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**Ethnicity Differences in Britain: Integrated Indians and
Segregated Pakistanis**

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Dedications

This dissertation is dedicated to all the ones I love. Above all, to my dearest parents, sisters, and my future husband. I pleaurably dedicate it to all the members of my jury and colleagues. A special dedication goes to a very special person whom I have recently met, and have a lot of respect and admiration to Pr YACINE Rachida. I do not want to forget my little nephew Mohamed, my brother in law Said, and all my friends BERKAT Wafa, DJEFFEL Chahrazed, and BENZARA Amina.

Abstract

Britain has always been described as a multi-ethnic society receiving people from all over the world with different cultures, beliefs, and traditions. Indian and Pakistani ethnic groups were among the first to migrate to the U.K. mainly due to previous colonial relationships, and in search for better living conditions as well. There is much evidence that the Indian community and the Pakistani community experience different levels of cohabitation into the British society. Whereas Indians could prosper and achieve considerable levels in different arenas, Pakistanis remained severely segregated. Many factors have contributed to such stark differences between the two groups, however, religious affiliation tends to be the main reason. The basic of this research paper is to identify the main reasons behind these unequal levels of integration between the Indian and Pakistani groups in Britain, and to examine which of these reasons tends to be the most influential. To do so, I've tackled in my dissertation the historical background the British and Indians shared; where and when did they first meet, and how their relationship became stronger through time. The dissertation includes the creation of the British Raj and how it ended up leading to the creation of the new separate Muslim state of Pakistan. In addition to the migration history of the Indian and Pakistani groups to Britain. Furthermore, it illustrates how hugely is the difference between the Indians' level of cohabitation in the British society and that of the Pakistani community. It demonstrates the high rates of educational qualifications, labour opportunities, and political participation that Indians have. Contrastingly, it shows the poor and limited level of integration whether in education, employment chances, or social cohabitation that Pakistanis suffer from. To clarify the reasons behind these stark differences between these two groups, a number of factors are taken into consideration including: English fluency, educational qualifications, social and cultural constructions, political discourse, and more precisely religious affiliations. I have concentrated more on the main reason standing against Pakistanis' integration in the British society which is the religious affiliation. By recalling a number of terrorist attacks which are basically attributed to Islam, it shows how badly is the Pakistani community, and the Muslim community in general, affected by their religious affiliation.

Résumé

La Grande-Bretagne a toujours été décrite comme une société multiethnique. La Grande-Bretagne est une société très ouverte qui accueille chaque année des différents pays, populations, sans aucune référence à la race, à la religion, la classe et le métier. Les groupes ethniques Indiens et Pakistanais ont été parmi les premiers à migrer vers le R.U. Principalement en raison de relations coloniales antérieures, et à la recherche de meilleures conditions de vie. Ainsi, il ya beaucoup de preuves que les collectivités et l'expérience de la communauté Pakistanaise Indienne à différents niveaux de la cohabitation dans la société britannique. Considérant que les Indiens pourraient prospérer et atteindre des niveaux considérables dans les différents domaines, les Pakistanais sont restés sévèrement séparés. De nombreux facteurs ont contribué à ces différences marquées entre les deux groupes, cependant, l'appartenance religieuse tend à être la principale raison.

La base de cette étude est d'identifier les principales raisons derrière ces niveaux inégaux de l'intégration entre les groupes Indiens et Pakistanais en Grande Bretagne, et d'examiner à laquelle ces raisons ont tendance à être les plus influents. Pour ce faire, j'ai divisé mon essai en trois chapitres.

Le premier chapitre de cette recherche implique l'historique, les Britanniques et les Indiens partagés; ou et quand ils ont tout d'abord ne satisfait, et comment leur relation est devenue plus forte à travers le temps. Il explique aussi la création du Raj Britannique et comment il a fini menant à la création de la nouvelle Etat Musulman séparé du Pakistan.

Le deuxième chapitre traite l'histoire de la migration des groupes Indiens et Pakistanais en Grande-Bretagne. Par ailleurs, il illustre comment énormément est la différence entre la cohabitation des Indiens dans la société Britannique et celle de la communauté Pakistanaise. Il illustre les taux élevés de diplômés d'études, les possibilités du travail et la participation politique disposant d'Indiens. Par contraste, il montre les pauvres et limité le niveau d'intégration que ce soit dans l'éducation, chances d'emploi ou sociale cohabitation Pakistanais souffrent de.

Afin de préciser les raisons de ces différences flagrantes entre ces deux groupes, un certain nombre de facteurs est pris en considération notamment: anglais maîtrise, des constructions sociales et culturelles, politiques, diplômés d'études.

ملخص

لطالما وصفت المملكة البريطانية كمجتمع متعدد الأعراق تجمع ناس من جميع أنحاء العالم مع اختلاف معتقداتهم و تقاليدهم. و كان من أوائل المهاجرين الى بريطانيا الهنود و الباكستانيين, و ذلك راجع أساسا للظروف الاستعمارية في الماضي, و أسباب هذه الهجرة كذلك البحث عن فرص عمل لتحسين المستوى المعيشي. غير أن اندماج كل من هاتين المجموعتين كان مخيف عن الآخر حيث أن الأقلية الهندية استطاعت التأقلم بصورة ناجحة انعكس ذلك من خلال توليهم مناصب مهمة في مختلف المجالات. في حين الأقلية الباكستانية بقيت منعزلة. العديد من العوامل ساهمت في هذه التباينات الكبيرة بين هاتين المجموعتين غير أن الانتماء الديني كان له بالغ التأثير.

أساس هذا البحث العلمي هو تحديد الأسباب الرئيسية الكامنة وراء هذه الاختلافات في مستوى الاندماج بين الجماعات الهندية و الباكستانية في بريطانيا, بالإضافة الى دراسة أي من هذه الأسباب يعد الأكثر تأثيرا. لهذا فرسالتى مقسمة الى ثلاثة فصول.

الفصل الأول من هذا البحث يشمل الخلفية التاريخية المشتركة بين البريطانيين و الهنود من خلال التطرق الى بداية العلاقات بين الجانبين و كيف تطورت مع مرور الوقت مرور بالحكم الاستعماري البريطاني للهند وصولا الى اقامة دولة اسلامية منفصلة وهي الباكستان.

الفصل الثاني يتناول تاريخ هجرة الجماعات الهندية و الباكستانية الى بريطانيا, بالإضافة الى اظهار مدى الفروقات و حجمها في الاندماج في المجتمع البريطاني لكل من المجموعتين. كذلك توضيح مدى تفوق الهنود على المستوى العلمي, العملي, و السياسي. هذا عكس الباكستانيين الذين يعانون من ضعف اندماجهم سواء على مستوى التعليم, فرص العمل, أو الجانب الاجتماعي. بالإضافة الى التطرق الى الأسباب المؤدية الى هذه الفروقات. حيث هناك مجموعة من العوامل التي احدثت بعين الاعتبار بما في ذلك الطلاقة في اللغة الانجليزية, المؤهلات العلمية, التكوين الاجتماعي و الثقافي, الخطاب السياسي, و بالتحديد الانتماءات الدينية.

الفصل الأخير من هذه الدراسة يركز على السبب الرئيسي الذي يعد من أهم العوائق المانعة لاندماج الباكستانيين في المجتمع البريطاني و هو الانتماء الديني. هذا من خلال تطرق الى الهجمات الارهابية المنسوبة للاسلام و التي أساءت للأقليات الباكستانية من خلال اعاقه اندماجهم في المجتمع البريطاني.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACPO	The Association of Chief Police Officers.
BNP	The British National Party.
BSA	The British Social Attitudes.
CCIF	The Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en France.
CPS	The British Crown Prosecution Service.
DIH	The Demos Integration Hub.
EUMC	The European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.
FAIR	The Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism.
FNSEM	Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities.
FRA	The European Union's Fundamental Rights Agency.
GCSE	General Certificate of Secondary Education.
HEIPRs	Higher Education Initial Participation Rates.
HLCID	High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora.
IAG	The Algerian Islamic Armed Group.
IHRC	The Islamic Human Rights Commission.
IRR	The Institute of Race Relations.
LFS	Labour Force Survey.
MSF	The Muslim Safety Forum.
NEP	National Equality Panel.
NHS	The National Health Service.
NRI	The National Resources Inventory.
ONS	Office for National Statistics.
PIOs	People of Indian Origins.
PSI	The Policy Studies Institute.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Despite the political rhetoric about Britain's traditions of 'liberty' and 'tolerance', the UK actually has a long history of inequality and discrimination on grounds of gender, race, and religion. Racial discrimination, a prominent feature of the colonial experience, proved to be equally problematic for Commonwealth settlers, particularly students. One Indian who tried to obtain a job in the car industry was told that employment was only open to union members, but when he attempted to obtain a union card he was refused. The same person faced similar discrimination when trying to obtain a job in Coventry transport services. And for those who were lucky enough to get a job, they were often unable to retain their positions. The 25-year-old Sohan Lal was one of many. He was forced out of a job at a foundry in Derbyshire when 200 of his white colleagues went on strike in protest at his appointment.

Inequalities of race and religion were deep-rooted and were becoming even more salient. The newcomers had to live through hardship and were exposed to high levels of segregation. South Asians, particularly Indians and Pakistanis, who now represent the fastest-growing immigrant populations in the United Kingdom, tried to cohabitate in Britain. However, there were different obstacles standing in their way which they had to overcome. They had to establish their own religious and cultural institutions in a host society that had very few temples for Hindus, mosques for Muslims, or gurdwaras, a place for worship, for Sikhs. Britain has been a country of immigration over the past two hundred years in a variety of ways. However, at the same time as positive developments have taken place, an iron girder of racism and xenophobia has remained.

Generally speaking, the South Asian groups show a plural non-assimilationist structure. However, their levels of segregation show considerable internal variation with Pakistanis having high levels of encapsulation while Indian rates are relatively modest. Whereas Indians have done quite well, Pakistanis have remained severely undeveloped.

Despite sharing the same heritage, soil, ancestry, and family, being both considered as strangers, and suffering from deprivation and ethnic penalty, the dissimilarity in education, economic position, political participation, and perceptions of social citizenship is significant across Indian and Pakistani groups in the UK. Unlike Pakistanis, Indians are considered to be the most successful immigrant group in Britain.

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In his analysis of the 1991 census data, the geographer Ceri Peach studied the degree of segregation among Britain's ethnic groups. He concluded that Pakistani segregation is very high, while Indian segregation is significantly lower. In education, for instance, though gaps remain between majority and minority ethnic groups, however, rates vary by both gender and ethnicity/religion, with some minorities (such as Indians) doing as well as, or better than, their white counterparts, while Pakistanis are underachieving.

Furthermore, minority ethnic groups have historically been more likely to experience unemployment than the white majority. However, according to the Britain's labour market data, the Indian community is more likely to experience the highest employment rate in the U.K. with 71.6% in 2014. This contrasts sharply with Pakistanis' rate which is only 51%.

Pakistanis are one of the most economically disadvantaged ethnic groups in the UK and are more likely to be considered 'poor'. About 60 percent of British Pakistanis are living in relative poverty while for Indians the figure is closer to only 25 percent. Indians are better represented in the top jobs than even the White British. Whereas, Pakistanis are significantly underrepresented. 12 percent of doctors are Indian while many Pakistanis are clustered in low-skilled professions.

Moreover, there is a great deal of change within the Indian community in Britain and increasingly young people of Indian origin are participating in community work and public life, and entering politics. For instance, in 2015, a record number of 10 Indian-origin Members of Parliament (MPs) were elected in the general election in the UK. Breaking with that the previous 2010 general election record in which eight Indian-origin members were elected. On the other hand, though some improvements have taken place, but still Pakistanis' participation in politics is a poor one. In addition, Pakistanis are more likely to be exposed to racist attacks. The chances of a Pakistani being racially attacked in a year is more than 4 percent; the highest rate in the UK.

In September 2005, Trevor Phillips, then the Director of the Commission for Racial Equality, made a speech in which he warned that Britain was sleepwalking into segregation and that the Pakistani community is to suffer the most.

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Besides, on 17 August, 2013, the law chief Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, made a speech in London, during which he blamed ethnic Pakistanis, and not Indians, on fuelling corruption. Furthermore, only 31% of Britons say that migrants from Pakistani origins are quite integrated into the British society, in contrast to 54% who say that integration of Pakistanis is not well at all.

The focal point of this dissertation is based on the following two questions: why is the Indian community more integrated into the British society than the Pakistani community? And to what extent are these ethnic differences related to religious affiliation?

Different reasons were set out in order to explain why these ethnic differences are among these two groups. One form of explanation lies in some specific characteristics that can be considered specific to a particular group and which could increase or decrease its rates of discrimination and deprivation. In my perspective, I hypothesise that the Indian community tends to be more integrated than the Pakistani community in the British society mainly due to their weak level in the English fluency, their different history of migration, their social and cultural constructions, and most importantly their religious affiliations.

The real impediment standing against Pakistanis' integration in the British society is their religious affiliation. 92% of Pakistanis are Muslims, making by that Britain's largest Muslim population. According to a study conducted by Clark and Drinkwater, there is a strong link between the disadvantage of Pakistanis in Britain and their religion. Gareth Price, head of the Asia Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, stated that British Pakistanis are more likely to be radicalised as compared to other Muslim communities in Britain. Pakistanis, who are 92% Muslims, tend to suffer from racism and ethnic penalty more than their Indian peers, who are only 13% Muslims.

A series of terrorist events, beginning from the Rushdie Affair, then the 9/11, 7/7, and recently Paris attacks increased the number of Islamophobic discrimination and Anti-Muslim hate crimes. Moreover, negative stereotypes about Muslims and Islam tend to worsen the situation even more. The frequency of hate speech paves the way for manifestations of hatred towards Muslims in various forms including verbal and physical attacks and leads to increased discrimination and isolation in the society.

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According to The European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia's report Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, Muslims tend to experience different aspects of discrimination and marginalization in employment, education, and housing. Moreover, Muslims are more likely to be victims of prejudice and hatred in different forms from verbal threats to physical attacks.

The Main keywords of this dissertation are ethnicity, integration, segregation, hate-crime, and Islamophobia. Firstly, ethnicity means an ethnic group; a social group that shares a common and distinctive culture, religion, and language. Secondly, integration which is to include members of different racial, religious, and ethnic groups into the society and treat them as equals. Segregation, in contrast, means to exclude and discriminate members of different racial, religious and ethnic groups. Furthermore, hate crime is any criminal offence committed against a person or property that is motivated by hostility towards someone based on their disability, race, religion, gender identity, or sexual orientation. Finally, Islamophobia is the dislike of or prejudice against Islam and Muslims.

In order to tackle this point, I've divided my dissertation into three chapters. Firstly, it is important to ask how the British and Indians, including Pakistanis at that time, came into contact with each other and how hostility and tension between Hindus and Muslims led to the creation of Pakistan. Thus, chapter one basically provides the historical background and the long relationship both Britain and India shared. How from just a trading company, the East India Company turned to be a strong political body that paved the way to a strong British rule over India. Besides, it presents the different phases the British Raj has gone through. The chapter includes as well the long and fierce struggle conducted by the Indians in order to obtain their independence. It also explains how the end of the British Raj resulted in the partition of the Indian country, and the creation of the new separate Muslim state of Pakistan.

The second chapter, on the other hand, initially discusses the different migration waves of both Indians and Pakistanis who chose to set off to the United Kingdom in search for more labour opportunities, and for better living conditions as well. In addition, it demonstrates the stark differences between Indian and Pakistani levels of cohabitation into the British society. It shows how Indians are more successful, more socialised than their Pakistani peers. Indians tend to reach high levels in education, occupy important positions in different fields, and be more integrated into the British society. In contrast, Pakistanis' levels of

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education are quite under the national average, they face a high level of discrimination in different areas, especially in the labour market. In attempting to understand these differences that occurred between these two ethnic minorities. Some factors should be taken into consideration and be studied: lack of fluency of the English language, levels of education/qualifications, the social and cultural construction, the political discourse, and for the most religious affiliation.

Finally, chapter three is devoted to explain and give a broader vision on the main reason leading to great levels of deprivation among the Pakistani groups. It reveals why though some slight developments have taken place for some groups, especially Indians, Pakistanis have remained highly segregated. The rationale shows that these stark differences mostly stemmed from the most cumulative impact which is the religion affiliation. Islam is considered to be the first impediment towards Pakistani Muslims' integration. And things have gone even worse for Pakistani Muslims especially after the 9/11 event and the July 2005 London bombing attacks.

British India : from Empire to Independence**1. Introduction**

Though the British were not the first to reach the Indian subcontinent, however, they were the first to establish a powerful empire in India. It all started by the creation of the East India Company, a trading company which turned to be a strong political authority. The British East India Company was one of the world's first corporations. Chartered by the English Crown, it had its own Army, installed its own Governments, minted its own coins, and ruled entire countries. Nevertheless, after a long successful journey, the Company was revoked in January 1874.

When the Company's economic power began to decline, the British government took over rule of the Indian subcontinent and this marked the beginning of a new era known as the British Raj. In 1858, British crown rule was established in India. However, this formalisation led to a fierce struggle conducted by the Indian people known as the 'Great Rebellion', the 'Indian Mutiny' or the 'First War of Indian Independence'.

Along with its struggle to get rid of the British rule, India had to face another internal bloody conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Hindus comprise the majority of the population of India at eighty percent while Muslims are a minority, making up only fourteen percent. The feeling of being dominated by the majority led the Muslim community to demand their own independent state.

After a number of long devastating wars, India was finally able to regain its independence. By the end of World War II, the Labour government in Britain decided to end the British rule in India, and in early 1947 Britain announced its intention of transferring power no later than June 1948. However, as independence approached, brutality between Hindus and Muslims had escalated. Thus, leading the new viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, to advance the date for the transfer of power. By 1947, it was clear that only partition could resolve the conflict among the Indian people.

2. The East India Company

Recording the train of events, unraveling the constitution of the British body, half political, half commercial, through which the business has been ostensibly performed; portraying the impacts of its commercial operations; displaying the legislative proceedings to which the connection of Great Britain with India has given birth is the main path through which one can comprehend the profound relationship these two nations share along time ago. The foundation of the East India Company marked the inception of the long British Indian interrelationship.

The saga of the British East India Company is an entrancing story of the ascent and fall of the world's first business entity, as well as the first mega-multinational organisation. The East India Company was an oddity without a parallel in the history of the world. Originating from sea-faring traders that step by step turned into a commercial body with immense assets, and by the force of unforeseen circumstances assumed the form of a sovereign power over Britain's most valuable acquisition, the kingdom of India, which Benjamin Disraeli,¹ the British prime minister (1874-81), described as "*the brightest jewel in the crown*" (Pavaskar, Madhoo, Saran, Soumya, and Hiral Jain: 2013, p. 18).

The English East India Company

was one of the first companies to offer limited liability to its shareholders. It laid the foundations of the British empire. It spawned Company Man. And—particularly relevant at the moment—it was the first state-backed company to make its mark on the world (The Economist, 2011).

The company emerged as the most astounding edifice of commercial capitalism between Asia and Europe from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Gradually the company expanded its trading network and was perfectly settled in India. It had additionally

¹Benjamin Disraeli, 1st Earl of Beaconsfield (21 December 1804 – 19 April 1881), was a British politician and writer, who twice served as Prime Minister. He played a central role in the creation of the modern Conservative Party, defining its policies and its broad outreach. Disraeli is remembered for his influential voice in world affairs, his political battles with the Liberal Party leader William Ewart Gladstone, and his one-nation conservatism or "Tory democracy". He made the Conservatives the party most identified with the glory and power of the British Empire.

succeeded in wiping out the other adversary European powers from India (Pavaskar, Madhoo, Saran, Soumya, and Hiral Jain: 2013, p. 19).

The British vicinity in India is unquestionably not a recent one. However, they were not the first to reach India. *"Even though the British got away with the jackpot, the real pioneers to reach India were the Portuguese"* (Jha: 2014, p. 12). Before anyone else, the Portuguese had formed important establishments in India. And after that, the British offered themselves as contenders for the riches of the East. The success of the Portuguese in establishing a lucrative trade with the East naturally excited a craving among the other nations of Western Europe.

From the time when Vasco de Gama distinguished his nation by discovering the passage round the Cape of Good Hope,¹ an entire century had slipped by, amid which, without an adversary, the Portuguese had enjoyed, and abused rich lands with some of the favourite productions of nature; had achieved the most brilliant conquests; and by their commerce poured into Europe, in unexampled profusion, those commodities of the East, on which the nations at that time set an extraordinary value (Bowen, 2010).

The circumstances of this splendid fortune had violently attracted the attention of numerous European countries, particularly Britain. A dynamic spirit of commerce had already begun to display itself in England. The nation had cheerfully acquired its full share of the improvement which had dawned in Europe, and the tranquil and economical reign of queen Elizabeth I had been favourable, both to the accumulation of capital and to those projects of private emolument on which the spirit of commerce depends. A brisk trade, and of considerable extent, had been carried on during the greater part of the sixteenth century with different parts, which enlarged the commercial resources of England and made it the capital of a large importation of the most ingenious and industrious people in Europe.

All this, however, was barely enough to fulfill the British desire for wealth and strength. The lustre of the Portuguese in the East peculiarly pulled in the admiration of the English. Nothing can more plainly demonstrate to us the yearning with which the English coveted a share in the riches expected to be drawn from the East, than the persevering efforts

¹The arrival of Vasco da Gama, a nobleman from the household of the King of Portugal, at the port of Calicut in south-west India on 27 May 1498.

which they had made to discover a channel from which the Portuguese should have no falsification to exclude them. Numerous endeavours were made in order to explore a new way to the East. However, no endeavour was effective as much as it was anticipated. In spite of this disappointment, the task of getting an entry by the north–west was fervently continued (Pavaskar, Saran, and Jain: 2013, p. 18).

As a trading company, the establishment of the East India company was of a major importance to strengthen the British empire's position around the world. As Edmund Burke¹ stated: *"The orient sun never laid more glorious expectations before us... You are plunged into Empire in the east. You have formed a great body of power, you must abide by the consequence"* (1769), trading companies played a significant role in the formation of European nations and in the subsequent rivalries between them for commercial trade monopolies during the eighteenth century (Sajid: 2011, p. 16).

In order to protect its newfound economic institution, the British crown had to face a number of fierce rivalries, including the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the French, who as well were starving to impose their dominance.

After a long successful journey, the last quarter of the sixteenth century witnessed the collapse of the Portuguese dominance. During which the Portuguese Crown confronted a mounting range of problems in its Euro-Asian pepper trade. This, coupled with the loss in 1585 of Antwerp's position² as the staple market for Asian spices in north-western Europe due to the blockade of the Scheldt,³ gave the merchants from the northern Netherlands a strong incentive to challenge the Portuguese monopoly of the Cape route and participate directly in the Euro-Asian spice trade (Bowen, 2010).

Furthermore, in April 1595, the Amsterdam-based 'Company of Far Lands', that was among the first of the so-called Dutch 'pre-companies',⁴ sent out four ships to the East Indies

¹Edmund Burke (1729 –1797) was a British-Irish statesman born in Dublin, as well as an author, orator, political theorist, and philosopher who, after moving to London, served as a member of parliament (MP) for many years in the House of Commons with the Whig Party.

² Antwerp, in modern Belgium, was not only the largest Dutch city, but was also the cultural, economic and financial centre of the Seventeen Provinces and of north-western Europe.

³The Scheldt is a 350-kilometre long river in northern France, western Belgium and the south western part of the Netherlands.

⁴The Dutch East India Company, known as the VOC, was the new fierce rival the English EIC had to face after the portuguese. The VOC created a string of "factories," fortified trading posts defended by garrisons, from Java to Japan and from Persia to Siam. These posts were linked by a regular exchange of information and commodities.

under the command of Cornelis de Houtman¹. One of the ships was lost but the remaining three came back in August 1597 with a cargo of pepper, nutmeg, and mace (Ibid).

Then, various new 'pre-organizations' had been composed for exchange with the East Indies. One of these was in Amsterdam, two in Zealand and another two in Rotterdam. The Amsterdam organisation was converged in 1598 and came to be known as the 'Old Organisation'. It was on the account of this Company that eight ships were conveyed toward the East in the spring of 1598. The ships returned safely in 1599 and the benefit on the voyage was estimated at around 400 percent (Ibid).

This created great trepidation among the English merchants engaged in the spice trade from the Levant where supplies of Asian spices were brought in regularly via the water-cum-land route passing either through the Red Sea and Egypt or through the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and the Syrian desert. The trepidation of the Dutch domination of the spice market in north-western Europe consequently served as the impulse that led a gathering of London merchants to apply to the Crown for a monopoly charter for the East India trade (Auber: 1826, p. 5).

On December 31, 1600, Queen Elizabeth 1 granted over 200.000 English merchants a royal charter² permitting them the privilege to trade in East Indies. The arrangement done on new year's eve would change the fortunes of this country forever. The East India Company would go to become so wealthy and powerful that it helped turn Britain into a worldwide superpower. The Company's primary function was to act as an organisational vehicle for interest groups that were able to enjoy protected status in the East India trade. Sir James Lancaster³ commanded the first East India Company voyage in 1601, with five ships from Woolwich, and arrived in India at the port of Surat, which was established as a trade transit point in 1608 (Bowen, 2010).

Tensions between England and the Netherlands continued to deteriorate as competition grew more heated and three wars broke out between 1652 and 1674 over trade routes to the East Indies (Ferguson, Niall: 2004, p. 22). Unlike a large number of the contentions of this era that were waged to preserve the balance of power or extend the boundaries of empires, these Anglo-Dutch Wars were fought entirely over commercial

¹Cornelis de Houtman was a Dutch explorer who discovered a new sea route from Europe to Indonesia and who thus begun the Dutch spice trade.

²The Royal Charter of the East India Company on December 31, 1600 by Elizabeth I gave it a monopoly on all English trade to the east of the Cape of Good Hope, hoping to break the Dutch monopoly of the spice trade in what is now Indonesia.

³Sir James Lancaster (1554 - 1618) was a prominent Elizabethan trader and privateer.

intrigues. The long naval wars between the English and the Dutch within the narrow seas were not terminated until William of Orange united the two countries in 1689 (Wilson, Hunter: 1886, p. 362).

After the Dutch rival became alienated with the English, war with France spilled over into the Indian subcontinent during the mid-1740s (James, Lawrence: 1998, p. 19). Despite the fact that the French 'Compagnie des Indes Orientales'¹ had been established in 1664, mismanagement and disregard prevented it from becoming a significant contender for Indian trade. Whereas the British East India Company had dependably been claimed and worked by private speculators, the French Compagnie was a government operation dominated by an inner circle of French nobles who already possessed massive fortunes and were entirely uninterested in commerce (Ibid).

By the mid-eighteenth century, the East India Company turned into a military institution as an attempt to create a corporate empire bounded by coastal settlements in the Indian subcontinent. As Janice Thomson argued mercantile companies were, obviously, *"state-created institutions that used violence in the pursuit of economic gain and political power"* (1994). These kinds of institutions were of a large importance for European state formations since they paved the way for national governments to achieve political, territorial, and economic goals at little cost to themselves and *"exploit nonstate coercive capabilities in conquering and colonizing large areas of the globe"* (Thomson: 1994, p. 41).

"The British East India Company became the supreme executive authority in Bengal, including, of course, Dhaka..." (Rabbani: 1997, p. 14). The Company altered its prudent status and became much more a political institution. It began meddling in the political affairs of the Indian rulers. With its help, England was able to extend her territorial outskirts to the Indian subcontinent.

"It is because of the divisions between Indian rulers that almost the whole of Hindostan [the northern half of India], have come into the possession of the English..." (H.K, 1789). The Indian population was a diverse one and included people belonging to different races, religious, social classes, and cultures who spoke different languages. Numerous Indian

¹Compagnie de Indes Orientales (CIO) was founded by *Jean-Baptiste Colbert* in 1664 to pursue direct competitive trade with the Dutch and English in the East Indies (India and Ceylon).

states were constantly at war with each other. Thus, it was not surprising that they fell an easy prey to the European powers, especially the British (Bowen, 2010).

Against misgovernment such as then afflicted Bengal it was impossible to struggle. The superior intelligence and energy of the dominant class made their power irresistible. A war of Bengalees against Englishmen was like a war of sheep against wolves, of men against demons (B.M, Thomas:1841).

Bengal was the biggest province with a population of 78 million. This population was consisted of demographic differentials between Hindus and Muslims. Unfortunately as population grew, separation and antagonism between the Hindus and Muslims had widened. This division had weakened the Bengalees position on one hand and strengthened the British position on the other.

Emulating the pattern of history, numerous nawabs¹ were enthusiastic about enlisting the backing of outsiders as a means to remove themselves from the shadow of regional warlords and guard their territorial independence. The French fomented aggression against the British and effectively looked for unions with provincial authorities to strengthen their position. In response to this adjustment in policy, the Company was constrained to utilize a much bigger standing armed force, which was outfitted to launch hostile invasions against the French coalition. This marked *"the end of any hope of peaceful trading, or of what would nowadays be called non-intervention in India affairs, and it became apparent that the East India Company must either fight or die"* (Churchill, Winston: 1983, p. 285). The English were unprepared for this rather sudden shift in French strategy; the Compagnie was able to achieve early victories in the struggle for southern India and wrested control of Madras² from the British in 1746 (Brown: 2010, p.21).

¹A nawab or nawaab is an honorific title ratified and bestowed by the reigning Mughal emperor to semi-autonomous Muslim rulers of princely states in South Asia.

² Madras is the capital city of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Located on the Coromandel Coast off the Bay of Bengal, it is the biggest cultural, economic and educational centre in South India.

For three years after the occupation of Madras, the French Compagnie, under the eager administration of Joseph Francois Dupleix¹, appeared to be slowly overturning the status quo in their favor throughout key parts of the subcontinent. The British, nonetheless, were able to mount a forceful resistance and eventually halted the aggressive development of the French. Not long after these initial successes, Robert Clive², a captain in the Company army, was able to overwhelm the enemy strong hold of Arcot in 1751. This monumental British victory stemmed the tide of French successes, but this triumph alone would not expel them from India (Majumdar, R.C., H.C. Raychaudhuri and Kalikinkar Datta: 1963, p. 652).

This web of alliances and complex conspiracies managed by these 'private' enterprises occurred many times without the official sanction of their home governments and during periods of international respite from war. Despite the fact that there was a brief cessation of open hostilities after Dupleix left in 1754, these intrigues signaled the beginning of a transition in the Company from an exclusively commercial enterprise into an organ of imperialism (Higham, Charles: 1934, p. 80).

According to Vincent A. Smith³'s *Oxford History of India*, the British East India Company served as an agent of British influence and imperialism in India. As Frederick Stephens stated:

The use imperialistic powers to benefit economically, politically, and geographically began with the British East India Company in the early 1600s where the land was used for spice trade and provided as a trading post for both British, Dutch and other settling imperialists at the next 100 years... (2014).

The Company's accession of territories in India shaped the English imperial history in India. Through time, the British influence spread all over the subcontinent and eventually gained a powerful military presence (Sajid: 2011, p. 16). In the late 1700s, millions of Indians

¹Dupleix, Joseph François (1697–1763) was a French colonial administrator in India. He went to India in 1721 as an officer of the French East India Company.

