and receiver would be crucially supportive to Western education from 1854, land tax revenues being partially meant for scholastic and university provision ever since then.⁴⁵⁷ According to Roy, the English language could not be officialised in India until upon the military conquest of parts of the Indian territory, upheld by a grid of treaties and alliances between the East India Company and local chiefs and rulers.⁴⁵⁸ Likewise,

⁴⁵⁴ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 55.

⁴⁵⁵ Hejeebu. S, op. cit. , p. 500.

⁴⁵⁶ Marshall. P. J, op. cit. , p. 128.

⁴⁵⁷ Whitehead. C, 2005, "The Historiography of British Imperial Education Policy, Part I: India" in History of Education: Journal of the History of Education Society, Vol. 34, No. 03, pp. 315-329, tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00467600500065340, p. 319.

⁴⁵⁸ Roy. M, op. cit. , p. 84.

railway private enterprises in British India from the mid nineteenth century are said to have benefited from much state patronisation relying on that fiscal extraction carried out at tremendous rates.⁴⁵⁹ The construction and operation of the colonial railways would be paid for by the Indians with their own money.⁴⁶⁰

To put it in a few words, by the end of the eighteenth century, north eastern India had already been dragged to colonial military and economic submission as well as to some Anglicization especially the region of Bengal. The basis of nineteenth-century westernisation in British India was the English company's shift from a trader to a ruling coloniser, which would in fact aid the coming educational and infrastructural projects in the colony.

⁴⁵⁹ Bagchi. A. K, 1988, "Colonialism and the Nature of 'Capitalist Enterprise in India'" in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 23, No. 31, pp. PE38-PE50, Mumbai, Economic and Political Weekly, p. 45.

⁴⁶⁰ Satya. L. D, 2008, "British Imperial Railways in Nineteenth-Century South Asia" in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 47, pp. 69-77, Mumbai, Economic and Political Weekly, p. 71.

CHAPTER THREE

Colonial Westernising Education in Nineteenth-Century British India

Westernisation as well as modernisation are commonly viewed as coming through the co-agency of English education.⁴⁶¹ However, the latter process in the given colonial context is claimed to have been not easy. The British writer Marriott observes that the Western-education policy in nineteenth-century British India might have presented the most critical and intermingled troubles of all those which colonial British rule met therein.⁴⁶² Having a similar opinion, the French writer Chailley, dealing with the administrative problems of British India during the period under study, puts the following words:

*All colonizing nations are sooner or later faced with the problem of the education of the natives. It is a grave, a difficult, one may say a distressing, problem which cannot be evaded, and which involves a conflict between interest and conscience*⁴⁶³

1- The Educative Commitment

Religious, linguistic, and scientific are the three broad qualifiers one may assign to the colonial educative program in nineteenth-century British India where Western-style education was rendered imperative for lots of natives being agog to depart from their traditional caste or class rural lifestyle for an urban colonial promised one.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶¹ Ramanna. M, 1992, "Profiles of English Educated Indians: Early Nineteenth-Century Bombay City" in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27, No. 14, pp. 716-721+723-724, Mumbai, Economic and Political Weekly, p. 716.

⁴⁶² Whitehead. C, 2005, "The Historiography of British Imperial Education Policy, Part I: India" in History of Education: Journal of the History of Education Society, Vol. 34, No. 03, pp. 315-329, tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00467600500065340, p. 316.

⁴⁶³ Chailley. J, 1910, Administrative Problems of British India, London, Macmillan, p. 478.

⁴⁶⁴ Roy. M, op. cit. , pp. 83, 84.

1-1- Overview

After the British had been expanding their colonising foothold in India since 1757, they now in the nineteenth century took it upon themselves to educate the natives in the Western style. And, as a policy of its own, this program involved four major aspects differently discussed by historians and contemporaries regarding its circumstances, contents, motives, and results.

Educating the indigenous population was not the first-instance goal of the English going to India, but circumstances made them end up as educators implying a whole matter of theorisation and planning. It is said that this mission was made incumbent on the East India Company running the colonial State up to 1857. Thereafter, Western education was put under the responsibility of the Indian Government headquartered in Calcutta, in dependence of the India Office located in London, under the British executive power. In practice however, the day-to-day management of colonial education was decentralised to the regional colonial governments. This devolution resulted in educational results being diversified, not homogeneous.⁴⁶⁵

Because each regional colonial government was given latitude to determine the way it would carry out Western education, British India was never submitted to an education policy in the real sense of the term. The provisions for and the regulations of that education were not uniform across the length and width of the colony, which was mainly due to the latter being too vast and varied culturally, economically, and politically. In this design, the East India Company and then the India office in London made such broad edicts as to render their applications possible in different regional conditions. By way of illustrating this non-uniformity, one may compare between the three Presidencies. In Bengal where popular demand was mostly for secondary and college levels, educational provision went often accordingly especially through private projects. Bombay's tendency was rather for

⁴⁶⁵ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 318.

primary schooling assured chiefly by its provincial government while Madras gained the label of evangelising centre.⁴⁶⁶

The religious and intellectual westernisation of British India was embodied in a series of parliament-supported organisms that could enter India only upon the 1813 governmental decision lifting the traditional ban imposed by the East India Company on any evangelical mission into the Indian sub-continent.⁴⁶⁷ The Charter Act of 1813 entitled for the first time the foundation of English evangelist schools in India, which ended the formerly-lasting religious neutrality of the English company.⁴⁶⁸ This decision inaugurated a colonial phase characterized by concentrated Christian union work in different areas of European outlook — literature, science, and mainly religion.⁴⁶⁹ The Baptist Missionary Society, the London Missionary Society, the Church Missionary Society, the Madras Auxiliary Society, the Scottish Missionary Society, the British and Foreign Bible Society, and the Ladies Society for Native Female Education were established between 1792 and 1824.⁴⁷⁰ At a later stage, the Society of St John the Evangelist, also known as the Cowley Fathers, and the Indian Missionary Society were founded in 1875 and 1897.⁴⁷¹ By 1833, the Church Missionary Society alone had admitted twenty-eight evangelicals operating in the colony.⁴⁷²

It is explained that these societies were all Protestant but different from each other in their ideologies and actions. Nevertheless, they closely associated their work with a common social end namely converting the Indians to Protestantism and teaching them the notions of civilisation and happiness. All of those societies aimed at remoulding the Indian society from the inside if necessary by means of

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid. , p. 320.

⁴⁶⁷ Viswanathan. G, 1988, “Currying Favor: The Politics of British Educational and Cultural Policy in India, 1813-1854” in Social Text, No. 19/20, pp. 85-104, Durham, USA, Duke University Press, pp. 86, 91.

⁴⁶⁸ Thiessen. J, op. cit. , pp. 34, 35.

⁴⁶⁹ Bugge. H, 1998, “Christianity and Caste in XIXth Century South India: The Different Social Policies of British and Non-British Christian Missions” in Archives de sciences sociales des religions, No. 103, pp. 87-97, Paris, EHESS, p. 87.

⁴⁷⁰ Riddick. J. F , op. cit. , pp. 146-148.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid. , pp. 153-154.

⁴⁷² Strong. R, op. cit. , p. 124.

new legislation buttressed by the colonial administration.⁴⁷³ In fact, co-operative efforts between the colonial State and the British missionaries in India would throughout the nineteenth century assume organised reforms to abolish traditional aspects, viewed as retrograde, of the Indian society such as human-death sacrifices.⁴⁷⁴

Britain's attitude towards evangelicalism in her Indian territories turned increasingly favourable from the late eighteenth century and is qualified as liberal and nationalistic since performed by private priests mostly selected from the metropolis. The colonial State always recognized the independence of these evangelicals and allotted for their functions subventions estimated and settled by the local controlling authorities.⁴⁷⁵

But, when it came to Western linguistic or scientific learning, finance and supervision were rendered more public and less private so as to show more formal care on the part of the colonial State and the metropolis. Indeed, the British Parliament is said to have issued official reports increasingly entrusting educative sponsorship and control to the colonial government.⁴⁷⁶ That was the case in 1854 when the Education Despatch dismissed the usual Boards of Education, composed of private servants and officers, and ordered a public department of education to be set up at the level of each presidency and sub-presidency.⁴⁷⁷ Besides, before and after the 1854 Despatch, the bulk of educational provision was being financed through land taxation managed by the colonial State since 1765 when it took over civil administration, or *Diwani*, of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷³ Copland. I, 2006, "Christianity as an Arm of Empire: The Ambiguous Case of India under the Company, C. 1813-1858" in The Historical Journal, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 1025-1054, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1030, 1032, 1033.

⁴⁷⁴ Arnold. E, 1892, "The Duty and Destiny of England in India" in The North American Review, Vol. 154, No. 423, pp. 168-188, Des Moines, University of Northern Iowa, p. 172.

⁴⁷⁵ Frémeaux. J, 2002, Les empires coloniaux, Paris, CNRS Editions, p. 336.

⁴⁷⁶ Heredia. R. C, op. cit. , p. 2335.

⁴⁷⁷ Mill. J. S, op. cit. , p. 81.

⁴⁷⁸ Chaudhary. L, 2010, "Taxation and educational development: Evidence from British India" in Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 47, pp. 279-293, Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp. 281-283.

According to Whitehead, the Indians were never consulted as to whether or not they accepted the promotion of Western education in the colony nor did they hold consensual views on it. They soon manifested a striking opinion divergence. Unlike most Indians, a tiny but growing and influential Indian minority kept being supportive of the progression of Western education in view of economic and social benefits it offered.⁴⁷⁹ That divergence was played out between the Orientalists and Anglicists including Indians and British alike. A common aim to the Anglicists, i.e. those who advocated the westernisation of British India according to English standards, was to raise generations of Indian elite well impregnated with European and Christian education and make them a filtrating agent of this education for the Indian lower classes.⁴⁸⁰ As for the Orientalists, they did not countenance westernising education often for cultural reasons. Also, many Orientalist Indians passionately took scientific Western education while resentfully recoiling from Christianisation.⁴⁸¹

To round up, one may presume that not only economically exploitative was the British colonial rule in nineteenth-century India but also officially paternalistic as it sought to share Western cultural values out of eurocentricity.

1-2- Religious Education

1-2-1- The Evangelical Mission

From the late eighteenth century, a will was manifested to associate free Anglo-Indian trade⁴⁸² with imperial religious responsibility.⁴⁸³ A colonial era was

⁴⁷⁹ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 319.

⁴⁸⁰ Constable. P, op. cit. , p. 288.

⁴⁸¹ Robb. P, 2002, A History of India, New York, Palgrave, p. 139.

⁴⁸² As a national cause, free imperial trade had been defended and recommended by the Scottish philosopher Adam Smith who saw this approach as a means of increasing the yield on the British imperial possessions. Smith argued that the British State could through economic liberalism put a term to the existing imbalance between cost and gain since the imperial state expenses, the military and administrative ones, outweighed the colonial profits made only privately through company monopoly. So, free imperial trade was rendered an official British policy in 1813 at the parliamentary abolition of the traditional monopoly of the East India Company. This would result in much more private commercial activity and returns within the Anglo-Indian context. Fieldhouse. D.K, op. cit. , pp. 272, 392.

coming about whereby it would be incumbent upon the British State to evangelise its Indian subjects.⁴⁸⁴

The forces allowing and upholding from 1790 Anglican evangelicalism in British India was not merely religious. Parliamentary intention behind this venture was politically conservative : cementing British royalism both as the national regime of the metropolis and as the heading position at the Anglican Church⁴⁸⁵. This meant a defensive measure against American republicanism developing as a threat against British royalism since the American Independence in 1783. More importantly, as this threat was far accentuated by the French Revolution⁴⁸⁶, the state-church alliance in Britain since about 1790 was a way of warding off the danger of popular rising and regime overthrow following the example of France. Officially espousing in 1813 the cause of Christianising the Indians under the care of the Church of England, the British Parliament would gain the support of the British evangelical circle to maintain the British monarchical system. British royalism is officially included in Anglicanism, so defending the latter necessarily signified defending the former.⁴⁸⁷

In addition to this political incentive, another impetus for transplanting the Anglican Church into India was purely theological. According to Strong, this

⁴⁸³ Dalziel, N, op. cit. , p. 60.

⁴⁸⁴ Marriott, J, 2003, The Other Empire, Metropolis, India, and Progress in the Colonial Imagination, Manchester, Manchester University Press, p. 94.

⁴⁸⁵ The Anglican Church was established in 1534 by King Henry VIII to concretize the break of the English nation with the Roman Catholic Church. The Anglican Church is not only Protestant but also recognizes the British Monarch as its supreme head. By the end of Queen Elizabeth I's reign in 1603, the state church of England was definitively espoused to this ideology. Dupuy, B, 2009, « Anglicanisme » in Les Essentielles d'Universalis, Religions, Vol. 16, pp. 30-35, Paris, Encyclopædia Universalis, pp. 30-32.

⁴⁸⁶ The French Revolution (1789-1799) marked a watershed in the history of France by violently abolishing monarchy after the overthrow and execution of King Louis XVI and laying for the country a new political basis that attracted foreign peoples' interest. This revolution went to the establishment of the Republic of France, which would cause emulation in Italy and Germany through the nineteenth century. This revolution was mainly spearheaded due to and against social inequalities engendered by social privileges and an abuse of ruling power. Yet, it met with a growing critical movement born in England under the leadership of Edmund Burke who opposed the idea of using violence to eradicate the national political tradition of the monarchy. Martin, J. C, 2009, « Révolution française » in Les Essentielles d'Universalis, Histoire, Vol. 5, pp. 744-779, Paris, Encyclopædia Universalis, pp. 744, 746, 771.

⁴⁸⁷ Strong, R, op. cit. , pp. 118, 119.

Anglican commitment was deeply marked by the doctrine of God's providence which assigned Britain the duty to expand Christendom worldwide in return for the benediction of the Divinity protecting her against foreign threats. The belief in this evangelising duty as being rewarded by this providential protection rose on account of the salvation of the British nation from the Napoleonic Wars which marred other European neighbouring nations. Indeed, British evangelists tied future national immunity and imperial sovereignty in India with national obedience to this divine will.⁴⁸⁸

In the light of the Adams' article, one may see that the ground on which this imperial commitment was to be fulfilled was getting favourable. It is said that the epoch from around the 1770s to the 1830s is that of political theorisation calling for governmental interference in the field of education. It was the time of much public-spirited pressure in a new Britain where statesmen as well as religious men campaigned to make Parliament recognize the education of the subjects as a state obligation regardless of colour or race. Britain had now theorists claiming that the improvement of the individual mind through state efforts would lead to stable political rule and economy and thus to social prosperity.⁴⁸⁹

Although the idea of leading massive evangelical conversion in British India did not meet with general agreement from within the clerical milieu of the metropolis, it was continually advocated by influential currents. *Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of Great Britain* and *An Enquiry into the Obligations of Christians to Use Means for the Conversion of Heathens*, published in 1792 by Charles Grant and William Carey respectively, commonly called for preaching the gospel across the Indian territories under British rule.⁴⁹⁰

The former publication reckoned India as the darkest area of the world, fraught with moral injustice on account of such inhumane religious rites as the infanticide of females, the drowning of the old or ill in the River Ganges, and self-

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid. , pp. 136, 138.

⁴⁸⁹ Adams. N. L and Adams. D. M, op. cit. , p. 157.

⁴⁹⁰ Copland. I, 2006, op. cit. , pp. 1026, 1031, 1036, 1039.

maining.⁴⁹¹ As for the latter publication, it theorised the imperial evangelical ambition on the basis that despite all the former efforts made after Jesus Christ to popularise the gospel worldwide, a large part of mankind was still drowning in darkness engendered by not being Christian. Hence, Carey recommended the participation of the whole British ecclesiastical body as the means of realising something that could outshine by far all the previous similar-type missions. To his home critics and opponents, trying to intimidate him by the implacability of Indian objection to be met, Carey replied by the example of all the prior company traders who had managed to gain room and favour from the local clans and tribes he qualified as barbarous and uncultivated. As an anglicist theorist, Carey was capable of pointing selectively to background assets to convince and drag progressively both evangelical theologians and Parliamentary members into line with his desideratum. Carey implicitly heralded his nation as lucky and superior having, unlike India, the Bible, one official language written nationwide, ministers, and an effective government which all made up the means enabling Britain to grasp and popularise the truth.⁴⁹²

One strategy defended by Carey as capable to increase the feasibility of this mission was the division of labour by creating such aforementioned societies independent of each other and cohesive, each one being composed of consenting members. This approach may be deemed a success in view of all the ensuing achievements those evangelical societies made throughout the century. For instance, the Baptist Missionary Society, of which Carey was a co-founder, could already in 1802 preach and translate the Bible into Indian languages at Serampur in Bengal.⁴⁹³ This initial assignment and that of founding schools in Calcutta were shared by the latter society, the Church Missionary Society, and the London Missionary Society. Similarly, the British and Foreign Bible Society applied itself from 1804 to dispense across India countless copies of the Bible translated into many languages. A Sanskrit translation of the New Testament was achieved in

⁴⁹¹ Trautmann. T. R, 1997, Aryans and British India, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, pp. 98, 101, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109.

⁴⁹² Marriott. J, op. cit. , p. 89.

⁴⁹³ Ibid. , pp. 89-90.

1808 by Reverend Carey, followed by translations he made in other local languages viz. Orlyya, Hindi, Marathi, Punjablin, Assamese, and Gujarati between 1813 and 1820.⁴⁹⁴

The main ideology that guided succeeding generations of missionary evangelicals working both in British India and Britain was the belief that misery and backwardness had unavoidably resulted from spiritual lack to be healed only by means of evangelisation.⁴⁹⁵ In this frame, three types of contribution came to colour this imperial mission namely sympathy, charity, and the salvation of the Indian people from sin and evil.⁴⁹⁶ In parallel, an idea would soon be spread in British India by operative missionaries according to which Hinduism was nothing but a tissue of superstitions.⁴⁹⁷ Indeed, the evangelist missionaries worked not only to lead Indian souls to the Christ but also to grind down practices typical to Indian culture.⁴⁹⁸ A similar account is put by Desousa in these following words:

By the early nineteenth century, the official discourse spoke of the civilizing mission of British rule that had brought a new political and moral order to India based on Western norms. Indians were seen as incapable of understanding what was in their best interests, colonial rule was necessary for the good of India, and the British flag came to signify progress for and care of the natives. Indians were weak in body and timid in spirit; Indian civilization was full of vice, crime, superstition, injustice, and anarchy. It was only under British protection that Indians could be brought into a progressive state of happiness.⁴⁹⁹

In Peggs's view, the actual importance of those imperial evangelicals resided in their smart way of including theology in policy so as to face a problematic social situation. The Indian society was inherently dominated by the stoic poor

⁴⁹⁴ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 144, 147.

⁴⁹⁵ Peggs. J, 1832, India's Cries to British Humanity, London, Simpkin and Marshall, p. 446.

⁴⁹⁶ Marriott. J, op. cit. , p. 90.

⁴⁹⁷ Pécastaing-Boissière. M, op. cit. , p. 225.

⁴⁹⁸ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 318.

⁴⁹⁹ Desousa. V, op. cit. , pp. 61, 62.

most of whom were already known to be totally indifferent towards Western civilisation.⁵⁰⁰ To soothe this crisis, Anglican evangelicals kept emphasizing on the fundamentals of the Christian theology viz. original sin, human oneness with God, the ability to renewal or improvement through faith, and the attainment of sacredness through ethical deeds. These fundamentals were also highlighted in epic colonial narratives published during the nineteenth century for the purpose of that imperial mission in quest of a more comfortable and happier life for the Indian individual.⁵⁰¹

A case in point is the writing of Claudius Buchanan⁵⁰², entitled *Memoir on the Expediency of an Ecclesiastical Establishment for British India* and published in 1805 chiefly to claim Anglican supremacy in the periphery. This evangelical publicist verbalized the importance to be expected from the cohesive role of the British company and the Anglican Church allied to each other. Buchanan recommended the union of these two powers to affront the retrogressive character of the Indian society, illustrated by such Hindu human-death customs as voluntary drowning in the Ganges and child sacrifice.⁵⁰³ He recurrently comes back through his book to the practice of burning widows, reporting the example of one hundred and sixteen women having undergone alive this sacrifice near the corpses of their husbands around 1804 near Calcutta supposed to be the most civilized corner of Bengal.⁵⁰⁴ As a socio-religious thinker, Buchanan saw the idolatry, ritualism, and superstition of Hinduism as a flaw that necessitated the cure of Christianity.⁵⁰⁵ Appreciated by the Parliament, Buchanan's narrative hastened the appointment of a bishop to India. So, the first incumbent to Calcutta's diocese, Reverend Thomas Fanshaw Middleton, was set in 1815 with the support of three archdeacons in

⁵⁰⁰ Peggs, J, op. cit. , p. 446.

⁵⁰¹ Marriott, J, op. cit. , p. 90.

⁵⁰² Claudius Buchanan was a reverend serving the company officials as a chaplain and professor of classics in Fort William, Bengal, between 1797 and 1808. In 1812-13, through his updating of his 1805 *Memoir*, he supported before the British Parliament the free access of evangelical missionaries to India. Strong, R, op. cit. , p. 157.

⁵⁰³ Marriott, J, op. cit. , pp. 92, 93.

⁵⁰⁴ Buchanan, C, op. cit. , p. 34.

⁵⁰⁵ Constable, P, op. cit. , p. 287.

Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras namely Reverend Henry Lloyd, Reverend George Barnes, and Reverend John Mousley.⁵⁰⁶

Thus, one may presume that the evangelical mission in nineteenth-century British India was stimulated by a mood of self-confidence and optimism. This deduction matches up with Buchanan's version selected from his 1805 primary source, running as follows:

*The natives of Hindustan are a divided people. They have no common interest. To disseminate new principles among them is not difficult. They are less tenacious of opinion than of custom. ... It has been calculated that there are an hundred casts of religion in India. Our religion is therefore inculcated ... because its civilizing and benign influence is certain and undeniable. We have seen that it has dispensed knowledge and happiness to every people who have embraced it ... it attaches the governed to their governors; and facilitates our intercourse with the natives.*⁵⁰⁷

Notwithstanding, reading through Marriott's analysis, one may presume that the risk of failure was not absent from the evangelist conscience since the author mentions the then widely-seen indifference of the Indian people vis-à-vis any Christianising or civilising venture. Indeed, British mood of confidence and optimism was, to some degree, false from the start.⁵⁰⁸ Sundaram thinks that the evangelization of the colonized was being done but in no enormous way as the traditionalism intrinsic in Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism was eventually triumphant against all Western missionary exertions.⁵⁰⁹ This fiasco had been anticipated by Buchanan having written this passage picked up from his 1805 primary source, going as follows:

⁵⁰⁶ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 147.

⁵⁰⁷ Buchanan. C, op. cit. , pp. 26, 27, 29.

⁵⁰⁸ Marriott. J, op. cit. , pp. 92, 93.

