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SPECIFICITY OF THE USE OF METAPHOR BY OLD KABYLIAN SPEAKERS (70-90) YEARS OLD IN THEIR EVERYDAY SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

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MrsSORAYA HAMANE

Dedications

To the memory of my father,

to my mother,

to my husband, to my two angels Zineb and Ramzi,

to my sister and brothers,

to my best friend Nafissa.

MrsSORAYA HAMANE

Abstract

The aim of this study, is to show how metaphors reflect cognitive and cultural human experiences encoded by language as a means of recording human experience. It also explores the extent to which culture models and frames this cognition and how it influences metaphor to a high degree. Thus, this research may contribute to see and recognise how the members of the Kabylian culture structure or map their experiences of the world and expound them into their native language.

Metaphors are not just playing with words or even a free play of ideas. They should be in harmony with the social and historical settings with the beliefs and personal constructs of the society or micro society of the time. In this research work, we try to demonstrate that metaphors not only make the Kabylian (i.e., a Berber minority in Algeria) thoughts vivid and interesting, but they actually structure their perception and understanding of the world in and around them.

Keywords: metaphor, culture, cognition, old kabylian speakers, speech interaction.

Résumé

L'objectif de cette étude est de mettre en évidence une réflexion sur les métaphores à partir d'expériences cognitives et culturelles telles exprimées et encodée dans la langue comme outil d'enregistrement de l'expérience humaine. Il s'agit également de voir comment la culture modélise, contrôle et limite cette cognition et à quel point la culture influence-t-elle la métaphore. Cette étude nous permet de mieux connaitre et de comprendre la façon dont les personnes (issues de la culture Kabyle) règlementent et planifient leurs expériences de la vie et l'enregistrent dans leur langue maternelle.

Les métaphores ne se limitent pas à jouer avec des mots ou même à jouer librement avec des idées. Elles doivent être compatibles avec le contexte social et historique et avec les composantes humaines de la société ou d'une communauté donnée. Dans cette thèse, notre but est d'expliquer que les métaphores observées et analysées ne permettent pas seulement la renaissance des idées kabyles mais aussi l'organisation de leur perception et leur conception du monde qui les entoure.

Mots clés: métaphore, culture, cognition, interlocuteurs kabyles d'âge avancé, interaction verbale.

الملخص:

الهدف من هذه الدراسة هو إبراز انعكاس الاستعارات على الخبرات الانسانية المعرفية و الثقافية المعبر عنها عن طريق اللغة كأداة لتسجيل الخبرات الانسانية. و إلى أي مدى الثقافة تصوغ و تقيد هذه المعرفة، إضافة إلى تأثر الاستعارة بالثقافة إلى حد كبير. هذا البحث قد يسمح لنا بإلقاء نظرة و التعرف على الكيفية التي ينظم و يخطط بها الأفراد ذو ثقافة قبائلية خبراتهم الحياتية و يسجلونها عبر لغتهم الأصلية.

الاستعارات ليست فقط لعب بالكلمات أو حتى لعب حر للأفكار بل يجب ان تكون متناسقة مع الخلفية الاجتماعية و التاريخية و مع المعتقدات و التركيبات الإنسانية للمجتمع أو لمجتمع خاص. في هذه الأطروحة نهدف لتوضيح أن الاستعارات لا تقوم فقط بإحياء أفكار القبائليين (الطائفة البربرية القليلة في الجزائر) بل تقوم بتنظيم و إنشاء تصوراتهم و مفاهيمهم للعالم المحيط بهم.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الاستعارة، الثقافة، المعرفة، المتحدثون القبائليون كبار السن، التفاعل اللفظي.

General Introduction

"*Man, is confronting reality, faces a kaleidoscope of phenomena ranging from the natural to the man-made, to the imaginary, to the totally abstract. Comprehension of such a broad inventory of reality and non-reality requires language, the tool that permits man to take verbal stock of objective and subjective experiences alike. In man's ongoing endeavor to conceptualize and verbalize a world that can never be fully known, language is the vital intermediary. Language provides a repertoire of coping mechanisms, of which metaphor is one of the most powerful and useful*" (Malloti quoted in Basson, 2006: 38).

Language not only assists us in sharing information, establishing mere relations, or simply employed for aesthetic purposes, it also conceptualises as well as verbalises our entire reality of life. It fulfils an emotive function, and helps us understand new things in the light of the known. Language is part and parcel (integral part) of culture, i.e., language is a medium for everyday social contacts, social expression and social experience. Alessandro Duranti (1997: 337) succeeds in conveying this idea in a very neat and concise way, thus he summarises the following:

"*By connecting people to their past, present and future, language becomes their past, present, and future. Language is not just a representation of an independently established world. Language is also that world. Not in the simplistic sense that all we have of our past is language but in the sense that our memories are inscribed in linguistic accounts, stories, anecdotes, and names just as much as they are contained in smells, sounds, and ways of holding our body*".

Culture is said to be crucial in metaphor understanding. Metaphors are generally understood according to our own values which are fully grounded and coined in fact by the specific culture we live in. Culture is also taught to be the mirror of life as held up to us (society). In other words, different cultures lead us to different conceptual systems with different world perceptions of reality. In this research paper, we will investigate, demonstrate, argue and prove that the most part of everyday Kabyle utterances are metaphoric and culture-specific, i.e., as native speakers, we would like to give the opportunity to any foreign speaker to try to come in contact with Kabyle language, discover its rich heritage, and know how

much metaphors structure the totality of our life (past, present and future). Our research paper has two main goals. First, it aims at showing that some Kabyle metaphors may exist in some other languages, and thus are somehow semantically equivalent, i.e., universally applicable since the physical features of human beings are predominantly the same across linguistic and cultural models, while many other conceptual metaphors in Kabyle remain unique in their use (culture-specific). Zoltán Kövecses (2005: 2-5) has generated numerous cross-cultural studies of conceptual metaphors where he stated that while some source domains in metaphors are universal among various cultures, others exist only in particular cultures. For instance, the concept of '**Life'** is metaphorically conceptualised as '**A Journey**' in English culture, whereas speakers of Kabyle commonly view the concept of '**Life'** through the perception of '**A Day**'. Thus, the particular mappings (linguistic utterances/expressions) the Kabyle native speakers use to talk about life are based on a deeper connection between the two concepts of 'life' and 'day'. Kövecses (2015: 13) postulates the following:

"*even such potentially universal metaphors may display variation in their specific details because people do not use their cognitive capacities in the same way from culture to culture ... Finally, many conceptual metaphors are unique to particular (sub) cultures or sets of cultures because of differences in such factors as social-cultural context, history, or human concern that characterize these cultures.*"

Second, this paper also intends to demonstrate that culture and metaphor are both engaged in mutual interaction (tied to each other), i.e., they both operate together that they can easily lead us to a good understanding of the world around us. Metaphor is pervasive in our everyday life, i.e., metaphors play a central role in defining the old Kabylians everyday realities. Our aim is to show clearly that our category of informants (70-90 years old) are not using metaphors just for shaping their views of what the world is like, but metaphors are setting up expectations for the future, i.e., metaphors are rooted in the beliefs, practices and intentions of language. Jacobus A. Naudé in the same line of thought expresses:

"*when people speak, they are not merely uttering sounds with structure and meaning. They intend something, and that intension is entrenched in their whole material (the things people do…), habitual (how they do things or get them done…) and mental being*

(about their reasons for doing these things in the way they do…)" (Naudé quoted in Basson, 2006: 37).

Metaphor is in us as much as we are in it: metaphor dwells in the language of every kind. Metaphor is deeply ingrained in our work, private life, thoughts processes, actions, daily conversations, speeches, discourses, etc. As Carter (2012:138) writes: "…*such metaphors are often so deeply impregnated in language and culture that they are not noticed as such.*" That is to say, the everyday use of such linguistic metaphors is so evident, frequent and unnoticed, that we even do not realise it in many natural/usual circumstances. Metaphor is omnipresent in plain language, poetics and passionate language. Several theories view metaphors as a means of creative people, mainly (poets, or writers), yet metaphor is not restricted to this kind of people only, but it is encoded in our fundamental mode of thought. Metaphor, in fact, plays a more prominent role than we all imagine, i.e., it has a significant impact on our minds and attitudes, the same way, it pervades our world (daily activities, experiences), enriches our language and utterances.

"*In the past few decades, many scholars have argued that metaphor is not simply a form of speech but more fundamental: a form of thought with its own epistemological functions. Metaphors and other tropes not only serve as the foundation for much everyday thinking, they also continue scholarly theory and practice in a variety of disciplines, as well as providing much of the foundation for our understanding of culture*" Gibbs (1994: 122) .

The research questions that we will be seeking to answer throughout the thesis are:

- To what extent are the Kabyle metaphors in their nature universal, semi-universal, or culture-specific (specific in essence)?

- Do the Kabyle native speakers have different worldviews in using conceptual metaphors? i.e., in what ways are the metaphorical utterances in Kabyle relevant to an understanding of culture and society?

- How can the cognitive view of metaphor simultaneously explain both universality and diversity in metaphorical thought?

- How much culture is dynamic and significant in using metaphors among the Kabylian speakers? i.e., what could be the degree of impact of culture on the production of metaphor?

Our work is partly based on a corpus which includes informants/participants who belong to the Kabyle community, mainly those enclosed between 70 and 90 years old without focusing on the gender. The corpus was gathered through tape recordings: the recordings were planned and arranged without the participants' awareness. We have also opted for using other methods to collect our research data so as to obtain reliable results because we found them complementary and useful to the interpretations. Those added methods are the video recording device, notes-taking (where we have recorded our reaction concerns and speculations) and observation. In order to revive the ancient Kabyle cultural heritage, we sought the most appropriate poems, lyrics and songs selected from different social categories (poets, songwriters, philosophers, wise people etc.) which actually depict the reality as they saw it and lived it.

We had access to the most important materials and documentation such as books, encyclopaedias, journals, articles and net sources. 70% of the documentation is updated and enabled us to carry out both the theoretical and analytical frameworks. Our present work was partly based on the conceptual metaphor theory (hereafter CMT) developed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and a short time later by Zoltán Kövecses whose most explicit and major concern was how a variety of factors such as (environment, social cultural context, communicative situation of groups of people or individuals, etc.) shape and govern our daily metaphors.

Our corpus includes a large variety of Kabyle metaphors selected from different themes: emotions, wedding, religion, social relations, behaviours, beauty, everyday interaction, etc. Our work in its entirety is a kind of analysis that evokes a set of realities grounded in the Kabyle way of life (shared beliefs, knowledge, worldviews, language, needs, interests, etc.).

Our thesis is divided into three main chapters: the first chapter is an overview of the historical background of metaphor as traced in the ancient times. The teaching of rhetoric was one of the dominant teaching practices in ancient Greece. The movement that was led by the

sophists had as its objective the teaching of the techniques of persuasion. The sophists were skilled orators who were often hired exclusively to teach the Greek nobility the techniques of oral presentation and public speaking. The teaching tradition the sophist led was subject to criticism, despite its popularity, by a number of thinkers and philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle. Plato, for instance, criticised the sophists' teaching method for being based on the art of memory as a means of persuasion that marginalised truth and reason in favour of memory and emotions. For Plato, the preparation of the mind for the discovery of truth was the essence of education that the sophists' method lacked. Aristotle also criticised the sophists' rhetoric for lacking truth and reason, but unlike Plato who was against the use of emotions in argumentation, he believed in their importance along with that of reason for constructing persuasive arguments. This chapter also shed light on some other rhetorical figures generally mapped by two terms 'tropes' or 'schemes' such as apostrophe, personification, hyperbole, etc.

Chapter two (Theoretical Analysis) discusses a large scale viewpoints of metaphor. Historically, metaphor has long been treated as nothing more than a decorative instrument (language), i.e., serving no other purpose but the merely decorative, sounding well and impressive. The comparison view asserts that metaphorical utterances involve a comparison or similarity between two or more objects. In other words, this approach sees metaphors as condensed/elliptical versions of similes or comparison with the terms 'like' and 'as' omitted. Metaphors and similes share both the same literal and figurative meanings; however, the rhetoric of a metaphor is more ornamented and offers much more degree of eloquence than the simile does.

The substitution approach holds that a metaphor is a non-literal (metaphorical) expression used instead of some equivalent literal expression. The proponents of this theory suggest that metaphorical senses are treated separately from literal ones, but their metaphoricity often remains implicit or unnoticed and not explained or labelled. The substitution theory asserts

that metaphor is just a different way of saying what can be said literally. It gives a fresh spin on worn-out literal language (Gisela Kreglinger, 2013: 19).

"*Briefly stated, the substitution view regards the entire sentence that is the locus of metaphor as replacing some set of literal sentences; while the comparison view takes the imputed literal paraphrase to be a statement of some similarities or analogy, and so takes every metaphor to be a condensed or elliptic simile*" (Max Black, 1993: 27).

The interaction theory goes back to Ivor Richards (1936), and then passed on to Max Black in the early 60's. The great pioneering job undertaken by Richards permitted the emergence of two significant shifts in the theory of metaphor: the idea was restricted to only one dimension, that from words to thought/ideas, and from transfer or substitution to interaction. To make this theory clear, I. A Richards, the father of this new criticism, brought into existence the notion of 'tenor' ⟶ what is meant, and 'vehicle' ⟶ the way it is said. In his book, 'Models and Metaphors' (1962), the revisionist scholar Max Black highlighted, supported and extended Richards' interaction view. Black argues that metaphor "*has its own distinctive capacities and achievements*" and that sometimes it "*creates the similarity*" rather than formulating an antecedently existing one. Black at his turn cleared up this confusion (Richards' terminology tenor/topic and vehicle) by introducing the two terms: 'principle' and 'subsidiary' subjects (1962) which later he termed 'primary' and 'secondary' subjects (1993).

- Primary subject ⟶ what the metaphor is really about.
- Secondary subject ⟶ the images or imagery that the vehicle evokes.

"*the interaction theory views metaphor as the interaction between two semantic fields expressed by the two end-points of a metaphor; its special effect coming from the tension between the literal and the figurative meanings; metaphors have a strong raison d'etre since they are not replaceable and they can create new relationships between two concepts*" (Judit Ferenczy, 1997: 149).

The third chapter is kind of reassessment of the previous theories (the substitution and the interaction theories). Several recent studies, such as the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) attested and affirmed in their findings, that metaphor is widely recognised as the cornerstone of human cognition in ways previously unachieved and unacknowledged. This

cognitive metaphor theory (sometimes called the conceptual metaphor theory CMT) which sprang as an outstanding variety of topics all over the 20th century, operates at the level of thinking. The proponents of this theory viewed that thought has primacy over language, and that few or even no abstract notions can be talked about without metaphor, i.e., there is no direct way of conceiving them and we can only understand them through the filter of directly experienced concrete notions (source domain notions). Furthermore, the metaphorical filter most of the time highlights certain aspects of target domain and hides others at the same time (Zweiri and Murphy, 2011:33). The conceptual nature that the cognitive linguistics attributed to metaphors led later to the consideration of the impact of culture on the conceptualisation and use of metaphoric expressions. The cultural-based approach to the study of metaphors focused on explaining both the universality and cultural variation of metaphor. In other words, the approach sought to explain both the commonalities and differences that metaphoric expressions exhibit within and across-cultures in terms of the sources, targets and meanings of those metaphors. This chapter is also devoted to the findings. It deals almost entirely with the analysis and interpretations of the specificities of the use of metaphor by old Kabylian speakers in their everyday social interactions.

Our research work ends with the conclusion that any language is in constant need to be practiced and preserved by its community members since language is the most important and distinctive cognitive skill of any society. This latter enables people to communicate and express themselves in unique ways (every language expresses thoughts and ideas in specific ways, both grammatically and semantically). Using metaphor among old kabylian speakers promotes and maintains the dynamicity inside home in particular and outside home in general.

1.1   Introduction

In any language, spoken or written, things demand and depend upon more than making a collection of statements worthy of belief. Because first, all what should be said is heard, then interpreted and finally understood. Second, because writing is intended to be read by others, with minds different from our own. Our reader does not make the same mental connections we make; he does not see the world exactly as we see it; he is already flooded daily with thousands of statements demanding assent, yet which he knows or believes to be false, confusing, or deceptive. One way to feel ready and comfortable in both speaking and writing is the use of metaphor, because for instance, when someone feels unable to carry on one's idea or one's thought, i.e., when someone lacks lexis (a gap in finding one's words/vocabulary) thus, he / she resorts automatically or unconsciously to metaphor. In other words, we most of the time come across difficulties in expressing our daily experiences, such as (feelings, emotions, deceptions, anger and melancholy, etc.), therefore, the only way to get out of this 'word deficiency' is resorting to metaphors, so as to fill up or plug that lexical field. Further, if we use then, 'metaphor' with little care and skill developed by practice then anyone can master it, and its use will add not just beauty and emphasis and effectiveness to our spoken and written language, but a kind of freedom of thought and expression we have never imagined possible.

1.2   Metaphor : Etymology and Origins

Our aim in this present work is to delineate and to provide the reader with an overview of metaphor from early studies with the ancient Greeks up to the present day studies.

1.2.1 Etymology

Hawkes states: "*The word metaphor comes from the Greek word metaphora derived from meta meaning 'over', and pherien, 'to carry'. It refers to a particular set of linguistic processes whereby aspects of one object are 'carried over' or transferred to another object, so that the second object is spoken of as if it were the first*" (1972:1). Thus, metaphor and meaning transference are seen as synonyms in terms of etymology. Metaphor is usually taken to an all-embracing term including other figures of speech (ibid). Whereas, the updated word

'metaphor' is derived from the Greek metaphora which means 'transfer'. The morpheme meta means 'transfer, carry over' and the other morpheme pherin is translated into English as 'to bear, to carry' (Charteris-Black, 2004:19).

Our interest consists, in focusing on the word rhetoric as a major key to get through the genesis of metaphor. The word rhetoric took its definition from the Greek roots. It has been defined as the art of 'Well Saying' and the power to play a game with languages, the main actors being the figures of speech.

1.2.2 Origins

Before getting into the heart of the matter (getting deep in theories), we think it would be better and very important to make a step backward, and shed light on some ancient Greek philosophers' viewpoints, such as Plato and Aristotle, in order to draw a general vision of what were the ideas and thoughts spread all over that era. Many historians credit the ancient city-state of Athens as the birthplace of classical rhetoric. Because Athenian democracy marshalled every free male into politics, every Athenian man had to be ready to stand in the assembly and speak to persuade his countrymen to vote for or against a particular piece of legislation. In other words, a man's success and influence in ancient Athens depended on his rhetorical ability (Brett and McKay, 2010)[1]. The technical teaching of rhetoric was introduced in the middle of the fifth century B.C.E. through the practices of Older Sophists[2] (Jarrat, 1991; Mailloux, 1995; Poulakos, 1995; Grimaldi, 1996; Vitanza, 1997). John Poulakos (1993) in the same line states: "*when the Sophists appeared on the horizon of the Hellenic city-states, they found themselves in the midst of an enormous cultural change: from aristocracy to*

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[1] Brett and Kate McKay, "Classical Rhetoric 101: A Brief History", 30 November, 2010, Web. 11 June 2016. http://www.artofmanliness.com/2010/11/30/history-of-rhetoric/

[2] The Sophists –"*Sophistês*" (the name being derived from the Greek word '*Sophos*' meaning 'wisdom', 'expertise', 'specialized skill or craft' or 'knowledge') were mainly professional intellectuals and teachers (the best known of whom are Protagoras, Gorgias, and Isocrates), mostly non –Athenian Greeks who travelled from polis to polis teaching young men in public spaces how to speak and debate. The suffix "*-tês*" indicates a practitioner or participant in a sphere of activity designated by the nominal root. These Sophists, who could not participate directly in the politics of Athens, acted as itinerant orators and teachers of rhetoric. They were incapable of providing what they claim to. Hence, these Sophists were pseudo practitioners of '*Sophia*'. Their status as outsiders raised distrust, and their approach was discredited for a number of reasons. To meet the needs of students in Greece, the so called 'Sophists' (experts, educators and advocates) emerged and took students for pay (they mainly target wealthy and naïve Athenian youths) and taught them how to be effective in public life by marshalling arguments, dividing speeches into logical parts, and carefully choosing and combining words. Those Sophists even taught their students how to make a weak argument stronger and a strong argument weak. In short, the Sophists were unethical as well as incompetent. (For further reading see: Allan, K, 2009, p. 832, Kennedy, G, A, 2nd Edition,2007,P. iX, Romilly, J, 1992,pp.1-30+pp.93-96 , and Rankin, H, D, 2014, pp.13-30).

democracy." And that the changes in the Greek political system *"created the need of a new kind of education, an education consistent with the new politics of limited democracy."*[3]

From the point of view of etymology the term 'rhetoric' derives from the Greek *rhêtorikê* meaning ('art / technique of a public speaker', from *eirein* 'to say or to speak') (Allan, K, 2009:833). Rhetoric is used at that time, somewhat pejoratively, to describe the technique of a public speaker or politician. The word 'rhetoricians' (Greek origin) and 'orators' (Latin origin) played an important role in the development of politics from antiquity to our days. Indeed, rhetoric from (the Greek origin *'rhêtôr'*, orator, teacher or even master) is the art or technique of persuasion which is regarded most common, although more nuanced definitions have often been provided (ibid).

1.3 The Sophists' Role / Movement:

For the great majority of Athenians at the fifth century (B.C.E), during the classical period, the skill of 'clever speaking' or 'speaking well' was one that it was essential to acquire (Jacqueline De Romilly, 1992:57). In other words, the ancient Greeks and Romans gave a great deal of thought to what good speaking required. Throughout history, thinkers and charlatans alike have devoted a considerable amount of effort to figuring out what sounds good, looks good, and works to motivate various audiences. In those days, an individual could make his voice heard directly and all major decisions were the outcome of public debates. Speech was thus an important mode of action, and it became increasingly significant so as democracy developed (ibid). In her journal, Keith Crome (2005, issue 9) has noted that The Sophistic movement flourished in and around the city of Athens at that period (the latter half of the fifth century BC). It almost immediately acquired a bad reputation, and this reputation has stuck: a Sophist, is said to be a quibbler; someone who indulges in mere argument for argument's sake; someone who, by playing on words, makes issues problematic that are not. The art of the speaker, or rhetoric, was one of the foremost preoccupations of the Sophists' teaching: this was a skill that all the Sophists possessed; and to teach it was also the purpose of the movement that is known as the 'Second Sophistic', under the Roman Empire. Rebecca LeMoine (2015:32-54) explains that the Sophists as a 'professional class' use their skill with words to beat others into submission. The Sophist's classroom offers a comparatively

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[3] Quoted by John Poulakos in Herrick, J, A, The History and Theory of Rhetoric: An Introduction, 5th Edition, London and New York: Routledge, 2013,p.29.

harmless opportunity to test and develop one's moderation, i.e., (it facilitates the cultivation of moderation by simulating the agonistic conditions of the assembly or courtroom, where many encounter temptations to bully others verbally). That is, by arousing one's inner bully, the Sophists exposed the limits of one's moderation and thus unintentionally help to teach what they claim to teach. In one memorable image in the dialogue, the Sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are described as only being able to:

"make fun of people, tripping them up and overturning them by means of the distinctions in words, just like the people who pull the chair out from under a man who is going to sit down and then laugh gleefully when they see him sprawling on his back. So you must think of their performance as having been mere play… they said they would give you a demonstration of hortatory skill, but now it seems that they must have thought it necessary to make fun of you before beginning. So, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, put an end to this joking; I think we have had enough of it" (278b-c).[4]

In contrast to Rebecca LeMoine and other rhetoricians, Jacqueline De Romilly (1992:1) reflects on the word 'Sophists', and interprets it as *"professionals of intelligence. And they certainly set out to teach people how to use their intelligence. They were not sages, Sophoi, a word which connotes not a profession but a state of being."* Unlike Patricia O'Grady (2008:12) who views it as *"freelance, mostly non-Athenian, independent teachers who travelled throughout Ancient Greece from city to city making their living out of the new demand for education."*

We may distinguish three kinds[5] of Sophistic activity:

- First, presentations, performances, or displays to audiences;
- Second, composition and dissemination of written works;
- Third, private instruction.

These kinds may be conceived more succinctly as public oral, public written, and private activities. It is well known that the Sophists presented on a large scale. For example, it is one thing to deliver a presentation at a Hellenic festival such as the Olympic games or a state – sponsored civic occasion such as military funeral; it is another to present before a smaller and

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[4] Cooper, J, M, Plato: Complete Works, Indiana Polis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997, p.715.
[5] Wolfsdorf, D, C: "Sophistic Method and Practice" in Bloomer, W, M, A Companion to Ancient Education, Willey Blackwell, 2015, p.66.

narrower assembly of guests at the home of a patron or in an athletic training –ground, i.e., a gymnasium or palaistra. Most of the Sophists served as ambassadors (the practice of presenting or performing at civic or Hellenic events appeared closely related to ambassadorial service) (ibid: 67). Consider Hippias' claims in Plato's *Hippias Major*: *"whenever Elis needs to conduct any business with any one of the city-states, she always comes to me first among her citizens and chooses me as ambassador"* (281a).[6]

The Sophists' influence was rooted in their mastery of language: they were experts in the practice and theory of rhetoric and even in what we now call linguistics, i.e., the study of the form and grammar of language. The early Sophists were the heirs of the rhapsodes[7], declaimers of poetry, and they adopted the techniques of oral poetry to the various occasions of public speaking. A great majority of the Sophists lived on their wisdom: they exercised political power by using their rhetorical expertise in law courts and assemblies, and acquired a fortune from the very high fees they charged for teaching the oratorical skills. They encouraged and even compelled their students memorize phrases, figures of speech, or even whole orations that they could then adopt to particular occasion and on either side of an issue. They trained their students to argue from probability to conviction, i.e., to invoke the fund of community values in support of a probable position in order to win assent to it. (Jost and Olmsted, 2004:279-80). James Herrick (2013:35) reinforces the Sophists' teaching methods by focusing on helping students *"to analyze cases, to think on their feet, to ask probing questions, to speak eloquently, and to pose counterarguments to an opponent's case."* When the Sophist Protagoras (318e-319a) was asked what a student would learn from him, he answered: *"the proper care of his personal affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also of the state's affairs, so as to become a real power in the city, both as speaker and man of action."*[8] The Sophists were highly skilled in the epic tales and poems. They were able to find the most appropriate quotation to support any position, and regularly entered contests, and those who won were given prizes. This particular skill was in fact, needed to defend oneself against lawsuits even against the most frivolous of lawsuits brought by one who thought himself to be the better speaker. The Sophists thought courses that might have been labelled with such current phrasings as:

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[6] Hippias Major 281a (trans. mine).

[7] The art of delivery was first developed by actors and 'rhapsodes', and in the *Poetics*, knowledge of the delivery is conceived as belonging to the architectonic art of elocution (1456b8-19), which is used by actors, rhapsodes, *rhêtors*, and everyone who speaks. (a story-telling tradition in which groups of public reciters, called 'rhapsodes' memorized poems telling of mythical events, such as Homer). Thomas Sloane (2001:397).

[8] Protagoras in Sloane, T, O, Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.632.

- How to succeed both in political affairs and in business without really trying.
- How to win friends and influence people, using practised gestures, agile tongues and flowery eloquence.
- How to win no matter how bad your case is.
- How to fall in pigsty and come out smelling like a rose.
- How to succeed in life.
- How to play to win.

In short, the Sophists had no values other than wining or succeeding. They were not true believers in the Greek myths, but would use references and quotations from the tales for their own purposes. They said to be secular atheists and cynical about religious beliefs and all traditions. They made business of their own form of education as developing skills in rhetoric and took profit from it. Sophists, such as Thrasymachus in Plato's first book '*The Republic*' (336A-354C) believed and taught the following maxims[9] (principles):

- '*justice is in the interest of the stronger*', or more simply '*might makes / is right*', in other words, '*the just is nothing other than the advantage of stronger*'.
- '*injustice is better than justice*'. N. Jayapalan (2002:38).

Maxim1: "*might makes right*", was the motto of Thrasymachus and Athenian imperialism. This means, if you are powerful enough to lie, cheat, steal or kill to get what you want with impunity, i.e., if you are a dictator, then that makes it morally right (Francis Reeves,2004:78-79). According to Thrasymachus '*might makes right*' implies → it is right that the weak should be dominated by the strong, and that the person best at dominating others is the happiest, thus, the man (the ordinary individual, perfect and good man) is just the loser and the unjust (the tyrant) is the winner, the gracious and blessed.

Maxim2: "*injustice is better than justice*", Thrasymachus' second principle suggests that every man would like to fulfill his own interest. He views that life of injustice, which the powerful necessarily pursue, is what truly makes for their excellence and well-being. Thrasymachus plainly explained that the ruler, who takes advantage of his position to rob his /her subjects of their fortunes and transform them into slaves, is acting unjustly.

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[9] On Thrasymachus maxims or principles: Thrasymachus is the first who introduced the theme of force into conversation about <u>justice</u> in Plato's first book "*The Republic*". Thrasymachus who is said to occupy the *"central place"*, broke angrily into the conversation declares in front of his fellows (Socrates, Cephalus and his son Polemarchus, Adeimantus and Glaucon, the two brothers of Plato) that he has a better and adequate definition to offer on the term 'justice'. As already stated in many books by rhetoricians, Thrasymachus jumped widely and explosively into the discussion, so that Socrates treated him as a "*wild beast* [who] *sprang at us as if he would tear us in pieces*". Sean Noah Walsh (2012:119-121).

Thrasymachus praise of injustice is based on the fact that he regards it as the more profitable. In other words, the perfect tyrant thinks and does for himself than the just, and he actually does so in a way which elicits admiration (N. Jayapalan, ibid). To sum up Thrasymachus' point, we may say that all arguments about ethics, morality and justice are meaningless unless they are analysed as a struggle for power.

The Sophists' philosophy could be summed up into two words: skepticism and success.

- **Skepticism:** according to William Lawhead (2015: 30) skepticism is the claim that true knowledge is unattainable. The Sophists declared that all the truth is relative, all values and standards are relative too, and what is called "truth", "justice", or "moral goodness" is nothing else, but just sounds we make (the search for truth was not top priority). Thus, they taught their students the best way to adapt to the world and become in a sense realists, as well as, "*they tended strongly to take man as a standard of measurement and his knowledge of the world about him as the most practical approach to life's problems*." Edward M. Matthews (2007: 199).

- **Success:** was the second main theme of the Sophists (achieving success was their goal in life). If knowledge is impossible, then it is useless to seek for what you can't find. Instead, one should just try to get along. The Sophists mainly believed and taught that you should not ask questions like "Is it true?" or "is it right?" but you should instead ask, "will advocating this idea help me?", or "will performing this action be advantageous to me?" William Lawhead (ibid).

Human matters at large can be expressed and practiced both in positive and negative ways. For example, if medicines such as drugs, barbiturates, tranquilizers with high or low-doses levels are administrated inappropriately / not adequately, patients may then probably suffer, in other words, if the treatment (specific) is somehow taken incorrectly then, there must be a harmful effect, it may even bring or cause serious risks to human health. The same may also happen when food, knowledge, rhetoric and even water are irrationally used or abused to produce negative results. But if the procedure runs correctly and properly, then the human body will tolerate the medication well. In the same line of thought Gorgias (447A-465E) defends rhetoric and argues the following:

"*So it is not the teachers who are wicked, nor is the art either guilty or wicked on this account, but rather, to my thinking, those who do not use it properly. Now the same argument applies also to rhetoric: for the orator is able, indeed, to speak against every one and on every question in such a way as to win over the votes of the multitude, practically in any matter he may choose to take up: but he is no whit the more entitled to deprive the doctors of their credit, just because he could do so, or other professionals of theirs; he must use his rhetoric fairly, as in the case of athletic exercise. And in my opinion, if a man becomes a rhetorician and then uses this power and this art unfairly, we ought not to hate his teacher and cast him out of our cities. For he imparted that skill to be used in all fairness, whilst this man puts it to an opposite use. Thus it is the man who does not use it aright who deserves to be hated and expelled and put to death, and not his teacher.*"[10]

We may sum up the positive and negative aspects of the Sophists as follows:

- **Negative aspects:**
    - Sophistic rhetoric is misleading: the Sophists had a reputation for persuading by clever arguments and stylistic techniques (the argumentation they taught presumably was bad and fallacious), i.e., Sophists were not serious arguers (orators) inquiring after truth, but perpetrators of fallacious reasoning and seekers of personal profit (cleverness in turning an argument). Van Eemeren et al (1996:30) explain

        "*objectively speaking, there can be no such thing as good argumentation. If one person convinces another with his arguments, this is because the other person accepts what he says. The first person is, in other words, agreed to be right, but that does not necessarily mean that in objective terms he actually is right.*"

    - They taught in an authoritative rhetorical fashion (delivering their speeches but not answering question, denying absolute value of morality, being self-contradicting and finally showing shallowness of thought). In this context Kerferd (1981:9) explains Zeller's view and states the following:

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[10] Benson, T, W, and Prosser, M, H, Readings in Classical Rhetoric, New York and London: Routledge, 2008, p.13.

> *"Their* [the sophists'] *calling things into question destroys all scientific endeavour at the root, their eristic has as its final result only the bewilderment of the interlocutor, their rhetoric is concerned with appearance and serves the cause of wrong as well as truth, their views of scientific knowledge are that it is worth little, their moral principles are dangerous."*

- The Sophists developed a view of truth as relative to places and cultures and even doubted that there could be an absolute truth.
- Some Sophists built their view of justice on the notion of agreement or convention called in Greek '*nomos*'.
- 'Sophistic rhetoric' is nothing but a "*mirage*". In his book "*Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?*" Edward Schiappa (1991:5) emphasizes that Sophistic rhetoric is actually a "*mirage –something we see because we want and need to see it- which vaporizes once carefully scrutinized.*"
- Sophistic rhetoric is largely a fiction. (ibid: 14).
- The Sophists were relativists who eschewed any positive notion of "truth" in favour of subjectivism (They were more concerned with teaching political success than pursuing truth). Schiappa (1999:8).