²Robert Clive (1725 – 1774), also known as Clive of India, Commander-in-Chief of British India, was a British officer and soldier of fortune who established the military and political supremacy of the East India Company in Bengal.

³Vincent Arthur Smith (1848–1920) was a British Indologist and art historian. Smith wrote books on various rulers such as the Buddhist emperor, Ashoka and the Mughal emperor, Akbar, and a history of fine arts in India and Ceylon. He also published two comprehensive volumes on Indian history, *The Early History of India* and *The Oxford History of India*.

were under the British rule and were forced to work on plantations where they were treated much more as slaves than workers (Stephens, 2014).

Being in such a position, drove many historians to raise the question about the Company's sovereign power. Since each historian has his own different definition of sovereignty, each one has dealt with the issue differently. For instance, in her book *The Sepoys and The Comapny: Tradition and Trasition in Northern India 1770-1830*, Seema Alavi¹ asserts that the "*Company's political dominance in north India was based on its superior military power*" (2008, p. 3). According to Alavi, the Company's military "*was central to the development of the Company's political sovereignty*" (Ibid).

In contrast, Paul Halliday,² in his *Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire*, believes that the East India Company turned to be a "*sovereign company*" (2010, p. 282) mainly due to the Company's legal code. For Halliday, the Company's position as a sovereign power was basically related to its ability to regulate society (Williams: 2011, p. 14).

After a brief period of peacefulness, the Seven Years' War³ in 1756 revived the English-French enmity again. The English were persuaded their annihilation would mean the complete loss of access to India, which would help to lay the groundwork for an era of French matchless quality (James, Lawrence: 1998, p. 128). Unlike the previous international conflicts waged between the French and the British, the Seven Years' War saw the immediate military association of both governments on almost every occupied landmass. For the first time, naval support, military procurements, and a limited supply of reinforcements was offered to the Company by the British government as this fight neared an intensity that had not been reached in the far East up to this point.

"*As the French East India Company weakened, it began to rely on Indian princes as aproxies*" (Williams: 2011, p. 17), the French relied vigorously on local partners in their fight

¹Seema Alavi is a professor of history at Jamia Millia Islamia in New Delhi, India. She specializes in medieval and early modern South Asia, with an interest in the transformation of the region's legacy from Indo-Persian to one heavily affected by British colonial rule. She has written books on the military and medical cultures of the region from medieval to modern times.

²Paul Halliday is Julian Bishko professor of history and chair of the University's Corcoran Department of History. He writes about the legal history of Britain and its empire from the 16th to 19th centuries. His most recent book is *Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire*.

³The Seven Years' War (1756-63) was the first global war fought in Europe, India, and America. Early in the war, the French (aided by Canadian militia and Aboriginal allies) defeated several British attacks and captured a number of British forts. In 1758, the tide turned when the British captured Louisbourg, Québec City in 1759, and Montréal in 1760. With the Treaty of Paris of 1763, France formally ceded Canada to the British.

against the British, and there were numerous local Indian rulers who were willing to assist the French against what they perceived to be the growing strategic dominance of the English. While there were many allies of the British Company, the opposition of key nawabs, for example, Siraj-ud-daula in Bengal, shaped a great part of the essential battle in this particular theater of the war. Although the French supported the regime of Siraj-ud-daula, this Indian prince was determined not to end up as a political puppet propped up by foreign powers (Bowen, 2010).

After the declaration of war in 1756, Siraj-ud-daula swiftly attacked and grabbed the British holdings in Calcutta with expectations of depriving them of a foothold in Bengal. In this process, he captured 146 British citizens and placed them in what came to be known as the 'Black Hole of Calcutta' where 123 of them perished overnight (Churchill, Winston: 1983, p. 286). This action on the part of this Eastern tyrant outraged the British public and *"dispelled the last wishful illusion...that it might still be possible for them to remain in India as traders and no more"* (Churchill, Winston: 1983, p. 286). Led by Robert Clive¹, Company forces struck back quickly and immediately recaptured control of their possessions in Calcutta. When it came to deposing this nawab, however, Clive and his Company associates engaged in covert negotiations with several dissatisfied courtiers serving under Siraj-ud-daula² (Bowen, 2010).

These clandestine operations were pivotal parts of the strategy to dethrone this despot and take control of Bengal through his British-backed successor, Mir Jafar. These secretive operations went into action in the summer of 1757 when Clive launched a campaign north of Calcutta (Black, Jeremy: 2005, p. 82). On June 23, 1757, three thousand Company soldiers, the majority of them Sepoys³, met fifty thousand native troops under Sirajud- daula in the groves of Plassey. In mere hours, the Bengali army broke rank under the heavy fire of the Company guns. Days later, Siraj-ud-daula was assassinated by his cohorts. The crushing thrashing of this nawab ended the northern campaign in India with a resounding finality (James, Lawrence: 1998, p. 129).

¹Robert Clive (1725–1774), also known as Clive of India, Commander-in-Chief of British India, was a British officer and soldier of fortune who established the military and political supremacy of the East India Company in Bengal.

²Mirza Muhammad Siraj ud-Daulah, known as Siraj ud-Daulah, (1733–1757), was the last independent Nawab of Bengal. The end of his reign marked the start of British East India Company rule over Bengal and later almost all of South Asia.

³An indigenous soldier serving in the army of a foreign conqueror, especially an Indian soldier serving under British command in India.

The British then swung themselves to the southern peninsula and the capture of Pondicherry in 1761 extinguished French military operations in India (Higham, Charles: 1934, p. 81). Despite the fact that Britain had to weather many early reverses, the prudent direction of William Pitt the Elder eventually led the English allies to victory and the French defeat was accompanied by the suspension of numerous French colonial enterprises: the grandiose vision of Dupleix had been shattered and India was unquestionably in British hands (James, 130).

The Seven Years' War (1756–1763) ended by the thrashing of the French forces and put an end to the French magnificent aspirations, also stunted the development of the industrial revolution in French territories. Robert Clive, the Governor General, led the company to an astounding victory against Joseph François Dupleix, the commander of the French forces in India, and recaptured Fort St. George from the French. The company took this chance to seize Manila in 1762 (Encyclopedia, 2015). By the Treaty of Paris signed in 1763, the French were compelled to maintain their trade posts without any military presence, and only in small enclaves in Pondicherry, Mahe, Karikal, Yanam, and Chandernagar. These small outposts remaining under French possessions were not sufficient to satisfy French aspirations on Indian territories. Hence, eliminating a noteworthy wellspring of economic competition for the British company.

Oppositely, the victories of the British East India Company demonstrated the brute strength that this commercial institution had amassed. This period of British international supremacy was made conceivable through their unrivaled naval predominance and the non attendance of other nations with significant industrial capabilities or sufficient sea power. The lack of serious rivals essentially guaranteed the English effective monopolies in most foreign markets and allowing them to enjoy the benefits of imperialism (Bowen, 2010).

Karl Marx said: *"The events of the Seven-Years-War transformed the East India Company from a commercial into a military and territorial power"* (1853, p. 98). By 1772, it was abundantly clear that the Company had ascended. Whereas Bowen thought:

From very slender beginnings to a state of the highest importance; their concerns, simple at first, are grown extremely complex, and are massively broadened. They are no longer mere traders, and confined in their privileges ; they are sovereigns over fertile and populous territories (2010, p. 32).

The Company was moving relentlessly forward searching for more territory possession in India. The Seven years' war was the watershed in the Company's history. It started expanding its trading posts and controlling a large wealthy province in Northern India (Williams: 2011, p. 20).

Internal conflicts across the Indian subcontinent¹ offered the British company the chance to expand and tighten its territorial control over the subcontinent. Fundamentally, It was the battles of Plassey (1757), the Anglo-Mysore Wars (1799), and the Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845) which provided the ground for the British success in India. Through these battles, a long era of British political control over India began (Wikipedia, 2016).

The territorial improvement reached by the company led to positive effects upon both investor confidence and the financial markets. As one pamphleteer recalled:

when the first news arrived about our acquisitions in Bengal, so sudden an increase sick of wealth naturally drew the attention of every enterprising man, who, having little to lose, thought his entanglements could no possibly be too large in a stock where there appeared a certainty of gaining much (Bowen,H.V.: 2010, p. 57).

Subsequently, there was an exceptional increase in the trading of India stock, the total nominal value of the stock traded in 1766 was over £4 million, almost three times the amount of the previous year.

The flourishing the Company has witnessed after these territory acquisitions drove the company to face many oppositions to its monopoly. "*Through a combination of bad business policies and bad luck, the Company would incur the wrath of Parliament*" (Williams: 2011, p. 20). "*Doubts were progressively expressed about whether Britain's interests were best served by the Company's continued survival as a monopolist organisation*" (Bowen: 2010, p. 41). Pressure from merchants and manufacturers to end the monopoly of the Company mounted. The public opinion was critical of corruption in the Government in Bengal. Free enterprise was a major demand and calls for free trade grew eager during the nineteenth century (Ibid).

¹ After the death of its greatest ruler of the Mughal Empire, Aurangzeb (1658-1707), the Indian empire started to decline. Provincial governors gradually gained virtual independence from the emperors. This independence interference of the British company who extended its influence and meddled in the affairs of local princes.

Company officials had to struggle badly to defend their monopoly especially when the Company ran into financial difficulties. The Company was almost fatally weakened by a series of internal political crises, and this brought sharply into focus the question of whether an independent trading organisation was an appropriate body to administer a valuable territorial empire in India. As a result, the British Parliament enacted a series of laws among which the Regulating Act of 1773¹ stood first. The act initially provided the curb of the Company traders' unrestrained commercial activities. In addition, imposing some governmental order in territories under the Company control, and limiting the Company charter to periods of twenty years, subject to review upon renewal. This act gave the British government supervisory rights over the Bengal, Bombay, and Madras presidencies (Ibid, 42).

Eventually, the Charter Act of 1813² came to decrease the monopoly of the East India Company in all major sections. While they were able to convince Parliament to protect some of their commercial privileges for another twenty years, the voices opposing their monopoly were victorious and different endeavours were permitted to trade in India. This was obvious when the Charter Act of 1833 was issued and *"suspended all commercial activities of the Company and made them responsible only for the government of India under the Crown"* (Bowen, H.V.: 2010, p. 40).

The remarkably peaceful atmosphere of British India, however, was shattered by a reckless action made by the Company. When officials thoughtlessly issued the sepoy under their command firearm cartridges that were oiled with pig and cow fat, something entirely taboo for Muslim kosher laws and Hindu dietary restrictions, three regiments of sepoy positioned in Meerut responded by butchering their European officers on May 10, 1857, before fleeing west (Farwell, Byron: 1972, p. 84). This action seemed to affirm the rumors of a forced conversion in the minds of many natives and typified what natives saw as the disregard of Indian tradition.

The spread of this violent outbreak in the north caught the British off guard and the administration in Calcutta scrambled to put down this escalating uprising. The cause for alarm was rooted in the reliance the British government had on these native troops to enforce order

¹The Regulating Act, (1773), a legislation passed by the British Parliament for the regulation of the British East India Company's Indian territories, mainly in Bengal. It was the first intervention by the British government in the company's territorial affairs and marked the beginning of a take over process that was completed in 1858.

² The Charter Act (1813), known also as East India Company Act 1813, was passed by the British Parliament to renew the charter of the British East India Company.

in a land where they were immensely outnumbered. All of the British rule hinged on the dependability of these regiments and without their assistance, India would rapidly fall into turmoil. At the time of the outbreak, the Company army was composed of 277,000 men and only 45,000 of them were European; in the areas of major disaffection, however, there were just 5,000 British soldiers (James, Lawrence: 1998, p. 277).

For almost a half century, the British had used their rule to westernise India and to further the cause of Christian civilisation within the subcontinent. The eminent British historian, in his *Minute on Indian Education*, Thomas Babington Macauley¹ recommended that official funds should only be spent on English and Western education in India to produce a class of persons who would be racially Indian, "*but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect*" (B. M., Thomas:1835, p. 722). However, these improvements were faced by a severely Indian rejection. The combination of Indian resentment and British disillusionment created an impenetrable barrier in Indian society between the ruled and their rulers that had not existed prior to 1857 (Ibid).

The British, who had thought the Indians were capable of being educated in the ways of constitutionalism and civilisation, perceived the mutiny as confirmation that natives were unwilling or not ready to accomplish the British level of advancement and it was decades before the British would once again attempt to prepare India for self-rule. The confidence in India that had been manifested in British liberal reform projects and a basic trust with the native peoples was replaced by mutual suspicion and insecurity (Ibid, 230).

In 1857, the Indian Army rises up, the British government had to send troops from London to put down the mutiny. The Company was then abolished by Thomas Babington Macauley. The British Crown bore all governmental responsibilities held by the company, and its 24,000-man military force was incorporated into the British army. On January 1, 1874, the company was dissolved when the East India Stock Dividend Redemption Act came into effect (Pavaskar, Saran, and Hiral Jain: 2013, p. 24).

3. The British Raj

¹Thomas Babington Macaulay, 1st Baron Macaulay (25 October 1800 – 28 December 1859) was a British historian and Whig politician. He wrote extensively as an essayist and reviewer; his books on British history have been hailed as literary masterpieces.

The collapse of the East India Company did not weaken the British presence in India. But rather, paved the way for a new era, an era of full British domination almost over the whole subcontinent. Control of the empire had made Britain among the wealthiest and most powerful nation around the globe at the turn of the twentieth century, and India was the greatest colonial prize. As Lord George Curzon¹, the viceroy and the top British official in India from 1898 to 1905, proclaimed, "*as long as we rule India we are the greatest power in the world*" (Royle, Trevor: 1989, p. 3). For the British, possessing the Indian Empire was crucial for the British economic, as well as political advancement: "*By 1913, 60 percent of all Indian imports came from Britain and it had absorbed 380 million pounds in the British capital, one-tenth of all the country's overseas investments*" (Moorhouse, Geoffrey: 1985, p. 219).

In 1858, the British Crown rule was established in India, ending a century of control by the East India Company. All started when, On November 1, 1858, Queen Victoria issued a Royal Proclamation, hailed by many as 'the Magna Charta of India,' declaring the official end of the sepoy mutiny and heralding the formal opening of the British Raj (Wheeler, J.Talboys: 1899, p. 756).

Translated in every Indian dialect and dispatched across all of British imperial territories in southern Asia, the message of the Queen was unequivocal:

The new administration of India by the British government would continue the benevolent legal obligations to native states, reject all expansionist designs, defend religious liberty, extend clemency to fugitive members of the mutiny and govern with due regard...to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India
(Philips, C. H., Ed: 1962, p. 5).

Consequent to the Government of India Act 1858², the British government assumed the task of directly administering India. The declaration was preceded by a fierce resistance

¹George Nathaniel Curzon (11 January 1859–20 March 1925), known as The Lord Curzon of Kedleston between 1898 and 1911, and as The Earl Curzon of Kedleston between 1911 and 1921, was a British Conservative statesman. As Viceroy of India, he is noted for the creation of Eastern Bengal and Assam.

²The Government of India Act 1858 was passed on August 2, 1858 by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Its provisions called for the liquidation of the British East India Company (who had up to this point been ruling British India under the auspices of Parliament) and the transference of its functions to the British Crown

which was undertaken by the Indian people, mostly soldiers from the Bengal army. The rebellion lasted nearly two years, costing £36 million. It is mainly referred to as the 'Great Rebellion', the 'Indian Mutiny' or the 'First War of Indian Independence' (Kaul, Chandrika: 2001).

Resistance to the British rule in India started almost from its inception. Thus, the revolt of 1857 was no sudden occurrence, it was the culmination of a long furious Indian resistance to British domination (Kumar, Raj: 2003, p. 14). The British crushed the revolt, but they could not crush the spirit of nationalism among Indians. Soldiers, Mohammedans, and Hindus coalesced together for the purpose to expel the foreign rulers. Precisely, due to the growing influence of Christianity that threatened both Hindus and Mohammedans (Chandra, Bipan: 1989, p. 12). The whole Indian history is a long record of fights for the defence and assertion of one's own faith. There was a strong patriotic and national feeling among both Hindus and Mohammedans showing their attachment to their soil, their culture, and their own native rulers. Thus, all the native pride of the population asserted itself in a violent way, and called upon all true believers to rise against the English infidels, and drive these outsiders out from India (Ibid).

The Mutiny of 1857¹ had sharpened British suspicions of Indian loyalty. Ignoring the sympathetic statements made in parliament and the conciliatory proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1858, Britishers in India saw little motivation to concede Indians a more prominent measure of control over their own particular issues. The eleven year period following the Indian Mutiny was, for the most part, spent stabilising the subcontinent under the direct rule of the Crown and managed by people who had their understandings of India molded in the years before the mutiny. In 1863, Prime Minister William Gladstone² made the logical decision and appointed Sir William Lawrence, a veteran of the Company ranks, to

¹The Indian Rebellion of 1857 refers to a rebellion in India against the rule of the British East India Company, that ran from May 1857 to July 1859. The rebellion began as a mutiny of sepoys of the East India Company's army on 10 May 1857, in the cantonment of the town of Meerut, and soon escalated into other mutinies and civilian rebellions largely in the upper Gangetic plain and central India, with the major hostilities confined to present-day Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, northern Madhya Pradesh, and the Delhi region.

²William Ewart Gladstone (29 December 1809 – 19 May 1898) was a British Liberal politician. In a career lasting over sixty years, he served as Prime Minister four separate times (1868–74, 1880–85, February–July 1886 and 1892–94). He also served as Chancellor of the Exchequer four times. Gladstone was also Britain's oldest Prime Minister; he resigned for the final time when he was 84 years old. He first entered Parliament in 1832. Beginning as a High Tory, Gladstone served in the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel. After the split of the Conservatives Gladstone was a Peelite – in 1859 the Peelites merged with the Whigs and the Radicals to form the Liberal Party.

continue the process of stabilizing India and forging in the new direction the British Raj had taken (Wheeler, J. Talboys: 1899, p. 761).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Conservative and Liberal parties were the two predominant parties in the British parliamentary system. Being the two main leaders of the battling Conservative and Liberal parties in Parliament, Benjamin Disraeli, and William Gladstone formed the opinions of the two rival understandings of the Empire. Above all, it was the Raj which captured the British imagination. The securing access to and control of the Jewel in the Crown was a prominent feature of this debate as the Empire was dependent upon access to the markets of India, which now supplied 37.7 percent of British imports (Porter, Andrew, D. A. Washbrook, and Robin J. Moore: 1999, p. 44).

Benjamin Disraeli, as the leader of the Conservative, was primarily worried about the preservation of English institutions, which included the Empire. He asserted that the British hegemony was critical to global stability and believed that the maintenance of the Empire was essential to imposing their influence on the world amidst the growing contest for global leadership. In 1872, he made a speech at the Crystal Palace through which he asked his fellow citizens whether *"you will be content to be a comfortable England, modelled and moulded upon Continental principles and meeting in due course an inevitable fate, or whether you will be a great country, an Imperial country..."* (Marshal, P.J.: 2001, p. 58).

The Conservatives believed that the indefinite maintenance of the British Raj was crucial to the continued existence of the Empire. Hence, their primary duty was to guarantee the persistence of their rule by providing efficient administration under a benevolent despotism. Disraeli's perspective was that empire was fundamental to British interests and to its standing around the world (Porter, Andrew, D. A. Washbrook, and Robin J. Moore: 1999, p. 46).

Contrastingly, William Ewart Gladstone's perspective was completely different. As the leader of the Liberal party, Gladstone insisted on the 'equivalent privilege of all nations' and denounced imperial wars and conquests. Dissimilar to Conservatives, the Liberals had a foolishly idealised view of the nationalistic developments occurring on the continent and thought the bonds Britain shared with Europe could form the basis of Western cooperation. Consequently, Gladstone emphasized multilateral action, international order, and diplomacy to protect Britain and the broader interests of humanity (Ibid).

According to him, Britain's true imperial policy was to stay away from new acquisitions and foster the advancement of the current provinces towards self-government. His Christian principles push him to pursue to constrain British foreign policy with moral considerations and earnestly desired to protect the rights of those under British rule in the Empire. He saw an ethical obligation to give colonies, such as India, practical experience in responsible government under British oversight with the aim of rewarding success with self-rule. The gradual introduction of British institutions and the progress of the native peoples would eventually lead to the devolution of the British Empire, but Gladstone saw this as an open door for Britain to fulfill their moral obligations while still retaining a unique relationship with their former possessions (Ibid, 47).

While Disraeli possessed a more limited perspective of the future, William Gladstone was a firm advocate of what today is known as the British Commonwealth "*held together by loyalty to British culture and by shared economic interests,*" (Marshal, P.J.: 2001, p. 54) but his lack of attachment to the Empire caused him to be more shortsighted and less decisive in his foreign policy. Where the Conservatives were rallied around a specific platform designed to support the Empire by Benjamin Disraeli, the Liberals were essentially left with a long term vision for colonial self-rule by William Gladstone (Bowen, 2010).

By the end of 1868, Gladstone won the election and proceeded on a strenuous programme of what would nowadays be called 'modernisation'. However, in 1874, the tide turned, and Disraeli won the first clear Conservative victory since Sir Robert Peel in 1841. Dissatisfied in part by the weak foreign policy of Gladstone, and since what really mattered to Disraeli was foreign and imperial policy, the people finally gave Disraeli the majority in Parliament he needed to implement his imperial program (Lee, Stephen J.: 2005, p. 86).

The most enduring legacy of the Disraeli's programme was the purchase of a controlling share in the Suez Canal in 1875. He insisted that this purchase was an essential action to secure the highway to the Indian Empire and to the British dependencies. Disraeli understood the security of the canal was basic to British strategic interests since it provided Britain with a shorter sea route to its empire. The speedy and intense acquisition of these territories was largely prompted by the endless quest to secure the main location that could put in danger the Indian trade if they fell into the wrong hands (Ibid).

In 1876, Disraeli appointed Lord Lytton¹ to serve as Viceroy in India and to forcefully apply Conservative ideology in India. Once he had arrived in India Lytton proved himself to be completely devoted to the idea of consolidating Indian dependence on British presence. He concentrated on consolidating the position of the Raj under the Crown and securing the subcontinent from the intensifying threat of Russian expansion in Central Asia. Disraeli believed the initial phase in repelling this threat was to bind India to the institutions of the Empire and increase the attachment the native principalities had with the British government. With this in mind, in 1877, Benjamin Disraeli, had proclaimed Queen Victoria as Empress of India (Ibid, 87).

On January 1, 1877, Lord Lytton summoned the Delhi Durbar, which is the Court of Delhi, and presided over an Imperial Assembly conferring the imperial title on the British sovereign (Gopal, Sarvepalli: 1965, p. 119). Despite the fact that India was at that point under the British crown control after the rebellion of 1858, yet this title was a gesture to link the monarchy with the empire further and tie India more closely to Britain. The act signaled to the Eastern princes of India that they were loyal to the Western throne of Queen Victoria alone and was symbolic of the imperial grandeur that would accompany the Raj as it became an object of British patriotism.

Lord Lytton had done many measures to prove himself capable of imposing British dominance on the subcontinent. The Vernacular Press Act was one of the most consequential of these immoderate measures. The law was enacted in 1878 to curtail the freedom of the Indian-language press in order to prevent the vernacular press from expressing criticism of British policies (Encyclopedia, 2016).

The Conservatives had done much to improve the internal efficiency of the imperial administration. They had effectively transformed the Company apparatus into the focal point of the overseas Empire, united British patriotism behind the cause of passively civilising the subcontinent, and guarded the trade routes that buttressed their constantly contested international hegemony. However, in the general election of 1 April 1880, the Conservative

¹Edward Robert Lytton Bulwer-Lytton (8 November 1831 – 24 November 1891), was an English statesman and poet. He served as Viceroy of India between 1876 and 1880, during which time Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India. Lytton was afforded the rare tribute - especially for an Englishman - of a state funeral in Paris, although as Viceroy of India he has been criticised for his handling of the Great Famine of 1876–78.

party under Benjamin Disraeli was crushingly vanquished by the Liberals, at that time known as Whigs, under William Gladstone (Blake, Robert: 2011).

The Liberals' member, Gladstone, in his turn, selected an ideological miniature of himself named Lord Ripon¹ who would certainly work to recast Indian government according to the Liberals' standards. Lord Ripon was one of the most popular Viceroy of India. His work was mainly dedicated to the good and benefits of people. The Liberal vision of a self-governed India depended on encouraging and enlarging the Indian middle-class participation by merging them into civil activism and education. In 1882, Lord Ripon repealed the Vernacular Press Act passed by Lord Lytton, and therefore newspapers published in vernacular languages were allowed equal freedom with the rest of the Indian Press. This action extended Ripon's popularity among the Indians (McGraw, Tata: 2005, p. 51).

Another major concern for Ripon was to spread equality among the Indian people and boycott any form of racism. To this end, in 1883, he introduced the Ilbert Bill². By a special Act enacted in 1873, the Europeans in India were given the privilege to be tried only by European magistrates. Nonetheless, the amended bill provided that 'the Indian magistrates could judge cases involving British citizens.' This bill was popular with the native population, but the European community in India started agitating against the bill. Eventually, the bill was revised under enormous pressure. The revision gave rise to a feeling of nationalism and heightened the sentiment of solidarity among the Indian people (Ibid, 52).

The bitter controversy encompassing the measure deepened antagonism between British and Indians and was a prelude to the formation of the Indian National Congress³ the following year. The Indian National Congress was established in December 1885 by seventy-two political specialists. It was the first organised expression of Indian nationalism on an all-

¹George Frederick Samuel Robinson (24 October 1827 – 9 July 1909), styled Viscount Goderich from 1833 to 1859 and known as the Earl of Ripon in 1859 and as the Earl de Grey and Ripon from 1859 to 1871, was a British politician who served in every Liberal cabinet. Lord Ripon was a staunch Liberal democrat with faith in self government.

²Ilbert Bill was a controversial measure proposed in 1883 that sought to allow senior Indian magistrates to preside over cases involving British subjects in India. The bill, severely weakened by compromise, was enacted by the Indian Legislative Council on Jan. 25, 1884. The bitter controversy surrounding the measure deepened antagonism between British and Indians and was a prelude to the formation of the Indian National Congress the following year.

³The Indian National Congress (INC, often called the Congress), is one of two major political parties in India. Congress is one of the largest and oldest political parties in the world. The party was founded in 1885 during the British Raj; its founders include Allan Octavian Hume, Dadabhai Naoroji, and Dinshaw Wacha. In the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries, Congress became a pivotal participant in the Indian Independence Movement, with over 15 million members and over 70 million participants in its opposition to British colonial rule in India.

India scale. Initiated by A.O. Hume¹, a retired English ICS officer (Chandra, Bipan: 1989, p. 51) who had been outraged by the future of the Ilbert Bill. The foundation of the Indian National Congress, however, was not a sudden event. It was the culmination of a process of political awakening that had its beginnings in the 1860s and 1870s and took a noteworthy leap forward in the late 1870s and early 1880s (Ibid).

The year 1885 marked a turning point in this process, for that was the year the political Indians, intellectuals and educated professionals, interested in politics, who no more considered themselves as spokesmen of narrow group interests, but as representatives of national interest, and responsible to help guide India towards the phases of responsible government and full dominion status. The dominant factions in the Congress were elite Hindus and educated Bengalis. Therefore, Muslims never fully trusted the Congress and hesitated to support their efforts (Lapping, Brian: 1985, p. 30).

The fundamental nationalist Indian requests included :

No reduction of import duties on textile import no expansion in Afghanistan or Burma, the right to bear arms, freedom of the Press, reduction of military expenditure, higher expenditure on famine relief, Indianisation of the civil services, the right of Indians to join the semi-military volunteer corps, and the right of Indian judges to try Europeans in criminal cases (Chandra, Bipan: 1989, p. 69).

Undoubtedly, these requests were difficult for the British officials to grant, for that would undermine its hegemony over the colonial people.

The advancement of the Indian National Congress was hampered by the appointment of Lord George Curzon in 1898 (Mosley, Leonard: 2016). Lord Curzon was the last and among the most successful Viceroys of the Indian Empire. He played a major role in British policy-making. As a Conservative aristocrat, Curzon was a convinced imperialist who believed in the benefits of Western civilisation (Cavendish, Richard: 1999). His substantial

¹Allan Octavian Hume (1829–1912) was a civil servant, political reformer, ornithologist and botanist who worked in British India. He was one of the founders of the Indian National Congress, a political party that was later to lead in the Indian independence movement. A notable ornithologist, Hume has been called "the Father of Indian Ornithology" and, by those who found him dogmatic, "the Pope of Indian ornithology."

concern was to revitalise the efficiency of the Raj and diminish the native participation in the government. Curzon saw the necessity of benevolent despotism in enhancing the condition of the natives. Thus, he put a rapid list of reforms (Ibid).

The list included:

A stable Frontier Policy, the creation of the new Frontier Province, a Reform of the Transfer and Leave Rules in the Indian Civil Service, a diminution of Report Writing, a stable Rate of Exchange in the Currency System, the increase of Railways, the encouragement of Irrigation, a cure for Agricultural Indebtedness, a reduction of the Telegraphic Rate between India and Europe, the preservation of Archaeological Remains, Educational Reform, and Police Reform (Lipsett, H. Caldwell: 1903, p. 11).

To prevent any sort of resistance from the natives, Curzon rapidly imposed the reforms. But what really triggered the nation's outrage was the presentation of the Universities Act in 1904¹ (Burt, Alfred LeRoy: 1956, p. 670), which was passed to bring college under a firmer control of the Raj. The act was vehemently criticised by the educated class, and voices started to rise up against Curzon's policy. The firestorm over education reform got even worse by the announcement that Bengal was going to be partitioned in 1905 as a component of the last series of reforms (Ibid).

In 1902, Curzon had written, "*Bengal is ungovernably too large a charge for any single man.*" (Singh, M. K.: 2009, p. 16) Curzon's excuse on this partition was that the Bengal province was excessively gigantic, 1,89,000 square miles with a population of around 78, 493,000, to be governed by a single lieutenant governor. However, the lurked reason behind this action was to debilitate the Indian nationalism advanced in Bengal. As H.H Risley, the Secretary to the Government of India summed it: "*Bengal united is power, Bengal divided will pull in several different ways*" (Ibid).

¹The Indian Universities Act of 1904, passed on March, 21. This Act, made it clear that the Governor General will by his ordinary or extraordinary orders fix the territorial jurisdiction of the Universities and according to this provision the relations between colleges shall be established and maintained.

Curzon's proposals for the partition of Bengal¹ received Royal assent on September 1, 1905. Accordingly, the region was divided into two provinces the East Bengal and West Bengal; a new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was constituted by amalgamating Assam and Chittagong with fifteen districts of old Bengal. The new province was to have an area of about 1,06,000 square miles, and a population of about 31 million. The West region was composed of a non-Bengali Hindu majority and the East of a predominantly Bengali Muslim majority. Subsequently, the Hindu Bengali community was reduced to a minority in both provinces (Encyclopedia, 2016).

This British policy 'divide and rule' led to the rise of communal divisions and to the formation of the Muslim League in 1906. A group within the Congress Party was constantly skeptical about the Indian Muslims' loyalty to the Indian Nationalism and believed that the Indian Muslims were not entirely patriotic. Thus, the Muslims felt quite insecure and neglected by the Indian Nationalism Congress. They believed that the organisation was exclusively devoted to maintaining the Hindu majority (Abid: 2008, p. 139).