⁵⁰⁹ Sundaram. M. S, 1959, "A Century of British Education in India 1857-1957" in Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, Vol. 107, No. 5035, pp. 491-507, London, Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce, p. 497.

You will sometimes hear it said that the Hindoos are a mild and passive people. They have apathy rather than mildness; their hebetude of mind is, perhaps, their chief negative virtue. They are a race of men of weak bodily frame, and have a mind conformed to it, timid and abject in the extreme ... They have not a disposition which is accordant with the tenor of Christian principles. The spirit of their superstition has a continual tendency to deterioration. The European who has long been resident in India looks on the civilization of the Hindoos with a hopeless eye. Despairing, therefore, of intellectual or moral improvement, he is content with an obsequious spirit and manual service.⁵¹⁰

The religious mission in question was not restricted to the process of raising Christian Indians but included the creation and administration of schools to raise new clericals for the evangelising aim itself. As a case in point, the London Missionary Society founded and ran the Gosport Seminary between 1800 and 1840 as a centre of biblical teaching and missionary training for new subscribers most of whom would serve in India. Besides, the Church Missionary Society inaugurated its Islington School and the Bedford Missionary Training College in 1825 and 1840. Moreover, in 1818, the Baptist Missionary Society had permitted the Serampur College to come to existence.⁵¹¹

Alongside preaching, architectural and administrative works were also planned and fulfilled within the frame of the evangelical mission. In 1847 for example, Reverend Daniel Wilson, Bishop of Calcutta, inaugurated the newly-built St Paul's Cathedral to serve both Bengali and British Christians. Then, it was decided that the newly-built St Mary's Cathedral would take upon itself all the Bengali congregation.⁵¹²

The work of the committed evangelicals was carried out not merely in indoctrinating speech but also in rhetorical letters via special presses established in

⁵¹⁰ Buchanan. C, op. cit. , pp. 33, 36.

⁵¹¹ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 146-148.

⁵¹² Ibid. , p. 151.

British India, denigrating the local religions in favour of Anglicanism and Catholicism.⁵¹³ By way of illustration, in 1806, the Baptist Missionary Society demeaned Islam through its Serampur Press publishing a scathing tract. Again, the following year, this press made a similar attack with *the Persian Pamphlet*. More liberty was granted to such publications from 1808 by Governor-General Lord Minto who in fact took censorship off colonial missionary press. Hence, it is estimated that by 1820 thirteen operative presses had been owned by the Baptists in Serampur. Furthermore, *The Tract and Book Society*, founded at Agra in 1848 as a polyglot publishing house presided by an official to the British East India Company namely William Muir being then Lieutenant-Governor of north-western India, rose to oppose Hinduism and Islam.⁵¹⁴

Variation was made not only in terms of participating societies and productive presses but also in faith itself because it was deemed that the more evangelist efforts were put, the stronger colonisation would be. In fact, being concerned for the cause of maintaining suzerainty over India, the British Crown and its imperial government saw it worthwhile to further widen access to evangelical missionaries of the British nationality. This was done in expectation of further alignment with and loyalty to the colonial State on the part of the Indians. Thus, the evangelical assignment in British India became now divided between Anglicans and Catholics coming mostly from Britain.⁵¹⁵ And, Presbyterian contribution from Scotland was not absent either; it was much needed in view of its highly-estimated quality and could provide support to the British Indian empire in nineteenth century.⁵¹⁶

It may be noteworthy to report from Constable's article that Scottish participation in the evangelical mission had both professional and economic stimuli and followed a rather different approach. The Scottish gentry being poor but highly-accomplished in educative terms aspired to British India to work, raise

⁵¹³ Viswanathan. G, 1990, Masks of Conquests – Literary Study and British Rule in India, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 69-71.

⁵¹⁴ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 147-151.

⁵¹⁵ Frémeaux. J, op. cit. , p. 335.

⁵¹⁶ Constable. P, op. cit. , p. 278.

capital, and offer themselves landed property at home in order to gain political influence there. Presbyterian missionaries avoided immediate conversion from Hinduism or Islam to Protestantism and rather diffused and developed Christian ideals within these two native religions for fear of rejection or friction. This would over time lead to the gradual acceptance of and conversion to Protestantism by native generations. In fact, it is said that Presbyterian missionaries held an orientalist commitment whereby Christian moral principles were to be taught to the Indians without their evangelization happening directly. And yet, Presbyterian missionaries shared the driving Eurocentric belief that the Christian ideals were the supreme evolutionary human-life aspect far from the spiritual imperfections of any other religion.⁵¹⁷

British Catholic preachers in British India grew in number, which hastened the formation and development in the 1820s of a centre of Roman Catholicism at Sardhana near Meerut in Delhi. The centre turned out to be a community endowed with a church, a school, an orphanage, a convent, a college, an active press, as well as a hospital for Christianized Indians. More committed became Catholic evangelicalism in 1834 when the Governor-General vested Bishop Robert St Leger of Calcutta with the administration of the Roman Catholic Church in all British India. Aware of the increasing number of Indian Catholics, the colonial government designated in 1854 Bishop Anastasius Hartman as the chief representative of the Roman Catholic Church in all the colony. What also helped colonial Catholicism to invigorate its position was the presence therein of Catholic Irishmen serving as company soldiers.⁵¹⁸ Besides, the Portuguese had succeeded in disseminating the Catholic religion in Portuguese India during the two prior centuries, which had created a certain Indian familiarity with this form of spirituality. This Portuguese success constituted in fact a bridgehead for further Catholic evangelisation now to be performed by the British.⁵¹⁹

⁵¹⁷ Ibid. , pp. 280, 281, 289, 290.

⁵¹⁸ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 148, 150, 152.

⁵¹⁹ Washbrook. D, op. cit. , p. 493.

The Catholic participation went all the more so solicited since reckoned as outstripping the Protestant one in terms of the education level of missionaries and their teaching and preaching quality. It is testified by Bugge that the former came almost entirely from evangelists selected among the British clergy after a solid theological education while their Protestant colleagues were rather among low-educated religious men.⁵²⁰

However, somewhat later, there emerged the need for further broadening missionary participation by including any English-speaking Western people under British supervision. That was the case of American Societies solicited to act in concert with British ones, which resulted, according to Riddick, in a harmonious union that assured more translations of the Bible. In 1858, the latter could be read in ten Indian languages.⁵²¹ The preference given from 1813 to British missions was now in 1833 ended and missionary-entry restriction lifted, which was followed by rapid German partaking expected to be capable to diffuse Christianity across India by means of English education.⁵²²

The evangelical mission owed its accomplishment partly to native collaboration. Christianised Indians are said to have played the role of diffusers of the Bible in British India.⁵²³ This contribution began in 1807 when Abdul Masih was designated as the sponsoring reader of the newly-founded *Correspondence Committee for the Church Missionary Society* in charge of translating the Christian scriptures.⁵²⁴ Besides, Christianised Indians are said to have gained official jobs within the British Church.⁵²⁵ Illustrative is the position of two converted natives, including Abdul Masih, promoted as Anglican ministers in 1825 by Bishop Reginald Heber of Calcutta. By 1851, colonial statistics known as *the Decennial*

⁵²⁰ Bugge. H, op. cit. , p. 87.

⁵²¹ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 152.

⁵²² Sundaram. M. S, op. cit. , p. 497.

⁵²³ Chandra. S, 1970, "Hindu Conservatism in the Nineteenth Century" in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 50, pp. 2003-2007, Mumbai, Economic and Political Weekly, p. 2004.

⁵²⁴ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 148.

⁵²⁵ Chandra. S, 1970, op. cit. , p. 2004.

Missionary Tables had recorded 91,092 Christian Indians and twenty-one Indians serving as church ministers all under British rule.⁵²⁶

In brief, through private evangelicals and Indian participation, the metropolitan government in concert with the British East India Company could transplant Christendom into British India as a way of consolidating both colonial suzerainty over there as well as royal supremacy in the Anglican Church. But, as shown next, the zone of evangelisation was also accredited with another zone of westernisation being the diffusing of both English and English education.⁵²⁷

1-2-2- Missionary Bivalence

Literary and scientific education in nineteenth-century British India was not always assured by institutions venturing only in this field. The milieu of evangelisation itself favoured much linguistic and scientific Anglicisation.⁵²⁸

The theoretical belief behind this approach was that Western scholarship was itself brimmed with Christian morals and that this double education could evidence the falsehood of Indian religions and thus work to change the natives positively.⁵²⁹ Furthermore, it was thought that teaching English by missionaries would facilitate their task of diffusing Western social and gospel values.⁵³⁰ In other words, winning India for Christ was thought by the evermore-numerous missionaries entering the colony to be practicable through Western science taught in a Western language.⁵³¹ As such, the Scottish Mission Society, the American Mission Society, and the Church Missionary Society became bivalent opening and running since the 1820s schools in Bombay, Poona, Thana, and the Konkan villages for Christianizing and Anglicizing education.⁵³² Moreover, Dharwadker stands testimony to the fact that

⁵²⁶ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 149, 151.

⁵²⁷ Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , p. 108.

⁵²⁸ Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 278, 279, 282.

⁵²⁹ Bellenoit. H. J. A, op. cit. , p. 370.

⁵³⁰ Heredia. R. C, op. cit. , p. 2335.

⁵³¹ Sundaram. M. S, op. cit. , p. 495.

⁵³² Kamerkar. M. P, 2001, "Impact of British Colonial Policy on Society Relating to Education in Western India during the 19th Century" in Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute,

such Christian-missionary schools as St Xavier College in Bombay, Loreto Convent in Calcutta, and St Stephen's College in Delhi, turned out to be the most effective English-medium foundations in the private sector of British India's Western education.⁵³³

Early such efforts came from the British and Foreign School Society whose proselytizer Mary Cooke gave herself over to teaching young Indian ladies in Calcutta since 1821. Cooke's strategy was affording Western-topic education based on the study of the Christian Holy Book. Furthermore, in Calcutta, male and female Indians alike are said to have benefited in the 1830s from a significant educative work fulfilled by the Church of Scotland through its first missionary in India Reverend Alexander Duff.⁵³⁴ Actually, one striking feature to those evangelist-educative operators was that they permitted the inception in India of female schooling having long been inexistent before on account of native female-excluding custom.⁵³⁵ It is reported that between 1822 and 1837 Bombay was endowed with eleven girl schools.⁵³⁶ According to Choudhary, for such bivalent missionaries, English education represented a primordial vehicle for evangelisation.⁵³⁷

In this bivalent arena, room was also granted to evangelist press. *The Signpost* or *Dig-Darshan* was launched in 1818 as a monthly periodical by Reverend John Clerk Marshman in both English and Bengali for both educational and evangelical purposes. Another same-type periodical was *The Friend of India* established at Benares in 1838 by Reverend Robert Mather. The Christianizing-Anglicizing role of colonial press was further extended when *the Calcutta Christian Observer* orientated itself from 1831 to English-medium production about science as well as literature.⁵³⁸

Reading through Riddick, one may see that circumstances being favourable to the evangelical mission did not come solely from such positive positions as those

Vol. 60/61, pp. 373-382, Pune, Vice Chancellor, Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute, p. 376.

⁵³³ Dharwadker. V, op. cit. , p. 109.

⁵³⁴ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 148, 149.

⁵³⁵ Kamat. A. R, 1976, "Women's Education and Social Change in India" in Social Scientist, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 3-27, New Delhi, Social Scientist, p. 3.

⁵³⁶ Kamerkar. M. P, op. cit. , p. 376.

⁵³⁷ Choudhary. S. K, op. cit. , p. 58.

⁵³⁸ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 148-150.

already discussed but also from negative ones being at the Indian side. British evangelists knew how to make use of social Indian ordeals to secure wide realization of their aim. In this respect, Riddick tells about the impact of recurrent famines on Christian education for the victims. The thing is that the famines in northern India between 1837 and 1843 and that in the south between 1876 and 1877 caused many children to become orphans left to their own devices, which hastened British evangelists to found orphanages and provide relief. It is said that Agra, Sikandra, Benares, Gorakhpur, and Cawnpore were endowed with such educative establishments by the Church Missionary Society excluding from them both Hindu and Muslim cultures. For the aim of evangelising these orphans, care was much intensive. That was the case of the London Missionary Society said to have offered benevolence during the 1876-77 famine thanks to a fund of £ 10,665 raised by its supporters.⁵³⁹

Another Western-education strategy was *zenana* teaching implemented in 1853 by the Free Church of Scotland then represented by Reverends John Fordyce and Thomas Smith. *Zenana* teaching is a kind of private teaching promoted by British female missionaries for Indian girls and women at the latter's homes so as to protect their supposed respectability since the Hindu tradition did not allow caste mixing.⁵⁴⁰ This female-interaction approach was later in 1882 extended by the Church Missionary Society to Indian villages. According to Roy, this type of teaching gave rise to the Church of England Zenana Missionary as an active converter of Indian women to Christianity in the late nineteenth century.⁵⁴¹

But, influence could also occur in the opposite way: instructors of English or Western science could lead to evangelization.⁵⁴² According to Riddick, this became a strategy particularly adopted in Madras from 1843 when the Free Church of

⁵³⁹ Ibid. , pp. 150-153.

⁵⁴⁰ Paul. G. B, 1984, "Presbyterian Missionaries and the Women of India during the Nineteenth-Century" in *Journal of Presbyterian History (1962-1985)*, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 230-236, Philadelphia, Presbyterian Historical Society, pp. 231, 234, 235.

⁵⁴¹ Roy. A, op. cit. , p. 196.

⁵⁴² Strong. R, op. cit. , p. 124.

Scotland inaugurated a school for Indian girls urged later on at the age of twelve or thirteen to enter the Christian church.⁵⁴³

Working on Heredia's article, one may see that Catholic participation in this missionary bivalence was important fetching a particularity that set the British evangelizing occupation of India distinctively superior to the former Catholic Portuguese one. With the influx of British Jesuits to India since 1814, these took over a mission said to be relatively more critical. These Catholic missionaries, unlike their European predecessors in India, assumed higher education as an agent of evangelization within university centres. St Joseph's college of Nagapatnam and Tiruchirapalli, St Xavier's College of Calcutta, St Xavier's College of Bombay, St Aloysius College of Mangalore, and St Joseph's college of Darjeeling were established between 1844 and 1888.⁵⁴⁴ Besides, British Catholic missionaries in south India are accredited with the foundation and management of primary schools for the children of converted Indians.⁵⁴⁵

Colonial missionary education was not given singlehandedly by the British is corroborated by Bellenoit who explains that the Indian contributing role was played not only in teaching but also in patronage and planning. During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Indian elite in northern India went dictating the opening or maintenance of mission schools, taking advantage of financial shortages suffered from by British missionaries. Indian elite, be it religious, landed, or royal, is said to have paid much so that the English language and Western knowledge became so popular among rural communities of which registration demands swamped those Indian-funded schools. This provision was soon viewed as a form of welfare assuring social improvement that the colonial State had never been able to supply in many areas of the colony. Thus, Christian missionaries bowed to the preconditions of their Indian patrons who wanted those schools to be tolerant vis-à-vis Islam and Hinduism, which created a mood of religious plurality and eclecticism.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴³ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 151.

⁵⁴⁴ Heredia. R. C, op. cit. , p. 2333.

⁵⁴⁵ Bugge. H, op. cit. , p. 88.

⁵⁴⁶ Bellenoit. H. J. A, op. cit. , pp. 388, 389.

Relevant anecdotes narrate that in the region of Pali for example a group of Indian rich landowners built and offered a secondary school to the Church Missionary Society. Furthermore, the London Missionary Society was yearly given by a local Maharaja Rs 120 in aid of its Banaras College and was lent land by a regional prince for its Ramsay College while the colonial government refused to afford assistance. Other cases in point are the salvation of under-funded large and renowned schools such as St John College in Agra, about to close its door in 1884 when the colonial government wanted to terminate its function. So, in endorsement to St John College, both Hindu and Muslim notable families hastened to make a petition. Addressed to the Educational Department, the signed grievance could finally prolong the college's activity so as to receive other young Indians enthusiastic about English and Western knowledge.⁵⁴⁷

To round up this section, one may emphasize that Western evangelists in nineteenth-century British India played a double role, assuming an intellectual-spiritual contribution valuing English, Western science, and Christianity all together.

1-3- Anglicizing Education

1-3-1- The Contribution of Macaulay and Trevelyan

It is claimed that Western education was more officially and more seriously implemented in British India from 1835, a date from which the colonial State would indeed apply deeper educational Anglicist changes under the influence of Macaulay and Trevelyan.⁵⁴⁸

Published in 1883, a government primary source on colonial education shows that Western education in British India had not been promoted without conflicting struggle within the governmental circle itself. Adjudicating a disagreement growing in the early 1830s between British officials serving in the General Committee of

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid. , pp. 389, 390.

⁵⁴⁸ Frazer. R. W, op. cit. , pp. 386, 387.

Public Instruction⁵⁴⁹, Governor-General Lord Bentinck put an end in 1835 to the orientalist system in which the English East India Company had favoured the learning of India's local languages and traditional subjects.⁵⁵⁰ His decision was to make the whole Indian colony swing to English-style education in conformity with the claims of anglicist officials as Thomas Macaulay who requested that colonial education be set at the expense of the East India Company.⁵⁵¹ Lord Bentinck's favourable adjudication is said to have constituted a watershed in the history of British India as it announced the official westernising project of English-medium European-science instruction across the colony.⁵⁵²

To get Bentinck's approval, Macaulay and his followers had had to defend the anglicist educative scheme as being the sole workable measure of right government capable to guarantee the happiness and moral advancement of the Indians.⁵⁵³ Havell expresses Macaulay's reasoning as follows:

*Lord Macaulay's view of the worthlessness of all Indian culture governed the whole educational administration, with the intention of bringing to the benighted East that which academic Europe still believes to be the higher artistic culture of Greece and Italy.*⁵⁵⁴

The new policy was chiefly organized by Charles Edward Trevelyan who, serving as Deputy Secretary in the Political Department of the Government of

⁵⁴⁹ The General Committee of Public Instruction, founded in 1823, was the semi-official institution in charge of the colonial colleges and schools in British India. Before 1835, this committee had been seeking, under the leadership of its secretary Horace Hayman Wilson, Indian support for the colonial cause by developing oriental education for the Indians in return. Actually, prior to Lord Bentinck's official announcement of 1835, that committee had been focusing on Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian studies within the colonial educative program in preservation of good terms with influential native classes. This orientalist tendency was abandoned in 1835 being substituted by European learning defended as more valuable and constructive than Indian learning. Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 275, 277.

⁵⁵⁰ Government of India, 1883, *Report of the Indian Education Commission 1882*, Calcutta, Government Printing, archive.org/details/ReportOfTheIndianEducationCommission, pp. 8, 9.

⁵⁵¹ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 319.

⁵⁵² Roy. M, op. cit. , p. 88.

⁵⁵³ Thiessen. J, op. cit. , p. 36.

⁵⁵⁴ Havell. E. B, 1910, "Art Administration in India" in *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, Vol. 58, No. 2985, pp. 274-298, London, Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce, p. 274.

India, published in 1838 his *On the Education of the People of India* in endorsement of Lord Bentinck's decision.⁵⁵⁵ Equally supportive was the then governor of Bombay James Farish who made in the same year these following words :

*The Natives must either be kept down by a sense of our power, or they must willingly submit from a conviction that we are more wise, more just, more humane, and more anxious to improve their condition than any other rulers they could possibly have.*⁵⁵⁶

The force of the new policy is viewed as residing in the government's intention to westernise a little but influential upper-class minority in the hope that the latter would impart in its turn Western educative benefits widely to the indigenes.⁵⁵⁷ As for the prestige of that reform, it is seen as resting partly in the support of the government being not only the promoter of the project but also a public employer that would privilege in its recruitment Western-educated Indians. This advantage appealed to both job-ambitious Indians and Indian charity donors desirous for Indian participation in state bureaucracy.⁵⁵⁸ Actually, it is affirmed that in 1844, after the colonial State had reaped the early results of Western-education policy, it now issued an edict granting priority to Western-educated Indians in public function under British rule.⁵⁵⁹

Lord Bentinck saw employing English-educated Indians in government offices as economical to the Colonial State.⁵⁶⁰ Out of thriftiness, the recruitment tendency that ensued throughout the nineteenth century was the selection of natives being willing to work for payments much lower than those usually assigned to Europeans. And yet, Trevelyan's restructuring system, though often limited in practice to the Presidency of Bengal, gained an ideal reputation in other areas of

⁵⁵⁵ Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , p. 276.

⁵⁵⁶ Viswanathan. G, 1988, op. cit. , pp. 86, 103.

⁵⁵⁷ Adams. N. L and Adams. D. M, op. cit. , p. 165.

⁵⁵⁸ Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , p. 285.

⁵⁵⁹ Phillipson. R, p. 111.

⁵⁶⁰ Kamerkar. M. P, op. cit. , p. 377.

the colony. His reformatory provision was regarded by many Indians and colonists as prototypical and socially beneficial; thus, other areas of British India soon called for applying the same plan therein.⁵⁶¹

As an illustration to that educative reform, Hilliker highlights the involvement of the Scottish missionary Duff who applied himself, in concert with Trevelyan, to achieve some progress in the medical sector. It is stated that the two educators, acting within the Committee on Native Medical Education, presented their objection to physical harm pertaining to Indian traditional superstitions supposedly practised for medical treatment. The two anglicists believed in the capacity of European medicine to improve Indian health without resorting to fallacies. In conformity with their recommendations, Lord Bentinck allowed the Calcutta Medical College to come into existence in 1835 with its diverse specialities including the segmentation of the human body.⁵⁶² Pandit Gupta Madhusudan, inspector at the latter college, received homage in guns fired at Fort William for having had the bravery to initiate human dissection as a break with the age-old Hindu caste ideology.⁵⁶³ Twenty three years later, Mill officially praised further related medical achievements, putting the following passage:

*To afford encouragement to the graduates of the colleges, and meet the want of well-qualified medical officers for the service of Government, a special native medical service has been created, under the title of Sub-Assistant Surgeons, for which a degree in one of the medical colleges of India is a necessary qualification. Their professional qualifications are, in many cases, of a high order; and the triumph which has been effected over the religious prejudices of the natives, in popularizing the dissection of dead bodies, is a proof that this indirect mode of correcting their superstitions, by the influence of useful knowledge, is a highly-effectual one.*⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶¹ Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 276-278.

⁵⁶² Ibid. , p. 285.

⁵⁶³ Chaudhuri. S, 1990, Calcutta the Living City, Calcutta, Oxford University Press, p. 201.

⁵⁶⁴ Mill. J. S, op. cit. , p. 83.