- **Positive aspects:** against those negative aspects of being 'bad Sophists', we may suggest the following positive points based on James Herrick (2013: 27-50):

  - **Insight in logic and rhetoric:** most of the Sophists were interested in logic and contributed to the development of logic as well as the art of eloquentia.
  - **Diplomacy:** many Sophists were either diplomats or advisors for the diplomat, as they were well acquainted with various cultures and had mastered the art of persuasion.
  - **Educators and education**: the Sophists educated the youth according to a certain trait both in character and skills by giving special training. The Sophists claimed that they could make the youth better (adequate and superior politicians and influential / good manipulators relying completely on tricky emotions rather than a methodical investigation) by teaching them the strong ability of persuasion 'eloquentia'. George Pullman (1994:58) views Sophistic rhetoric as:

"*the only peaceful way we can make decisions and persuade other people … This rhetoric may be a balancing, antithetical reasoning from which relatively good decisions may be made, or it may be a kind of mood-altering drug. A person could take this drug innocently and become an instrument of the rhetor's will. Or a person could take this drug willingly, aware that the rhetor is manipulating emotions by constructing powerful fictions,… Sophistic rhetoric is always changing because circumstances are always changing. It cannot be fully and completely analyzed; therefore it cannot be rule-base.*"

- **Politics:** Gorgias remains the best example. He taught and mastered the skills of eloquentia very successfully in obtaining high positions in politics. Most of the Sophists were remembered more primarily as politicians than as Sophists: they were claimed to be active political consultants, advising influential politicians, giving advice, helping making legislation and conceiving political plots.

- **Cultural anthropology:** traveling from city to city made the Sophists well acquainted with multiple cultures, and this awareness of being 'pluralists' (of the culture) made them cultural relativists and individuals of great values.

- **Linguistic inquiry:** being itinerants, the Sophists were able to speak several languages and were interested in the inquiry of grammar and the linguistic structure.

- **Sociology:** the fact of traveling widely provided the sophists with new and large variety of acquaintances. Thus, their huge amount of knowledge about the societies, social structures and its conventions was the first, which could claim the start point of the sociology.

In short, the Sophists were foreigner innovators, itinerants, entertainers, lawyers and speech writers who had relocated to Athens. They were highly successful advocates in court who drew attention, and taught principally the study and mastery of persuasive discourse (or rhetoric) that brought them both fame and controversy. In other words, Sophists were so controversial that their schools of rhetoric were identified by Andrew Ford as "*a public nuisance and worse*" in (James Herrick, 2013:36). Susan Jarratt (1991:2) describes them as

"aliens, stranger guests to Athens, who impressed its citizens with their expertise as diplomats, teachers and performers ... The Sophists were said to be intellectually meretricious, performing feats of verbal trickery and enchantment."

1.4 Plato's viewpoints

1.4.1 On Sophistry

While reading Plato, one may consider that he is complicated, diversified, even audacious, and sometimes paradoxical. Plato portrays the Sophists on both sides, positively and negatively. He uses the term "Sophist" very carefully and always in such a way as to highlight the important differences between Sophistry and Socrates. According to Plato, the Sophists are clearly not philosophers. He emphasizes on the idea that the Sophists were wicked, dangerous and covertly immoral. Plato assertively distinguishes immoralism from Sophistry, and depicts the Sophists as teachers of traditional Greek morality. In other words, Plato's critique of the Sophists is that the Sophists are not immoral, but that they approach morality intuitively and traditionally rather than philosophically (Anton Powell, 1995:572-74). Plato condemns the Sophists partly for the use of their persuasive skills forcefully, effectively and profitably to defend famous drug dealers and notorious criminals (crime bosses). He emphasizes on the Sophists' interests in money, honour and power, as well as stresses on that the Sophists lack knowledge of the difference between the necessary thing and good things (Marina McCoy, 2008:126). Bruce A. Kimball (1986) assesses the idea of the decline of morality and states the following:

"The Sophists... attended more to devising persuasive techniques than to finding true arguments, and this amoralism exacerbated the disintegration of the ethical tradition and led to their condemnation."[11]

Following Plato's and Aristotle's dichotomy on Sophistry and rhetoric, George Grote (1850) at his turn affords us with the following description:

"[The Sophists are] ostentatious imposters, flattering and duping the rich youth for their own personal gain, and encouraging their pupils to the unscrupulous prosecution of

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[11] Bruce A. Kimball quoted in Williams, J, D, An Introduction to Classical Rhetoric: Essential Readings, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, p.21.

ambition and cupidity. They are even affirmed to have succeeded in corrupting the general morality, so that Athens had become miserably degenerated and vicious" Quoted in Kerferd (1981: 5).

In fact, in his dialogue The '*Sophist*', Plato exposes and exhibits the blatant reality of the Sophist. With humour, mockery and absurdity, Plato provides us with seven definitions (ibid: 4-5) concerning Sophistry stated as follows:

- **1st Definition:** a hired hunter after rich young men and rank. Who purports / intends to teach excellence.

- **2nd Definition:** a man, a merchant, or even a retail dealer who sells and buys knowledge (a travelling salesman of knowledge / a manufacturing trader of learning).

- **3rd Definition:** one who sells the wares in small quantities (retailer).

- **4th Definition:** a man who sells goods that he has manufactured in person for his customers (a seller of his own productions of knowledge).

- **5th Definition:** a combative / disputer/ debater or controversialist who deals in disputations and fights to earn money in private arguments (to make money from the discussion of right and wrong).

- **6th Definition:** a purifier of wrong opinions in the soul by means of the technique of refutation.

- **7th Definition:** a producer of images in men's souls, and imitator of the wise person, who is aware of his own ignorance when teaching via private cross questioning (a counterfeiter of philosophy, ignorantly framing contradictions that are based on appearances and opinions rather than reality).

In short, Plato's Sophists are no more than foreigners who only care about making money and who brag about works of their own manufacture. Plato ridicules the sophists for their philosophical naiveté, their pedagogical ineffectiveness, their boastfulness and their sham doctrines. Indeed, he vehemently criticised the Sophistic rhetoric and the rhetorical practices of Athenian democracy, and he asserted that the mankind had no hope to achieve political progress unless politics came under the guidance of philosophy.

1.4.2 On Rhetoric

Plato believed in the idea of separating the philosophers from the Sophists. In his dialogue the '*Sophist*', he clearly outlined the specificity of the differentiation of what a Sophist is and how he totally differs from a philosopher and a statesman. According to Plato the word 'Sophist' always denotes someone who is opposed to philosophy, that is to say, Plato undermines the status of the Sophists, and considers them being dangerous fraudsters and swindlers who charged fees for their intellectual instructions (they sold) and used their artful / crafty skills to debate any issue with fallacious arguments (Kerferd, 1981:24-26). Advocates (rhetoric's staunchest opponents) like Plato, Aristotle and some other thinkers, whether pro or against rhetoric, they all (more or less unwillingly) recognise the potential danger of 'sophistic trick' (to mislead an opponent), and acknowledge that rhetoric represents a dangerous threat to the moral basis of political life.

Plato condemns sophistic rhetoric not because it is rhetorical, but because he views it destructive. The term 'sophist' as Plato reveals through his dialogues (especially in 'Gorgias' and 'Phaedrus'), suggests and reflects an appearance of knowledge without substance, and that the sophists (wise) use probabilities (*eikos*) and semblances / pretences (*eidolai*) for the sake of persuading an audience. We may reinforce this idea of teaching fallacies[12] and corrupting or using a form of flatteries with the following passage:

"*And Tisias and Gorgias? How can we leave them out it is they who realized that what is likely must be held in higher honor than what is true; they who, by the power of their language, make small things appear great and great things small; they express modern ideas in ancient grab and ancient ones in modern dress; they who have discovered how to argue both concisely and at infinite length about any subject?*" Phaedrus (267a-b) in John M. Cooper (1997:543-44).

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[12] The word **fallacies**: Aristotle places it in the context of dialectic in which one person attacks a thesis and another person defends it. In this respect, fallacies are false moves employed in the attacker's efforts to refute the defender's thesis. Thomas Sloane (2001:295).
Fallacies are used in many forms in our modern communications, where the intention is to influence behaviour and change beliefs, such as the mass media today which may resort to this particular technique of misleading and cheating including: advertisements, politics, opinions-based news shows, newspaper editorials and propaganda (for any further research, see: Eemeren, F, V, and Garssen, B, and Meuffels, B, 2009, Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness, pp.1-4).

That is to say, Plato insists on the need of true knowledge, highlights the sophists' defaults in transforming the truth (using rhetoric as a means of deceit instead of seeking truth) and points out that the sophists are no more than 'insincere imitators' of truth.

"*Sometimes, in fact, whether you are prosecuting or defending a case, you must not even say what actually happened, if it was not likely to have happened - you must say something that is likely instead. Whatever you say, you should pursue what is likely and leave the truth aside: the whole art consists in cleaving to that throughout your speech*" Phaedrus (272e-273a) (ibid: 549).

On the one hand, Plato criticised rhetoric on the grounds that it does not embody an adequate conception of justice, and is thus dangerous. The sophists sought persuasion about justice by manipulating public opinion (*doxa*) (James Herrick, 2013:52). Plato condemns rhetoric as "foul" and "ugly" (Gorgias, 463). This idea was taken up by another great philosopher John Locke (1690) who seemed tremendously influenced by Plato's view. He writes in his famous and influential 'Essays on Human Understanding':

"*if we speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement; and so indeed are perfect cheats*" (ibid:2).

One of the influential tools used in stirring the public's ideas and morals is non-other than rhetoric. It can be broadly defined as an effective usage of language to leave impression on listeners. Being mastered by anyone by means of mere practice despite absence of prior knowledge has made rhetoric a powerful means widely used in gaining power in law courts and assemblies. And since it has always been regarded as a counterpart of sophistry; as demonstrated by Socrates in Gorgias: "*the sophist and the rhetor, you blessed man, are the same thing, or pretty close and nearly resembling*" Gorgias (520a) [13] , it has urged philosophers to direct their attention to rhetoric in an effort to outline its effectiveness and compare it with philosophy.

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[13] Plato, Gorgias, trans. James H. Nichols Jr., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, p.120.

Plato has always been known for his open disapproval to sophistry and thus to rhetoric. Despite what sophists say about rhetoric, to Plato it is nothing but a genre of flattery to please the other:

"[Rhetoric] *seems to me then ... to be a pursuit that is not a matter of art, but showing a shrewd, gallant spirit which has a natural bent for clever dealing with mankind, and I sum up its substance in the name flattery ... well now, you have heard what I state rhetoric to be – the counterpart of cookery in the soul, acting here as that does on the body*" Gorgias (385 B.C.).[14]

Besides being a "*counterpart of cookery*" Plato continues defining rhetoric and tearing it apart in his dialogue as a "routine" and not an art, as opposed to what it is believed to be:

"*not an art but a routine, because it can produce no principle in virtue of which it offers what it does, nor explain the nature thereof, and consequently is unable to point to the cause of each thing it offers. And I refuse the name of art to anything irrational*"[15] Gorgias (465a).

If we look closely to how Socrates defines rhetoric in Plato's dialogue, one would notice the reoccurrence and focus on how rhetoric is associated and mainly concerned with pleasuring the "body" in contrast with Plato's idealistic philosophy that deals with virtue or the "soul" in reaching true knowledge, which can be considered as the main point of conflict between rhetoric and philosophy in Plato's approach.

Being solely based on persuasion, rhetoric can be true or false since it leads to belief and not knowledge. Therefore, with rhetoric's power of persuasion and lack of distinct line between what is true and untrue, it poses a threat in giving birth to demagoguery and having multiple versions of the truth.

Such style of language cannot be accepted by Plato's methodological approach to ensure prevailing justice. Thus, Plato has severely attached sophistry- in the symbol of Gorgias and other fellow sophists- in one of his famous dialogues; Gorgias, to show the fogginess surrounding rhetoric style opposed to the direct way of the philosophical method.

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[14] Plato in Benson, T, W, and Prosser, M, H, Readings in Classical Rhetoric, trans. W.R.M. Lamb, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 19, 21.

[15] Plato in Matsen, P, P, and Rollinson, P, and Sousa, M, Readings from Classical Rhetoric, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1990, p.73.

In other words; Plato is mainly questioning the morality of rhetoric more than anything else in this dialogue and showing the confusion of sophists about the core of rhetoric itself and showing how sophists are ignorant about the style they teach.

On the other hand, in his dialogue *Phaedrus* one would notice the difference in approaching rhetoric this time. Instead of the heated dialogue in *Gorgias* in understanding the meaning of rhetoric, Plato is trying to lay an infrastructure to what constitutes a true rhetoric. Rhetoric has been revisited here to be as "art on enchanting" that is used for the good and the bad ends alike:

"is not rhetoric, taken generally, a universal art of enchanting the mind by argument; which is practiced not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in all equally right, and equally to be esteemed" Phaedrus (261a-b) in James D. Williams (2009:210).

This can give way to the possibility of rhetoric and philosophy to reach knowledge through a concrete methodology, which will be elaborated in the following Aristotelian approach.

1.5   Aristotelian viewpoint

Initially started by the sophists, rhetoric was seen as a tool to turn a weak debate strong and vice versa, regardless of whether the argument eventually led to the attainment of truth or not. Through the use of complicated analogies and bombarded metaphors, the sophists' rhetoric was the largely sought after art of debate until Aristotle challenged their unethical concept in *The Art of Rhetoric* where he sought virtue and truth alongside style. Aristotle defines rhetoric as:

"The faculty (dunamis)[16] *of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion"* (1355b) in James Herrick (2013:72).

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[16] Dunamis (synamis) later translated by W. Rhys Roberts (1954) as "faculty", which may be translated today as "strength", "power", "ability", or "capacity". According to the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, volume 1, the word "dynamis" goes back to the fifth century BCE, which denotes a source of power in persuasion, i.e., the earliest efforts to structure language to enhance persuasion reveal that arrangement could be used as hurstic device for argumentative effect. For further readings go to Sloan, T, O, Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, Vol.1, 2001, p.40.

Following Aristotle's famous dictum on '*the art of persuasion*' (rhetoric) already stated above, one may synthesise that "the available means of persuasion" would thus suggest the available means of leading audience/hearers to believe, trust, or have faith in the speaker's words. Aristotle thus reacts against those sophists who would reduce the art of rhetoric to mere formulae, a set of rules which later create influence, and finally argues it is a faculty of the mind to invent, select, and dispose such means to the end of persuasiveness. Scott F. Crider (2009:38).

However, because Aristotle was aware that audiences are intellectually miscellaneous and thus logical arguments alone would be too difficult for them to grasp, he included his three rhetorical proofs; "*ethos*" depending on the moral and ethical character of the speaker, "*pathos*" which puts the hearer into the desired frame of mind, and "*logos*" that is the speech itself and the logical arguments thereof. These proofs are also commonly recognised as the Aristotelian triad (figure illustrated below); all of them are equally interrelated since the orator has to be of a credible and trustworthy character in order to sway the thinking of his audience within a logical context.

(Sender/speaker/communicator)
*Ethos/*orators

M E A N I N G

Context

Universe

Logos
(Logic/ reasoning of
the text) = information

Pathos
(Emotions/values of
the audience)

Figure 1. Aristotelian rhetorical triad (Aristotle triangle).

Adapted from Andrea A. Lunsford and Cheryl Glenn (1990:175).

We may put more emphasis on this art of persuasion or conceptual tool (modes) for composing and analysing acts of communication by showing the following detailed diagram bellow:

Speaker/ creator of the message
Ethos

tone   context

Positions him/herself being:
- **credible**
- **correct** and
- f**air**

Intension
Aim & Purpose

Text /message Should be :
- **consistent**
- **deductive**
- **objective and**
- **academically focused**

context

Put & move the audience:
- **in the appropriate emotional states**
- **to care about the message**

purpose

Logos
Thesis/reason and invention = message

mode ←——————→ context

Pathos
Audience/ reader/ listener

Figure 2. Based on the Aristotelian rhetorical triangle.

Adapted from Hernández-Campoy (2016:7).

Note that: the word 'context' already stated in the above diagram stands for the place of publication (the rhetorical settings in which speeches are delivered), the ongoing conversation about the subject, and the social or cultural circumstances in which the text is embedded (subject, occasion and audience).

One has to target his/her audience effectively through the power of three vectors: *ethos, pathos* and **logos**. According to Deborah Tannen (1995), in her seminal article entitled

'The Power of Talk' "*communication isn't as simple as saying what you mean. How you say what you mean is crucial and differs from one person to the next.*"[17]

Consider the following figure that symbolises the dynamic performance of the three elements of persuasion:


Figure 3. *Ethos*, *pathos* & *logos* **egocentricity.**
Adapted from Herbert Gottweis (2007:245-48).

We may conclude then, that *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* (ethical means) are strongly tied / interrelated, vital and prominent in the history of oral and written communication. We approach rhetoric through these three dimensions, so that to reach the audience effectively. Although each of these pillars (*ethos*, *pathos* and *logos*) can be addressed in isolation, they work together (intertwined) to reinforce each other and add more strength to any delivered message.

Following the three means of persuasion defined above, Aristotle gives way to five bases on which any given rhetorical speech needs to stand, the five canons (crafts/procedures) of rhetoric are arranged and defined as follows:

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[17] Barbara Tannen quoted in Flannery, Jr, W, J, The Lawyer's Field Guide to Effective Business Development, American Bar Association, 2007, p.53.

- **Invention:** Known in Greek as (*heuresis*), whereas known in Latin as (*inventio*)[18]. According to Aristotle, invention revolves around finding out planning the best means of persuasion. This first step, widely recognised as the most difficult of all, lays the foundations to the other four canons as it involves creating something out of the nothingness, that is, to invent the purpose of the whole speech, the rationale, and the themes thereof. There are several factors determining this phase such as the audience addressed, the means of persuasion tackled, and the type of speech whether it is deliberative, judicial, ceremonial, etc.

   Corbett (1990) defines it as the "*discovery of what is to be said*"[19], in other words, the term 'invention' is central to the rhetorical process, provides guidance, frames and tests judgements, interprets texts, and finally analyses audiences.

- **Arrangement:** a term that refers to *taxis* in Greek and *Dipositio* in Latin. This second phase involves the organization of the part of speech or text to attain the ultimately desired persuasion. Zeineb Ibrahim et al. (2000) write the following:

   "*Arrangement is the organization of elements of a discourse in order to place its ideas in the way most likely to move a particular audience or to achieve a particular persuasive end.*"[20]

   Aristotle divided speech into five parts as follows:

   1. **Exordium:** "*commonly referred to as the introduction, is the first part of the disposition. The aim of the exordium is to make the audience attentive, benevolent, and keen on learning*"[21]. After the speaker has captured the audience's attention, he will then show knowledge, credibility, and liability in order to engage, lastly, the speaker will ensure that the audience is aware of his discussion topic. Aristotle states the following:

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[18] Kennedy, G, A, A New History of Classical Rhetoric , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p.4.
[19] Corbett quoted in Ibrahim, Z, M, and Aydelott, S, T, and Kassabgy, N, Diversity in Language: Contrastive Studies in Arabic and English Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2000, p.94.
[20] Ibid, p. 99.
[21] Mral, B, and Karlberg, M (1998) quoted in Mahdessian, N, The communication Strategies of Bush and Obama: An In-depth Analysis of the Rhetoric of Presidents Bush and Obama on the Annual State of the Union Address, Stockholm University, 2010, p.14.

"provide a sample of the subject, in order that the hearers may know beforehand what it is about ... so then he who puts the beginning, so to say, into the hearer's hand enables him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the story .... So then the most essential of special function of the exordium is to make clear what is the end or purpose of the speech."[22]

Note that the 'exordium' today stands for a wide range of introductory genre such as: prefaces, introductions and forewords.

2. **Narratio:** it is the second part/component of the disposition (arrangement), also known as narration. It is the story behind the ideas in the text. A good narratio leads to the main point of the speech and is succinct enough to captivate the audience. The audience's mood plays a major role in determining the flow and outcome of speech (Mral and Karlberg, 1998, in Mahdessian, N, 2010:15).

In the same line of thought, Theresa Enos explains:

"narratio ... conveys statements of fact furnishing either background information or context for the case has being argued ...these facts .... provide an argumentative scaffold based upon history, precedent , or tradition"[23]

3. **Propositio/(partitio or division):** the proposal of the speech's main theme to the audience. In this section (propositio) the rhetor outlines what will follow, in accordance with what has been stated as the point at issue in the case. Timothy A. Lenchak writes:

"[Propositio] clarifies the points at issue and states exactly what is to be proved"[24]

4. **Argumentatio:** the fourth part of arrangement (disposition) where the speaker presents all of his arguments and refutations supporting a

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[22] Aristotle quoted in Donfried, K, P, and Beutler, J, The Thessalonians Debate: Methodological Discord or Methodological Synthesis?, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000, p. 221.

[23] Enos, T, Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition: Communication from Ancient Times to The Information Age, New York: Routledge, 1996, p.453.

[24] Lenchack, T, A, Choose Life!: A Rhetorical –Critical Investigation of Deuteronomy 28, 69,- 30,20, Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1993, p.65.

certain theme. In other words, the rhetor or writer has to arrange the material so as to bring forward new premises, to confer presence on certain elements and to extract certain arguments from the listeners or readers (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1988, in Timothy Lenchack, 1993:66).

Christopher W. Tindale (1999) defines argumentation as:

> "*the site of an activity, where reasons are given and appraised, where beliefs are recognized and justified, and where personal development is encouraged.*"[25]

5. **conclusio:** widely known as the epilogue to a speech, the summary and recapitulation in which the speaker sums up his arguments, ideas and logical proofs. In book III, chapter 19, Aristotle describes the concept 'Epilogue' (peroration/conclusion) as follows:

> "*... has four parts. You must (1) make the audience well-disposed towards yourself and ill-disposed towards your opponent (2) magnify or minimize the leading facts, (3) excite the required state of emotion in your hearers, and (4) refresh their memories*" (trans. by Rhys, W, R, 2010:157).

- **Style:** style is the third of Aristotle's five canons of rhetoric and is the focal phase hereof. This canon involves the artistic choices a speaker has to follow in order to attract the attention of his audience; for a dry speech full of logical arguments alone bores the hearers.

  In his *Rhetoric* III 1-12, Aristotle dedicates a lengthy volume to stylistic norms and types necessary for all orators, in order to elevate their speeches to the desired persuasive effect. While it is inarguable true that clarity is the virtue of successful rhetorical speech or text, banality is regarded as a vice conversely. A banal speech is one that is full of arguments yet fails to appeal to the audience due to its lack of lively analogies and thought-provoking metaphors. Aristotle (rhet.III.2, 1404b1-4) defines the good prose style, e. i., the virtue of prose style, as follows:

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[25] Tindale, C, W, Acts of Arguing: A Rhetorical Model of Argument, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999, p.1.

> *"let the virtue of linguistic form be defined as being clear, for since the logos is a sign, it would fail to bring about its proper function, whenever it does not make clear – and neither banal/mean/flat above the deserved dignity, but appropriate."*[26]

In order to rise above the dilemma of being either dignified or banal in rhetorical speech or text, Aristotle, in his theory of metaphor, extensively elaborated the importance of metaphors as a way out of tediousness. On the importance of words and style, Aristotle's *On Interpretation* includes the following:

> *"words spoken are the symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul; written words are the sings of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affection themselves, of which these words are primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies."*[27]

Put simply, just as much as written words are symbols of spoken words, the latter are representations of "*the affections or impressions of the soul*" which in turn represent all things or objects outside of the soul.

Consequently, and according to Aristotle Poetics (21, 1457b9-16 and 20-22), a metaphor is "*the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion*"[28].

These four types[29] are exemplified as follows:

1- From the genus to species relationship, where a more general term is used instead of a specific term. Aristotle uses the example of:

   "Here stands my ship", where "stand" is a more general way of saying "is anchored".

2- From the species to genus relationship, where a more specific term is used in place of a general term. Aristotle's example is as follows:

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[26] "Aristotle's Rhetoric", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. N.P., 1 Feb, 2010, Web. 6 July 2016. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/#8.1

[27] Aristotle in Harris, R, Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to Play Games With Words, London and New York: Routledge, 1988, p.27.

[28] Aristotle in Harmon, W, Classic Writings on Poetry, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, p.53.

[29] Ibid.

"Truly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought", where "ten thousand" is a specific term representing the more general "a large number".

3- From the species to species relationship, where one specific term replaces another. Aristotle exemplifies this as follows:

(a) – "With blade of bronze drew away the life", where "to draw away" is used for 'to cleave'.

(b) – "cleft the water with the vessel of unyielding bronze", where "to cleave" is used for 'to draw away'. Thus, both 'to draw away' and 'to cleave', are species of "taking away".

4- Metaphor from analogy, which consists of substitution between "X is to Y" – type relationship. For instance, old age is to life as evening is to day, so we can speak metaphorically about the "old age of the day" or the "evening of life".

Lastly, there is another major difference between Plato's approach to metaphors and Aristotle's. While the former and his mentors saw metaphors as sheer means of ornament that places the hearer to no profound effect, the later insisted that they bring about learning, and thus are cognitively quintessential in rhetorical speech or text. For instance, "*if someone calls the old age "stubble", we have to find a common genus to which old age and stubble belong; we do not grasp the very sense of the metaphor until we find that both, old age and stubble, have their bloom. Thus, a metaphor not only refers to a thing, but simultaneously describes the respective thing in a certain respect.*"[30]

- **Memory:** this canon is not just about giving a speech extemporaneously; for memory here includes three facets in which the speaker is delivering on the fly, the speech itself is memorable to the audience and the speaker has an impressive storage of rhetorical fodder that can be summoned whenever the need arises. Because of the fact that speeches in the past lasted for several hours, orators used some techniques to remember the content alongside the second canon of arrangement which made speech parts easier to deliver and grasp for both orators and hearers respectively.

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[30] Rapp Christof (2002) quoted in Livingston, R, Advanced Public Speaking: Dynamic Techniques, Xlibris Corporation, 2010, p.42.

- **Delivery:** the fifth and last canon is concerned with how to be effective in delivering a rhetorical speech using and emphasizing on the right gestures, tone of voice, and pauses. Undoubtedly, delivery correlates hand in hand with ethos, since it depends largely on the character of the orator. Likewise, pathos and logos are very essential for an effective delivery. Gideon Burton (2001) still maintains Aristotle's proposal saying:

  "Delivery obviously has much to do with how one establishes ethos and appeals through pathos, and in this sense is complementary to invention, which is more strictly concerned with logos."[31]

  In other words, effective deliveries are of great importance for maintaining credibility, bring the audience through logical claims, and finally stir emotions that will move the audience to action.

In short, the Sophists trained their young students to memorise great/impressive speeches and to debate by imitation and constant practice. Aristotle on the contrary taught and instilled his students the investigative, rational ability to discover what is persuasive in any given setting (James Herrick, 2013:72). Aristotle asserts that rhetoric is actually an art that can be studied systematically, simply because it is useful both for our social and political sciences. Thus, Aristotle (1355b) quotes the following:

  "things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges [audience members] are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly" (ibid)

That is to say, Aristotle emphasizes on the fact of being very careful and adequate in using rhetoric on both sides of an argument, so that the decisions of the judges (audience) will not be deceived because truth and wisdom alone are not enough to convince an audience. Everyone can argue and persuade intuitively, but rhetoric skills remain very essential and make opinions more effective.

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[31] Ibid, p.45.

1.6   Metaphor: definitions

Metaphor is defined as the substitution of one object with another, used to assist expression or understanding. It is an implied comparison between two unlike things that actually have something important in common. The metaphor, according to I.A Richards[32], consists of two parts: The tenor and vehicle.

The tenor is the subject to which attributes are ascribed. The vehicle is the subject from which the attributes are borrowed. Other writers prefer using the general terms ground and figure to denote what Richards identifies as the tenor and vehicle. Thus, metaphor expresses the unfamiliar (the tenor) in terms of the familiar (the vehicle).

Consider the following example:

All the world's stage,
And all men and women are merely players.
They have their exits and their entrances.   (William Shakespeare. as you like it 2/7)

This well-known quotation is a good example of a metaphor. In this example, "the world" is compared to a stage, the aim being to describe the world by taking well known attributes from the stage. In this case the world is the tenor and the stage is the vehicle. "Men and Women «are a secondary tenor and "players" is the vehicle for this secondary tenor. The metaphor is sometimes further analysed on the basis of the ground and the tension. The ground consists of the similarities between the tenor and the vehicle, whereas, the tension of the metaphor consists of the dissimilarities between the tenor and vehicle. In the above example, the ground begins to be elucidated from the third line:

"They all have their exits and entrances."

In the play, Shakespeare continues this metaphor for another twenty lines beyond what is shown here, making it a good example of an extended metaphor.

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[32] Ivor, A, R, The Philosophy of Rhetoric , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936,p.96.

The corresponding terms to 'tenor' and 'vehicle' in George Lakoff's terminology [33] are target and source. In this nomenclature, metaphors are named using the typographical convention 'target is source', with the domains and the word. "is" in small capitals (or capitalized when small caps are not available); in this notation, the metaphor discussed above would state "life is a theatre". In a conceptual metaphor the elements of an extended metaphor constitute the metaphor's mapping. In Shakespeare's passage above, for example, *'exits'* would map to death and *'entrances'* to birth.

Here is another example, when Neil Young sings, 'Love is a rose'. Following Lakoff's and Johnson's Metaphor Nomenclature, (1980)[34] , we may say then: 'rose' is the vehicle which carries 'love', the tenor. We add that there is a particular tension between the subject 'love' and the object 'rose' which is, in fact, absent from the surface meaning, i.e., 'the literal expression' (Prandi, 1999) [35] and that tension emerges from what is called 'the common ground'[36] between 'love and rose' which implies 'the blossoming'.

To sum up, 'love' is as alive as a splendid 'rose'. 'Love' is gorgeous, and it blossoms the same way the rose does.

The definition of metaphor is generally divided into "living" and "dead" metaphors, i.e., metaphors which are still considered "novel" versus those which have been incorporated into normal usage. The dividing line between these two is very hazy and may depend on the culture, language, region, dialect or jargon where it is found.

Metaphor is often used as a teaching tool, or to convey difficult concepts. It is found throughout languages and is considered by many to be essential to language. Common examples of metaphor include:

"The internet is an information superhighway" as a living metaphor, whereas,

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[33] Lakoff,G, and Johnson, M, Metaphors We Live By , Chicago, London: University of Chicago press , 1980.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Prandi, M : "Grammaire philosophique de la métaphore", in Charbonnel, N, and Kleiber, G, La Métaphore entre Philosophie et Rhétorique, Paris, 1999, pp. 184-206.
[36] Prandi, M, The Building Blocks of Meaning, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2004.
For further readings , see Chapter VII , pp.223-227+p.391.

"To get into the heart of the matter"

"Sweet-heart"

"Fire-man"   as dead metaphors.

"The eye of a needle"

Metaphor is often equated to simile; the difference being that the metaphor draws a parallel between concepts, while the simile points to poetic similarities. According to Raymond Chapman:

> *"Metaphor is a term sometimes used to include the more particular types of figure (synecdoche, metonymy, hyperbole, etc.). While it may be convenient to consider them more specifically, they certainly have the nature of metaphor which makes analogy by compression of the simile so that the overt ground of likeness is not verbalized. The implicit comparison contained in metaphor is the essence of figurative language".* [37]

Here are a few examples which will establish the relations of literary metaphor to common usage:

> *'I feed a flame within, which so torments me*
> *That it both pains my heart, and yet contents me'.*   (John Dryden, Hidden Flame)

> *'When I have seen the hungry ocean gain*
> *Advantage on the kingdom of the shore.'*   (William Shakespeare, sonnet 64).

A metaphor can be opened into simile and compressed again: like in the following example:

(Mrs Skewton) *"had a sharp eye, verily, at picquet. It glistened like a bird's, and did not fix itself upon the game, but pierced the room from end to end, and gleamed on harp, performer, listener, everything."*(Dickens, Dombey and Son, Ch. 21).[38] Here the stereotyped *"sharp*

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[37]Chapman, R, Linguistics and Literature: An Introduction to Literary Stylistics, London: Edward Arnold, 1973, p. 73.

[38] Dickens, C, The Complete Works of Charles Dickens (in 30 Volumes, illustrated): Dombey and Son, Vol.1, New York: Cosimo Classics, 2009, p.305.

In " *Dombey and Son* " ,Dickens explains : Mr. Dombey is a stiff, dignified man who rarely shows emotion, but the birth of his infant son, who is named Paul, is cause for rejoicing. Mr. Dombey longed many years for a child who would become the Son of his mercantile firm of Dombey and Son. The fact that Mrs Dombey dies shortly after the boy's birth does not particularly concern him; his attention centres entirely on the little infant. Mr Dombey also has a daughter, Florence, but she means nothing to him, for she cannot take a place in the firm.

eyes" metaphor develops into the animate simile of the bird, and the metaphoric possibilities of both ideas are exploited with *"pierced"* and *"gleamed"*.

1.7 The Process of Classification of Metaphor:

Over the years, metaphors have been categorised in a variety of ways by different linguists. Aristotle differentiated between simple or double metaphors, current or strange metaphors and common or unused metaphors. Broeck(1981) [39] categorises metaphor according to its form as follows: *"lexicalized"* metaphors (which have gradually lost their uniqueness and have become part of the established semantic), *"Conventional"* metaphors (which are more or less *"institutionalized"* in that they are common to a literary school or generations) and finally *"Private"* metaphors (which are the so-called *"bold"*, i.e., metaphors that are products of the creative mind of a writer). Black (1962)[40] on the other hand stressed that the only distinction is *'dead and live metaphors'*. Within the basic distinction, he further categorises metaphors as *'dormant'* (when the meaning of metaphor becomes unclear because the sentence has been shortened); *'active'* (when the metaphor is newly formed and fresh); *'strong'* (which has high emphasis); and *'weak'* (which has low emphasis). What Black calls *'weak'* metaphors are in fact what most people call dead ones. Considering different categories of metaphors in English, it is observed that Newmark's classification is more comprehensive than others for the reason that it is selected as a basis of analysis. In his work Chapman (1973:77) affirms that common metaphor falls into at least four degrees of being figurative in the awareness of users and recipients:

1- The obvious and blatant metaphor which is always in danger of becoming ludicrous by associating with others in 'mixed metaphor' of the type.