What followed the partition, however, stimulated an almost national anti-British movement. Every segment of the Indian society rose up in opposition to the partition, involving non-violent and violent protests. Newspapers like Bengali, Hitabadi and Sanjibani condemned the partition, Hindus and Muslims composed songs, marched barefoot to the Ganges and chanted slogans in protest. They additionally adopted the swadeshi and boycott techniques, and there was even an assassination attempt against the Governor of the new province of West Bengal. Subsequently, Curzon's destruction came in 1905 after he lost a heated dispute with the military leadership of India over the reorganisation of the army. The movement was successful as the partition was revoked in 1911. As a result, the British government would have to rely increasingly on making concessions to preserve order (Brown: 2010, p. 60).

In 1919, Edwin Montague, Secretary of state for India, proposed a series of suggestions concerning the administration of India which ended up by the presentation of the

¹The decision to effect the Partition of Bengal was announced in July 1905 by the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon. The partition took place on 16 October 1905 and separated the largely Muslim eastern areas from the largely Hindu western areas. The Hindus of West Bengal who dominated Bengal's business and rural life complained that the division would make them a minority in a province that would incorporate the province of Bihar and Orissa. Hindus were outraged at what they recognised as a "divide and rule" policy, where the colonisers turned the native population against itself in order to rule, even though Curzon stressed it would produce administrative efficiency.

Government of India Act¹. The Act established 'diarchy,' "*a system of joint rule between the British government and legislative councils of native-born Indians*" (Bronstein, Jamie L. and Andrew T. Harris: 2012, p. 171). As indicated by this procurement, the British would be responsible for the national government, all military affairs, and foreign policy while the Indians were in charge of financial matters and law enforcement (Brown: 2010, p. 62).

Though, not entirely dissatisfied by the lack of radical concessions in this bill, nationalists were somehow calmed down. Unfortunately, the goodwill that these measures could have fostered was halted by the drawing up of the Rowlatt Acts². The government in India had inflamed public outcry when they decided to pass the Rowlatt Acts, which permitted the Raj to recapture a portion of the forfeited powers they had lost during the war. These acts increased the penalty for sedition, permitted the government to try revolutionaries without a jury, and expanded executive power to deal with suspected rebels (Gandhi, Mohandas: 1962, p. 201).

Though, the prerogatives of the Rowlatt acts were never once utilised, the bills caused a large series of violent disturbances across the Indian soil. Contrastingly, Mahatma Gandhi³, the great soul, and leader of the Indian movement for independence, called for a campaign of *satyagraha*⁴, non-violent civil disobedience. Despite Gandhi's call for peaceful disobedience, outbreaks of violence did occur in Delhi, Bombay, and mostly the Punjab; it was at Amritsar where violence disobedience had escalated disastrously (Lloyd, Nick: 2011, p. 26). Thus, British military commander R.E.H. Dyer hastily rushed his soldiers to the Jallianwala square and ordered them to fire on an unarmed crowd of demonstrators, about 20,000 demonstrators,

¹The Government of India Act received royal assent on December 23, 1919. It was an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It was passed to expand participation of Indians in the government of India. The Act embodied the reforms recommended in the report of the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, and the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford. The Act covered ten years, from 1919 to 1929. This Act represented the end of benevolent despotism and began genesis of responsible government in India.

²The Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, 1919, popularly known as the Rowlatt Act, was a legislative act passed by the Imperial Legislative Council in Delhi on March 18, 1919, indefinitely extending the emergency measures of preventive indefinite detention, incarceration without trial and judicial review enacted in the Defence of India Act 1915 during the First World War. It was enacted in light of a perceived threat from revolutionary nationalist organisations of re-engaging in similar conspiracies as during the war which the Government felt the lapse of the DIRA regulations would enable.

³Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (2 October 1869 – 30 January 1948) was the preeminent leader of the Indian independence movement in British-ruled India. Employing nonviolent civil disobedience, Gandhi led India to independence and inspired movements for civil rights and freedom across the world. He is unofficially called the Father of the Nation.

⁴Satyagraha (Sanskrit and Hindi: "holding onto truth") concept was introduced in the early 20th century by Mahatma Gandhi to designate a determined but nonviolent resistance to evil. Gandhi's satyagraha became a major tool in the Indian struggle against British imperialism and has since been adopted by protest groups in other countries.

at Amritsar in the Punjab, killing 379 people and left 1,208 wounded natives (Huttenback, Robert A.: 1966, p. 181).

By doing this, Dyer defaced the image of the Raj beyond repair. In a misguided attempt to defend order and the Empire, Dyer brought down the last vestiges of the Victorian Era. Many Indian leaders considered the Amritsar Massacre¹ as the incident had "*destroyed the trust in British justice and fair play that had been built up over one and a half centuries*" (Read, Anthony, and David Fisher: 1997, p. 19). The Indian people were no longer content to adopt the prudent course towards self-government established by the British and were from this moment onwards attempting to outdistance an already brisk pace towards home rule (Huttenback, Robert A.: 1966, p. 183).

Stunned by the brutality of the Amritsar Massacre Gandhi called for a nationwide Satyagraha, which in this case meant to boycott of all things British. He passionately declared that "*cooperation...with this satanic government was sinful.*" Mr. Gandhi had fundamentally called for all students to abandon their classes, for policemen to forsake their sworn duty, for government officials to resign their titles, and for the populace to pass over British products (Brown: 2010, p. 69).

On April 6, 1919, more than one million Indians throughout the country responded to Gandhi's call, and participated in civil disobedience, demonstrations, and nationwide *hartal* (general strike). However, because of the growing police repression, this non-violent civil disobedience was cut off, and a series of riots and violent disobedience took place in many areas. Unsatisfied with the violence, Gandhi stopped the campaign and went on a three-day penitential fast to urge Indians to stop their fighting (Powers, Roger S., et al: 2012, p. 447). As the result of the boycott imposed by Congress, moderates went to the polls and elected a fairly reasonable body that removed the Rowlatt Acts. In 1927, due to a massive pressure, the Parliament of England appointed a Statutory Commission to discuss India's political future.

¹The Jallianwala Bagh massacre, also known as the Amritsar massacre, took place on 13 April 1919 when a crowd of nonviolent protesters, along with Baishakhi pilgrims, who had gathered in Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar, Punjab, were fired upon by troops of the British Indian Army under the command of Colonel Reginald Dyer. The civilians had assembled to participate in the annual Baisakhi celebrations—both a religious and cultural festival for the Punjabis. Coming from outside the city, they may have been unaware of the martial law that had been imposed. On Dyer's orders, his troops fired on the crowd for ten minutes, directing their bullets largely towards the few open gates through which people were trying to flee. The British government released figures stating 379 dead and 1,200 wounded.

Despite the fact that it was the Indian political future to be discussed in this commission, the members of the commission were chosen exclusively from the British community without any Indian representative (Kaur, Sukhchain: 2012, p. 126). The Commission's work went on for two years evaluating the constitutional needs of India and attempting to gauge the readiness of the Indian people for further advancement towards responsible government. The Simon Report, named after the Commission's chairman, John Simon, was finally released in 1930, the panel concluded that the best political structure to suit the Indian requests was a federal union composed of provincial governments under a national authority. Eventually, the reluctantly embraced the establishment of provincial representation and the creation of communal electorates in the central government (Burt, Alfred LeRoy: 1956, p. 794).

In spite of these progressions, the exclusion from the commission burst the extreme craving of Indians to depend on themselves to reform their own constitution. This prompted a few endeavours intending to make the most suitable constitution that both the British and Indian politics would concur on. The first Round Table Conference to discuss the future of India was held in London in the fall of 1930. But it failed due the refusal of the Indian National Congress to participate since many of the Congress' leaders were in jail. The second Round Table Conference was held in London from 7 September 1931 with the participation of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. Unfortunately, the outcomes of the second Round Table Conference were again no substantial results regarding India's constitutional future (Brown: 2010, p. 72).

The process of finalising the initial constitutional reform offered by the British government went through a third Round Table Conference. But it was not attended by the Indian National Congress and Gandhi. Like the two first conferences, little was accomplished. The recommendations were published in a White Paper in March 1933 and debated in Parliament afterwards. Parliament began debating the provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935 in what promised to be a long, drawn-out process (Lapping, Brian: 1985, p. 46).

The bill was finally produced and ratified by Parliament. In it, India was given Dominion status, though it was not yet the same autonomous designation the other Dominions had recently obtained. Under this system, the British would retain command of Indian foreign policy, national defense, and most law enforcement, but nearly all remaining domestic affairs

were transferred to native management. The provinces were given a free hand in the government of their territories and were just restricted by the reserved power of the Viceroy to intervene for *"the prevention of any grave menace to the peace...of India."* (Phillips, Cyril H., Ed: 1964, p. 320)

As the world War II came to close, the British strength started to diminish as its economy was crashed with a debt of about \$40.000.000. Thus, the Raj authority was about to collapse. Meanwhile, a strong famine had hit India. Concerned for their domestic welfare, the British were not eager to invest any amount of wealth in an attempt to help the Indians. The untypically tepid response of the British to aid the affected Bengalis led to a fierce Indian animosity and it became apparent that the days of the Raj were numbered (Brown: 2010, p. 78).

Within months of obtaining victory, the British electorate turned Winston Churchill¹ out of power and gave a resounding mandate to the domestic agenda of the Labour Party led by Clement Attlee². The Labourites, who had dependably been cordial to the independence movement, started outlining the end of their Empire. To stabilise the condition of India, Attlee dispatched the Cabinet Mission in early 1946 to confer with nationalist leaders from all factions and develop the extremely complicated logistics behind the upcoming transfer of power (Lapping, Brian: 1985, p. 66).

Elections had been held in India following the end of the war and the result was an intensified religious partisanship in the government. Amidst this increasingly polarised climate, these emissaries from London were tasked with meeting top party officials to work out a potential framework for government. However, these attempts were pointless as the Muslim League announced it would only be satisfied with the establishment of a separate state. Shock waves of violence racked the subcontinent with this announcement, India was entering in what appeared to be a coming civil war (Ibid).

¹Sir Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill (30 November 1874 – 24 January 1965) was a British statesman who was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1940 to 1945 and again from 1951 to 1955. Churchill was also an officer in the British Army, a historian, a writer (as Winston S. Churchill), and an artist. He won the Nobel Prize in Literature, and was the first person to be made an honorary citizen of the United States.

²Clement Richard Attlee (3 January 1883 – 8 October 1967) was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1945 to 1951 and the Leader of the Labour Party from 1935 to 1955. Attlee was the first person to hold the office of Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, serving under Winston Churchill in the wartime coalition government, before going on to lead the Labour Party to a landslide election victory in 1945 and a narrow victory in 1950. He became the first Labour Prime Minister ever to serve a full five-year term, as well as the first to command a Labour majority in Parliament.

As the Hindus and Muslims took turns massacring each other across India, the Labour government became keenly aware of how misplaced their trust had been in their nationalist allies. In March of 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten¹ was inaugurated as the last Viceroy of the British Raj and June of 1948 was officially marked as the deadline for the British departure. The British started the procedure of quickly transferring the powers of the Raj to the governments of India and Pakistan. As the end of the summer neared, the British were eager to leave the problems of the subcontinent behind and relinquish the responsibilities of Empire (Ibid, 67).

Nearly two full centuries of British rule drew to a close when India officially celebrated her independence from imperial rule at midnight on August 14, 1947 (Herman, Arthur: 2008, p. 596).

Jawaharlal Nehru² addressed the people of India and heralded the coming "*midnight hour*" when "*India would awake to life and freedom*" (Nehru, Jawaharlal: 1971, p. 3). However, India did actually awake to another more horrific nightmare; a continuous bloody conflict.

4. The Partition of India

On August 15, 1947, British rule ended in India after almost 200 years of informal and formal occupation. The same year witnessed the termination of one regime and the inauguration of two new ones. Departing British colonial authorities rushed the split, and the result was a bloody wreckage. By the end of the British Raj, two states, India, and Pakistan, emerged from the South Asian landmass. Unfortunately, with deep-rooted and lasting antipathy towards each other. Since then, relations between the two dominions are fully shaped with an envenomed load of bigotry, prejudice, religious and nationalistic hostility. Both countries have spent large amounts of their fortunes on defence against each other. The religious controversy between the two groups, Hindus, and Muslims, continued to prosper in

¹Admiral of the Fleet Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas Mountbatten (25 June 1900 – 27 August 1979), known informally as Lord Mountbatten, was a British statesman and naval officer. During the Second World War, he was Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command (1943–46). He was the last Viceroy of India (1947) and the first Governor-General of the independent Dominion of India (1947–48), from which the modern Republic of India was to emerge in 1950.

²Jawaharlal Nehru (14 November 1889 – 27 May 1964) was the first Prime Minister of India and a central figure in Indian politics before and after independence. He emerged as the paramount leader of the Indian independence movement under the tutelage of Mahatma Gandhi and ruled India from its establishment as an independent nation in 1947 until his death in 1964. He is considered to be the architect of the modern Indian nation-state: a sovereign, socialist, secular, and democratic republic.

British India (Pandey, Gyanendra: 2001, p.16). During the last phase of the British Raj, anarchy reigned in the cities of India as hatred and violence spread across the country. Both Hindus and Muslims were eager to impose their power.

By the process of partition, the Indian people were no longer seen as one unity nation. Men, women, and children were all reclassified in terms of their Sikh-ness, their Muslim-ness, or their Hindu-ness. As the problem grew bigger the creation of two separate nation-states, one predominantly Muslim, one Hindu, was inescapable. On August 14, 1947, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was founded. The following day, the Republic of India was established to the south (Bates, 2011).

Apparently, there is an irresolvable large-scale disagreement between historians concerning the Hindu-Muslims struggle. Whereas some historians of Muslim politics in north India claim to have a list of critical dates and events date back to 1857 or even earlier that ensure ventures leading to the creation of Pakistan. According to them, along all these years there was a fundamental problem of Hindu-Muslim relations going on through the whole subcontinent that required a decisive solution. Contrastingly, other historians reject the latter view and contend that the contentions between Hindus and Muslims are due to modern political inventions; either of the British rulers or the Indian politicians. They insist that the making of Pakistan was an outcome of political, not religious struggles (Ibid).

The struggle over the partition, nonetheless, had long been a matter of debate between Hindus and Muslims. It all started many years ago as a marked upsurge of Hindu-Muslim conflict which started to take place all over India. A great deal of skepticism regarding the loyalty of the Indian Muslims started to be felt, as some national issues, such as the Hindu-Urdu controversy and the partition of Bengal (1905), occurred. The partition of Bengal in 1905 brought some sort of hope to Bengali Muslims who were politically, socially, economically and culturally crushed after the fall of Muslim rule in Bengal in 1757 (Ajithkumar: 2006, p. 5).

For the British, the advancement of Hindus or Muslims was no harm, what they were really concerned about was the unity of these two groups, which in every way would adversely affect the British interests. In contrast to the Muslims satisfaction over the partition of Bengal, Hindus, generally of the subcontinent and particularly of the Bengal, were entirely against this movement. A severe demonstration campaign was launched by Hindus from all over the subcontinent.

Hindus and Muslims were always seen as separate 'nations.' However, The two major communities in the Indians sub-continent had lived peacefully for centuries prior to the arrival of British and any political matter could have been resolved through negotiation and implementation of the constitution and an independent and strong Judiciary, which could protect the rights of Muslims, Hindus, and other communities. But, the British Empire's policy 'divide and rule' which was based on the creation of a rift between Hindus and Muslims in order to dilute any potential cohesive opposing force took this conflict to another more dangerous level (Mir: 2014, p. 102).

The 1905 partition of Bengal which had been claimed to be for an administrative expediency reason, in fact, aimed at thwarting the growing national solidarity and resulted in the growing sense of separation between Hindus and Muslims. The main motive was that of placating the Muslims and creating a solid Muslim block against the Hindus in respect of political views.

The Muslims were growingly recognising the nonattendance of a countrywide organisation like the Indian National Congress, through which they could effectively put forward their demands. The first Muslim political organisation which came into being was called "Mohammedan provincial Union"¹ with the objective of "*uniting the Mohammedans of the new province of East Bengal and Assam into a compact body and representing to government views and aspirations of Muslims in social and political matters*" (Hayat, Umar: 2007, p. 111).

However, the Muslims of Bengal soon understood that the problems of the Muslims of Bengal could not be solved locally and thus they immediately started arranging the Muslims of all over the sub-continent to adopt a more effective strategy to safeguard their rights vis a vis their rival communities. Eventually, the creation of a new organisation to protect Muslims' prerogative became indispensable. As a result, a public meeting of the Muslim leaders was held on December 30, 1906, with Viqar-ul-Mulk in the chair. After deliberations, it was concurred that a political organisation of the Muslims be established styled as the All

¹ The word Mohammedan means Muslim.

India Muslim League¹, foremost to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Muslims of India (Malik, Shafiq M.: 2012, p. 169).

All India Muslim League, the biggest political party of the Muslims of the Sub-Continent, played a pivotal role in the political and constitutional history of India in general and for the cause of the Indian Muslims in particular. After a long and tardy journey, the organisation grew up and went through a process of politicising the Muslim community of India, and gained support for the Party both in Muslim majority as well as in the Muslim minority provinces of Sub-continent. The freedom struggle of the Muslims in the Sub-continent was the fundamental cause of the League (Ibid).

All India Muslim League took a tremendous start by securing the privilege of separate electorate for the Indian Muslims in 1909. Likewise, the commencement of the Second World War and subsequent resignations of the Congress Ministries provided another opportunity to the League to prove its claim of representing the Indian Muslims. Muhammed Ali Jinnah², the president of the All India Muslim League, employed all tools to popularize the League and its message throughout India. He successfully brought Muslims of India under the League's banner (Hodson, H.V.: 1969, p. 527).

The main factor contributing to Hindu-Muslim strife was due to the interference of religious festivals, ceremonies, and beliefs. The periodic coincidence of the chief festivals of both religions due to the difference in their calendric systems led to a great increase of hostilities between the two groups. For instance, in Calcutta in 1926, the Muslim solemnity of Muharram was broke by the Hindus Rath Jatra and Raj Rajeshwari processions, and disturbances followed (Ibid).

Another common problem was the playing of music before mosques, which was strictly forbidden during prayer. When looking at official reports on communal violence from the early 1920s, most cases involved the making of music by Hindu processions in front of mosques. What's more, the Muslim Bakar Id sacrificial festival, during which a sacrificial

¹The All-India Muslim League (popularised as Muslim League) was a political party established during the early years of the 20th century in the British Indian Empire. Its strong advocacy for the establishment of a separate Muslim-majority nation-state, Pakistan, successfully led to the partition of India in 1947 by the British Empire.

²Muhammad Ali Jinnah (25 December 1876 – 11 September 1948) was a lawyer, politician, and the founder of Pakistan. Jinnah served as leader of the All-India Muslim League from 1913 until Pakistan's creation on 14 August 1947, and then as Pakistan's first Governor-General until his death. He is revered in Pakistan as *Quaid-i-Azam*.

animal, especially when it is a cow, was a sacred duty for Muslims, had always been a point of contention for Hindus (Thursby, Gene R.: 1975, p. 76).

Essentially, it was a matter of religious debate, a question of cow slaughter and the playing of music before mosques that led to this immense bloody conflict. These two activities became the main reason behind these communal conflicts in the 1920's. Some observers, ironically, have referred to the Hindu-Muslim clashes of the period as the "*cow-Music*"question (Ibid).

The Muslims were growingly thinking that their interests and traditions might be best protected if they had their own separate state, rather than some sort of a 'protected minority' status in a nation fully dominated by the Hindu majority. Among the first to make the demand for a separate state was the philosopher Allama Iqbal¹, who, in his presidential address to the 1930 convention of the Muslim League said that he felt a separate nation for Muslims was fundamental in an extensively Hindu-dominated subcontinent: "*the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India*" (Read, Anthony and David Fisher: 1997, p. 234).

In addition, he introduced the Two-Nation theory, also known as the Ideology of Pakistan (Cohen: 2004, p. 29) which stated that Muslims and Hindus were two separate nations by every definition, and therefore Muslims should have a self-governing homeland in the Muslim-majority areas of British India for the safeguard of their political, cultural, and social rights, within or without a United Nation. In his turn, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, also known as 'Quaid-I-Azam' or 'Great Leader', turned the two-nation theory into an effective political movement (Bates, 2011).

After two years, in 1933, Iqbal's proposal was strongly adopted by a group of Muslims living near Britain's Cambridge University. They started by publishing a pamphlet entitled *Now or Never*, in which they not only proposed the boundaries of an Indian Muslim state but also named it as Pakistan. According to Choudhary Rahmat Ali,² the new state should consist of the areas of the Punjab; Afghania, or the Northwest Frontier Province; Kashmir;

¹Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), widely known as Allama Iqbal, was a poet, philosopher, and politician, as well as an academic, barrister and scholar in British India who is widely regarded as having inspired the Pakistan Movement. He is called the "Spiritual father of Pakistan".

²Chaudhry Rehmat Ali (1895–1951) was a Pakistani Punjabi Muslim nationalist who was one of the earliest proponents of the creation of the state of Pakistan.

Sind; and Baluchistan; all in India's northwest. From these names, Ali derived the name Pakistan (Ibid).

For more than two decades, Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the president of the influential Muslim League, in fact, was at the forefront of the effort to ensure that Muslims and Hindus remained united in their effort to expel the British rule. However, as tension between the two groups grew bigger, he went so far as to announce in 1933 that Pakistan was an "*impossible dream*" (LaPierre, Dominique and Larry Collins, Ed: 1997, p. 127). Jinnah was entirely concerned about the security of Islamic communal electorates through an alliance with the Congress, but their Hindu adversaries remained unapproachable. The Congress insisted that it represented all of India and their overwhelming success frightened the Muslim League. Dreadful of Hindu intentions and their numerical superiority, Jinnah began the process of restructuring the League so that it was for Muslims what the Congress was for Hindus: the singular, political head of their religious faction (Brown: 2010, p. 81).

The fateful steps towards partition, however, were all taken somewhere around 1937 and 1946,¹ as tension started to take place at every nook and corner of India. After provincial elections in 1937, the congress refused to form coalition administrations with the Muslim League in mixed areas. Thus, Relations between Hindus and Muslims began to deteriorate, which led to a serious demand from Muslims for a separate Muslim State (Ibid).

In 1940, at a Muslim League session in Lahore, the historic resolution demanding an autonomous independent state for the Muslims of India, in the northeast and northwest of India, was introduced. Thus, the first official demand was made for the partition of India and the creation of a Muslim state of Pakistan. During the session, Jinnah, who had always believed that Hindu-Muslim solidarity was conceivable, reluctantly came to the view that partition was necessary to safeguard the rights of Indian Muslims :

The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures. They neither inter-marry, nor inter-dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on

¹Many examples of this point of view could be cited. Among the most clearly articulated is Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims Since Independence (Boulder, CO: 1997); see especially pp 55–56.

conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects in life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap (Jinnah: 1997).

As the year 1945 drew to close, India was rocked by rebellions and revolts on an unprecedented scale. As a result of this, the British government was eager to grant India its independence. A large scale of violent disturbance started to take place all over the subcontinent starting with the Great Calcutta Killing of August 1946, which was an immediate response to Jinnah's call for "direct action" for the achievement of Pakistan. Through which he asked the Muslims to show their determination for forming a separate state called Pakistan through processions and meetings. The call was made during the Cabinet Mission Plan; the last serious attempt made by Indian politicians, as well as British rulers, to preserve the Indian unity. Shortly after the Calcutta violence, serious rioting was spreading in many other places in northern and western India (Brass: 2003, p. 76).

After the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Governor-General of India, Lord Wavell, was supplanted by Mountbatten as the last Viceroy and Governor-General of India. Mountbatten was sworn in as viceroy on March 24, 1947. He quickly tried to get the situation in hand by arranging face-to-face meetings with top Indian officials; including Congress Party officials: Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel, as well as with Muslim League leaders Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. He also met with Mahatma Gandhi, the symbolic head of India's independence movement. However, these meetings convinced Mountbatten that the partition of India was now the only realistic possibility left for the British, as well as the Indians to overcome this horrific dispute (Brown: 2010, p. 84).

Despite the fact that Mountbatten was sent out with instructions to seek to resolve the problem among the Indian people, he determined very quickly after his arrival that the latter objective was impossible to accomplish. After intensive consultations with the principle Indian political leaders, he decided with the agreement of all that the demand for Pakistan and the consequent partition of India could not be avoided (Ibid).

As the last Viceroy of united India, Lord Mountbatten assumes the most controversial place in the vast gallery of leaders in the final phase of India's freedom movement. The new viceroy carried with him the precise date, 30th June 1948, by which the British intended to make a peaceful transfer of power to Indian hands. Promptly, Mountbatten began forming a plan for the partition of India in accordance with the requests of the Congress. By the middle of 1947, the settlement had been established and the documents creating the separate nations of Pakistan and India were signed by the heads of the necessary parties (Bates, 2011).

The rampant bloodshed continued unabated as the leaders proclaimed that the partition of India was finalised. Lord Mountbatten realised the gravity of the situation and shocked the world by announcing that the British would be withdrawing from India and Pakistan just within nine weeks. In a press conference, Mountbatten announced that the date of Britain's departure would not be June 1948, but it would be August 15, 1947. The antedating' of partition by Mountbatten from June 1948 to August 1947 resulted in one of the greatest upheavals in recorded human history (Ali, Umar: 2009, p. 120).

The British government announced Partition Plan on June 3, 1947, which was "*drawn up by a British lawyer, Cyril Radcliffe*" (Bates, Crispin: 2011), who had never been in India before. Furthermore, Prime Minister Attlee's historic reading of the Indian Independence Bill on 4th July 1947 in the House of Commons in which he stated that "*this Bill brings to an end one chapter in the long connection between Britain and India, but it opens another,*" obviously proved the British influence on the Partition process. The role of British leaders who by their acts of omission or commission played a major part in the making of a plan for dividing India (Ali, Umar: 2009, p. 120).

The quickness of Britain's departure left little time to accomplish the practical aspects of partition. As the nation was to be divided, partition process required that India's governmental assets had to be separated, its civil service had to be divided, its army forces had to be split, and the most important thing borders had to be drawn. All these tasks, however, were accomplished with great violence (Bates, 2011).

The persuasive diplomacy of Jawaharlal Nehru was able to preserve most of the subcontinent for his party and even allowed them to retain profitable lands with substantial

numbers of Muslims. Provinces such as the Punjab, Bengal, and Kashmir were divided with large numbers of Muslims still living in Hindu territory. The decision to give India a portion of the resource-rich province of Kashmir would prove to be a particularly controversial move since seventy-seven percent of the people in this united province were Muslim (Brown: 2010, p. 87).

News of the partition outraged Hindus and Muslims on both sides of the lines dividing India. Violence was reignited along the new borders, especially in the province of Kashmir. Fear and terror caused thousands to flee in the largest exodus in human history. India's partition led to one of the largest and most rapid involuntary migration in world history, with an estimated 14.5 million people who migrated within four years (Bharadwaja: 2008). The gross tragedy for people which partition involved; the migration of huge numbers to unknown places, the violence which deliberately targeted refugees and minorities and the particular terrors for women, sit alongside the immense problem families that families had to face, which was the reconstruction of their lives anew. As A.S. Bakshi, the Sikh civil supplies officer from the fertile district of Jullundur, said:

We used to be together...for days and nights, all of a sudden they lost confidence in us...at that time there were only two things...Muslims, and non-Muslims. We have lost the best of our friends, the people we loved, the places so much of us was embedded in every brick where we'd stayed for generations. (Khan, Yasmin: 2007, p. 124)

There is no denying to the fact that partition was an agonizing event in the light of the violence and dislocation it brought in its wake with thousands killed and millions displaced. Both nations were affected by the process of partition. Torture, death, and forced religious conversions drove so many to leave their homelands and be part of this involuntary migration.¹ The partition was accompanied by an extensive degree of horrendous and atrocious violence on both sides. Estimates of the dead range from 200,000 to two million.² To prevent capture, torture, death, or forced religious conversions people committed suicide, murdered their own children, spouses, and even their parents (Lester, David: 2010). Unduly,

¹ See Figure. 1

² See Figure. 2

women were to suffer more. Women were exposed to different kinds of humiliation; raping and disfiguring them in front of their relatives, branding them with words such as 'Pakistan, Zindabad'¹ or 'Hindustan, Zindabad' (Lester, David: 2010).

Despite the fact that both nations were extremely damaged by the process of partition, however, Pakistan was destroyed foremost. About 90% of the subcontinent's industry and taxable income base remained in India, including the largest cities of Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta. The economy of Pakistan was predominantly agricultural, and controlled by feudal elites. Besides, at the division of India, Pakistan won a poor share of the colonial government's financial reserves - with 23% of the undivided land mass, it acquired only 17.5% of the former government's financial assets. Once the army had been paid, nothing was left over for the purposes of economic development (Bates, 2011).

In addition, The government of Pakistan had been severely depleted by the flight of the educated class, which for the most part made out of Hindus since Muslims refused the British education. Partition related flows altered the composition of the literate populations in India and Pakistan. Whereas for India the standard number of literacy increased to 0.9%, there was a decrease of about 0.2% in literacy for Pakistan. Pakistan was more damaged because the Hindu and Sikh migrants who left the region were much more literate than the resident Muslims; literacy among Muslims was 3.35% while for Hindus it was 16.56% (Bharadwaja: 2008).

Ever since the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, when Britain dismantled its Indian empire, India and Pakistan have been arch rivals. Hitherto, there is still great anger and hurt in both Pakistan and India at the carnage, slaughter and separation of communities and families that came with partition. The sense of historical, intellectual, and cultural unity the Indian Muslims and Pakistani Muslims share in common led to a political delicate in India. Indian Muslims are always perceived as being 'anti-nationalists' because they covertly support the Pakistani enemy because their Muslim solidarity is more important than their Indian identity. Both nations remain in a type of cold-war conflict, with the ongoing violent and blood-soaked row about the expansive and expensive garden fence in the beautiful

¹ A common word used as part of a slogan in India and Pakistan, which means 'Long live'.

valleys and glaciers of Kashmir. This has recently escalated into dangerous nuclear arms race (Pandya, Amit: 2010, p. 3).

5. Conclusion:

The East India Company made its first step in India as a trading company. Then, the Company saw the rise of its fortunes, and its transformation from a trading venture to a ruling enterprise. However, mismanagement led to its abolishment. The corporate evolution of the British East India Company played a crucial part in the establishment of the British Raj. In 1858, the British rule was established in India, ending a century of control by the East India Company.

The collapse of the East India Company did not weaken the British presence in India. But rather, paved the way for a new era, an era of full British domination almost over the whole subcontinent. Britain managed to rule India from 1857 to 1947. Nevertheless, many Indians were distressed by the rapid cultural changes imposed by the British, and they worried that Hindu and Muslim India would be Christianized. Despite the fact that the British rule was widely imposed, however, the Indian independence movement started to take place all over the subcontinent. Eventually, in August 1947, the British rule came to an end and India became an independent country.