A further related achievement was made from 1837 following a governmental decision to set English as the official language of the judiciary field.⁵⁶⁵ English was to replace Persian in the colonial law courts.⁵⁶⁶

In short, the reform of Trevelyan and Macaulay signified for the Indians not merely the advent of enlightening precepts. It also signified the endowment of skills required as employment qualifications by the colonial State continuously more Anglicized and in need for subordinate Indian workforce.⁵⁶⁷

1-3-2- The 1854 and 1859 Despatches

It is affirmed that the colonial government in British India took it upon itself the management of linguistic and scientific Anglicizing education.⁵⁶⁸ However, the related directives emanated in first place from the metropolitan government making and despatching broad guiding lines.⁵⁶⁹

By way of consolidating and further clarifying the definition of the British educative commitment, the British government saw it urgent in 1854 to renew the charter of the East India Company in such a way as to respond favourably again to mounting missionary pressure in London. The new charter allotted more educative provision for the Indians under the terms of Charles Wood's Education Despatch which set up a detailed scheme for a more elaborate system. The latter was to range from primary to university teaching with the accompaniment of an auxiliary administrative body.⁵⁷⁰ Here was the commencement of a new policy that, in addition to highlighting methods to be adopted to impart Anglicizing education to the Indian upper classes, searched for expanding the benefits of Western

⁵⁶⁵ Phillipson. R, op. cit. , pp. 110, 111.

⁵⁶⁶ Chakraborty. M, and Kumar Mohanta. T, 2005, "Assessing Radicalism in Early Nineteenth-Century Bengal," in The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 66, No. 1, pp. 153-174, Meerut, Indian Political Science Association, pp. 164, 165.

⁵⁶⁷ Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , p. 278.

⁵⁶⁸ Whitehead. C, 2003, Colonial Educators, The British Indian and Colonial Education Service 1858-1983, New York, I. B. Tauris, p. 5.

⁵⁶⁹ Mehrotra. S, 2006, The Economics of Elementary Education in India, New Delhi, Sage, p. 11.

⁵⁷⁰ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , pp. 319, 320.

knowledge to the colonized masses.⁵⁷¹ For this aim, Governor-General Lord Dalhousie was to allow higher budgetary expenditure for planned realizations. He gave many concrete expressions to his efforts as an educational reformer. It is reported that he permitted the creation of the Education Department, being separate from the other colonial administrative organisms, the founding of training schools for teachers, and a rise in public schools' number.⁵⁷²

Another aim of the 1854 Despatch was to reduce private contribution and increase public one through more governmental interference. It is explained that so as to make a balance in educative authority the new regulation encouraged missionaries to go and give Anglicizing education in British India through grants-in-aid but under the inspection of the colonial government.⁵⁷³

It was in application of the 1854 Despatch that the colonial government founded higher-education centres but at first to supervise college education. Actually, being not yet supplied with a full pedagogical structure, such centres were initially intended as watchers of college programs, assessments, diplomas, and titles in preparation of a full-university system.⁵⁷⁴ It was after the fashion of the University of London that the Despatch recommended the diffusion of arts, science, law, medicine, and civil engineering in colonial universities established in the presidency main towns. The universities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay opened in 1857; that of Lahore in 1882; and that of Allahabad in 1887.⁵⁷⁵ Furthermore, the regulation led to an increase in colleges number from 27 to 75 between 1857 and 1882.⁵⁷⁶

Furthermore, the 1854 Despatch was meant to reduce native prejudice in the educative sector.⁵⁷⁷ For example, in 1856, a Hindu-girl school in Calcutta, formerly

⁵⁷¹ Chaudhuri. S, 1990, Calcutta the Living City, Calcutta, Oxford University Press, pp. 91, 92.

⁵⁷² Chailley. J, op. cit. , pp. 483, 484.

⁵⁷³ Forbes. G. H, 1986, "In Search of the 'Pure Heathen': Missionary Women in Nineteenth Century India" in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 17, pp. WS2-WS8, Mumbai, Economic and Political Weekly, p. 2.

⁵⁷⁴ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 107.

⁵⁷⁵ Frazer. R. W, 1972, British India, New York, New World Book Manufacturing Co. Inc, p. 388.

⁵⁷⁶ Choudhary. S. K, op. cit. , pp. 58, 59.

⁵⁷⁷ Mill. J. S, op. cit. , pp. 81, 84.

established by Elliot Drinkwater Bethune⁵⁷⁸, was joined to the Department of Female Education. As a government institution, Bethune's School now symbolized colonial defiance to Indian anti-female learning attitude. Female Western education in British India is said to have been expanded and satisfactory in Agra endowed in 1856 with ninety-seven girl schools gathering in total around 2,000 pupils thanks to the efforts of the Indian sub-inspector and expert Gopal Sing. Native anti-female educational tradition went on being attacked elsewhere as in Muttra, Mynpooree, Poonah, and Ahmedabad gifted with same-type foundations.⁵⁷⁹

Before 1858, colonial government in British India was resting with the East India Company. As the company's rule and education policy were viewed as responsible for the Great Indian Mutiny⁵⁸⁰, London had its optimistic idealism destroyed, which impelled the metropolitan government to issue the 1859 Education Despatch. The latter was a measure taken to promote direct supervision of colonial Western education putting a definitive stop to the company educative role which had relied mostly on private contribution. In this respect, the 1859 Despatch confirmed the principles of the 1854 Wood's Despatch and meant local land taxes for educative provision in the name of Great Britain's government. Nevertheless, the new despatch did not exclude private partnership left serviceable together with the colonial government throughout the rest of the nineteenth century.⁵⁸¹

It is stated that between 1874 and 1884 the number of college students in Bengal multiplied by three whereas that of secondary pupils by seven between

⁵⁷⁸ Elliot Drinkwater Bethune (1801-1851) is the pioneer of female education in British India. His foundation of the Bethune School for girls in Calcutta in 1849 was highly valued by Lord Dalhousie who undertook the establishment of similar institutions in the colony. Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 162.

⁵⁷⁹ Mill. J. S, op. cit. , p. 84.

⁵⁸⁰ The Great Indian Mutiny (1857-1858) brought together the last Mughal Emperor with Indian rebels in arms against British rule. Although the British East India Company was recognized as the maker of the British empire in India, it was deemed responsible for the massive discontentment that had led to that Indian rising and was therefore dismissed by the home government. The British crushing of that revolt assured more colonial control of the Indian sub-continent now deprived of its traditional dynasty of Mughal emperors. Instead, the colonial State was thereafter to be headed by the British Crown. Frémeaux. J, op. cit. , pp. 23, 71.

⁵⁸¹ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , pp. 319, 320.

1871 and 1882.⁵⁸² So, one may presume that the despatches opened the way for a certain progress in terms of admissibility of Indian learners.

Thus, one may deduce that the 1850s Despatches combined neatly with the contribution of Macaulay and Trevelyan as the mainstay of Anglicizing education in British India, laying down the salient directives and objectives of that westernizing instruction.

2- Views on Westernising Education

It is asserted that colonial westernising-education program in nineteenth-century British India, though not without paternalistic benefits for the colonized, is subject to high controversy, contemporary or post-nineteenth-century analyses or evaluations being not unanimous.⁵⁸³

2-1- Orientalist Views

The colonial Western-education policy in nineteenth-century British India resulted in being echoed by Indian or non-Indian objection and a progressive rise of nationalism.⁵⁸⁴

While anglicist observers claimed that Christianity and science were symmetrical, in that they were congruently united, many orientalist ones argued that this relationship was not necessarily true.⁵⁸⁵ According to Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, a British-educated literary Indian man, the Hindu cults of Brahma, Shiva, and Vishnu were relatively more associative with science and nature, which rendered Hinduism more genuine on the ground of reason and logic. Here, Chatterjee agrees with the contemporary Indian Christian-converted writer Nemeniah

⁵⁸² Copland. I, 2007, "The Limits of Hegemony: Elite Responses to Nineteenth-Century Imperial and Missionary Acculturation Strategies in India" in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 637-665, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 658.

⁵⁸³ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 315.

⁵⁸⁴ Tangri. S. S, 1961, "Intellectuals and Society in Nineteenth-Century India" in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 368-394, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 368.

⁵⁸⁵ Viswanathan. G, 1988, op. cit. , pp. 95-97.

Goreh who had recognized in 1862 the dissociation of Christianity with reason viewing most Gospel principles as incoherent and baffling.⁵⁸⁶

Washbrook explains that regional social currents from non-colonized Indian princely states discounted Western education brought to southern India as not useful to the natives. In fact, Mysore, Travancore, and Baroda, being autonomous of British rule, went on developing the concept of Indian modernity as potentially viable. These states turned out to be centres defending the modern Indian man as capable to realize more civilization and a better ruling system if he freed himself from British rule. This southern movement is hailed as a social activist that effectively inspired Indian generations in British Madras with possibilities of a nicer future through a firm stop of colonial acculturation.⁵⁸⁷

Being staunchly attached to the classical thoughts and theories long developed within the Indian learning system, the orientalist were for maintaining the Sanskrit and Arabic languages as well as the local philosophy and religions.⁵⁸⁸ They also argued that mathematics, arithmetic, law, and metaphysical sciences were already profusely dealt with in Sanskrit and Arabic texts and that Western science might be useful to the Indians if taught in these two native languages.⁵⁸⁹

So, in the late nineteenth century too, British India witnessed more discontentment among the native population rejecting the Western cultural standards.⁵⁹⁰ Many Indians were now claiming a general return to their ancestral ideals. For example, the *Arya Sanaj* is an early organized group that rose in 1875 to lead a mauling against evangelizing enterprise in northern India through tracts. The association defended the Hindu holy books, namely the Vedas, and the Hindu

⁵⁸⁶ Bellenoit. H. J. A, op. cit. , p. 382.

⁵⁸⁷ Washbrook. D, 2004, op. cit. , p. 492.

⁵⁸⁸ Bugge. H, op. cit. , p. 88.

⁵⁸⁹ Kamerkar. M. P, op. cit. , p. 375.

⁵⁹⁰ Bellenoit. H. J. A, op. cit. , p. 378.

religious basics as the source of all knowledge.⁵⁹¹ This revival of native religious identity was also manifested by the Theosophical Society⁵⁹² acting locally and abroad.⁵⁹³

Whitehead mentions several post-nineteenth-century historians' names associated with orientalist opinions. Samir Amin, for example, regards the colonial Western-education mission as destructive to the indigenous culture.⁵⁹⁴ An aspect of that destruction is Indian-vernacular schools being brought progressively to decline owing to the rise of English-medium ones.⁵⁹⁵ While, to the pleasure of many Anglicized Indians, English-written books were being massively sold at earnings to the publishers, to the detriment of Arabic and Sanskrit, books printed in these two native languages through substantial public subsidization ended up discarded in lumber rooms.⁵⁹⁶ Persian was to incur gradual rejection too since 1835 with Lord Bentinck's decision to withdraw it from colonial government and law courts.⁵⁹⁷ Because these native languages were being less and less used in administration and public life, they stopped developing necessary terminologies for daily specific purposes.⁵⁹⁸ Quoted by his former student Viollis, a Hindu teacher of political economy made this following testimony:

⁵⁹¹ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 153.

⁵⁹² The Theosophical Society was founded in New York in 1875 by Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, Colonel Henry Steel Olcott, and William Quan Judge and developed by a group of Western and Indian thinkers and scholars as a spiritual movement holding anti-westernising tenets including the defence of Hinduism. Theosophists Blavatsky, Olcott, Judge, Alfred Percy Sinnett, Annie Besant, and Allan Octavian Hume were fascinated by the East and encouraged the study of the Eastern religions, philosophies, and sciences and showed their social and cultural importance. The Theosophical Society, headquartered in Adyar, founded and published the monthly *The Theosophist* and contributed to the daily newspaper *The Pioneer* so as to demonstrate that Hinduism constitute the unique source of all knowledge and all the other religions and civilizations. This movement criticized Victorian Christianity as being morally incoherent since it viewed it as irrational offering no possibility of redemption. In preaching this cause in British India, Besant urged the colonized to be active in their opposition to Victorian evangelization so as to liberate themselves from this westernising temptation. Pécastaing-Boissière. M, op. cit. , pp. 174, 175, 176, 178, 191, 193, 204, 205, 222, 225.

⁵⁹³ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 154.

⁵⁹⁴ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 317.

⁵⁹⁵ Heredia. R. C, op. cit. , p. 2336.

⁵⁹⁶ Sundaram. M. S, op. cit. , p. 497.

⁵⁹⁷ Robb. P, op. cit. , p. 138.

⁵⁹⁸ Sundaram. M. S, op. cit. , p. 498.

L'Angleterre, en entravant notre développement, empêcha nos réformes sociales et religieuses que nous aurions faites si nous avions gardé notre liberté; en déclarant que l'anglais serait la seule langue utilisée dans les établissements scolaires, elle a ruiné nos écoles. Au Moyen Age, nous étions à ce point de vue plus avancés que vous autres, gens d'Europe : nos universités étaient renommées, nos écoles techniques formaient des commerçants hardis, des artisans dont le monde se disputait les produits, et chacun de nos villages ouvrait une école où le prêtre donnait aux enfants tout au moins un minimum d'instruction.⁵⁹⁹

Amin sees a double role in that educative mission being not only destructive but also constructive in the sense that it was formative of a native elite of submissive cooperates. This notion of intellectual and professional subordination is similarly observed by Martin Camoy claiming that this subordination is by definition included in colonialism based on the policy of the stronger trying to secure hegemony through the conquest of the weaker's spirit.⁶⁰⁰ This observation comes in agreement with the assertion of the Cambridge historian Fieldhouse who sees the practical aim of Anglicization not in making the colonized European in temper and outlook but rather in training them for subsidiary positions in colonial administration and government.⁶⁰¹ Meanwhile, the colonial State was hoping that those Indians raised in the British culture would be inspired, for the continuity of their professional and social welfare, to care for the maintenance of the Anglo-Indian colonial ties.⁶⁰² Proficiency in English was made a prerequisite to social and material advantages.⁶⁰³ Indeed, Western education had the objective of rendering some Indians attendants and mechanics within the colonial civil service.⁶⁰⁴

That Britain led such an educative policy was less for the sake of civilizing the natives of her colony and making them foster aspects of modernity than on

⁵⁹⁹ Viollis. A, op. cit. , pp. 34, 36.

⁶⁰⁰ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 317.

⁶⁰¹ Fieldhouse. D. K, op. cit. , p. 272.

⁶⁰² Karat. P, 1972, "The Role of the English-Educated in Indian Politics" in Social Scientist, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 25-46, New Delhi, Social Scientist, pp. 26, 27, 32.

⁶⁰³ Phillipson. R, 1992, Linguistic Imperialism, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 111.

⁶⁰⁴ Chaudhuri. S, op. cit. , pp. 200, 201.

the altar of stability for her imperial power itself.⁶⁰⁵ In other words, the venture was mainly for security to British hegemony over India.⁶⁰⁶ It is claimed that Britain saw the introduction of the British culture and literary studies as a tool of social discipline and colonial management in avoidance of native rebellion and resistance.⁶⁰⁷ In that, voluntary, and not obligatory, enrolment in Anglicizing education was seen and applied as the most efficient way to keep up political control over the colony.⁶⁰⁸ Once familiar with and keen on British habits, tastes, knowledge, and Western faith, the Indians were expected to remain attached to the British imperial educational presence and colonial rule. In fact, basing her Western-education commitment on the consent of the individual Indian learner, the metropolis is said to have taken that charge as a protective measure against Indian rising and imperial-suzerainty loss.⁶⁰⁹ As an orientalist viewer too, Kamerkar mentions Trevelyan's belief that the Indian assimilation of the English language and European ideas would show the natives that this colonial educative commitment was a therapy to the long-lasting political chaos engendered by the traditional Indian system of government.⁶¹⁰ Mill admired in 1858 the success of general non-compulsoriness when it came to westernisation in British India, saying that:

*Officers trusted themselves to the people. By their courage and frankness they gained their confidence. They made them understand that they were not considered as wild animals to be hunted down; that nothing but their good was intended; and the object which had for years been vainly sought by force, was accomplished by explanation and persuasion.*⁶¹¹

It is believed that this linguistic and intellectual Anglicization came about under political, economic, and social unrelenting inducements.⁶¹² Discussing strategies by which the British could keep up the administration of their colony, Desousa

⁶⁰⁵ Roy. M, op. cit. , p. 84.

⁶⁰⁶ Copland. I, 2006, op. cit. , p. 1040.

⁶⁰⁷ Roy. A, op. cit. , p. 2.

⁶⁰⁸ Choudhary. S. K, op. cit. , pp. 57, 58.

⁶⁰⁹ Viswanathan. G, 1990, op. cit. , pp. 1, 2, 10.

⁶¹⁰ Kamerkar. M. P, op. cit. , p. 378.

⁶¹¹ Mill. J. S, op. cit. , p. 92.

⁶¹² Phillipson. R, op. cit. , p. 110.

gainsays the rejuvenating or civilizing character usually accredited to westernising education. The author thinks that the colonial educators, be them governmental or private, were rather most triumphant in constituting a category of middle-class or upper-class westernised Indians who would be disposed to aid both colonial rule and exploitation in return.⁶¹³ To illustrate this Indian utility for the colonial State, Phillipson mentions the need for such Western-educated natives as interpreters between the British colonial regime and millions of Indian subjects.⁶¹⁴ Thus, the belief that Western education could act as an imperial safeguard became the reasoning behind government support to that educative policy throughout the nineteenth century.⁶¹⁵ The claims of Phillipson and Desousa square with Choudhary's words running as follows:

The major change in Indian higher education took place through the initiatives of British rulers that made an impact both in positive and negative ways. At that time, the indigenous system of education received a severe setback as the British system created a new class which served the British rulers. Indians increasingly demanded an English style of higher education because it provided prestigious jobs in the British bureaucracy or in the growing commercial sector of the economy. Hence, the British themselves were convinced that they needed a class of educated Indians at the secondary-level posts in the Government to act as intermediaries between the Raj⁶¹⁶ and the Indian population.⁶¹⁷

Nevertheless, things ended by working contrarily to that expectation. Over time, even when native opposition was not addressed to Western-learning diffusion or evangelization, it would be turned to the colonial rule itself by those having

⁶¹³ Desousa. V, op. cit. , pp. 63, 64.

⁶¹⁴ Phillipson. R, op. cit. , p. 110.

⁶¹⁵ Copland. I, 2006, op. cit. , 1038, 1039, 1040.

⁶¹⁶ The British Raj was a new phase in the history of British India, whereby the latter was brought under tighter colonial administration from 1858. In that, the periphery was put under direct metropolitan crown rule with the goal of assuring continuity for British paramount power. Thiessen. J, op. cit. , p. 44.

⁶¹⁷ Choudhary. S. K, op. cit. , pp. 50, 58.

received Western education.⁶¹⁸ Western education shook Indian conservatism and ingrained Indian liberal thought.⁶¹⁹ It is explained that from the Hindu *baboo* class rose English-educated leaders of the Indian nationalist movement operative from the last quarter of the century so as to campaign against British rule.⁶²⁰ Disaffected by the small number of posts created for the Indians by colonial recruiting bureaucracy, the *baboo* turned out to represent the university-educated Indian who could not get the promised and desired job. Yet, as a holder of a Western-type diploma, the *baboo* was qualified to administrative position, which entailed his indocility vis-à-vis the colonial State.⁶²¹ Indeed, Western education is said to have turned counterproductive to the stability of the *Raj*.⁶²²

Yet, in her 1858 Proclamation⁶²³, Queen Victoria pledged that her Indian subjects would be freely admitted to her public function if responding to that diploma qualification.⁶²⁴ And earlier, the 1833 Act, enacted by the colonial State, had explicitly promised the free incorporation of the natives in the colonial civil service, too, by stipulating that:

*whatever other tests of qualification may be adopted, distinction of race or religion shall not be of the number; that no subject of the King, whether of Indian or British or mixed descent, shall be excluded from the posts usually conferred on uncovenanted servants in India, or from the covenanted service itself, provided he be otherwise eligible.*⁶²⁵

⁶¹⁸ Markovits. C, 1987, "Some Trends in European (Mainly British) Historiography of Modern India" in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 10, pp. 416-418, Mumbai, Economic and Political Weekly, p. 417.

⁶¹⁹ Métin. A, op. cit. , p. 199.

⁶²⁰ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 320.

⁶²¹ Roy. A, op. cit. , pp. 2, 3.

⁶²² Markovits. C, op. cit. , p. 417.

⁶²³ The 1858 Proclamation of Queen Victoria was addressed to the Indian people, recognizing their right to a fair colonial government capable of realizing for them social, economic, and scientific progress within a policy of metropolitan paternalism. Pécastaing-Boissière. M, op. cit. , p. 218.

⁶²⁴ Frazer. R. W, op. cit. , p. 372.

⁶²⁵ Pattabhi. B. S, 1935, The History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1935), Masulipatam, The Working Committee of the Congress, p. 7.

In a few words, one may claim that Christian and Anglicizing education in nineteenth-century British India was largely detrimental to Indian culture and strategically meant for the creation of a handful of native elite collaborators for securing a continuation of British imperial rule.

2-2- Anglicist Views

While the above orientalist vision generally leaned on popular attachment to the traditional Indian outlook or dissatisfaction with nineteenth-century Western education in British India, the anglicist vision, on the other hand, rested on moral and practical grounds to defend the reformatory educative policy.⁶²⁶

The Anglicists opposed the Indian educative system viewing it necessarily replaceable by the British one being entirely based on British or at least European literature.⁶²⁷ Probably more anglicist than others were Buchanan and Macaulay. The former claimed that “...no system which has not the reformation of the morals of the people for its basis, can be effective”⁶²⁸. As for the latter, serving as the President of the Committee of Public Instruction, he considered that “a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.” Not only contemporary writers as Buchanan or company officials as Macaulay were largely anglicist; so were British missionaries particularly those in higher education carrying it out in English only.⁶²⁹

The anglicising campaign unfolding in nineteenth-century British India included the attack of Trevelyan against an orientalist attempt to promote the Arabic language. Using his professional position in the General Committee of Public Instruction, Trevelyan influenced the colonial government to hinder in 1833 an enterprise of John Tytler, an official in the colonial medical service, to translate European medical works to Arabic. The anglicist reformer pleaded rather for an

⁶²⁶ Gupta, J, 2008, “Modernity and the Global "Hindoo": The Concept of the Grand Tour in Colonial India” in *The Global South*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 59-70, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, p. 68.

⁶²⁷ Bugge, H, op. cit. , p. 88.

⁶²⁸ Buchanan, C, op. cit. , p. 35.

⁶²⁹ Bugge, H, op. cit. , p. 88.