Here is an example:

'I smell a rat, I see it floating in the air, but I hope to nip it in the bud'

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[39] Broeck, R, V, D, "The Limits of Translatability Exemplified by Metaphor Translation", in Poetics Today, 2.4, 1981, p.75.
[40] Black, M, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962, pp.25-26.

2- The metaphor which is accepted as figurative because it puts an idea more vividly and forcefully than abstraction could do, but does not seem seriously deviant in any register :

'In the light of experience'.

3- The metaphor which is not regarded as figurative at all (*dead metaphors*) except when attention is drawn to it by gross '*mixing*' or by the difficulty of finding a non-metaphorical word to fill the same space :

Head:
- *The head of a page.*
- *The head of state.*
- *The head of government.*
- *The head of the department.*
- *The head of a queue.*

Face:
- *The face of a mountain.*
- *The face of the watch.*

Eye:
- *The eye of a needle*
- *The eye of a hurricane.*

Mouth:
- *The mouth of a hole.*
- *The mouth of river.*

Neck:
- *A bottleneck in production.*
- *The neck of a shirt.*
- *Neck of the woods.*

Shoulder:

- *The shoulder of a mountain.*
- *The shoulder of a jacket*

Heart:

- *The heart of the city.*

Arm:

- *The arm of a chair.*
- *The arm of a tree.*

Hand:

- *The hands of a watch.*
- *The hands of a basket.*
- *The hand of the sword.*

Foot:

- *The foot of the hill.*
- *The footnote.*

Consider the following examples in Kabyle:

Head:
[ʌqərrɒ]

- [ʌqərrɒ pəðrær]   (the head of the mountain) ⟶ meaning 'the summit'.
- [ʌqərrɒ pəʃrɔːf]   (the head of a hill).
- [ʌqərrɒ nətmæʃint]   (the head of a machine / an engine).
- [iχəf nətsəgniːθ]   (the head of needle).
- [iχəf nəlχiːɖ]   (the head of a string).

Face :
[uðəm]

- [uðəm ntəkθævθ]   (the face of a book) ⟶ meaning the inside of the
  book – the written part .
- [uðəm   nətḍəfʂi:ts]   (the face of plate).

Eye :
[θi:ɫ]

- [θi:ɫ netsæru:θ]   (the eye of a lock).
- [θi:ɫ nətsəgni:θ]   (the eye of a needle).
- [θi:ɫ ntəpu:rθ]   (the bull's eye) ⟶'l'œil de bœuf ' - it could be also the
  hole of the lock. [41]
- [θi:ɫ nətqəfælt]   (the eye of a button).

Mouth:
 [imi:]

- [imi: uðəkken]   (the mouth of the kitchen worktop).
- [imi: nəlɣɑ:r]   (the mouth of a cave).
- [imi: nəlvi:r]   (the mouth of a well).
- [imi: pwæsi:f]   (the mouth of a river).
- [imi: nəθtɔ:tɔ:ʃθ]   (the mouth of a hole).
- [imi: nəθdɒvsi:ts]   (the mouth of plate).
- [imi: ntəppu:rθ]   (the threshold).
- [imi: nelkæf]   (the mouth of a ravine/precipice).
- [imi: nlɑ:jənʂɒr] (the mouth of the spring).

 Neck:
[θɑmgʌɫ]

- [θɑmgʌɫ ntəqrɑ:ts]   (the bottleneck).

 Shoulder :
 [θæjəts]

- [θæjəts nətqəndɔ:rθ]   (the shoulder of a dress).
- [θæjəts nluzi:n]   (the shoulder of the factory) ⟶ meaning the right or
  left side of the factory .

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[41] A small oval window for an upper storey and sometimes set above a door, i.e., 'the magnifying glass'.

Heart:

[u:l]

- [u:l nətðəlæθ]   (the heart of the watermelon).
- [u:l ntemði:nt]   (the heart of the city).
- [u:l nətmæʃi:nt]   (the heart of the machine) ⟶ the engine.

Arm:

[iɣi:l]

- [iɣi:l[42] ubɑltɒ]   (the arm of a coat).
- [iɣi:l nelkətsen]   (an arm of fabric / material).
- [iɣi:l ntəsfi:fθ]   (an arm of string / thread).

Hand:

[æfu:s]

- [æfu:s nətfəlıu:ʃθ]   (the hand of the broom) meaning 'the broom-stick'.
- [æfu:s uɖəlæ]   (the hand of the basket).
- [æfu:s [43] ⎫
  [ifæssen[44] ⎭ ⟶ nəssæ]   (the hand / hands of a watch) ⟶ meaning the straps.
- [æfu:s nətmuɣħəlt]   (the hand of the rifle) ⟶ Meaning the stock.
- [æfu:s pɒfɖi:ʂ]   (the hand of a hammer).
- [æfu:s umehræz]   (the hand of a pestle).
- [æfu:s ntəppu:rθ]   (the hand of the door) ⟶ Skeleton key. [45]

Foot:

[ʌɖɑ:r]

- [ʌɖɑ:r nətmæʃi:nt]   (the foot of an engine) it could be a cooker / a sewing machine, etc.
- [ʌɖɑ:r nətɑ:vlæ]   (the foot of the table).

4- The metaphor which is totally 'dead' because its literal meaning is lost or obsolescent and known only to the student of language: 'ponder', 'depend',' 'preposterous'. This type is metaphorical only in a historical view. These metaphors which we all

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[42] [iɣi:l] in kabyle represents a means of measurement, i.e., (meter).
[43] [æfu:s] – is a reference to singular as opposed to [ifæssen] >
[44] [ifæssen] – ref .to plural
[45] Also known as "passingkey"- or a similar object capable of opening any lock regardless of make of type.

understand without having to think too hard. We do not even release that they are metaphors. For David Punter (2007) dead metaphor designates the following:

> "*A metaphor which has been used so often that it barely stands out as a metaphor at all and has descended to the level of cliché.*" [46]

A trope or a figure of speech that has lost its force and imaginative effectiveness through use and time automatically loses its strength of persuading, i.e., it no longer influences thought. Thus, this latter type has been conventionalized, lexicalized or 'dead' metaphor. In the same line of thought, Ungerer and Schmid (1996) [47] explain:

> "*The logic behind these labels is that trough its frequent association with a certain linguistic form, the figurative meaning of a word has become so established in the speech community* (i.e. Lexicalized). *When a unit of linguistic form and meaning is conventionalized and lexicalized, the metaphorical force of the word is no longer active; the metaphor is 'dead'.*"

Nelson Goodman (1976) echoes the notion in this way:

> "*As time goes on, the history may fade and the two uses tend to achieve equality and independence; the metaphor freezes, or rather evaporates, and the residue is a pair of literal uses-mere ambiguity instead of metaphor.*"[48]

1.7.1 Newmark's Classification of Metaphor:

In his work on translation, Newmark [49] (1988:106) mentioned perhaps the most extensive classification scheme for metaphors with six categories: 'dead', 'cliché', 'stock', 'adapted', 'recent' and 'original'.

- **Dead metaphor:** is a metaphor that loses its figurative and connotative meanings and is used like ordinary words. It is a metaphor where one is "*hardly conscious of the image*", i.e., a metaphor which cannot normally be recognised as a metaphor.

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[46] Punter, D, Metaphor: The New Critical Idiom, Routledge, 2007, p.146.
[47] Ungerer,F, and Schmid,H,J,An Introduction To Cognitive Linguistic, Addison Wesley Longman ,1996, p.117.
[48] Nelson Goodman quoted in Eubanks, P, A War of Words in The Discourse of Trade: The Rhetorical Constitution of Metaphor, Southern Illinois University, 2000, p.64.
[49] Newmark, P, A Textbook of Translation, Prentice Hall International, 1988, pp.106-12.

Newmark (ibid) argued that the vehicles of dead metaphors are often taken from terminology from "*space and time, the main part of the body, general ecological features and the main human activities.*" Newmark's examples of dead metaphors included: '*field, line, top, bottom* […] *fall, rise.*' Lakoff and Turner (1989) claim that a huge amount of so-called dead metaphors (conventional metaphoric expressions) are in fact alive. Thus, these metaphors may be highly conventional and effortlessly used, but this does not mean that they have lost their vigour in thought and that they are dead. On the contrary they are "*alive*" in the most important sense.

"*Determining whether a given metaphor is dead or just unconsciously conventional is not always an easy matter ... however, there are plenty of clear cases of basic conventional metaphors that are alive-hundreds of them- certainly enough to show that what is conventional and fixed need not be dead.*"[50]

- **Cliché metaphor:** was defined as a category of metaphors which lost their aesthetic sense and are used only in connotative function, in order to express thoughts more clearly often with a larger share of emotions. They are used "*emotively*" "*as a substitute of clear thought.*" Newmark (1988:107). In other words this type of metaphor is overused and no longer conveys any figurative meaning which means that the figurative force has been significantly reduced. Cliché metaphors however indicate to the reader a word or an expression that is not ordinary. Thus, clichés are metaphors which rely on overly familiar language, whether figurative or literal. Here are some examples: '*to stick out to smile*', '*transparent lie*', '*I lost my head*', '*as old as time*', '*explore all avenues*', etc.

- **Stock or Standard metaphor:** Newmark (1988:108) defines this type of metaphor as "*an established*" metaphor which can be efficient when used informally. He states "*a stock metaphor has certain emotional warmth and which is not deadened by overuse*" like '*he sees fear in my heart*', '*his life hangs on a thread.*' Such metaphors are usually applied in non-formal text. Examples of this type of metaphor include '*to oil the wheels*', '*keep the pot boiling*' and '*he's on the eve of getting married*'.

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[50] Lakoff, G, and Turner, M, More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphors, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989, p.130.

- **Adapted metaphor**: P. Newmark (1988:111) does not offer a definition for this specific type. These metaphors are actually stock metaphors but are adapted by the writer or speaker into a new context. While translating these structures Newmark suggested adapting metaphor in the target language according to a native speaker of the translation. In the process of translation of such metaphors the translator should strive to preserve the shape and the content. Consider Newmark's selected examples: *'sow division'* ⟶ lit-trans: (semer la division), *'get them in the door'* ⟶ lit-trans: (les introduire / aire le premier pas).

- **Recent metaphor:** Newmark (idid) categorises this metaphor as '*metaphorical neologism'*. These specific metaphors are produced via coining or as Newmark elaborates *"they are neologisms fashionable in the source language community."* In other words, they are categorised as slang and colloquial, they are specific to each language. They are new expressions which have quickly become popularised in the language such as: *'fuzz'* ⟶ (policeman), *'spastic'* ⟶ (stupid), *'skint'* ⟶ (without money), *'groovy'* ⟶ (good),etc.

- **Original metaphor:** Newmark (1988:112) considered these metaphors to be individual author's metaphors used by the author individually and are not common in everyday usage. He asserted that these are "[metaphors] *created or quoted by the SL* [source language] *writer.*" He adds that this type of metaphor *"contain*[s] *the core of an important writer's message, his personality, his comment on life, and though they may have a more or a less cultural element, these have to be transferred neat."* (ibid). Newmark emphasises that original metaphor enriches the target language and the examples he provides seem quite elaborate and even *'bizarre'*.

We notice that metaphor has gradually been categorised by a great deal of linguists starting from Aristotle moving progressively away from being considered a mark of a genius to being recognised as a widespread phenomenon in language, i.e., the use of the term 'metaphor' frequently provokes confusion because sometimes scholars seem to use it to refer to a particular linguistic expression and at other times to metaphor as a phenomenon.

1.7.2 Notional Classes of Metaphor:

According to Ullmann (1962)[51] and Leech (1969)[52], the most frequent types of conventionalized metaphors are:

- **Concretive metaphors:** uses a concrete term to talk about an abstract thing. In other words, concretive metaphors "*is the result of giving concreteness or physical existence to an abstraction*"[53], i.e., abstractions are given substance. Common examples in English include:
    - *The light of learning.*
    - *The burden of responsibility.*
    - *The pain of separation.*
    - *Vicious circle.*

Common examples in Kabyle include:

- [θæfæθ   nədɖuni:θ] lit-trans: (the light of life).
- [iɣili:f ðunəzgu:m   nədɖuni:θ] lit-trans: (the burden and anxiousness of life).
- [Λrrɔ:ħ jənnæðæm] lit-trans: (the soul is tortured / is beaten to death).
- [Λduni:θ θətskeɭɭiχ / θetsɣurrɔ:] lit-trans: (life betrays and plays tricks).

- **Animistic metaphors:** this attributes animate characteristics to the inanimate, i.e., inanimate nouns receive animate qualities. Vico (1725) an Italian philosopher, one of the most eminent thinkers in the field of metaphor states:

    "*In all languages, the greater parts of expressions referring to inanimate objects are taken by transfer from the human body and its parts, from human senses and human passions.*"[54]

    Consider the following examples in English:
    - *An angry/monotonous sky.*

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[51] Ullmann , S, Semantics: An Introduction to the Science of Meaning, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962, p. 214.

[52] Leech, G, N, A Linguistic Guide to English Poetry, London: Longman, 1969, p. 158.

[53] Oda, A, H, and Mohammad, M, M: "The Impact of Linguistic Context on Metaphoric Proverb Comprehension by Iraqy EFL Learners" in Fedhil AL-Hajaj, J, and Davis, G, University of Basrah Studies in English: Contemporary Studies in Descriptive Linguistics, Vol.16, Peter Lang AG,2008, p.212.

[54] Vico quoted in Ullmann(1962:214) for further reading see Vico 1948 [1725].

- *A sweet/happy home.*

- *A sad home.*

- *The heart of the forest.*

Consider the following examples in Kabyle:

- [jerfæ igənni] lit-trans: (the sky is angry).

- [θəʧæθ /θəssəvlæθ əlqɑː] lit-trans: (the ground swallowed/ate him).

- [θədʂɑːd θəvħiːrθ] lit-trans: (the garden smiled).

- [slælwən iðurær] lit-trans: (the mountains uttered trilling cries of joy)- (les montagnes ont lancé des youyous 'de joie')

- **Humanizing (Anthropomorphic) metaphor:** this ascribes characteristics of humanity to what is not human, i.e., non-human nouns are given human attributes.

  Consider the following:

  - *A charming / the friendly river.*

  - *A friendly or naughty city.*

  - *The laughing valleys.*

  - *The furious ocean.*

Here are some examples in Kabyle:

- [lætsruːnt Λtəʒjɔːr] lit-trans: (the trees are crying).

- [ləvħər ighəplən] lit-trans: (a furious ocean / sea).

- [θæmuːrθ jessuwħæʃen] lit-trans: (the frightening city).

- [θədʂɑjeɣd θziri] lit-trans: (the moon smiled to us).

- **Synaesthetic** [55] **metaphor:** this transfers meaning from one domain of sensory perception to another. In other words, it is based on transposition from one sense to another, from sound to sight, from touch to sound, from

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[55] Word Origin and History for synaesthetic also synesthesia, "sensation in one part of the body produced by stimulus in another", in some cases via French, from Modern Latin, from Greek syn - "together" (see syn-) + stem aisthe "to feel, perceive." Also psychologically, of the senses (colours having an odour, etc.)
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/synaesthetic
(Psychology) pertaining to synaesthesia, pertaining to stimulation of one sense which triggers a reaction in another sense (i.e. seeing a particular colour upon hearing a certain melody)
http://traduction.babylon.com/anglais/synaesthetic/

taste to smell or from feeling to smelling, etc. for instance when we speak of a 'warm' / 'cold' voice, we perceive a kind of similarity between warm or cold temperatures and the quality of certain voices. Paprotté and Dirven (1985:99) posit:

"*Synaesthesia denotes a process whereby one sensory stimulus may evoke a stimulus in a different sensory organ.*"[56]

Common examples in English include:

- *Warm colour* ⟶ touch /tactile in combination with sight /vision.
- *Loud perfume* ⟶ sound / hearing in combination with smell.
- *Sweet hold* ⟶ taste in combination with touch.
- *Inhale a soft weather* ⟶ feeling in combination with smelling.
- *Sweet music* ⟶ taste in combination with sound.
- *Sour smell* ⟶ taste in combination with smell.
- *Heavy explosion* ⟶ touch (great weight sensation) in combination with sound.
- *Heavy sorrow* ⟶ touch (carrying a heavy burden/weight sensation) in combination with feeling.

Here are some examples in Kabyle related to 'synaesthesia':

- [ʌmæn ziɖən] lit-trans: (sweet water).
- [ʌmæn imelħen] lit-trans: (salty water).
- [θæɣəʃθ iħlæn] lit-trans: (sweet melody/voice).
- [ʌrrɪħæ θæssəmæmθ] lit-trans: (a sour smell).
- [lʌɫər ʌzɑjæn] lit-trans: (loud perfume).
- [ʌnezgu:m ʌzɑjæn] lit-trans: (a heavy problem).
- [ʌnezgu:m ʌmɒqrɑn] lit-trans: (a big/huge problem).
- [ʌwæl ʌħni:n] lit-trans: (a soft/kind word).

We consequently notice and interpret that synaesthetic metaphors are expressions in which one sensory modality is described in the terms of another. Accordingly, a voice

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[56] Paprotté, W, and Dirven, R, The Ubiquity of Metaphor: Metaphor in Language and Thought, Vol. 29, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, John Benjamins Publishing Company,1985, p.99.

(hearing modality) can be described as sweet (taste modality) or a musical note (one again hearing modality) as sharp (taste modality). Similarly, colours (sight modality) are often defined as cold or hot (touch modality/ sensation).In the example 'warm colour', there may be some or other feature associated with fire that is transferred to colours, 'warm colours' being predominantly red or yellow in tone. In fact, it is not the percept of touch itself which is transferred to sight, but some other experience that co-occurs with the touch of heat, i.e., the colours of the fire or of something glowing that is actually transferred. 'Sweet' in sweet water in Kabyle utterance [Λmæn   ziɖən] implies the presence of the characteristic flavour and consequently of pleasant taste stimulating qualities found with (sugar, honey, ripe fruits, etc. Thus sweet water contrast with salty water. 'Sour' in sour smell in kabyle utterance [Λrɾiħæ θæssəmæmθ] is smell in terms of taste, which we may notate as 'smell→taste' (that should be read 'smell goes to taste').

We can sum up the different sensory transfers (the sensory modalities transfers) from the source to the target domain into the following two diagrams:


Figure 4. Model of metaphorical transfers among sensory modalities.
**(Adapted from Cacciari,1998: 129 after Williams,1976).**

Figure 5. Model of metaphorical transfers among sensory modalities
according to the data analysed above both in English and in Kabyle.
(Adapted from Cacciari, 1998).

Note that figure 2 represents the results obtained both for English and Kabyle synaesthetic metaphors (interpretations made via a specific diagram adapted from Cristina Cacciari,1998).

1.8   Figures of Speech:

Before we talk about the figure of speech devices. It is very important to look upon the meaning. Kennedy (1991) illustrates:

"*A figure of speech may be said to occur whenever a speaker or writer, for the sake of freshness or emphasis, departs from the usual denotations of words.*"[57]

Rhetorical figures generally mapped by two terms ' tropes' and 'figures' or 'schemes' are literally devices. When used effectively they bring a whole new meaning to written and spoken language. Figures of speech are not devices stating what is demonstrably untrue. Indeed they often state truths that more literal language cannot communicate; they call attention to such truths; they lend them emphasis. Perrine (1992) explains: "*figures of speech are another way of adding extra dimension to language.*"[58] In other words a figure of speech is any way of saying something than the ordinary way.

Figures of speech are just common in our everyday speech. They not only aim at increasing vividness and the impact of language, but also make language more powerful, more forceful, more explicit; thus make our communication more efficient and more effective, Manfred Kienpointner (2011) emphasises on this and claims: "*in ancient rhetoric, FSP* (figures of speech) *were characterized as a kind of ornament added to plain speech to improve its persuasive impact.*"[59]

Knickerbocker noted that figures and symbols are images used in a particular way to explore the less known through the known. He gives an example, that Joseph Conrad describes an old Chinese ship-owner as having *"a face like an ancient lemon".*[60]

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[57] Kennedy, X,J, Literature: an Introduction to Fiction Poetry and Drama , Boston-Toronto: Little and Brown,1991, p. 584 .

[58] Perrine, L , Literature: Structure, Sound and Sense, Harcourt: Brace Jovanovich college publishers,1992, p.65.

[59]Kienpointner, M: "Figures of Speech" in Zienkowski, J, and Östman, Jan-Ola, and Verschueren, J, Discursive Precmatics: Handbook of Pracmatics Highlights, John Benjamins Publishing company, 2011, p.102

[60] Knickerbocker, K, L, and Willard Reninger, H, Interpreting Literature, New York, Chicago, San Francisco. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, p. 366.

The images in this figure are the face and the lemon, the first unknown to us, the second well known. Our imagination will be required to transfer the relevant characteristics of the ancient lemon to the face, and we can see it as wrinkled, jaundiced, dried-up, oval-shaped, and toughened by time – but the irrelevant characteristics of the lemon we will allow to drop away. That is why we must make the proper association between the face and the lemon.

If we transfer a figure into the purpose object it means we have reached one level in order to understand the figure of speech but for the people who have no any ability in interpreting figurative meaning it means that he has 'an empty art' to understand it and cannot reach one level to understand it. We need to learn-even a few of figure of speech to enlarge our understanding and enjoyment of poetry.

Wren and Martin[61] write: "*figure of speech is a departure from the ordinary form of expression, or the ordinary course of ideas in order to produce a greater effect.*" This definition explained that figure of speech related what we called connotative meaning. A Figure of Speech is a word or words used to create an effect, often where they do not have their original or literal meaning. Arthur Quinn[62] in the same context states:

"*these figures of speech have been named and collected because they are, if used properly, extremely helpful in learning and teaching how to write, speak, read, listen better.*", and adds: "*the figure of speech help you see the choices available in a given context. And being able to see them helps you make them or judge them.*"[63]

As an integral part of language, figures of speech are found almost everywhere: in oral literature, polished poetry, prose and mainly in everyday speech. Whether conscious of it or not, we use figurative speech to convey messages with meanings clear, fresh and unexpected ways. Figures of speech not only help readers understand and stay interested in what we have to say, but also guide them operate intensely upon the feelings. James Potter in one of his relevant quotations claims: "*they* [figures of speech] *are immediate because they embody the meaning in imagery instead of expressing it abstractly.*"[64]

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[61] Wren, P, C, and Martin, H, High School English Grammar and Composition, New Delhi: Schand and Company Ltd revised Edition, 1995, P.297.

[62] Quinn, A, Figures of Speech: 60 Ways to Turn a Phrase, Routledge, 2012, p.5.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Potter, J, L, Elements of Literature, New York: the Odyssey Press, 1967, pp.56-57.

A figure of speech is said to be, when the meaning of the words has a "deep" meaning, which is different from the "surface" meaning.

Here are some examples:

1- a) I'm at sea ⟶ surface meaning (hereafter SM).

b) I'm lost / confused ⟶ deep meaning (hereafter DM).

2- a) She poured oil on troubled water ⟶ SM.

b) She calmed things down ⟶ DM.

3- a) His account of the accident is fishy. We have to get some other witnesses ⟶ SM.

b) Suspicious / unlikely to be true or something is /seem wrong ⟶ DM.

4- a) The minute I came in, I smelled a rat. Sure enough, I had been robbed ⟶ SM.

b) I believe something is wrong ⟶ DM.

5- a) You had better pull your socks up ⟶ SM.

b) You would better work hard / get a move or being more alert ⟹ SM.

6- a) My head is spinning with ideas ⟶ SM.

b) It means I'm not focused on one idea, but I have several different trains/my head is full of ideas ⟶ DM.

The same thing occurs in Kabyle, and we may exemplify this as follows:

1- a) [θləħu: fəθfəðnæn] (she walks on the toes) ⟶ SM.

b) [θəħrəʃ]/[θəzwʌr fjimæni:s] (she is cunning / skilful and vigilant) ⟶ DM.

2- a) [jəssuliji ʌsæwən] (he made/forced/compelled me to walk up-hill) ⟶ SM.

b) [jəssəlviji] + [imeħniji/ jessætsviji] (he caused me trouble / he made me crazy) ⟹ DM.

3-
    a) [tswærzɤ siswæddæw ælmi ðsufəlæw] (I'm chained from up to down) ➔ SM.

    b) [urəzmiræɤ ðæʃæxəðməɤ] (I'm very busy / I can't do something without his/her consent) – depending on the context situation we are talking about ➔ DM.

4-
    a) [leθgədzəm θæsæs]⁶⁵ (his liver is getting cut) ➔ SM.
    [læθətsudu:m θæsæs felæs] (his liver is bleeding inside) ➔ SM.

    b) [θɤɑɖiθ / θɤɑɖits] ➔ DM.
    [leθətsru fəlæs / lejətsru fəlæs] (She / he is worried about him / her) ➔ DM.

5-
    a) [jənʃəw silɤəðmæ] (he became bold from hard work) ➔ SM.

    b) [jætsəv / imeħæn] (he's exhausted) ➔ DM.

6-
    a) [iʃæv si θæzlæ] (his head turned white from running) ➔ SM.

    b) [iθæv / jæjæ] (he's very tired with hard work) ➔ DM.

7-
    a) [θʌrɤɑ θʌbbɒdi:w fəlæs] (my belly is burnt for him) ➔ SM.
    [ħɑrqaɤ fəlæs] (I'm burnt for him).

    b) [ugæðeɤ fəlæs] (I'm worried / troubled about him / her) ➔ DM.
    [nəʒmæχθ] (I miss him / her).

8-
    a) [jəḰmæs jimi:m] (his / her mouth is kept shut) ➔ SM.

    b) [urθəstɒqɒθæræ / uristɒqɒθæræ lehðɔ:r] (she /he is not talkative) ➔ DM.

9-
    a) [rzʌnɫ wennₙi:s] (his / her eyes are broken) ➔ SM.

    b) [jusætsi:d nædæm / jusæθi:d] (she / he is sleepy) ➔ DM.

10-
    a) [θəssufɤed ʌrɒħæni:s ðitslili:w] (she got the demon out of her) ➔ SM.

    b) [θərwɑ rrɑji:s] (she had fun / she enjoyed herself) ➔ DM.

11-
    a) [læθəli:nt θippuræ gqɒrrɔ:ji:w] (doors are opening in my head) ➔ SM.

    b) [iqɑrħiji uqɑrrɒji:w] (I have got a strong headache) ➔ DM.

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⁶⁵ The two utterances in "example 4" refer back to one common surface meaning, though the two verbs are different [leθgədzəm] – verb 1 + [læθətsudu:m] – verb 2,but both stand for the same deep meaning. (verb 1 + verb 2) .the two verbs here serve the same conjugation 'she + he'.

12- ⌠ a) [iħemled wæsi:f] (the river overflowed) ⟶ SM.

b) [θædɖærθ kæmel θusɑ:id] (the whole tribe came / all the members of the tribe came) ⟶ DM.

1.8.1 The Classification of Figures of Speech:

According to Rajni Sehgal (2001)[66] figures of speech may be classified as follows:

- Figures based on resemblance such as apostrophe, metaphor, personification and simile.
- Figures based on contrast such as oxymoron.
- Figures based on association such as metonymy and synecdoche.
- Figures based on overstatement or extension of ideas such as hyperbole.

1.8.1.1 Apostrophe: the term apostrophe comes from (the Greek verb apostrephein), literally means *'a turning away'*[67]. In the original oral situation this indicated that the speaker turned away from his primary or general audience in order to address another or a more specific audience.[68] The Homeric invocation of the Muses, for example, is one form of apostrophe. However, as a figure of speech, the apostrophe implies the turning towards something. The grammatical case connected with the apostrophe is therefore the vocative: the apostrophe is grammatically speaking, a turning of the discourse from the third person to the second person, directly addressing someone or something as 'you'[69]. Apostrophe as a literary term, is a direct address to someone dead, absent or a personified object or idea as if they were present and alive and capable of hearing and understanding what is being said. Quintilian, speaking, of oratory, defines apostrophe as follows: "*a diversion of our words to address some person other than the judge*"[70] and though Quintilian advises his students of rhetoric not to imitate the style of historians because it is too much like that of the poets, thus Quintilian suggests:

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[66]Sehgal, R, Objective English, Sarup and Sons, New Delhi, 2001, pp.2-6.
[67] Lausberg, H, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study, trans. Bliss, M,T and Jansen, A and Orton, D, E, ed. Orton, D, E and Dean Anderson, R., Leiden: Brill, 1998, p.338.
[68] The function of the apostrophe has been reevaluated by deconstructionist critics such as Jonathan Culler and Paul de Man; see Kneale 1999, pp. 11 and 17-20.
[69] On theories of apostrophe from the antiquity to the modern period, see Kneal, J. Douglas, 1999, p.19; Franchet d'Espèrey, S, 2006,pp.164-65, and Sonnino, L, A, 1968,pp.33-34.
[70]Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, trans. H.E. Butler (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library, 1921), Vol II, Book IV Chapter 1, p. 41.

"[Apostrophe] *is entirely banned by some rhetoricians as far as the exordium is concerned, and for this they have some reason, since it would certainly seem to be more natural that we should specially address ourselves to those whose favour we desire to win.*"[71]

Yet, Quintilian allows that occasionally, and states on the same process: "*some striking expression of thought is necessary… which can be given greater point and vehemence.*"[72]

Consider the following apostrophes in English literature:

'*Blue Moon, you saw me standing alone*
Without a dream in my heart
Without a love of my own.'   (Lorenz Hart, "Blue Moon", 1934)[73]

'*Twinkle, twinkle, little star,*
How I wonder what you are.
Up above the world so high,
Like diamond in the sky.'   (Jane Taylor, "The Star", 1806)[74]

This nursery rhyme from 'The Star', written by Jane Taylor, is a child's address to a star. Talking to a star being an imaginary idea, this rhyme makes for a classic example of apostrophe.

"*Hello darkness, my old friend*
I've come to talk with you again"   (Paul Simon, "The sounds of Silence", 1964)[75]

Paul Simon wrote these verses 'The Sounds of silence' right after the murder of John F. Kennedy.

"*Sweet Thames! run softly, till I end my song.*"

(Edmund Spenser, Prothalamion,1596) [76]

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71 Ibid, p.41.
72 Ibid.
73 Lorenz Hart quoted in Gurley, John G, Ten Fantasy Lectures on the Sun, Moon, and Stars, RoseDog Books, 2011, p.115.
74 Jane Taylor quoted in Gay,W, The 'Monster' Songwriter's Manual: A Personal Look at The Craft of Songwriting, Xlibris Corporation,2009,p.36.
75 Paul Simon quoted in Culler, J, Theory of Lyrics, Harvard University Press, 2015, p.216.
76 Spenser, E, The Works of Edmund Spenser: A Variorum Edition, The Minor Poems Part Two, ed. Greenlaw, E, and Grosvenor Osgood, C, and Morgan Pedelford, F, and Heffner, R, Johns Hopkins Press, 2002, p.660.

This is a long verse (a nuptial song) that Edmund Spenser composed in honour of the twin marriage of the Duke's daughters of Earl of Worcester, Elisabeth Somerset and Katherine Somerset.

Consider now the following utterances in Kabyle while apostrophizing nature:

The great Berber poet, philosopher and the most well-known wise man in Kabylie Si Mohand ou-Mhand[77] in his lyrics said:

1-[ʌjiðuræʁ ndʒərdʒər ʌnħæl rəpwi ʌðaʁiʂʂar] lit-trans: (Mountains of

Djurdjura! We implore/ beseech God to shield us).

2-[əslæm nəliɑh fəliæwən ʌʂʂɒlæħ nətmu:rθ ʌgi nusæd sətɑɛɑ: ðwænu:z

tsnəfχæ ðəgnæʁ urθəlii] lit-trans: (peace of Allah be upon you good men of this

country, we arrived with obedience and humility, arrogance / vanity is not with us).

3-[tsḴilæḴ ʌjuli:w ihʃi:ʃ bɑrkæk tsnəfʃi:ʃ θətswæwəχðəd̪ wər θəsɛid̪ ħəd]

lit-trans: (I implore you my heart be pertinacious stop being capricious and spoiled,

you are broken / splintered and you have nobody at your side).

Here are some verses from the dead singer Matoub Lounès[78] using the 'vocative' form 'you':

4-[slævits ʌjevæħri] lit-trans: (play it gentle breeze).

[nu:ʁəd ʌvri:ð nətnəlii] lit-trans: (we took /chose the freedom path).

[slævits ʌjevæħri] lit-trans: (play it gentle breeze).

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[77] Si Mohand ou-Mhand At Hamadouche born in Tizi Rached about (1845 -1906) in Ain El Hammam. He descended from an important family, and was educated in a traditional, religious teaching. (Hence the title 'Si' (doctor) is added to his name). His life was marked by the strong repression which followed the Kabyle revolt in 1871 against the French colonial rule. For any additional guidance on Si Mohand Ou-Mhand's poetry and achievements check the following: Mammeri, M, "Yenna-yas Ccix Muhand", "Cheikh Mohand a dit", Laphomic, Alger, 1989 – Adli,Y, Si Mouhand ou Mhand:Errance et révolte,Paris Mediterranee,2001.

[78] Lounès Matoub (1956-1998). He began his career as a singer under the patronage of the established Kabyle singer Idir. He recorded his first album 'Ay Izem' (The Lion) in 1978, which actually revealed a phenomenal success. He went on recording 36 albums, as well as he wrote songs for other artists. He gave his first major concert in April 1980, at the time of the "Berber Spring" protest movement in Kabylie. His music is an attractive mixture of oriental Chaabi orchestration with politicized Berber (Tamazight) lyrics, and covers a broad variety of topics including the Berber cause, democracy, freedom, religion, Islamism, love, exile, memory, history, peace and human rights. Unlike the Amazigh poets and musicians who preceded him, Matoub's style was direct and confrontational.

[Ʌssægi ðəgæssəni]   lit-trans: (today in that day).

(taken from [slævits Ʌjevæħri], 1981).

5-[Ʌjeðrær gər iðurær] lit-trans: (you mountain between mountains).

[Ʌjitij rʒu: ur ɤəlli]   lit-trans: (you sun wait don't set).

[səʃvæħæ nwən idnufrær]   lit-trans: (with your beauty we came into

existence /into view).

([slævits Ʌjevæħri], 1981).