The growth of Muslim separatism from the late 19th century and the rise of communal violence from the 1920s to the virulent outbreaks of 1946-1947, which coupled the British withdrawal. Muslims, as a religious community, comprised only 20% of the population and represented great diversity in economic, social and political terms. This had led to huge hostilities between Hindus and Muslims which ended up by the creation of the new Muslim separate State of Pakistan.

Indian and Pakistani groups in Britain

1. Introduction:

Being a British colony for about 200 years has definitely strengthened the relationship between India and Britain, and this has encouraged many Indians, and Pakistanis as well, to migrate to Britain. After the end of the British Raj, a large number of migrant flows from India and Pakistan started to move out to the United Kingdom in search for better labour opportunities.

As the post-war economic boom began to take place in Britain, Indian and Pakistani migrants had no other choice but to migrate to Britain. However, the experience of these newcomers tends to be a difficult one. They found themselves by no means pawn in the face of the resultant forces of racial and ethnic exclusionism. Nevertheless, Indians have been actively, and indeed very successfully, integrated in the British society. Most members of the Indian ethnic group are achieving a spectacular degree of educational success. Besides, they occupy some of the most important positions.

In contrast, the Pakistani population is considered to be one of the most disadvantaged ethnic groups in the UK. And are more likely to be considered 'poor' under official classifications than their white counter parts. Furthermore, a number of studies has shown that there is still a substantial gap between the educational attainment of pupils of Pakistani heritage and the national average.

Many factors have contributed in these stark differences between the Indian and Pakistani communities including: English fluency, education, social and cultural construction, and most importantly religious affiliations.

2. History of Migration

The root of social diversity in most Western European countries lies in their recruitment of labour from colonies and former colonies to fill gaps in the labour market following the Second World War. With 7.8 million migrants living in the country in 2013, the United Kingdom has one of the largest foreign-born populations in the EU, just after Germany (10.2 million) and before France (7.5 million).¹ Britain has always been a multicultural society, experiencing large-scale immigrant flows and settlement over the past half century.² Britain, and especially the London area, is an increasingly diverse society in terms of both the size of the migration flows to the UK, and the origin of migrants: 57% of all African-Caribbean people, 82% of all Africans, 49% of Bangladeshis, 42% of Indians, and 29% of Pakistanis live in Greater London (Hansen, Randall: 2000, p. 23). According to the 2001 census, 7.9% of the population self-identify as ethnic minorities.³ Some of its minority group populations have been there for an extremely long period.

The current minority ethnic populations are largely the result of immigration in the post-war period from former colonies or Commonwealth countries. Labour shortages generated by Britain's relative postwar affluence were filled by colonial workers who took advantage of privileged immigration channels. Until 1962, Commonwealth immigrants had enjoyed unimpeded access to the United Kingdom and during the 1950s about 500,000 migrants, predominantly young men, travelled to the United Kingdom (Hansen, Randall: 2000, p. 17).

In *Domicile and Diaspora: Anglo-Indian Women and the Spatial Politics Of Home*, Alison Blunt states: "In 1947, there were roughly 300,000 Anglo-Indians in India and, against the advice of Anglo-Indian leaders, at least 50,000 had migrated by 1970, half of whom settled in Great Britain in the late 1940s and 1950s" (2005, p. 3).

As the ex-imperial power in the region, sentimental attachment and familiarity made Britain the natural choice of destination for its post-colonial citizens, particularly South Asians wishing to leave the subcontinent. South Asian migration flows became significant

¹Source: Eurostat.

²Note there have been integration programs dating back at least a century- for example, there were resettlement programs for Belgian refugees in the 1910s and Polish refugees in the 1940s that catered to hundreds of thousands of people. See Jill Rutter and Matt Cavanagh, *Back to Basics: Making Integration Work in the UK* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, forthcoming, 2012).

³ See table 1

after World War II, given that India was part of the British Commonwealth after its independence in 1947 (Darwin, John: 2011).

According to Vizram's study (1986), there are three major categories of South Asian migrant flows. The personal servants of Imperial adventurers and administrators, who accompanied their masters on their eventual return home, were among the first South Asian migrants to come to Britain. There were also seamen, who used to work in an equally menial capacity on British merchant ships since they invariably served in the stokehold. Finally, there was a bunch of affluent travellers who came to Britain in search of a mixture of adventure, excitement and professional qualifications, including Gandhi and Jinnah. However, until the beginning of the twentieth century, the presence of South Asians in Britain stayed finite.

The explanations for international migration are diverse, complex and inter-linked (Massy, et. al. 1993). Social scientists have argued that the social, economic and environmental contexts of the society determine to a large extent the reasons behind migration process. As Titelbaum and Russell suggest,

International migration may be best seen as a focal point of intersection among economic, demographic and political differentials. As these disparities widen, so does the potential for (although not necessarily the actuality of) international migration (1994:229).

By the end of the British Raj, there were some dramatic changes as so many male members of the indigenous working class had left the subcontinent heading to Britain. The primary motive for those seeking migration is better work opportunities and better financial returns. The end of empire, which coincided with an economic boom in Britain, provided employment opportunities for South Asians at the bottom rung of the employment structure. Decline in status for South Asians was partially alleviated by improved financial rewards, as unskilled jobs in Britain paid better than skilled employment in the subcontinent. Though some skilled workers had been among these immigrants, earlier migration waves from India, including Pakistan at that time, was characterised by a lower social background. In contrast,

the new migrant wave is composed of highly skilled workers (Unterreiner, Anne: 2015, p. 10).

"In England and Wales specifically, Indian migrants are the largest group of migrants, representing 9.2% of the foreign-born population" (Ibid, 12). Indian and Pakistani communities represent one of the fastest-growing immigrant populations in the United Kingdom. Both had some of the largest increases between the 2001 and 2011 Censuses. People identifying as Pakistani and Indian each increased by around 0.4 million (0.5 percentage points and 0.6 percentage points respectively). Also, the 2011 Census shows that the majority of the usual resident population, 48.2 million people (86.0 percent of the population) reported their ethnic group as White. Within this ethnic group, the White British was the largest, with 45.1 million people (80.5 percent), followed by Any Other White with 2.5 million people (4.4 percent). Indian was the next largest ethnic group with 1.4 million people (2.5 percent) followed by Pakistani (2.0 percent) (Ibid).

While this is in itself a reason to examine these populations in greater detail, recent events have brought them into the spotlight. Though these populations may have similar histories and cultures, they also have distinct characteristics which made them experience different degrees of integration in Britain. Pakistani communities on average face greater poverty, and socialising barriers than Indian communities.

As Thandi explains, *"the main pull factor was the increased demand for labor in war-devastated Britain"* (2007, p. 162), thousands of young men from Independent India and newly-formed Pakistan gravitated towards England in search of jobs. Thandi continues:

Insufficient supplies of home workers meant that many manufacturing industries, especially those requiring unskilled labor, and public services such as the newly created National Health Service and the public transport system, needed 'ready-made' labor. To fill such vacancies quickly, government departments actively promoted immigration (2007, p. 162).

Following the Second World War a number of policies were introduced, firstly to encourage migration into the UK to help with reconstruction, and then to work in the growing fields of the NHS and the car industry (Geddes, 2003). Most Indian and Pakistani immigrants who came to Britain were motivated by the desire for economic advancement. The prosperity of those who returned from Britain encouraged others to migrate as well. Many such migrants helped sustain the economic boom of the time not just in the UK but across much of Western Europe, by taking on jobs that nationals were no longer willing to do. This meant that these settlers were usually located at the bottom end of the labour market (Paul, Kathleen: 1997, p. 56).

"Indian migration flows became significant after World War II, given that India was part of the British Commonwealth after its independence (1947)" (Unterreiner, Anne: 2015, p. 10). The 1948 Nationality Act¹ reaffirmed the right to British citizenship to all members of the Commonwealth, without restriction. Thus, Britain confirmed its commitment to the Empire/Commonwealth by refusing to draw a distinction between citizen and subject and conferred a common set of rights and privileges which entitled every subject in the empire to enter Britain, serve in the armed forces, stand for Parliament and vote. Thus, in the light of the importance assigned to South Asia and the Commonwealth in general, any measures to restrict the entry of Indians and Pakistanis would have been highly controversial (Paul, Kathleen: 1997, p. 56).

However, it had been assumed wrongly, that these migrant workers would return home when they were no longer needed. By the late 1970s, it was clear that this was not the case as the migrant population had evolved to include women, children, and older people. In 1961, one-sixth of immigrants were women and there were few children. By 1971, women and children accounted for 75 % of immigrant arrivals (Winder, 2004). Because many of these workers came from former colonies, they held passports for the UK and so had the same rights as those born in the country (Geddes, 2003).

¹The British Nationality Act 1948 was an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom that created the status of "Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies" (CUKC) as the national citizenship of the United Kingdom and its colonies. The Act, which came into effect on 1 January 1949, was passed in consequence of the 1947 Commonwealth conference on nationality and citizenship, which had agreed that each of the Commonwealth member states would legislate for its own citizenship, distinct from the shared status of "Commonwealth citizen" (formerly known as "British subject").

As Ruby Dhar argue: *"There was no doubt that cheap labour from developing and over populated south Asian countries were providing an invaluable supply of labour and contributing to British economy, they came to be viewed as potential threat by the local natives"* (2007, p. 16). In the 1970's policies began to tighten up the rules on who was eligible to migrate to the UK. Citizens of the UK and colonies that were born in the UK or had a parent or grandparent born, adopted, registered or naturalised in the UK, had the right to live in the UK, whereas citizens of independent Commonwealth countries no longer had the right. This essentially meant that all non-patrial Commonwealth citizens would be treated the same as any other foreign immigrants (Dummet, 2001).

By time, things have changed progressively. From job seekers to permanent citizens, migrants are now viewed as competitors for scarce jobs, housing, and social services, they threaten to alter communities characters against the will of the original inhabitants. In addition, events since the mid-1990s have undermined confidence both in the ability of the country to integrate visible minorities and in the efficacy of multicultural policies in doing so. In 2001, gangs of Asian and White youth fought in England's northern cities; in July 2005, four suicide bombers who were British Muslims attacked London and four others tried; and, in October 2005, riots broke out between members of Birmingham's Black and Asian communities. These horrendous events led to a large scale of segregation and deprivation among ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims (Ibid).

2.1.Indian diaspora

The historical colonial relationship between Britain and India has strongly influenced migration histories, as this region became a source of labour migrants for Britain's postwareconomy. This was initially predominantly male labour migration, but many wives and children were later brought to the UK, predominantly during the 1960s and 70s. The UK has always been an important destination market for Indian emigrants and has a sizeable Indian diaspora community. According to the 2001 census, the majority are Hindus. People of

Indian origin make the largest ethnic minority in Britain.¹ They constitute 1.8% of the total population in the UK (Wikipedia, 2011).

The majority of the first migrants from India came from the Punjab, Gujarat, and Kashmir states. The migration flows from this period were chain migrations from specific regions, religious groups, castes and villages. While 80% of British Sikhs are from the Jullundur District (Punjab), 70% of Indian Hindus and Muslims are from the Gujarat State (Unterreiner, Anne: 2015, p. 10).

As India is a diverse nation, its diaspora consists of many ethnic subgroups. The 64th round of National Sample Survey data (2007-2009) shows that the Punjabis and the Sikhs mark significantly a large number of migrants into Britain. According to this survey, the number of out-migrants from Punjab was estimated at 386,423² (Ibid).

Amongst the various Indian communities who settled in Britain were the Punjabi and the Gujarati people. At the origin, the majority of the first migrants from India came from the Punjab, Gujarat, and Kashmir states. The migration flows were chain migrations from specific regions, religious groups, castes and villages (Williams 2013). While 80% of British Sikhs³ are from the Jullundur District (Punjab), 70% of Indian Hindus and Muslims are from the Gujarat State (Peach, Ceri: 2006, p. 136).

"The Indian population was concentrated in London, and in the cities of the Midlands, and in Lancashire and West Yorkshire" (Lupton, Ruth, and Anne Power: 2004, p. 4). Indians are mainly concentrated in Leicester area (especially Belgrave, Rushey Mead, Highfields, Spinney Hills, Evington) and has high concentration in other areas like Bedford (Queens Park, Cauldwell), Birmingham Sparkhill, Sparkbrook, Glasgow (especially Pollokshields, Pollokshaws and Woodlands), Leeds (Harehills, Chapeltown) and London (especially Tower Hamlets, Newham, Hounslow, Brent, Southall, Ilford, Harrow). The High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora report also confirms that Indians over 40 percent population live in inner and outer London.

¹The contribution of UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction :A report by the ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford for the Department for International Development.

²See Table 2

³Within the Indian ethnic group, 45% are Hindu, 29.1% are Sikh, and 12.7% are Muslim

"This current immigration trend is in line with migration flows from India since the 1990s-2000s" (Unterreiner, Anne: 2015, p. 13). Students and professionals from diverse regions of India came in significant numbers. Indian chain migration was mainly composed of skilled migrants, 61.7% Indian residence permit holders came to study or work. These immigrants played a significant role in the development of their native places (Ibid).

The colonial connection between India and the U.K. had ensured intimate interaction between the two countries. The ties between the British and the Punjab region go back a long way. From 1857 onwards many Punjabis served in the British army. Sikh soldiers who served in elite regiments, were often sent to other colonies of the British Empire, and saw active service in both world wars. After 1857, a considerable number of servants and Indian students increased in Britain. The migration of Indian people to Britain in the decades that followed continues to be an enduring reminder of Britain's imperial past. This has obviously contributed to the evolution of an Indian community in Britain (Chanda, Rupa, and Sriparna Ghosh: 2013, p. 4).

The origins of the present-day Indian Diaspora lay in the variety of interactions between the long British Raj and India. Migrants who came from India consisted of highly skilled individuals responding to job vacancies in the UK. Indian migration to Britain began as early as the 18th and 19th centuries when the Parsi community of Gujarat and Bengali community arrived in Britain as qualified lawyers, doctors, professionals to settle down in the U.K. Another factor was a history of military service in the British armed forces. During the First and Second World Wars, many Indians had been recruited by the British for government service as clerks and lower-level officials. After the wars came to an end, many British Indian Army soldiers settled down in Britain (Heath: 2013, p. 21).

The largest settlements, however, occurred after 1947. The first massive flow of Indians into the U.K. from post-independence India started to take place during the period from the 1950s to the 1960s. Large numbers of workers, mainly of Punjabi origin, fled to the U.K. in the aftermath of the post-World-War-II reconstruction efforts in the industrial sectors. Britain encouraged migration from former colonies to satisfy its post-war labour needs. Thus, the 1948 Nationality Act was enacted to give rights of entry and citizenship to all citizens of British and the Commonwealth and embodied the domestic need to ensure labour migration to rebuild postwar Britain and the international objective of seeking to maintain a united British

Commonwealth. The second major wave took place during the 1960s and 1970s when PIOs, mainly of Gujarati origin, were forced to leave British colonies in East Africa (Ibid).

Following the abolition of slavery in 1833, there was a compelled migration of Indians to various British colonies to work on sugar and rubber plantations. This movement occurred under a system of temporary labour migration, which the British had imposed in order to meet the demand for cheap labour in plantations and mines. For Indians, Poverty and lack of labour were the prime push factor. By 1878, Indian labourers were working in Guyana, Trinidad, Natal (South Africa), Suriname, Fiji and East Africa (Naujoks, Daniel: 2009).

While plantation workers in Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Fiji, and Mauritius were mainly recruited from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the Indian labourers working in Guyana and East-Africa, were mostly from Punjab and Gujarat. In addition to this, Punjabis also migrated to countries in East Africa, specifically, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to work in developmental projects initiated in these countries when they were part of British East Africa (Chanda, Rupa, and Sriparna Ghosh: 2013, p. 4).

Some also migrated as recruits in the British army to serve in East Africa. Subsequent Punjabi migration to these countries was also driven by network effects, i.e., kinship and friendship ties with Indian migrants already present in those countries.¹ However, large numbers of Asians, particularly Indians, who were eradicated from Uganda by Idi-Amin, all run out to Britain in a massive influx in the early and mid 1970s. This second wave of migration included a large number of considerable expertise in trade and business, which helped in the economic success and prosperity of the Indian community in the U.K (Ibid).

Along these years, a continuous stream of Indian immigrants kept on settling in the U.K. The number of immigrants from India has risen steadily. In the 1990s, another major wave of Sikh migration occurred in Britain, mainly from Afghanistan following the political turmoil in that country. These Sikhs had migrated to Afghanistan from India in the pre-independence period and were largely composed businessmen and traders in that country. Today, they are mainly present in Southall in Greater London. Hence, in the post-independence period, there has been considerable forced migration of Punjabis to the U.K. at various points in time, due to a lot of political problems and instability (Khadria: 2006, p. 172).

¹In the migration literature, network effects are seen as playing an important role. Network effects lower the cost of migration for prospective migrants.

Socio-economic factors have been the main driver of migration from India to the UK in the post-independence period. Direct migration of Indians, mainly Punjabis, to the UK reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s when many Indians migrated in response to the demand for low-skilled workers in Britain's industrial sector after the Second World War. In addition, during the 1960s and 1970s, there was low-skilled and skilled migration from India to the U.K. in search of better employment, educational facilities and other benefits which were not available in India. In part, such flows were triggered by a change in mindset and aspirations for a better standard of living. Initially, migration was primarily attributed to cheap labour male migration. The UK's Commonwealth immigration policy facilitated such flows as it allowed any citizen of a Commonwealth country to live, work, vote, and hold public office in the UK (Chanda, Rupa: 2012).

The Indian community has risen to a very high level in the UK and it is said that there are about 300 important businessmen and 150 rich and prominent Indians. The number is increasing. Achieving successful results, and retaining substantial positions, Indians have become among the most effective and prosperous ethnic groups in Britain. Among the most important and well known Indian personalities are Lord Swaraj Paul, Laxmi Mittal, Shrichand, Gopichand Hinduja, Hotelier Jasminder Singh, Manu Bhai Madhavanim, and Gulu Lalvani (Ibid).

2.2.Pakistani Diaspora

Large numbers of Pakistani migrants are settled around the world. By the year 2005, about four million Pakistanis were living outside Pakistan.¹ However, the largest number is centred in Britain. The migration of Pakistanis to Britain started slowly and peaked in 1961 and 1962. In 2005, the number of Pakistani population in Britain reached 800,000, thus, making the largest Pakistani community in the West. There are several similarities between the Pakistani migration and the Indian migration to Britain. Pakistani, inhabitants from those areas of India which are now in Pakistan, presence in Britain is extremely related to imperialism and colonialism which goes back to the 18th century when sailors, students, and professionals had been entering Britain (Malik, Soni: 2015).

The mass migration to Britain of Pakistanis had its origin in colonialism. For example, many soldiers who joined the British army in the war were posted to the British Isles, and

¹See Table 3

some of them began to settle there. Initially, however, their number was very small, until after the partition of India. At the time of the partition in 1947, a large-scale movement of the population took place between India and Pakistan. Various surveys have shown that many of these displaced people came to Britain, thus becoming migrants twice (Alam, M. Y., and Charles Husband: 2006, p. 5).

A large majority of Pakistani migrants in the UK originate from Mirpur in Kashmir, which has a long history of out-migration. Sailors from Mirpur found work as engine-room stokers on British ships sailing out of Bombay and Karachi, some of whom settled in the UK in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, big Pakistani flows started to set off in post-war Britain, mainly due to a major shortage of labour, particularly in mature industries such as textile where working conditions were poor. Pakistani migrants who came to Britain after the war found employment in the textile industries of Lancashire, Yorkshire, Manchester and Bradford, cars and engineering factories in the West Midlands, and Birmingham, and growing light industrial estates in places like Luton and Slough (Ibid).

Partition, as well, caused the displacement of large populations, especially in the Punjab and Mirpur, and these people then began to look to their future in Britain over a longer term. In 1951 there were 5000 Pakistanis, and by 1961 this figure had risen to 24,900 and by 1966 it had grown to 119,700. The significant number increased as Pakistanis joined the 'beat-the-ban-rush' to come to Britain before the Immigration Act 1962¹ closed the door (Abrahamova, Natali: 2007, p. 23).

Many British Pakistanis had come from the northern Punjab. Many too had served in the British armed forces, as with the Indians. The major group of migration, however, came from the rural Mirpur District of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, who began to migrate when the town and its surrounding areas were submerged by the waters of the Mangla Dam.² Economic hardship was the driving force behind the Pakistani migration to Britain. Wages for manual labour in Britain in the early 1960s were over thirty times those offered for work in Pakistan (Ansari, Humayun: 2003, p. 152).

¹ The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 was an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Before the Act was passed, citizens of British Commonwealth countries had extensive rights to migrate to the UK. In response to a perceived heavy influx of immigrants, the Conservative Party government tightened the regulations, permitting only those with government-issued employment vouchers, limited in number, to settle.

²The Mangla Dam is a multi purpose dam located on the Jhelum River in the Mirpur District of Azad Kashmir, Pakistan. It is the 7th largest dam in the world.

Pakistanis found work in low-status, poorly paid occupations which held no attraction for white workers, thereby producing a racialised division of labour. The search for accommodation produced similar divisions and a segmented housing market emerged in many cities. Poverty and hostility forced the Pakistani immigrants into poor private rental accommodation and the worst of the owner-occupied housing in the declining inner cities. Access to public housing was generally denied (Ibid).

The numbers of Pakistani migrants in the U.K. is now relatively straight forward. Having moved from generic categories such as Asians to ethnic categories in the 1990s the census makes enumeration straightforward and accurate. According to the 2001 census, almost three-quarter of a million Pakistanis (749,000) out of a total population of visible minorities which was just over 4.6 million (55% of whom were born in Britain) making Pakistanis around one per cent of the total population in the country (Ibid).

This makes them the second largest minority after the Indians and the overwhelming majority are citizens. During the 1990s, a debate over the size of the Muslim population resulted to a campaign, which insisted on making a study over religious identity. The study revealed that Muslims were the largest faith community in Britain after Christians (72 percent), making up nearly 3 percent of the population that is almost 1.6 million people of which the Pakistanis are the largest component of 43 per cent (Samad: 2012, p. 114).

The main factor behind Pakistani migration is the search for a better standard of living and to support their families back home. Most of them were mostly poorly educated, semi- or non-skilled people from the rural areas. Dr Ikhlaq Din, a health researcher, suggested that: "*many Pakistanis who came to the United Kingdom...were reluctant migrants*" (Din, Ikhlaq: 2006, p. 20). Instead, he contends that for many of these people, "*England was vilayat, 'a place of dreams'*" (Ibid, p. 34). He supports this by pointing out that many of the Pakistanis who came to the UK "*belonged to the lower castes...and had little opportunity to better themselves back in Pakistan*" (Ibid).

The Pakistani diaspora in Britain concentrated on improving its economic situation, but also brought over an accommodated close and extended family members and helped them to settle in their respective countries. However, The second and third generation of Pakistanis settling in Britain are very different from their predecessors. Most are well-educated and better integrated into their respective European societies. They are mostly skilled

professionals working in the medical field and information technology. Thus, they contribute to the development of Pakistani society (Abbasi, N. M.: 2010, p. 6).

Pakistani migrants and their children influence their homeland culturally and economically, keeping close ties to their roots by travelling to Pakistan and investing there. The Pakistani diaspora in Britain is well known for its contributions to charitable causes in Pakistan and the Muslim world, whether in building schools and hospitals or in providing help during hard times (Ibid).

Today, these Muslim groups are more likely to be living in some of the most inferior housing stock, having the poorest health, getting significantly the most underachieved results in education, and being underemployed or, more likely, being unemployed in the labor market when compared with their non-Muslim South Asian peers. The biggest part of them, specifically those from the rural areas of Azad Kashmir (Pakistan), are working in the declining or highly competitive manufacturing, textile, and catering sectors; living in inner city housing built at the turn of the twentieth century (which often needs substantial repairs and maintenance); and live as joint and extended families in restricted zones of ethnic and cultural maintenance. Also, they tend to remain closer to their families, extending their religious and cultural manifestations of life, and thus help to shape their presence in Britain (Lewis, Phillip: 2002, p. 54).

For most of the post-WWII incomers, religion was, and is, an important part of identity. Modood et al. (1997) found that 95% of Muslims, 89% of Hindus and 86% of Sikhs defined religion as 'very' or 'fairly' important in their lives. Also, the 2005 Citizenship Survey found that 79% of Muslims were 'actively practising', compared with 73% of Hindus, 74% of Sikhs, 54% of 'Other Religions' and just 38% of Christians (Kitchen et al. 2006). The issue then is basically not about the large amount of migrants, since for migration over this period pales into insignificance relative to that of previous eras (Casanova, 2007). It is, rather, a question of the extent of the difference in both cultural and religious terms between these newcomers and the European societies that they have made home. Eventually, this resulted in widespread racism which interacted with socio economic positioning to establish a pattern of inequality that has generally remained obdurately resistant to change to the present day (Lewis, Phillip: 2002, p. 56).

According to the 2001 Census, a study on the religious composition of racial/ethnic groups shows that the black-Caribbean and white groupings are largely Christian by self-identification (over 80%), and with similar proportions answering 'No Religion' (15% or more). The black African group has a much lower proportion of 'No Religion' than the black-Caribbean group, and a significant Muslim component (22%). The Indian group, however, tends to be the most mixed by religion, containing Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims and Christians. By contrast, members of the Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups are almost exclusively Muslim (98% in both cases)¹. The variations between these groups, however, indicate the dangers of ethno-religious inequality and social exclusion (Ibid).

3. Levels of Cohabitation

Though the common perception about Britain is that it is a multi-ethnic society receiving people from all over the world with different cultures, traditions, and beliefs, however, these groups have always been a subject of discrimination and different acts of racism. As the biggest migrate diaspora in Britain, South Asians, mainly Indians and Pakistanis, tend to be among the most affected group.

The disadvantaged position of these migrants then can be traced back to their initial (post-WWII) settlement in Britain. For not only was no provision made for their arrival in terms of, for instance, housing, but they were confronted by deeply entrenched racism on all dimensions of 'social wealth' including health, education, employment, social services and social security, and even the criminal justice system.

Unfortunately, along these years, things were not getting any better. Inequalities of race, colour, religion, gender, sexual orientation and disability were deep-rooted and were becoming even more salient. The newcomers had to live through hardship and were exposed to high levels of segregation. Trevor Phillips, Director of the Commission for Racial Equality, made a speech in which he warned that Britain was sleepwalking into segregation. Trevor Phillips stated that:

¹See figure 3

... Residential isolation is increasing for many minority groups, especially South Asians. Some minorities are moving into middle class, less ethnically concentrated areas, but what is left behind is hardening in its separateness. The number of people of Pakistani heritage in what are technically called "ghetto" communities trebled during 1991-2001; 13% in Leicester live in such communities (2005).

Modood, as well, argues that:

...the hostility against the non-white minority is likely to be particularly sharp if the minority is sufficiently numerous to produce itself as a community and has a distinctive and cohesive value system that can be perceived as an alternative, and a possible challenge, to the norm (Khatib, Nabil: 2009, p. 306).

The persistent segregation and exclusion of ethnic minorities has caused tensions between minority and majority populations. Despite the apparent efforts made by successive British governments to promote racial equality and integration and to ban discrimination, there are great complaints of lack of integration among minority groups. Numerous studies have explored ethnic segregation (e.g. Peach, 1996; Simpson, 2004; Burgess 2005). Most have found how disastrously segregated different ethnic minority groups are, and a few have explored how these patterns have changed over time for different groups.

Both, Indians and Pakistanis, are quite isolated. According to the index of dissimilarity, a standard measure of residential segregation, 63 percent of Indians would need to move to another neighbourhood within England in order for there to be no segregation between them and all other ethnic groups. For the Pakistani community, this is even higher, at 76 percent. However, it is widely apparent that Indians are more integrated socially than Pakistanis. Whereas Indians have witnessed a large scale of development, and could prosper in Britain, Pakistanis, remain severely disadvantaged (Demos, 2015).

Generally speaking the South Asian groups show a plural non-assimilationist structure. However, their levels of segregation show considerable internal variation with Pakistanis having high levels of encapsulation, while Indian rates are relatively modest. According to a study based on official census figures, people of Indian origin are most likely to be in elite professional and managerial roles in Britain. A detailed analysis of the 2011 census found that Indians are the most successful ethnic minority group with 15.4 percent found in class 1 of eight occupational groups, comprising higher managerial, administrative roles as well as professions like doctors and lawyers. By contrast, just 6.6 percent of all Pakistanis make it into class 1. The divergence between the social mobility of the Indian and Pakistani communities in the UK is one of the most intriguing findings of the Demos Integration Hub. The Demos Integration Hub found that almost half Pakistani origin men were taxi drivers, if not, they occupy other unskilled labour (Ibid).

Despite sharing soil, ancestry, heritage and family, being both considered as strangers, suffering from deprivation and ethnic penalty, however, the differentiation in economic position, migration history, political participation and perceptions of social citizenship are significant across Indian and Pakistani groups in the UK and they are becoming increasingly evident. The degree of educational and socio-economic mobility which 'Pakistanis' have so achieved is a great deal less impressive than those of people whom large-scale data-collection exercises categorise as 'Indian' (Modood: 1997, p. 58). In addition, just under 60 percent of British Pakistanis are living in relative poverty, while for Indians the figure is closer to 25 percent (Demos, 2015).

In his analysis of 1991 census data, the geographer Ceri Peach studied the degree of segregation among Britain's ethnic groups. He concluded that Pakistani and Bangladeshi levels of integration are very low comparing to those of Indians (Peach, Ceri: 1996, p. 216). This large scale of divergence between the two groups is obviously seen through inequalities across diverse arenas including education, employment, health and civic participation. A number of surveys and Censuses providing information about the educational performance, employment, economic activity, health, politics and civic engagement of Indian and Pakistani ethnic groups in Britain show great diversity in the levels of integration between the two groups (Schonwalder, Karen: 2007, p. 10).

3.1. Education

Studies show that there is a greater degree of segregation among ethnic minorities, and that *"South Asians are substantially more segregated in schools than they are in neighbourhoods"* (Johnston, Burgees, and Wilson: 2006, p. 8). Approximately one-tenth of students of ethnic minorities attend schools with a non-white majority. For instance, between 41-49 per cent of Indian students were at schools where Indians were predominated, and only around one-fifth were in White majority schools. However, Pakistanis were more widely segregated than any other South Asian groups, *"for example; 2-in-5 Pakistani primary school students attend primary schools with a Pakistani majority, as do 1-in-5 of secondary school students"* (Ibid).

Historically, ethnic minority groups have been disadvantaged in terms of education and there has been an educational gap between ethnic minority groups and White British people. A greater concern was given to the poor educational performance within ethnic minority groups. As a result, the construction of multicultural and antiracist education in Britain was originated. Many reports were drawn in order to study this phenomenon including the Burnage Report which investigated a racially motivated murder of an Asian student, Ahmed Iqbal Ullah, at Burnage High School in Manchester in 1986, a school that had a strong anti-racist policy. According to the report, the school's particular antiracist policy contributed to the incident (Modood, May: 2001, p. 311).