English translation as being relatively adequate in content, claiming that former Arabic translations of that documentation in Egypt and Bombay had shown failure for inadequacy. Tytler's project soon came to a stop after Trevelyan had been appointed by Lord Bentinck as Deputy Secretary of the Native Medical Education Committee. This appointment was to reinforce the anglicist ambition.⁶³⁰

The anglicising campaign was partly induced by British Benthamists acting within the East India Company in application of the doctrine of Jeremy Bentham namely Benthamism also called Utilitarianism, its main principle being the search of common utility.⁶³¹ This philosophy recommended that all Man's behaviour should aim at maximal happiness for the maximal number of people and the avoidance of human pain, which set the ideology itself on a rationalistic base favouring collective interest within society.⁶³² Thus, utilitarianism came to struggle against arbitrary passions and immoral religious beliefs and deeds.⁶³³ In an 1838 report, Trevelyan is said to have considered Indian history as composed of tales; Indian medicine as false; Indian geography and astronomy as ridiculous; and Indian law as contradictory, not firm, and brutal.⁶³⁴ Utilitarians, such as Trevelyan who pleaded in 1838 for the westernizing education of the Indians under the British flag, did much to give British presence in India the significance of abuse reform as well as common civilizing progress.⁶³⁵

Adhering to the laissez-faire policy, utilitarian colonial thinkers advocated the greatest individual liberty alongside equal social liberty. But, they claimed that since the pursuit of happiness and the avoidance of pain should exist at the whole social level, every governmental measure was to be in accord with this doctrine. Thus, while they recommended the minimization of state interference in private ambitions, they acknowledged the necessity of the law as being absolutely supreme

⁶³⁰ Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , pp. 282-284.

⁶³¹ Bellenoit. H. J. A, op. cit. , pp. 369, 370.

⁶³² Trautmann. T. R, op. cit. , p. 117.

⁶³³ Audard. C, op. cit. , pp. 736, 737.

⁶³⁴ Handy. J and Kirkpatrick. M. D, 2016, "'A Terrible Necessity': The Economist on India" in Canadian Journal of History, Vol. 2, No. 51, pp. 269-300, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, pp. 283, 284.

⁶³⁵ Marx. R, 2009, op. cit. , p. 709.

so as to assure welfare enterprises.⁶³⁶ Accordingly, under the terms of his 1835 official edict, Lord Bentinck ordered that English be the official language of the colonial State in replacement of Persian for management efficiency and future social and political betterments.⁶³⁷

While Utilitarians observed the pursuit of happiness and the avoidance of pain as being rightful moral acts, they equally saw that the right action for a category of people to do may be harmful for another category of people.⁶³⁸ Indeed, utilitarianism claims that the right act to be done by one social community in a given situation may have negative effect for an opposite community. Thus, this theory argues it is judicious to assess and compare the effects of possible actions and then choose the best alternative.⁶³⁹ Utilitarians believed in the complementary relationship between science and material progress as epitomized by the Industrial Revolution. They valued highly the dissemination of science as the prerequisite of the formation of wealth.⁶⁴⁰ Accordingly, Utilitarians advocated a complete rejection of both orientalist education and Indian spiritual tradition and an entire assimilation to British norms on the ground that Western science was to guarantee the development of the Indian society regardless of the conservative Indian character.⁶⁴¹ It is thought that what favoured the reception of utilitarianism in British India was the latter being affected by political and social disorder entailed by Indian despotism and a mediocrity in social relations that could be cured by means of Western education.⁶⁴²

Another anglicist view emerged upon the Great Indian Mutiny and would partly account for the limited character of the Western-education system in British India. This view may be reducible to the fact that the colonial officers, becoming aware of the firm attachment of the Indian population to its native culture and

⁶³⁶ Gregg, P, 1984, A Social and Economic History of Britain, Cheltenham, Nelson Thornes Ltd, pp. 278, 279.

⁶³⁷ Robb, P, op. cit. , p. 138.

⁶³⁸ Gregg, P, op. cit. , p. 279.

⁶³⁹ Audard, C, op. cit. , p. 739.

⁶⁴⁰ Whitehead, C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 318.

⁶⁴¹ Desousa, V, op. cit. , p. 63.

⁶⁴² Wilson, J. E, 2007, "Early Colonial India beyond Empire" in The Historical Journal, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 951-970, London, Cambridge University Press, p. 967.

religions, were too concerned not to arouse further Indian discontentment now that the mutiny was over in 1859.⁶⁴³ In fact, British administrators knew about the dangers to be created by a foreign culture contacting a local one and thought it would be safer to make no further attempt to introduce drastic cultural change into the Indian society.⁶⁴⁴ The blame was put on the British East India Company liquidated in 1858, its powers and rights being transferred to the British Crown by an act of parliament for fear of losing British interests in India in case another Indian rising was to shake the colonial State.⁶⁴⁵

Dalziel tallies with Whitehead examining the role and major effect of the ‘white man’s burden’ on Anglo-Indian rapport. The term ‘white man’s burden’ came to refer to the missionary duty the British assigned themselves towards India from 1813. Being mainly religious, this commitment had its executors, evangelicals and radical liberals, introducing successfully Christianity as well as British social manners and morals with the proclaimed aim of civilizing the colonized. To these innovative measures were added those implemented by Governor-General Lord Bentinck between 1828 and 1835 including the promotion of both Western-science education and the learning of English. The whole reform constituted a time bomb of which explosion in 1857 would induce Britain to revise her westernising program.⁶⁴⁶

Those numerous colonial measures, including prohibitive ones such as the abolition of *sati*⁶⁴⁷, brought up a nationwide class of anglicised Christian Indians contributing to the dissemination of the Western cultural character across the sub-continent. Notwithstanding, this new fashion was regarded by the bulk of the colonized population as an offense to its own institutions and dogmas pertaining

⁶⁴³ Handy. J and Kirkpatrick. M. D, op. cit. , p. 294.

⁶⁴⁴ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , pp. 319-320.

⁶⁴⁵ Marx. R, 2009, op. cit. , p. 710.

⁶⁴⁶ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 61.

⁶⁴⁷ Of all the ancient rituals determining Indianness and appalling the British, *sati* was particularly criticized for immorality. *Sati* was the frequent fire immolation of Hindu widows, practised even forcibly against their will by their relatives. The frequency of *sati* could be decreased through the constant efforts of the company from 1813 after the House of Commons had renewed the company’s charter deciding in favour of the evangelical mission for British India. Marriott. J, op. cit. , pp. 59, 60, 93, 94, 118.

either to Hinduism or Islam.⁶⁴⁸ Cases in point are the 1850 Caste Disabilities Act, giving property heritage right to Hindu converts to Christianity, and the 1856 law entitling Hindu widows to remarry.⁶⁴⁹ In Copland's view, the evangelising efforts prior to the Great Indian Mutiny were considerable but modestly fruitful since most Indians kept being attached to their native faiths and cultures. And yet, these little-scaled Anglicisation and evangelisation were enough to threaten the Indian identity and thus contributed to provoke the rising.⁶⁵⁰ Even the company Indian soldiers, known as *sepoys* and making up % 92,60 of the company army, took part in the rebellion, which caused Britain to almost lose her control over India.⁶⁵¹ It is estimated that out of the four hundred evangelical missionaries in all British India thirty-seven were killed by the mutineers.⁶⁵² What is more, to regain the control of the revolted areas, the British did it at the cost of one-year colonial revenues totalling around £ 36 million.⁶⁵³ Washbrook discusses that point of causality as follows :

*Doubtless, the supremacy eventually established by English culture, and the growing authority of European over other knowledges as the nineteenth century wore on, affected Indian eclecticism and reduced it, in many circumstances, to slavish imitation of the colonizers. But, much of the old spirit continued to live on: where evangelical missionaries found themselves drawn into caste conflicts over honour and status, which had a much older history; and where European ideas of modern statehood came eventually to be turned against the colonizers themselves.*⁶⁵⁴

So, the revision of the westernising program due to the revolt was officially for the colonial conservation of the traditional holy makings of the Indian

⁶⁴⁸ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 61.

⁶⁴⁹ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 108.

⁶⁵⁰ Copland. I, 2006, op. cit. , pp. 1045, 1047, 1048.

⁶⁵¹ Fieldhouse. D. K, op. cit. , p. 277.

⁶⁵² Riddick. J.F, op. cit. , p. 152.

⁶⁵³ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 112.

⁶⁵⁴ Washbrook. D, 2004, op. cit. , p. 494.

society.⁶⁵⁵ Colonial interference in any local religious conviction, worship, or tradition was now solemnly banned by the metropolitan government.⁶⁵⁶ The latter felt even obliged to recognise the right of the Indians to opinion liberty as to the rightness or wrongness of any spiritual matter.⁶⁵⁷ Thus, it is believed that the colonial State thereafter no longer seriously ventured into Christian education.⁶⁵⁸ In her primary source published in Allahabad in 1858, Queen Victoria herself pledged that her government would apply a policy of social acceptance for the sake of Anglo-Indian coexistence in the colony.⁶⁵⁹ In this frame, the monarch promised the protection of the Indian ancestral traditions and customs.⁶⁶⁰ The historian Fieldhouse comments upon the new policy in the ensuing words:

*By the late nineteenth century, Britain had created an educational system based on the European model, which may have concentrated excessively on the teaching of English and on European subjects. Yet, British rule was characterized more by its cautious conservatism than by its innovation. During nearly two centuries of power, it made surprisingly little impact on Indian civilization. Hindu religion and the caste system remained the basis of Indian society: only a very small minority of Indians were affected by Western ideas and habits. The British Raj was an umbrella under which Indians retained their own identity.*⁶⁶¹

For instance, being conscious of the fact that the untouchables were categorically rejected by the native population for supposed irremediable uncleanness, the Catholic missionaries kept debarring this unaccepted community

⁶⁵⁵ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 61.

⁶⁵⁶ Heredia. R. C, op. cit. , p. 2335.

⁶⁵⁷ Frémeaux. J, op. cit. , p. 335.

⁶⁵⁸ Patterson. S, 2009, The Cult of Imperial Honour in British India, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 102, 103.

⁶⁵⁹ Hanover. V, 1858, *Proclamation, by the Queen in Council, to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of India*, London and Allahabad, www.bl.uk/.../proclamation-by-the-queen-in-council-to-the-..., pp. 1, 2.

⁶⁶⁰ Pécastaing-Boissière. M, op. cit. , p. 218.

⁶⁶¹ Fieldhouse. D. K, op. cit. , pp. 283-284.

from the church. Moreover, unlike the Protestant missionary churches, the Catholic ones would never rank a low-caste employee or official above a high-caste one.⁶⁶²

Yet, one may argue that the colonial State did not honour its promise of never re-interfering in the traditional matters of Indian life. Imperial evangelicalism kept gathering momentum, which caused the Indian Christian minority to grow even after the Proclamation of Queen Victoria of 1858.⁶⁶³ The colonial government went on realising Christianizing plans bringing about further aggrandisement in colonial structure for the acculturation of the natives. That was the case in 1877 when the diocese of Calcutta, having become too large, split into two by shooting off the diocese of Lahore embracing northern British India under the responsibility of Reverend Thomas Valpy French as its first incumbent.⁶⁶⁴ What is more, the massive conversion of low-caste Hindus in the 1860s and 1870s to Protestantism was an expression of British objection to the traditional caste system of India, which likewise constituted a religious offence to the colonized population.⁶⁶⁵

According to Bugge, one overt way of defying and sapping the caste system in British India was the introduction of a special party called 'love-feast'. Celebrated at least once a year, this event became a custom that gathered low-caste members with high-caste ones around a meal within the same Protestant congregation. This practice became so appreciated by its partakers that they got used to eating from the same plate, which had been traditionally unfeasible. Moreover, high-caste partakers were made familiar with such food systematically mismatched with their caste as meat. Overtime, the love-feast party became so usual even in seminaries, messes, and lectures.⁶⁶⁶

To sum up this section, one may infer that the anglicist commitment in nineteenth-century British India was characterized not only by the notion of eurocentricity, setting Western cultural standards well above those of India, but also

⁶⁶² Bugge. H, op. cit. , pp. 89, 90.

⁶⁶³ Constable. P, op. cit. , p. 288.

⁶⁶⁴ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 153.

⁶⁶⁵ Constable. P, op. cit. , p. 288.

⁶⁶⁶ Bugge. H, op. cit. , p. 93.

by a certain hesitation and refrainment out of deference to Indian sensibilities. In fact, Britain did emanate from 1858 ambivalence towards acculturating her Indian subjects.

2-3- Assessment of the Educative Enterprise

In assessment of colonial westernizing education in nineteenth-century British India, one may report critical views on the input or output of this reformative enterprise.

Examining the extent of Western education in nineteenth-century British India, one may claim that this reform was never performed in serious terms. It is said that the colonial government based in Calcutta never issued a common pattern for the whole educative enterprise nor did it spend on it sufficient funds out of parsimony.⁶⁶⁷ Indeed, the colonial government is criticized by Indian observers as having lacked a sustained interest in the matter. Indian pursuit of English education was so increasing that late in the century many profit-seeking schools kept operating with no monetary aid from the colonial government and thus turned free from governmental inspection.⁶⁶⁸ *Zanana* teaching, for example, is said to have always suffered from a dearth of both books for Indian girls and instrumental literary documents for woman tutors i.e. the *zananas*.⁶⁶⁹

Hilliker illustrates that insufficiency with the contribution of Trevelyan and Macaulay following Lord Bentinck's 1835 regulation. The author says that their reforming efforts were significant, but the ensuing production was not large enough owing to inadequate subsidization and the absence of a fair distribution across the colony. With an annual budget of only about Rupees 275.000, of which around % 65 emanated from the colonial government and % 35 from Indian wealthy patrons, educational provision was mainly devoted to Bengal being the capital region of the

⁶⁶⁷ Whitehead. C, 2003, op. cit. , pp. 6, 47, 48.

⁶⁶⁸ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , pp. 320, 321.

⁶⁶⁹ Government of India. , op. cit. , p. 536.

British Indian empire.⁶⁷⁰ Indeed, there kept being no equitable supply of that provision for the three colonial Presidencies as Bengal, and more specifically Calcutta, were receiving most educative benefits throughout the century.⁶⁷¹ What is more, just a few Bengali institutions could benefit from that budget such as the Calcutta Madrasa and the Hindu College.⁶⁷² Even the latter was operating on very restricted terms as it never had over a hundred students.⁶⁷³

In the light of the new educative order promoted since 1835, British India made intense anglicist efforts for institutional foundation, which however did not always lead to the wanted results. According to an 1883 government primary source, this scheme made only three real achievements being outstanding lasting secondary schools located in Madras, Cuddalore, and Rajamahendra and opened before the issuance of the 1850s Despatches.⁶⁷⁴ Moreover, intense anglicist efforts did not mean swift realisation; deciding on the educational policy and implementing a related decision entirely on time were two distinct matters. It is stated that educational arrangements and provisions between 1835 and 1854 went much more slowly than it had been foreseen. The British are accused of having been dilatory in dealing with the Western education of the colonized Indians.⁶⁷⁵

One may claim that the Indian society itself was partly responsible for that ineffectiveness. Female schooling for example, though considered and programmed within the British education policy, met with opposition from the supposed narrow-mindedness of many Indians described as staunchly conservative.⁶⁷⁶ As a customary principle, only boys received instruction while girls had no admittance to school especially in the Muslim community where they had to wear the veil very early in the morning and stay at home.⁶⁷⁷ Forbes explains that the failure of westernising schools to attract Indian females was also due to the Indian non-acceptance of

⁶⁷⁰ Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , p. 276.

⁶⁷¹ Kochhar. R, 2008, "Seductive Orientalism: English Education and Modern Science in Colonial India" in *Social Scientist*, Vol. 36, No. 3/4, pp. 45-63, New Delhi, Social Scientist, p. 46.

⁶⁷² Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , p. 276.

⁶⁷³ Kamerkar. M. P, op. cit. , p. 376.

⁶⁷⁴ Government of India. , op. cit. , p. 10.

⁶⁷⁵ Chailley. J, op. cit. , p. 483.

⁶⁷⁶ Forbes. G. H, op. cit. , p. 2.

⁶⁷⁷ Métin. A, op. cit. , p. 189.

male teachers for girls, while schools tended to lack female teachers. Besides, the domestic responsibilities that the Indian females assumed before and after their early marriage busily held them.⁶⁷⁸

At the end of the nineteenth century, it was estimated that only twelve million Indians were literate in English while only one-fifth of Indian boys and one-fiftieth of Indian girls attended the English-instruction schools of British India. This restriction is said to have occurred in spite of the fact that the budgetary expenditure for English education was multiplied by a factor of one hundred since 1859.⁶⁷⁹ Female literacy in all British India accounted for just 0.2 % in 1881.⁶⁸⁰ The primary source of Harmand confirms this scantiness claiming that one is right

*en évaluant à un chiffre très inférieur à 25,000 le nombre des Indiens qu'on peut appeler des hommes instruits, et que, sur les 123 millions de femmes hindoues et musulmanes de l'Inde, il n'y en a probablement pas 500 auxquelles on puisse donner la même qualification. A Madras, la partie la plus anglicisée de l'Inde, la proportion des diplômés par rapport à la population totale est de 38 à 1 million. On ne parle ici que de ceux qui ont reçu une instruction anglaise.*⁶⁸¹

Even the 1854 Despatch is said to have been applied in an ineffective manner as it was discriminatory vis-à-vis the colonized. Walsh acknowledges that the application of the despatch raised an Indian degree-holder elite with a good command of both English and European science in different regions of British India. Notwithstanding, the author adds that the result of this project was a non-mass educative system as those Indian graduates made up only a little minority.⁶⁸² More specifically regarding that discrimination, Choudhary sees colonial higher education following the 1850s Despatches as bringing inequalities vis-à-vis region,

⁶⁷⁸ Forbes. G. H, op. cit. , p. 2.

⁶⁷⁹ Métin. A, op. cit. , p. 190.

⁶⁸⁰ Kamat. A. R, 1976, op. cit. , p. 4.

⁶⁸¹ Harmand. J, 1892, *L'Inde*, Paris, Société d'éditions scientifique, p. 186.

⁶⁸² Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , pp. 107, 108.

gender, and caste. In this, colonial higher education is said to have been concentrated in towns and cities and more afforded to males and high-caste orders than to females and low-caste orders.⁶⁸³ Most female education would still be given at the primary level only.⁶⁸⁴

The parsimony of the central government was to engender a situation of constraint and mediocrity. Examining Bellenoit's article, one may put forward the analytical view that religious, linguistic, or scientific education was not always independently in the British hands. Northern India for example is said to have had its mission schools frustrated as continuously unable to afford typical Western education for lack of funds, which caused the number of qualified teachers to be critically small. In fact, the Education Department, being under the control of the colonial State, never allotted enough money to recruit enough European instructors, which not only made missionary education poor in quality but also dependent upon Indian teachers. Thus, many schools in northern India became incapable to assure professional prospects for their learners; the latter received no sufficient Western knowledge for employment within the colonial state. Consequently, those schools were shunned by students and their families who rather sought acceptable results so that decent or prestigious jobs be got right upon their educative courses.⁶⁸⁵ This scholastic mediocrity and Indian pursuit of colonial employment are said to be not specifically regional but rather general in British India particularly late in the period under study.⁶⁸⁶

Educative constraint also manifested itself in the limitation of admittance to colleges and universities since matriculation preconditioned both test passage and then high fees. This fact in its turn meant a constraint in the recruitment of Indians by the colonial State. The thing is that the Educative Department was acting according to the limited availability of administrative jobs, restricting ipso facto registration at colleges and universities.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸³ Choudhary. S. K, op. cit. , p. 59.

⁶⁸⁴ Kamat. A. R, 1976, op. cit. , p. 4.

⁶⁸⁵ Bellenoit. H. J. A, op. cit. , pp. 385, 386, 388.

⁶⁸⁶ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 320.

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid. , p. 321.

Reading Kochhar's article, one may think that that learning-recruiting situation grew more critical as even Western-graduated Indians remained redundant, which engendered Indian discontentment and British fear of Indian disloyalty.⁶⁸⁸ Between 1855 and 1868 for example, it is estimated that the jobs granted to such educated Indians by the Home Civil Service across too-heavily-populated British India totalled 9, 824 only.⁶⁸⁹ Therefore, the British would often be accused by the Indians of intentionally depriving them of the opportunity to prosper socially.⁶⁹⁰ The inability of the colonial State to meet all Indian white-collar employment ambitions even after university graduation gave an incomplete character to the advantageousness of that colonial westernising education.⁶⁹¹ Kamat sees this problem as due to the incapacity of the colonial State to set up a balance between student registration and diploma-holders recruitment.⁶⁹² Hilliker agrees with Whitehead adding that this economic powerlessness to provide administrative jobs for all Anglicized Indian diploma-holders was a cause of popular discontentment. Actually, British India saw a boost in anti-British nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century.⁶⁹³

Another analytical view regarding the constant reliance of missionary schools in northern India upon the natives is that the solicited Indian teachers tended to outnumber the British ones. Thus, those Christian institutions lost much of their Christian religiosity as their Indian instructors were and remained either Muslim or Hindu in both worship and professional interaction. Bellenoit puts the percentage of operative Christian teachers at around 20.63 and that of Hindu and Muslim ones together at around 79.37 as corresponding to the period between 1888 and 1906. As a result, missionary schools in northern India became less coloured by Christianity and more influenced by native religions though their curricula kept being Western, not oriental, in content. In other words, although Christian by

⁶⁸⁸ Kochhar. R, op. cit. , pp. 58, 59.

⁶⁸⁹ Thiessen. J, op. cit. , p. 43.

⁶⁹⁰ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 321.

⁶⁹¹ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , pp. 323, 324, 326.

⁶⁹² Kamat. A. R, 1980, "Educational Policy in India: Critical Issues" in Sociological Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 187-205, New Delhi, Indian Sociological Society, p. 195.

⁶⁹³ Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , p. 277.

foundation, those schools soon turned partly Indian in outlook due to an Indian-teacher majority therein. This majority and the registered Indian learners were anglicist in terms of language and science but remained orientalist in spirit.⁶⁹⁴ Moreover, lack of Christian outlook in those regional missionary schools was evidenced by an imbalance in student demographics, shown as about % 04.13 for Christian Indian students versus % 95.86 for Hindu or Muslim Indian students attending between 1880 and 1906. Being not at heart attracted by Christian values, the bulk of those provincial students manifested a certain eclecticism and were more interested in passing their exams than in assimilating and adopting Christian morals. Actually, because they aspired to administrative positions under the colonial umbrella, those schooled in northern India ran mainly after diplomas so as to better their social status but showed little attachment to biblical education.⁶⁹⁵

According to Heredia, in all British India, many Indians agreed to take Western education but not the Christian religion.⁶⁹⁶ One of the main causes of this selective attitude is said to be the influence of the Bengali scholar Ram Mohan Roy the founder of the Hindu College of Calcutta. He exhorted his country fellows to come to terms with European thought without giving up their ancestral spirituality. Thus, even though Indians prospered as English-literate lawyers, doctors, teachers, or journalists within the colonial administration, they remained proud of their being faithful Hindus or Muslims. So, the final result did not correspond to the expectation of Macaulay whose ideological enterprise had rather aimed at total anglicist assimilation in terms of language, culture, science, and religion all together.⁶⁹⁷

In Whitehead's opinion, the colonial enterprise in question was a failure if most-of-time related Indian attitude is taken into account. The author claims that principles and theories were easily feasible, but when it came to applying them duly government officials and school managers often proved to be incapable owing

⁶⁹⁴ Bellenoit. H. J. A, op. cit. , pp. 385, 386.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid. , pp. 386, 387.