6-[Ʌjafrɔ:χ ɛaʒəl ɛalli]   lit-trans: (bird ! hurry and take flight).

[siðurær næθjiræθən]   lit-trans: (to Aït Yiraten Mountains,).

[Ʌθwæsi:f ð wæð ɛajsi]   lit-trans: (Aït Wassif and Aït Aïssi,).

[Ʌtsuddær iwaɖijən]   lit-trans: (and fly over Wadhiyen villages,).

[səggəgni gɡəɤrɑn ɛeddi]   lit-trans: (get through Agwni Gweghran village,).

[innæsen jiwən jiwən]   lit-trans: (tell them one by one).

[fəslimæn ɛazəm sθəqsi]   lit-trans: (and ask them about Sliman Azem).

(taken from the poem [θiðəts jefren], 1988).

Let's illustrate this with some verses from the international singer 'Idir'[79] [ji:ðir] in Kabyle :

7- [əndu əndu Ʌjiɤi]   lit-trans: (get churned, get churned whey).

[fkəd θewæreʃθ əppu:ði]   lit-trans: (give us a lump of butter).

[Ʌkkən itsnətsmenni]   lit-trans: (this is the way we wish it).

(taken from, 'A Vava Inouva' album, 1976: 'Ssendu' song).

The following illustrations are a selection of our everyday social interactions corpus:

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[79] An international berber, Kabyle singer from Ben Yenni village. Idir (stage name) has been the ambassador of the Kabyle culture, especially the Kabyle music, with only his vocals and acoustic guitar. Idir has always used his status to claim his Berber (Amazigh) identity. His song entitled 'A Vava Inouva 'was and is still a great success in his career. Idir defended his national identity once again at "Le Zénith" in Paris in the spring of 2001 at the "21st Berber Spring", a celebration of Berber culture. And on July 8, he organised a special fund-raising concert to support the population in Kabylie when anti-government riots rocked the cradle of Berber culture in the summer of 2001. Idir was joined by a number of stars and thousands of Algerian and French fans who turned out to "Le Zénith" to support the population in Kabylie.

8-[ʌnsuwqəd ləswæq nwən lfæjðæ nʃɑlɪɑ:h ʌtsnæwi:] lit-trans: (we hunt through your markets and we will take profit nshallah) – this utterance is specially used when Kabylians get into the country as strangers.

9-[ħudæɤ ʌjeħni:n ʌqlæɤ ðilænejæḴ] lit-trans: (protect us affectionate God, we are under your protection/ we are in your care) – this utterance is specifically used when the elderly kabylians feel troubled.

10-[jeʧæk wæḴæl jetsu:k əzmæn ʌgmæ] lit-trans: (dust has eaten you, time has forgotten you my brother) – this utterance is addressed to the dead or to the missed shahid depending on the situation we are in.

11-[ʌslæm fəlɪæwən ʌḴri gətʂən ðæki əknirħæm rʌpwi ʌtsissæwsæ fəlɪæwən] lit-trans: (peace be upon you everyone resting here, Allah have mercy on you and expand your graves) – this utterance is a special 'douàa' when entering a Cemetery.

12-[ʌjemæn uɤæltəd uðeɤədʒædʒæθæræ] lit-trans: (come back water do not leave us) – this utterance is used when there is the cutting off water.

Apostrophe today is an invocation, an exclamatory[80] figure or address of speech. It occurs when a speaker breaks off from addressing the audience (e.g. in play) and directs speech to a third party such as an opposing litigant or some other individual, sometimes absent from the scene. The addressee is very often a personified abstract quality or inanimate object. The apostrophe was a common feature in funeral orations and poems, articulating the grief and sharing it with the family of the deceased, thus, Quintilian presented the figure of apostrophe along with that of '*exclamatio*' ('outcry'[81]) as a means of expressing grief or indignation. Lamy (1741:165) ranks the apostrophe among the vehement figures and states:

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[80] The term '*exclamatio*' is restricted to apostrophe by Rhetoric meaning (exclamation or interjection), which was used to express grief or indignation when the occasion seemed to be worthy such as in 'affections' which include: wonder, admiration, despair, wishing, indignation, protestation, misery and cursing. The vocative exclamation "O" is used while apostrophizing a beloved, the muse, God, time, or any other entity that can't respond in reality. For further reading see: Culpeper, J, and Kytö, M, Early Modern English Dialogues: Spoken Interaction as Writing, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.220.

[81] George Puttenham (2007) in his book entitled 'The Art of English Poesy' writes on "*Ecphonesis* or *outcry*": "*the figure of exclamation I call him the outcry because it utters our mind by such words as do show any extreme*

"l'apostrophe se fait lorsqu'un homme étant extraordinairement émû, il se tourne de tous côtés, il s'adresse au ciel, à la terre aux rochers, aux forêts, aux choses insensibles, aussi bien qu'à celles qui sont sensibles. Il ne fait aucun discernement dans cette émotion; il cherche du secours de tous côtés : il s'en prend à toutes choses, comme un enfant qui frappe la terre où il est tombé."[82]

Such extraordinary emotion implies that the apostrophe is one of the figures partaking of the sublime.

Here are some examples taken from literature:

Look at the following short passage how Mary Shelly uses apostrophe in her novel ('Frankenstein,'1818):

"Oh! Stars and clouds and winds, ye are all about to mock me; if ye really pity me, crush sensation and memory; let me become as nought; but if not, depart, depart, and leave me in darkness."[83]

Navarre Admiral, a protestant who faces his death with courage as murdered in his bed says:

"O God, forgive my sins."[84]

Consider Lamartine's apostrophic question:

"Objets inanimés, avez- vous donc une âme?"[85]

['O' inanimate objects, do you have a soul?] - (translation mine) -

Here is a piece of poem taken from Charles Baudelaire's great portrait of exile "Le Cygne" [the Swan]   while apostrophizing nature:

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passion, whether it be by way of exclamation or crying out, admiration or wondering, imprecation or cursing, obtestation or taking God and world to witness, or any such like as declare an impotent affection."
Puttenham, G, The Art of English Poesy: A Critical Edition, ed. Whigham,F, and Rebhorn, A,W, 2007,p.297.
[82] Lamy, B, La Rhétorique ou L'art de Parler, ed. F. Didot, 1741, liv. II. Chap. IX, p.165.
[83] Wollstonecraft, S, M, Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus, Phonexis Science Fiction Classics, Arc Manor LLC,2009,p.103.
[84]Hart, J, Shakespeare and His Contemporaries, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p.48.
[85] Alphonse de Lamartine, Oeuvres poétiques, Paris, Gallimard, 1963, p.392.

" *Eau, quand donc pleuvras-tu ? quand tonneras- tu, foudre ?* "[86]

[Water/rain when will you fall? When will you light / sound, thunder?] – (translation mine).

Here are some utterances in Kabyle taken sometime from poetry, and some other time from songs (lyrics in Kabyle) or simply from everyday speech:

Chikh Si Mohand ou Mhand in his poems [issefræ] said:

1-[Λjuːl Λndæ θərriḍ kifkif Λtsəvrəḍ bəssiːf Ḵnuː wer θətsæddi θjiθæ] lit-trans: (Oh! heart wherever you go, it's the same. You have to be patient, you have to bend/ lean forward so that you won't be hurt) – we have to state that this is just an approximate translation because of the specificity of the use of the Kabyle language.

2-[Λjeħniːn jessəḍħarən lħeq] lit-trans: (Oh! affectionate Lord 'Allah' who reveals /shows the truth).

[fiħæl mæ nəntɑq] lit-trans: (without asking / begging you).

[Λmʃum Λθidjes wæssis] lit-trans: (the wicked, his time is short / his day will come sooner).

Consider the following verses from Matoub Lounès using the apostrophic 'exclamatio':

3-[jΛ lemri fkiɣɑḴən uðmiːw] lit-trans: (Oh! mirror I gave you my face).

[Λθrəʒmətid seʃwæmi] lit-trans: (you stoned it to scars).

[mikræɣ Λðqɑzmæɣ ləvɣiːw] lit-trans: (when I stood up to face my desire).

[iḍəlvijid Λjægi] lit-trans: (he asked me this!).

[ðiðæmnis næɣ ðiðæmniːw] lit-trans: (my blood or his blood).

[ðnətsæ næɣ ðnəkini] lit-trans: (that's the way it is : him or I).

(song [Λssegi lliɣ],1981).

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[86] Charles Baudelaire quoted in Nock-Hee Park, J, Apparitions of Asia: Modernist Form and Asian American Poetics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 137.(The notion of '*eau*' in this poem has an echo of the vocative exclamation 'O').

4-[ɑ! θæmurθ iðəwlæwən] lit-trans: (Oh! mother land where sparkles the snows).

[ɣæs vəgnəd ʂifæ puðmi:m] lit-trans: (please ! just diffuse the radiant beauty of

your face).

[ʤərʤər ð lɔ:res jiwən] lit-trans: (the Djurdjura and the Aurès are one)

[imæziɣən ðæræwim] lit-trans: (all the Amazighs are your children).

(song [slævits ʌjevæħri], 1981).

Idir (Hamid Cheriet) says in his lyrics:

5-[ʌtsḴilḴ əlɬiji:n θæppurθ ɑ! vævæ jnuvæ ɑ! vævæ jnuvæ] lit-trans: (please

open the door Oh! father 'Inouva').

[ʧənʧən θizəvgæθini:m ʌjelɬi ɣrivæ (Ghriva) ɑ!] lit-trans: (shake your

bracelets… Oh! my daughter 'Ghriva').

[ugæðər əlwæħʃ əlɣavæ ɑ! vævæ jnuvæ ɑ! vævæ jnuvæ] lit-trans: (I fear

the monster of the forest… Oh! father 'Inouva').

[ugæðər ulæ ðnəkkini ʌjelɬi ɣrivæ (Ghriva) ɑ!] lit-trans : (I fear him too …

Oh! my daughter 'Ghriva').

('A Vava Inouva' album,1976).

Cherif Hamani[87] in this regard says :

6-[ʌjæmæ mənæɣ ʌkməzraɣ] lit-trans: (Oh! mother I wish I see you).

[ʌjæmæ mənæɣ ʌmhəðraɣ] lit-trans: (Oh! mother I wish I talk to you).

[ʌjæmæ ursəntəzmirəɣ] lit-trans: (Oh! mother I can't bear the calamities/ I can't

endure the great pain).

[segmi kmidrəfðən θəfɣəd̪] lit-trans: (from the time they lifted and took/moved

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[87] Cherif Hamani, at an earlier age (20 years old) became a remarkable poet and singer known all over the region of Kabylie. He actually shared and brought us expressions of happiness, grief, inconsolable love, courage, the great sadness and sorrow, regrets and memories of the past, the fundamental values and virtues of the Kabyle society, in such a way that he vehicled the most salient properties of historical and cultural heritage of the people at that time. Cherif Hamani in these special lines/ verses honoured the memory of his mother, so as to show us his endless gratitude towards her and unimaginable wishing to see her once again, call her by her name 'yemma', cry on her shoulders, and seek her pardon.

away your dead body).

[ðəgɡul θəpwitənt] lit-trans: (in your heart you wrapped them/ you took them) –

note that the personal pronoun object 'them' refers back to 'troubles' taken with the

dead.

(Cherif Hamani [ʌjæmæ],1974).

Towards the end of his life, Slimane Azem[88] was so sick of the state of the Kabylian

song and poetry, that he launched a very desperate appeal to the dead:

This is a desperate appeal to the great Man Chikh Si Mohand ou Mhand:

7-[si mu:ħ ʌwi kidjəræn] lit-trans: (Oh! Si Moh, if only you can comeback among

us).

[ʌtwɑli:ɖ əzmæn] lit-trans: (to see the time being).

[mækɣɑɖən wiðən jətsru:n] lit-trans: (when those who cry make you pity /you feel

very sorry for them).

[ʌɣdəʃnu:ɖ fæjni ɛəddæn əknə ðwejən illæn] lit-trans: (you sing for us things

we endured / suffered and things that exist today/ things we live today).

[ʌðwæjən rædiθəddu:n] lit-trans: (and things that are coming).

[ʌjni ɣdədʒæn imewlæn] lit-trans: (things that our ancestors left for us).

[ʌsjisæɣ əð ləħsen] lit-trans: (with great significance / high rank and goodness /

virtuousness).

[θuræ krənd wiðni θjətsu:n] lit-trans: (now came into existence the new shoots

/the new generation who totally forgot him).

(Slimane Azem, 'Si Moh' song, 1982).

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[88] Da Slimane Azem (1918-1983). The great poet of exile known almost in all parts of the world. He was and still remains one pioneer amongst others who set the bases, and who witnessed the background of a specific generation at specific period of time. All throughout his poems, Da Slimane Azem the genuine, the hero, the torchbearer of human dignity recorded his everyday life, experiences and background ancestors. He served with devotion his country and compatriots. Too many people of his generation who acquainted him or lived that era called him "*le plus grand fabulist de son temps*" and "*un grand artiste disparu*".

The examples below are taken from the everyday social interactions while apostrophizing:

8- [jɑːrʌpwi fkəd əlfutsuħ]   lit-trans: (Oh! God open us the doors).

9-[ʌjitiːʒ ʃɑrqed fəlɪænəɤ]   lit-trans: (Oh! sun shine on us).

10-[ʌnæɤ ʌşɑħæ θəχðɑːðiji]   lit-trans: (Oh! health you betrayed me).

11-[ʌnæɤ ʌşɑħæ θədʒid̪iji]   lit-trans: (Oh! health you left me alone/ you let me

down

12-[ʌlæhwæ ʃħæl ʌkkæ ʌdəkkæθd̪ fəlli?] lit-trans: (Oh! rain, how long will you

fall upon me?)

Like any other manners of speech, apostrophe consists in signifying something by virtue of grammatical structure in the construction of discourse. Yet, it is an enunciation wherein the speaker interrupts the discourse to address directly a person or a personified thing, either present or absent. Apostrophe as a distinctive feature is consciously utilized for a host of purposes. In prose, for example, its most common purpose is to exhibit strong and powerful emotion, so emotional feeling that it sounds hard to hold back. In speech as well, the same feeling is conveyed via apostrophe, especially when the speaker is reproaching an addressee or a group of addressees because of being dissatisfied with their behaviour. The power of the apostrophe as a device is to arouse feelings and emotions; therefore, its use adds fervour (enthusiasm / excitement) to the speech and contributes to a sincere and animated style.

In classical rhetoric, the apostrophe was also seen as a device by means of which the orator could turn to a new subject. Quintilian interpreted this function as a kind of '*aversio* '[89], a turning from one thing to another in order to divert the audience's attention from the question at hand. Quintilian in this context (vol. IV, 9.2.39) puts:

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[89] The apostrophe /aversio itself remains an interactional device, recommended for heated discourse.
Fahnestock, J, Rhetorical Style: The Uses of Language in Persuasion, Oxford University Press, USA, 2011, p.292.

"The term apostrophe is also applied to anything which serves to distract the hearer from the questions at issue."[90]

Thomas Gibbons, in Rhetoric, (1767) views such a category of trope as:

"Apostrophe is a figure in which we interrupt the current of our discourse, and turn to another person, or to some other object, different from that to which our address was first directed."[91]

Rhetoricians claim that passion spontaneously seeks apostrophe. The answer would seem to be that to apostrophize is to will a state of affairs, to attempt to call it into being by asking inanimate objects to bend themselves to your desire. In these terms the function of apostrophe would be to make the objects of the universe potentially responsive forces: forces which can be asked to act or refrain from acting or even to continue behaving as they usually behave. We may conclude that:

"Apostrophe is a favorite tool of propagandist and demagogues."[92]

1.8.1.2 Hyperbole: is a figurative language technique where exaggeration is used to create a strong effect. With hyperbole the notion of the speaker is greatly exaggerated to emphasize the point. Cuddon (1998) defines hyperbole as *"a figure of speech which contains exaggeration for emphasis."*[93] Moreover, hyperbole is said to be *"a way of speaking or writing that makes someone or something sound much bigger, better, smaller, worse, more unusual etc., than they are."*[94] The word hyperbole is actually two root words: "hyper" which means "over", and "bole" which means "to throw". So, etymologically, "hyperbole" translates roughly "over throw" or "to throw over". Hyperbole or language that is hyperbolic overstates

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[90] Quintilian, vol IV, 9.2.39, in Van Eck, C, and Brussels, S, and Delbeke, M, and Pieters, J, Translations of the Sublime: The Early Modern Reception and Dissemination of Longinus' Peri Hupsous in Rhetoric, the Visual Arts, Architecture and the Theatre, (Intersections), Brill Academic Pub, 2012,p.14.

[91] Thomas Gibbons (1767) in, Kneal, J, D, The Mind in Creation: Essays on English Romantic Literature, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992, p.95.
For further reading on 'L'effet de Rupture', i.e., a sudden stop in the flow of the speech, see also Franchet - d'Espérey, S, " Rhétorique et poétique chez Quintilien: à propos de l'apostrophe", in Rhetorica, University of California Press,vol. 24.2, printemps 2006,pp.180-82.

[92] Mcguigan, B, Rhetorical Devises: A Handbook and Activities for Student Writers, Prestwick house Inc, 2007, p.142.

[93] Cuddon quoted in Ruiz, J, H, Understanding Tropes: At the Crossroads Between Pragmatics and cognition, Peter Lang GmbH, 2009, p.49.

[94] Heacock, P, Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.469.

a point or goes a bit too far, i.e., it is an extravagant exaggeration which affects an emotional response as in:

1- *It'll take me a million years to fix this problem.*

2- *We nearly died of laughter.*

3- *I'd move mountains for you.*

4- *Peter was thirsty enough to drink a river dry.*

5- *Your bag weighed a ton.*

6- *I've been teaching here since the Stone Age.*

7- *You cooked enough food to feed a whole army.*

8- *I've seen this movie a least 80.000 times.*

Consider the following in Kabyle:

1- [θsædɑːd̪ ʌsuggæs ʌθidæɤəd] lit-trans: (You took one year to buy it).

2- [ilæqɑːm lqərn ækkən ʌdæwd̪əd] lit-trans: (You need/you took a century to arrive).

3- [nɤɑntiji θsəbbɑd̪inæki] lit-trans: (These shoes are killing me).

4- [ʌmuθæɤ silχuːf] lit-trans : (I'm dead with fear).

5- [ʌðiθənɤ əmæ] lit-trans : (Mum is going to kill me).

6- ⎰[nuðæɤ fəllæs[95] lvər ussæħæl] lit-trans: (I sought it land and sea).
   ⎱[nuðæɤ fθəkθævθ æki lvər ussæħæl] lit-trans: (I sought for this book land and sea/ in land and sea).

7- [θnæwləd̪ ʌnnəʃθ æjəʧ laskər] lit-trans: (You cooked enough food to feed an army).

8- [jəʧæ lvər jernæ əssæħæl] lit-trans: (he ate land and he added the sea).

9- ⎰[jesseɤliːd igənwæn] lit-trans: (He let heavens fall).
   ⎱[isersəd igənni fəllæs] lit-trans: (He let the sky fall on him).

10- [refðənt ggəni] lit-trans: (they lifted him high into the sky).

11- [θəpwæ silħumæn] lit-trans: (she's baked / cooked with heat).

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[95] Utterance n°6 contains two different word transcriptions: [fəllæS] + [fθəKθævθ æKi]:1[fəllæS] which goes back to 2 [fθəkθævθ æki]. Thus transcription n°1 means (for it), whereas, transcription n°2 means (for this book), i.e., n°1 refers to the personal pronoun object (it) which substitutes 'this book'.

12- [nəpwæ si lhumæn, ʌrɔːħ θəfʁəd] lit-trans: (we are baked with heat, the soul is released / getting out).

We may say then, that hyperbole is a familiar and often used trope. It is a deliberate, an obvious, deceitful and intentional exaggeration or simply excess, throwing over or beyond. It is an extravagant statement or figure of speech not intended to be taken literally. Considering hyperbole is often used to describe events, thoughts, perspectives or experiences, it is striking that there is a significant lack of scholarship. Quintilian offers several interesting explicit descriptions of hyperbole that carry stylistic and epistemological implications; indeed, Quintilian's theory is the most influential theory of hyperbole in the history of rhetorical theory. On the stylistic level, Quintilian views hyperbole as: *"a bolder sort of ornament,"*[96] and he adds: "it *is an elegant surpassing of the truth; and is used equally for exaggerating and extenuating."* [97]

Rather than a lack, hyperbole is considered elegant, but this elegance can go awry if, at least the appearance of moderation, i.e., decorum, is not maintained. Quintilian claims:

"*But even in the use of the hyperbole some moderation must be observed; for though every hyperbole is beyond belief, it ought not to be extravagant; since, in no other way do writers more readily fall into ..., "exorbitant affectation".*"[98]

Once more, decorum is used to regulate hyperbole's excesses that can move "*beyond belief* ." for Quintilian, elegant hyperboles are decorous while extravagant hyperboles push the boundaries too far, and when they move beyond moderation into "*exorbitant affectation,*" he calls them " *the vast number of absurdities.* "[99]

Although hyperbole is a pervasive and significant force within thought and language, the evidence suggests it is often overlooked, distrusted, and neglected, especially in the current context. As one theologian states:

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[96] Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory; or Education of an Orator, In Twelve Books,Vol.2 of 12, Forgotten Books,2013,p.140.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid, p.142.
[99] Ibid, p.142.

"At best, when we hear hyperbole at all today it sounds ridiculous, foolish, absurd and even fanatical. We are in danger of losing a dimension to language which stretches the imagination, challenges ready-made assumptions, and forces unusual perspectives."[100]

(Stephen: 1993) further suggests:

"Hyperbole is more than occasional eruption or a useful. It is basic fact of language and action that commands attention and warrants understanding on its owner terms."[101]

Hyperbole privileges emotion over reason, and it often verges on the edge of madness. Hyperbole blatantly, disorientingly, and traumatically batters its audience and pushes it towards alternative ways of perceiving meaning and being through extreme contradiction. Unlike other tropes hyperbole is paradoxical in the extreme. It repeatedly shocks and destabilizes with audacious claims that are meant to force one beyond the literal and into the figurative realm. It does not insinuate or offer insights, though its path to these insights might be sly and deceitful, and it offers dissonance rather than resonance, and the resonance it does offer might be dissonance itself. The difference of hyperbole from other tropes is that it amplifies this fact, so it is more than apparent that what is being said is a falsehood. As Seneca posits:

"The set purpose of all hyperbole is to arrive to the truth by falsehood."[102]

On the ground of boldness, Quintilian asserts: *"Hyperbole is an elegant straining of the truth,"*[103] he adds in what is perhaps the most paradoxical definition of such a trope: *"It is enough to say that hyperbole lies, though without any intention to deceive."*[104]

Hyperbole does not suspend the logic of language but asserts impossibilities as possibilities and possibilities as impossibilities to push beyond its own limitations. In the same line of thought Noel Malcolm expresses:

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[100] Webb, Stephen, H, Blessed Excess: Religion and the Hyperbolic Imagination, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993, P.XII.
[101] Ibid, p.150.
[102] Seneca, L, A, Moral Essays, Volume III, De Benificiis, Trans. John.W.Basore, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press,1935,7.22.1-7,p.509.
[103] Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, trans. H. E. Butler (Loeb Classical Library,1921),8.6.67,p.339.
[104] Ibid, 8.6.74, p.343.

"*It* [hyperbole] *makes reference to impossible things not because it is trying to describe an impossible world… but as rhetorical figure, to emphasize and dramatize impossibility itself.* "[105]

We may say then, hyperbole is often rejected as a lie which is only partly true, because it is a lie on the side of the truth. Consider the following utterances:

1-[θekθævθæ zzajəθ θəḴθæl ʌʈʊn] lit-trans: (this book weights a tone).

2-[ukmɑzriɤærӕ ʌddəqs] lit-trans: (I haven't seen you for ages).

3- [iχeddəm i:ḍ əðwæs[106] uriṣawəd] lit-trans: (he works day and night to satisfy his family's needs).

1.8.1.3 Personification: A word that goes back to the Greek origins '*anthropomorphism*'[107]: (Greek '*anthröpo*s', meaning 'human being' + Greek '*morphë*', meaning 'form'). Aristotle (III.11.30) describes personification as: *"Homer's common practice of giving metaphorical life to lifeless things."*[108] This means that Homer often, by making use of metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate. Homer's poetic language was able to evoke senses outside the linguistic apparatus. Accordingly Aristotle (III.11.4) praises him especially for his ability to make the lifeless living and create activity, concluding: *"*[Homer] *makes everything move and live, and energeia is motion."*[109] Thus, we may say, with Homer's use of poetic language, poetry becomes more than words reflecting reality but instead interacts with and influences reality. In the same line of thought Quintilian (III.9.1.3) proposes the following: *"metaphor is a trope, and personification is a metaphor."*[110] Demetrius of phalerum or (Demetrius Phalereus)[111] provides the first definition of personification, using instead the term '*prosopopeia*'. He writes: *"Another figure of thought –the so-called 'prosopopiea'- may be*

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[105] Malcolm, N, The Origins of English Nonsencse, Hammersmith: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997,p.84.

[106] The sound /ə/ in the following transcription in Kabyle [əðwæs] substitutes the connector 'and' in English.

[107] Ford, J, T, Saint Mary's Press Glossery of Theological Terms, Saint Mary's Press,2006,p.17.

[108] Aristotle quoted in Rutter, B, Hegel on the Modern Arts: Modern European Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.162.

[109] Aristotle in Kneal, J, D, Romantic Aversions: Aftermaths of Classicim in Wordsworth and Colleridge, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999, p.79.

[110] Quintilian in Dodson, J, R, 'Powers' of Personification: Rhetorical Purpose in the Book of Wisdom and the Letter to the Romans, Walter de Gruyter GmbH and Co.KG, D, Berlin, 2008,p.29.

[111] Demetrius of Phalerum was an Athenian orator from Phalerum, a student of Theophrastus, and perhaps of Aristotle. He was the last among the Attic orators worthy of the name. His orations were characterised as being soft, graceful, and elegant.

employed to produce energy of style."[112] Bernard lamy (1676) goes on explaining the term *'prosopopeia'* saying:

"*when a passion is violent, it renders them mad in some measure that are possess'd with it in that case, we entertain ourselves with rocks, and with dead men, as if they were living, and make them speak as if they had souls.*"[113]

Consider how Wordsworth personifies 'The Daffodils' in his first following stanza:

I wandered lonely as a cloud
That floats on high o'er vales and hills,
When all at once I saw a crowd,
A host, of golden daffodils;
Beside the lake, beneath the trees,
Fluttering and dancing in the breeze.   (William Wordsworth, The Daffodils, 1815).

The Daffodils are personified as forming a crowd and as dancing. Some are resting their heads on stones as on pillows, and some others tossed, and reeled, and danced, and seemed as if they verily laughed with the wind.

Personification as usually mentioned in different books appears to be a type of metaphor, a metaphor with a particular kind of content. According to Ruth Miller and Robert A. Greenberg (1986) "*personification is a figure of speech in which an abstract idea, inanimate objects, or aspect of nature is described as if it were human.*"[114] A postmodern theorist Paul de Man has proclaimed this special kind of metaphor "*the master trope of poetic discourse.*" [115] Marcel Danesi at his turn defines it as follows: "*personification is the representation of inanimate objects or abstract ideas as living beings.*"[116] X.J. Kennedy (2002) in the same context states: "*personification: a figure of speech in which a thing an animal, or an abstract term (truth, nature) is made human.*"[117] Nofal (2011) claims that an

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[112]Demetrius quoted in Paxson, J, The Poetics of Personification, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.12.

[113] Bernard Lamy quoted in Harwood, J, T, The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986, p.234.

[114] Miller, R, and Greenberg, R, A , Poetry: An Introduction, London: Macmillan, 1986,p.74.

[115] De Man, P, The Resistance to Theory: Theory and History of Literature, Vol.33, University of Minnesota Press, 1986, p.48.

[116] Danesi, M, Messages, Signs, And Meanings: A Basic Textbook in Semiotics and Communication Theory, 3rd ed, Canadian Scholars Press Inc,2004,p.117.

[117] Kennedy, X, J, and Gioia, D, Literature: An Introduction to Fiction, Poetry, and Drama, 8th Edition, Longman, 2002, p.866.

Chapter One: Metaphor: Historical Background

inanimate object or animal is given human qualities, i.e., personification is an ontological metaphor in which a thing or abstraction is represented as a person.[118] For James Paxson (1994) personification occupies a *"key, privileged role as a figure always telling something about figuration itself."*[119]

Here are some utterances in Kabyle:

- [læðijetsħəlii uqʒu:n Λsefkæɣ imensi:s] lit-trans: (the dog implored me for his dinner).
- [Λllən usḴiddɪvəntæræ] lit-trans: (eyes never lie).
- [θəʧæθ θiməs] lit-trans: (the fire devoured him).
- [lΛθləħu θimæs θugi Λteħvəs] lit-trans: (the fire won't stop / the fire ran wild).
- [uðfəl iɣu:m lqɑã] lit-trans: (the snow covered the land).
- [θæppu:rθ θugi Λtəlii] lit-trans: (the door protested as we opened it).
- [sliɣæs iθəppurθ θuʒɑ:q] lit-trans: (I heard the door screaming).
- [Λşəmmi:ḍ lejgədʒəm] lit-trans: (the cold is chopping).
- [θddærθ kæmel θətɒş] lit-trans: (the whole village is sleeping).
- [lΛʃəthənt Λtəʒjɔ:r] lit-trans: (the trees are dancing).
- [jeslef Λşəmmi:ḍ uðmi:w] lit-trans: (the gentle wind caressed my face).
- [ətsḴəl fjeðrimni:Ḵ ðniθni iðeħvivi:Ḵ] lit-trans: (money is the only friend that you can count on).
- [iləħqiji:d ji:ḍ ək θiziri θəḍşaji:d] lit-trans: (the night joined me and the moon smiled down upon me).

What Fontanier calls personification is actually a 'trope', whereas, Lakoff and Johnson (1985) consider it as a metaphor, and it is subordinated with Fontanier to metonymy, metaphor and synecdoche. Fontanier states the following:

"La personnification consiste à faire d'un être inanimé, insensible, ou d'un être abstrait et purement idéal, une espèce d'être réel et physique, doué de sentiment et de vie, enfin ce

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[118] Nofal , K,H, "Syntactic Aspects of Poetry: A Pragmatic Perspective" ,International Journal of Business and Social Science , Vol.2, Nᵒ.2, Jordan , 2011, p. 43.
[119] Paxson, The Poetics of Personification, ibid, p.21.

qu'on appelle une personne; et cela, par simple façon de parler, ou par une fiction toute verbale, s'il faut le dire. Elle a lieu par métonymie, par synecdoque, ou par métaphore." [120]

Paul Ricoeur (1977) probated the theory of his fellow Fontanier saying that "*personification in turning an inanimate, non-sentient, abstract, or ideal entity into a living and feeling being, into a person, remind us of the metaphorical transfer from the inanimate to the animate.*" [121] According to François Rouy (1980) personification is quite simply "*la représentation, sous la forme d'une personne, humaine en général, d'un être qui, dans la réalité, n'en était pas lui-même une.* "[122] lynne Cameron (2003:241) states that personification metaphors use 'Vehicle' terms from the domain of people to refer to 'Topics' that are not human. She carries on saying that personification is one type of the broader category of animation, in which Vehicle domains are animate but not necessarily human. Consider the following examples in English: the news <u>took</u> me by surprised, the ringing of the phone / the phone <u>awaked</u> me, life <u>slapped</u> me, necessity is the <u>mother</u> of invention.

Consider some other examples in Kabyle:

-   [iḴəʃmed wæs] lit-trans: (the day entered).
-   [θəkḵer θinififθ ði θæddærθ θəqləv ʌdduni:θ] lit-trans: (the storm stood up in the village and turned over everything upside down) – also (the storm attacked the village with a great rage).
-   [jəpd̪əd ji:d̪!] lit-trans: (the night arrived!).
-   [sæni θrɔ:ħ θqɑndɒrθi:w?] lit-trans: (where's my dress gone?).
-   [θævuzəɡɡæɤθ θnəq ilɒfænən] lit-trans: (German measles kills the babies).

The more recent conceptual metaphor approach describes personification as:

"*Ontological metaphors…where the physical object is further specified as being a person. This allows us to comprehend a wide variety of experiences … in terms of human motivations, characteristics, and activities*" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 33).

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[120] Fontanier, P, Les Figures du Discours, op. cit ; Paris, Flammarion, 1977, p.111.

[121] Ricoeur, P, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. Czerny, R, with McLaughlin, K, and Costello, J, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977,p.68.

[122] Rouy, F, L'Esthétique du Traité Moral d'après Les ouvres d'Alain Chartier, Librairie Droz, Genève, 1980, p.9.

Lakoff and Johnson point out that personification is not a unified process but highlights particular aspects of people and attributes them to physical objects. In the above examples in Kabyle, the day [æs] is personified as a human being who opens the door and ready to come in, whereas the second utterance the word storm [θinififθ] is personified to a furious person / a great warrior who attacked the village and turned everything upside down. In the third utterance the word night [i:ɖ] is personified one more time to the man who arrived by surprise for a certain period of time. The word dress [θæqɑndɔ:rθ] in utterance four is an independent being that can leave the woman's wardrobe. And finally the term German measles [θævuzəgɡæɤθ] is personified as something akin to a murderer.

Goatly (1997:52) portrays animating and personifying metaphors as conceiving of abstract entities in terms of four selective categories: life, survival, relationships and control. Conceptual metaphor theory explains personification as a mechanism that "*allows us to make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms.*" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 34). Personification as a metaphorical device, generally occurs in everyday conventional language, and as already said it is also used commonly in literature. This aspect of poetic language has been studied extensively from a cognitive linguistic view by George Lakoff and Mark Turner (1989). Once of the abstract concepts that is very often personified in literature is 'Time'. We may find time personified in several ways in Kabyle:

- [lwəqθ   ðæmwak̲rɑ:ɖ] lit-trans: (time is a thief).
- [lenətsæzzæl   ðəlwəqθ] lit-trans: (we are running side by side with time) / (we are running concurrently with time).
- [jedɖæjeɤ   lwəqθ] lit-trans: (time surpasses us) / (time is a pursuer).
- [lenətsæzzæl   zðəffi:r   nəlwəqθ] lit-trans: (we are running after time).
- [lwəqθ   ujətsraʤu   ħed] lit-trans: (time waits for nobody).