For many South Asians, such deeds were centrally related to what might be described as "cultural-racism", racism which uses cultural difference to vilify or marginalise cultural assimilation from groups that also suffer color-racism. This racism is directed to groups who are perceived to be culturally different; including distinctive religions, languages, customs, and family structures, South Asians were just such groups. Racism towards these ethnic minority groups became even more evident through disputes such as the Honeyford Affair in Bradford, when a headteacher, Ray Honeyford, incurred the wrath of local Pakistanis for insulting Pakistani culture (Halstead, 1994), and the campaign for state-funded Muslim schools (Walford, 1994).

However, the assumption that academic underachievement was primarily caused by color-racism, and that all non-white groups perform worse than whites was challenged by the Swann Inquiry which found that the Asian-white parity hid the fact that Indians were

achieving better than whites, but the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were doing even worse than Caribbeans (Modood et al., 1997).

Many post-war immigrants lacked qualifications or had qualifications that were not efficient enough compared to the natives' ones. However, between 1991 and 2011, gaps in educational achievement by ethnic group have narrowed, and there was an overall improvement in educational attainment by ethnic minority groups that experienced greater improvements compared with the White group; most broad ethnic groups have, on average, seen a greater improvement in attainment at age 16, compared with White British pupils¹ (Ibid).

The 2011 Census shows that there is a great development among some ethnic minority groups concerning their educational experience who tend to outperform their white peers in different fields. Minority ethnic groups comprise a higher share of the undergraduate population in England (16 percent) than of the working population (nine per cent). Their Higher Education Initial Participation Rates (HEIPRs) vary from 39 to over 70 percent, and all minority ethnic groups have a higher rate than the White group (38 per cent).

Despite these improvements, some groups continue to face a disadvantage in terms of education. Some groups such as Caribbeans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are proportionally less qualified than their white peers, while others such as Chinese, Indians, Asians, and Africans are much more so. Thus, the levels of attainment and rates of improvement vary meaningfully within these ethnic groups, and there is a considerable disparity between the groups' educational achievement (Ibid, 96).

For instance, whereas Indians are considered to be among the most qualified students, and have done exceedingly well in the sphere of education. Pakistanis, on the other hand, are proportionally less qualified than their white peers and there is still a huge gap between the educational attainment of pupils of Pakistani heritage and the national average. Also, Pakistani (32 percent) adults are the most likely to have no qualifications. In his book, *British*

¹Measured in terms of attaining five or more GCSEs at grades A*-C, including English and Mathematics, although similar trends are observed based on attaining five or more A*-C GCSE grades, or using the capped (Best 8) points score.

Muslims and State Policies, Muhammed Anwar¹ argues that the majority of Pakistani Muslims show lower educational achievement as compared to Whites or Indians (Anwar, Muhammed and Qadir Bakhsh: 2003, p. 18). As a result, today the Indian community's educational performance is assessed as being higher than that of the majority community in Britain.

Pakistani pupils tend to be among the lowest proportion of achieving the higher grades in different arenas. By contrast, Indian pupils outperform all other population groups.² Historically, there has always been a significant heterogeneity between the two groups, Pakistani pupils have always performed worse than their Indian counterparts. According to the Runnymede Trust study, these differences are mainly related to poverty, social background, and English fluency (Johnston, Burgees, and Wilson: 2006, p. 9).

Measuring achievement in terms of attaining 5 or more GCSE A*-C grades or equivalent including English and mathematics over the period from 2004 to 2013, Strand demonstrates that: in 2013, the odds of Indian students reaching this level of attainment were more than double those of White British students. However, Pupils from Pakistani heritage continued to be less likely to reach this level of achievement than White British pupils in 2013.³ Yet, the gap had narrowed considerably over the period since 2004 (Stocks, Lucy et al.: 2015, p. 6).

Furthermore, when looking at the destination of students after Key Stage 5 (A-Levels), Indians outperform all other ethnicities, including White peers. Indians are highly likely to go into higher education and attending Higher Education Institutions.⁴ Additionally, 26 percent of British Indian students in England goes on to a top-flight university, compared with 15 percent of their white British classmates. And most of them are specialised in professional fields such as medicine, engineering, and so on. British Indians are barely 2 percent of the population, however, 12 per cent of them are doctors (Ibid).

3.2. Employment

¹Mohammad Anwar Shaikh (1 June 1928 – 25 November 2006; popularly known as Anwar Shaikh) was a Pakistani-born British author residing in Cardiff, Wales. Muhammad Anwar's most popular book is *Race Relations Policies In Britain, The Myth of Return, Young Muslims in Britain, and Pakistan: Time for Change*.

²See Table 4

³See Table 5

⁴See Table 6

According to Dex and Lindley *"Evidence on pooled groups of non-Whites in the 1990s suggested that non- White employees had a greater degree of over education than White employees"* (2007, p. 7). Although members of ethnic minority communities are better educated than White British people, they remain subject to inequalities in employment. *"Minority ethnic graduates found it harder than White graduates to get graduate level jobs"* (Ibid). As demonstrated by CODE research examining ethnic inequalities in the labour market, unemployment remains higher amongst most ethnic minority groups than for the White British. It is undeniable that all ethnic minorities experience some level of ethnic penalty and discrimination in the labour market, comparing to their White peers. Generally, all ethnic minority communities have lower economic activity rates, higher unemployment and lower levels of full-time workers than those of white natives. However, there is a clear difference between the more economically successful Indian population and the more economically marginalised Pakistanis. Indians compare well with the white population by having the lowest unemployment rates with 8.1%.¹ In addition, they are mainly concentrated in the highest skilled professions (Demos, 2015).

Indians are becoming more and more incorporated into employment patterns. Both Indian men, as well as women, are the only exception in 2009, whose employment rate is almost identical and there is no significant different comparing to those of white natives. Even in earlier years, Indian men are the least disadvantaged group: their employment rate is six percentage points lower than white natives in 2000 and eight percentage points lower in 1993. Contrastingly, Pakistanis, both men and women, are significantly disadvantaged relative to white native men in all years² (Dustmann, Frattini and Theodoropoulos: 2010, p.4).

In 2014, the employment rate for the Indian community in the UK reached 71.6% in 2014, thus reaching the highest results ever. By contrast, The employment rate of Pakistanis was only 51%. This means that approximately 7, 84,000 Indians are working in Britain, an increase of 32,000 from the previous year and a whopping 2, 38,000 more since 2005. Of these, over 100,000 people from the Indian community run their own businesses in the UK.

¹See Figure 4

²See Table 7

Contrastingly, there were only 5, 60,000 Pakistanis holding jobs. In an exclusive interview to TOI, Britain's employment minister Priti Patel¹ said :

UK is home to a large and successful Indian diaspora community who are highly driven, educated and integrated to every aspect of British life. Their contribution to Britain is absolutely phenomenal. When PM Modi visits UK, it will fill him with great pride to see how successful British Indians are (Sinha, Kounteya : 2015).

She also added that:

Latest figures show that the British Indian community is highly successful when it comes to running their own businesses. The employment rate among the Indian community reached a record high last year and we also have over 100,000 people from the Indian community in UK who are running their own business. At a time when we have over 700,000 vacancies in the job market in UK, we know British Indians are excelling in every walk of life. (Sinha, Kounteya : 2015)

The unemployment rates for Muslims living in Britain are disproportionately high. In its 2004 Annual Population Survey, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in Britain found that unemployment rates for Muslims were higher than those for people from any other religion, for both men and women. A research in 2004 shows that 13% of Muslim men in Britain were unemployed, which was over three times the rate for Christian men (4%) (The Guardian, 2004).

Muslims between the ages of 16 and 24 years old were found to have the highest unemployment rates— 28%, compared to 11% for Christian males from the same age group. The ONS survey also revealed that "*men and women of working age from the Muslim faith*

¹ Priti Sushil Patel (born 29 March 1972) is a British Conservative Party politician who has been the Member of Parliament (MP) for the Witham constituency in Essex since 2010. Appointed Minister of State for Employment attending Cabinet on 11 May 2015, and previously a member of the Public Administration Select Committee.

are...more likely than other groups in Great Britain to be economically inactive, that is, not available for work and/or not actively seeking work" (2004).

A large scale of unemployment rates is basically related to cities where the largest number of Muslims is settled there. For instance in Birmingham, the British city with the largest Muslim population outside of London, Muhammad Anwar has noted that there exists a strong correlation between the areas of Birmingham where the city's Muslims are most concentrated and the areas of Birmingham which contain the city's highest unemployment rates (2003, p. 63). Moreover, on the issue of unemployment, many have concluded that significant discrimination towards Muslims still exists in Britain. For instance, in 2004, a BBC investigation found that *"candidates with English-sounding names were nearly three times as likely to get a job interview as those with names indicating that they might be Muslim"* (Muir, Hugh: 2004).

Pakistanis are more likely to experience long-term unemployment, are under-represented within professional and managerial positions, and have fewer chances of socio-economic mobility than Indians (Platt, 2005; see also Modood et al, 1997, pp. 138-43). In addition, according to the report of the National Equality Panel (NEP), in relation to median male hourly wages in 2006_08, while Indian men earned £11.20 (slightly less than white British men at £11.40), Pakistanis earned £7.70 (2010, p. 130).

Moreover, Pakistani women are more likely to be unemployed compared to any other ethnic group; at least 20% of Pakistani women are unemployed. And for those who are working, they are most likely to occupy jobs with a low payment, unskilled labour jobs such as packers, bottlers, canners and fillers, or to work as sewing machinists. In contrast, Indian women tend to be more active with only 8% rate of unemployment¹ (Gillespie et al.: 2008, p. 21).

3.3. Economic Activity

There are marked differences in the level and type of economic activity between Indian and Pakistani communities. Indians are better represented in the top jobs than even the

¹ See Figure 5

White British. Of those that are employed, Whites and Indians disproportionately concentrate in the highest skilled professions, with 35% and 43% respectively. Conversely, Pakistanis concentrate in the lowest skilled professional. Indian settlers have gradually moved away from the sub-proletarian occupations into which they were initially directed, and started moving upwards. Most members of the older Indian generation used business enterprise as their stepping stone to achieve success. Typically, they began with the ubiquitous corner shop, before moving on to establish much larger enterprises in either wholesaling, services or in manufacturing (Demos, 2015).

Not only had they already begun to establish for themselves a strong economic base, but their children were also doing well at school and college. A high proportion of their British-born offspring is achieving a spectacular level of educational success. Law, Pharmacy, Accountancy and particularly Medicine are the favored routes to upward mobility: no less than 20% of the places in Britain's medical schools are now filled by the children of British Indian parents. Furthermore, 12 percent of doctors are from Indian origins, while many Pakistanis are clustered in low-skilled professions. It is relevant to point out that migration of Pakistanis into Britain was to fill unskilled textile jobs in Yorkshire and Lancashire textile mills; indeed, one study found that Pakistanis are among the less qualified groups who are most likely to obtain unskilled jobs (Ibid).

British Indians, are among the most successful industrious communities into the British society. They could even surpass the White British group in some cases. According to a study based on official census figures, people of Indian origin are most likely to be in elite professional and managerial roles in Britain. A detailed analysis of the 2011 census reveals that Indians are the most successful ethnic minority group with 15.4% found in class 1 of eight occupational groups, comprising higher managerial and administrative roles. Furthermore, more than 75 per cent of British Indian students in England get five or more "good" GCSEs, compared to 61 percent of white British students. Also, 14 percent of British Indian students obtain three A/ or A grades or better at A-level. Whereas, it's 10 percent for white British students (Hellen, Nicholas: 2015).

Approximately 30 Indians occupy permanent positions as professors in major universities and research institutions in various disciplines including engineering, computer science, biochemistry, chemistry, aerospace and others. However, this is related to inequality

among Muslim students in the U.K. South Asian Muslims encounter bias in the 'old' i.e. pre-1992, universities. The chance of a white applicant being offered admission was almost a third higher than for an equivalently qualified Pakistani or Bangladeshi (Shiner, M.: 2002, p. 209).

In an exclusive interview to TOI, Britain's employment minister, Priti Patel said: *"UK is home to a large and successful Indian diaspora community who are highly driven, educated and integrated to every aspect of British life. Their contribution to Britain is absolutely phenomenal. When PM Modi visits UK, it will fill him with great pride to see how successful British Indians are"* (Sinha, Kounteya, 2015).

In her examination, Evandrou¹ (2000) found substantial levels of deprivation among ethnic groups. However, there were some variations, with Indians experiencing the lowest levels of multiple deprivations. But the rate rose to around a half for Pakistanis who were the most likely to suffer very high levels of deprivation in accordance to Bangladeshis. The review found that all identified minority ethnic groups had higher rates of poverty than the average for the population.

However, despite being all exposed to poverty danger and being all relatively worse off than White groups, what really stands out is the poverty risks for Pakistanis. But, rates of poverty were highest for Black Africans, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis. Whereas Indians were among those with lowest rates. And this can be mainly due to low earnings. Analysis of earnings data from the Labour Force Survey, 2001-05 shows that Pakistani workers were paid the lowest earnings.

Heath² (2001), as well, has argued that unemployment is the crucial issue, and it has also been claimed that employment differentials are much more the reason behind deprivation. High unemployment rates among men; low levels of economic activity among women; low pay; and large family sizes all these contribute to a situation in which 60 percent of Pakistanis are poor. However, Indian people have high levels of employment, and their earnings are on a par with those of white workers.

¹Professor Maria Evandrou is the Head of the Department of Ageing/Gerontology within Social Sciences: Ageing/Gerontology at the University of Southampton.

²Sir Edward Richard George Heath (9 July 1916 – 17 July 2005), often known as Ted Heath, was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1970 to 1974 and Leader of the Conservative Party from 1965 to 1975.

On these measures, they can be seen to be prospering. In attempting to understand these differences in employment chances and rates of pay, some factors should be taken into consideration and be studied: levels of education/qualifications and whether those qualifications (or years of schooling) were obtained in the UK or abroad, lack of fluency in English language, lack of familiarity with job-search institutions, and more limited networks.

3.4. Politics and Civic Engagement

As mentioned above, Britain is a multi-ethnic society containing multiple ethnic minorities that now make up ten percent of the population and have the right to vote and stand for elections. Their participation in the electoral system gives them the opportunity to express their perspectives. Their representation in politics is crucial to achieving equality of opportunity in the political system, as well as in other fields. Due to their concentration in certain areas, ethnic minority participation is becoming increasingly significant.

Statistics show that more than 6% MPs in the House of Commons and Members of the House of Lords are from an ethnic minority background¹. According to the latest available estimate from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Annual Population Survey 2015 about 13% of the UK population are from ethnic minority background.² Moreover, the number of ethnic minority female MPs in the House of Commons nearly doubled after 2015, from 1.5% (11 of 650) in 2010, to 3.0% (20 of 650) in 2015. Among Government agencies the non-white population is the most proportionally represented in the Civil Service. In 2015, 11% of Civil Servants were from minority ethnic groups.³ This compares with 7% in the UK Armed Forces.⁴ Among other public sector organizations, the NHS has the largest share of ethnic minorities. 17% of all NHS staff and 40% of hospital medical and dental staff in England are from an ethnic minority background⁵. This compares with 5% of National Fire and Rescue service staff.⁶

¹ House of Commons Library, (2016) Briefing Paper – CBP-7483, January 2016; Operation Black Vote (2015) 'BME peers', 2015

² See table 8

³ ONS (2015) 'Civil Service statistics 2015', October 2015

⁴ Ministry of Defence, (2015) UK armed forces quarterly personnel report: 2015, May 2015

⁵ HSCIC, (2015) 'NHS Workforce Statistics in England, Non-medical staff', March 2015

⁶ Department for Communities and Local Government (2015) 'Fire and rescue authorities: operational statistics bulletin for England 2014 to 2015' September 2015

Asian and ethnic minority presence in parliament still remains low with regard to the number of MPs needed to make Westminster representative of Britain's racially mixed population. However, people of Indian origin are most likely to be in elite professional and managerial roles in Britain. *"A record number of 10 Indian-origin Members of Parliament (MPs) were elected in recently concluded general election that elected 56th Parliament of the UK. It has broken the previous 2010 general election record in which eight Indian-origin were elected"* (General Knowledge Today, 2015). Indians occupy some significant positions, and more likely to be involved in politics.

The political participation of members from Indian origins has its patterns many years ago. For instance, Dadabhai Naoroji, born near Mumbai in 1825, was elected Liberal MP for Finsbury Central from 1892 to 1895. Additionally, Mancherjee Bhownagree, later Sir Mancherjee, who was elected and represented Bethnal Green North-East from 1895 to 1905: the second Indian of unmixed parentage and the first minority ethnic Conservative to sit in Parliament. They were followed by Shapurji Saklatvala who was a Parsi born in Bombay and represented Battersea North for Labour from 1922 to 1923 and as a Communist from 1924 to 1929.

Contrastingly, Muslims are highly ignored. Statistics show that Muslims participation in politics is quite poor. For instance, in the elections of May 2005, there were 48 Muslim candidates from the three major parties. However, only four were victorious. This led to suggestions that the main political parties in the UK were unwilling to put forward Muslim candidates in seats they believed to be winnable. Muslims, who are socially and residentially more separated from British society may feel less a part of the British political community. As the British Prime Minister, David Cameron¹, has argued:

But these young [Muslim] men also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity. Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live

¹David William Donald Cameron, (born 9 October 1966), is a British politician who is at present the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Leader of its Conservative Party, and Member of Parliament for the Oxfordshire constituency of Witney. In 2005, he won the UK Conservative Party leadership election. Following the election of a hung parliament in the 2010 general election, Cameron became Prime Minister as the leader of a coalition between the UK Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.

separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values (2011).

He also added that:

The failure, for instance, of some to confront the horrors of forced marriage, the practice where some young girls are bullied and sometimes taken abroad to marry someone when they don't want to, is a case in point. This hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and something to believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology. Now for sure, they don't turn into terrorists overnight, but what we see – and what we see in so many European countries – is a process of radicalisation (Ibid).

4. Causes of Unequal Levels of Cohabitation

Despite their shared socio-economic background, members of Indian and Pakistani groups have followed sharply differing trajectories of adaptation and upward mobility as the years have passed. Different reasons were set out that explained why these ethnic differences are among these two groups. One form of the explanation lies in some specific characteristics that can be considered specific to particular groups and which could increase or decrease their rates of discrimination and deprivation.

Speaking good English plays a significant role in the emergence of any group. Being in a country where English is the main and first language requires that each person in order to achieve success in whatever field has to master English. Unfortunately, for some groups, they were not good enough, for instance Pakistanis. Moreover, the diaspora of both Indian and

Pakistani groups is considered to be the watershed in their level of integration. Education, likewise, is another important feature. Educational qualification is the key component to occupy high positions. This plays a decisive role in promoting the social level. Even the social and cultural constructions of each group can be considered as an impediment in the group's path to integration. Furthermore, the political discourse as well has a major part in guiding the general public opinion of the British society. Media as well plays a big part in distorting the Muslims' image. In recent periods, the language used to describe Muslims often connotes violence, thereby leading to a wide negative perception of Islam. However, what actually matters the most is the religious affiliation. Clark and Drinkwater (2015), in a recent study funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, have also made a link between the disadvantage of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in the UK and their religion.

4.1.English Fluency

The English language provides a major economic contribution to the UK's prosperity. Research shows how a good command of English can contribute to national growth and competitiveness. In 2012, according to a survey conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit, almost 70 percent of executives stipulated mastering English for their workforce in order to realise corporate expansion plans, and a quarter said that more than 50 percent of their total workforce will need English ability (Demos, 2015).

Being a fluent English speaker is one of the most essential factors for successful integration into British society and for taking part in the broader social and cultural life of the country. English fluency is basically related to educational achievement. A study of the coefficient of English as a mother tongue on English test scores at Key Stage 1 and at Key Stage 4, reveals that at Key Stage 1, English test scores of pupils whose mother tongue is English are 35.9% of a standard deviation higher than those of pupils whose mother tongue is not English, compared to only 5.6% of a standard deviation at Key Stage 4. Consequently, English language fluency not only helps to explain differences in the level but also in the evolution of attainment gaps between White British and ethnic minority pupils (Ibid).

Besides, lack of English fluency is shown to have a highly significant impact on the earnings of ethnic minorities in Britain (Lindley, J.: 2003). According to Chiswick's work, language fluency has a serious impact on economic outcomes (Chiswick: 1978, p. 897).

Almost all (95 percent) of the people who NatCen surveyed for Being British Today (2014) expressed the view that to be 'truly British' you must be able to speak English. According to the 2011 census just over 92 per cent of the population of England and Wales (49.8 million) had English as their main language (Stokes, Peter: 2013).

There were 4.2 million people, or 7.7 percent, who did not have English as their first language; 3.3 million people, or 6 per cent, who had English as a second language could speak it well or very well. And 863,150 people or 2 percent could not speak English well or at all. This suggests that more than one-third of the ethnic minority population do not have English as their first language. Though English fluency is almost complete among second and third generation migrants, the first generation tend to suffer more from low level of English fluency (Ibid).

In 2011 around 9 percent of school children (1.1 million of a UK total of 9.9 million) came from homes where English was not the first language, though in many cases the children were semi-bilingual when they started school. The level of English competency among actual immigrants is reasonably high although some groups fare better than others: for instance, 82 percent of Indian immigrants spoke English well compared with 64 per cent of Pakistani immigrants (Demos, 2015).

According to a research carried out for the Department for Work and Pensions, people of Pakistani heritage have the lowest level of English language proficiency of all the major minority ethnic groups (Tackey, N.D. : 2006, p. 2). Furthermore, the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in 1997 found that only 28 per cent of Pakistani women aged 45-64 years spoke English fluently or well. Fluency in English, Tackey et al (2006) argued, increases people's likelihood of being employed by up to 25 percent. Moreover, it put forward the view that poor English impacts negatively upon the views of prospective employers.

4.2. South Asian migrant Diasporas

Both Indian and Pakistani migrant flows headed to Britain in search for better living conditions. However, they have not experienced the same path. A large number of migrants who came from India were from the most developed regions of Jullundur and Hoshiarpur. They mainly consisted of students studying in British universities, and highly skilled

academics, intellectuals and medical professionals. Nevertheless, though there were some skilled and highly educated individuals from Pakistani origins, a major stream of arrivals of Pakistani migrants were composed of peasant farmers and unskilled workers. For instance, the Mirpuri arrivals were originated from smallholder peasant farms, and were on the whole less educated and skilled than Indian migrants. They also had less experience of urban living. Thus, many settled in northern towns, working in the ailing wool and cotton mills of Yorkshire and Lancashire (Ember, Ember, and Skoggard: 2004, p. 456).

Furthermore, a large number of Pakistani migrants concentrated in inner city areas which had difficult access to good schools, and limited chances of employment. The Indian groups, differently, had a more southern and Midland distribution and were concentrated in more favourable areas for education, as well as employment (Ibid).

Pakistani Muslims in the U.K. are mainly centered in cluster areas, mostly Birmingham and Bradford.¹ Most of these areas are facing high rates of deprivation due to poor education, a lack of labour market skills, as well as some discrimination in the job market. *"Among young people aged 16–24, Muslims shared the highest figure for unemployment with those in the category of 'any other religion'"* (Hussain, Serena: 2007, p. 28) (three times greater than the national average). According to the 2001 Census, Muslims demonstrate the highest levels of economic inactivity when compared with all other groups. This led to substantial levels of deprivation among the Muslim community, who experiences higher rates of poverty than the average for the population (Ibid).

In addition, to high unemployment rates, the extremist economic marginalisation of Pakistani diaspora resulted in hard living conditions. The contrast between the Pakistani and other groups is apparent. Pakistanis were drawn to the Manchester and Leeds/Bradford conurbations in the 1950s and 1960s to prop up the failing textile mills. However, these industries fell to Third World competition and the poorly qualified Pakistani population has remained rooted in areas of high unemployment. The Pakistani communities were establishing themselves within this urban fabric of the city, the textile industry went into a terminal decline. By the late twentieth century, the textile industry in Bradford was almost

¹See table 9

entirely extinguished and the labour force that had been drawn into service was finding itself with high levels of unemployment and underemployment (Schönwälder, Karen: 2007, p. 11).

It is quite clear then that the precise levels of prosperity which settlers enjoyed immediately prior to their arrival had a far-reaching impact on the trajectories of adaptation which they subsequently followed. These stark differences between the two groups are still up today. Whereas The Indian population, with their higher educational levels, are concentrated in the most white-collared parts of Britain. One-third of the Pakistani population live in the North East, North West and Yorkshire regions where high rates of poverty and unemployment are the greatest. Also, residence in deprived northern cities with ailing economies has hindered Pakistani entrepreneurial activities, and a depressed housing market in these regions made it difficult to move.

4.3. Education qualification

As mentioned above, educational qualification, too, plays a crucial part in the progression of ethnic groups. The educational achievement of ethnic minorities is substantially dissimilar to that of White British. *"According to the Vocabulary Naming Assessment, scores of all ethnic minority children are at least 42% of a standard deviation lower than those of White British children; for non-Caribbean Blacks, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani children, the gap is larger than 1 standard deviation"* (Dustmann, Frattini, and Theodoropoulos, p. 8).

There is even a substantial heterogeneity across ethnic groups: while the achievement gap is at least 30% of a standard deviation for Black Caribbean, other Black (Pattern Construction Assessment), Pakistani and Bangladeshi children (Pattern Construction and Picture Similarity Assessment), it is insignificant or even positive for Indians, Chinese, and other ethnic minority children. The two ethnic groups with the lowest share of children for whom English is the mother tongue, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani, experience the lowest scores. Thus, some findings argue that these differences may be partly related to English language ability (Ibid).

Moreover, the quality of school attended plays a significant part concerning visible minorities' integration and life chances. For historical reasons, the education system has

tended to increase rather than remove race-based differences in educational outcomes. This is mainly because entrance to good schools is possible by living within a particular catchment area¹ or by paying an extremely high tuition fees. Those with the most noticeably bad school results – Pakistanis and Bangladeshis – have a tendency to live in areas with the worst schools. Although causality is difficult to establish, there can be little doubt that their fairly dreadful school results cannot be separated from the quality of inner city schools (Haider, Murtaza, 2015).

4.4.Social and cultural constructions

Moreover, the social and cultural constructions of any group play a major part in the process of integration among ethnic groups. Pakistanis, particularly, in Britain are often seen as deeply resistant to assimilation. Apart from theories about the alleged impact of 'Islamic fundamentalism', the most usual way of explaining these tendencies is to point out what Anwar has graphically identified as a *myth of return*. The expectation that the central purpose of migration was not to achieve permanent settlement in Britain, but to accumulate sufficient wealth to make possible an eventual return to Pakistan (Anwar, Muhammed : 1979, p. 74).

In that context, retention of social and economic links with their home villages, as well as repeated return visits, could all be seen as part of a longer-term strategy to resist all changes which might impede their eventual return (Dahya, Badr: 1976, p. 32). It follows that if Pakistani settlers' commitment to the myth were ever to weaken, then the religious and cultural values whereby they organized their lives would become much more open to Western influence.

Muhammad Anwar insisted on how important kinship links among Pakistanis are. In the 1990s and though the myth ceased from being that much influential, however the impact was still great. There is currently a widespread concern that Pakistanis are not following the stereotypical immigrant path of economic and cultural assimilation into mainstream society. There is a very widespread popular belief that Muslims are different. Many also believe

¹ In 2003, estate agents estimated that access to a good state school added EUR 69,000 to the price of a house. For particular schools, the figure can be closer to EUR 220,000, or double the price of an average UK house.

that the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims are growing over time as ideas of radical Islam have a growing influence¹ (Hamashita, Manami: 2007, p. 77).

Another significant and related issue is the role of women in each community. The divergence between the social of the Indian and Pakistani communities in the UK plays a massive role in Indian and Pakistani women's ability of integration. Isma, a Pakistani girl explains how, due to certain restrictions imposed by her parents, she would often be seen as 'different: "*People knew I was different not only because of my skin colour but also because of what I could and couldn't do.*" She carries:

Other girls would go on sleepovers but I wasn't allowed, unless it was a close family friend or relative. Although these things seem minor at first, they were still restrictions which meant that there were certain things that I, as a Pakistani, couldn't do, whereas other English people could do. (Syed, Arub, 2016)

Furthermore, the Muslim impact is manifested strongly through *Purdah*², the seclusion of women and their absence from economic activity. Muslim women in the UK are less likely to become economically active due to religion and cultural values and norms (Holdsworth: 1997, p. 435). Only 29 percent of Pakistani women aged 25 and over are economically active. Pakistani women are less likely to have qualifications than women belonging to other ethnic groups due to earlier marriage, family formation, and cultural practices (Dale, A.: 2002).

However, Indian women are much better integrated into the labour market. For instance, in England and Wales, of 352,769 British Indian women of working age 222,087 are economically active. Thus, having much higher average economic activity rates than Pakistani.³ Furthermore, British Indian women compare well with their White peers with 70 percent of British Indian women work, which is close to the national average (Kirkup, James : 2015).

¹Just to give an example, the Daily Telegraph of January 20, 2006 contained an article with the statement "the findings depict a Muslim community becoming more radical and feeling more alienated from mainstream society". Lurid tales of forced marriage, honour killings and hate-filled religious literature within these communities spilling out into rioting (in 1989, 2001 and 2005) and recent terrorist plots lead to a less than.

²Purdah is a religious and social practice of female seclusion prevalent among some Muslim communities in South Asia. A woman who practices purdah can be referred to as pardanashin or purdahnishan.

³ See Table 10

The low economic activity rates of Pakistani women are often taken as evidence of cultural or religious attitudes to women working. Marriage in itself was much more likely to reduce economic activity for Pakistani women. Having children reduced economic activity of women across the board; but there were still differences between ethnic groups, with Pakistani women least likely to combine motherhood with paid work (Ibid).

It is quite true that unlike their mother's generation, who were largely restricted to the home, most young Pakistani women have the expectation of working and developing their professional careers. They are becoming more visible in all walks of life: corporate, media, political and community based. However, Pakistani women stress that they still have to reconcile these aspirations and goals within the framework of a patriarchal culture and that there is still a long way to go before women gain parity and equal status within the community (The Change Institute, 2009).

4.5. Political discourse

The antagonistic political discourse against the Muslim community has exceedingly contributed to the growth of different discrimination acts towards Muslims. The use of hate speech opens the door for manifestation of hatred towards Islam and Muslims in different ways including verbal and physical attacks and leads to increased discrimination and isolation in the society. These negative and violent contexts led to a violent reaction and made these attacks against Muslims look a normal and natural behaviour. Although the political discourse in the United Kingdom has generally maintained a tolerant tone, political elites and political parties, especially the right wing ones, used the anti Muslim post 9/11¹ atmosphere in order to achieve their own goals and score political points.

The British National Party was among the first political entities to embrace Islamophobia. Following the attacks, BNP² continuously propagated hatred and encouraged abuse and insult of British Muslims. One of their political goals was to present the danger of Islam to the British public. In order to achieve this goal BNP created a leaflet entitled "*The*

¹The September 11 attacks (also referred to as 9/11) were a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist group Al-Qaeda on the United States on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001. The attacks consisted of suicide attacks used to target symbolic U.S. landmarks.