⁶⁹⁶ Heredia. R. C, op. cit. , p. 2337.

⁶⁹⁷ Mc Intyre. W. D, 1996, Colonies into Commonwealth, London, Blandford Press, pp. 179, 180.

to their lacking favourable feedback from the colonised. The problem was that the latter bore financial or customary constraints that limited their school attendance and familiarity with Western education. Child labour among the colonized population was a daily necessity that precluded schooling set on the payment of fees even for poor peasants. Besides, unlike the English-class tradition in which the upper strata volunteered out of humanity to provide education to lower social orders, the Hindu caste system knew no such welfare. Thus, even when upper-caste Indians financially supported anglicising schooling, it was solely for the benefit of their own offsprings.⁶⁹⁸

Contrarily to the expectation of anglicist missionaries and statesmen, the filtration of anglicising education by upper-strata Indians down to lower-strata ones failed. This failure was also due to an impact of this instruction on the Indian upper classes theoretically expected to be the secondary educational diffuser after the Western missionaries and teachers. According to Kamekar, the problem is reducible to the fact that after having grown Anglicised in language, science, and culture, upper-classes Indians turned their backs scornfully to their non-Anglicised countrymen. Thinking now more highly of themselves, such upper-classes Indians went aloof from and unhelpful to the rest of the society most of which remained illiterate.⁶⁹⁹ Consequently, the Anglophile current was partly disrupted.⁷⁰⁰

In brief, westernising Christian or scientific education in nineteenth-century British India may be labelled as largely incomplete, not uniform, monetarily precarious, dependent on the Indian response, and not always professionalising vis-à-vis the colonized.

⁶⁹⁸ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 320.

⁶⁹⁹ Kamekar. M. P, op. cit. , p. 378.

⁷⁰⁰ Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , p. 277.

CHAPTER FOUR

Colonial Westernising Technical Infrastructure in Nineteenth-Century British India

Colonial rule in British India is said to have been induced by the determination of making profits through the exploitation of Indian riches.⁷⁰⁰ However, this economic calculus is said to be veiled by continual theorisation trying to reflect a legitimate image of imperial rule justified by the pretension to civilise and modernise the colony.⁷⁰¹ The four last decades of the nineteenth century are observed as a period of infrastructural innovations with the proclaimed aim of economic development for the Indians under British rule.⁷⁰² In a primary source published in Allahabad in 1858 and addressed to her Indian subjects, Queen Victoria of Great Britain and Ireland said:

*It is Our earnest desire to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its government for the benefit of all Our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be Our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude Our best reward. And may the God of all Power grant to Us, and to those in authority under Us, Strength to carry out these Our Wishes for the good of Our people.*⁷⁰³

1- Telegraph

In the second half of the nineteenth century, British India was equally the scene of a communicative revolution brought about by an aspect of new technology namely telegraph.⁷⁰⁴

⁷⁰⁰ Desousa. V, op. cit. , p. 61.

⁷⁰¹ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 125.

⁷⁰² Derbyshire. I. D, 1987, "Economic Change and the Railways in North India, 1860-1914" in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 21, pp. 521-545, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 545.

⁷⁰³ Hanover. V, op. cit. , p. 2.

⁷⁰⁴ Dutt. R, 1902, The Economic History of India under Early British Rule, London, Kegan Paul, p. 431.

1.1- Telegraph Installation

The telegraphic enterprise in British India is commonly said to be a feat of engineering combining science with perseverance, in other words, technical and human virtues.

Anglo-Indian by professional vocation within the East India Company, the Irish assistant surgeon William Brooke O'Shaughnessy put down his name in history as the establisher of telegraphic communication in British India. Prior to this achievement, the scientist had laid an experimental background in India itself. He had invented an advanced kind of electrical engine namely the silver chloride battery. This technical realisation, increasing his confidence in electricity's potentialities for mankind's advantage in his adoptive colony, would spur his examination of the feasibility of telegraphic communication there.⁷⁰⁵

Therein, telegraphic communication was equally precluded by another technical progress made in 1839 when O'Shaughnessy set up an experimental line near Calcutta, which showed the usefulness of steps for a more efficient achievement. This experiment brought the conclusion that it was possible for an induction coil to convey coded shocks for manual reception by a line user. This, in its turn, constituted a peripheral invention that O'Shaughnessy could then develop thanks to other discoveries of his own. It is said that he succeeded in making good transmission of signals by associating hydraulic potentialities with electricity along a considerable distance, involving the use of miles of iron wire on trees and the Hooghly River. This experiment was not to be his final specimen of telegraph installation, but it demonstrated the need for subaquatic metallic circuits for the purpose of the project lying ahead. Thus, O'Shaughnessy is one of the fathers of submarine telegraphy. All his preliminary testing works are said to have been

⁷⁰⁵ Gorman. M, 1971, "Sir William O'Shaughnessy, Lord Dalhousie, and the Establishment of the Telegraph System in India" in *Technology and Culture*, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 581-601, Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 582, 583.

auspicious as they led him to deduce that telegraph lines as long as hundreds of miles would be, once set up, easily operable.⁷⁰⁶

Because setting up even an initial simple experimental line was reckoned as a highly-expensive project, telegraph installation in British India proved to be not financially independent though achieved by private hands.⁷⁰⁷ O'Shaughnessy is said to have been certain of his enterprise's viability, and yet this was not enough for its realisation. O'Shaughnessy formally solicited in 1850 the board of directors of the East India Company for funding while having the advocacy of Lord Dalhousie. As a utilitarian of considerable administrative wizardry, the latter is deemed by many historians the most effective of British India's rulers partly on account of his devotion to technological westernisation therein. In fact, Dalhousie is claimed to be of a pragmatic mind open to new ideas in favour of economic betterment of the colony through a wider commercial exploit.⁷⁰⁸ He ended as an active promoter of telegraphy in British India.⁷⁰⁹ It is stated that upon a test done successfully on telegraphy in the colony by O'Shaughnessy, the latter was appointed Superintendent of Electronic Telegraphs in 1850 by Dalhousie who would permit the spending of £ 217,000 just over the next six years for the construction of 4,000 miles of line.⁷¹⁰ The promotion of the telegraph in British India is said to have spanned the second half of the nineteenth century, but it is during Dalhousie's general governorship, in the 1850s, that the telegraphic linking of the major Indian centres was achieved.⁷¹¹

Telegraph installation could only start after Dalhousie had persuaded the board of directors of the East India Company, severely beset by martial costs in the colony, that a planned line of just 80 miles would be the cornerstone of a future network of several thousands of miles. It is the personal advocacy of Dalhousie that made O'Shaughnessy obtain soon from London a favourable reply

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid. , p. 583.

⁷⁰⁷ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 88.

⁷⁰⁸ Gorman. M, op. cit. , pp. 584, 585.

⁷⁰⁹ Seaman. L. C. B, 1973, Victorian England, London, Routledge, p. 344.

⁷¹⁰ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 51.

⁷¹¹ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 99.

for the enterprise he was to head up.⁷¹² The engineering skilfulness of O'Shaughnessy alone, without the technophile and utilitarian character of Dalhousie, could not have secured the approval and patronage of the company's direction.⁷¹³

Conceding full and swift assent to O'Shaughnessy's enterprise had its cause not truly in the hierarchical status of his supporter Dalhousie as governor general but rather in the latter's exceptional professional achievement within the colonial State. Before he assured that positive response from the company's direction, Dalhousie had been in office for four years during which he served the imperial interests in a very distinguished way if compared with his predecessors. Thus, by 1850, Dalhousie had already attained the top of his charisma and prestige both in the metropolis and periphery. The appreciation of his personality in Britain and India made his request indeclinable.⁷¹⁴

O'Shaughnessy himself highlights the role played by Dalhousie to endow British India with a telegraphic system. The Governor-General put at O'Shaughnessy's disposal men for the construction of the line and its stations, funds, and a variety of materials necessary for that initial project. Iron supply, for instance, amounted to 2800 tons. Besides, Dalhousie is said to have put all the available conveyance means in the project's service. Equipment was brought inland from Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay aboard river steamers, boats, elephants, and bullocks.⁷¹⁵

Dalhousie's backing for O'Shaughnessy's telegraphic project was not limited to the abovementioned provision; his backing also came about in form of bureaucratic facility not enjoyed by other colonial matters in British India. Gorman asserts that the bureaucracy of the East India Company was usually too irritatingly complicated retarding the decision about any major concern. But, Dalhousie made

⁷¹² Gorman. M, op. cit. , p. 587.

⁷¹³ Arnold. D, 2004, Science, Technology and Medicine in Colonial India, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 114, 115.

⁷¹⁴ Gorman. M, op. cit. , p. 588.

⁷¹⁵ O'Shaughnessy. W. B, 1853, The Electric Telegraph in British India, London, S. Taylor Printer, pp. 28-48.

O'Shaughnessy's enterprise exceptional by sparing it the numerous winding channels of administrative communication. Dalhousie insisted on and preserved the enterprise's independence of all governmental sectors except the person of the Governor-General while his ideas and views kept being harmonious with those of O'Shaughnessy. This caused the latter to be an efficient realiser and manager.⁷¹⁶

The first telegraphic project subsidised by the colonial State was to result firstly in a 21-mile line stretching from Alipore near Calcutta to Diamond Harbour at a depth of 0.6 metre. The composition of the line was a series of layers of different materials carefully selected for technical and availability reasons. The core of the line was a rod made of iron for electrical conductivity and insulated by two impervious sheets of fabric charged with pitch and tar for protection against tropical heat and dampness.⁷¹⁷ These sheets were set spirally in adverse directions to allow for flexibility. Sand, melted rosin, and clay were utilized to reinforce the insulated rod, and specific chemical compounds to supply energy.⁷¹⁸ Thus, the line was made solid enough to withstand the steps of bullocks, buffalos, and elephants much ambulatory around there. The line's integrity and efficiency underground were assured. As for vandalizing threat, it was not totally eliminated, but the line was sufficiently hard and could not be damaged unless with specific hard tools.⁷¹⁹

As part of the line was to be installed overground, O'Shaughnessy had to consider how to assure its durability in open nature. It is stated that the striking feature in here was his utilisation of bamboo trees as the main supporting poles of the line. His selection of the bamboo tree was for its ability to curve with strong wind after which the tree straightened up. Thus, the inner rod was to remain flexible enough and did not split even in the strong tropical storms.⁷²⁰

As for the route of the telegraphic system, it had to be determined by the then political and military colonial interests. Having been traced by Dalhousie

⁷¹⁶ Gorman. M, op. cit. , pp. 587, 594, 595.

⁷¹⁷ Arnold. D, op. cit. , p. 115.

⁷¹⁸ Gorman. M, op. cit. , p. 585.

⁷¹⁹ O'Shaughnessy. W. B, op. cit. , pp. 58-90.

⁷²⁰ Gorman. M, op. cit. , p. 586.

himself, this route went, in the shape of a crescent, northwest from Calcutta to Agra then southwards to Bombay along the Malabar Coast before turning eastwards and following the Coromandel Coast to reach Bangalore and then Madras. Also, this line as existent in 1855 included a branch going off northwest to Delhi and then Peshawar.⁷²¹

O'Shaughnessy's skilfulness is said to have been guided by a sense of bravery. In Gorman's view, this electrician is worthy of admiration by virtue of his determination to keep ahead in his enterprise he knew well to be extremely difficult. His confidence stimulated his challenging of the local environment plagued with disease and endangered by hostile opponents and wild creatures. It is reported that his workers died of cholera. Besides, material and Indian manpower were scanty and expensive from the start. Also, so as to provide the enterprise with a capable staff, O'Shaughnessy had to found special schools in India and England where his workers had first to go through trainings to do even the easiest tasks. Furthermore, nearly half of the line was to be set under water in marshes teeming with snakes and rats. In addition, mountains, rivers, and forests made the transportation of material and manpower too difficult due to the transportation means being still mostly primitive.⁷²² Moreover, friction sometimes erupted between the project's workers and the local villagers, and the latter replied, with the help of elephants, by damaging the line being under construction.⁷²³ But, O'Shaughnessy's most troublesome mishap in his enterprise is said to have been the misbehaviour of English or Indian workers. Lack of punctuality, assiduity, and attention resulted in the frequency of mistakes in telegrams and failures in sending, which made him much retained by clients' complaints and forced him to institute fines for defective signallers and messengers.⁷²⁴

In spite of all these circumstances, the enterprise is said to have been successful and highly estimated both in the colony and Britain, with the first

⁷²¹ Hamill. L, op. cit. , pp. 267, 268, 281, 282.

⁷²² Gorman. M, op. cit. , pp. 585, 586, 592, 594, 595.

⁷²³ Metcalf. B. D and Metcalf. T. R, op. cit. , p. 206.

⁷²⁴ Gorman. M, op. cit. , p. 595.

telegraphic line being inaugurated for the public in December 1851. What is more, two months later, O'Shaughnessy achieved a simultaneous extension of the line from Diamond Harbour to Kedgerree near the Hooghly River.⁷²⁵ Then in 1864, India saw the achievement of the first effective submarine international line linking Karachi to the Persian Gulf and tied to a land line ending at western Europe.⁷²⁶ Hamill specifies that that underwater line stretched along the coast of Baluchistan at a length of 1,450 miles, linking as such India to the Ottoman Empire so that telegrams sent to Constantinople could then be dispatched to London through the land line.⁷²⁷ So, if Dalhousie had got in 1850 a remuneration promise of 20,000 rupees to be paid by the company to O'Shaughnessy, the court of directors in London, being still indebted to O'Shaughnessy for his accomplishment, granted the latter a bonus of 25,000 rupees and the title of knight six years later.⁷²⁸ The way was well opened for gradual line extension so that by 1892 every town of political or economic importance in British India had been endowed with a telegraphic office.⁷²⁹ By 1901, the whole Indian telegraphic network had attained 40,000 miles.⁷³⁰

Once O'Shaughnessy's initial enterprise was accomplished, he made it function as simply as it had to because of the modest equipment being afforded for the telegraphic service and the latter being staffed mostly by Indians who considerably lacked knowledge about Western technology. Nevertheless, over time in the century, telegraphy in British India could be rendered more elaborate courtesy of continuous technical or manpower progress. This included mainly an improvement in the quality of signallers and maintenance and in managerial ability, which were all assured by a rise in the budget allotted for telegraphy in the colony.⁷³¹

⁷²⁵ Ibid. , p. 586.

⁷²⁶ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 88.

⁷²⁷ Hamill. L, op. cit. , p. 272.

⁷²⁸ Gorman. M, op. cit. , p. 596.

⁷²⁹ Harmand. J, op. cit. , p. 126.

⁷³⁰ Meiklejohn. M. J. C, 1902, The British Colonies and Dependencies, London, Holden, p. 20.

⁷³¹ Gorman. M, op. cit. , pp. 593, 600.

So, one may conclude that early telegraph installation in British India, though running into natural, economic, or social difficulties, owes its eventual success to the competence of its leader and miscellaneous provisions on the part of the colonial government. O'Shaughnessy was capable, thanks to his Western technical skill and Dalhousie's support, of making all necessary adaptations in a foreign risky environment.

1.2- Assessment

Although telegraphy in nineteenth-century British India had the inconvenience of not being fully established in terms of infrastructure and qualified staff, British or Indian contemporaries extolled its social, military, political, or economic virtues.⁷³²

From primitiveness, whereby railroads were not yet built; river transport was unreliable; and decent roads were scarce and not traversable in rain time, communication shifted to technology. Now, it would not take days or weeks but just some hours for news to be delivered.⁷³³ This swiftness in communication would also serve swiftness in transport: trains needed to be guided by telegraphic signals making this means of transport not only effective but also safe.⁷³⁴

Telegraphy became so appreciated for its rapidity that it was soon introduced to journalism.⁷³⁵ It is stated that *the Delhi Gazette* and *Lahore Chronicle* are the first Anglo-Indian newspapers to adopt this new means of communication and thus expediting the diffusion of news from British ships sailing from Europe to Bombay. This practice was to revolutionise journalism in British India.⁷³⁶

On the social ground, telegraphy came to serve family rapport; in this, Indians soon got accustomed to utilise the new infrastructure for such affairs as weddings,

⁷³² Ibid. , p. 601.

⁷³³ Ibid. , p. 596.

⁷³⁴ Wenzlhuemer. R, 2010, "Editorial—Telecommunication and Globalization in the Nineteenth Century" in *Historical Social Research*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 7-18, Berlin, Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences, Centre for Historical Social Research, p. 11.

⁷³⁵ Stein. B, op. cit. , p. 258.

⁷³⁶ Gorman. M, op. cit. , p. 597.

engagement, and other domestic matters. O'Shaughnessy reported that in the first year of telegraph operation in British India, one-third of the delivered telegrams had been for such Indian-family purposes.⁷³⁷

On the military ground, the usefulness of telegraphy was mostly seen at trouble time. During the Crimean War in the mid-nineteenth century, as tension was growing around Turkey, England was in increasing need for soldiers. So, Bombay received from London an order by ship to prepare a regiment of Indian cavalry to be sent to the combat zone. For this, Bombay and Calcutta exchanged a series of telegrams just in a few hours so that that need for soldiers was effectively met.⁷³⁸ Another illustrating example is the Sepoy Mutiny.⁷³⁹ Shortly before the telegraphic lines were cut by Indian rioters, news of the urgency had been delivered to all the scattered telegraphic stations and thus allowing the British to act on time to regain their control of the colony. However, as Calcutta was cut off the two principal military bases, namely Bombay and Madras, it became urgent, too, to reinstate the interregional telegraphic contact. In facing the Indian revolt, the British officials are said to have combined successfully and for the first time civilian and military telegraphic lines to send thousands of messages while depriving the Indian mutineers from the benefit of this communicative means. The eventual British triumph and restoration of colonial rule and order are not due solely to telegraphy as weaponry had its part too, but telegraphy is said to have been a key factor in British superiority during those 1857-1858 Anglo-Indian hostilities.⁷⁴⁰ Triumph would have been for the Indians if their mutiny had been enacted before telegraph installation.⁷⁴¹

⁷³⁷ Ibid.

⁷³⁸ Ibid.

⁷³⁹ Headrick. D, 2010, "A Double-Edged Sword: Communications and Imperial Control in British India" in Historical Social Research, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 51-65, Berlin, GESIS - Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences, Centre for Historical Social Research, p. 51.

⁷⁴⁰ Gorman. M, op. cit. , pp. 598, 599.

⁷⁴¹ Kochhar. R. K, 1993, "Science in British India. II. Indian Response" in Current Science, Vol. 64, No. 01, Bangalore, Indian Academy of Sciences, rajeshkochhar.com/data/publications/ScienceinBritishIndia-II.pdf, p. 4.

From the start, telegraph installation in British India was a state concern.⁷⁴² The political rationale and contribution of electric telegraphy were imperialistic.⁷⁴³ The promotion of electric telegraphy since 1851 went within the frame of unifying and concentrating colonial rule of British India.⁷⁴⁴ In 1853, Marx had predicted that political impact in these following words:

*The political unity of India, more consolidated, and extending farther than it ever did under the Great Moguls, was the first condition of its regeneration. That unity, imposed by the British sword, will now be strengthened and perpetuated by the electric telegraph.*⁷⁴⁵

Then, improving communication between Britain and India gained priority in 1858 when the British crown took over, from the East India Company, the governance of the colony upon the Indian Mutiny. Improvement in imperial communication became much more noticeable in 1870 after the installation of submarine cables between the metropolis and its periphery. Other private Western engineers rose to fame as telegraph promoters in British India. For instance, the Indo-European Telegraph Company, led by the Siemens brothers, William operating in London while Werner, Walter, and Carl in Germany and Russia, succeeded in establishing a line stretching from London to Karachi. This line, passing through Germany, Poland, Russia, under the Black Sea, and then through Georgia, carried its first message from London to Calcutta in April 1870.⁷⁴⁶ The wanted political result of all that is told by Sarkar's following words:

⁷⁴² Stokes. E. T, 1980, "Bureaucracy and Ideology: Britain and India in the Nineteenth Century" in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 30, pp. 131-156, London, Royal Historical Society, p. 144.

⁷⁴³ Chakravarty. G, 2004, The Indian Mutiny and the British Imagination, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 36, 164.

⁷⁴⁴ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 88.

⁷⁴⁵ Marx. K, 1853, op. cit. , p. 217.

⁷⁴⁶ Hamill. L, op. cit. , pp. 268, 273, 281.

In British India, the political imperative unleashed by setting upon nature and the gathering together of human beings can be identified at the level of the state, which, after the mid-nineteenth century, acted as the primary instrument of India's technological reorganization. Forging India into a productive, interlocking network of irrigation works, railways and telegraphs, the colonial state introduced and oversaw the establishment of modern technics. In an important sense, however, technology was not only the instrument but also the substance of state power.⁷⁴⁷

By 1889, a telegram sent from anywhere in Britain to any Indian possible destination took only one and a half hours for delivery. Between 1877 and 1893, whereas telegraphic lines number in Britain rose from 42 to 54, that in British India from 29 to 69. The fact that telegraph installation was projected and carried out simultaneously in Britain and its Indian colony may be seen as an indication of how much primordial the invigoration of imperial telegraphic communication was in the eyes of the colonists.⁷⁴⁸

The consolidation of the Anglo-Indian imperial ties courtesy of telegraphy came also in an economic context.⁷⁴⁹ Faster news about markets and prices enhanced commercial activity.⁷⁵⁰ This betterment in communication being accompanied by a betterment in transport, represented by colonial railways, boosted goods importation into the colony, inviting thus more British businessmen to come and make trade careers in British India.⁷⁵¹

Inside the colony, better acquaintance of what happened at the social and political levels was also an outcome of the rapid expansion of the telegraphic

⁷⁴⁷ Sarkar. S, 2010, "Technical Content and Colonial Context: Situating Technical Knowledge in Nineteenth-Century Bengal" in Social Scientist, Vol. 38, No. 1/2, pp. 37-52, New Delhi, Social Scientist, p. 39.

⁷⁴⁸ Hamill. L, op. cit. , pp. 274, 275.

⁷⁴⁹ Riddick. J. F, op. cit. , p. 137.

⁷⁵⁰ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 89.