Thus, personification allows us to use knowledge about ourselves to comprehend other aspects of the world, such as time, death, natural forces, inanimate objects, etc.

We may conclude that personification is regarded to be both a product of thought and speech at the same time. We can even summarise, that personification communicates in a way like no other in order to decorate or amplify, to educate or clarify, to motivate or manipulate, to expose the cause or to deflect attention away from an insufficient system.

1.8.1.4 Metonymy: the notion of metonymy is by all means not a new notion in the context of variation and change in historical linguistics literature. On the contrary, it is a commonplace among other notions in both prestructuralist and structuralist work. Nerlich and Clarke (2001:245) postulated: "*Metonymy has been studied for at least two thousand years by rhetoricians, for two hundred years by historical semanticists, and for about ten years by cognitive linguists.*" The first use of the term metonymy can be found in ancient Greek philosophy. As metaphor is Greek for 'transfer' / 'transport', metonymy is Greek for 'a change of name', i.e., it is the figure by which something is called by a name not its own, but suggesting its qualities. This was already stressed in 1925 by the French linguist Gaston Esnault. He distinguished between metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. However, in his definition of metonymy Esnault (1925:29) referred to Democritus[123]. He wrote: "*the meaning of the word metaphor is 'transfer', that of metonymy 'change' (of name), and that of synecdoche 'annexation'.*" Thus, Esnault agreed with traditional rhetoric, but as a semanticist, he pointed out:

"*metonymy doesn't open up new paths to follow as metaphorical intuition does; instead it hurries over the stages in paths that are too well known and shortens the distances so as to facilitate the rapid intuition of things that we already know.*" (ibid: 31). In other words, metonymy enables us to say things quicker, to shorten conceptual distances.

When using metonymy, the name of a referent (or thing referred to) is replaced by the name of an attribute, or entity related in some semantic way, or by spatial proximity, or another kind of link, i.e., the ground of the substitution is not similarly as it is in the case of a metaphor, but association (Thoronborrow and Wareing, 1998:109). Lakoff and Johnson (1980:35-40) see metonymy as a form of figurative speech, in which one expression is used to refer to the standard referent of a related expression. They demonstrate that metonymy is not just a matter of names of things, but basically a conceptual phenomenon. They add metonymy like metaphor, is not only a linguistic form but also a powerful cognitive tool for people's conceptualization of the world. Metonymy is part of our everyday way of thinking, is part and parcel of our experience, i.e., is grounded in our experiences, is subject to general and systematic principles, and structures our thoughts and actions: *"metonymic concepts (like THE PART FOR THE WHOLE) are part of the ordinary, everyday way we think and act as*

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[123]   An influential ancient Greek pre - Socratic philosopher primarily remembered today for his formulation of an atomic theory of the universe. He wrote theoretically on poetry and fine art.

well as talk."(ibid: 37) Thus, metonymy is a cognitive phenomenon that may be even more fundamental than metaphor. Metonymy is understood as a conceptual process in which one conceptual entity, the 'target', is made mentally accessible by means of another conceptual entity, the 'vehicle', within the same idealised cognitive model ICM Lakoff (1987)[124].

According to Beatrice Warren (1999), metonymy does provide an abbreviation mechanism (abbreviation device), that highlights the importance of implicitness of human communication (Grice, 1975). And, apart from finding the implicit referring item, its interpretation involves retrieving a relation. Fass (1988) emphasises: *"metonymy is a nonliteral figure of speech in which the name of one thing is substituted for that of another related to it."*[125] While Radden and Kövecses (1999) completed the above quotation claiming: *"[metonymy] is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the Vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same cognitive model"*[126] Analogously, Croft (1993) proposes metonymy as "*a shift of a word meaning from the entity it stands for to a 'contiguous' entity."*[127] The term "contiguity"[128] is a central concept in the definition of metonymic relatedness. In its literal sense, it starts off as a spatial notion where two entities connect by literally touching each other, and is extended a conceptual contiguity, or semantic relatedness. Whereas Nunberg (1978)[129] announces that metonymy is a case of "deferred reference", in which a speaker uses a description of an entity and succeeds in referring to it.

The function of metonymy is traditionally determined as causing a referential shift, through which salient conceptual structure is used to access a less prominent concept. Thus, this explanation agrees partially with Langacker's viewpoint "*A well-chosen metonymic expression lets us mention one entity that is salient and easily coded, and thereby evokes–*

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[124] Lakoff, G, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, p.78.

[125] Fass, D: "An Account of Coherence, Semantic Relations, Metonymy, and Lexical Ambiguity Resolution" in Small, S, I, and Cottrell, G, W, and Tanenhaus, M, K, Lexical Ambiguity Resolution: Perspectives From Psycholinguistics Neuropsychology and Artificial Intelligence, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 1988,p.155.

[126] Radden, G, and Kövecses, Z: "Towards a Theory of metonymy" in Panther, K, U, and Radden, G, Metonymy in Language and Thought: Human Cognitive Processing, Vol.4, John Benjamins Publishing, 1999, p.21.

[127] Croft (1993) quoted in Canning, P, Style in the Renaissance: Language and Ideology in Early Modern England, London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p.108.

[128] Refers to (nearness or neighbourhood). It is a key term in the understanding of the definition of metonymy, to which both traditional rhetoricians and cognitive linguists agree.

[129] Nunberg, G, The Pragmatics of Reference, Bloomington: The Indiana University Linguistics Club, 1978, p.186.

essentially automatically–a target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name."[130] Langacker goes further offering the following cognitive explanation: *"a process consists in mentally accessing one conceptual entity via another entity."*[131]

According to the concise encyclopaedia of semantics: *"metonymy is a pragmatic strategy used by speakers to convey to hearers something new about something already well known."*[132] This distinguishes it from *"metaphor, which can be regarded as a pragmatic strategy used by speakers to convey to hearers something new that cannot easily be said or understood"* (ibid).

In fact, using metaphors, speakers tell you more than what they actually say; whereas, using metonyms speakers tell you more while saying less. We may say then, that the hearer looks at metaphor as a strategy used to extract new information from old words, whereas, he looks at metonymy as a strategy used to extract more information from fewer words. Thus, both (metaphor and metonymy) are pragmatically grounded and exploit cognitive mapping processes. Let us now concentrate on some accurate examples in English:

- We need some <u>faces</u> around here to come to the stage and perform the following scene. (i.e., we need some <u>new students</u> to come on the stage…).
- We meet lot of <u>good heads</u> in the <u>university.</u> (i.e., we meet <u>brilliant</u>/<u>clever</u> students …) - the word 'HEAD' is related to the model 'INTELLIGENCE'.
- Is there any <u>strong body</u> over here? (i.e., is there any <u>physical strength</u> /<u>body strength</u> …).
- My neighbour bought a <u>Nissan</u>/ <u>Chevrolet</u>. (i.e., he bought a special brand <u>car</u>).
- I'm reading <u>Wordsworth</u>. (i.e., I'm reading one of <u>Wordsworth's poems</u>).
- I saw a <u>Hollywoodian</u> film. (i.e., I saw an <u>American movie</u>).
- My brother has a <u>good ear</u> for music. (i.e., good ear here stands for my brother's <u>ability of appreciating music</u>).
- This pupil writes a <u>fine hand</u>. (i.e., the pupil writes <u>neatly</u> or has <u>good handwriting</u>).

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[130] Langacker, R, W, Grammar and Conceptualization, Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000, p.199.
[131] Langacker, R, W (1993) quoted in: "Towards a Theory of metonymy" in Panther, K, U, and Radden, G, Metonymy in Language and Thought: Human Cognitive Processing, Vol.4, John Benjamins Publishing, 1999, p.19.
[132] Allan, K, Concise Encyclopaedia of Semantics, Elsevier Ltd., 2009, p.551.

- She works with a <u>newspaper</u>. (i.e., Newspaper stands to represent <u>a group of journalists</u> and <u>editors</u> working together to churn out news items).
- Would you please <u>give</u> me a <u>hand </u>carrying these two baskets? (i.e., the hand here stands for <u>help</u>).

Let us now consider some utterances in Kabyle using metonyms:

- [ʌgrəd   <u>ifæsni:m</u>] lit-trans: (get your <u>hands</u> in),i.e., metonymically implies give a <u>help</u>/<u>get involved</u> in an <u>activity</u>.
- [fkəd   <u>ʌməzzɒɤi:ḵ</u>]$^{(+)}$ lit-trans: (give your <u>ear</u>) ⟶ 1st utterance carrying a positive aspect – i.e., [ʌməzzɒɤi:ḵ] (his ear) stands for the <u>state </u>of <u>being attentive</u>/ very <u>careful </u>in <u>listening</u>. 'Ear' here substitutes the concept 'attention'.
- [fkəd   <u>ʌməzzɒɤi:ḵ</u>]$^{(-)}$ lit-trans: (give your <u>ear</u>) ⟶ 2nd utterance carrying a negative aspect- i.e., [ʌməzzɒɤi:ḵ] (his ear) stands for the <u>state </u>of <u>being a spy</u>.
- [χɒşnæɤ   ḵræ   iqərrɑ] lit-trans: (we need some <u>heads</u>) (i.e., the heads here refer to some <u>clever</u> people). Heads here substitute the concept '<u>intelligence</u>'.
- [ɤriɤæs   i   ʃʃi:χ si muħænd u- mħænd] lit-trans: (I've read <u>Chikh Si Mohand ou Mhand</u>) (i.e., I've read <u>Chikh Mohand's work</u>).
- [ulæʃ   θujæθ   ʌjrəfðən] lit-trans: (there are no <u>shoulders</u> [θujæθ] to lift) (i.e., the shoulders refer back to the <u>physical strength</u>/body strength/health).
- [θæɤəʃθi:s   θəppɒḓ   sæməzzɔ:ɤi:w] lit-trans: (his voice caught my <u>ear</u>),i.e., his /her charming voice caught my <u>attention</u>.
- [mɒqqɒr <u>jimi:m</u>] lit-trans: (your <u>mouth</u> is big) ,i.e., the word mouth [imi:m] here represents the concept of <u>awkwardness</u>, <u>roughness</u>, <u>harshness</u>, <u>reprimand</u> and <u>verbal attack</u> in answering an saying things to people. Thus, the shape of the tongue 'being long' is the conduit metonymy to the state of 'being aggressive'. We may add the following adequate equivalence in English 'shoot one's mouth off'.
- [swi:ɤ   θæqrɑ:ts   kæmel] lit-trans: (I drank the whole <u>bottle</u>) , i.e., the concept 'bottle' [<u>θæqrɑ:ts</u>] here is in close connection/relation with the container-and the contained (container ⟶ bottle + the contained ⟶ water, juice/any liquid in the container). It is our familiarity with metonymy that makes it possible for us to understand the above utterance in Kabyle [swi:ɤ   θæqrɑ:ts   kæmel]. Although it sounds absurd literally, but it's quite well interpreted metonymically, i.e., it's quite clear that I drank the liquid, not the glass object 'bottle'.

- [fukæɤ   ʌðəvʂiːw] lit-trans: (I have finished my <u>dish</u>), the dish here stands for the <u>contained</u> <u>food</u>/ the meal itself.

- [fukæɤ   θækuziːnt] lit-trans: (I have finished the <u>kitchen</u>) ⟶ the word 'kitchen' in itself is in connection with both '<u>householding</u>' and '<u>cooking</u>' concepts.

- [θæppurθiːw   θəlli   ləvðæ] lit-trans: (my <u>door</u> is always <u>open</u>), an opening door here carries an extra interpretation- metonymically refers to the concept generosity/warm reception/hospitality, etc.

- [ʂiwɒɖ / ʃeɡɡæjæs   ʌslæm   iwɔχɑːm] lit-trans: (bring/send greetings to <u>home</u>),i.e., we mean by 'home' here <u>all the family members</u>.

We may sum up then, one of the main purposes of using metonymies is adding flavour to both writing and speaking. Using a metonymy serves a double purpose: it breaks any awkwardness of repeating the same phrase over and over and it changes the wording to make the sentence more interesting.

1.8.1.5 Synecdoche: (Greek synekdoché. From Syn-together + ekdoché- understanding in a certain way, interpretation, a derivation of ekdéchesthai to receive, understand). Traditionally, synecdoche is a term used to refer to a classical rhetoric phenomenon that substitutes part for whole or a whole stands for a part and a genus for a species or a species for a genus.[133] The definitions on metonymy and synecdoche have always been confusingly similar. Many linguists see no difference and consider synecdoche as a subtype of metonymy (lakoff and Johnson 1980:36, Croft 1993:350, Warren 1992a:64, Koch 1999:155, among others), i.e., which means that it is superfluous. Seto (1995)[134] advocated a new assessment of synecdoche in cognitive semantic where he tackles metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche as the three corners of what he calls in his paper '*the cognitive triangle*'. This triangle describes metaphor as being based on similarity, metonymy on contiguity and finally synecdoche on inclusion. Seto goes further elaborating his view on synecdoche in his article *"Distinguishing Metonymy from Synecdoche"* saying:

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[133] Seto, K: "Distinguishing Metonymy from Senecdoche" in Panther, K, U, and Radden, G, Metonymy in Language and Thought: Human Cognitive Processing, Vol.4, John Benjamins Publishing, 1999.p92.

[134] Seto, K, On the Cognitive Triangle: The Relation Between Metaphor, Metonymy and Synecdoche, Unpublished manuscript, 1995, pp.3-4.

"*synecdoche should be independent of metonymy… [it] is a conceptual transfer phenomenon based on the semantic inclusion between a more comprehensive and a less comprehensive category.*"(Seto, 1999:92)

 Consider the following examples in English in which:

(**1**) A part represents the whole

- The phrase *'hired hands'* ⟶ generally stands for workmen.
- The word *'wheels'* ⟶ refers to a vehicle.

(**2**) The whole represents a part

- The <u>UK</u> won a gold medal in the Olympic Games ⟶ this actually means that <u>a team</u> from the United Kingdom, not the country as a whole.
- The <u>police</u> intervened immediately ⟶ can be used to represent only <u>one</u> or <u>a few</u> <u>police officers</u>.

(**3**) From genus to species

- The word *'mortal'* ⟶ refers to a human being.
- The word *'stone'* ⟶ refers to a jewel.

(**4**) From species to genus

- To earn one's daily <u>bread</u> ⟶ refers to food or money- (fishing is my bread).
- The term <u>coke</u> ⟶ refers to all or any <u>carbonated</u> <u>drinks</u>.

The trope "synecdoche" is a figure of speech which expresses either more or less than it literally denotes. By synecdoche, an object is given a name which literally denotes something more or something less than we intend. Thus, it is spoken of the whole while referring only to a part or vice versa. Joseph Devlin by the same token proposes:

"*by it* [synecdoche] *we give to an object a name which literally expresses something more or something less than we intend. Thus: we speak of the world when we mean only a very limited number of the people who compose the world.*"(2008:73).

We may exemplify this by offering the following:

- The <u>world</u> criticized his article. ⟶ using the whole for a part (meaning the category of people who read his article).

- The farmer boasted about how many <u>head</u> of cattle he owned. ⟶ using a part for the whole (meaning that the farmer / the shepherd certainly owned the whole cows not just the heads).

- The captain shouted: "all <u>hands</u> on deck." ⟶ using a part for the whole (meaning that the captain wants everybody / the whole crewmember on deck).

- The visitor exclamated: "this is a fine <u>marble</u>!" ⟶ using a part for the whole (the word marble refers back to the marble statue).

- Abraham saved up 3000000 DA to buy / to get some new <u>wheels</u>. ⟶ using a part for the whole (meaning that Abraham did not literally buy only <u>wheels</u> for 3000000 DA, but he actually bought a whole big <u>car</u>).

Brigitte Nerlich in her article entitled, *"Synecdoche: A trope, a whole trope, and nothing but a trope?"* offers us a fairly updated status report on synecdoche, where she explains clearly in her conclusion, that:

"for a very long time the kernel of synecdoche consisted of two types of synecdoches: the part– whole one and the genus-species one, with the part-whole one being the epicentre, as a quick look at same reference dictionaries will confirm. Only recently has this kernel been broken up and one part of it being annexed by metonymy."[135]

Here are some examples of synecdoche that we can hear from casual conversations in Kabyle:

- [ezlæn χɑmsi:n <u>ðæqɒrrɔ:</u>] lit-trans: (they slayed / slaughtered fifty <u>heads</u>) ⟶ heads refer back to the whole number (50) of <u>cows</u> or <u>lambs</u>.

- [θəfkæd <u>lqɑ:</u> ʌsəggæseki] lit-trans: (the <u>land</u> gave enough this year) ⟶ the land here carries with it the concept '<u>fertility</u>'/ a <u>productive</u> land.

- [θesræwlæɤ <u>frɑnsæ</u> siðurær] lit-trans: (<u>France</u> chased us away to the highlands/to the mountains) ⟶ France here means the <u>French army</u>.

- [<u>ðiðæmni:w</u> iðijɤɒrrən] lit-trans: (it's my *blood* that betrayed me) ⟶ blood here means '<u>kinship</u>'.

- [æɤ ʌvri:ð <u>ukɑrrɔ:ʂ</u>] lit-trans: (take / choose the <u>carriage path</u>) ⟶ the carriage path here stands for <u>motorway</u>.

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[135] Nerlich, B: "Synecdoche: A trope, A Whole Trope, and Nothing but A Trope?" in Burkhardt, A, and Nerlich, B, Tropical Truth(S): The Epistemology of Metaphor and Other Tropes, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2010, p.135.

- [jɒk ʌllən ɣɑrnɑɣ] lit-trans: (all <u>eyes</u> are fixed on us) ⟶ the eyes (part of the body) here which is part of the whole refers back to the <u>person</u>/<u>persons</u> who are looking at us.

- [uθqəbbelɣɑɣæ dæw ʌsæqfi:w] lit-trans: (I won't accept him under my <u>roof</u>) ⟶ the roof here means the <u>house</u>.

- [ifæssən jək læχedmæn] lit-trans: (all <u>hands</u> are at work) ⟶ the hands here stand for <u>people</u>/<u>everybody</u> .

1.8.1.6 Oxymoron: as it is given in pocket Fowler's Modern English Usage (2008:474), is a Greek term derived from an interesting etymology: oxys which means 'sharp','*keen'* or 'pointed' and moros which means 'dull', 'stupid' or 'foolish'. Cuddon indicates that oxymoron is a "*figure of speech which combines incongruous and apparently contradictory words and meanings for a special effect.*"[136] In other words oxymoron, most of the time regarded as a compressed paradox, can be considered a common device of poetry especially, which is closely related to paradox and antithesis. Thus, oxymoron is a literary figure of speech in which two words, two terms, two phrases or two ideas of opposite meaning are brought together for special effect, i.e., they are combined to create a rhetorical effect by paradoxical means. According to Alabi (2007:168) oxymoron "*is a figure of speech in which two contradicting words are placed side by side in a statement thereby making it sound self-contradicting. In other words oxymoron yokes two terms which are ordinarily contradictory.*" Raymond Gibbs (1994:395) at his turn defines the trope oxymora as figures of speech that combine two seemingly contradictory elements, i.e., an oxymoron places two contradictory ideas side by side and fuses them together. Consider Shakespeare's examples in the play (Romeo and Juliet, I.i.172-4), where Romeo sees love as follows: *'bright smoke', 'cold fire' 'sick health'* and *'sweet sorrow'*. Romeo's utterances seem absurd, i.e., literary speaking, these statements seem nonsensical, in terms that the smoke is never bright, fire is not cold, to be healthy is not to be sick and finally sweet is never fused with sorrow. Oxymora are frequently found in our everyday speech, many of them barely noticed as such, consider the following examples (phrases):

'Old news', 'open secret', 'act naturally', 'sad smile', 'plastic glasses', 'walking dead', 'same difference', 'silent scream', 'awfully good', 'teacher student', 'sweet agony', *'loyal opposition'*, *'original copy'*, 'clearly misunderstood', 'absent presence', etc.

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[136] Cuddon, J, A, Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, 4th Edition, London: Penguin Books, 1998, p.627.

Note that: although they seem absurd and awkward, they actually add flavour to our everyday speech.

From the point of view of the semantic perspective following Shen's proposal (1987:108), a distinction can be drawn between two types of semantic structures which can count as types of oxymora. Direct oxymora consist either of two terms that are antonyms, or two terms whose only difference consists of a change in the plus or minus (+/-) sign of their lowest, distinctive feature, or other features being identical. Consider the two following examples: *'a feminine man'* and *'living death'*.

The indirect oxymora consist of two terms that are not the direct antonyms of each other, but have only one term that is the hyponym[137] of the first term's antonym. Consider the example selected from the Hebrew poet Nathan Altherman's Summer Night: *'the silence whistles'*, and another one already taken from Shakespear's work Romeo and Juliet: *'sweet sorrow'*. It is worth to make a clear distinction between the two terms *'silence'* ≠ *'whistles'* and *'sweet'* ≠ *'sorrow'*. Thus, on the basis of this platform (the indirect oxymoron definition), we may conclude, following Shen's grounded structure, that there exists a combination of silence and hyponym of sound, i.e., the second term of the oxymoron is not *'sound'* but its hyponym *'whistle'*. As Shen explains, the feature list of this latter term adds the feature *'sharpness'* to those of *'sound'*, and this addition turns *'whistle'* indeed into a hyponym of *'silence'*: consequently, 'whistle' is not the direct opposite of *'silence'*, and with a little more precision the indirect antonym relation in such a case, another type of sense relation hyponym, should be considered ⟶ *'whistle'* is a member in the set of *'sound'* entities ⟶ shout, scream, sing, etc. *'sweet sorrow'* following the same model of analysis, should be understood as: *'sorrow'* is conceived of as an example (that is, a hyponym) of the category *'bitter entities'*; the term *'bitter'* is the antonym of the first term *'sweet'*.

Meyer Abrams similarly writes: "*if the paradoxical utterance combines two terms that in ordinary usage are contraries, it is called an oxymoron.*"[138]

Although oxymoron is very often strange looking and odd sounding, our entire life is a set of paradoxes. It engages our reflections, ideas and thoughts because paradox has always been at the centre of the human condition. Carl Jung (1964:85) points out:

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[137] Hyponymy is the relationship that obtains between specific and general lexical items, such that the former is 'included' in the latter. (see Shen, 1987 for a detailed analysis and elaboration).

[138] Abrams , M, H, and Galt Harpham, G, A Glossary of Literary Terms, 10th Edition, Boston: Wadsworth, 2012,p.267.

"*Man's real life consists of a complex of inexorable opposites - day and night, birth and death, happiness and misery, good and evil. And if it were not so, existence would come to an end.*" Judson Cornelius (2005:19) explains that Oxymora are often used deliberately for effect, as in '*cheerful pessimist*' and some others have an ironic twist, such as '*military intelligence*',' *business ethics*',' *science fiction*' and '*war games*'.

Paul Ricoeur (1977:110-11,197) one of the greatest French thinkers and philosophers focused on the term Oxymoron and defined it as "*the simplest sort of meaningful self-contradiction*" adding that it is "*just an extreme case of direct contradiction; it bears in most cases on the joint presuppositions of the ordinary designations...oxymoron is an impertinent epithet par excellence, where impertinence is heightened to the point of antithesis.*"
We wrestle daily with a great amount of experiences we live by, we wrestle with love and hatred, beauty and ugliness, hostility and cordiality, truth and falsehood, etc. we may conclude that the special effect of oxymoron is in fact twofold:

- It forces the readers to read the opposing sides thoughtfully, enabling them to become aware of the conscious execution of the utterance.
- It makes the readers ponder the meaning beyond the contradiction.

In short, oxymoron is purposefully used in order to achieve various effects such as drawing attention, brevity, humour, sarcasm and contrast. Oxymoron expresses our mixed emotions and conflicting feelings.
Here are some oxymoronic utterances in Kabyle:

- [jeqqi:m jəvdəð] lit-trans: (he stayed up).
- [θətfi:θ θæwlæ uʂɒmmi:d] lit-trans: (a cold fever caught him).
- [læjetsizri:r tiði θæʂemmɑṯ] lit-trans: (he's sweating a cold sweat).
- [θimuʃuhæ θiʒðiði:n] lit-trans: (new/modern tales/stories).
- [seddæɤ æs ʌverḴen] lit-trans: (I spent a dark day).
- [θæki tæsumθæ θæqɒrɑnt] lit-trans: (this is a hard pillow).
- [wiki ðləχvar iqðimæn] lit-trans: (these are old news).
- [ðæqʃi:ʃ ʌmɒqrɑn] lit-trans: (an old boy).
- [ʌduni:θ ðæs dji:d] lit-trans: (Life is a day and night).
- [lwəqθ jezmær ʌðjæddɪ slæqəl neɤ suɤiwəl] lit-trans: (Time can pass slowly and quickly).

- [lhæm jesruːj jeʂʂədʂɑːj] lit-trans: (Troubles make <u>cry</u> and <u>laugh</u>).

- [Λtɬæm əttæfæθ ɤuːr uðərɤæl əmsæwæn] lit-trans: (<u>Darkness</u> and <u>light</u> for the blind are the same/ are equal).

- [Λduniːθ rzɑːgəθ ziḍəθ / ħlæwəθ] lit-trans: (Life is <u>bittersweet</u>).

- [Λqlæɤ ʒmæ wəhəðnæɤ] lit-trans: (we are <u>alone together</u>).

- [ərnuji ulæ ðnək Λssufɤiji] lit-trans: (<u>include</u> me <u>out</u>).

- [jəmmuːθ jeddær] lit-trans: (he's <u>dead alive</u>).

- [mɒqɒr ʃwiːɬ] lit-trans: (it's a <u>little big</u>).

- [Λzhɑr Λmʃuːm] lit-trans: (<u>bad luck</u>).

- [θisliːθ θəʃvæħ urθəʃviːħ] lit-trans: (the bride is <u>pretty ugly</u>).

We may conclude that the oxymoron is a combination of two contradictory or opposite words which may produce a dramatic effect but indeed does not make sense. Oxymorons are most of the time found in our everyday speech (casual conversations) and in literature as well. Some of the examples above even seem comical, i.e., they produce a sort of comical effect, thus it is a lot of fun to use them.

1.8.1.7 Simile: the word 'simile' is derived from a Latin word 'similis' [139] meaning 'resemblance and likenesses'. Zhang (2007:158) in his book entitled '*English Rhetoric*' claims that simile is a figure of speech by which two concepts or two dissimilar things are imaginatively and descriptively compared because they have at least one quality or characteristic in common or in resemblance, and the most commonest connectives (simile markers) are: 'as', 'like' and some other words used in similes such as: 'as if', 'resemble', 'suggest', etc.

Being a subdivision of metaphor, simile draws attention to a similarity between two terms through words such as 'like' and 'as'. Simile does not always entail figurative language, since both terms of the simile can often be understood literally. In the same line of thought Cuddon (1998:830) described simile as follows:

"*a figure of speech in which one thing is likened to another, in such a way as to clarify and enhance an image. It is an explicit comparison (as opposed to the metaphor, q.v., where the comparison is implicit) recognizable by the use of the words 'like' or 'as'.*"

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[139] Ayers, D, M, Bioscientific Terminology: Words From Latin and Greek Stems, The University of Arizona Press, 1972, p.165.

Plotnik (2000:79) states that simile, metaphor and analogy are *'relational'* expressions. They relate one thing to another, however, the manner in which they do so varies (ibid). Miller (1993:371) at his turn distinguished three types of *'comparisons statements'*: literal comparison, similes, and analogies. He explained that they "*are easily recognizable by their use of one or another copula of similitude: 'like,' 'is like,' 'acts like,' 'looks like,' 'as,' 'is as adj as,' 'resembles,' 'reminds me of,' 'is the same as,' 'similar to,' 'the same way,' and so on.*" Miller argued that in literal comparisons, the grounds are obvious. For example, *'John's wife is like his mother'*; whereas, with a simile the grounds for the comparison are not obvious as in *'john's wife is like his umbrella'* (ibid: 372). Miller tried to defend the traditional view that metaphor is an abbreviated simile and added that the thought provoked is the kind required to appreciate similarities and analogies (ibid:357). He argued that metaphors are recognised as false and then treated as comparison statements. For example *'man is a wolf'* is false in fact, and if someone wants to understand it, it has to be associated with *'man is like a wolf'* or the reader and listener must make it even weaker and interpret it into *'man seems like a wolf'* (ibid: 367-68). Miller thus, concludes that "*the grounds for a metaphor, therefore, can be formulated as relations of similitude that can be expressed as comparison statements*"(ibid: 398).

It's common known that the distinction between simile and metaphor is among the oldest and most tenuous recognised in rhetorical theory. For many theorists and analysts this distinction, in fact, is without difference. As Aristotle (Rhetoric III.4.20-25) puts it: "*the simile also is a metaphor; the difference is but slight... [Similes] are to be employed just as metaphors are employed, since they are really the same thing.*"[140] In the same vein he sees simile as "*less pleasant, as it is more drawn out, and it does not say that this is that, and so the mind does not think out the resemblance either.*"[141] As Aristotle, Lakoff and Johnson (1980), and Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) take metaphor as the more basic of the two figures, and view simile as the explicit expression of a metaphorical mapping. Theorists viewed metaphor and simile as twin manifestations of a single basic phenomenon. Over the centuries, the relation between the two has consistently been seen as a matter of anthological priority as Glucksberg (2001:29) puts it: "*which comes first, the metaphorical egg or the chicken of similitude?*"

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[140] Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. Rhys, W, R, ed. Ross, W, D, Cosimo, Inc., 2010,p.126.
[141] Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, chap.3, p.235 quoted in Baake, K, Metaphor and knowledge: The Challenges of Writing Science, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003, p.77.

The chief function of simile is to draw sharp pictures in the mind through comparisons, in order to give deeper insight into things, persons and ideas through suggestive association, or to explain abstract, complicated ideas in simple, concrete imagery. Similes can be divided into two types: closed similes and open similes.

- Close similes refer to the simile with which the common quality or the ground of the comparison is clearly stated. For example, *'he is obese like a pig'* ⟶ the common quality/comparison ground is stated both in 'he' and the 'pig' in association with 'obesity'.

- Open similes refer to the simile with which the common quality of the two unlike elements is unstated. Thus, it is left for the reader or listener to comprehend. For example, *'he is like a pig'* ⟶ we may attach a great number of qualities such as 'greedy', 'obese', 'dirty', 'lazy', etc., to the pig ⟶ the common quality/ the comparison ground is not stated here. Therefore, an open simile is not as easy as a closed simile for readers to understand or to conceive. To understand it, one has to result to the context.

Janet Watson (2001:32-33) in her book *"Speaking Volumes: Orality and Literacy in the Greek and Roman World"* proposed that similes serve the storyteller and his audience in many ways. Thus, she mentions a great deal of functions that she herself identifies:

- **Explanation and modeling:** in this function the simile serves as an advance organizer.

- **Reconceptualization**: this goes beyond the first function of explanation, and will assist in creating a richer reading than would ordinarily be available from the narrative itself.

- **Filling lexical gaps:** one has to resort to similes when there is no word or form of words available to describe an action or an event.

- **Expressing emotional attitude:** this according to Goatly (1997), is one of the major functions of metaphor, especially as it occurs in literature. Such impact (expressing emotional attitude) derives from the tension created by a metaphor or a simile between the similarities and dissimilarities between it and the target domain and the emotional associations of each. Similes play an important role in presenting the inner and unknowable feelings of an individual to outside world.

- **The cultivation of intimacy:** intimacy may develop between a speaker and his or her audience when the speaker chooses vehicles for comparison which refer directly to the experience of the audience.

Granger and Meunier (2008:132) argue that simile can be handled in the same way as metaphors using the traditional terms 'topic', 'vehicle' and 'grounds', or within conceptual metaphor theory, i.e., as a mapping between two semantic domains. A metaphor as Granger and Meunier claim needs not always have an explicit topic or vehicle, whereas a simile needs both (ibid). Ricoeur (1977:28) in *'The Rule of Metaphor'* tries to convince us that because simile lacks forcefulness and the power of metaphor, it also lacks the potential to shape cognition. He quotes:*"[Simile] dissipates that dynamism of comparison by including the comparative terms."* In his analysis, Ricoeur borrows heavily from Aristotle, who argues that simile and analogy are forms of metaphor. According to Devlin (2008:69-70) simile is a 'statement of the resemblance' of objects, acts or relations, which are similar in shape, size, colour, activity, effect, etc. this figure of speech makes the principal object plainer, less dramatic, contrast with it and impresses it in more forcibly on the mind. He asserts:

"*mere likeness does not constitute a simile. For instance there is no simile, when one city is compared to another. In order that there may be a rhetorical simile, the objects compared must be of different classes.*"

Consider the following examples from everyday speech in English:

- Mum is always 'as busy as a bee' ⟶ (implies the state of being energetic and dynamic / very busy).
- You've never been clever. You're 'as blind as a bat'⟶ (implies unaware / can't see very well at all).
- Her bed was 'like a pile of rocks' ⟶ (implies very rough/ uncomfortable/ very hard).
- The secret of our success is 'as plain as day' ⟶ (implies very clear to see).
- The two sisters are 'as different as night and day' ⟶ (implies two different characters).
- My son and daughter fought 'like cats and dogs' ⟶ (implies two different moods arguing violently all the time).

- That manager is 'as stubborn as a mule' ⟶ (implies the person is obstinate / narrow minded).

- Life is 'like a box of chocolates' ⟶ (implies life makes surprise, i.e., you never know what you're going to get from life: sourness, bitterness or sweetness / different tastes and flavours).

Now consider some examples from everyday speech in Kabyle:

- [θzæð, θəʃvæħ Λmeθsəkku:rθ] lit-trans: (she is sublime, she is as beautiful as a partridge) ⟶ (implies she is sublime and very attractive).

- [iθəts Λməfrɔ:χ] lit-trans: (he eats like a bird) ⟶ (implies he eats very little).

- [θuɣæl Λməθʃirəts gæresen] lit-trans: (she became like a ball between them) ⟶ (implies to underestimate a person/to make from him/her a toy or a game).