²The British National Party (BNP) is a far-right British nationalist political party. It was formed by John Tyndall in 1982 from the merging of several political parties. The BNP also advocates the reintroduction of capital punishment and opposes same-sex marriage, multiculturalism and what it calls the Islamification of the UK.

truth about I.S.L.A.M." (Using 'I.S.L.A.M.' as an acronym for "Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson and Molestation of women"). The leaflet was widely distributed in the UK. In the leaflet BNP states:

Among the native British majority, no one dares to tell the truth about Islam and the way it threatens our democracy, traditional freedoms and identity - except for the British National Party. So angry are the old parties about our willingness to stand up and tell the truth that they are about to rush new repressive 'laws' through Parliament to make exposing the evils of Islam an imprisonable offense. The facts you are reading in this leaflet will soon be 'illegal' - so read on while you can. (2014)

BNP concludes its anti Muslim pamphlet as following:

It's a war in which the weapons of the enemy are immigration, high birthrates, and the old political parties. A war in which the only response that can do any good is to organize a new political party - one which will stop immigration and ensure that the British remain the majority and take back control of our own country - the British National Party! Join our Crusade. (Ibid)

Over the last few years, it seems to be increasing in popularity. The majority of British Muslims say they have witnessed discrimination against followers of the Islamic faith and that a climate of hate is being driven by politicians and media. According to the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC)¹ study (2007), More than two-thirds of Muslims said that they had heard anti-Islamic comments by politicians, and half thought politicians condoned Islamophobic acts (Dodd, Vikram: 2015).

¹The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) is a non-profit organisation based in London. Its stated mission is to "work with different organisations from Muslim and non-Muslim backgrounds, to campaign for justice for all peoples regardless of their racial, confessional or political background."

Nearly nine out of 10 thought discrimination was driven by the way Muslims are portrayed in media coverage. More than half said they had been *"overlooked, ignored or denied service in a shop, restaurant or public office or transport"* while three-quarters said they had been stared at by strangers. The IHRC report links rising prejudice to politicians and the media and says: *"Just over half believe that politicians condone discriminatory acts against Muslims. This perception indicates that the level of political discourse is seen to be poisonous and one of attribution of blame to Muslims"* (Ibid).

4.6. Media

Media, as well, played a huge role in developing negative attitudes and intolerance against the Muslim community. The majority of Muslims in Britain believe that *"part of their continued existence as an unaccepted and often despised minority is based on the presence of the 'evil demon'- the media"* (Abbas, Tahir: 2005, p. 12). The way in which the language, terminology, and ideas published in many British newspapers, portrayed Muslims in a negative way, influenced greatly the public opinion. As Cristopher Allen in his book 'Islamophobia' noted:

The role and impact of the media is one that is contentious and debatable...to try and explain the media's role therefore remains difficult. None of the reports suggested that the media directly caused or, indeed, were responsible for any reported or identified act of aggression or significant change in attitude. However, this is not to dismiss their impact in any way, and despite there being no direct evidence to suggest otherwise, the media continue to play a major role in the formulation and establishment of popular perceptions in the public sphere (Allen, C.: 2010, p. 12).

Differences and stereotypes were highlighted, violent Muslim behavior made headlines. The media tend to focus more on certain totemic issues, e.g. forced marriages, female circumcision and the veil, reinforcing a view of Islam as monolithic and authoritarian. Thus, the Media portrayal of Muslims had a crucial impact on the

way British society sees and understands Muslims in post 9/11 United Kingdom. Therefore, in order to understand post 9/11 anti-Muslim sentiment in British society, it is essential to consider the role of media in this period. Press attention that Muslims and Islam received after 9/11 is best portrayed by former Guardian editor Brian Whitaker¹ in his publication "Islam and the British press".²

Whitaker did his research by focusing on the online version of most prominent British newspapers, that incorporated word 'Muslim'. The first part of his research covered the period from January to the 9th September 2001. The second part of his research covered the articles published from June 2001 to June 2002. The results were dramatically different and numbers increased significantly. *"The disseminative audience of the British press was therefore much wider immediately following 9/11 than on what might be termed a 'normal' day prior to it"* (Allen, Chris: 2012, p. 6).

4.7. Religious affiliation

Religion in general, and Islam in particular, has become a significant dimension in the discourse on minorities and social analysis, mainly due to a considerable growth of the Muslim population in Britain coupled with different terrorist events attributed to Islam. According to the 1994 Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM), all ethnic groups under study confirmed that the most prejudice is directed at Asians and/or Muslims (Modood, T et al: 1997, p. 52).

Muslims in the UK are disproportionately represented in the most deprived urban communities. One third of the Muslim population live in the 10 per cent most deprived neighbourhoods. Behind a large Christian majority, and excluding the non-religious, the census reveals that Muslims are the second largest religious group, and are also the fastest growing (The Change Institute, 2009).

¹Brian Whitaker has been a journalist for the British newspaper *The Guardian* since 1987 and was its Middle East editor from 2000 to 2007. He studied Arabic studies at the University of Westminster and Latin at the University of Birmingham. He is currently an editor on the paper's "Comment is free."

² See Table 11

There are now more than 2.7million Muslims in England and Wales, an increase of over one million since 2001. British Muslims now comprise at least 4.8% of the population in England and Wales, which is up from 3% in 2001. Unsurprisingly, these statistics have been met with alarm on the right-wing. Commentators such as Douglas Murray point to the growing Muslim population as indicative of Britain's "troubling future" (Ibid).

Prior to the publication of *The Satanic Verses*¹, written by an eminent diasporic Pakistani author living in London named Salman Rushdie², Muslims in Britain were perceived as a law-abiding minority. However, the global crisis, that came to be known as the Rushdie affair, following the burning of this book in Bradford, and the death sentence *fatwa*³ declared by Ayatollah Khomeini⁴ brought the Muslim community in Britain, and in the Western world in general, into the public eye (The Guardian, 2009).

Furthermore, the terrible events of 11 September 2001, and then the 7 July 2005⁵ bombings, the relationship between the wider society and British Muslims became much more troublesome. Muslims began to experience unfair treatment in different arenas, whether in education, in the labour market, or even health sector. Around 44 percent said this treatment was on the grounds of their religion affiliation. Indeed, it is on this basis that Modood⁶ has strongly argued that the essential reason for British Muslims' much more severe condition of relative deprivation, as opposed to their Hindu

¹*The Satanic Verses* is Salman Rushdie's fourth novel, first published in 1988 and inspired in part by the life of Muhammad. In the United Kingdom, *The Satanic Verses* received positive reviews, was a 1988 Booker Prize finalist and won the 1988 Whitbread Award for novel of the year. However, major controversy ensued as some Muslims accused it of blasphemy and mocking their faith.

² Ahmad Salman Rushdie (born 19 June 1947) is a British Indian novelist and essayist. His second novel, *Midnight's Children* (1981) won the Booker Prize in 1981. Much of his fiction is set on the Indian subcontinent. He combines magical realism with historical fiction; his work is concerned with the many connections, disruptions, and migrations between Eastern and Western civilizations.

³A legal document issued by a Muslim cleric.

⁴Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mūsavi Khomeini (24 September 1902 – 3 June 1989), known in the Western world as Ayatollah Khomeini, was an Iranian Shia Muslim religious leader, revolutionary, politician, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution which saw the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. Following the revolution, Khomeini became the country's Supreme Leader,

⁵The 7 July 2005 London bombings, often referred to as 7/7, were a series of coordinated terrorist suicide bomb attacks in central London which targeted civilians using the public transport system during the morning rush hour.

⁶Tariq Modood (born 1952) is a British Pakistani Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at the University of Bristol (1997). Modood is the founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship and one of the leading authorities on ethnic minorities in Britain. He was awarded an MBE for services to social sciences and ethnic relations in the 2001 New Year Honours list and elected to the Academy of Social Sciences in 2004.

and Sikh counterparts, is the outcome result of their exposure to a virulently Islamophobic form of cultural racism (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2005).

Depending on the religion dimension, previous studies conducted on the economic activity of the South-Asian population in Britain have found stark differences between the three main religious groups: Muslims; Hindu; and Sikh (Brown, M. S. : 2000). For instance, in her study on migration and social mobility, Platt¹ (2005) has identified religion as an important factor in determining the probability of a professional/managerial class outcome. According to this study, being a Christian, or a Hindu increased the likelihood for a professional/managerial class outcome, other things being constant, while being Muslim decreased the likelihood for such a destination.

Moreover, Platt argued that in addition to the ethnic ranking that places Indians ahead of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, there is a religious ranking within the Indian population setting Hindus at the top and Muslims at the bottom (Brown, M. S. : 2000). 'Ethnic penalty' is then not experienced evenly by all the non-white groups. As mentioned above, there is substantial proof that the penalty devolving to the Muslim groups is higher. According to Modood (2005), the extra level of penalty facing Muslims in the British labour market is mainly related to 'cultural racism'. A recent study has shown that skin colour and culture (religion) are the main mechanisms through which ethnicity operates to reinforce disadvantage among some groups, such as Muslims (Modood, T. : 2005).

¹ Lucinda Platt is Professor of Social Policy and Sociology in the Department of Social Policy at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research interests focus on immigration, ethnicity, poverty and inequality.

5. Conclusion:

The aim of this chapter was to examine the reasons which drove Indians and Pakistanis to emigrate to the U.K. when the British Raj ended. As might be seen from evidence available above, after independence, a large number of Indians and Pakistanis emigrated to the U.K. in search for labour and better living conditions. However, While Indian immigrants bent upon becoming successful settlers, Pakistanis failed.

When comparing Indians and Pakistanis in Britain, it is obvious that they experience widely different levels of integration. The first thing to note is that Indians are more integrated socially than Pakistanis. Whether in education, labour market, or politics Indians proved themselves as strong competitors even to their white peers. However, Pakistanis' rates have always been poor.

Many factors have contributed in such great diversity between these two ethnic groups including English fluency, which is much high for Indians than Pakistanis. There is additionally the history of migration. The early Pakistanis coming to the UK tended to have lower levels of education than Indian migrants, who were mainly highly skilled academics. Furthermore, there is the matter of social and cultural constructions which are mainly related to the role of women in each of these two communities. Due to the seclusion of women in the Pakistani society, Pakistani women by and large do not work, while Indian women are much better integrated into the labour market. Moreover, negative stereotypes presented in the media and antagonistic political discourse have led to a common negative perception of Islam and Muslims.

However, what tends to be the most influential reason is religious affiliations. Being the largest Muslim population in Britain, have made Pakistanis among the most segregated groups in Britain. Due to a number of terroristic attacks a high level of anger about Islam, and Muslims in general, which led to the discrimination of Muslims from the British society.

Islam and Muslims in Britain

1. Introduction

Processes of globalisation and migration have resulted in a considerable Muslim presence in the UK. According to sources, the Muslim presence in Britain is not a recent one. It actually dates back to hundred of years. The biggest influx, however, occurred during the 1950s and was mainly composed of South Asian settlers.

Though negative perception towards Islam has always been the case, however, Muslims during this period were at most marginalised and neglected. Nevertheless, after a series of terrorist attacks an exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility toward Islam and Muslims started to expand in Britain, and the Western world in general. Since the Rushdie affair, the 9/11 attacks, the social, economic and political positions of British Muslims have been exposed to different kinds of discrimination. Following these terrorist attacks the majority non-Muslim population became increasingly hostile towards Muslims. However, the 7/7 London bombings is the most influential event.

On 7 July 2005, four bombs were detonated in the centre of London, in the morning rush hour. Three exploded in Underground stations and the fourth on a bus. In the immediate aftermath of the bombing attacks, this diversity became a target for some individuals who misused the religious background of the bombers as an excuse for racist attacks and abuses against members of minority communities, British Muslims in particular.

2. The roots of Islam in Britain

According to the 2011 Census, Islam is considered to be the second largest religion within the United Kingdom; with 2,706,066 Muslim population¹ (4.5% of the total population). The large majority of Muslims in the United Kingdom live in England: 2,660,116 (5.02% of the population). Since the founding of Islam, Muslim communities have developed and flourished across the world. Despite the common assumption, the Muslim presence in Britain is definitely not a recent one. A small Muslim settlement in Britain stretching back hundreds years ago undermined the conception that Muslims are foreign newcomers to British society (Wikipedia, 2014).

It is claimed that the first Muslims to land on English shores were predominantly from North Africa and Turkey. Among the first recorded Muslim visitors was a famous intellectual named Al Idrisi, a North African Arab patronised by Sicilian kings, who toured the West of England in the early 1100s. In addition, a merchant named Ahmet Efendi, accompanied by a certain Niqula, were believed to be among the first Turks to arrive in England. Sake Deen Mohammed, who came with Captain Baker, exemplified another Muslim earlier permanent settlement in England. There are also references to Islamic scholars in the prologue to Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* (1386) (BBC, 2009).

Despite these settlements, Muslim presence in Britain remained to a large extent limited. However, the establishment of the East India Company by Queen Victoria I was an important conduit of the immigration of Muslims to the British Isles. As the Company grew bigger, the demand for manpower increased steadily for its trading vessels. Indian sailors, including Indian Muslims, were among the first to respond to this demand. Many of these sailors settled in Britain, usually in London (Ibid).

Due to the small number of these Muslim seafarers, however, they were marginalised and neglected historically as well as physically. Nevertheless, the number of Islam migrants started to develop through time. During the first quarter of the 20th century it was estimated that there were around 10,000 Muslims in Britain. The largest group of British Muslims, South Asians predominantly of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin, had grown from 640,000 in 1991 to around 1 million, an increase of 36 per cent. The total number of Muslims in Britain is

¹"2011 Census: KS209EW Religion, local authorities in England and Wales." Office for National Statistics.

probably about 2 million, about 2% to 4% of the population, and over half of them were born in Britain (Gilliat-Ray, Sophie : 2010, p. 24).

After the Crusades against Islam, Britain became friendly with some Islamic countries. With the rise of the Ottoman Empire there began more formal links. In 1588 Elizabeth I offered a treaty to ally with Ottoman Sultan Murad III against Catholic Spain. Due to Queen Elizabeth's good attitude towards Islam, Muslim traders were given protection in England, and in return, English traders were given free passage in Muslim territories. During this earlier period, there were even some Englishmen who converted to Islam, among the first ones was John Nelson (BBC, 2009). A few years later, in 1649, came the first English version of the Qur'an, by Alexander Ross. During the 18th and 19th centuries, conversion to Islam started to occur amongst the English upper classes, including Edward Montagu, son of the ambassador to Turkey (Ibid).

The first large group of Muslims in Britain arrived during the eighteenth century, when Britain witnessed an enormous economic and military development. They were sailors recruited in India to work for the East India Company, and so it's not surprising that the first Muslim communities were found in port towns. The British dominance spread all over the world, including Muslim states. This included Egypt and many other regions of the Middle East. The next wave of Muslim immigration to Britain followed the opening of the Suez Canal (Iqbal, Jawad, 2016).

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 marked the beginning of significant Muslim immigration. The increase in trade caused a demand for men to work in ports and on ships. This resulted in an extended number of Muslim settlements in Britain, mainly in search for labour market. During the nineteenth century, an extended number of sailors and traders from the Ottoman Empire travelled to Britain, and some of them decided to stay there. For instance, according to the 1881 census, there was 8 Egyptians and 44 Turks resident in Merseyside. Additionally, during the late 1880s, a few passing Muslim population was to be found in the ports and urban centres of Britain (Ibid).

Some sailors started to put down semi-permanent or permanent roots, frequently resulting from relationships that had grown up between them and local women. Women who married the seamen would very often convert to Islam and take a Muslim surname, to be

passed on to their children as the families became members of the dockside working class population. Prayer rooms and eventually mosques with koranic schools were established in both Cardiff and South Shields (Ibid).

Moreover, there were even Arab sailors, from the Ottoman navy, and large numbers of lascars, or sailors, from different parts of the Indian subcontinent who worked on British vessels and participated in wars. Then, by the mid nineteenth century, due to its large impact on global politics and trade, Britain became among the most attractive destinations for scholars, intellectuals, and travellers across the world. Thus, a large demand for teachers of Eastern languages and culture emerged in Britain (Ansari: 2003, p. 2).

Muslims increasingly travelled to Britain to impart, as well as to obtain education. From the 1840s, a considerable flux of Indian students headed to British universities. From only four students in 1845, the number had increased to 700 by 1900, including the Indian politician, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the 'founding father' of Pakistan. Evidently, many of these students did not return to their homelands and preferred to settle down in Britain (Ibid, 3).

The first relatively permanent Muslim migration to the U.K., however, occurred after the Second World War. Since the Second World War, Muslims have migrated to Britain in relatively much larger numbers, with the majority coming from South Asia (primarily Pakistan and Bangladesh). Muslims in Britain started to attract attention after the 2nd World War when masses of immigrants from various countries of Commonwealth were looking for job opportunities in the United Kingdom. Thus the migration happened mainly for economic reasons, initially as part of the post-war reconstruction of Britain (Ibid).

During this period, huge changes in economic and social sector occurred in the United Kingdom. Given the economic rise of Britain, most indigenous workers hold a highly qualified position and due to this fact there was an entire lack of unskilled workers to do manual or shift work. Furthermore, the situation in the South Asian subcontinent, from where most Muslims come from, was wretched. High rates of unemployment, poor living conditions, and bad education are some of the so-called 'push' factors which forced Muslims to find better living conditions in Britain (Helanova, Michaela: 2011, p. 34).

Muslim migrants were attracted by the opportunities for the financial gain this otherwise undesirable employment offered. The pay in Britain for manual labour was up to 30 times greater than for equivalent jobs in some of the countries of origin. Immigration from Muslim countries remained fairly low throughout the 1950s, more or less corresponding to the demand for labour at that time (Hussain, Choudhury: 2007, p. 28).

In addition, the partition event drove many Indians, as well as Pakistanis, to leave the subcontinent. This devastating event of the Indian partition, contributed in the migration of thousands of refugees fleeing to Britain in search for better living conditions. Many left because they wanted to escape the disruption and community violence that coincided with the division of British India into Pakistan and India; about 2 million people died in communal violence, ostensibly on religious grounds. The brutality following the partition process drove many Pakistani Muslims to leave the Indian subcontinent. Whereas some have chosen to head to the new established Muslim State, Pakistan. Others chose to go and settle in Britain, where increased opportunities for better living conditions and labour were available.

In the early 1960s, however, immigration legislation influenced by growing racial tensions, aimed to halt the inflow of migrants. Thus, in 1961 as news spread of the impending Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962), which curtailed automatic entry to the United Kingdom for Commonwealth citizens, led to an enormous rush to 'beat the ban'. Migrants saw this as a crucial period in which to take the decision to migrate and to bring over their families, wives and children. Also, the building of the Mangla dam in 1960 had left some 250 villages submerged, displacing 100,000 Mirpuris, who took up the opportunity offered by the British Government to assist in rebuilding the UK economy (Ibid, 13).

The large number of those who arrived initially as pioneers were joined by members of their villages, and *biraderi*¹ clans or kin networks, who often helped motivate prospective migrants to take the risks involved. This process is often described as 'chain migration'. As a result, a large number of Muslim communities began to emerge in different areas such as: Greater London, the South East, the West Midlands, West Yorkshire and Lancashire in England; in Scotland, central Clydeside; the ports of South Wales; and in Northern Ireland, the capital, Belfast (Ibid).

¹Biraderi clans, meaning brotherhood, are the extended clan or tribal networks that influence the UK's nearly one million strong Pakistani community.

The steady stream of Muslim migration then continued until the early 1970s when it tapered off as a result of further legislation. Once the Immigration Act of 1970 was in place, the stream of migrants started to decrease, however, this did not mean the end of Muslim settlement in Britain. Despite the virtual halting of primary migration, in addition to some movement back to countries of origin, the reuniting of families and the movement of refugees and asylum-seekers meant that immigration, including that of Muslims, continued to increase in the 1980s and 1990s (Wikipedia, 2014).

The British Muslim community has grown from some twenty thousand in 1950 to around 2 million at present, Muslims are now the largest religious minority in Britain making about 4.8% of the population, with 2,706,066 Muslims of the total population.¹ This statistic shows that Islam is the second-largest religion after Christian (59.3%).² The Muslim population in Britain comes from a large assortment of ethnic backgrounds. About three-quarters of the Muslim population in Britain are originated from an Asian ethnic background, particularly Pakistani (43 percent), Bangladeshi (17 percent), Indian (9 percent) and Other Asian(6 percent) (Sunak, Rajeswaran: 2014, p. 23).

As Muslim settlements solidified in Britain, Muslims progressively engaged in the establishment of institutions that they hoped would enable them to meet their material and spiritual needs. Yemeni and Somali Muslim seamen were the first who set up make shift prayer rooms in their dockyard communities in Cardiff and South Shields in the second half of the nineteenth century. The following Muslim institution was made by an indigenous convert, Abdullah Quilliam, who established the Liverpool Muslim Institute containing a prayer room, an orphanage, a press and a school. Another bold move was the construction of the Shah Jehan Mosque in Woking in 1889, the first purpose built mosque anywhere in Western Europe (Ibid).

As described above, Muslim settlement in Britain occurred periodically, in that different communities arrived in higher concentrations according to the pull-push factors facing them at any given time. This has resulted in communities being formed along ethnic

¹ National Labour Force Survey, 2008.

² See Table 12

lines that have come to be concentrated in different parts of Britain. 76% of the Muslim population live in four regions: London, West Midlands, the North West and Yorkshire, and The Humber. Muslim diasporas in the U.K. tend to live in cluster areas. For instance, in some areas, such as parts of Birmingham and Bradford, up to one-quarter of the population is Muslim (Ali, Sundas: 2015).

Unfortunately, due to poor education, a lack of labour market skills, as well as some discrimination in the job market, most of these areas are in serious decline.¹ This led to substantial levels of deprivation among the Muslim community, who experiences higher rates of poverty than the average for the population. In addition, to high unemployment rates. There are effects on health too, Muslim community is exposed to different diseases like high levels of stress, diabetes, coronary disease, and others (Idib).

In 1991 it was only 1.7 times what it had been in 1981; and between 1991 and 2001 it only grew by 1.6 times the previous population. Based on a projected 2011 population of 2.2 million, the rate of increase between 2001 and 2011 is estimated to be 1.4 times the 2001 figure. In overall numbers, the UK Muslim population is rapidly increasing. (The Telegraph, 2011)

The Muslim population in U.K. has remarkably grown. The Office for National Statistics announced that, in just two decades, the percentage of the British population born abroad has doubled to over 11% (Ibid).

The Muslim community is ethnically diverse with significant numbers of Muslims from every ethnicity category recorded in the census. The largest ethnic category is 'Asian', with 59.6% of the total Muslim population. According to the 2011 Census, Pakistani Muslims make up the largest proportion of the Asian Muslims, and of the total Muslim population as well, 32% of the total Muslim population (Ali, Sundas: 2015, p. 15).

¹See Lindley, J. 2002. "Race or religion? The impact of religion on the employment and earnings of Britain's ethnic communities." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 28(3): 427-42. See also Brown, M.S. 2000. "Religion and economic activity in the South Asian population." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(6):1035-61.

This led to an increased fear among the British. Again, according to (BSA) survey, in 2003, 48 percent of Britons worried that an increase in the Muslim population would weaken Britain's national identity. The rise in the Muslim population, especially because of a high birth rate, means that Muslim "clusters" are getting bigger. There are eight English council areas where Muslims make up more than 20 percent of the population. Tower Hamlets in London tops the list with 34.5 percent. Recently, however, some Muslims start moving out of those clusters into more mixed areas. While Tower Hamlets' Muslim population grew 19 percent over the decade to 2011, that is far slower than the UK growth of 75 percent, or even London's figure of 35 percent (Ibid).

This means that Britain's Muslim population has multiplied 10 times faster than the rest of society over the past decade while the number of Christians in the country has dropped by more than two million during the same period. Demographers expect that trend to continue. A recent study titled "*The Future of the Global Muslim Population*" argues that Britain's Muslim population will double to 5.5 million within the next 20 years. The emergence of such a huge Muslim society in Britain drove many to worry about Britain's future. This resulted in increasing the political pressure on British Prime Minister David Cameron, who delivered a keynote speech on immigration to members of his Conservative Party in Hampshire on April 14 to crack down on widespread abuses of the immigration system (The Guardian, 2011).

According to David Cameron's perspective, immigration is the main reason behind this Muslim demographic explosion. As a result, he addresses the abuse of student visas, by far the biggest route for non-EU immigrants into Britain. He literally declared:

Immigration by students has almost trebled in the past decade. Last year, some 303,000 visas were issued overseas for study in the UK. But this isn't the end of the story. Because a lot of those students bring people with them to this country: husbands, wives, children...we know that some of these student applications are bogus, and in turn their dependents are bogus. Consider this: a sample of 231 visa applications for the dependents of students found that only twenty-five percent of them were genuine dependents. The whole system is out of control and

we're now getting to grips with it. That badly needs to be done. (Cameron, David : 2011).

3. Contemporary Islamophobia -post 9/11 and 7/7 events-

Among the most contentious terms to have emerged in recent years is that of 'Islamophobia'¹. Literally translated as dread or hatred of Islam. A number of events accompanied with several terrorist attacks have brought the Muslim community, mainly of Pakistani origins, especially the youth, under a sharp spotlight and scrutiny, and have led to an exponential increase in Islamophobic rhetoric and agendas, including calls to ban the Quran, close mosques, deport Muslim citizens and forbid immigration from Muslim countries.

For many, Islamophobia is tightly related to the most two terrifying terrorist attacks of the 9/11 and 7/7 events. Of course, there is no doubt about the significance and impact of these events and the way in which they shaped and determined how Islam and Muslims have since been viewed. However, the xenophobia of Islam in Britain, and in the Western world, in general, dates back to the earlier centuries. Since the genesis of Islam in 622, Europe's awareness of Muslims has been overwhelmingly negative. As early as the eighth century, enmity towards Islam and Muslims has been a feature of European societies. Muslims have always been portrayed as barbaric, ignorant, closed-minded semi-citizens, maddened terrorists, or intolerant religious zealots (Esposito, John L.: 2002, p. 56).

As the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) noted in its report on Islamophobia across fifteen European states ensuing the attacks on New York and Washington, *"Much of what occurred post-September 11 drew heavily upon pre-existent manifestations of widespread Islamophobic and xenophobic attitudes"* (Allen, Chris and Nielsen, Jorgen : 2002, p. 16). Furthermore, according to Ziauddin Sardar², a British Pakistani writer, contemporary manifestations of Islamophobia are little more than a re-emergence of historical anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic phenomena (1995). For him, *"Islamophobia and*

¹Islamophobia (or anti-Muslim sentiment) is the prejudice against, hatred, or bigotry towards the religion of Islam or Muslims.

²Ziauddin Sardar (born 31 October 1951) is a London-based scholar, award-winning writer, cultural critic and public intellectual who specialises in Muslim thought, the future of Islam, futures studies and science and cultural relations. *Prospect* magazine has named him as one of Britain's top 100 public intellectuals and *The Independent* newspaper calls him: 'Britain's own Muslim polymath'

prejudice against Muslims, has a long memory and still thrives..." where it *"...resides so deeply in [the Western] historical consciousness"* (Ibid). Thus, Islamophobia is just a new word for an old fear and hatred towards Muslims.

In its turn, the publication of the Runnymede report: *Islamophobia: a challenge for us all* in 1997 has significantly ensured that Islamophobia was afforded public and political recognition. The report was the first source to provide an explicit definition of Islamophobia: *"the shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, as a result, to fear or dislike all or most Muslims"* (Runnymede Trust 1997). The report stated in its opening pages that: *"in the last twenty years...the dislike [of Islam and Muslims] has become more explicit, more extreme and more dangerous"* (Ibid).

There was a big disagreement among authors concerning the first use of the term 'Islamophobia'. It was widely claimed that Islamophobia both as a concept and neologism was first introduced in Britain. The Oxford English Dictionary suggests that the term was first used in print in a 1991 American periodical, *Insight*. However, others believed that it was first used in France by Etienne Dinet and Sliman Ben Ibrahim, when in 1925 they wrote, *"accès de délire islamophobe."*¹

In addition, another theory suggests that Islamophobia as a term was first coined by a Muslim researcher at the Policy Studies Institute ('PSI') in the late 1980s (James, 1997). One final theory suggests that Islamophobia is an entirely new and contemporary phenomenon, related entirely to the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) or in the UK, the events of the 7 July 2005 London tube train bombings (7/7) (Allen, Chris: 2010).

The Muslim presence in Britain has over the past decade become a significant factor in political, social and cultural spheres. In a speech at Bloomberg in London the former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair said that *"whatever our other differences, we should be prepared to reach out and cooperate with the East, and in particular Russia and China to combat*

¹Etienne Dinet and Sliman Ben Ibrahim, *L'Orient vu de l'Occident* (Paris: Piazza Geuthner, 1925). Whilst having not been able to access this text directly, this reference has been substantiated by Professor Jocelyne Cesari of CNRS-Paris and Harvard University via electronic communication (2 October 2005). In addition, this early usage is referenced in a number of French and German based texts and websites including Alain Gresh, *A propos de l'Islamophobie*, 19 February 2004 (3 October 2005). <http://oumma.com/article.php3?id_article=964> and Alain Gresh, *L'utilisation du mot 'Islamophobie'*, 20 February 2004 (3 October 2005) http://toutesegaux.free.fr/article.php3?id_article=21&date=2004-02.

Islamic extremism" (2014). There is much in the racist backlash to the London bombs that has echoes to what happened decades ago in the country.

According to the 2001 Census, 98 percent of Pakistanis in England are Muslims representing the largest Muslim population in the UK. This has led them to be the most segregated groups across the UK and this is fed by public moral panics surrounding the danger of Islamic 'terror' or 'disloyalty', expressed in the speeches of politicians, newspaper columns, and global news reports. During the 1970s and 1980s, Britain was faced with a wave of racist violence. This included racist 'Paki'¹ bashing gangs, often of drunken white youth, for whom 'Paki' meant any Asian. Many people were murdered, including taxi drivers, students and restaurant workers. Hence, Pakistanis in the UK have had to contend since 1988 with a series of global crises, from the Rushdie affair and September 11 to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and these have set them apart from the wider South Asian diaspora in the UK, despite a shared history of migration (Lambert and G. M.: 2010, p. 77).

Despite these negative attitudes and ideas towards Islam, however, since their arrival as one constituency of the mass migration to Britain from the West Indies, India, Pakistan and other Commonwealth countries following the Second World War, Muslim communities were, up until the 1980s at least, largely both politically and socially invisible. Nevertheless, as a number of events started to take place in Britain, and in the whole world as well, hatred and racism towards Islam and Muslims begin to flourish.

The Rushdie Affair in its turn contributed in escalating the level of hatred in Britain against the Muslim community. After the publication of the novel '*The Satanic Verses*', which was an anti-Islamism novel, by Ahmed Salman Rushdie, British Muslims started to protest against the novel. There were even protests outside Britain, mostly in India and Pakistan. Although most protesting Muslims have never read the book, they believe it to be an assault on the collective cultural identity of the whole Umma. *The Satanic Verses* was published in September 1988 and the first street protests, which took place in Britain in December of the same year, did not arouse much interest (Anthony, Andrew, 2009).

¹Paki acquired offensive connotations in the 1960s when used by British tabloids to refer to subjects of former colony states in a derogatory and racist manner.