⁷⁵¹ Misra. M, 1999, Business, Race, and Politics in British India 1850-1960, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 18, 19.

network, which made the colonial Principalities of Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay reach a better administrative coordination.⁷⁵²

The westernising character of telegraphy in nineteenth-century British India was seen not only in the communicative novelty and speediness it presented but also in the economic opportunity it effectively gave to the colonised to set foot on a new work field. It is said that O'Shaughnessy's initial enterprise alone resulted in the creation of sixty telegraph stations, each offering employment for Indians either as white-collar workers, battery men, couriers, or signallers with possibility to evolve from novice recruits to qualified professionals.⁷⁵³ This economic impact is confirmed by the Indian scholar Kochhar as follows:

*The role of the Indians in the scientific pursuits remained peripheral. However, as the needs of the Empire grew so did its perception of the abilities of the natives. The scientific content of the British administration in India increased steadily; and with it increased the role assigned to the Indians. As a first step, the natives moved from being coolies to calculators. In the second, they graduated to become doctors and engineers to work on the network of railways, telegraph ...*⁷⁵⁴

To put it in a nutshell, O'Shaughnessy's position in the history of British India is not merely that of the pioneer of telegraphy but also that of the first administrator of this communicative means. This led him to attest the significant utility of telegraphy, which proved to be mostly in favour of British imperial interests. But, the telegraph was not the sole infrastructural westernising trapping in British India during the second half of the nineteenth century: wherever telegraphic lines were laid, rail lines construction followed or had formerly begun.⁷⁵⁵

⁷⁵² Arnold. D, op. cit. , pp. 113, 114.

⁷⁵³ Gorman. M, op. cit. , p. 593.

⁷⁵⁴ Kochhar. R. K, 1993, op. cit. , p. 3.

⁷⁵⁵ Adams. J and Craig West. R, 1979, "Money, Prices, and Economic Development in India, 1861-1895" in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 55-68, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 63.

2- Railway Transport

It is asserted that long-distance land conveyance in British India was revolutionised in the second half of the nineteenth century by railways building.⁷⁵⁶ Railways are seen as amongst the main colonial infrastructural undertakings therein.⁷⁵⁷ “*Railways in colonial India were iconic of the exciting new mobilities of people and goods ushered in by the global transformations of the nineteenth century ...*”.⁷⁵⁸ However, not always positive is the vision of historians or scholars regarding what this colonial infrastructural fulfilment involved or had as its underlying principle.

2-1- The Railway-Building Commitment

Of all Britain’s imperial performances in nineteenth-century India, railway building and running together are said to constitute one of her most challenging and demanding commitments there.⁷⁵⁹

The economist Thorner claims that the process of railway building was not launched until upon increasingly-louder calls voiced by English and Scottish traders operating in groups in the East or Indian port cities. These British capitalistic profit-seekers, being aware of India’s scope as an endless source of raw materials and a favourable market for British-made goods, jumped up in several committees to require from the British government licencing terms for that technical achievement. In London, Liverpool, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, those activists heralded in press, pamphlets, and public meetings private enterprise as more likely

⁷⁵⁶ Derbyshire. I. D, op. cit. , p. 524.

⁷⁵⁷ Chattopadhyay. S, 2011, “Tracking Modernity: India’s Railway and the Culture of Mobility” in *Victorian Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 719-721, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p. 719.

⁷⁵⁸ Bhattacharya. S, 2015, ““Those Two Thin Strips of Iron”: The Uncanny Mobilities of Railways in British India” in *Nineteenth-Century Contexts. An Interdisciplinary Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 5, pp. 411-430, London, Routledge, p. 411.

⁷⁵⁹ Sharma. A. K, 2011, “The Indian Railway and its Rapid Development in British India”, www.essaysinhistory.com/articles/2011/5, pp. 1-5.

to succeed than state undertaking in opposition to the administration of the East India Company as the head of the colonial State.⁷⁶⁰

What permitted the launching of that westernising enterprise is said to be a compromise reached between the British Cabinet, the East India Company, and private engineers. According to this compromise, the metropolitan government guaranteed proportional gain to the private promoters in protection against failure risk.⁷⁶¹

It may be worth mentioning here that the 1849 contract suited so finely the interests of the East India Company and those of the private promoters that it would subsequently be taken as a specimen for many other similar projects that ended in the making of the main rail lines of British India. According to Thorner, the 1849 chief contractual terms pertained to the nature of the undertaking, guarantee of profit, supervision, and control. On the basis of precise contractual terms, British India was to have in the early 1850s its first two rail lines laid across strategic regional areas.⁷⁶²

Firstly, it was ratified that the enterprise was to be private, not public, and funded by capital-raising non-state firms in the United Kingdom, but the colonial State retained the right to buy the railways after twenty-five years following their achievement.⁷⁶³

Secondly, so as to motivate private businessmen to put their money in the venture, it was agreed that the colonial State was to conform to certain financial duties fulfilled through Indian-land taxation.⁷⁶⁴ The metropolitan taxpayers, as for them, were in no way to be held in charge of the project. The main of these duties, to come into force upon the inauguration of each railway, was paying an annual contribution to each railway unable to earn five per cent of the invested

⁷⁶⁰ Thorner. D, op. cit. , pp. 389, 390.

⁷⁶¹ Handy. J and Kirkpatrick. M. D, op. cit. , pp. 292, 293.

⁷⁶² Thorner. D, op. cit. , pp. 389, 390.

⁷⁶³ Prasad. R, op. cit. , p. 1254.

⁷⁶⁴ Chattopadhyay. S, op. cit. , p. 719.

money.⁷⁶⁵ This contribution was to be enough for each deficient railway company to pay a five-per-cent dividend to each of its shareholders. In this very respect, the colonial State had to pay by the end of the nineteenth century an aggregate sum of £ 50 million.⁷⁶⁶ The state-guarantee contractual term also granted to the private companies the right to hand back their projects at any time to the colonial State in case of total unprofitability and this after a warning, made one year beforehand, upon which they would have all their invested money back.⁷⁶⁷

So, it was mostly in concert with the colonial State that private companies went on making railroads through territorial grants and profit being guaranteed to the promoters by contract and payable by the Indian taxpayer.⁷⁶⁸ The realisation of the railways was thus often private, but their ownership sometimes ended for the State buying the lines. Between 1879 and 1889, in conformity with the railway contractual terms, the colonial government is said to have repeatedly used its buying right to come into possession of lines previously privately owned such as the East Indian Railway linking Calcutta to Delhi and the North-Western Provinces.⁷⁶⁹

Thirdly, it was agreed under the terms of the 1849 contract that the foregoing financial state assistance to the railway companies would in return earn the State supervision and control of the enterprise. In this frame, all of line administration, the selection of construction type and function mode, and the fixing of rates and fares would be the prerogatives of the colonial State precisely the central government located in Calcutta.⁷⁷⁰ Having had to his credit the supervision of Britain's railroad-making, as chairman of London's Board of Trade, Lord Dalhousie had now to do the same in British India being under his general governorship.⁷⁷¹ Notwithstanding, those prerogatives were counterbalanced by the acknowledged right of the railway private companies to appeal to the metropolitan

⁷⁶⁵ Matikkala. M, 2011, *Empire and Imperial Ambition*, New York, I. B, Tauris, p. 67.

⁷⁶⁶ Satya. L. D, 2008, "British Imperial Railways in Nineteenth-Century South Asia" in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 43, No. 47, pp. 69-77, Mumbai, Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 69, 70.

⁷⁶⁷ Thorner. D, op. cit. , pp. 390, 391.

⁷⁶⁸ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 108.

⁷⁶⁹ Harmand. J, op. cit. , p. 136.

⁷⁷⁰ Thorner. D, op. cit. , p. 391.

⁷⁷¹ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 107.

government against any unfavourable decision taken by the colonial State. Thus, the 1849 compromise, which would be imitated for other railway projects in the colony, reserved the last adjudicating word for the British Cabinet headed by the British Prime Minister.⁷⁷²

It is said that on the basis of this state guarantee principle the collection of funds from the investing public in the metropolis would go without difficulty so that the length of operative railway would increase in miles from 4,000 by 1868 to 10,000 by 1882 then to 25,000 by 1902. This upswing in line construction resulted from an enthused upturn in invested capital totalling in million pounds sterling 80, 135, and then 236 by 1868, 1882, and 1902 respectively.⁷⁷³ Frazer puts a similar account of the progress in the building of railways reaching a length of 300 miles by 1856 and over 21,072 miles by 1895 at an aggregate cost rising to 227 million pounds sterling.⁷⁷⁴ Meanwhile, the guarantee principle was duly applied costing the colonial government around £ 1,300,000 annually in the late 1850s.⁷⁷⁵ As such, the colonial State played an encouraging role vis-à-vis the private railway companies, which is confirmed by Jules Harmand, a witness of the epoch under study, in these ensuing words:

*Il faut encore ajouter la tâche de sauvegarder les énormes intérêts commerciaux de la mère patrie, représentés par un capital garanti de plus de 200 millions de livres sterling, avancé à l'État au grand bénéfice de l'Inde, ou placé dans les chemins de fer. Il serait donc criminel de nier la responsabilité du gouvernement à l'égard de ceux qui ont consacré des sommes immenses au développement des ressources de l'Inde sur la foi des promesses officielles, et qui ont déposé leur argent dans les affaires de l'Inde sur l'invitation des autorités impériales.*⁷⁷⁶

⁷⁷² Thorner. D, op. cit. , p. 391.

⁷⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ Frazer. R.W, op. cit. , pp. 374, 375.

⁷⁷⁵ Handy. J and Kirkpatrick. M. D, op. cit. , p. 296.

⁷⁷⁶ Harmand. J, op. cit. , pp. 126, 127, 375.

Formerly, in the Anglo-Indian relationship, wealth had long been directed towards the needs of the metropolis. However, from the mid-nineteenth century, wealth flow had to be partially inverted for the whole railway enterprise.⁷⁷⁷ Hence, the colonial railway network set operating with a hundred-fifty mile merchandise line in Calcutta between Howrah and Raniganj and a twenty-one mile line in Bombay between the city and its suburbs. It is estimated that the first five thousand miles of track had been laid by 1869 and another eleven thousand miles by 1890.⁷⁷⁸ The precise number of lines grew from 20 in 1853 to 23,627 in 1900.⁷⁷⁹ Asia had got its largest railway network in British India by the 1860s.⁷⁸⁰ By 1880, British India's railroad network had by far become more extensive than anyone made in a non-European country as the United States of America.⁷⁸¹ The historian Kerr puts the world-scale length ranking of Indian railway network at fourth in 1901 and the number of its passengers in that year at 183,098,000.⁷⁸²

To round up this analysis, one may claim that the whole colonial railway enterprise in nineteenth-century British India owes its accomplishment to a combination of hand-in-hand factors. While it was carried out by British private capitalists under peripheral state supervision and metropolitan governmental ultimate arbitrage, it was also relying on Indian-land tax revenues.

2-2- Assessing Views

Like the imperial educative contribution in nineteenth-century British India, the realisation and utilisation of railway infrastructure were eulogised but not immune from controversy on account of consequential economic, social, or environmental inconveniences for the colonised.

⁷⁷⁷ Habib, I, 1975, "Colonization of the Indian Economy 1757-1900", in Social Scientist, Vol. 3, No. 8, pp. 23-53, New Delhi, Social Scientist, pp. 20, 21.

⁷⁷⁸ Walsh, J. E, op. cit. , p. 107, 108.

⁷⁷⁹ Das, P. V, 2013, "Railway Fuel and its Impact on the Forests in Colonial India: The Case of the Punjab, 1860-1884" in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 1283-1309, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 1287.

⁷⁸⁰ Chattopadhyay, S, op. cit. , p. 719.

⁷⁸¹ Sharma, A. K, op. cit. , p. 1.

⁷⁸² Kerr, I. J, 2014, "Colonial India, its Railways, and the Cliometricians" in The Journal of Transport History, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 114-120, Manchester, Manchester University Press, p. 114.

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the railway enterprise did not go in a regular pattern. It rather underwent several changes in ownership, management, and operation so as to better suit the changing interests of those who carried it out. To make things advance, compromises between the colonial State, the metropolitan government, and the British private investors had to be found and applied.⁷⁸³ One may argue that the British colonists who cared for modifying the enterprise's terms and conditions did it on the altar of their own economic interests and not for the sake of colonial modernity, civilisation, or whatsoever relief for the Indians. For this argumentation, one may find it worthwhile considering the three different phases through which the whole railway enterprise was run with certain accompanying premeditated facts.

As the colonial State found itself overcharged for the aforementioned five-per cent guarantee duty totalling around £ 15 million by 1869, it resorted, with the approval of the Secretary of State for India in London, to restrict the interference of the railway private companies. In 1869, it was decided that the latter would maintain their ownership and management of the already-built railways and that new lines would be made and administered by the colonial State. According to Thorner, the advantage in the second railway-building phase stretching from 1870 to 1880 was that the new rail lines were subject to no such guarantee payment and could be built and operated as well as the private lines. Moreover, railway construction would cost much less when performed by the State than by any private company.⁷⁸⁴

However, this resolution is said to have been not entirely successful as the colonial government was seen as slow and incompetent. In the metropolis as in the periphery, the questions as to which type of ownership and which type of management of Indian railways would serve best kept being raised as many involved British colonists were still unsatisfied by the way those lines had been

⁷⁸³ Thorner. D, op. cit. , pp. 392, 394.

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid. , pp. 392, 393.

functioning.⁷⁸⁵ So, a new compromise between the colonial State and private entrepreneurs was signed in 1879 followed in the century by similar arrangements all of which made the period from 1880 to 1900 that of public-private harmonious collaboration in almost all India's railway service with a revised guarantee principle. So as to keep low the railway-building cost and make the quality of rail transport higher, it was agreed that the colonial State would progressively get the ownership of all the rail lines by buying out all the shareholders upon the contractual term of twenty-five years following every rail line inauguration. As for management, it would be privatised except for military lines left to the colonial public authorities. Through this third phase, the land tax revenues of British India did not stop taking part in the business as the new guarantee, rated at four per cent on the invested capital and paid by the colonial State to each managing-company shareholder, would be settled out of that colonial fiscal income.⁷⁸⁶

Analysing Thorner's article, one may argue that those railways showed success in their realisation but also certain failures in the way they were kept in operation. Through the three enterprise phases discussed above, arrangements that constituted advantages for the British reverberated as inconveniences for the Indians. The fact that India's railways had their administration, through the three phases, residing with the British, either colonial governors or private companies, and never shared with the natives resulted in India being deprived of several economic benefits.

Before and after the 1879 regulation, the British railway managers retained the right to staff the lines at their pleasure.⁷⁸⁷ Due to this prerogative, it is said that from its inauguration to the end of the nineteenth century the colonial railway service deliberately included just very few Indians in its personnel. What is more, the colonial State and the private railway companies developed for the natives no

⁷⁸⁵ Reddy. M. A, 1990, "Travails of an Irrigation Canal Company in South India, 1857-1882" in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 12, pp. 619-621+623-628, Mumbai, Economic and Political Weekly, p. 628.

⁷⁸⁶ Thorner. D, op. cit. , pp. 394, 395.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid. , pp. 392, 401.

training program that could have enabled them to assume all levels and sorts of railway work.⁷⁸⁸

Another related point that one may regard as negative for the colonised concerns the distribution of those railways across the country, which may make the researcher believe that the British were regionally selective in their whole railway enterprise. Railways were not randomly laid.⁷⁸⁹ The railway venture aimed to link interior resourceful areas to the major Indian port cities so as to make way for maritime raw-material on-going exportation.⁷⁹⁰ This geo-economic plan resulted in vast Indian areas remaining entirely devoid of railway service during and after the period under study.⁷⁹¹

Inadequacy persisted not solely in the railway network itself but equally in the serviceability rate owing to systematic financial control and constraint exerted by the colonial State on the private managing companies. It is explained that the Indian railway service met with severe undercapitalisation engendered by the contractual principle according to which no budgetary expenditure could be done without the assent of the Finance Department of the Government of India. Consequently, the existing lines were not permitted to provide enough conveyance for the Indian overcrowding passengers, which caused tenacious congestion and discomfort to traffic. From their opening to the end of the period under study, India's railways were always subject to financial shortage, which did not facilitate transit for the indigenes. Instead of offering high-rate conveyance at low fares, they kept providing low-rate conveyance at high fares.⁷⁹²

While that inadequate budgetary allotment concomitantly limited the rail lines in conveyance rate and heightened fares, the guarantee clause within the third contract produced little inducement for the private managing companies to relieve

⁷⁸⁸ Satya. L. D, op. cit. , pp. 71, 73.

⁷⁸⁹ Donaldson. D, 2010, "Railroads of the Raj: Estimating the Impact of Transportation Infrastructure" in Asia Research Centre Working Paper, Vol. 41, London, Asia Research Centre, lse.ac.uk/collections/AsiaResearchCentre, pp. 4, 7.

⁷⁹⁰ Sugihara. K, op. cit. , p. 1.

⁷⁹¹ Thorner. D, op. cit. , p. 392.

⁷⁹² *Ibid.* , pp. 395, 396.

this insufficiency. It is stated that the private shareholders knew that their dividends would always be paid by the colonial State no matter what would happen, which did not motivate them to make substantial progress in the railway service.⁷⁹³ Just in 1884-85, a total of £ 4,750,000 was paid in England as being such company dividends.⁷⁹⁴

Still with British selectiveness, Thorner paints another controversial picture of nineteenth-century British India where the new transport infrastructure made no economic contribution for the natives. It is claimed that one drawback to India's railways is that they did not take part in the development of local industry whatsoever. The British just failed to promote indigenous industries capable to provide the country with railway necessities and accessories. Before and after the 1879 regulation, British railway managers retained the right to buy equipment at their pleasure.⁷⁹⁵ Due to this prerogative, all needed equipment — locomotives, rolling stocks, spare parts, and various stores — was to be imported from homeland, which caused the colony to remain self-insufficient in railway material requirements. Indian businessmen were in constant discord with this provision policy because the same imported items either were or could have been made in India.⁷⁹⁶

However, historians do not put converging views about the rationale or results of the whole railway enterprise, these views being either negative or positive. Prasad, for example, verbalises the opinion that the new mode of transport became highly-estimated by the colonised population regarding it as a move towards modernity, which rendered imperative the popular adaptation to this technological innovation. Prasad supports his opinion by mentioning that the yearly number of railway Indian travellers kept increasing so that only between 1854 and 1867 it moved from 0.5 to 13.8 million.⁷⁹⁷ That passengers number had gone up to 110 million by 1889. This mounting passenger use rate may account for the mounting gross returns of the railway business attaining £18 million by 1887 and

⁷⁹³ Ibid. , p. 397.

⁷⁹⁴ Harmand. J, op. cit. , p. 113.

⁷⁹⁵ Thorner. D, op. cit. , pp. 392, 398.

⁷⁹⁶ Satya. L. D, op. cit. , p. 71.

⁷⁹⁷ Prasad. R, op. cit. , pp. 1263, 1267.

for the net returns of £ 276,000 realised in just 1888-89 by the East Indian Railway alone.⁷⁹⁸ Even Indian commoners and paupers proved keen on paying for train travel although the major aim of constructing railroads was to transport British trade and military forces.⁷⁹⁹

Thinkers such as Rudyard Kipling view colonial trains as a confirmation of the benevolent interventionism of British rule in India, producing in return popular thankfulness as well as good spirit towards the Raj. In this respect, one argument put forward by Bhattacharya for this railway usefulness is technical; the scholar affirms that the new means of conveyance raised travel velocity much beyond that of the then common natural transport means. What illustrates that popular adaptation is said to be the Indians taking to trains for pilgrimages in sacred locations.⁸⁰⁰ The coloniser perceived his railway infrastructure as an agent of mobility brought to a stationary colony.⁸⁰¹

High train velocity was equally beneficial to freight transit in a radical way.⁸⁰² Pre-railway Indian trade had long been too restricted by the use of bullocks, camels, horses, ponies, donkeys, mules, and elephants.⁸⁰³ Unlike pre-railway India where overland animal-undertaken freight transport had been costly and too limited in speed, volume, and distance, railway-built India would now have its trade turning inter-regional, much more voluminous, quicker, and less expensive.⁸⁰⁴ Whereas bullocks could carry goods at only 30 km a day, trains could carry the same goods at 600 km a day.⁸⁰⁵

Moreover, trains would achieve better results than any traditional means of transport such as boats. Contrarily to railway transport, water transport, be it coastal or fluvial, was irregular and limited, due to unfavourable weather conditions caused

⁷⁹⁸ Harmand. J, op. cit. , pp. 113, 127, 136.

⁷⁹⁹ Headrick. D, op. cit. , p. 54.

⁸⁰⁰ Bhattacharya. S, op. cit. , pp. 412, 414.

⁸⁰¹ Chattopadhyay. S, op. cit. , p. 719.

⁸⁰² Andrew. W. P, 1884, Indian Railways, London, W. H. Allen and Co, pp. 25-29.

⁸⁰³ Donaldson. D, op. cit. , pp. 1, 6.

⁸⁰⁴ Derbyshire. I. D, op. cit. , pp. 526, 527.

⁸⁰⁵ Donaldson. D, op. cit. , pp. 1, 6.

by winter rainfall and summer dryness, and dangerous due to high-risk piracy. Trains, on the other hand, could break down these inconveniences by assuring swiftness rising up to 600 km a day, regularity through predictable timetables, affordability through relatively cheaper travel cost, and safety through the elimination of the piracy risk.⁸⁰⁶ Railway superiority is confirmed by Arnold in these following words:

*Over much of northern India and Bengal, it was railways, not steamers, that ultimately supplanted the older river boats and ferries. Communication and transport by land, rather than on water, remained the greatest challenge of the age. There is an argument for seeing the paucity and poor quality of India's roads as both a cause and a consequence of its technological backwardness and so claiming that a revolution in transportation only came with the railways.*⁸⁰⁷

Furthermore, Ward states that railway conveyance secured economic improvement as well as human salvation.⁸⁰⁸ This is confirmed by Walsh who says that by 1890 Indian interior markets had been unified by a far-extended railway network linking Indian hinterland to the main port cities of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, and Karachi. Transited goods rose in million ton from 3.6 in 1871 to 42.6 in 1901, which resulted in goods being cheapened and more available in both rural and urban India. In famine times, trains are said to have distributed victuals to different starving areas.⁸⁰⁹ The following passage is quoted from an official colonial report that underlines British benevolence towards the Indian famine-stricken regions, claiming that:

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid. , p. 7.

⁸⁰⁷ Arnold. D, op. cit. , pp. 104, 105.

⁸⁰⁸ Ward. B, 1961, India and the West, Delhi, Publications Division, pp. 123, 124.

⁸⁰⁹ Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 108.

God's hand has been laid heavily upon India during this past year in famine and in pestilence. The latter has continued its ravages from former years with unabated virulence and an extending area, while the former has been caused by the failure of the rains over a large part of the country. Millions of people have been brought to the point of starvation, and the Government of India has had to contend with a famine of hitherto unparalleled magnitude. One effect of such calamities is to draw India and Britain together in a bond of closer sympathy, and as on the occasion of former famines, India's cry for help has met with a generous response from the homeland.⁸¹⁰

Thorner puts the rise in rail-transported goods at from 12 million tons to 15 million tons between 1869 and 1882.⁸¹¹ Thanks to those trains, interregional grain carriage is said to have gained high speed, and Burmese rice is said to have reached famine-stricken north-Indian areas.⁸¹² Actually, the extension of the colonial railway network is thought to have had this humanitarian objective.⁸¹³ This is confirmed by Arnold as follows:

Railways also occupied a more distinctively-Indian niche, being partly intended as a technological solution to the famines that struck the North-Western Provinces and Madras in the 1830s and which recurred with devastating frequency throughout India between the 1860s and 1900s. In 1880, the Famine Commission initiated a new phase of railway construction, calling for a further 20,000 miles of railways to be built as protective, or anti-famine, works.⁸¹⁴

⁸¹⁰ Anglo-Indian Evangelization Society, 1900, Twenty-Ninth Annual Report, 1899, Leith, Duff & Thomson Printers, p. 5.