- [θəʃvæ θΛjɑzi:ɫ θævərɑ:ni:θ] lit-trans: (she resembles a foreign hen) ⟶ (implies a hen out of the group, i.e., a hen added to the henhouse/ added to the group is by no way welcomed – une poule étrangère/ hors du groupe n'est pas toujours la bienvenue à la basse-cour).

- [susæm θuɣɑ:ləɖ Λməvzi:z[142]] lit-trans: (shut up you became like a cicada) ⟶ (implies being talkative).

- [Λwæli:s Λmmuði əttemənt] lit-trans: (his/her word is like butter and honey) ⟶ (implies being wise and reasonable).

- [ðeχeddæ Λməzrəm] lit-trans: (malicious such as/like a serpent) ⟶(implies viciousness and evil).

- [θgæ Λməθserðu:nt[143]] lit-trans: (she looks like a mare) ⟶ (implies elegance, gracefulness + majesty).

- [læθətsəflili Λməðziri] lit-trans: (she is shining as moon)⟶ (implies radiant/bright and rosy).

- [læjətsfədʒi:ʤ uðmi:s Λmθəfθi:lt / Λmjiti:ʒ] lit-trans: (her face is sparkling like a light/the sun) ⟶(implies an exquisite natural beauty).

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[142] The term [ɑvzi:z] means the cicada, and the word [Λmə] refers back to the simile marker 'like' or 'as'. A cicada is a large bug with long transparent wings, found chiefly in warm countries. The male cicada makes a loud, shrill droning noise after dark by vibrating two membranes on its abdomen. For further information, check International Wildlife Encyclopedia, 3rd Edition, Marshall Cavendish Publishers, 2002, p.455.

[143] The word 'mare' [θæserðu:nt] in kabyle most of the time symbolises positive aspects when referring to women's beauty- such an attractive woman is given the attribute [θæserðu:nt] which covers the whole female beauty.

- [θəʃvæ θizemθ] lit-trans: (she resembles a lioness) ⟶ (implies bravery, tenacity and perseverance, all together forming one quality).

  Note that the underlined transcribed words in kabyle are simile markers: [Λmə]+ [θəʃvæ].

We may conclude, that while similes are easy to recognise as they are announced by 'like' or 'as' in most cases, their interpretation is not always simple, involving semantic as well as pragmatic considerations. The impact of simile is usually less powerful, suggestive and effective than a metaphor.

1.9   Conclusion

We come up to conclude that this chapter has traced some historical facts and outstanding aspects of Sophistry (sophists' movement) in ancient Greece. Neither rhetoric nor philosophy can exist or function independently of the other. We may add that we do not understand philosophical thoughts as something unique or independent of rhetoric. Both Plato and Aristotle recognise the danger of sophistic tricks. They commonly explained and argued that rhetoric is more than it seems, and that with their great eloquence, wit and popularity, the sophists do not produce true knowledge. Unlike Plato, Aristotle devoted a lot of time for rhetoric and thus drew and followed his proper path differently. He was tremendously aware that philosophy was neither in position to distort or even destroy rhetoric nor to absorb it. On the contrary, he tries instead to establish and assess the existing descriptions and rules for the use of persuasive speech (eloquence), to delimit its legitimate uses. Aristotle went forward in establishing a close connection between the sphere of validity of rhetoric and that of philosophy. This chapter also shed light on some other figures of speech and their general functions (metonymy, hyperbole, apostrophe, oxymoron, personification, synecdoche and simile).

The next chapter will be devoted mainly to the theoretical part of metaphor including the three basic views: comparison, substitution and interaction. It will also treat two crucial parameters, namely the motivations of metaphor use and problems raised of metaphor.

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims at further clarifying and analysing certain prominent reasons and motivations of the use of metaphor. It also sheds light on some problems of metaphors such as its translatability, interpretation, implicature and some other anomalies. This chapter treats at the same time the widespread agreements and disagreements between the theories, i.e., the challenges and influences between the traditional theories (substitution and comparison views) and the interaction approach.

2.2 The Motivations For Metaphor Use

Metaphor is, and has always been centrally concerned with language use. Although originally conceived as an applied branch/ discipline of the field of literature and rhetoric, as a site for conversations on the practicalities of interactions, metaphor has come to its own as an internationally recognised and recognisable field in cognitive linguistics.

Metaphor is said, in particular, to be the core of linguistic creativity (and especially poetic). It is now assumed, by almost everybody (psychologists and linguists), that metaphors are part and parcel of our activities in life. They are important tools of cognition and communication, providing us with unfamiliar ways of conceptualizing familiar things, and familiar ways of conceptualizing unfamiliar things (Lakoff and Jonson 1980; Ortony, 1979). In that sense, as Ortony (1975)[143] argued, metaphors are not just ornamental, they are necessary. Metaphor is not limited to specific studies or restricted to a minority interest, but its work is relevant to all students in all disciplines (literature, economy, medicine, politics, etc.). In other words, we use metaphors all the time to help us define our natural and scientific world, as well as they explain our behaviour and attitudes. Andrew Goatly (1997) notes in this context:

"*If, as I believe, metaphor and mental processes it entails, are basic to language and cognition, then a clearer understanding of its working is relevant, not just to literature students, but to any students.*"[144]

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[143] Ortony, A, "Why Metaphors Are Necessary and Not Just Nice", Educational Theory, Vol.25, N° 1, Winter 1975, pp.45-53.
[144] Goatly, A, The Language of Metaphors, London: Routledge, 1997, p.1.

Metaphor remains essential, supplements knowledge about already quiet known things, and quite well understood topics. Metaphor is regarded as an integral component in our cognition, allows richness of detail, unexpectedness, wonder, admiration and speculation.

In teaching, as well as in studying, metaphor remains a major tool we resort to. Because metaphor is basic to language and thinking, any well-educated or non-educated person should have some understanding of its processes. However, we the 'speakers' in our everyday social interactions need essentially to be in a constant touch with such a language tool. Common sense traditional teaching often presents metaphor as an anomaly, or an unusual and even a deviant way of using language. Locke (book 3, ch. X), for instance, denounced figurative language as follows:

"*But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that ... all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheat.*" [145]

Locke is very explicit in showing his enthusiasm and eagerness towards metaphorless language. In other words, Locke is against the 'metaphor use', and he implicitly assumes the possibility of a philosophical language without metaphor.

Today, however, philosophers, psychologists and linguists agree that metaphor is not something that can be easily confined, but is an indispensable basis of language and thought. Locke's quote paradoxically provides evidence for this. The following concepts that Locke uses 'move', 'mislead' and 'cheat' are being used metaphorically, adding to this, 'eloquence hath invented' is a case of personifying metaphor as well.

Metaphor is always said to be part and parcel of our culture. Men and women, youngsters and elders extract, wrap, and mainly reinforce their thoughts, ideas and writings via the key metaphor. Metaphor espouses our everyday speech the whole day long. It is deeply rooted in the human mind. For example, we may say while resorting to metaphor, 'It is as hot as hell', or again 'It's hot as the fingers of hell'. Thus, metaphor is felt to add forcefulness, and evidently the forcefulness has some relation to sharpness of detail and concrete of expression. We are attracted to metaphor in the first place because ordinary

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[145]Lock (1690) quoted in Yu, C, Nothing to Admire: The Politics of Poetic Satire from Dryden to Merrill, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 53.

language seems worn and abstract. Metaphor tends also to accompany the expression of emotions and attitudes. For example, when we feel a special kind of happiness, we automatically try to express our feelings through different words that fit them, more or less adequately, or with more accuracy depending on shades of meaning.

Saying, 'I am happy', may appear to us quite different from saying, 'I am walking in the air'. In other words, sometimes we feel like a 'gap'/ 'breach', or a 'lack', and even a 'failure' in finding out appropriate adjectives which first define and specify, then right after qualify any special feeling or desire.

In such cases in fact, we sometimes tend to resort to the world of metaphor consciously or unconsciously to fill that lexical gap. Here are some other examples concerning the feeling of the extreme degree of 'happiness' when referring to metaphor:

- 'I'm feeling up'
- 'I feel I am flying'
- 'I feel like a million dollars'
- 'I am walking on the air this morning'
- 'Thinking about her always gives me a lift'
- 'I am over the moon'
- 'I am on top of the world'
- 'I am in a good mood /spirits'

The same thing happens with the native Kabylian speakers when expressing their feelings metaphorically in their everyday social interactions. Trying to join the examples already illustrated right above, we suggest the following utterances:

1-[tiḵli ʌtətʌrd̪əq silfərħ] lit-trans : (she is going to burst with happiness).

Note that: the sound [tə] refers to the personal pronoun 'she' which is opposed to [ði] indicating 'he' in Kabyle language.

2-[lʌjətsæfəg silfərħ] lit-trans : (He's flying with happiness).

[lʌθətsæfəg silfɑrħ] lit-trans : (She's flying with happiness). ⎱ The state of being happy.

[lʌjetsnəgi:z silfɑrħ] lit-trans (he is jumping with happiness). ⎰

Note that: the three utterances together share the same implication, but do not share the same degree of feeling in expressing happiness.

3-[ʌsseki d̠ɑ:nd ʃlæɣmi:s] lit-trans : (Today, his moustache laughed) ⟶ being happy.

Note that: this utterance may seem nonsense in another language, but this is something specific to language community and culture.

4-[tiḴli ʌðiɖʌgər iʃətɖni:s] lit-trans : (He is at the point of throwing his clothes) ⟶ he is happy.

5-[iʃu:f uqɑrɒji:s] lit-trans: (his/her head is swelling).

Note that: the unit [ji:s] in the utterance [uqɑrɒji:s] (his/her head) refers back to the personal pronouns she and he at the same time.

We want to show that the same procedure is maintained with this speech community. When words lack accuracy, or when we feel some kind of failure, metaphor becomes then the best mediator between the speakers, so as to reach strength and subjectivity.

We are all attracted by the use of metaphor may be for one common reason that it provides us with more vigilance, more defence and more protection. Metaphor thus, is not an empty play of words, but something which needs to be in harmony with the social and historical setting, with the beliefs shared and personal constructs of the society.

One other reason is that metaphor stands as an attempt to persuade the hearer to accept things as they are in reality. Metaphor thus might be the most appropriate way of persuasion, and even a strong emphasis on persuasion about our feelings, emotions and attitudes. Metaphor is one way for exteriorizing our grief, sadness and even passion. This could be one way, to escape from the bitter reality, so instead we all try or prefer to turn to metaphor to reconstitute it and finally reach our satisfaction, aim the target, and plug the gap.

Here are some examples:

1-[ʌduni:θ θətsɣuru:] lit-trans : (Life betrays).

2-[θəssæðər ʌnɳi:s]
or [θəssæðər iwænɳi:s] ⟶ Lit-trans: (she dropped down her eyes) implies ⟶ she got angry/she felt upset.

3-[lʌjətsewəl θuræ θirwi:] lit-trans : (He is boiling with anger and he is at the point to smash him up) implies ⟶ He's very furious and he's at the point to massacre him.

4-[θəzzuzu:n ʌduni:θ] lit-trans : (Life rocks) implies ⟶ Life distracts people and leave them do whatever they want.

5-[ʌfsæɣ fuli:w] lit-trans : (I run over/mashed my heart) implies ⟶ to forgive someone though we are not at fault.

6-[jʌtʃɔ:r   uli:s]   lit-trans : (His/her heart is full) implies ⟶ she/he is troubled – having problems all around or being sad.

7-[zu:r   uli:m] lit-trans : (Your heart is thick) implies ⟶ a careless/mindless person.

8-[jʌssuli:d   ʌfwəði:w] lit-trans : (He rose up my bowels/belly) implies ⟶ he's disgusting me – he is driving me crazy.

9-[mlælən   wulæwən] lit-trans : (the hearts met).

or [nnəʒmæn   wulæwən] lit-trans : (hearts gathered together). ⎫ implies ⟶ Reciprocity in feelings/agreement, etc.

10-[juɣ   jer   ʌvri:ð] lit-trans : (he bought the wrong way/ road) implies ⟶ to become delinquent/ bandit-to lose one's reason and good manners / to become a devil.

11-[jʌvrən θæmgʌrt gəli:s]

or [jʌvrən θijərsi:s]

lit-trans :(He broke his daughter's neck) implies ⟶ he well brought up his daughter.

Note that: the second utterance [jʌvrən θijərsi:s] in Kabyle, the personal pronoun 'he' is included within the verb [jʌvrən] (he broke).

12-[ʌweli:s   ʈarʂa:ʂθ] lit-trans : (His / Her word is a bullet) implies ⟶ he's a wise man– what he says is worthy depending on the context.

13-[jəӃʃəm   uli:w] lit-trans : (He entered / got in my heart) implies ⟶ he pleases me – I like him.

These are some illustrations on the use of metaphor by old kabylian speakers. This is to show that we often resort to metaphor for one simple reason, that we do not have any other choice. Metaphor, thus, would be an immediate result of the gaps and limitations of our words and expressions. Words are not always clear, direct and to the purpose in our everyday speech. Things said may lack intelligibility, the reason why we most of the time wrap the words with new ornaments, i.e., we make them wear new uses to make up for their failure to attain more or less the adequate idea, because we have a finite number of ideas, but we produce an infinite number of sentences.

As Pierre Fontanier argues, "*a fairly restricted number of words* [*which*] *furnish the means to express an infinite number of ideas*" quoted in Paul Ricoeur (1977:72).

We may draw the following conclusion, that one major motivation among others behind the use of metaphor is the filling or the plugging of the infinite lexical gaps. In this

context Paul Ricoeur terms metaphors that help bridge those gaps as 'forced metaphor' (ibid: 71). When ideas seem unclear or not direct, or when they are not properly transmitted through certain codes, concepts and signs, 'forced metaphors' come to emerge on the surface, i.e., they intervene systematically and naturally. We say for instance, in Kabyle [vərɾi:Ḵ wuli:s] (His heart is black), or [qəssi:h wuli:s] (His heart is hard), meaning that the person is spiteful, mischievous, wicked and unforgiving depending on the context. As a conclusion, we may draw a conjuncture between the following two concepts: that of the wickedness first, and that of the unforgiveness second recognised as two 'conduits metaphor' in association with the black colour, which then becomes a proper sign of wickedness and unforgiveness.

Dumarsais (1824) writes in this context of plugging gaps:

"Les langues les plus riches n'ont point assez grand nombre de mots pour exprimer chaque idée particulière par un terme qui ne soit que le signe propre de cette idée; ainsi, l'on est souvent oblige d'emprunter le mot propre de quelque autre idée, qui a le plus de rapport a celle qu'on veut exprimer" (Dumarsais 1824: 34).

Metaphor, thus, can gain predominance in abstract areas where no proper terms are accounted for. The experience we live is absolutely private without language, i.e., (language is a tool through which we express our ideas and thoughts, we pour our feelings and emotions via language); therefore, one major aim of using or resorting to metaphor is to disclose the less clear ideas and thoughts, through casting them in terms of others which are clearer. It could be either very difficult or sometimes even impossible to grasp abstract and intangible concepts and phenomena apart from our concrete reality. We usually use as a source our physical experiences to explain and note clearer such phenomena tucked away in an abstract word. As already said, we absorb and assimilate these notions and concepts in terms of our (perceptions and senses) for it is the only way for us to become fully aware of them and finally reach intelligibility in our everyday social interactions.

Consider the following examples in Kabyle concerning the notion of time:

1-[lætsnæði:ɤ lwəqθ] lit-trans : (I'm searching for time).

2-[ʌdjɑwəḓ lwəqθ] lit-trans : (Time is arriving).

3-[iləħqəd lwəqθ] lit-trans : (Time is coming).

4- [idɔ:l lwəqθ] lit-trans : (Time is long).

5-[jæddɑ lwəqθ] lit-trans : (Time passed/Time is over)

6-[jufəg   lwəqθ] lit-trans : (Time flew).

7-[juḵræɤ   lwəqθ] lit-trans : (Time has stolen us).

8-[jekkæji   lwəqθ] lit-trans : (Time betrayed me).

We notice in these examples that the use of metaphor is very essential and inevitable when dealing with 'the notion of time'. The description of time recommends and needs the use of some spatial or motion words. The words used in utterances above like [idɔ:l], [jæddæ], [jufəg], [ʌdjɑwəd] and [iləħqəd] are words belonging to space, which are metaphorically used to map an abstract area of experience which is time. Whereas, the rest of utterances like [lætsnæði:ɤ], [juḵræɤ] and [jekkæji] are words belonging to human actions.

Metaphor as a basic mechanism can construct a new world (Levin, 1979), i.e., metaphors are actually 'building blocks' with which we can construct and conceptualise our real world. Levin (1988) acknowledges that metaphorical utterances arise simply because "*our language is not an ideally efficient mechanism.*"[146] The practical function of metaphor is to give concrete illustrations of objects. Nearly all readers find abstractions "alien" to them that they need a concrete statement such as the one the analogy offers (Brooks and Warren, 1979:270-72).

Metaphor can be regarded as a communicative device. It "*fulfills the necessary communication function of conveying continuous experiential information, using a discrete symbol system*" (Piavio and Walsh in Ortony,1993:308-9). Through imagery, the metaphorical expression, which is used in communication, introduces a vivid representation of the perceived experience (ibid: 309).

In education for instance, the use of metaphors and analogies is very important. Teachers in general, rely on this phenomenon so as to characterise their teaching experience. Good teachers use metaphors and analogies for the sake of achieving greater accuracy in transmitting the message. In other words, with their abilities, teachers create metaphors to make new and unfamiliar concepts more meaningful to students. As Ortony (1975:45) explains: "*Metaphors, and their close relatives, similes and analogies, have being used as teaching devices since the earliest writings of civilized man*". In addition, the use of metaphor

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[146] Levin quoted in Needham-Didsbury, I, "Metaphor in psychotherapeutic discourse: Implications for utterance interpretation", Poznań Studies in Contemporary Linguistics, Vol. 50, Issue 1, 2014, p.91.

was and still is an opportunity to foster the teachers' awareness of their own teaching (Mouraz et al., 2013:99).

Metaphor plays a key role in the field of education. First because it enlivens ordinary language and gives maximum meaning in a minimum of words. For example, 'our garden is an adventure park'. Second it identifies the dynamics of educational processes, as well as, it clarifies and classifies the functions of educational actors (Jensen, 2006; Magalhães and Stoer, 2007; Patchen and Crawford, 2011).

In science as well, metaphor is an essential ingredient. It "*is used to explain, test or visualise one (novel) reality in terms of another (less novel) one*"[147]. For example, induce students to assess understanding of concepts via the use of metaphor, aiming to allow them to start building a well-grounded and a deep understanding of some basic concepts in science. We may compare a form of a bird to that of an airplane to introduce novice students 'the principle of aerodynamics'. It has been proved for almost many decades, that metaphor is a tool of exploration and discovery, which enables scientists to interpret the natural world providing a way of imposing structure within novel or unfamiliar situation by relating them to familiar experiences (Gay Ashkenazi, 2006:6). Many researchers and practitioners worked hard on the matter, and thus ascertained that scientific metaphors "*extend beyond the boundaries of professional scientific activities and pervade the scientist's daily life as well*" (ibid).

In short, metaphors allow scientists to see and feel things that passed by unseen and unfelt, enrich our experience of the natural world. Thus, through metaphors we systematically become aware of meaning and structure in different intricate situations. Theodore Brown (2003) writes the following:

"*metaphor is essential to every aspect of science ... None of the scientist's brilliant ideas for new experiments, no inspired interpretations of observations, nor any communications of those ideas and results to others occur without the use of metaphor ... if we are to appreciate metaphor as an essential element in the workings of science, we must understand its roles more generally in thought, language and, action.*"[148]

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[147] Wall, A, and Goronwy, T, J, Myth, Metaphor and Science, Chester: Chester Academic Press, 2009, p.33.

[148] Brown, T, L, Making Truth: Metaphor in Science, Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2003, p.15.

In science, Metaphors function differently than in any other discipline. Claiming the particularity and importance of this phenomenon in such a field, Peter Smith (2000) puts the following:

"The metaphors of science are as much part of our culture as are those of aesthetics or philosophy, but scientific metaphors acquire unique authority by virtue of their origin in a discourse which claims privileged access to true knowledge about the world."[149]

Richard Boyd (1993:286) explains that metaphorical expressions in science are unique in function. Scientific metaphors are those which describe theoretical claims, but for which no adequate literal paraphrase is known (they cannot be literary expressed). Consider the following theoretical example proposed by Boyd (ibid: 287) and that is derived from the terminology of computer science: thought is a kind of "information processing" + the brain is a sort of "computer". So here lies the concern that no literal expression can describe the same theoretical claim. Metaphor thus, should be regarded as a central and vital tool used by any scientist to achieve his goals.

Metaphor has various functions in various contexts of human communications (Mooij, 1993:67). Those three main functions are stated as follows:

- The emotive
- The persuasive
- The cognitive

In the emotive function, metaphor serves to express, excite and transfer emotional attitudes and feelings, whereas, in the second function, it serves to persuade the audience with respect to a course of action or a point of view. And finally the third action that serves to express cognitive insights (ibid). Most of the metaphorical terms used in the emotive function are terms related to the words abuse and praise such as 'Hurrah!', 'beast' and 'angel', etc. Metaphorical terms of persuasive function can be found in political and commercial propaganda, and those related to the cognitive function do abound in philosophy, criticism, the humanities, and even science. Mooij stresses on the usefulness of those three functions and writes: "*metaphors can help to reveal aspects of the world that would otherwise have*

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[149] Smith, P, D, Metaphor and Materiality: German Literature and World-View of Science 1780-1955, Vol.4, University of Oxford, 2000, P.2.

remain hidden. [They] *are then thought to extend the range of objects that can be discussed, described, characterized, understood, and explained – briefly: know*" (ibid:68).

Piavio and Walsh (1993:307) apply the term 'solar eclipse' to metaphor for the reason that it hides the objects of study and at the same time reveals some of its most noticeable and interesting characteristics "*when viewed through the right telescope.*" Thus, metaphor obscures its literal meaning while at the same time permits certain new features and new understanding to emerge. Metaphor highlights the potentiality of language users, and enables them to create and understand new and original linguistic combinations (ibid).

Metaphorisation, through which writers and speakers use new metaphorical dimensions of meaning demand and reflect to establish a link between two concepts. Some good examples of this process (metaphorical extensions) can be found in the metaphorical use of the body parts in English illustrated as follows: 'mouth', 'head', 'eye', 'leg' and 'foot' to talk about rivers, persons, needles, tables and mountains respectively.

Here are some examples from the old Kabylian speakers:
-Metaphorical extensions in the application of words:

1)**Mouth**

Situation 1:

X: [iniji:d θbəlɑː d̪ fəlæs θæppu:rθ !]

lit-trans: (Tell me, you closed the door on him!)

Y: [ʌlæ! dʒi:ɣ θæppu:rθ θəli imi: puʃən]

lit-trans: (No! I left the door open the mouth of the fox).

This is a short dialogue taken from an informal setting between a mother -in- law and her daughter -in- law. In the Kabyle society the newly born babies are not supposed to be left alone with doors closed. The mother's presence is very essential because of some evil beliefs which are part of the Kabyle customs.

The utterance [imi: puʃən] (the mouth of the fox) implies to let the door a little bit opened as a reference to the opening of the fox's mouth.

situation2:

[θəppɒ d̪ ʌlmi ðimi ntəppu:rθ θuɣɑləd]

Lit-trans: (She reached the mouth of the door and she came back).

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This is an utterance taken from a conversation which took place at home (informal setting) between two sisters -in- law. A asked B if she called her aunt a visit, and B answers that she got there but renounced at the last minute.

Situation3:

[snəgðəm θæɖəvʂiːts ʃjimiːs θədʒətʂ ʌtuduːm]

 Lit-trans: (Invert the plate on its mouth and leave it drain).

This situation took place in a wedding. One of the guests asks his daughter to take the plate invert it, and let it drain.

2)Head

Situation 1:

[sæni iguɣæl uqərɒ nətmæʃint ?]

Lit-trans: (where did the head of the machine go?) or (where is it?)

This setting took place at home. The mum forgot about the place where she put the upper part of the sewing machine. This upper component is termed in Kabyle the 'head of the machine' [uqərɒ   nətmæʃint]. Knowing that, the ancient design is composed of the upper and lower parts.

Situation 2:

 X: [ðæʃu   læθχədməɖ ?]

lit-trans: (What are you doing?)

 Y: [letsnæðiːɣ ʌqərɒ/iχəf nəlχiːɖ urθufiɣæræ]

lit-trans: (I am looking for the head of the string, I didn't find it).

The setting here took place at the dressmaker's home. the woman took a new thread reel, but did not manage to find out the tip of the thread which is specifically termed in Kabyle [ʌqərɒ nəlχiːɖ].

3)Eye

Situation 1:

[θwælætsiːd / θmɑrqitsiːd siθiːɫ ntəppuːrθ]

Lit-trans: (she saw her from the eye of the door).

This is an utterance selected from a conversation between two neighbours. A is informing B that the person C was keeping an eye on another person.

Situation 2 :

[isæddæji:d siθi:ɫ nətsəgni:θ, jʌsəḴwiji imi:w]

lit-trans : (He made me pass from the eye of the needle, he dried my mouth) implies

⟶ 'He humiliated me, I couldn't even utter a word' / he exhausted me after grumbling too much to me.

This utterance describes a situation between a mother and her eldest son. The first utterance (1) [θi:ɫ nətsəgni:θ] implies that the mother was offended and was humiliated by her elder son; whereas the second utterance (2) [jʌsəḴwiji imi:w] means that the mother couldn't speak more, she couldn't even find her words or say something clear and adequate (she lost her lexis) – speaking with her son is a tiresome task – (her son is unbearable).

4)Leg

Situation 1:

[sæni guɤɑ:l uqəʒi:r ukursi ?]

Lit-trans: (where did the leg of chair go?)

This utterance took place at home. A father is asking and blaming at the same time one of his sons for the reason why they threw the leg of the chair which could be easily repaired.

Situation2:

[ʌθen jarəʌz uqəʒi:r nətɑvlæ. midjusæ vævæθwən msəfhæməθ ji:ðəs]

lit-trans : (Here the leg of the table is broken, when your father arrives explain yourselves) implies ⟶ when your father arrives, let him know that you're the responsible.

This situation illustrates a grand-mother and her grandsons discussing about who broke 'the leg of the table' [ʌqəʒi:r nətɑvlæ].

Situation 3:

[ɤɒrəm jæhθuθi uqəʒi:r ukursi]

Lit-trans: (mind where you are sitting / be careful, the leg of the chair is rotted).

This utterance took place in the park. A man is warning a person about the problem.

5)Foot

[æfəs kæn fuɖɑ:r nətmæʃi:nt urətsəgəðæræ!]

lit-trans : (Just press on the foot of the machine (sewing machine), don't be afraid!).

This utterance is selected from a situation which took place at the dressmaker's home who is supposed to be a teacher. The metaphorical expression [ʌḍaːr nətmæʃiːnt] (the foot of the sewing machine) refers back to the pedal of the sewing machine and this is a frequently used metaphor, which is actually a dead metaphor simply because it has lost its potential ability to surprise through repetition (Cruse, 1986).

Note that: the sounds [fu] in [fuḍaːr nətmæʃiːnt] refer to the preposition 'on' in Kabyle.

6)Hand

Situation 1:

[ʌθniːn məʧən / fukən ifæssən uḍəlæ]

Lit-trans: (here are the hands of the basket torn).

This situation took place in the market. The grandfather noticed the miserable state of the basket and thus complains about the torn handles.

Situation 2:

[sæni θərriːḍ ʌfuːs nətfəluːʃθ?]

Lit-trans: (where did you put the hand of the broom?)

This utterance is taken from a conversation that held in the yard where children were playing. The youngest brother asks his elder brother to bring him the broom.

Situation 3:

X: [θædʒvikəm? θəlhæ?]

lit-trans : (Does she please you? Is she nice?)

Y: [xuşənts / θxɔːş ifæsssən]

lit-trans : (She lacks hands) implies ⟶ she's not good at cooking

Note that: this metaphor is specific to culture.

These two utterances are taken from a long conversation, dealing with a topic about 'marriage'. The utterance [χuşənts ifæssən] implies (she is not good at cooking) / (she is lazy/not active).

The two interlocutors (X and Y) are both elder females taking turn in this conversation implying that the girl they are speaking about is not 'handy'. Let's examine the following utterance [rzən ifesniːs] (her hands are broken). We notice that this utterance is similar in meaning to [χuşənts ifæssən], and that the verbs [χuşənts] (she lacks) + [rzən] (are broken) taken separately are in fact very different, but one joins the other in terms of situation.

Here is an equivalent expression in French 'avoir les bras cassés' which may seem awkward/odd or even does not exist in English at all.

Here are some other examples on metaphorical extensions:

Head

- [ʌqərɒ   usənnæn] lit-trans: (the head of a thorn) implies ⟶ 'the tip/ the sharpened tip of a prickle.

- [ʌqərɒ   ləmħæjən] lit-trans: (The head of miseries/troubles) implies ⟶'the miserable'.

Note that: some of the vegetables in Kabyle are generally related to the term 'head'. And thus, they are called:

- [ʌqərɒ   nəslɑtɑ] lit-trans: (head of the lettuce) implies ⟶ how much lettuce we are speaking about (in terms of number).

- [ʌqərɒ   nəʃʃuflɜːr] lit-trans: (head of cauliflower). Implies ⟶ only one cauliflower.

Arm

- [fkijiːd   siːn   iɣalɩən   nəʃʃæʃ] lit-trans: (give me two arms of the fabric/the material) implies ⟶ two meters of the fabric (stating the measurement unit 'meter').

Hand

- [ʌθæn gər ifessən nrʌpwi] lit-trans: (He's in between God's hands) ⟶ implies 'he is agonizing'.

- [jeɣliːd   sifesniːs] lit-trans : (He fell in his hands) implies ⟶ 'to be at the mercy of somebody'/ 'nothing can be done except waiting his grace'.

- [ʌpʒən   ifesniːs]   lit-trans : (Her hands are good) implies ⟶ 'she is handy/skilful'.

- [ɣliːn   ifesniːw] lit-trans : (My hands fell) implies ⟶ 'I'm exhausted' or 'I'm not feeling well' (in case of hearing bad news or receiving any other chock /can't move my hands from the chock)

- [ʃəmmʌr   ijfesniːḴ] lit-trans: (Roll up to your hands) implies ⟶ 'get yourself ready to work'.

- [æfu:s æθulæwi:n] lit-trans : (hand you women) implies ⟶'clap hands'(this utterance is specific to language community. [æfu:s æθulæwi:n] is an utterance generally used in weddings in case there is no ambiance to create joy among people).

Eye

- [θəɤli:d θiti:s] lit-trans: (His / Her eye fell)
- [ɤli:ntəd wænni:s] lit-trans: (His / Her eyes fell)

implies ⟶ 'to be envious', 'to be jealous' (an extreme jealousy).

Note that, in the first utterance [θəɤli:d θiti:s], the verb [θəɤli:d] (fell) which is quite different from English and French is in the singular, whereas, the second utterance [ɤli:ntəd wænni:s], the verb [ɤli:ntəd] is used in the plural. Personal pronouns are systematically included within the verbs when referring to Kabyle language.

- [rwi:nt wænni:s] lit-trans : (his / Her eyes are mixed up) implies ⟶ he/she is 'furious' and 'angry'.

- [jesseðər iwænni:s] lit-trans : (He lowered/got down his eyes) implies ⟶'to be / get sulky or get angry' especially in case of being upset and stressed.

- [fɤəntəd wænni:w] lit-trans : (his/her eyes bulged) implies ⟶ being very scared/a sudden stun/being dazed.

- [ʌzzent wænni:s] lit-trans : (his/her eyes are too spicy) implies ⟶ being mischievous/shrewd character.

In sum, metaphor is regarded and ranked as a powerful tool, whenever one describes new situations in terms of what has been described before. Black in his later essay (1977) described metaphor as "*cognitive instruments*", that is to say, metaphors do function cognitively in such a way that they play a constant role in human communication and experiences. Thus, he views this latter as follows:

"*some metaphors enable us to see aspects of reality that the metaphor's production helps to constitute. But that is no longer surprising if one believes that the world is*

necessarily a world under a certain description- or a world seen from a certain perspectives. Some metaphors can create such a perspective."[150]

After long observation Ricoeur (1977) argued that the power of metaphors lies in its ability to allow language get beyond the limits of its prosaic boundaries and into an "*extra-linguistic*" place of poetic creativity. Ricoeur explored different aspects of extended discourse. Among those forms, he carefully examined live metaphors. He explains that a live metaphor is a kind of discourse that says more than one thing at the same time and adds that it is the product of sentences, but no more the result of substituting one word in the terms of another for decorative or rhetorical effect. I.e., a metaphor proceeds mainly from tension between all the terms at the level of the sentence. Thus, Ricoeur terms a live metaphor "*a metaphorical twist.*"[151]

According to Ricoeur, metaphors can also extend beyond a single sentence as in the case of poetic language which redescribes reality. Ricoeur goes further in adding the term "*a linguistically creative dimension*". For him metaphors as primary interpreters of reality act dominantly and overwhelmingly over any discourse to define and redefine the world. In other words, metaphors open our minds to new visions and new dimensions. Thus, they allow us to speculate more about the ways of seeing the world.

2.3   Metaphor: problems raised

It is only around the 70's that a prevailing view among philosophers, linguists and cognitive scientists emerged to claim that metaphor falls inevitably in pragmatics rather than in semantics. Metaphor as a widely spread linguistic phenomenon occurs in different forms of language communication. The crucial problem at stake is how a metaphor differs from any other literary expression (Rumelhart, 1993). Many philosophers have traditionally established a difference between literal and figurative language. They assumed that the figurative language is essentially 'marked'/distinctive and somehow a 'deviant' exploitation of the literal. Thus, Rumelhart and Sadock (1993) in the same field of study have questioned if

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[150] Black quoted in Schmicking, D, and Gallagher, S, Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010, p.403.