However, in January 1989, when the novel was publicly burnt in Bradford, the British media started to pay more attention to the issue. In the early days of February 1989, seven people were killed during demonstrations in Pakistan and India, and on the 14th of the same month, the head of state of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, called on Muslims all over the world to execute the author, Salman Rushdie, who was pronounced guilty of blasphemy and of committing libel against the community. An Iranian businessman offered a \$3 million bounty for his head. Khomeini's edict reads:

I inform all zealous Muslims of the world that the author of the book entitled The Satanic Verses – which has been compiled, printed, and published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet, and the Qur'an – and all those involved in its publication who were aware of its content, are sentenced to death. I call on all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, whenever they may be found, so that no one else will dare to insult the Muslim sanctities. God willing, whoever is killed on this path is a martyr. (Pipes, Daniel: 2003, p. 57)

The affair was seen very differently from various perspectives. While many in the western world saw it as a matter of freedom of speech, most Muslims perceived it as an insult and smear campaign against their holy prophet.

In addition to the Rushdie affair, a series of events: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990¹, the second Gulf war in 1991², the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993³, the campaign of violence by the Algerian Islamic Armed Group (IAG) in 1995 and 1996⁴, the

¹The Invasion of Kuwait, also known as the Iraq–Kuwait War, was a major conflict between Ba'athist Iraq and the Emirate of Kuwait, which resulted in the seven-month-long Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and subsequently led to direct military intervention by US-led forces in the Gulf War and the setting alight by Iraq of 600 Kuwaiti oil wells.

²The Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991) was a war waged by coalition forces from 34 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait.

³The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, carried out on February 26, 1993, when a truck bomb was detonated below the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.

⁴The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was one of the two main Islamist insurgent groups that fought the Algerian government and army in the Algerian Civil War.

rise of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in 1996¹, the Luxor massacre of foreign tourists in 1997², the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998³, and the eruption of the second Palestinian *intifada* in 2000⁴ have brought Muslims under a severe scope (Elzain, 2005, p. 134).

During the summer of 2001, violent disturbances took place in the north of England. The activities of the British Nationalist Party (BNP) inflamed antagonism and mutual distrust between Muslim and white communities. In towns such as Oldham and Burnley, Muslim men of South Asian descent clashed with white extremists and police, highlighting the considerable discontent felt among some sections of the local Muslim communities (Ibid, 221).⁵

However, no other single terrorist incident has ever changed UK foreign and domestic policies as dramatically as the el-Qaeda attack on US soil on 11 September 2001. The horrific events of 9/11, a series of airline hijackings and suicide attacks against the United States, have increased British Muslim anxieties. The incident has had a terrible and incomparable impact on the victims, their families, New Yorkers, and Americans. But the effects of the attack have stretched far beyond U.S. borders (Ibid).

Since 9/11 and the subsequent 'global war on terror' Muslims across the world have found themselves under greater scrutiny in the name of security. The attacks had a significant impact on British families, the national psyche, and the country's subsequent response to terrorism. As Murad Qureshi, a borough councillor, declared: *"The climate has changed alarmingly in recent years. When you start seeing ministers such as foreign office minister Dennis MacShane targeting Muslims that is a clear indication of just how stark the situation has become"* (Stone, Richard: 2004, p. 3).

¹The Taliban is an Islamic fundamentalist political movement in Afghanistan currently waging war (jihad) within that country.

²The Luxor massacre was the killing of 62 people, mostly tourists, on 17 November 1997, at Deir el-Bahri, an archaeological site and major tourist attraction across the Nile River from Luxor in Egypt. It is thought to have been instigated by exiled leaders of Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, an Egyptian Islamist organization.

³The 1998 United States embassy bombings were attacks that occurred on 7 August 1998, in which over 200 people were killed in nearly simultaneous truck bomb explosions in two East African cities, one at the United States Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the other at the United States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.

⁴The Second Intifada was the second Palestinian uprising against Israel. It started in September 2000, when Ariel Sharon made a visit to the Temple Mount.

⁵Speaking on BBC television in June 2001, BNP leader, Nick Griffin, stated that troubles in the area were 'not an Asian problem, but a Muslim one'. See Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), "The Oldham Riots: Discrimination, Deprivation and Communal Tension in the United Kingdom."

He continued:

Muslims have become the new political black. But the race relations industry has failed to take that on board. I am very disappointed with the response of the CRE and the Home Office... I went to school in west London with a lot of black lads and I never had the kind of grief that they had from the police. But I am beginning to realise how they felt. (Ibid)

The 9/11 brought with it new concepts to the West: Al-Qaeda¹, Osama bin Laden², the Taliban, terrorism, jihad, and, unfortunately, Islamism. Islam wrongly became synonymous with extremism and terror. Consequently, about 3 million British Muslims in the UK have experienced-victimization and alienation from society as a result of Islamophobia. Muslims in Britain have felt increasingly vulnerable since September 2001. For some, this vulnerability has been accentuated by the many acts of discrimination perpetrated against them as well as the introduction of new legislation to deal with suspected terrorists (Elgamri, Elzain: 2005, p. 136).

Religion, more than race, has become a serious fault-line, *"things had become far worse since 9/11. Religion rather than 'race' or ethnicity was recognised as being a more important marker upon which discrimination was based"* (OSI: 2005, p. 18). Leaders of right-wing nationalist, anti-immigrant political parties, political and media commentators regularly employ hate speech and dangerous invective mainly aimed to conflate Islam and Muslims with terrorism. For instance, the former leader of the UK Independence Party, Lord Pearson, who stated in one video: *"The fact is that Muslims are breeding ten times faster than us... I do not know at what point they reach such a number that we are no longer able to resist the rest of their demands, but if we do not do something now, within the next year or two, we have, in effect, lost"* (Pearson: 2009). In addition to what the Guardian columnist Polly Toynbee who writes *"I am an Islamophobe, and proud of it"* (Toynbee, Polly: 2008).

¹Al-Qaeda is a militant Sunni Islamist global organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and several other Arab volunteers who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. It operates as a network made up of Islamic extremist jihadists.

²Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden (March 10, 1957 – May 2, 2011) was the founder of al-Qaeda, the organization that claimed responsibility for the September 11 attacks on the United States, along with numerous other mass-casualty attacks against civilian and military targets worldwide.

Eventually, this results in the growth of Islamophobia, a widespread suspicion of mainstream Muslims and discrimination towards Muslims based on their religion more than their race, which leads to social discrimination and political alienation, institutionalised harassment, and what is even worse hate crimes and physical attacks. As Professor Ted Cantle, a British national expert on inter-cultural relations, says: *"There is not just simply residential segregation, but there is a separation in education, in social, cultural, faith, in virtually every aspect of their daily lives, and employment too"* (White, Vivian: 2007).

Furthermore, as Jorgen Nielsen noted last year in the European Monitoring Centre on Xenophobia and Racism (EUMC) report entitled Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001:

Images and stereotypes [of Muslims and Islam] are now so deeply embedded and also necessary to media coverage, that Islamophobia is almost a natural process...the role and impact of the media become increasingly worrying, where accuracy and inaccuracy become increasingly blurred and where real Muslims and their stereotypical constructs become indistinguishably one...what is concerning is that if 'Muslim' and 'Islam' continue to be skewed in this value loaded way, then they will become increasingly synonymous with media constructed Islamophobic stereotypes. (Allen, C. and Nielsen, J.: 2002)

Islamophobia, therefore, despite its old existence, has become more voracious and extreme in its manifestations after the post-September 11th upsurge. Whether at the institutional levels of national government that have over and over flopped to close an anomaly in the law that certainly allows hatred against Muslims to be perpetuated in favour of tightening security legislation that predominantly affects Muslims communities only, or at the street level, where Muslim men, women, and children have been exposed to various verbal harrassments and even physical attacks, Islamophobia has become a much normal and acceptable phenomenon in Britain, and the whole Western world.

Immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Britain began adopting some new policy decisions to confront international terrorism. On 14th December 2001, the British parliament adopted the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act¹. The new law extended the powers of the British security services in a broad number of areas related to the war on terrorism, including detentions, investigations, and surveillance, and to the war on non-conventional terrorism. For instance, concerning arrests and according to Section 4 of this Act, the Minister of Interior holds the entire power to order the administrative detention of foreign nationals (that is, not British citizens or residents) suspected of being international terrorists who threaten Britain's national security and who cannot be deported to their countries of origin (Wikipedia, 2016).

Things have gone even worse for Pakistani Muslims, and the Muslim community in general, especially after the July 2005 London bombing attacks. Within hours of the bomb blasts there were signs that retribution had already started, ranging, for instance, from more than 30,000 abusive e-mail messages posted to at least one mainstream Muslim website that caused the server to crash, to a suspicious fire at a mosque in Leeds (as well as the petrol bombing of a Sikh temple in Kent). By Saturday, some 70 incidents had been reported, including the suspicious fires, two possible assaults, verbal abuse and threatening calls (The Guardian, 2005).

Furthermore, Islamophobic discrimination starts to occur mainly everywhere; in the workplace, at schools and universities, in the media, and in politics. According to The European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia's report *Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia*, Muslims *"experience various levels of discrimination and marginalization in employment, education and housing ... In addition, they are vulnerable to manifestations of prejudice and hatred in the form of anything from verbal threats through to physical attacks on people and property"* (EUMC, 2006).

Muslim immigrants are far worse off than any other group, especially in employment, education, and housing opportunities. Unemployment rates among Muslims are almost twice

¹The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was formally introduced into the Parliament of the United Kingdom on 19 November 2001, two months after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September. It received royal assent and came into force on 14 December 2001. Many of its measures are not specifically related to terrorism, and a Parliamentary committee was critical of the swift timetable for such a long bill including non-emergency measures.

as high as those of non-Muslims. It is widely believed by many Muslims that when a person with a Muslim name applies for a job they are likely to be rejected. A huge number of Muslims have been victims of discrimination in the workplace, especially when applying for a new job. In a study conducted by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, "*interviewees report instances of temporary employment agencies receiving requests from companies not to send them Muslim workers*" (EUMC, 2006).

In the light of what has been mentioned above, It is quite reasonable to hypothesise that Muslims would experience a higher 'penalty' in terms of their educational and employment outcomes than other non-Muslim groups. The Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities established that Muslims from Pakistani and Bangladeshi origins were the most disadvantaged ethnic groups in Britain. And the common assumption is that Muslims have brought almost all of their problems on themselves, above all through their refusal to assimilate and play a full role in mainstream society. Nor is that all, it is often claimed that Muslims have behaved differently from other immigrant groups, such as Sikhs or Hindus, by refusing to accept the legitimacy of the British state (Modood, T et al: 1997, p. 57).

In his latest book, *British Muslims and State Policies*, Muhammad Anwar shows that the majority of Pakistani Muslims show lower educational achievement as compared to whites or Indians (2003, p. 18). The collected data in relation to the differential educational achievement among ethnic minorities, first highlighted by the Swan Inquiry, found that Indians were achieving results better than whites, but the Pakistanis were doing even worse than Caribbeans.

In general, all ethnic minority groups experience some degree of discrimination in different fields. However, following a series of events, Pakistani group, whose members are predominantly Muslims (92 percent) (Peach, C. 2006), are found to experience significant ethnic penalties in different arenas, most notably in employment performance measured by rates of economic activity, unemployment, and proportions in semi- or unskilled manual work. As Peach¹ writes: "*Muslims experienced the highest unemployment rates, the highest proportions of long-term unemployed and the lowest occupational profile*" (2006).

¹Guthlac Ceri Klaus Peach is a geographer from Bridgend, Wales. He was an undergraduate (BA 1961), graduate student (DPhil, 1964), and lecturer at Merton College, Oxford before being appointed to a

All these terrorist attacks served as a catalyst for an upsurge in anger and animosity toward Arabs and Muslims living in the United Kingdom. Muslims in Britain are still facing a large scale of the Islamophobic crime. According to Met Police statistics, Hate crimes against Muslims in London have risen by 70% in the past year (Adesina, 2015). In 2015, Islamophobic crimes have extended to be about 816, while it was about 478 during the previous 12 months (Ibid).

According to all what have been cited above, obviously, the ethno-religious background and class are interwoven to the extent that the separation between them is not easy, if not impossible. A fairly consistent body of research evidence shows that, relative to other religious groups in Britain, Muslims report and experience discrimination of a greater frequency and seriousness than other religious groups. In relation to a wide range of social areas, Muslim organisations reported a consistently higher level of unfair treatment than most other religious groups, both in terms of the proportion of respondents indicating that some unfair treatment was experienced, and in terms of the proportion indicating that these experiences were frequent.

Following the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, a series of new acts was passed by the British government. a new Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Bill in November 2001.¹ The law permitted detention of foreign nationals for an unlimited time if it was not considered safe to deport them to their country of origin. It further allowed the freezing and confiscation of funds associated with terrorism and required individuals not to associate with suspected terrorists or proscribed organizations and report any suspicions to the police. A person can be arrested and interrogated in anticipation of violence rather than in response to the action (European Monitoring Centre, 2005).

After the terrorist attacks on the London subway in July 2005, the government passed a modified Prevention of Terrorism Act. This act permitted the arrest of terrorism suspects

lectureship in Geography at St Catherine's College, Oxford in 1965 at the age of 26. He held this post jointly with a lectureship at Keble College, Oxford and a Faculty Lectureship at the University of Oxford.

¹The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was formally introduced into the Parliament of the United Kingdom on 19 November 2001, two months after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September. It received royal assent and came into force on 14 December 2001. Many of its measures are not specifically related to terrorism, and a Parliamentary committee was critical of the swift timetable for such a long bill including non-emergency measures.

having them detained for up to ninety days without any charges, and proposed that those who have been accused of terrorism should be stripped of their citizenship (Ibid).

A study by the Institute of Race Relations reveals that the anti-terrorism statutes have been used mostly against Muslims. A minority of arrests have resulted in convictions. Statistically, of all the cases that were analyzed, one in eight was a Muslim individual arrested for terrorism and turned over to the immigration authorities without any prosecution for the alleged initial offenses (A., Kundnani: 2004).

Another relevant aspect that witnesses the rise of Islamophobia in Western Europe is the significant increase in toughening immigration policies of individual countries since the 9/11. There have been significant changes in France, where the former French president Nicolas Sarkozy¹, called for tightening of immigration policy. The law was passed in May 2006. The changes were mostly directed to the Muslim population. The new immigrants were bound to accept religious caricatures in the papers, women were forbidden to take I.D. Photographs with their head covered and had to accept examination by male doctors.²

Moreover, Muslim immigrants must confront further difficulties including more control over residence permits, visas, and nationalization. The term that politicians use to address the problem is 'cultural distance' in order to justify the rising Islamophobic measures taken by the government. Physical abuse of Muslim population in Western Europe has increased dramatically after the 9/11 attacks. Abuse includes property damage and discrimination against Muslims. In the Netherlands, at least eighty violent events against Muslims followed the 9/11 attacks.

In 2004, the murder of Theo VanGogh³ was followed by a planted bomb at a Muslim school that burned down (BBC: 2004). The Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en France (CCIF) was founded in 2003. Its purpose was to follow and investigate anti-Muslim actions. In the

¹Nicolas Sarkozy (born Nicolas Paul Stéphane Sarközy de Nagy-Bocsa; 28 January 1955) is a French politician who served as the President of France and Co-Prince of Andorra from 16 May 2007 until 15 May 2012.

²The Migration policy Institute. "Immigration and the 2007 French Presidential Elections."

³Theodoor "Theo" van Gogh (1957–2004) was a Dutch film director, film producer, television director, television producer, television presenter, screenwriter, actor, critic and author. Van Gogh worked with the Somali-born writer and politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali to produce the short film *Submission* (2004), which criticized the treatment of women in Islam. On 2 November 2004, Van Gogh was murdered by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim.

span of only one year, the Collective Against Islamophobia in France encountered numerous incidents. Among those were physical attacks on Muslims and vandalizations of mosques and cemeteries.

In the aftermath of July 7, anti-error measures and migration policy have been strictly modified. The Labor government proposed a raft of antiterror measures, most of which were put before Parliament as a new Terrorism Bill in October 2005.¹ The most controversial proposals was an extension on the amount of time that police can detain terrorist suspects without charge and the introduction of a law against the "*glorification of terrorism*". The government basically proposed that the police would have the entire legitimacy to hold terrorist suspects for 90 days, rather than the 14-day period that existing legislation allows. Despite Blair's² very public attempts to defend this measure, members of Parliament (MPs) rejected it (Blair's first parliamentary defeat since coming to power in 1997) but later voted to support a 28-day holding period (Hampshire and Saggar, 2006).

Furthermore, the 7/7 bombings gave an extra impetus to the securitization of migration policy discourse as well as galvanized support for specific control measures that might otherwise have met with greater opposition in the legislature and wider civil society. These measures fall into four broad categories: border controls, asylum restrictions, acquisition and removal citizenship, and deportation orders (Ibid).

The first featured in the government's immediate response to the London attacks was the introduction of a series of severe measures to control borders. The government's five-year strategy for asylum and immigration, *Controlling our Borders: Making migration work for Britain*, which was published in February 2005 as part of the Labor party's preelection campaign, included various measures related to border controls. These measures include extended provisions for immigration officials and subcontractors to search aircraft, ships, and vehicles at ports of entry and powers to enable immigration officers to verify and detain

¹The Terrorism Act 2006 is an Act of the Parliament of the U. Kingdom that received Royal Assent on 30 March 2006, after being introduced on 12 October 2005. It creates new offences related to terrorism, and amends existing ones. The Act was drafted in the aftermath of the 7 July 2005 London bombings, and some of its terms have proven to be highly controversial. The government considered the act a necessary response to an unparalleled terrorist threat.

²Anthony Charles Lynton Blair (born 6 May 1953), originally known as Anthony Blair, but later as Tony Blair, is a British Labour Party politician, who served as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK), from 1997 to 2007. From 1983 to 2007, Blair was the Member of Parliament (MP) for Sedgefield, and from 1994 to 2007, Blair was the Leader of the Labour Party. He now runs a consultancy business and performs charitable work.

passengers' identity documents and demand biometric information; such as finger prints or eye-scan data.

The British prime minister emphasized that the proposals contained in the bill are significantly important and should be strictly followed. He also announced the creation of a list of countries specifically designated for biometric visas. In addition, he reported that the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were compiling an international database of persons whose activities or views pose a threat to Britain's security. *"Anyone on the database,"* Blair insisted, *"will be excluded from entry with any appeal only taking place outside the country"* (2005). The civil rights group Liberty argued that these proposals were disproportionate and would undermine human rights.

In addition, the political asylum measures were highly restricted. It is worthwhile to note that the British public's antipathy toward asylum seekers goes back to the early 1990s, when the country, like many others in Europe, received thousands of applications from people fleeing the Balkans; the British media tends to portray asylum seekers as economic migrants who want to benefit from the country's welfare system. However, since many of the July 21 bombers were claimed to be British citizens who had originally arrived in the UK as asylum seekers, this antipathy has become deeply rooted in the British society (Hampshire and Sagar, 2006).

In August 2005, the prime minister, Tony Blair, stated that *"anyone who has participated in terrorism or who has anything to do with it anywhere will automatically be refused asylum"* (Blair: 2005). The statement claimed to be entirely respected. A new immigration bill would prevent asylum claims by persons deemed to be associated with terrorist activities although there is no evidence that previous asylum recipients had terrorist ties before their arrival (Hampshire and Sagar, 2006).

The next step was related to acquisition and removal of citizenship. The newly introduced immigration bill would tighten the conditions for acquisition of British citizenship while making it easier for the home secretary to deprive someone of their citizenship status under the terms of the 1981 British Nationality Act. Due to this bill, the government's ability to strip someone of citizenship would become easier as the bill would give the home secretary more leeway in making such decisions (Ibid).

Additionally, the bill gave the home secretary a new power which allowed it to withdraw the right of abode in the United Kingdom from any person whose exclusion or removal is considered to be conducive to the public good. As the prime minister has made clear, the intention behind these measures is to prevent the acquisition of citizenship by those *"engaged in extremism"*. Thus, helping the government to strip *"extremists"* of their citizenship (Ibid).

Furthermore, the introduction of new deportation orders was another important move made by the British government towards Muslims communities. Following the three months after the London bombings, 22 people, including the radical cleric Abu Qatada, were detained pending deportation. Since July 2005, the home secretary has widened the criteria under which foreigners can be deported to include a list of *"unacceptable behaviors"* that threaten public order, national security, or the rule of law. These include fomenting, justifying, or glorifying terrorist violence; seeking to provoke terrorist acts; fomenting other serious criminal activity; and fostering hatred that might lead to inter-community violence (Ibid).

In fact, this set of rules, in addition to others, are essentially directed towards Muslim citizens. Muslims became victims, both of the terrorists and of overzealous sections of politics, the media, and the public opinion in general, which accepted the terrorists' definitions of Islam and imposed them blindly on Muslim communities living in the UK. Muslim communities are hugely stigmatised and are threatened by different forms of hate crimes. Unfortunately, due to extensive terrorist attacks, which have been obviously connected to Islam, the war on Islam and Muslims is still growing. Muslims in the West are going through a difficult time wherein their fundamental rights are being violated and eroded in the wake of an upsurge in Islamophobia.

Recently, the Conservative leader, David Cameron, conducted a negative campaign in which he stigmatised Muslim women, particularly Pakistani women. He claimed some 190,000 British Muslim women – or 22% – *"speak little or no English despite many having lived here for decades."* He went on to say *"60% of women of a Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage are economically inactive."* He has been indicted of stigmatising Muslim women after announcing plans to help these women to learn English and warning that migrant spouse who fail language tests may have to depart the UK (Mason, Rowena, and Harriet Sherwood: 2016).

Hostility towards Muslims took different shapes including: verbal and physical attacks on Muslims in public places, attacks on mosques and desecration of Muslim cemeteries, a widespread of negative stereotypes in the media, including the broadsheets, and in the conversations and 'common sense' of non-Muslims – people talk and write about Muslims in ways that would not be acceptable if the reference were to Jewish people, for example, or to black people. Furthermore, *"negative stereotypes and remarks in speeches by political leaders, implying that Muslims in Britain are less committed than others to democracy and the rule of law– for example, the claim that Muslims more than others must choose between 'the British way' and 'the terrorist way'¹"* (Pratt and Woodlock: 2016, p. 23).

The number of anti-Muslim hate crimes has increased, ranging from death threats and murder to persistent low-level assaults, such as spitting and name-calling. In 2005, *The Guardian* commissioned an ICM poll which indicated an increase in anti-Muslim incidents, particularly after the London bombings in July 2005 (The Guardian: 2005). For instance, In July 2005, a Muslim man, Kamal Raza Butt, was beaten to death outside a corner shop in Nottingham by a gang of youths who shouted anti-Islamic abuse at him (Dodd, Vikram: 2005).

4. Anti-Muslim Hate-crimes

Many argue that no such phenomena like: 'anti-Muslim racism', 'intolerance against Muslims', 'anti-Muslim prejudice', 'anti-Muslim bigotry', 'hatred of Muslims', 'anti-Islamism', 'anti-Muslimism', 'Muslimophobia', 'demonisation of Islam', 'demonisation of Muslims' or 'Islamophobia' towards the Muslim community exist. They actually accuse those who insist on such a thing, that they are in fact playing victims and pleading for special treatment. However, there is no escaping the reality. Precisely following the events of the 9th September 2001 in New York, and the London bombings on the 7th July 2005, Muslims across the United Kingdom have been severely exposed to different sorts of discrimination and hostility.

According to a study conducted by Tell Mama (2012)², an organisation that monitors Islamophobic incidents, the number of hate crimes against Muslims in London has risen to

¹ This particular insult was made by Denis MacShane MP, minister of state at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in November 2003. It was compounded by the feebleness of his apology a few days later

² Tell MAMA's (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) parent organisation, undertakes work on inter-faith integration, conflict resolution, and extremism prevention in Britain, Pakistan and the Middle East.

816 Islamophobic attacks in 2015, compared to 418 in 2014. Fiyaz Mughal, a member of the organisation, said that a large number of victims, about 60%, were women wearing the Hijab (2012).

The situation of Muslims is one of the most pressing issues facing British society today. A great extent of negative feelings and attitudes towards Islam and Muslims has hazardously escalated into the British society. Hate crimes on the streets against both persons and property, desecration of Muslim cemeteries, cultural centres, religious buildings, harassment, abuse and rudeness in public places, and unlawful discrimination in employment practices are among the most inflexible forms of racism Muslims have to endure (Travis, Alan: 2015).

Apart from being an abstract intellectual exercise, Islamophobia is a reality today. This is purely depicted through a large number of hate crimes towards Islam and Muslims. According to the British Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) hate crime can be defined as follows: *"Hate crime is any notifiable criminal offence committed against a person or property that is motivated by hostility towards someone based on their disability, race, religion, gender identity or sexual orientation"* (CPS: 2012).

Recent studies attest to the proliferation of this pervasive ideology of hate resulting in attacks on Muslims in the West at different levels of society. For instance, according to a recent report published by the European Muslim Research Centre, titled *Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: UK Case Studies*, offers a disturbing coverage of recent attacks against Muslim individuals, their homes, mosques, and Islamic centres and leaders. Meanwhile, a number of recent publications including *Islamophobia* authored by Birmingham University Research Fellow Chris Allen and *Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century*, edited by Professor John Esposito¹ and Dr Ibrahim Kalin² and a number of others, all emphasize on the harsh reality that many try to deny it, attacks against Islam and Muslims in Western countries are a reality (Allen, Chris: 2012).

¹John Louis Esposito (born May 19, 1940) is an American professor of International Affairs and Islamic Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. He is also the director of the Prince Alwaleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown.

²Ibrahim Kalin is chief policy advisor to Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and is a fellow at Georgetown University's Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding.

Negative perceptions of Islam exist since the first conflicts between the Muslim world and Europe from the Crusades¹ to colonialism. However, the first anti-Muslim prejudice was being identified and where a distinct 'British-Muslim' identity was also emerging was related to a number of incidents which re-empowered hatred and fear against Islam. It was in 1989, following the Rushdie affair, that both the conceptual and physical distance between Islam and the West was removed (Ibid).

Furthermore, following the 9/11 events politicians, public servants, police, think-tanks and journalists generally failed to recognise the extent to which unfair and unrepresentative portrayals of Muslims as terrorist and security threats fuelled Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crimes. As a result, Muslims are now a prime target for serious violence and intimidation. Since then, Islamophobia has become one of the most dangerous prejudices of the modern world next to xenophobia² and anti-Semitism³, with its epicenters in the United States and Western Europe. After these attacks, there has been a significant increase in calculated discrimination, illicit labeling, negative stereotyping and even physical violence toward Muslims (Lambert and G. M.: 2010, p. 99).

Many have linked the fierce hate-crimes against Muslims, and Islam in general, to the mainstream politicians and sections of the media. A study conducted by a former Scotland Yard counter-terrorism officer reported that: *"Attacks ranging from death threats and murder to persistent low-level assaults, such as spitting and name-calling, are in part whipped up by extremists and sections of mainstream society"* (Dodd, Vikram: 2015).

Muslims in Britain, and in the Western world in general, have expressed their concerns about the way Islam is portrayed in the media. They feel that public understanding and view points of their faith and beliefs are negatively affected by such representation. As van Dijk⁴ observes that, *"the beliefs and 'social representation' many members of the dominant (white)*

¹The Crusades were a series of intermittent Papal sanctioned military campaigns beginning in the late 11th-century. They commenced with a call to arms by Pope Urban II who was responding to a request for military support for the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Emperor, Alexios I, needed military reinforcements for the conflict with the westward migrating Turks in Anatolia.

²Xenophobia is the fear of that which is perceived to be foreign or strange.

³Antisemitism is hostility, prejudice or discrimination against Jews.

⁴Teun Adrianus van Dijk (born May 7, 1943, Naaldwijk, the Netherlands), is a scholar in the fields of text linguistics, discourse analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). With Walter Kintsch he contributed to the development of the psychology of text processing. Since the 1980s his work in CDA focused especially on the study of the discursive reproduction of racism by what he calls the 'symbolic elites' (politicians, journalists, scholars, writers), the study of news in the press, and on the theories of ideology, context and knowledge.

in-group have about immigrants and minorities are largely derived from discourse. That is, discourse as a social practice of racism is at the same time the main source of people's racist beliefs" (Cottle, Simon: 2000). Thus, the way people see Islam and Muslims through the media contributes to a large extent in the social discrimination and disadvantage amongst Muslim minorities.

An essential set of research, including the Runnymede Trust (1997 and 2001) and Bunglawala (2002) and many recent publications including Abbas (2000), Poole (2001) and Allen (2002), has illustrated that on the whole the images and discourses relating to Islam/Muslims in mainstream Western media tend to be negative;

The western media are largely seen by Muslims as a negative influence. This view is perhaps not without foundation. The traditional Orientalist stereotypes of Muslims as political anarchists and tyrants at home subjugating their women have been disseminated in the media as caricatures and stereotypes. Very often the news that is shown about Muslims centres around negative stories. (Ahmed, A. F.: 1992, p.9)

Representations of Muslims as the 'enemy within' have augmented bigotry and hostility towards the Muslim community and made Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim hate crimes look like a natural and normal behavior;

The media in Britain continues to reinforce Islamophobic attitudes in the majority community. In addition many Islamic movements, as well as Western Islamophobia, have helped create a perception that Muslims share few civic values with other faiths and traditions in Britain: that they are not sincere in their acceptance of democracy, pluralism and human rights. Government and other mainstream politicians also use a vocabulary that has the potential to generate fear, threats and antipathy towards British Muslims. (Ansari, K. H.: 2002, p. 24)

The assumption that the impact of these negative stereotypes represented in the media was strongly confirmed by the findings of the European Muslim Research Centre's report into Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crimes in London which stated that:

... now prima facie and empirical evidence to demonstrate that assailants of Muslims are invariably motivated by a negative view of Muslims they have acquired from either mainstream or extremist nationalist reports or commentaries in the media... the major motivating factor for violence against Muslims is a negative and false belief that Muslims pose a security or terrorist threat. (M.G., Jonathan, and Robert Lambert: 2010)

Following the 9/11 events, there was a great increase in reports about Islam and Muslims. For instance, figures collected by Whitaker show the extraordinary increase in the number of articles containing the word 'Muslim' before and after September 2001.¹ Many mainstream politicians and media personalities have contributed to a false and negative view of Muslims as terrorists, terrorist sympathisers, and extremists.

Other incidents including the Bali bombings in 2002², the Madrid bombings in 2004³, the London bombings in 2005, the terrorist incident in Glasgow airport in 2007⁴, more recently the Charlie Hebdo Shooting⁵, along with numerous other terrible terroristic attacks mainly attributed to Islamic extremists have served to boost and amplify the adverse impact of 9/11 on Muslim communities in the UK.

¹ See Table 13

²The 2002 Bali bombings on 12 October 2002 in the tourist district of Kuta on the Indonesian island of Bali killed 202 people, further 209 people were injured. Members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a violent Islamist group, were convicted in relation to the bombings, including three individuals who were sentenced to death.

³The 2004 Madrid train bombings (also known in Spain as 11-M) were nearly simultaneous, coordinated bombings against the Cercanías commuter train system of Madrid, Spain, on the morning of 11 March 2004 – three days before Spain's general elections. The explosions killed 192 people and injured around 2,000.^{[1][3]} The official investigation by the Spanish judiciary found that the attacks were directed by an al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cell.