⁸¹¹ Thorner. D, op. cit. , p. 392.

⁸¹² Derbyshire. I. D, op. cit. , p. 532.

⁸¹³ Donaldson. D, op. cit. , pp. 7, 8.

⁸¹⁴ Arnold. D, op. cit. , p. 108.

Besides, it is reported that the historian Dave Donaldson believes that this trade improvement permitted a rise in Indian income during the last three decades of the nineteenth century.⁸¹⁵ Harmand, an erstwhile French consul in Calcutta, put in his 1892 primary source the following confirming words:

Pendant les dernières années de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales, grâce surtout à la vigoureuse impulsion de Lord Dalhousie, on commença à entrer à grands pas dans une voie meilleure. Sous la direction éclairée de M. Thomson, l'un des hommes d'État les plus sages que l'Inde ait possédés, on réalisera de grands progrès dans les Provinces du Nord-Ouest. On avait fini par comprendre que ces perfectionnements matériels, qui facilitent et rendent moins couteuses les communications et la production, étaient indispensables pour améliorer la condition du peuple. C'est en 1853 que Lord Dalhousie, dans une dépêche qu'on peut regarder comme le point de départ du système actuel des chemins de fer de l'Inde, déclara qu'il était nécessaire de joindre les unes aux autres par des voies ferrées les villes principales et les provinces les plus importantes de la péninsule.⁸¹⁶

Morality is another argument provided for the railway enterprise by many British contemporary administrators who assigned the new transport mode the role of making modern science overcome Indian superstition in defiance of social backwardness.⁸¹⁷ Those colonial trains are eulogized as the factor in a sharp cultural transformation by integrating the Indian castes through same-compartment overcrowded travelling.⁸¹⁸ The thing is that as any Indian who could afford train service would come physically very close to a country citizen belonging to a different caste, religious community, or ethnicity, those trains became an instrument of unprecedented socialisation. Being squeezed together in one compartment, Indian passengers indulged in a move against discrimination, stigmatisation, and separatism

⁸¹⁵ Kerr. I. J, op. cit. , p. 115.

⁸¹⁶ Harmand. J, op. cit. , pp. 125, 126.

⁸¹⁷ Chattopadhyay. S, op. cit. , p. 719.

⁸¹⁸ Chaudhuri. S, op. cit. , p. 240.

associated with their traditional prejudices.⁸¹⁹ Thus, according to the contemporary engineer G. W. MacGeorge, colonial trains constituted for the British an evidence of their devotion to improve the Indian society.⁸²⁰ This socialising role of trains was testified to by the contemporary observer Lord Curzon of Kedleston as follows:

*The instruments of Western civilization have lent powerful, though sometimes unconscious, aid to this process. Railways have not only bridged distances and helped to relieve distress, but they have broken down the barriers that separated races and communities and castes, and have exerted a unifying influence not merely in the interest of the rulers, but upon the ruled.*⁸²¹

Henry Bartle Frere, Governor of the Bombay Presidency, foretold in 1863 that India's railways would render the colonial society more cohesive unifying its categories and races, which would ultimately push forward Western civilisation. Likewise, the British official and writer N. G. Priestley affirmed that the enforced cramming of Indians of different castes into carriages was bound to overwhelm their social differences and boost mutual acceptance.⁸²² The same view is supported by Prasad quoting from an imperial official document dating from 1846 that trains were that "*mighty engine of improvement which would cause the slumbering spirit of India to awake from the sleep of ages, the sleep of apathy, superstition, and prejudice.*"⁸²³

Unlike Walsh, Dutt for example is rather critical observing the railway enterprise as being useful for Britain, not for her periphery. Railway infrastructure, in Dutt's view, was always carefully provided in an effort to increase imperial revenues through the transportation of increasingly-cultivated raw materials and

⁸¹⁹ Bhattacharya. S, op. cit. , pp. 411, 412, 413, 415, 419, 420.

⁸²⁰ Arnold. D, op. cit. , pp. 109, 110.

⁸²¹ Lord Curzon of Kedleston, 1910, "British Rule in India II" in The North American Review, Vol. 192, No. 657, pp. 152-164, Des Moines, University of Northern Iowa, p. 157.

⁸²² Bhattacharya. S, op. cit. , p. 415.

⁸²³ Prasad. R, op. cit. , pp. 1253, 1254.

expensive crops.⁸²⁴ This is also confirmed by Dalziel who sees the investment of about £ 100 million in railway building just by 1870 as a tactic to increase the income of the colonial State through agricultural commercialisation.⁸²⁵ Industrialising Europe was demanding much agricultural raw materials, which induced the opening up of an Indian market to be provisioned by means of colonial trains.⁸²⁶ It is asserted that the British put high hopes of making India an alternative to the United States as a supplier of raw cotton.⁸²⁷ In putting these similar analyses, Dalziel, Derbyshire, and Dutt concur with Marx who in 1853 said:

*The ruling classes of Great Britain have had, till now, but an accidental, transitory and exceptional interest in the progress of India. The aristocracy wanted to conquer it, the moneyocracy to plunder it, and the millocracy to undersell it. But now the tables are turned. The millocracy have discovered that the transformation of India into a reproductive country has become of vital importance to them, and that, to that end, it is necessary, above all, to gift her with means of irrigation and of internal communication. They intend now drawing a net of railroads over India. And they will do it. I know that the English millocracy intend to endow India with railways with the exclusive view of extracting at diminished expenses the cotton and other raw materials for their manufactures.*⁸²⁸

Thorner details in his article the metropolitan and peripheral pressures behind the imperial commitment of endowing the Indian colony with railway transport, showing in that an economic impetus. It was not at random that the first two rail lines were laid across geographically-strategic areas. Setting one line between Calcutta city and the Burdwan coal fields and the other one between Bombay city and the Deccan cotton fields was rather deliberate and purposeful.⁸²⁹ How is it that

⁸²⁴ Dutt. R. P, op. cit. , p. 65.

⁸²⁵ Dalziel N, op. cit. , p. 93.

⁸²⁶ Derbyshire. I. D, op. cit. , pp. 523, 525.

⁸²⁷ Handy. J and Kirkpatrick. M. D, op. cit. , pp. 270, 281.

⁸²⁸ Marx. K, 1853, op. cit. , p. 217.

⁸²⁹ Thorner. D, op. cit. , pp. 389, 390.

the majority of railway lines were meant to operate between the Indian agricultural interior and the major Indian harbours? The plan was to capably and continually extort profit from the colony by systematically matching its agriculture to its trade.⁸³⁰ Colonial governors continued supporting railway construction despite recurrent losses and deficiencies undergone by railway companies because those statesmen were well aware of the magnitude of profitability trains would continually generate for Britain.⁸³¹

The latter view is common to Sugihara claiming that it was mainly Britain seeking to embark upon the continuous cycle of exporting Indian raw cotton to the British textile factories and sending back Lancaster's cotton fabric to the colony that stimulated India's nineteenth-century railroad making.⁸³² That raw cotton exportation turned out to be systematic because this product, on which the British cloth manufacture greatly depended, was uncultivable in the metropolis and gradually unprocurable from the United States.⁸³³ Besides, other Indian primary items such as opium, wheat, rice, indigo, and tea could be ferried by train from hinterland to harbours in order to be shipped to the United Kingdom or other European countries.⁸³⁴ Sugar exportation became now much less expensive, too, thanks to the expansion of the Indian railway network.⁸³⁵ Thus, Indian economy is said to have satisfied British economic interests only while the Indians got no economic relief or compensation from Britain in return.⁸³⁶

And, due to the cheapness of the imported Lancaster's textile products, most British India was doomed to cloth de-industrialisation.⁸³⁷ Contemporary Indian nationalist scholars such as Dadabhai Naoroji, Mahadev Ranade, and Romesh Dutt

⁸³⁰ Das. P. V, op. cit. , p. 1287.

⁸³¹ Reddy. M. A, op. cit. , p. 619.

⁸³² Sugihara. K, 1971, "Notes on the Trade Statistics of British India", www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/COE/Japanese/Newsletter/No.6.../SUGI.html, p. 1.

⁸³³ Handy. J and Kirkpatrick. M. D, op. cit. , pp. 286-290.

⁸³⁴ Ghoshray. A, 2015, "A Robust Estimation of the Terms of Trade between the United Kingdom and British India, 1858–1947" in *Economic Modelling*, Vol. 51, pp. 53-57, Amsterdam, Elsevier Inc, p. 56.

⁸³⁵ Bagchi. A. K, op. cit. , p. 41.

⁸³⁶ Satya. L. D, op. cit. , pp. 70, 75.

⁸³⁷ Arnold. D, op. cit. , p. 96.

complained that India's endowment with railways in the second half of the nineteenth century had escalated the weakening of her handicrafts by extending the local market for imported British-made goods.⁸³⁸ Statistics on Britain's exports to India between 1859 and 1877 show that British cotton manufactures exports to India doubled over this period.⁸³⁹ Actually, invading the Indian market through the promotion of rail transport enabled the British to annihilate India's industry and to create colonial dependence on Britain's one.⁸⁴⁰ So, one may infer that the rate of colonial economic exploitation increased concomitantly, which is confirmed by Markovits putting these ensuing words:

*Even in the Age of Reform, which saw a deliberate attempt at introducing significant changes in the local economy and society, the British impact remained limited. Only with the building of the railways and the increased commercialisation of agriculture thus brought about did the British achieve significant result.*⁸⁴¹

The local market is said to have been extended harmfully for the Indians by the increasingly-extended railway network having played still another socio-economic role in tandem with a newly-introduced system of land ownership. It is explained that these two colonial westernising novelties were meant to boost both agriculture and agricultural commercialisation with the aim of raising the fiscal income of the colonial State to the detriment of India's traditional rural socio-economic structure.⁸⁴² As quoted in 1865 by *The Economist* newspaper in London, the Indian Finance Ministry buttressed the general colonial taxation in British India by saying "*we are giving India wealth and we should tax that wealth ... The native comfort, ease, and opulence which English rule creates, maintains, and improves ought to defray the costs of that rule.*"⁸⁴³

⁸³⁸ Chattopadhyay. S, op. cit. , p. 720.

⁸³⁹ Habib. I, op. cit. , p. 21.

⁸⁴⁰ Satya. L. D, op. cit. , p. 72.

⁸⁴¹ Markovits. C, op. cit. , p. 417.

⁸⁴² Meena. H. K, op. cit. , pp. 3-5.

⁸⁴³ Handy. J and Kirkpatrick. M. D, op. cit. , p. 298.

British India opted for a system of land privatisation which, together with the railway infrastructure, was to erode India's traditional bucolic self-sufficiency. Private land ownership in the countryside was now to be granted to a handful of native chiefs paying taxes to the colonial State and collecting land rent in money from native peasants like in the Western World.⁸⁴⁴ Traditionally however, Indian rural political masters had been exercising private-property rights in shares of the village crops while rural land had been owned collectively by the rural community, which characterized the Indian village as self-subsistent. By the end of the nineteenth century, this ancient mode had been considerably replaced by that of high crop marketability assured by railway transport. The new trend was a village system headed by rent-receiving landlords known as *zamindars* and driven by an Indian category of money-lenders from whom farming peasants borrowed to pay for land tenancy.⁸⁴⁵

The Indian nationalist Mahatma Gandhi regards those colonial railways too critically believing that British India was between 1860 and 1900 the scene of unprecedented agricultural commercialisation and falling per-capita nutrition as a result of the promotion of rail transport.⁸⁴⁶ It is claimed that although agricultural per-capita yield increased, the economic situation of the Indian rural mass kept declining. The traditional self-sufficiency of the Indian village was being subverted by the colonially-imposed trend of increased cash-returning cropping so that land rent dues could be paid in money.⁸⁴⁷ It is implied that the railways, being the preponderant form of public investment in British India due to their high utility in agricultural commercialisation, nourished the evil side of many colonised who preferred to serve the colonial markets rather than the bellies of their hungry compatriots.⁸⁴⁸ Facility and rapidity in the rail transport of grains caused the frequency of famines.⁸⁴⁹

⁸⁴⁴ Wagner. K. A, 2007, Thuggee, Banditry and the British in Early Nineteenth-Century India, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 34, 35, 85.

⁸⁴⁵ Thorner. D, op. cit. , p. 400.

⁸⁴⁶ Donaldson. D, op. cit. , p. 8.

⁸⁴⁷ Derbyshire. I. D, op. cit. , pp. 521, 541.

⁸⁴⁸ Satya. L. D, op. cit. , pp. 71, 75, 76.

⁸⁴⁹ Donaldson. D, op. cit. , p. 8.

Rural living standards in British India were mostly deteriorating. While the new system was giving rise to a rich village class of moneylenders solicited to meet required rent payment, it impoverished land tenants because these had to reimburse moneylenders at high interest rates.⁸⁵⁰ Handy and Kirkpatrick tally with Derbyshire by stating that colonial authority remained so rigid on land tax collection that *zamindars* resolved in their turn to collect rent dues from their tenants even at bad harvest or famine times. This entailed relentless pauperization and frequent land eviction for the native peasantry.⁸⁵¹

*“The institutions and values associated with modernity in Victorian Britain were promulgated by the colonial State in India to subsume traditional culture in order to build a homogenized population suitable for industrial labour.”*⁸⁵² The gradual conversion of the Indian village from a self-reliant communalistic entity to a land-privatised market-oriented cash-crop colonial collaborate not only raised but also concentrated production according to regional cultivability. In other words, the new village life modality brought about regional agricultural specialisation to serve imperial or European interests. For example, the United Provinces in the north were rendered “the sugar province” of British India with a sugarcane acreage rise of more or less 40 % realised between 1860 and 1895. Meanwhile, this area is said to have known hyper-dramatic rise in its oilseed production so as to respond favourably to the growing European industrial need for this commodity.⁸⁵³

This socio-economic rural metamorphosis may lead one to believe that the colonial railway enterprise was much more destructive than constructive for the colonized.

⁸⁵⁰ Adams. J and Craig West. R, op. cit. , p. 56.

⁸⁵¹ Handy. J and Kirkpatrick. M. D, op. cit. , pp. 282, 283.

⁸⁵² Bhattacharya. S, op. cit. , p. 413.

⁸⁵³ Derbyshire. I. D, op. cit. , pp. 529-531.

Colonial railway making and using, which caused agricultural and industrial dislocation and aggravating famines, were disapproved of not only by colonised intellectuals but also by European contemporary thinkers or officials such as the social reformers Florence Nightingale and Vaughan Nash.⁸⁵⁴ The British journalist and humanitarian William Digby, too, rebuked that colonial policy for being selfish since it caused Britain to thrive economically to the detriment of India of which population had consequently to fall into destitution and starvation.⁸⁵⁵ Another example is the British theosophist Allan Octavian Hume whose outspoken criticism earned him in 1882 a demotion from his job as a high colonial fiscal bureaucrat. Hume kept attributing Indian misery and wretchedness to the colonial system he qualified as economically exploitative and therefore called for a legitimate rising.⁸⁵⁶ The year following his downgrading, he meant the following written words to the young diploma holders of Calcutta's university:

Every nation secures precisely as good a Government as it merits. If you the picked men, the most highly educated of the nation, cannot, scorning personal ease and selfish objects, make a resolute struggle to secure greater freedom for yourselves and your country, a more impartial administration, a larger share in the management of your own affairs, then we, your friends, are wrong and our adversaries right, rightly and inevitably have they become your rulers. And rulers and taskmasters they must continue, let the yoke gall your shoulders never so sorely, until you realise and stand prepared to act upon the eternal truth that self-sacrifice and unselfishness are the only unfailing guides to freedom and happiness.⁸⁵⁷

In his 1853 primary source, the German thinker Karl Marx had foreseen advantageousness for the Indians in the railway infrastructure by saying:

⁸⁵⁴ Chattopadhyay. S, op. cit. , p. 720.

⁸⁵⁵ Matikkala. M, op. cit. , pp. 67, 68.

⁸⁵⁶ Pécastaing-Boissière. M, op. cit. , p. 223.

⁸⁵⁷ Patabhi. B. S, op. cit. , pp. 12, 13.

*When you have once introduced machinery into the locomotion of a country, which possesses iron and coals, you are unable to withhold it from its fabrication. ... The railway system will therefore become in India truly the forerunner of modern industry Modern industry, resulting from the railway system, will dissolve the hereditary divisions of labour upon which rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress and Indian power.*⁸⁵⁸

However, contemporary Indian nationalists are said to have acknowledged no civilising quality to the railway network denouncing it as an oppressive machine assuring the drain of India's wealth and resources to Britain.⁸⁵⁹ One may argue that Karl Marx had been falsely optimistic in his above words because later on in a letter dated 1881 he severely criticised the way the colonial State used the railway network. He changed his view discounting colonial trains as being, in retrospect, totally useless for the natives by writing that:

*In India serious complications, if not a general outbreak, is in store for the British government. What the English take from them annually in the form of rent, dividends for railways useless to the Hindus; pensions for military and civil service men – what they take from them without any equivalent and quite apart from what they appropriate to themselves annually within India, speaking only of the value of the commodities the Indians have gratuitously and annually to send over to England – it amounts to more than the total sum of income of the sixty millions of agricultural and industrial labourers of India ! This is a bleeding process.*⁸⁶⁰

⁸⁵⁸ Marx. K, 1853, op. cit. , p. 217.

⁸⁵⁹ Bhattacharya. S, op. cit. , pp. 412, 428.

⁸⁶⁰ Marx. K, 1881, “Marx to Nikolai Danielson in St Petersburg”, www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1881/letters/81_02_19.htm, p. 1.

In sharing her technology with India, the metropolis intended not only to strengthen her imperial foothold but also to control her territorial possessions more profitably there.⁸⁶¹ In Das's view, if the colonial State gave priority to the Calcutta-Lahore trunk line including the Amritsar-Multan Line, it was with both military and economic aims. The latter line was in fact meant for carrying colonial trade, soldiers, and ordnance.⁸⁶² That is confirmed by Harmand stating that the achievement of such a railway enterprise was known by the colonial government to be indispensable for increasing its power of action through better interregional communication.⁸⁶³ Donaldson explains that this military motivation gathered momentum due to the 1857-58 *sepo*y mutiny which showed the vital importance of military connection across the colony through elaborated railway transport.⁸⁶⁴ The railway network fetched the advantage of decreasing the need for troops by accelerating their movement.⁸⁶⁵ The new transport means had reduced British India, in the view of the contemporary engineer MacGeorge, to a twentieth of its prior size by the end of the nineteenth century as remote Indian areas had been rendered much closer to each other.⁸⁶⁶ Meanwhile, on the economic ground, the process of subordinating the Indian economy to the British industrialised capitalistic one was being successfully achieved by the Indian railroad network.⁸⁶⁷ In 1884, Andrew highlighted these military and economic advantages as follows:

*Where it takes three months now, it will take only as many days, to bring distant consignments to market, and the same capital, consequently, which at present can be returned only three or four times a year, may be returned, probably, twenty. A railroad will operate in the same manner, increasing the effective strength of the army. The effect of rapid communication by railway, speaking militarily, is, that it enables you to do with a small army the work of a large one.*⁸⁶⁸

⁸⁶¹ Sharma. A. K, op. cit. , pp. 1-2.

⁸⁶² Das. P. V, op. cit. , p. 1289.

⁸⁶³ Harmand. J, op. cit. , pp. 125, 127.

⁸⁶⁴ Donaldson. D, op. cit. , p. 7.

⁸⁶⁵ Adams. J and Craig West. R, op. cit. , p. 63.

⁸⁶⁶ Arnold. D, op. cit. , p. 109.

⁸⁶⁷ Das. P. V, op. cit. , p. 1285.

⁸⁶⁸ Andrew. W. P, op. cit. , pp. 8, 9, 14.

Das focuses on the regional specimen of the Punjab as being much affected by the railway enterprise ending in the connection of its agricultural interior with the nearest port city namely Karachi. Hence, the author believes that a key intention behind the fulfilment of that Western railway enterprise was the adjustment of the Punjab to the British industrial home needs in a durable way. Furthermore, so as to render the Multan-Karachi connection more advantageous, the Amritsar-Multan Line was lengthened from Multan to Shershah and Jullalpoor, which effectively decreased the travel time between Multan and Karachi from four days to around two hours.⁸⁶⁹

These were not the only improvements due to the railway infrastructure in the Punjab. Others followed. In 1879, a further extension to the Amritsar-Multan Line, called the Indus Valley Railway, was inaugurated to further augment the Punjabi trade by linking Lahore to Karachi. Three years later, the colonial Punjabi government deemed in a written report this extension an economic success on account of a resultant substantial growth in wheat trade, which encouraged the maximisation of train use for intensifying global Punjabi commerce. Then, the Punjab Northern Railway, inaugurated in 1875, became since 1883 associated with an increase in wheat trade, too. This is said to illustrate the fact that a railway line made specifically for military objectives could also attain commercial ones.⁸⁷⁰

All these facts constitute a further indication of Queen Victoria's 1858 proclaimed promise being unfulfilled since British rule kept being favourable to no economic or political stability for India whatsoever.

In addition to all that, by reading Satya's article, one may believe that railway operation had during the second half of the nineteenth century a destructive impact on India's ecology. The author emphasizes the fact that the

⁸⁶⁹ Das. P. V, op. cit. , pp. 1288-1290.

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid. , p. 1290.

colonial trains constituted an insatiable drain on the colony's firewood being a locally-available appropriate economical fuel.⁸⁷¹

Because the railway network was continually expanded across the colony, its firewood demand rise concomitantly.⁸⁷² This situation is said to have been bound to entail wide deforestation especially in Oudh, the Upper Provinces, and the Punjab. As these regions were non-productive of coal and far from coalmines, unlike eastern and central India, the colonial State saw it worthwhile to fall back on those regions's forests in order to assure train functioning around there. The period from 1860 to 1884 is said to be that of forest exhaustion and denudation in the Punjab to the point that many thinkers such as Ramachandra Guha claim it to be a watershed in the Indian ecological history.⁸⁷³ Meanwhile, in the northern region of Uttaranchal, deforestation was so intensive, too, that it is identified not only as "*the declining vegetational cover but also as extracting more wood than the regenerative capacity of forests*".⁸⁷⁴

According to Das's article, the colonial State realised and admitted at several moments and circumstances the particular utility of resorting to Indian firewood, the latter being put in comparison with other exploitable fuels. It is stated that coal use for railway operation was recurrently planned and applied but not conveniently adopted until the early 1880s after the British had discovered in India coal of appropriate quality and quantity for the colonial trains.⁸⁷⁵

Between the inauguration of the colonial railway network and the late 1870s, attempts were unsuccessfully done to keep fuelling those trains with coal instead of firewood. This preference was on the ground of more efficiency. There emerged

⁸⁷¹ Satya. L. D, 2008, "British Imperial Railways in Nineteenth-Century South Asia" in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 47, pp. 69-77, Mumbai, Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 73-75.