[151] For Beardsley (1962) on 'metaphorical twist' states that comparison takes place between objects whereas opposition exists between words. The 'twist' is brought about by tensions within discourse itself. Consequently, a theory of verbal opposition is distinct from object comparison theory as the order of words is distinct from the order of things (cited in Paul Ricoeur, 1977:398). For further readings see Beardsley, M,C, "The Metaphorical Twist", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 22,March 1962, pp.293–307.

really a genuine difference in kind existed between literal and metaphorical language. From the point of view of Jerrold Sadock, both the conventional and the figurative meanings do not form two well defined categories of utterances (cited in Ortony, 1993:71). He adds that conventionality and figurativeness are in fact at two ends of a scale (ibid). In the same line of thought David Kaplan argues:

"*The problem of metaphor is to describe and explain how creative and imaginative uses of language refer to reality in such a way that produces new interpretations of the world*"[152]

Some researchers belonging to the relevance[153] theory such as Sperber and Wilson (1986), Beznidenhout (2001), and Carston (2002) assert that the difference between literal and metaphorical meaning is just a matter of degree not a difference in kind. Some other theorists like Goodman (1968), Searl (1979), and Nunberg (2002) reject the classical distinctions among different forms of the figurative/non-literal language. Thus, they treat metaphor and some other forms of figurative language as a single unified phenomenon (Reimer and Camp, 2006: 849).

One question should be asked here. How do metaphors work? And at what extent do they manage to convey or to mean accurately what they do? There is a particular 'tension' between the subject and the modifier in the metaphorical expression. This tension is absent or hidden in fact from the literally expression. This conflict thus, leads both the reader and listener to react, and then it gives birth to an interpretation (Prandi, 1999). The same way, Ricoeur (1977) puts emphasis on the concept of 'tension' between tenor and vehicle. This tension can be described as that between an 'is' and an 'is not' (1977: 293), as 'a play of semantic pertinence and impertinence' (ibid: 343). Thus, he writes:

"*The only criterion of metaphor, in fact, is that the word gives two ideas at once, that it contains both 'tenor' and 'vehicle' in interaction. By contrast, this criterion can serve to define literal meaning: if one cannot distinguish tenor and vehicle, then the word can be*

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[152] Kaplan, D, M, Ricoeur's Critical Theory, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003, p.48.
[153] The relevance theory traditionally defined as a cognitive theory of human communication developed by D. Sperber and D. Wilson, was fully described in their 1986 book, but it really emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a cognition-centered alternative to Grice's cooperation-ruled explanation of human communication. For further readings see Yus, F: "Relevance Theory" in Barber, A, and Stainton, R, J, Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Oxford: Elsevier, 2010, P.648.

provisionally regarded as literal .... But, in this case, literal meaning has nothing to do with proper meaning. Furthermore, literal language becomes extremely rare, outside of the technical language of the science"[154]

Beardsley (1967) at his turn worked on the elaboration of 'tension'. He recognises two features working together in genuine symbiosis, i.e., two features "*working in tandem within metaphor*" (Reimer and Camp, 2006: 846) between the concept that is expressed by the metaphorical term and the concept that we intuitively applied to the subject.

Proponents such as (MacCormac, 1985; Searl, 1979; Beadsley, 1962) see metaphor as literally false or even logically contradictory, that is, language represents or conveys a semantic anomaly. These latters suggest three stages[155] in the process of understanding a metaphorical expression:

- Deriving the literal meaning of the expression.
- Testing whether the literal meaning makes sense and consequently detecting an anomaly.
- Seeking an alternative meaning (the metaphorical meaning) because the literal meaning fails to make sense.

Here are some Kabyle utterances selected from the everyday speech ('tension' reassessed). Consider how the human organ 'heart' works metaphorically:

1- [vərri:Ḵ   wuli:s] lit-trans: (his/her heart is black) – this specific utterance in Kabyle could be interpreted differently depending on the situation we are dealing with (two

implicatures).implies — he/she is spiteful, nasty/always with a nasty temper.
— he/she is unmerciful/being cruel and harsh with others.

[vərri:Ḵ]
[wuli:s]   a tension carried   a negative attitude :Vindictiveness/ruthlessness.

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[154] Paul Ricoeur quoted in Dews, P, The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy, Lonson: Verso Press, 1995, p. 101.

[155] Sopory, P, and Dillard, J, P: "Figurative Language and Persuasion" in Dillard, J, P, and Pfau, M, The Persuasion Handbook: Developments in Theory and Practice, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002, p.412.

2- [məlʮu:l wuli:s] lit-trans: (his/her heart is white) implies → he/she is kind / a forgiving person - $\underset{\text{carried}}{\underline{\text{a tension}}}$ → a positive attitude: goodness.

3- [zədi:g wuli:s] lit-trans: (his/her heart is neat/tidy) implies → he/she hasn't got bad intentions/not being afraid of the person $\underset{\text{carried}}{\underline{\text{a tension}}}$ → a positive attitude: innocence + forgiveness.

4- [qəssi:ħ uli:s] lit-trans: (his/her heart is hard) ⎤

 [uli:s ðɑzrɔ:] lit-trans: (his/her heart is a rock) ⎦ implies → she/he's cruel/wicked and unforgiving depending on the context.

 $\underset{\text{carried}}{\underline{\text{a tension}}}$ → a negative attitude : harshness.

5- [zu:r uli:s] lit-trans: (his/her heart is thick) implies → he/she is an ill-bred person.

 $\underset{\text{carried}}{\underline{\text{a tension}}}$ → Insouciance/apathy.

6- [jetsəv wu:l] lit-trans: (the heart has worked hard) / (the heart suffered) implies → the person suffered too much and no more energy is left (losing and wasting one's strength with the hard days) $\underset{\text{carried}}{\underline{\text{a tension}}}$ → Sufferings/troubles + bitterness.

7- [jəmmu:θ wuli:s] lit-trans: (his/her heart is dead) implies → she/he is a carless person/ a person who never cares about things that should be good for him (living without an aim) $\underset{\text{carried}}{\underline{\text{a tension}}}$ → nonchalance.

8- [qðən wulæwən] lit-trans: (the hearts are cauterized) implies → the person is either:

 ⎡→ ⁻A negative attitude: we got used to the bad situations/we become accustomed to certain problems.

 ⎣→ ⁺A positive attitude: we did what we wanted exactly/we pleased ourselves.

$\underset{\text{carried}}{\underline{\text{a tension}}}$ → (-) with a negative charge => fatigue / (+) with a positive charge =>pleasure.

9- [jətʃæ uli:s] lit-trans: (he ate his heart) implies → he does not react to situations, not even an emergency situation/being passive in front of a situation or any problem/never get involved. $\underset{\text{carried}}{\underline{\text{a tension}}}$ → passiveness/lacking in energy and will/not taking part.

10- [χɑʂræn wulæwən nməddən] lit-trans: (the hearts of the people failed) implies → all the good manners went away/the humans became bad tempered/to become irritated. $\underset{\text{carried}}{\underline{\text{a tension}}}$ → radical change in manners and temper.

Figure 6. Based on Prandi's view (S+M=tension carried).

We may draw the following conclusion: the examples above reinforce and strengthen the idea of tension between the subject and the modifier in Kabyle when using metaphor. This is to show clearly that this particular 'tension' is quite absent (hidden) from the literal expression or let's say from the surface meaning. Both utterances of example (4) can be summed up as follows: [qəssiːħ] (is hard) and [ðɑzrɔ̄ː] (is a rock) together refer to a 'hard substance', that is to say, the human organ 'heart' is attributed a specific characteristic which is 'hard substance' to rich or to give birth to a new interpretation. Thus, the heart (the main organ in the body) taken as a 'hard substance' or a 'hard muscle' will systematically lead us to interpret it as a cruel/wicked, an unforgiving, severe and undesirable person. Note that the interpretation may vary from one context to another depending on the situation.

The utterances (1 and 2) [vərr̪iːḴ] (is black) and [məlluːl] (is white) in Kabyle, like in any other language are two contrasted colours which lead us straightforward to two opposite things or to a divergence of attitude: the 'white colour' most of the time symbolizes 'goodness', 'purity', 'forgiveness', etc., whereas the 'black colour' always reflects a negative aspect, thus, it symbolizes 'vindictiveness', 'evil', and 'mischievousness'.

The two utterances may be represented as follows:

[vərri:Ḵ wuli:s] - ◄┐ symbolises 'Evil'.

[məlƚu:l wuli:s] + ◄┘ symbolises 'Goodness'.

Utterance (8) [qðən   wulæwən] (the hearts are cauterized) may be metaphorised in different ways: [æjen   wulæwən] (exhausted are the hearts) or [muθən   wulæwən] (dead are the hearts) ⟶ they both convey one common implicature a 'negative' attitude or situation. This is to say, when you cauterize a special region in the body, you leave a burn scar so that it lasts the rest of your life (we live with it for a lifetime). And this is the way we remember things quite well. From the time the heart is cauterized nothing beautiful is left after but just bad souvenirs (no need to be experienced once again). This is to show how a specific culture determines and invades both thoughts and language and at the same time how it conceives and models somehow adequately the main organ of the body 'heart' to achieve a certain degree of injury or a certain 'lingering wound' for conveying the right straightforward feeling. Furthermore, the metaphors of a language do reflect the society they are born and spoken in. Thus, the metaphors of a language are in fact the metaphors that belong to the society and culture. Fairclough (2001) in the same line of thought views language and culture as follows:

"*there is not an external relationship 'between' language and society, but an internal and dialectical relationship. Language is part of society; linguistic phenomena are social phenomena of a special sort, and social phenomena are (in part) linguistic phenomena*"[156]

Utterance (8) as already stated above holds two charges ┌─► -
                                                        └─► +

The utterance with a positive charge in the second context [uli:w   qðæɣθ,   rɑpwi   ævðəχθ] (my heart I cauterized it, God I worship him) – is a common saying among the native Kabylian speakers which implies ⟶ I did what I did, and this is it and God I worship him – in fact this specific utterance means that the person did what he views is good without getting beyond the laws or without transgressing the limits of God.

Identifying metaphors is not an easy job. Thus, we most of the time feel incapable to solve the riddle. We even wonder whether such an expression is a metaphor or not. Different authors dealt with the same question every now and then. For example, Mooij (1976) poses

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[156] Fairclough, N, Language and Power, 2nd Edition, London, New york: Routledge, 2001, P.19.

the question: *"How are we to recognize and locate metaphors?"* [157] He recognises a metaphorical expression as an expression that denotes somehow 'strangeness' or 'surprisingness' to the text. Thus, most authors and interpreters remain silent about the actual procedure of metaphor identification:

> *"One notion we find in many approaches to metaphor which, in other respects, may widely differ, is that of the strangeness or surprisingness of a metaphorical expression in its context."*[158]

Once again Paul Henle (1958) turns attention to the notion of 'strangeness' and maintains that all metaphors are striking in some measure, i.e., they produce a sort of 'shock' in statements. In this context Henle explains: *"the outstanding characteristic of metaphor is the sort of shock which it produces."* [159] We may conclude, in a general way, that the shocks vary from metaphor to metaphor or from utterance to utterance: there may be a shock of recognition when (a) an unsuspected similarity is revealed or (b) a shock of non-recognition where the reader must attempt to visualise something which has no relation to perceivable reality (Peter W. Nesselroth, 1969:83).

There is a problem in the way metaphor manifests itself. Kleiber argues in (Charbonnel and Kleiber, 1999) that there is not necessarily a shared feature available between subject and modifier or between the literal utterance and the metaphorical expression, and thus the metaphor should not be analysed on the semantic, but on the pragmatic level (Allerton, et al.,2004:146). Kleiber and Searle and many others attest: *"metaphor is an instruction for an interpretation"* (ibid). In other words, if the hearer recognises that the utterance is not systematically meant literally but metaphorically, then at this level, he has to check out whether the utterance is obviously defective (false not true) literally, and then must seek or calculate the possible alternate meanings he intends to convey:

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[157] Mooij J, J, A, A Study of Metaphor: On The Nature of Metaphorical Expressions, With Special Reference to Their Reference, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976, p.18.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Ibid.

"*Where an utterance is defective if taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning*"[160]

Another problem lies in Black's theory of metaphor. The great assumption that the central problem of metaphor involves a 'shift of meaning', that is, moving from ordinary senses to metaphorical ones. This theory is completely wrong and inaccurate because it can be shown that there is no shift of meaning that takes place in metaphorical statements (Mark Johnson, 1981: 333). There is no shift in fact, when dealing with a dead metaphor since this latter is already generally understood (common known metaphor). Thus, in this case such a metaphor (dead) is evident to everyone; it becomes semantically accepted and justified. In living metaphors, however, we have terms used normally, but in incongruous (inappropriate) context, and here the metaphors attain their force because of their alien context (ibid).

We very often remain incapable and perplex in translating some specific metaphors between unrelated cultures, i.e., the task in translating those kinds of metaphors becomes so hard that their transportability into another culture fails completely in many cases. The translation and interpretation of metaphors are strongly culturally conditioned. Adopting a metaphor to a new context makes the translator being very careful in preserving the concepts and meanings together at a time. Newmark (1988:106) in the same context states: "*usually cultural metaphors are harder to translate than universal or personal metaphors.*" Although cultures may look similar in dealing with the universal issues and problems, each culture stands unique amongst others. In other words, each culture comprises its own patterns of ideas, values, attitudes, assumptions and beliefs common to a particular group of people thinking and feeling with their proper way. This idea goes hand in hand with Newmark's following quotation:

"*The more culturally remote in time and space a text, the less is equivalent effect even conceivable unless the reader is imaginative, sensitive and steeped in the SL*[source language] *culture*" (ibid:49).

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[160] Searle (1979) quoted in Gibbs, R, W, The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, .P. 68.

People of a given culture have knowledge of the world that may be quite different from any other, due to their own perspectives, different experiences and background. In this vein Mildred Larson (1998) states:

"*One of the most difficult problems in translating is found in the differences between cultures. The people of a given culture look at things from their own perspective. Many words which look like they are equivalent are not. They have special connotations*"[161]

Another problem usually emerges in the process of translation, that of the degree of translatability. Translators and scholars, in most of the time stand on 'uneasy terrain'[162] regarding the translatability of metaphor for the reason that they cannot or even never reach the greater or lesser degree of compatibility between languages. That is to say, the degree of translatability is due to a set of variables[163]: 'cultural references', 'communicative purpose' (of the text and of the metaphor itself), 'functional relevance', 'information burden', 'metaphor typology', 'degree of compatibility of the conceptual and formal structures of the two languages involved', 'translator's competence', 'connotations', 'degree of lexicalization of metaphor', 'comprehensibility of the metaphor the cognitive role', etc.

Each language group has its own way of life and its manifestations, thus each society will interpret a message in terms of its own culture. Snell-Hornby (1988) writes:

"*the essential problem posed by the metaphor in translation is that different cultures, hence different languages, conceptualise and create symbols in varying ways and formats, and therefore the sense of a metaphor is frequently culture-specific.*"[164]

According to Mildred Larson (1984) five major problems[165] in interpretation and rendition of metaphorical expressions come into consideration:

- The image used in a metaphor may be unknown in the target language;
- The topic of the metaphor is not always expressed explicitly in the source text;

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[161] Larson, M, L, Meaning-Based Translation: A Guide to Cross-Language Equivalence, Lanham: University Press of America, 1998, P. 149.
[162] Samaniego Fernández (2011) quoted in Herrera-Soler, H, and White, M, Metaphor and Mills: Figurative Language in Business and Economics, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2012, p.162.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Snell-Hornby quoted in Seyed-Gohrab, A, A, Metaphor and Imagery in Persian Poetry, Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012, p.208.
[165] Ibid.

- The point of similarity might be implicit and hard to identify;

- The point of similarity may be understood differently in one culture than the other;

- There is also the possibility that the receptor language does not make comparisons of the type that occurs in the source text metaphor.

We may sum up the problems of translatability of metaphors with the following the quotation:

"*differences between cultures may cause more severe complications for the translator than do differences in language structure*"[166]

Consider the degree of translatability and adequacy in the following utterances in Kabyle:

1- [lΛdətsnunnuθənt θmuʃuhæ ðiθæddærθ] approximate lit-trans: (the tales are proliferating in the village) implies ⟶ problems are getting bigger/problems are increasing.

2- [jəppwi:θ ðiθnifi:fθ uθidʒæræ Λðiʒmæ iʒəqdɒrni:s] approximate lit-trans: (he took him/brought him in a tornado, he didn't let him gather his belongings) implies ⟶ he came and took him without informing (an unexpected / unplanned / unannounced action- to take someone by surprise without letting him/her thinking = exerting a sort of pressure on somebody.

3- [ensi:ts θvəχsi:sθənni, si θiskerθənni] approximate lit-trans: (from where is that fig, from that fig tree).
   or [ensi:θ iniɣəmənni, si θiskerθənni] approximate lit-trans: (from where is that dried fig, from that fig tree).
   These two significant metaphoric utterances are quite similar. They both imply ⟶ one must recognise his roots (good roots) - someone who belongs to a noble family and good ancestors is systematically a good person. When such an utterance is pronounced, the message conveyed behind it is the 'good upbringing' of the person involved in the situation.

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[166] Nida (1964) quoted in Glodjović, A, "Translation as a Means of Cross-Cultural Communication: Some Problems in Literary Text Translations", Facta Universitatis Series: Linguistics and Literature, Vol. 8, N° 2, 2010, p. 142.

4- [lɑ:jɑɖ ʌjəkren fuʃʃən jekkər fθɑɤɑ:t] approximate lit-trans: (the shout that should be roused on a wolf is roused on a goat) implies ⟶ we most of the time blame an innocent (a just) instead of blaming the unjust (the guilty).

5- X: [ʌθæn ʌssæki jɑ:rqɑmd uvri:ð] approximate lit-trans: (here today the road/the way has been confused to you) implies ⟶ I didn't expect you to come and call a visit = your coming quite surprises me.

Y: [ðæjən tswærzæɤ siswæddæw ʌlmi ðsufəllæw] approximate lit-trans: (this is it/no way I am chained/bound from down to up) implies ⟶ having no rest at all/can't move or do something out of routine but just working hard (dealing with daily chores with nonstop).

This is a short conversation between two cousins who didn't meet for ages. X got surprised for seeing her cousin paying a visit. And Y answered that she had no time to do it before.

6- X: [ðæʃu θjuɤən ?] approximate lit-trans: (what's up with him ?)

Y: [ʌssæki θərwi θɑ:tɑrθi:s] approximate lit-trans: (today his spices are mixed up) implies ⟶ the person is very furious and unbearable (just get away from him).

This conversation took place at home. The son is asking mum what's wrong with dad, and the mother answers that his father is furious and that he is getting out of his nerves.

7- [ækkæ ijurænt θlufæ fənjiri:w] approximate lit-trans: (this is how the problems/the miseries are written on my forehead) ⟶ I'm born to lead such a life (this is my destiny).

8- [θisli:θ ʌki θuɤɑlæwən tæjɑzi:t θɑvərrɑni:θ] approximate lit-trans: (this sister -in law became for you a foreign hen) implies ⟶ whenever there is a new comer the society tends to put him/her into quarantine and scorns him/her all the way (humiliation and bad behaviour).

Metaphors are exploitations or floutings of the Gricean maxim of Quality, i.e., we may say rather that metaphors taken literally either violate the maxim of Quality or are conversationally inadequate in other ways, particularly with reference to Grice's maxim of relevance (Levinson, 1983:157). Metaphors express a 'categorical falsehood', i.e., (a semantic

category or electional violations) intending to convey something different in a certain context (ibid).

We suppose that it would be worthy or more appropriate to state briefly the 'Gricean maxims' (1975) which somehow seem rational in constituting our conversational practice.

2.3.1 The Conversational Maxims

Grice viewed conversation as a cooperative effort with a common purpose guided by unwritten rules. The common rules being implicit rules or shared beliefs that participants follow so that they would not lie, deceive, monopolize, or waste each other's time (Timothy, 2003: 288). Each participant has to follow the four Gricean maxims so as to restore the conversation to the right form. For example in setting conversations, if someone dominates a conversation he or she will be urged to allow someone else to talk (taking turn in conversation). Here are the four maxims governing the cooperative principle, according to Grice which involve: quantity, quality, manner, and relevance (ibid).

2.3.1.1 Quantity

The speaker should make complete statements covering the necessary information. The speaker should be just enough, not too much or too little (ibid).

2.3.1.2 Quality

The speaker should be truthful because the listener relies on the speaker to convey an appropriate message or to provide accurate information. Most of the time speakers tend to bend or simply bend the rules of quality when they employ certain forms of speech, such as 'metaphor' (ibid).

2.3.1.3 Manner

The speaker should be clear and concise and should not obscure the information in the conversation, i.e., the speaker should avoid ambiguity and vagueness (ibid).

2.3.1.4 Relevance

What the speaker says should be relevant to the topic at hand. The information should be useful and related to what is being discussed. Conversations are not about speaking; they are about making contributions to the ongoing discussion (ibid: 289).

We may ask ourselves the following questions: why are there conversation maxims? And what do they exactly treat, represent or work about? The answer would be simply, the most influential ideas about trope understanding come from Grice's theory of conversational implicative and Searle's work on 'speech act' in order to regulate conversation by certain global conventions, which he calls 'maxims'. Grice (1975, 1978) notes that much of the information conveyed in conversation is implied rather than asserted. He argues that the speakers and listeners expect each other to interpret their utterances as if they were acting in a 'rational' and 'cooperative' manner (the cooperative principle). To establish this, speakers and listeners operate according to several maxims, which include first 'quantity' i.e., (make your contribution as informative as needed), second 'quality' (do not say what you believe to be false), third 'relevance' (simply be relevant when you interact), and finally 'manner' (avoid ambiguity) (Gibbs in Ortony, 1993:254).

Taking into account the Gricean proposition that involves a 'categorical falsity', i.e., (something she/he believes to be false) makes us understand that the speaker is flouting the first maxim of Quality of the cooperative principle: "*do not say what you believe to be false*" (ibid). Levinson (1981: 157) on the contrary disagrees and argues that sentential metaphors are not necessarily false, and are not 'categorial' falsehoods. Searle in the same line of thought states that

"*The problem of explaining how metaphors work is a special case of the general problem of explaining how speaker meaning and sentence or word meaning come apart…Our task in constructing a theory of metaphor is to try to state the principles which relate literal sentence meaning to metaphorical [speaker's] utterance meaning*". (Searle in Reimer and Camp, 2006: 855)

Searle's model shows, clearly indeed, that the recognition of a deviant literal meaning triggers the search for a figurative meaning. Searle summarises and formulates the interpretative process (parallel to the process he had already postulated for the indirect speech acts) into a three-step model of metaphor comprehension:

- **Stage 1:** the listener/the hearer must process a certain kind of strategy to decide whether to seek out a non-literal or a metaphorical interpretation at all in the

message. "*where the utterance is defective if taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning*" (Searle in Ortony, 1993:103)

Note that: there should be a shared strategy between speaker and listener, on the basis of which the listener is able to decide that the message should not be taken literally. Thus, the message may appear inaccurate and wrong if taken literally (Reimer and Camp, 2006: 855).

- **Stage 2:** once the hearer/listener decides to interpret the utterance metaphorically, she/he resorts to a set of principles to generate or extract possible/true interpretations that the speaker might intend by her/his utterance (ibid).

- **Stage 3:** once the hearer has already generated this set of possible meanings by these principles, at this stage, he must identify which element in that set is not likely to be the speaker's intended meaning (ibid).

We may say that the task is not easy at all. Interpreting someone's utterance remains very hard to reach and grasp. The gap is very often left opened for the hearer to seek out a new understanding, build a new meaning and finally reach an accurate predicted metaphoric utterance "*in fact, to give an accurate account of literal prediction is an extremely difficult, complex, and subtle problem*"(Searle in Ortony, 1993:85).

Following the Gricean basis, Deirdre Wilson (1995)[167] reconsiders the notion of 'truthfulness' explaining that unlike other categories (lies, jokes, fictions, etc.) metaphor, irony and other tropes are overt violations of the most important maxims 'truthfulness', in which the listener/hearer is meant to assume that the maxim of truthfulness is no longer operative, but that the supermaxim of quality remains strong, so that some true proposition is still conveyed.

Consider the following examples (metaphor as involving 'overt violation' of a maxim of literal truthfulness):

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[167] Wilson, D, "Is there a maxim of Truthfulness", UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 7, 1995, P.200.

What is said= conventional implicature (in relation with what is meant by linguistic items in an utterance).	**What is meant** = conversational implicature (in relation with pragmatic inferences which arise from textual factors and the understanding that conventions are observed in conversations).
(1) Brian's mouth is one huge metal factory.	We may say instead: (1a) Brian's mouth looks like/or is like a huge metal factory ⟶ implicature: Brian is wearing braces/all his teeth are covered with braces.
(2) This book is an open flower.	We may say instead: (2a) this book is like an open flower ⟶ implicature: the book is very interesting (scented pages and fragrant hours and moments in reading).
(3) The world is a stage.	We may say instead: (3a) the world is like a stage ⟶ implicature: the world is compared to a play on stage – the whole life is a matter of scenes passing successively with nonstop.
(4) She is a shining star in her class.	We may say instead: (4a) she is like a star that shines in class ⟶ implicature: she is the most brilliant student in class.
(5) The house was a zoo this morning.	We may say instead: (5a) the house looks like/is like a zoo ⟶implicature: everything in the house is upside down (confusion and disorder).
(6) Sam is a pig.	We may say instead: (6a) Sam is like a pig ⟶ implicature: Sam is either greedy/messy/filthy or gluttonous (depending on the context).

When utterances like these are figuratively or metaphorically intended, they do not engage the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed, i.e., they must be treated as blatant violations of the supermaxim 'truthfulness' (Grice, 1975). When a maxim is deliberately and blatantly violated, the hearer is supposed to notice the violation (an anomaly) and thus pursue or seek out some related true preposition that the speaker might have wanted to communicate. All utterances stated above are metaphoric instances that would be substituted or altered into similes. In short, Grice might analyse: example (1) as implicating (1a), (2) as implicating (2a), (3) as implicating (3a), (4) as implicating (4a), (5) as implicating

(5a), and (6) as implicating (6a). Thus, Grice's account of figurative language seems inadequate in some respects and mistaken in some others.

"*Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged*"[168]

If we go along with the Gricean approach (Grice 1975, 1978), we should explain that what is said is not cancellable. And if we try to cancel explicitly what is said, we undoubtedly make an unintelligible utterance. What is said in the sentence and what is implicated in an utterance of the same sentence is called the '*total signification of an utterance.*'[169] The implicature refers to the set of ways that is used to convey the literal unuttered or unexpressed information. Thus, the relationship between what is said and what is unsaid can be represented as follows:

Figure 7. Based on the Gricean Assumption (1975).

As far as the two terms 'conventional' and 'conversational' implicatures are concerned, Paul Grice defines each case as follows:

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[168] Grice, P, H (1975), "Logic and conversation" in Grice, P, H, Studies in The Way of Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989, p.26.
[169] Ibid, p.41.

"the conventional meaning of the words used will determine what is implicated, besides helping to determine what is said ...   [whereas he calls] conversational implicatures, as being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse. "[170]

Conventional implicatures are in fact, determined by a conventional meaning of the word that carries the implicature. Conversational implicatures, however split [171] into 'generalized' conversational implicatures and 'particularized' conversational implicatures. As Grice (1975) puts it:

"Particularized conversational implicatures [are] *cases in which an implicature is carried by saying that p on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context, cases in which there is no room for the idea that an implicature of this sort is normally carried by saying that p. But there are cases of generalized conversational implicature. Sometimes one can say that the use of a certain form of words in an utterance would normally (in the absence of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature."*[172]

First, generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs) are context independent; they have preferred interpretations that occur without reference to the context. Second, particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs) are context dependent, i.e., their recognition requires a consideration of the utterance in terms of a context (Holtgraves in Colston and Katz, 2005: 77). PCIs *"are highly context dependent and they are not consistently associated with any linguistic form"* (Meibauer in Mey, 2009: 365). Hirschberg (1985) at her turn denies that there is any theoretically significant distinction and points out, the difference between the two concepts (generalized and particularized) lies only in a matter of degree of dependence on context, and thus, not a categorical distinction (cited in Green, 1996: 99). Borg (2010: 280) assumes that GCIs can be recovered by listener without access to a current state of mind of the speaker, consequently they are not fully pragmatic content. Horn (2004:4) in contrast, asserts that the GCIs and PCIs are distinguished as pragmatic content because they are 'calculable, non-detachable and cancellable' without contradiction.

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[170] Ibid, p. 25-6.
[171] Ibid, p.37.
[172] Ibid.

Metaphor covers a wide range of cases: from the simple form ('He is a lion') to an extended one developed through many metaphors over several lines of a text to a whole novel or poem (Leech, 1969: 159).

Consider the following metaphors in Kabyle:

From the simple form [ramzi ðizəm] (Ramzi is a lion) or [ramzi ðæɣilæs] (Ramzi is a tiger) to an extended one:

1- [lʌjətsru: wuli:w ɣər ðæχəl] lit-trans: (my heart is crying in the inside) implies
   ⟶ to be in struggle with life / to be or to remain stuck to the deep sadness.

2- [wθənti:d ləħjɔ:ɖ] lit-trans: (the walls hit him) implies ⟶ life taught him a lesson.

3- [jusæd uħvi:v pwæliən] lit-trans: (the lover/the sweetheart of my eyes came) implies ⟶ sleep (this is specific to language community- the utterance refers to the idea that the person is very sleepy and can't manage to stay awakened any more).

4- [lʌjəssudu:m θæsæw] lit-trans: (he is draining my liver) implies ⟶ to feel very bad for someone/to be upset and feel extremely troubled about someone (to cause to feel extremely stressed and depressed).

5- [əkær əʃirəw ʃwit] lit-trans: (get up and shiver a little bit) implies ⟶ be active/react and get ready to do something/be motivated instead of doing nothing.

6- [fkəd ifæsni:K̲] lit-trans: (give your hands) implies ⟶ come and work/get involved in an activity.

Cuddon (2013:186) explains that frequently used metaphors can become dead 'lifeless'. Consequently, they lose their figurative strength and imaginative force. In other words, the persistent usage of a large number of expressions gave them the rank of non-metaphoric function (their 'overusage' has put them in the 'cliché' class) (ibid: 660). They do not evoke any imagery from the semantic field to which they originally belonged. They may even lose their potential ability to surprise through repetition. Hence, there would be no need to use any strategy to interpret metaphor (Cruse, 1986):

"[metaphor] *loses its characteristic flavour, or piquancy, its capacity to surprise … Interpreting it then no longer requires the activation of the metaphorical strategy.*"[173]

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[173] Cruse, D, A, Lexical Semantics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, P.42.

As Kittay (1987) argues that the dormant double semantic import of a dead metaphor (the conventional metaphor) *"is either fully forgotten by the generally competent speaker (a genuinely dead metaphor) or for practical purposes safely disregarded"*[174]

Black (1993) assumes that all conventionalized metaphors (lexicalized expressions) are 'misnomers'. He describes them as 'catachreses'[175], which have lost their metaphoricity and are no longer recognised active (they have lost or have never had a double meaning). Max Black points out this fact saying:

"*A so-called dead metaphor is not a metaphor at all, but merely an expression that no longer has a pregnant metaphorical use. A competent reader is not expected to recognize such a familiar expression as "falling in love" as a metaphor, to be taken au grand sérieux. Indeed, it is doubtful whether that expression was ever more than a case of catachresis*" (Black in Ortony, 1993: 25).

There are many instances of dead metaphors in English, such as the followings:
- 'The head of the class'
- 'The head of the queue'
- 'Branches of government'
- 'The face of a clock'
- 'The leaf of the book'
- 'The eye of a storm'
- 'The eye of the hurricane'
- 'The shoulder of the hill'
- 'The body of the essay'
- 'The market leader'
- 'The head of the church'
- 'The brain of the organization'
- 'On the one hand'/ 'on the other hand'
- 'The king of the jungle'
- 'The heart of the computer'
- 'The heart of the matter' etc.

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[174] Kittay, E, F, Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, p.89.
[175] Black in "Metaphor" defines catachresis as "the use of word in some new sense in order to remedy a gap in the vocabulary" in Mark Johnson (1981:69).

The same thing occurs in Kabyle in our everyday social interactions. Consider the following Kabyle metaphors which seem approximately the same in English:

Body-parts

    1- Head

- [ʌqərrɒ pʌʃrɔːf] lit-trans : (the head of the cliff) ⟶ means/refers to 'the top of the cliff'.

- [ʌqərrɒ pəðrær] lit-trans : (the head of the mountain) ⟶ means/refers to 'the summit'.

- [ʌqərrɒ pəχɑːm] lit-trans : (the head of home) ⟶ means/refers to 'the chief / 'the boss'/'the responsible'.

Note that, we opted for writing 'means / refers' instead of 'implies' because it is said already that dead metaphors lose their figurative strength and imaginative force (Cuddon, 2013).

    2- Eye

- [θiːɫ nətsəgniːθ] lit-trans : (the eye of the needle) ⟶ means/refers to the hole of the needle from which the thread in introduced.

- [θiːɫ ntəppuːrθ] lit-trans : (the eye of the door) ⟶ means/refers to 'peephole'.

- [θiːɫ ntsæruːθ] lit-trans : (the eye of the key) ⟶ means/refers to 'the hole of the lock'

    3- Mouth

- [imi ntəppuːrθ] lit-trans : (the mouth of the door) ⟶ means / refers to 'the threshold'

- [imi lʌjənşɔr] lit-trans : (the mouth of the spring) ⟶ means / refers to the natural spring itself (the proximity of water source).

- [imi nətvəɫɫiːθ] lit-trans : (the mouth of the barrel/the jar) ⟶ means / refers to the proximity or the edge of the openness of the barrel.

    4- Hand

- [æfuːs ntəʒɣəlt] lit-trans : (the hand of the spoon) ⟶ means / refers to the spoon itself.

- [æfuːs uzəɫʌ] lit-trans : (the hand of the spindle) 'la main du fuseau' ⟶ means/ refers to the weaving object (the spindle itself).

- [æfuːs nətməghəlt] lit-trans : (the hand of the rifle) ⟶ means / refers to 'the 'stock' or to the rifle itself'

Note that: the majority of kitchen utensils and gardening tools in Kabyle are systematically attributed the term 'hand' when referring to them.

- [æfuːs nətgəlziːmθ] lit-trans : (the hand of the pickaxe).
- [æfuːs ntuggi] lit-trans : (the hand of the cooking kettle).
- [æfuːs ntəfluːθ] lit-trans : (the hand of the ladle).