⁴The 2007 Glasgow International Airport attack was a terrorist ramming attack which occurred on Saturday 30 June 2007, when a dark green Jeep Cherokee loaded with propane canisters was driven into the glass doors of the Glasgow International Airport terminal and set ablaze.

⁵On 7 January 2015, two brothers, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, forced their way into the offices of the French satirical weekly newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris. Armed with assault rifles and other weapons, they killed 11 people and injured 11 others in the building.

This anti-Islam phenomenon has dangerously developed, especially when British politicians started to trigger the public attention. Leaders of right-wing nationalist, anti-immigrant political parties, political and media commentators, and hard-line Christian Zionist¹ religious leaders start to employ hate speech against Islam and Muslims in general. The scale of intolerance, discrimination, and violence have been exacerbated in recent years by the reaction to terrorism and extremism in the name of Islam. In June 2008, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg² highlighted the problem of violence against Muslims claiming that:

a mixture of Islamophobia and racism is also directed against immigrant Muslims or their children. This tendency has increased considerably after 9/11 and government responses to such terrorist crimes. Muslims have been physically attacked and mosques vandalised or burnt in a number of countries. In the United Kingdom no less than eleven mosques were attacked after the London terrorist bombings on 7 July 2005 and in France five mosques were attacked with explosives or put alight in 2006. (Hammarberg, Thomas: 2008)

The experience of Muslims as victims of violence, intimidation, and discrimination in the UK, thus, remarkably intensified. An increased number of attacks on U.K. mosques and U.K. Muslims goes hand in hand with the anniversary of the al-Qaeda terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York (Harris, Paul: 2010), and the 7/7 Bombings of London. Thus, much anti-Muslim violence in the U.K. is a response to the 'war on terror' campaign, which George Bush³, the previous U.S. president, and Tony Blair, the former U.K. Prime

¹Christian Zionism is a belief among some Christians that the return of the Jews to the Holy Land, and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, is in accordance with Biblical prophecy. The term began to be used in the mid-20th century, superseding Christian Restorationism.

²Thomas Hammarberg (born 2 January 1942 in Örnköldsvik, Sweden) is a Swedish diplomat and human rights defender. He held the post of Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights in Strasbourg from 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2012.

³George Walker Bush (born July 6, 1946) is an American politician who served as the 43rd President of the United States from 2001 to 2009 and 46th Governor of Texas from 1995 to 2000. Eight months into Bush's first term as president, the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred. Bush responded with what became known as the Bush Doctrine: launching a "War on Terror", an international military campaign which included the war in Afghanistan, in 2001, and the Iraq War, in 2003.

Minister, launched against what they called "*an evil ideology*" (Blair, 2010). Different acts of assault against Muslims and Islam have become a commonplace in many parts of the U.K.

4.1. Hate-crimes against Muslims

Serious anti-Muslim hate crimes, which in many cases cause death and serious, permanent injuries to victims, major suffering to their families and fear and tensions in communities, become a common incident among the British society. For instance, a Ph.D. student named Yasir Abdelmouttalib was seriously injured during an unprovoked gang attack when he was on his way to Friday Jumma prayer at the London Central mosque in Regents Park in June 2004. He was struck repeatedly on the head with a road sweeper's broom which caused him to remain in a coma for three months (M.G., Jonathan, and Robert Lambert: 2010, p. 20).

According to researchers at the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) and researchers and case workers at the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) in London, following the 7/7 incident an alarming increase in violent attacks on Muslims across the UK has been recorded. In the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 London bombings a Pakistani, Kamal Raza Butt, was beaten to death outside a corner shop by a gang of youths who exclaimed anti-Islamic abuse at him: "*Butt, 48, from Pakistan, was visiting Britain to see friends and family. On Saturday afternoon, he went to a shop in Nottingham to buy cigarettes and was first called 'Taliban' by the youths and then set upon*" (Dodd, Vikram: 2005). Both the Forum Against Racism and Islamophobia (FAIR) and the Muslim Safety Forum (MSF) insist that the attack on Butt was actually an Islamophobic act:

Nottinghamshire police described the incident [Butt's murder] as racially aggravated, not as Islamophobic, angering Muslim groups and surprising some senior officers. Nottingham police said it was connected to a backlash against Muslims following the London bombings, which has seen mosques firebombed and Muslims attacked in the street. Superintendent Dave Colbeck, of Nottinghamshire police, said: "It would be inappropriate to comment on the possible motive... It is a localised incident and we are not looking at it as anything rather than an isolated incident. (Dodd, Vikram: 2005)

Describing Butt's murder as "a localised incident" left no room to relate this incident to Islamophobia. When meeting police at New Scotland Yard MSF volunteers expressed their serious concern, as Azad Ali, the forum chairman, said:

You can't class this as racist, there was no racist abuse shouted at him, it was Islamophobic... It is good the police have made arrests. We are disappointed that they have misclassified it, especially after all the advice to be more alert to Islamophobic hate crime. (Dodd, Vikram: 2005)

However, as time passed Islamophobic attacks on Muslim communities did not stop. On Thursday, 5 November 2009, three Muslim students were stabbed in an attack by a multi-ethnic gang in a street near City University in the London Borough of Islington. The main cause of the attack is due to two Muslim prayer rooms, male and female, which are situated in the basement of City University's Gloucester Building in Whiskin Street, a short walk from the main campus building in Northampton Square. The attack caused facial and head injuries for three students after being attacked with bricks and other projectiles (M.G., Jonathan: 2010).

Muslims face hostility, harassment or violence is also dependent on the extent to which a person's Muslim identity is visible. Thus, women who wear a headscarf are more likely to face hostility and discrimination because they are more 'visually' Muslims. Muslim women wearing a headscarf are reported to bear the brunt of Islamophobic attacks with people spitting at them or trying to remove their headscarf (Ibid).

For instance, a violent attack on a Muslim woman while returning home on a bus from a shopping center just because she was wearing a burka.¹ Eventually, this has led many Muslim communities to inhibited behaviours in order to prevent any risk of attack, abuse, or discrimination. Thus, many Muslims who use to wear remarkable Islamic outfits have changed their behaviour. For women, some restrict their public appearance to a minimum, while others, discard their Islamic origins by wearing Western clothes when being in public places. Though it does not seem to be a widespread phenomenon, but in some cases, men

¹Burka or chador- a full length garment covering a woman from head to foot, generally black.

were even forced to shave their beards off to avoid any kind of violence or discrimination (M.G., Jonathan, and Robert Lambert: 2010, p. 21).

The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) in cooperation with the predecessor to the European Union's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), made numerous reports in recent years to analyse the various challenges experienced by Muslim communities in Europe. Among these reports, *Discrimination and Islamophobia against Muslims in the European Union in 2006* (Hate Crime Survey, 2008).

The report showed the disadvantaged position of Muslim minorities in key areas of social life, such as employment, education, and housing. It also documented manifestations of 'Islamophobia' in all E.U. member states, including cases of racist violence and crime. In addition, other reports displayed that many Muslims are living in poor housing conditions, getting worse jobs, and limited opportunities for educational advancement comparing to other citizens (Ibid).

Though official figures suggest a decline in the number of crimes motivated by hatred toward Muslims, the primary concern of Muslim minorities is about their security. Inayat Bunglawala, *the spokesman for the Muslim Council of Britain*, he insisted that an increasing number of incidents of attacks against mosques and Islamic schools are still occurring, and noted that British Muslims generally consider anti-Muslim prejudice to be increasing. Also, Britain's first Muslim minister, Shahid Malik, showed a big concern about what he described as growing hostility to Muslims in the U.K. (Morris, Nigel: 2008).

The most vulnerable to harassment and violence, however, are ordinary people, who are exposed to assault in their shops, schools, or homes, often accompanied by racist and/or anti-Muslim epithets. For instance, On August 23, 2007, in Southampton, a driver purposely tried to hit a 30-year-old woman wearing traditional Islamic dress and a headscarf. According to police, the man drove up to her and verbally abused her. He then left, turned the car around, and drove toward her. Fortunately, the woman escaped unharmed, although badly shaken by the incident (BBC: 2007).

Isma Din, a 23-year-old Muslim woman, is another victim of these terrible islamophobic hate crimes. On May 15, 2007, in Meersbrook, Isma was repeatedly punched in the face and head. The victim, who sustained cuts to her face and a fractured eye socket,

suffered blurred and double vision and required surgery. She believed the main reason behind the attack was the headscarf she was wearing (Dunn, Sarah: 2007).

Negative attitudes towards Muslims, and Islam in general have developed to a larger extent. Prior to the September 11th, anti-Muslim sentiment seems to have worsened. Assaults, arsons, and other violence seem to have been highest immediately after the attacks but have stayed high since.¹ A 2004 survey by the IHRC showed 80% of Muslims saying that they had experienced discrimination because of their faith, up from 45% in 2000 and 35% in 1999. The IHRC attributed these changes both to increased hostility and an increasing awareness of discrimination among Muslims. Muslims were no longer welcomed into the British society:

Muslims' involvement in deviant activities threatens security in the UK, Muslims are a threat to British mainstream values and thus provoke integrative concerns, there are inherent cultural differences between Muslims and the host community which creates tensions in interpersonal relations and Muslims are increasingly making their presence felt in the public sphere. (Poole, Elizabeth: 2010, p. 84)

Due to a number of terroristic acts, which is mainly attributed to Islam, Muslims are considered to be a threat to the Western society. Thus, negative attitude towards Muslims has become wider in Britain, and the Western world in general.

4.2. Hate-crimes against Islam

The attacks were not only directed towards Muslims but towards Islam as a religion. There has been an exponential raise in Islamophobic rhetoric and agendas, including calls to ban the Qur'an, to close mosques, and to prevent any kind of Islamic practices. Mosques, religious buildings, and cemeteries were particular targets of vandalism and arson following several terroristic attacks.

¹There have been problems with attacks on asylum seekers and increasing Islamophobia. Up to a third of Muslims say they or their family members have been victims of hostility. (ENAR United Kingdom Shadow Report, 2003).

Since the 9/11, and then 7/7, events criminal damage, arson, and violence against mosques, Islamic institutions, and Muslim organisations has heightened dramatically. The authors of a University of Exeter report on anti-Muslim hate crime rated that since 9/11, between 40 and 60 percent of British mosques, Islamic centres, and Muslim organizations have been exposed to at least one attack that could have been reported as a hate crime (M.G., Jonathan, and Robert Lambert: 2010). Over 1000 hate crimes; attacks that include petrol bombs thrown into mosques, bricks thrown through mosque windows, pigs heads being fixed to mosque entrance, abusive written messages on mosque walls and vandalism, at over 700 Islamic venues were recorded following the 9/11 events.

Moreover, after the July 2005 bombings in London, bias crimes increased greatly in London. Scotland Yard reported 269 crimes in the three weeks following the attacks while only 40 had been recorded during the same period one year earlier. In March 2006, precisely in Perston, the Jamia Masjid mosque was attacked by gangs of white youths using brick and concrete block. The youths damaged a number of cars outside the mosque and stabbed a 16-year-old Muslim teenager (Wikipedia, 2016). Another incident took place On July 6, 2009 when the Glasgow branch of Islamic Relief was badly damaged by a fire which police said was started deliberately, and which members of the Muslim community of Scotland allege was Islamophobic (BBC: 2009).

On 26 May 2013, in the wake of the murder of the British soldier Lee Rigby, carried out by violent jihadis, the Grimsby Islamic Center was firebombed. Two ex-soldiers, Stuart Harness, and Gavin Humphries, later pled guilty to the attack (Pitt, Bob: 2013), while a third man was found guilty of aiding and abetting them (Grimsby telegraph: 2013).

In the Merseyside area, a British neoNazi named Ian Forman had developed a homemade bomb and had reached various mosques and Islamic centres as potential targets. His conspiracy was revealed when work colleagues found him looking for chemicals and explosives on the web. During a police raid, an explosive was found accompanied with a replica Nazi uniform and plans for a bombing campaign. Moreover, Forman made video clips of himself experimenting with explosives, and made an amateur anti-Islam video. He was active online and frequently expressed his racist ideology to contacts. In early May 2014, Ian Forman was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment (BBC: 2014).

In some incidents, religious texts were also desecrated and destroyed. Violence and threat were not only centered in Britain, but it was spread all over Europe. For instance, on

December 10, 2007, in Lauingen, Germany, an incendiary device was ignited outside a mosque. The fire was quickly extinguished, causing no damage. The following day, a mosque in the town of Lindau was defaced with neo-Nazi graffiti and swastikas (Hate Crime Survey: 2008).

An anti-Islamic tendency developed, and a call to eradicate all kind of Islamic facets has spread across Britain, as well as Europe. The banning of the veil or Niqab is also a reoccurring theme. In 2009, the now frequently updated blog 'Allahu Akbar' claimed Islam to be equivalent with Nazism and came to the following conclusion: *"Islam is not a religion. Our politicians and leaders must realise this. Islam is a 'hardcore' form of Nazism. What is it that our politicians and experts are missing? Allowing the Niqab and the veil are steps backwards, not forward"* (Lagerlof, David, Jonathan Leman, and Alexander Bengtsson: 2011).

Another common form of anti-Muslim hate crimes is Vandalism targeting mosques. A specific form of such a phenomenon is 'pork attacks'. Pork being taboo in Islam, was used to insult Muslims by throwing bacon or other pork meat into mosques. There are several instances of such a behavior:

- In the wake of the brutal murder of British soldier Lee Rigby by two radical Muslims in Woolwich, south London, on May 22, 2013, four British men, Thomas Ashton, Andrew Warner, Steven White, and Travis Crabtree, from Blackpool formulated a plan to exact revenge by tossing the head of a pig into the parking lot of a local mosque (Carter, Claire: 2014).
- On December 3, 2013, before the Madani academy's opening, a Muslim school in Portsmouth, a pig's head was attached to the school gates (Fishwick, Ben: 2016).¹

Another product of the rising radicalism among British public was the spread of anti-Muslim sentiment among other British minorities. Hindus and Sikhs were distancing themselves from Islam in order to protect themselves from anti-Muslim attacks. The British National Party tried to use the situation by publishing another Islamophobic project, supported by Sikh and Hindu organizations. The participation of mentioned organizations meant further validation of BNP's views on Islam (Hate Crime Survey: 2008).

¹See Figure 6

It became evident that every time there's a terrorist attack, particularly in the Western world, there's a backlash against Muslims. In December 2013, the Guardian reported that hate crimes against Muslims had "*soared in the UK*" that year, with the Metropolitan Police (Greater London) alone having recorded 500 anti-Muslim hate crimes. Attacks against Muslims in London have more than tripled since the Paris terrorist atrocity. The Metropolitan police recorded that they had received 24 reports of Islamophobic incidents in the week ending 10 November, three days before the massacre in the French capital. However, the figure rose to 46 in the week ending 17 November, just four days after the attacks (Stormark Kjetil: 2015, p. 13).

There was a further rise of reported attacks in the week ending 24 November when the tally reached 76. A series of high-profile anti-Muslim attacks carried out on public transport. Also, a woman wearing a hijab was pushed into an oncoming train on the London Underground (Gani, Aisha: 2015). A study on Hate crime against Muslims, released in 2015, showed that the figure of incidences reported to police across England and Wales had jumped by nearly a fifth. There were 52,528 such offences in 2014/15 – an increase of 18% compared with the previous year. More than 80% were classed as race hate crimes, with others involved religion, disability, sexual orientation and transgender victims (Gani, Aisha: 2015).

5. Conclusion:

The Muslim community is being victimised on the basis that their culture and essential beliefs are a fundamental threat to the rest of society. This has resulted in a growing sense of inequality, injustice, and prejudice among Muslims in Britain, as well as the rest of the Western world. Many commentators believe will alienate Muslims, perhaps further intensifying the Muslim community's sense of grievance.

This resulted in a great absence of Muslims in public life, including politics and government, senior positions in business and commerce, and in culture and the arts. This led to a wide belief that all or most Muslims are religious fanatics, and have violent tendencies towards non-Muslims. All this fostered a feeling of not belonging in Britain among some Muslims. Thus, Muslims in Britain constantly face the challenge of proving that they do indeed belong to British society.

The 9/11, and 7/7 events These events have raised questions amongst the host society of the ability of Muslims to assimilate peacefully. Local Muslims of South Asian origin experienced the backlash from the 7/7 bombings due to their skin colour and also their Islamic dress. The number of hate-crimes against Muslims, and Islam have escalated dangerously.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Britain's long history as the most successful imperial power across the world ended up with the loss of its most precious colony, India. However, this was not the final cut between the two nations. Following the Indian independence, as well as the partition process, a large number of migrants both from India and the newly Islamic state of Pakistan continued to travel to Britain and many have chosen to settle down there.

The experience of these newcomers was extremely hard. South Asian migrants had to face an uphill struggle of racial and ethnic exclusionism, mainly due to cultural and religious differences. There is a clear cut evidence of inequalities related to race and ethnicity in the British society. A number of recently conducted studies has confirmed that these inequalities are stubbornly constant, and members of minority ethnic groups remain, on the whole, in more deprived positions than their white counterparts on many indices of social wealth.

Nevertheless, there is a large extent of internal variations among these ethnic groups. Overall, Pakistanis are treated less favourably than their Indian counterparts on all dimensions; whether in education, employment rates, economic position, and political participation. Whereas the Indian community has prospered, the Pakistani community has continued to experience worse living conditions.

According to a study conducted by the Demos cross-party policy think tank, almost 60% of British Pakistanis live in the top quartile of the most segregated areas in Britain. While for Indians the figure is closer to 25%. Indians in Britain are among the high-earning immigrants. According to the Migration Watch, Indians have high rates of employment and good wages. In contrast, Pakistanis tend to have lower rates of employment combined with lower wages.

These variations are clearly linked to a number of factors. These include the *English fluency* which is much higher for Indians than Pakistanis contributes to a large extent in the discrimination of the latter. Being in a country where English is the main language, requires that each person in order to achieve success in whatever field has to master the English language. According to a research carried out by the Department for Work and Pensions, people of Pakistani heritage have the lowest level of English language proficiency of all the

major minority ethnic groups with 64 per cent of Pakistani immigrants spoke English well, compared to 82 percent of Indian immigrants.

Moreover, the migration history of each group plays an important role in defining their current position. Whereas a large number of migrants who came from India were from the more developed regions and were highly skilled workers, a major stream of arrivals of Pakistani migrants were composed of peasant farmers and unskilled workers. The precise level of prosperity which settlers enjoyed immediately prior to their arrival had a far-reaching impact on the trajectories of adaptation which they subsequently followed. These stark differences between these two groups are still up today. Whereas The Indian population, with their higher educational levels, are concentrated in the most white-collared parts of Britain. One-third of the Pakistani population live in the North East, North West and Yorkshire regions where high rates of poverty and unemployment are the greatest.

Furthermore, the social and cultural constructions of any group play a significant part in the process of integration among ethnic groups. Indians are considered to be more integrated socially than Pakistanis. Pakistanis' social and cultural constructions tend to harden their integration process, especially for women.

Analysis of social engagement with the mainstream culture claims that Muslims are more likely to live in ethnically and religiously isolated ghettos where their friends, spouses and business associates are all of the same ethnicity and religion, which in turn breeds ethnically and religiously isolated identities (Ousley, 2001). However, Indians seem to be more integrated mainly due to their likelihood of culturally adapting to British society because of their moderate Hindu or secular tendencies (Heath and McMahan, 2005).

Religious affiliation, however, is the major determinant of integration. Religion in Britain has emerged as a major social signifier. For instance, South Asian minorities are no longer seen as Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis, but rather as Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims. Muslims presence in Britain is not a recent one, however, during the 1980s and 1960s they started to become a subject of controversy due to the increasingly salient presence of Muslim minorities in Britain. The rise in political importance and awareness of Islam, domestically and internationally, though, began after a series of events.

Preceding a number of terrorist attacks, which are initially imputed to Islam, racism has been switched off from "ethnic penalty" to rather "Islamic penalty". Muslims in the UK,

and the West in general, are going through harsh times wherein their fundamental rights are being violated and eroded in the wake of an upsurge in Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments.

It all started in 1989 following the Rushdie Affair. Then, various terrorist incidents including the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the second Gulf war in 1991, the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the rise of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in 1996, the Luxor massacre of foreign tourists in 1997, the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the eruption of the second Palestinian *intifada* in 2000, the 9/11 attacks, and the 7/7 London bombings have brought Muslims under a severe scope.

Following these events, the chance of a Pakistani Muslim, and Muslims in general, to be a victim of an Islamophobic discrimination, or an Anti-Muslim hate crime increased. However, the menace of harassment, intimidation and violence against individuals form just one dimension to anti-Muslim hate crime. Since the 9/11 and the 7/7 events, between 40 and 60 per cent of mosques, Islamic centres, and Muslim organisations have experienced at least one form of attack that could have been reported as a hate crime.

Moreover, the situation gets even worse due to the vitriolic attack on Muslims by the media and politicians following the 9/11, and especially 7/7 events. Britain's most successful electoral far-right party, the British National Party, has initiated numerous campaigns against Britain's Muslim communities. In the wake of 9/11, the BNP widely distributed a leaflet entitled 'The Truth about I.S.L.A.M' with I.S.L.A.M supposedly an acronym for 'Intolerance, Slaughter, Looting, Arson and Molestation of women' (Copsey: 2013, p. 12).

Following the 7/7 London bombings the BNP distributed a leaflet that carried an aerial photograph of the bus ravaged by one of the London bombs, along with the slogan "maybe now it's time to start listening to the BNP." There have also been a lot of BNP campaigns against 'grooming' by 'Muslim paedophile' gangs. Besides, the BNP has claimed that British Muslims, Pakistanis in particular, are solely responsible for the heroin trade.

Though all minority groups tend to suffer from discrimination and deprivation, however, British Muslims, especially Pakistanis, are more likely to experience high levels of discrimination. For instance, according to census statistics Muslims, as a whole, are by far the most disadvantaged faith group in the UK labour market. Muslims are three times more likely

to be unemployed than the majority Christian group. They have the lowest employment rate of any group, at 38 per cent, and the highest economic inactivity rate, at 52 per cent.

In conclusion, therefore, it is argued that the differentiation between Indian and Pakistani groups in their level of integration is mainly related to a number of factors including fluency in English, history of migration, social and cultural constructions, and more precisely due to their religious affiliations. Factors associated with religion are more likely to affect Pakistani Muslims.

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
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FIGURES

Figure 1


Pakistani Refugees fleeing from India after the Partition



Source: <http://www.scoopwhoop.com/inothernews/partition-photos-1947/>

Figure 2


A large number of deaths following the Partition



Source: <http://www.scoopwhoop.com/inothernews/partition-photos-1947/>

Figure 3


Ethnicity by religion, England and Wales



Source: ONS, 2003.

Figure 4


Unemployment rates by ethnic group



Source:ONS, Census 2011

Figure 5

Profile of Unemployment in Women by Ethnic Group



Source: Unemployment rates of women by ethnic group, ONS (2008)

Figure 6

A pig's head left tied to the Madani school gate in Portsmouth, with an obscene message



Source: <http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/our-region/portsmouth/pig-s-head-tied-to-muslim-school-gates-in-portsmouth-1-7173200>

TABLES

Table 1

Population of the United Kingdom by Ethnic Group, 2001

Category	Total population		Minority ethnic population
	Number	%	%
White	54,153,898	92.1	n/a
Mixed	677,117	1.2	14.6
Asian or Asian British	2,331,423	4.0	50.2
Indian	1,053,411	1.8	22.7
Pakistani	747,285	1.3	16.1
Bangladeshi	283,063	0.5	6.1
Other Asian	247,664	0.4	5.3
Black or Black British	1,148,738	2.0	24.8
Black Caribbean	565,876	1.0	12.2
Black African	485,277	0.8	10.5
Black Other	97,585	0.2	2.1
Chinese	247,403	0.4	5.3
Other	230,615	0.4	5.0
<i>All minority ethnic population</i>	<i>4,635,296</i>	<i>7.9</i>	<i>100.0</i>
All population	58,789,194	100.0	n/a

Source: Office for National Statistics, 2001 Census

Table 2

Estimated Size of Different Overseas Indian Communities

	ALL PEOPLE	Hindu	Muslim	Sikh	Others
ALL PEOPLE in England and Wales	52, 041,916	552,421	1, 546,626	329,358	49, 613,511
Asian	2, 273,737	533,397	1, 139,065	316,763	284,512
Indian	1, 036,807	466,597	131,662	301,295	137,253
Indian Punjabi	466,563 1				
Pakistani	714,826	547	657,680	346	56,253
Bangladeshi	280,830	1,693	259,710	113	19,314
Other Asian	241,274	64,560	90,013	15,009	71,692

Note: Data for Punjabis is estimated based on the share of Punjabis in total Indian migrants to the UK from the High Level Committee Report on the Indian Diaspora (February 2003)

Source: Office of National Statistics

Table 3

Number of Pakistanis Settled in the West, 2005

No	Countries	Overseas Pakistanis
1.	UK	800,000
2.	USA	600,000
3.	Canada	250,000
4.	France	50,000
5.	Germany	52,668
6.	Greece	32,500
7.	Netherlands	40,000
8.	Norway	36,400
9.	Denmark	20,250
10.	Australia	20,000
11.	Italy	18,624
12.	Belgium	14,500
13.	Ireland	7,000
14.	Sweden	5,250
15.	Austria	3,500
16.	New Zealand	3,000
17.	Switzerland	2,415
18.	Spain	2,000

Source : overseas Pakistanis Division, Government of Pakistan

Table 4

Percentage of Pupils Attaining Different Levels at Key- stage 1 (5–7 year old)

	Reading level		Writing level		Maths level	Science level
	2+	2A/3	2+	2A/3	2+ 2A/3	2+ 3
White	89%	56%	85%	37%	92% 52%	91% 23%
Indians	94%	64%	92%	50%	95% 61%	93% 27%
Pakistanis	87%	45%	83%	31%	88% 41%	85% 13%
Bangladeshis	89%	51%	86%	35%	90% 46%	87% 15%
Black Africans	90%	54%	86%	35%	90% 44%	88% 16%
Black Carribeans	88%	47%	82%	30%	89% 37%	88% 14%

Source: DfE, National Pupil Database, 2013

Table 5

Attainment of 5 or more GCSE Grades A*-C including English and Mathematics for FSM Pupils, by Ethnic Group, 2004 and 2013

5 or more GCSE grades A*-C including English and Maths (%)	2004	2013
White British	14.1	32.3
White Other	20.1	43.8
Mixed White and Black Caribbean	13.7	37.5
Indian	35.3	61.5
Pakistani	22.5	46.8
Bangladeshi	29.3	59.2
Black African	19.1	51.4
Black Caribbean	13.9	42.2
Chinese	55.4	76.8

Source: Strand (2015).

Table 6
Pupils attending Higher Education Institutes (HEIs)

	Top Third HEI
White	25%
Indian	37%
Pakistani	23%
Bangladeshi	27%
Black African	21%
Black Carribean	15%

Source : National Pupil Database

Table 7

Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market. The main ethnic minority groups based on Labour Force Survey data, pooled for the years 2003 and 2004.

	Share	% of group born in UK	Age left FT Education	Employment Rate	Hourly Wage
A. Men					
White British	90,45	94,43	17,38	80,16	11,60
Black, Caribbean	1,08	62,31	17,22	68,76	10,32
Bangladeshi	0,56	20,68	17,61	59,55	6,73
Pakistani	1,38	37,03	18,43	62,31	8,54
Indian	2,26	37,74	19,52	75,29	11,72
b. Women					
White British	90,16	93,82	17,37	67,57	8,93
Black, Caribbean	1,25	59,53	17,50	64,70	9,37
Bangladeshi	0,53	24,62	16,94	21,83	8,93
Pakistani	1,34	40,94	17,43	24,37	8,59
Indian	2,14	34,57	18,74	58,72	9,08

Note. The Table reports the share of ethnic minorities in the working age (16–65) population in England, the share of individuals born in the UK, the average age at which individuals left full time education, excluding those currently in education, the share of employed workers and the gross hourly wage.

Source. Labour Force Survey, 2003 and 2004, working age population (16–65).

Table 8

Ethnic Makeup of the United Kingdom (%), Q3 2015

	England	Wales	Scotland	Northern Ireland	United Kingdom
White	85.3	95.6	95.8	98.6	87.0
All Ethnic Minority Groups	14.7	4.4	4.2	1.4	13.0

Source: ONS, Annual Population Survey Q3 2015.

Table 9

Local Authorities with the Highest Counts and Percentages of Muslims in England and Wales, taken from the 2001 National Census

Local Authority	Muslim Count	Local Authority	Muslim Percentage
Birmingham	140,033	Tower Hamlets	36
Bradford	75,188	Newham	24
Tower Hamlets	71,389	Blackburn	19
Newham	59,293	Bradford	16
Kirklees	39,319	Waltham forest	15

Source: Pakistanis Muslims Division, Office of National Statistics

Table 10

Numbers of Women of Working Age, Selected Ethnic Minority Groups: England and Wales

Numbers	White British	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Black Caribbean
Women of working age	13, 521,869	352,769	209,611	80,238	200,342
Women who are economically active	9, 621,003	222,087	63,665	21,322	145,761
Women who are in employment	8, 836,288	192,191	46,525	14,023	124,549
Women who are unemployed	362,910	13,710	9,404	3,522	11,625

Source: 2001 Census Standard Tables, Crown Copyright 2003

Table 11

Number of articles in the period from January to the 9th September 2001

Newspaper No. of articles	
Guardian	817
Independent	681
Times	535
Daily Telegraph	417
Daily Mail	202
Mirror	164
Daily Express	139
Sun	80
Daily Star	40

Number of articles % increase in the period from June 2001 to June 2002:

Newspaper No. of articles % increase	
Guardian	2,043 250%
Independent	1,556 228%
Times	1,486 278%
Daily Telegraph	1,176 282%
Daily Mail	650 322%
Mirror	920 561%
Daily Express	305 219%
Sun	526 658%
Daily Star	144 360%

Source:Allen C. (2010). Islamophobia (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company).

Table 12
Religion in the 2011 Census

Religion	Total Population	%
Christian	33,243,175	59.3
Muslim	2,706,066	4.8
Hindu	816,633	1.5
Sikh	423,158	0.8
Jewish	263,346	0.5
Buddhist	247,743	0.4
Any other religion	240,530	0.4
No religion	14,097,229	25.1
Religion not stated	4,038,032	7.2
All	56,075,912	100

Source: Census 2011. ONS Table KS209EW.

Table 13

Articles containing the word 'Muslim'

Newspaper	2000-2001	2001-2002	% Increase
Guardian	817	2.043	250
Independent	681	1.556	228
Times	535	1.486	278
Telegraph	417	1.176	282
Mail	202	650	322
Mirror	164	920	561
Express	139	305	219
Sun	80	526	658
Star	40	144	360

Note: the 12 month period between early September 2000 and 2001 compared with 19 June 2001 to 19 June 2002.

Source : Whitaker, B. "Islam and the British Press After September 11."2002.

<<http://www.al-bab.com/media/articles/bw020620.htm>> (accessed May 2015)