⁸⁷² Babu. S. V, 2014, "Clearing the Forest: Colonialism and Deforestation in Nagaland, Northeast India" in Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 19, No. 6, pp. 14-16, Ghaziabad, IOSR, iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol19-issue6/Version-5/B019651416.pdf, pp. 2, 3.

⁸⁷³ Das. P. V, op. cit. , pp. 1283, 1284.

⁸⁷⁴ Dangwal. D. D, 2005, "Commercialisation of Forests, Timber Extraction and Deforestation in Uttaranchal, 1815-1947" in Conservation and Society, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 110-133, Mumbai, Wolters Kluwer, dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/.../commercialisation_of_forests.pdf?, p. 1.

⁸⁷⁵ Das. P. V, op. cit. , p. 1290.

the initial tendency of importing, for coal-poor Indian areas, English coal shipped in tremendous amounts at tremendous expense. Overtime, as the railway network grew in length reaching 3,000 miles by 1865, the colonial State expressed its worry regarding coal insufficiency in India and English-coal expensiveness. The shipment cost of English coal is said to have rendered this fuel fourfold more pricey in India than in England.⁸⁷⁶

And, as it was too expensive to ferry Indian coal from eastern or central India, where this fuel was naturally available, to the northern coal-poor regions such as the Punjab, north-Indian firewood became increasingly attractive. Thus, the Punjab is said to be the first region of British India to rely on its firewood as cheaper train fuel though this source of energy was known to be three times less efficient than coal.⁸⁷⁷

This reliance upon firewood made north Indian plains and forests the object of on-going clearing mainly those in Lahore, Montgomery, Multan, Chenab, Jhelum, and Shahpur. It is claimed that this process of tree felling to meet the colonial fuel demand of northern railways, in addition to its being ecologically destructive, created a long-lasting scarcity for the north Indian villagers who had now in the 1870s and 1880s to undergo restriction on their own firewood home consumption. In fact, the colonial constant recourse to local firewood as the cheapest alternative to sustain colonial train operation in the north generated firewood famine to be incurred by the colonised population. What is more, that resultant scarcity did not induce the colonial State to halt its railway extension policy in the north, which allowed no relief to the famine until after 1884; the Punjabi railway network grew in mile from 733.25 to 1824.35 between 1877 and 1884.⁸⁷⁸

In the 1860s, northern railway operation and expansion became not guaranteed by the firewood stock offered by the northern forests as the latter, being the major fuel source in northern British India, had already been

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid. , p. 1292.

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid. , pp. 1293, 1294.

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid. , pp. 1291, 1296, 1301, 1308, 1309.

overexploited and denuded of their trees.⁸⁷⁹ Therefore, the colonial State took up in parallel forest conservation so as to exclude the Indians from wood exploitation. So, what caused the north Indian population to lack its own firewood in the 1870s and 1880s is not only that state forest cutting but also the new state strategy of forest conservation launched in 1865 as a prohibitive measure against natives woods exploitation. This was done in order that the north Indian firewood stock would be reserved for the sole colonial purposes of train fuelling and railway expansion. The Forest Department was brought into existence to keep those forests under state control and limit the existing cutting-rights of native communities there.⁸⁸⁰

In Uttaranchal, so as to meet the rising train demand for firewood, the Forest Department set about in the 1870s searching for other exploitable forests. Surveys revealed the existence of large tracts of wood-yielding areas around there but insisted on the necessity of making them accessible. So, the department had to spend important sums of money in the project of constructing roads to make those areas reachable.⁸⁸¹

Furthermore, for fear of running completely out of firewood, the colonial State assigned the Forest Department the project of afforestation in the Punjab. Wide firewood plantation was thus carried out in the region though it was known that it would take for the trees of the suitable quality over a decade to mature and yield firewood. Estimations of necessary firewood amounts were done to meet the then and future train demands, which made afforestation weigh expensively on the colonial finance. For instance, the plantation of just 20,000 acres in the Punjab is said to have cost 1,350,000 rupees. The yearly train firewood demand rose up to 2,300,000 maunds, and by 1870 the aggregate land put under firewood plantation had expanded to 12,315 acres.⁸⁸² The colonial State was willing to invest much money on afforestation but never with the aim of meeting the needs of the

⁸⁷⁹ Babu. S. V, op. cit. , pp. 1, 2.

⁸⁸⁰ Satya. L. D, op. cit. , p. 74.

⁸⁸¹ Dangwal. D. D, op. cit. , p. 113.

⁸⁸² Das. P. V, op. cit. , p. 1300.

northern native population for that daily home fuel. The north Indians saw that the British need always took precedence over theirs.

To conclude this section, one may infer that Britain was concerned about keeping high her drain of Indian natural riches through promoted railway transport supported by telegraphy. But, Britain showed no concern about relieving the consequential lingering intensifying pauperisation and starvation of her Indian subjects. In fact, by 1900, British India had been made an underdeveloped subservient economy with modern Western-style trappings.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

General Conclusion

To conclude what has been said, one may start by highlighting the significance of various English achievements in India prior to the whole colonial westernising program. The realisation of forts by the East India Company together with its increasing military, territorial, administrative, and commercial control in the eighteenth century paved the way for the nineteenth-century educative, scientific, and infrastructural missions. By the time Britain implemented her civilizing agenda in India, the company had already rooted its governance in the Indian regions meant to benefit from the westernizing enterprises.

One may underline the fact that not all nineteenth-century Indians or observers appreciated the cultural, linguistic, religious, or infrastructural changes brought under the sway of British imperialism. This analytical research work involves studying the ethics or rationale of the British empire in India, which polarizes opinion between the governor and the governed and then between pro-colonialist and anti-colonialist viewers.

With regard to the westernising-education policy in nineteenth-century British India, one may deduce that the British State acted with a certain smartness and judiciousness when favouring therein Anglican evangelicalism and then Catholicism. As such, British Parliament preserved the traditionally-entrenched monarchical system of the State by winning the backing of the national evangelical currents in rejection to the growing republican menace emanating from both the American and French Revolutions. Thus, the British Monarch would remain as the head of both the State and the Anglican Church at both the metropolitan and the peripheral levels, benefiting from both Anglican and Catholic loyalty to the cause of imperialism. To buttress this monarchical-imperial interest, the British evangelist milieu got, in return, permission to critically regard the religious gap between the metropolis and the periphery by publicly and continually discounting both

Hinduism and Islam as being false.⁸⁸³ So, what was expectedly played out is British evangelists defending royalism against republican expansion.

The orientalist-anglicist controversy emerged to polarize public opinion on the cultural innovations brought by the colonisers during the nineteenth century including the English language. The British in India elaborated profitable commercial business with the help of Indians taught and required to use English and English norms for practical reasons. This acculturation caused a sharp view division among the colonized many of whom refused to conform to the British lifestyle and rejected the belief that English be a window to the world. The orientalists advocated Indian conservatism and revivalism.⁸⁸⁴ While many Indians socialised into Western cultural values, many others did oppose them out of conservativeness.⁸⁸⁵

Although many British colonists evinced throughout the nineteenth century their willingness to educate the Indians, they were in that constantly confronted by many different obstacles mainly at the peripheral level. One may believe that the local tradition restricted much the educative opportunity given to low-caste Indian children. Lack of public spiritedness in the Indian upper castes meant a lack of educational charity for low-caste members while colonial educational plans met with insufficient governmental subvention. To that were added supposed Indian backwardness, putting a ban on girl schooling, and family straitened circumstances forcing child employment and no child education.⁸⁸⁶ Deficiency in state budgetary provision, which narrowed teacher recruitment, and the well-nigh overall indifference of the natives vis-à-vis Western education contributed to hinder the educative enterprise.⁸⁸⁷

On account of both constant low financing and irregularity in educational provision across the colony, the Western-education commitment in nineteenth-

⁸⁸³ Strong. R, op. cit. , pp. 118, 119, 129, 130.

⁸⁸⁴ Roy. M, op. cit. , pp. 84, 85.

⁸⁸⁵ Desousa. V, op. cit. , p. 64.

⁸⁸⁶ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , pp. 320, 321.

⁸⁸⁷ Chailley. J, op. cit. , p. 484.

century British India may be qualified as non-achieved.⁸⁸⁸ Actually, concerning the question as to whether or not that policy was a success, one may reach the conclusion that it was a partial failure for want of a general basis to that educative system. The British in India did not succeed in establishing a unified democratic educative pattern. They rather set up patchy education being intentionally for the production of anglicised native servants from the upper Indian classes, loyal to the imperial cause, and not for the generation of an independent India with its own trained government. The amount of that educational provision, believed to be small if the number of the colonized people is taken into consideration, did not benefit the native masses as these remained mostly excluded from it.⁸⁸⁹ What is more, if European standards are taken into consideration, the overall educative provision may be estimated as meagre in quality mainly due to limited governmental or private finance.

What seems to have rendered the failure of that educative commitment more critical is the colonial State having ever been in no position to guarantee suitable jobs within colonial administration for all the minority of Western-taught Indians. This employment insufficiency was to affect Anglo-Indian relationship as many Indian graduates were disappointed, which created a situation of unrest.⁸⁹⁰

One may claim that the major objective of promoting Western education in nineteenth-century British India was trying to secure Indian faithfulness to the cause of imperialism. Many Christianised or English-educated Indians were being made ethically loyal to the colonial regime.⁸⁹¹ In this respect, the latter called into play mutual serviceability in which the colonised were to receive Western education, which they construed as a modernising and civilising blessing, because they were primordially needed within colonial bureaucracy. They were employed as cheap clerks or intermediaries between the governor and the millions of those

⁸⁸⁸ Whitehead. C, 2005, op. cit. , p. 320.

⁸⁸⁹ Kamerkar. M. P, op. cit. , p. 377.

⁸⁹⁰ Hilliker. J. F, op. cit. , p. 277.

⁸⁹¹ Heredia. R. C, op. cit. , p. 2338.

under governorship.⁸⁹² In fact, this scheme of Western education was nothing but a procedure for British-Indian socialisation.⁸⁹³

Indian feedback on this colonial educative scheme was not identical but varied according to regions. A sense of racial separateness between the colonised and the colonisers often resulted in the former being not totally flexible to the will of the latter; thus, a certain early-avowed pessimism was mixed to the Christianising and anglicising commitments. Missionary approach was not devoid of scepticism and suspicion towards the Indians. And, since evangelising missionaries were also language or science instructors, they were often on frustrating terms. The problem was that most of schooled Indians kept being enthusiastic about Western-knowledge acquisition, so as to gain diplomas and eventually administrative jobs within the colonial State, but little impressed by the Christian religion and principles. Most anglicised Indians remained faithful to their original spirituality. In fact, the majority of Indians who ran after missionary schools did so with the aim of gaining a better professional status and not copying Western worship.⁸⁹⁴

Western education in British India involved a strategic adaptation in colonial attitude. The British succeeded in making many Indians passionately keen on Western norms and culture by avoiding coercion. Interested Indians received this education under no compulsion. But, the avoidance of coercion could not secure the imperial ties at trouble time. The British did not fail to switch to violence and repressiveness to save their colonial hegemony when massive opposition to anglicisation rose in the middle of the century to shake the established colonial regime.⁸⁹⁵

The adherence of most Indians to their orientalist, Hindu or Muslim, identities allowed lesser room for westernising reform in the aftermath of the Great Indian Mutiny as Britain agreed not to permit further imperial interference in Indian

⁸⁹² Mehrotra. S, op. cit. , pp. 11, 12.

⁸⁹³ Chaudhuri. S, op. cit. , p. 94.

⁸⁹⁴ Roy. M, op. cit. , p. 92.

⁸⁹⁵ Desousa. V, op. cit. , pp. 61, 62, 66.

culture and spirituality. This new refraining policy may reveal a certain wisdom in British administration owing to the mutiny of which recurrence was unwanted.

However, historical views and analyses do not always converge on the latter vision. The British evangelising and anglicising efforts are claimed to have continued throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Those post-mutiny efforts, be them governmental or private, Protestant or Catholic, made the periphery spiritually and intellectually tied permanently to Western society and to England in particular. This was visible in the fact that the Indian demand for registration in Christian colleges and universities kept increasing so that it exceeded places availability. It was a planned union in which Britain ranked persistently as the ruling paternalistic nation. Indeed, the stereotype of British superiority over 'Indianness' remained endemic being unruffled by the Great Indian Mutiny.⁸⁹⁶ The Protestant evangelical commitment kept being defined by the will to transcend and obliterate the supposed Indian backwardness seen in 'Hindu idolatry' and 'Islamic bigotry'.⁸⁹⁷ Those educative efforts reverberated down the years as a cultural legacy seen today in different fields of the Commonwealth country such as language and literature, sport, science, technology, and transport.⁸⁹⁸ The Great Indian Mutiny did not put a definitive stop to Indian voluntary acquiescence in Christianisation and Anglicisation.

But, deeper examination of westernising education in nineteenth-century British India leads to the logical deduction that this commitment was not ever-productive for the cause of colonialism itself. It is true that the promotion of the English language nationwide came mostly in assistance and consolidation of British power since it opened professional grounds for emerging middle-class or urban elite Indians within colonial administration.⁸⁹⁹ Notwithstanding, though only a minority, the Western-educated young Indians were also made well familiar with the political past of the Europeans and Americans who had not been able to enjoy

⁸⁹⁶ Heredia. R. C, op. cit. , p. 2338.

⁸⁹⁷ Bellenoit. H. J. A, op. cit. , p. 369.

⁸⁹⁸ Dalziel. N, op. cit. , p. 109.

⁸⁹⁹ Roy. M, op. cit. , p. 84.

the benefits of freedom and equality until upon tensions and ructions opposing the governed and the governor.⁹⁰⁰ Western education came to play against the stability of British rule by letting the Indians know about the notion of democracy with historical examples of English rising. British India was at the same time affected by a persistent economic crisis marked by misery and recurrent famines entailed by the promotion and misuse of railways siphoning Indian riches to Britain.⁹⁰¹ This situation waked up Indian aspiration for justice and liberty by kindling nationalistic opposition to the colonial dispossession of Indian wealth.

With regard to the westernising-infrastructure policy in nineteenth-century British India, assessing views have been far from being consensual. According to the colonist opinion, this policy was materialized in two modern engines of social and economic advancement for the colonised. Telegraph lines and rail lines were the products of Western wizardry and science shared by the colonial State.⁹⁰² Several points served as arguments in the rationalisation of those railways by contemporary colonists. These claimed that trains in British India became much appreciated by her native population enjoying their quality of being significantly faster than all the traditional natural transport means, which thus increased the Indian use rate for both trade and pilgrimage.⁹⁰³ By the turn of the century, the benefits of the colonial trains had already been well brought to Indian commerce by promoting trade mobility and market incorporation and reducing both goods prices and interregional price gaps. These achievements were thought to have come within the frame of improving Indian living standards under British rule.

Moreover, contemporary colonists saw in those railways the ability to break down the traditional Hindu principle pertaining to the caste system regarded by the British as retrograde. In this respect, trains were hailed as successful in lessening superstition that had long been separating the Hindus on the basis of their caste belonging. With a railway network with which the colonised were increasingly

⁹⁰⁰ Tangri. S. S, op. cit. , pp. 372, 373.

⁹⁰¹ Pécastaing-Boissière. M, op. cit. , pp. 218, 222, 223.

⁹⁰² Walsh. J. E, op. cit. , p. 107.

⁹⁰³ Bhattacharya. S, op. cit. , pp. 411- 415.

familiar, time came up for physical inter-human rejection to be considerably cut down since a low-caste Hindu could now travel together with a high-caste one within tight space. Thus, the Indian society was seen as less divided since less attached to its old-age segregating caste hierarchy and more inclined to inner tolerance and familiarity between Hindus.

As for telegraphy, it was hailed as a modern instrument for better connection between Indian family members and as an opportunity for Indians to get jobs and evolve professionally within this section of colonial public function.

On the other hand, the anti-colonist opinion is that railway transport and telegraphy did no or little good for the Indians. Being developed in parallel, the two infrastructures assumed a dominative role to bring the colony under advanced British exploitation.⁹⁰⁴ While railways, guided by telegraphic signals, assured the fast movement of colonial troops inland, they also permitted the conveyance of raw cotton and jute from Indian hinterland to harbours for shipment to Britain and the distribution of British-made goods across the colony. Thus, the railway network in concert with the telegraphic one is said to have politically and economically united the colony and rendered it much closer to the metropolis. Besides, since the realisation of railway infrastructure much depended on Indian-land tax revenues, one may conclude that Britain was the scientific participant of the project whereas India its financial one.⁹⁰⁵ But, the resultant enrichment was to take place in Britain, not in India. The latter was seen as victimised undergoing progressive economic decline and human loss due to recurring famines partly imputed to the colonial railways draining off Indian raw materials and food for the British benefit. So, one may presume that the effect of railway transport came opposite the official ideology of the *Raj*.

Before the British *Raj*, colonial rule in British India was marked by the East India Company seeking to minimise investment in spite of public exhortation to

⁹⁰⁴ Arnold. D, op. cit. , pp. 113, 114.

⁹⁰⁵ Pécastaing-Boissière. M, op. cit. , p. 218.

profuse contrary action.⁹⁰⁶ However, from the inception of the British *Raj* in 1858 to the end of the nineteenth century, the colonial State showed a departure from that minimisation, associating high-scale westernising infrastructural investment to the theory of colonial benevolence and paternalism. In practice however, this investment was seen as associated rather to the British enthusiasm for colonial drainage and despoilment.

One may deduce that the quality of the colonial railway service remained by and large not good due to the constant care for the interests of those who built, owned, and ran the lines reserving no economic interest for the colonised. The service was often subject to a contractual policy of state control that restricted capital expenditure on private railway building and management and of state-guaranteed interests for the private shareholders, that discouraged serious investment. Actually, the private railway companies grew nonchalant and unwilling to effect substantial progress in the service as their profits were known to be always assured. As a result, nineteenth-century British India never possessed a railway network as important in length and serviceability and as cheap in fare as that in a really-modernised country.⁹⁰⁷

The relationship set and strengthened between the colonial railways and Indian northern forests between around 1865 and 1885 was from the start to the advantage of the colonial State developing an instrumentalist vision, and not an ecological one, of those natural train-fuel stocks. Northern railway operation and expansion became dependent on northern Indian forests to the detriment of the local population left deprived of its own firewood.

Even after Queen Victoria's 1858 Proclamation promising decent civil life for her Indian subjects, the latter kept being debarred from participation in the management of their own affairs. This exclusion prevented the Indians from serving

⁹⁰⁶ Thiessen. J, op. cit. , p. 45.

⁹⁰⁷ Thorner. D, op. cit. , pp. 397, 401, 402.

their own political and economic interests, and reserved profitability in British India for the British only.⁹⁰⁸

Ultimately then, one may conclude that the whole colonial westernising theorisation and realisation made by the British to supposedly improve the Indian society and economy throughout the nineteenth century were far more beneficial for Britain than for her periphery. The so-called civilising Western educational or infrastructural achievements in British India were mostly aimed at the invigoration of the British imperial hand and at the prosperity of the industrialised metropolis. This colonial westernisation might have been regenerative to the Indians but to a very little extent.

⁹⁰⁸ Dutt. R, op. cit. , p. 432.

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L'Occidentalisation coloniale de l'Inde britannique durant le dix-neuvième siècle

Résumé

La coexistence impériale entre les Indiens et les Britanniques pendant le XIX^{ème} siècle a conduit les premiers à imiter la culture européenne à grande échelle. La société indienne était de plus en plus soumise à la transplantation de la pensée, la spiritualité, et la science technique occidentales. Pendant leur présence coloniale en Inde à long terme, les Britanniques y-ont accru leur domination et pénétration par le biais d'une importante contribution rénovatrice variée. L'Inde était acharnement le théâtre d'une adaptation voulue d'ordre éducatif aussi bien infrastructurel à l'instar de la métropole britannique de sorte à assouvir les intérêts de cette dernière. Alors qu'une série d'historiens sont convaincus de la qualité régénératrice de cette contribution coloniale vis-à-vis les colonisés, beaucoup d'autres la voient plutôt comme destructrice à l'égard de l'économie et des valeurs morales ou culturelles ancestrales indiennes.

Mots clés : colonisation britannique de l'Inde, évangélisation, éducation angliciste, télégraphe, chemins de fer et trains.

Colonial Westernization in Nineteenth-Century British India

Abstract

Imperial coexistence between the Indians and the British during the nineteenth century led the former to imitate European culture on a large scale. The Indian society was increasingly submitted to the transplantation of Western thinking, spirituality, and technical science. During their long-term colonial presence in India, the British extended their domination and penetration there by means of great multifarious renovating contribution. India was persistently the scene of deliberate adaptation in both education and infrastructure after the fashion of the British metropolis in such a way as to meet the latter's interests. While a series of historians are persuaded of the regenerative quality of this colonial contribution vis-à-vis the colonized, many others view it rather as destructive vis-à-vis India's economy and moral or cultural ancestral values.

Keywords: the British colonization of India, evangelization, Anglicist education, telegraph, railways and trains.

التغريب الاستعماري في الهند البريطانية خلال القرن التاسع عشر

ملخص

التعايش الإمبريالي بين الهنود والبريطانيين خلال القرن التاسع عشر دفع بالأوائل إلى تقليد الثقافة الأوروبية على صعيد عالي وأصبح المجتمع الهندي خاضعا أكثر فأكثر إلى التوغل الفكري والروحاني والعلمي التقني الغربي. خلال التواجد الاستعماري في الهند على المدى الطويل، قام البريطانيون بتفعيل هيمنتهم وتوغلهم عن طريق مساهمة مجددة و متنوعة. كانت الهند مسرحا متعصبا لتكيف مراد ثقافي و هيكل على سبيل مثال بريطانيا. هذه الأخيرة كانت تسعى إلى تحقيق مصالحه حيث اقتنع جمع من المؤرخين أن هذه المساهمة لها عائد لفائدة المستعمرين وأنها مخربة لاقتصاد الهند و القيم الأخلاقية و الثقافية التراثية الهندية. في حين تمسك كتاب و مؤرخون آخرون بالرأي المعاكس المدعي أن تلك المساهمة كانت مخططة لصالح الهند البريطانية فكانت حسيبهم ساعية إلى ترقية هذه الأخيرة عن طريق فتحها إلى الحضارة الغربية.

كلمات مفتاحية: الاستعمار البريطاني للهند، التبشير، التربية الانكليزية، التلغراف، السكك الحديدية والقطارات.