5- Foot

- [ʌɖaːr nətmæʃiːnt] lit-trans : (the foot of the machine) e.g: 'the foot of a cooker'
- [ʌɖaːr nətfəluːʃθ] lit-trans : (the foot of the broom) ⟶ means/refers to the lower part (without the stick)

6- Leg

- [ʌqəʒiːr nətævlæ] lit-trans : (the leg of the table) ⟶ means / refers to the plinth (le socle d'une table).

Another problem related to metaphor is that of interpretation. The notion of interpreting metaphors has been discussed by many linguists among different viewpoints. Following the view that meaning can be constructed either in dealing with the literal or figurative language, Rumelhart (1993) postulates the following account of the reading process which is applicable to the literal and figurative linguistic use:

"The process of comprehension is identical to the process of selecting and verifying conceptual schemata to account for the situation (including its linguistic components) to be understood." (Rumelhart, 1993: 77).

Rumelhart ([1979], 1993) as well as Langacker (1987) on the same vain make the same claim. They feel that all semantic interpretation requires use of encyclopedic knowledge, i.e., interpreting any linguistic statement, requires the hearer/the interpreter to find the real world schema[176] that best corresponds to the semantic parameters of the statement. Whether or not the statement is seen as metaphorical depends on how well the schema fits the semantics (the degree of appropriateness/fit), but the process involved remains the same (Ryder, 1994: 142).

"The interpretation process, I believe, is no different here [for metaphorical statement] *than for a literal predication, the outcome is simply different. We say that a statement is*

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[176] The word schema refers back to the characteristic properties of the predicate concept. "*in general, predication suggests that the characteristic properties of the predicate concept are to be applied to the subject concept*" (Rumelhart 1993: 82).

literally true when we find an existing schema that accounts fully for the data in question. We say that a statement is metaphorically true when we find that although certain primary aspects of the schema hold, others equally primary do not hold. When no schema can be found which allows for a good fit between any important aspects of the schema and the object for which it is said to account, we are simply unable to interpret the input at all." (Rumelhart, 1993:82)

Our everyday conversations often convey information and predictions that go beyond what we literally say. Many theorists believe that these predictions (metaphorical interpretations) derived from certain metaphorical statements are 'parasitic' upon literal usage. In other words, a metaphor cannot be understood as a metaphor only if one can understand the literal meanings of the words used to make the metaphor. Thus, the meaning of the metaphor and its proper force rest upon the awareness of literal meaning (Binkley in Mark Johnson, 1981: 142).

As previously discussed in some theoretical frames, the most commonly mentioned device for detecting figurative expressions is the presence of incongruence within an expression or between expressions and the context. According to Black (1993) the recognition of a metaphor is based upon two major factors: the general knowledge of what is to be a metaphor, and the particular judgment that a metaphorical reading of any statement is here preferable to a literal one. Metaphors are interpreted in such way by the reader / the listener in specific contexts. Black (1993) in this context writes:

"*Our recognition of a metaphorical statement depends essentially upon two things: our general knowledge of what it is to be a metaphorical statement, and our specific judgment that a metaphorical reading of a given statement is here preferable to a literal one. The decisive reason for the choice of interpretation may be, as it often is, the patent falsity or incoherence of the literal reading – but it might equally be the banality of that reading's truth, its pointlessness, or its lack of congruence with the surrounding text and nonverbal setting*" (Black in Ortony, 1993:34).

If certain knowledge on the speaker's cultural background is missing, then, the interpretation of metaphor will be blocked. It is necessary to point out that the listener or reader (in case of grasping the meaning of metaphors as it is intended by the speaker/writer)

has to be familiar with the cultural background of the context in which a metaphor has been used (Littlemore, 2001: 334). Littlemore (2003) adds: "*metaphors are typically culturally-loaded expressions, whose meaning has to be inferred through reference to shared cultural knowledge.*"[177] According to Carter (1997) the appropriate ground of metaphors is often culturally specific, and it will not necessarily be familiar to non-native speakers (Littlemore, 2001: 334).

Consider the following metaphorical expressions in Kabyle:

Example 1:

    a- [ifuːħ imiːs] lit-trans : (his/her mouth smells bad) ⟶ can be interpreted through another possible metaphor which is:

    b- [jərkæ imiːs] lit-trans : (his/her mouth is rotten).

Both (**a** - **b**) utterances imply ⟶ she / he is 'an ill-bred' and 'insolent person'.

Example 2:

- [jəʃḍəd swæwæl] lit-trans : (he slipped/he felt down with the word) implies ⟶ he revealed the secret unintentionally/ recklessly.

Example 3:

- [lætəssæfeg θæwlæ] lit-trans : (fever is flying him) implies ⟶ very ill/the sensation of great malaise (a feeling of general discomfort and weakness).

Example 4:

- [θəqqimed / jeqqimed sinɲiːg lkænuːn] lit-trans : (she/he set beside the oil lamp) implies ⟶ the person we are speaking about here is in fact absent, but considered being present (as if he/she had access to know or to be aware of things during his/her absence) – the idea of 'spying on somebody'.

    Note that: this utterance is much more specific to the culture community. Nothing could be found similar in English or French.

Example 5:

- [θəzzi jessi ʌduniːθ] lit-trans : (life twisted me)
- [θəzzi jessi lqɑː] lit-trans : (earth twisted me)

implies ⟶ I'm shocked/I'm confused.

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[177] Littlemore, J, "The Effect of Cultural Background on Metaphor Interpretation", Metaphor and Symbol, 18 (4), 2003, p.273.

Those two instances or utterances are used in special situations (specific context) when we are not expecting things to happen. Thus, the person is taken by surprise/or is caught unprepared, so that he/she remains speechless.

Example 6:

- [θɑrwæ læqəl] lit-trans : (she is filled with mind) implies ⟶ the state of being sedate, serene and quiet.

    Note that: this is a pure specific utterance related to culture and couldn't be understood by a non-native speaker unless he/she is in contact with the language use (to be familiar with the language and community background).

All the preceding problems led many philosophers and commentators, such as Lock, Nietzsche and Hobbes to consider metaphor as an irrational and absurd phenomenon. As Mooij (1976) significantly observes:

"*metaphors have been reproached with falsification of reality in a similar way. Speaking in metaphors was said to be a form of speaking falsehood. Other critics have emphasized that the use of metaphors entails absurdities or is at least irrational*"[178]

2.4 Theories of Metaphor

"*Throughout the history of Rhetoric, metaphor has been treated as a sort of happy extra trick with words, an opportunity to exploit the accidents of their versatility, something in place occasionally but requiring unusual skill and caution. In brief, a grace or ornament or added power of language, not its constitutive form* ... [metaphor spreads throughout every word we utter and every thought we express] *that metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language can be shown by mere observation. We cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse without it.*"[179]

Metaphors have been a central study for many influential figures around the world across centuries. They have been theorised by many philosophical views, and each studied the conception of metaphors from its own perspective, highlighting the different functions and

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[178] Mooij, J, J, A, A Study of Metaphor: On The Nature of Metaphorical Expressions, With Special Reference to Their Reference, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976, p.15.
[179] Richards, I, A, "Philosophy of Rhetoric" in Johnson, M, Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981, pp.49-50.

features characterising each tendency. From Aristotle to the 20th century, theorists have tried and are still trying to define general rules for the transfer in meaning and have considered metaphors as the means to which we are able to grasp and relate to abstract concepts.

2.4.1   Theory of Comparison

This theory goes back to Aristotle's rhetoric in which metaphors are regarded as implicit comparisons between a metaphorical expression and a literal paraphrase based on underlying analogy or similarity (Ning Yu, 1998:10). This view claim that metaphors are best viewed as condensed/elliptical versions of similes or comparison with the terms 'like' and 'as' omitted (Cornell Way, 1991:34). This doesn't mean that a simile makes the same kind of apparent assertion or effect as its equivalent metaphor, but simply that interpretatively the simile and metaphor will be equivalent (Goatly, 1997: 118-119). It is important to mention that before Aristotle's arrival, there was a high focus and use of similes by the well-known Homer; these latest were then by the time of Aristotle identified as 'metaphors'.

Advocates of the comparison theory postulate that a metaphor of the form 'A is B', such as: 'Life is a journey' and 'Man is a wolf' are the collapsed forms of the sentences: 'Life is like a journey' and 'Man is like a wolf'. Accordingly, metaphors are basically squeezed comparisons, like similes, they are used to connect two terms together that the metaphor/simile maker thinks they are compatible. Thus, metaphors and similes are regarded as equals, adding that any metaphor can be paraphrased into a simile and vice versa.


Figure 8a. Based on Comparison Approach: Metaphors are collapsed forms of similes.

So, two terms are compared and the transfer of meaning takes place between them. Analogy (similarity) is, thus, the basis of a shortened version of the literal simile. Since literal similes do not require special extralinguistic knowledge for their comprehension (i.e., there is no need to interpret), "*most of the knowledge necessary for the comprehension of metaphor is already contained in the speaker's and hearer's semantic competence, together with the general background knowledge of the world that makes literal meaning comprehensible*" (Searle in Ortony, 1993: 95). In other words, metaphors and similes share both the same literal and figurative meanings; however, the rhetoric of a metaphor is more ornamented and offers much more degree of eloquence than the simile does. For example, the metaphor 'stars are diamonds': if we apply the comparison theory, one would obviously say that the stars are compared to diamonds. The two terms 'stars and diamonds' share the same characteristics that are the glow and the beauty. Thus, The metaphorical statement 'stars are diamonds' can be paraphrased as: 'stars are **like** diamonds'.

It is clear that nothing has changed. Both the literal meaning and the figurative one are kept correct; hence, the way the sentence is uttered or expressed seems better under the form of a metaphor. In other words, the rhetorical force of the metaphor strengthens the manner an idea is communicated, whereas in the structure of a simile, there is that element of the sentence that reduces its rhetoric strength which is the simile marker "Like". We can also notice another structural difference between a simile and a metaphor. A simile appears longer than the metaphor does. So, it becomes less attractive. As a result, the hearer will be less interested.

Furthermore, Aristotle treated metaphor as an element of rhetorical and poetic style. In 'Poetics' (1457b 6-9) he discussed the standard definition of metaphor and writes:

"*metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference be neither from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy* " (Aristotle quoted in Ricoeur, 1977: 13).

As already mentioned above in the Aristotelian definition, a metaphor is used to embody something's qualities or features in something else and may take many forms or types based on a semantic level: from general to specific, from specific to general, from specific to specific, or through analogy. Aristotle generally more appreciates the use of metaphors on analogy, whereby the two contents in a metaphor can be selected from different domains. Besides, it is the kind of metaphors that resembles to similes, the fact that renders it important

because it is the main focus of this theory. Thus, Aristotle prefers analogy in dealing with metaphors, simply because it raises the sense of reasoning and challenge (Kittay, 1987: 3). Aristotle explains in his Poetics (quoted by Parker, 1982: 133) that the transfer of meaning occurs when a concept from one domain takes the place of a concept from another. For instance, the utterance 'the human mind is a computer' $\longrightarrow$ the two terms 'mind' and 'computer' belong to two fields that are quite distinct from each other in terms of their main focus of study: the first one 'human mind' is attached to neurology (the scientific study of the nervous system), whereas the second 'computer' deals with computing science. So, a metaphor could consist of such paradoxical relationship to serve a rhetoric end. These are called models; it is vital to say that Aristotle does not theorise about models. For instance, he would use the human body as a model in a metaphor to describe other things whatever the discipline; they belong to, is different, i. e., he did not emphasise on the relationships between models and the other explanatory resources.

Additionally, it is very important to notice that two types of metaphor: from genus to species and from species to genus from the point of view of Quintilian were considered as types of 'synecdoche'. Like metaphor, synecdoche is another figure of speech in which a term may either indicate part of something to refer to the whole of it or the opposite. For example, the term '**coke**' is a common synecdoche for all carbonated drinks, the same way the word '**boots**' refers to the soldiers, and the word '**faces**' refers to people.

Aristotle highlights another central theme or motif in metaphor, a sort of a magnet, power and attraction that keeps people always interested in learning. He supports a much more sympathetic view of metaphor both in his Rhetoric and Poetics and thus, acknowledges its positive cognitive role in all domains and disciplines. He writes (Rhetoric 1410b):

"*To learn easily is naturally pleasant to all people, and words signify something, so whatever words create knowledge in us are pleasurable ... Metaphor most brings about learning...*"[180]

In the same context, Samuel Levin (1982) argues that "*Aristotle's theory takes the form it does under the influence of his preoccupation with the teaching function of metaphor, the role*

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[180] Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy, 2nd Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, P.218.

it plays in the transmission and acquisition of knowledge."[181] This quotation displays the great value that Aristotle offers to metaphor in terms of learning, arguing that it is important to know the fundamental meaning and signification of words, i.e., the lexis that is of course worth learning. It is also worthy to learn about the variety of words and their combinations which may produce a new and innovative knowledge and which at the same time augments the learner's motivation for knowing more in reference to metaphors. As a consequence, the level of learning increases and becomes much more pleasant through the use of such linguistic devices. In other words, for Aristotle, pleasure and learning are greatest when the mind is compelled to seek meaning. Aristotle emphasises that through metaphor, "*it becomes clearer [to the listener] that he learned something different from what he believed, and his mind seems to say, 'How true, and I was wrong'* " (Rhetoric 1412a, trans. George A. Kennedy, 2007:223). We may conclude, then, that in this way metaphor has an especially condensed, supreme and dominant power to change someone's mind, to have someone conceive a new idea.

Searle at his turn analyses metaphor and acknowledges that the hearer "*has to contribute more to the communication than just passive uptake*" (Searle, 1993: 111). As metaphors have that decorative power into poetic writings; it is without doubt a vital rhetorical device. Aristotle comments on metaphors in his Rhetoric (1407b 26-27), saying that metaphors offer language what he calls 'impressiveness.'[182] This concept (impressiveness) definitely defines another function of a metaphor. He (Rhetoric 1405a 4-8) also maintains that this phenomenon "*gives style clearness… and distinction that nothing else can.*" [183] Additionally, Aristotle affirmed that to be able to create metaphors characterises someone's ability to distinguish or identify what he called "likeness" even between things that are totally different from each other. Furthermore, Aristotle rejects any possibility that metaphors could turn the text obscure or unclear. In contrast he supports the use of metaphors to strengthen the core of the written material. This also seems accurate for Ricoeur (1972), who carried on Aristotle's theory. Thus, he skilfully notes:

"*Metaphor not only opens the text, but keeps it open. Metaphor does not stand between meaning and the learner. Rather, metaphor pushes meaning out in front of itself. It*

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[181] Samuel Levin quoted in Fahey, M, F, Metaphor and Shakespearean Drama: Unchaste Signification, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p.15.
[182] Aristotle in Driscoll, S, "Aristotle's A Priori Metaphor", Aporia, Vol. 22, N°.1, 2012, p.25.
[183] Ibid, p.26.

does not hide meaning behind the rhetoric of the text, but discloses it by creating openness in the text. Thus, metaphor is not purely ornamental, but is functional in a more fundamental way. It is what primarily discovers." [184]

Aristotle came to support the implication of metaphors in other domains of study rather than in literature. He sheds light on the fact that 'metaphor' is not a monopoly of literature; it could be included even in science, arguing that the supremacy of logic threatens the way a specific scientific work is built (that is the methodology). And this is what Sean Driscoll has gone to prove in his "*Aristotle's A Priori Metaphor*" quoting Mary Hesse's (1966) objection:

"It is still unfortunately necessary to argue that metaphor is more than a decorative literary device and that it has cognitive implications whose nature is a proper subject of philosophic discussion."[185]

Obviously, Marry Hesse asserts that Aristotle's cognitive association to metaphors is as accurate as its poetic or literary association. In other words, Hesse has initiated us realise that metaphors are extremely vital and essential to scientific progress. So, a metaphor is not applicable only in literary works such as poetry and novels for one mere reason that is beautification is more about strengthening the meaning and providing a crucial feature that is eloquence which reinforces the method used in the study as well. Similarly Max Black (1962) highlights a conclusion in a prominent study of metaphor and analogy in science saying:

"Metaphorical thought is a distinctive mode of achieving insight, not to be construed as an ornamental substitute for plain thought."[186]

Regardless of these virtues, the comparison theory has been criticised on a number of points. The first point refers back to William Lycan (1999) who views that metaphors cannot be all translated into similes assisting his claim with a Shakespearean metaphor example: "*When the blood burns, how prodigal the soul lends the tongue vows*", Lycan explains:

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[184] Ibid, p .27.
[185] Ibid, p.20.
[186] Max black quoted in Swedberg, R, Theorizing in Social Science: The Context of Discovery, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014, p.22.

"*A first pass might be: when x, which is like a person's blood, does something that resembles burning, how prodigally y, which is like person's soul, does something similar to lending some things that are vow like to z, which resembles a person's tongue*" (Lycan in Reimer and Camp, 2006: 851-52).

In such cases, there is no possibility that enables someone to translate the metaphor into a simile, because as it is noticed, there is no relationship of two-noun, i.e., there is only one part in this kind of metaphor that are: blood, soul, and tongue; they are not confronted with other models; instead, they are given characteristics which are not theirs like: burns and lends, without similarizing them to other things. So, there is no possibility to turn them into similes. Second, metaphors are described as vague and profound and the fact that they are just based on comparison makes them uninspiring, i.e., they simply become unexciting and uninformative that they can be transformed into similes; this idea demonstrates that everything is like everything else. The third point can be illustrated through Sylvia Plath's (1961) poem "Mirror": "*I am silver and exact. I have no preconceptions*", depending on the simile theory, this verse could be transformed into "she is like a Mirror" which is totally wrong in this case: the mirror does not represent Sylvia, instead, it "reflects" the world around her that is male-possessed; the word "reflects" reveals the metaphor (ibid: 852).

Consider the following utterances in Kabyle, where comparison by analogy is shown, relying on Aristotle's theory:

	Metaphors are abbreviated similes		
Similes (Kabyle)	**English Literary translation**	**Elliptical similes: minus the use of simile markers (like+ as) – metaphors -**	**Implicature**
1.[θəʃvæ θæfθi:lt]	She resembles /looks like/ is like/as a light.	[θæmətɒθinæ tæfθi:lt] (that woman is a light)	The sublime beauty.
2.[jeʃvæ lvæz]	He resembles/ looks like/ is like an eagle.	[ʔqʃiʃinæ ðəlvæz] (that boy is an eagle)	Virility, smartness and handsomeness.

3.[θgæ ʌməθsəkku:rθ]	She looks like a partridge.	[θæqʃiʃθinæ tæsəkku:rθ] (that girl is a partridge)	Graceful and elegant.
4.[jəʃvæ ʌzgər]	He is like a bull.	[əmmim ðəzgər] (your son is a bull).	To be rough, violent, careless and unaware.
5. a.[θəʃvæ æʁərvæl igəqarʂan] b.[θgæ æmuʁərvæl igəqarʂan]	a. She is like a pierced sieve. b. she resembles/looks like a pierced sieve.	[ðæʁərvæl igəqarʂan] ((she/he is) a holed/pierced sieve)- note that: the personal pronouns 'she/he'+ 'to be' are implicit within the utterance.	A person who never keeps secrets/unaware and never controls what he/she says.
6.[ʌmθəwθu:lt gəχa:m]	He is like a rabbit at home.	[tæwθu:lt gəχa:m] ((he is) a rabbit at home). Note that: the personal pronoun 'he' and the auxiliary 'to be' in present are both implicit within the utterance.	Being a coward.
7.[jəʃvæ θæqləndʒəts]	He resembles/ is like a wheelbarrow.	[tæqləndʒəts] / [juʁalæḴ tæqləndʒəts] ((he is) a wheelbarrow) / (he became for her a wheelbarrow).	She is exploiting him (the fact of exploiting somebody in doing something).
8.[θəʃvæ æggur umi zzin jəθræn]	She resembles/ looks like/ is like the half-moon surrounded by stars.	[ðæggur umi zzin jəθræn] ((she is) the half-moon surrounded by stars). Note that: the personal pronoun 'she'+ 'to be' in present are implied within	Gorgeous and charming - sublime beauty.

		the word [ðæggur].	
9. a.[jəʃvæ æzrəm igʒərħən] b.[ʌməzrəm igʒərħən]	a.He is like an injured snake. b.like an injured snake.	[ðæzrəm igʒərħən] (an injured snake) note that: we are addressing either a male or female (utterance b). The personal pronouns 'she' + 'he' are implicit within the word [ðæzrəm] in utterance (b).	Furious/irritated person.
10.[θəʃvæ iti:ʒ idiʃərqən]	She is like the sun that shines/rises.	[ðiɬi:ʒ idiʃərqən] ((she is) the sun that shines/rises). Note that: the personal pronoun 'she'+ 'to be' in present are implied within the utterance.	Very attractive.
11.[rɑmzi ʌmmizəm]	Ramzi is like a lion.	[rɑmzi ðizəm] or [ðizəm] (Ramzi is a lion) or (a lion) note that: the personal pronoun 'he' is implied within [ðizəm].	brave and courageous
12.[θəʃvæ θæqʒu:nt igθətsən]	She looks like/is like a dog which bites.	[tæqʒu:nt igθətsən] ((she is) a dog which bites). Note that: the personal pronoun 'she' + 'to be' in present are hidden within the utterance.	Spiteful and nasty.
13.[rɑmzi ʌmuɣilæs]	Ramzi is like a tiger.	[rɑmzi ðæɣilæs] (ramzi is a tiger).	He is verile, brave, outstanding and handsome

			person (all together).
14.[θəʃvæ θæjazi:ɫ θavərrɑni:θ]	She is like a foreign hen.	[tɑjɑzi:ɫ θavərrɑni:θ] ((she is) a foreign hen). Note that: the personal pronoun 'she' + 'to be' in present are hidden within the utterance [tɑjɑzi:ɫ].	She has nobody to turn to/scorn the person all the way/to be humiliated.
15.[θəʃvæ θæməgħəlt]	She is like a trifle.	[tæməgħəlt] ((she is) a trifle). Note that: the personal pronoun 'she' + 'to be' in present are hidden within the word [tæməgħəlt] (verb+ noun).	She is well shaped (referring to the body).
16.[θgæ ʌməθziri:]	She looks like a full moon.	[tiziri:] ((she is) is a full moon). Note that: the personal pronoun 'she' + 'to be' in present are hidden within [tiziri:].	Extremely beautiful.
17.[læθləħu ʌməθsərðu:nt]	She is walking like mare.	[tæsərðu:nt] ((she is) a mare). Note that: the personal pronoun 'she' + 'to be' in present are hidden within the word [tæsərðu:nt].	Elegance.
18.[mɒqqɒr ʌmmɯʃæʃfəl]	He is tall (robust) like a tree (a specific giant tree).	[ðæʃæʃfəl] ((he is) a tree) .Note that: the personal pronoun 'he' + 'to be' in present are hidden within the word [ðæʃæʃfəl].	Being giant/get beyond the norms (height).
19.[lejləħu ʌməlbej]	He is like El Bey.	[ðəlbej] ((he is) El Bey). Note that: the personal	Being proud.

		pronoun 'he' + 'to be' in present are hidden within the word [ðəlbej].	

Note that: the simile markers 'like' and 'as' in Kabyle are most of the time not apparent but hidden within verbs such as in the above examples 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9a, 10, 12, 14, 15, and 16: [θəʃvæ] / [jeʃvæ] / [θgæ] (she resembles/looks like ⟶ subject + verb + simile marker 'like/as') ; whereas, in utterances 6, 9b, 11, 13, 17, 18, and 19 the simile marker 'as' or 'like' is an integral part of the vehicles: [ʌmθəwθu:lt] (like a rabbit), [ʌməzrəm] (like a snake), [ʌmmizəm] (like a lion), [ʌmuɣilæs] (like a tiger), [ʌməθsərðu:nt] (like a mare), [ʌmmuʃæʃfəl] (like a specific creeping plant), [ʌməlbej] (like El Bey).Thus, [ʌm] first part of the vehicle designates/denotes the simile marker 'like' or 'as'.

We may draw then, the following conclusion:

> Metaphor = simile [-] minus 'simile markers' (like and as) => a comparison by analogy.

Similes and overt comparisons are ways of specifying metaphorical interpretations, allowing to get access easily to the process of interpretation which is left implicit with metaphors proper (Goatly, 1997: 116). The comparison theory was excluded by proponents of the interaction theory for one reason, being simply a modification of the substitution theory (ibid). Mooij (1976) and Goatly (1997) together believe that the two theories the comparison and the interaction are two quite compatible views. The interaction theory is nothing else than the extended comparison view or the similarity/analogy view (ibid).

Throughout the centuries, many theorists and linguists have sustained and shared the Aristotelian view. Among those are: Cicero (De Oratore, Book III, chap.XXXIX) who claims that metaphor "*is a brief similitude contracted into a single word,* " Blair (1785) at his turn sees metaphor as "*an abridged comparison,* " Hill (1878) who defines it as "*an abridged simile,*" Mead (1894) who regards metaphor and simile as "*essentially alike: and a metaphor can be made from any simile by omitting the word like or as,* " Meiklejohn (1891) who believes "[a] *metaphor is a simile with the words like or as left out,* " Burnett (1774) who states that a metaphor "*is a simile in one word,*" Henry Home (1855) who declares that a metaphor *"differs from a simile in form only, not in substance*" (cited in Donawerth, 2002: 279), and finally Vendryès who describes it as "*a comparison in a nutshell*" (quoted in Mooij, 1976: 29).

The comparison view reveals that a metaphor can be analysed as follows: the subject of metaphor is called either 'tenor' or 'topic', and the part which describes the tenor is the vehicle. The similarities between the two (tenor and vehicle) are called 'ground' (Malmkjær, 2002: 352). So for example [Λduni:θ   ðəlæv] (life is a game/a play), which does exist, and which coincides quite well with the same utterance in the English language, where [duni:θ] (life) represents the tenor, the and [læv] (game/play) is the vehicle and the similarities between [duni:θ] and [læv] are 'the ground' on which the two are compared.

Note that: the morpheme [ðə] in Kabyle functions as the auxiliary 'to be' in the present simple 'is'.

This view asserts that the function of metaphor is to present both the topic and the vehicle similar in some respects, in spite of their plain, patent differences. In other words, the proponents of this approach explain that no significant difference exists in saying 'X is Y' and 'X is like Y'. In the classical theories of language, metaphor deserves no more attention; it is nothing more than an instance of language (poetic figure). It is also seen as a breakaway from the normal function of language. Everyday language had no metaphors (they do not belong to the realm of everyday language), but they do belong instead to the figurative language. In this context, Lakoff (1993) states:

"In classical theories of language, metaphor was seen as a matter of language, not thought. Metaphorical expressions were assumed to be mutually exclusive with the realm of ordinary everyday language: everyday language had no metaphor, and metaphor used mechanisms outside the realm of everyday conventional language". (Lakoff, 1993: 202).

The purpose of metaphor is to highlight and make language more interesting (adding forcefulness and vitality) and to stimulate or challenge both the reader and the hearer. The writer or speaker uses metaphor in order to be thought-provoking. The reader or hearer has to make clear up, puzzle out and solve the enigma of the literal meaning of the metaphor. Thus, this implies that there must always be a literal meaning which can be decoded from its 'Pretty wrapping or Packaging' (the metaphor) (Miriam Volkmann, 2004:5).

Consider the following examples in Kabyle:

1- [Λduni:θ   ðləmħæjən] lit-trans (life is troubles).
2- [Λduni:θ   ðjəppwæs] lit-trans (life is one day).
3- [Λduni:θ   ðævri:ð] lit-trans (life is a road/a way/a journey).

4- [ʌduni:θ   θətslæv   sjəmðænən] lit-trans (life plays with people).

5- [θərwi: θætɑrθi:s] lit-trans (his spices are mixed up).

6- [lhəm   iwɑ:r] lit-trans (misery is difficult/dangerous).

7- [uɣælənt   weni:s   tigðuri:n   iðæmən] lit-trans (his eyes became pots of blood).

8- [ʌwæli:s   ðədwæ] lit-trans (his word is a remedy).

9- [jəmæs   ð   vævæs   ðuði   ttæmənt] lit-trans (his/her mother and father are butter and honey).

10- [ʌduni:θ   rzɑgəθ] lit-trans (life is bitter).

11- [θiti:s   θəɣli:d] lit-trans (his eye fell).

Note that the assimilation of two sounds, like [tt] is put purposely to mark intonation, i.e., to show where the stress falls.

The following chart (table) sums up and analyses the preceding examples above in Kabyle.

NS' utterances in Kabyle. 'thought - provoking' (metaphor)	Tenor / Topic	Vehicle	Ground
S1	[ʌduni:θ] (Life).	[ləmħæjən] (Troubles).	'Difficulties and problems that one may constantly face/to stand constantly at attention'.
S2	[ʌduni:θ] (Life).	[jəppwæs] (One day).	'Short duration'.
S3	[ʌduni:θ] (Life).	[ævri:ð] (A road/a way/a journey).	'Journey–a distance walked with one beginning and one end'. 'from A – B with no return'.

			'Passengers, passers-by'.
S4	[Λduni:θ] (Life).	[θətslæv sjəmðænən] (Plays with people).	'Toys/puppets which could be manipulated, thrown away or cuddled'.
S5	[θætɑrθi:s] (His spices).	[θərwi:] (Mixed up).	'Intensity' – 'an excess of spices' (an exaggeration).
S6	[lhəm] (Misery).	[iwɑ:r] (Dangerous).	'Warrior' – 'strong adversary' – (tiresome).
S7	[enni:s] (His eyes).	[tigðuri:n iðæmən] (Pots of blood).	'An intense red colour' – (the burst of tiny vessels in the eye).
S8	[Λwæli:s](His word)	[ədwæ] (Remedy)	'Relief' – 'a recovering' – 'a sensation of well-being' and 'bringing comfort'.
S9	[jəmæs ð vævæs] (His/her mother and	[uði ttæmənt](Butter and honey).	'Softness' – 'sweetness' – 'good

	father).		taste'.
S10	[ʌduniːθ] (Life)	[rzɑgəθ] (Bitter).	'Too much trouble' – 'unbearable' – 'bitterness'.
S11	[θiɪ̈ːs] (His eye).	[θəʁliːd] (Fell).	'Envy and jealousy'.

Thus, if we use the same key words, as mentioned in the comparison viewpoint we may draw the following conclusion:

Subject (topic / tenor) + predicate (the part that describes the tenor) which is called (the vehicle) = 'the common ground', (i.e., the similarities between the 'T+V').

Figure 8b. Reassessed (comparison view).

Metaphor is thought to be an ornamental function, i.e., a kind of device that can be added to language or that can spice it up. It is a special trope detachable from language which is used mainly to achieve particular stylistic effects (Hawkes, 1972: 15, 34, 90). Aristotle (1440b 10-15) puts:

"strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh" (Aristotle, quoted in Paul Ricoeur, 1977: 37).

Metaphor conveys new ideas and thoughts Aristotle explains. Metaphor as a trope teaches, allows its listener or reader to learn something new. Aristotle implies that metaphor might be

used as a means of 'discovery'. As Susan Eastman quotes "*such a "redescription" of reality is at the same time a "discovery" of previously hidden connections*".[187]

 Among the advocates of classical views are Cicero and Geoffrey of Vinsauf who maintain that the role of metaphor is "*cosmetic with respect to 'ordinary' language*" (Hawkes, 1972: 11).

The comparison theory as already mentioned by Way (1991) is a slightly more version of the substitution theory, whereas Black (1962) sees it as a "*special form*" of the substitution theory, because "*it holds that the metaphorical statement might be replaced by an equivalent literal comparison*" (quoted in Mark Johnson, 1981: 71). Leino and Drakenberg (1993:13) at their turn criticised both the substitution and comparative views for sharing the assumption that there are constantly two objects to be substituted or compared. Steen (1999) explains that the target of the figurative words does not have to be expressed in the same clause, or even expressed at all "*the figuratively used words in a metaphor are about something, but that something does not have to be expressed in the same clause; indeed, it may not even be expressed at all.* "[188]

2.4.2   The Substitution Theory of Metaphor

This view holds that metaphor involves replacing one word with another word, i.e., '**A** can be substituted by **B'**. Max Black (1955) explains:

"*According to a substitution view, the focus of metaphor, the word or expression having a distinctively metaphorical use within a literal frame, is used to communicate a meaning that might have been expressed literally. The author substitutes M for L; it is the reader's task to invert the substitution, by using the literal meaning of L. understanding a metaphor is like deciphering a code or unraveling a riddle*" (quoted in Lynn R. Huber, 2007: 70-71).

In other words, the metaphorical term stands in the place of the literal term, and the intended meaning of the statement dwells within the literal term. Black thus, implies that it is the

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[187] Eastman, S, Recovering Paul's Mother Tongue: Language and Theology in Galatians, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007, p.91.
[188] Steen, G : " Metaphor and Discourse: Towards a Linguistic Checklist for Metaphor Analysis " in Graham, L, and Cameron, L, Researching and Applying Metaphor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.84.

reader's/hearer's task to invert the substitution, since understanding the entirety of a metaphor, demands the reader/hearer to be engaged in a mental decoding (deciphering and guessing) that can bring to light the appropriate literal meaning underlying the metaphorical expression.

As previously mentioned in the comparison view, the substitution theory echoes Aristotle's definition of metaphor "*giving the thing the name that belongs properly to something else*" (Ricoeur, 1977: 13). This theory reveals that a metaphorical expression is used in place of a literal expression. Cornell Way (1991:33) in the same line of thought writes:

"*The substitution approach is any view which holds that a metaphorical expression is used in place of an equivalent literal expression and, therefore, is completely replaceable by its literal counterpart. Metaphor, then, involves a substitution of an improper word for the proper one.*"

 We may say then, that the cognitive content of the metaphor is simply its literal counterpart. And that the metaphor brings new life to old, overused expressions and dress up the exhausted speech in '*ornate garb*' (ibid). Black (1962) brings a further recap of this view and states the following:

"*Again, the reader is taken to enjoy problem-solving- or to delight in author's skill at half-concealing, half-revealing his meaning. Or metaphors provide a sock of "agreeable surprise" and so on. The principle behind these "explanations" seems to be: when in doubt about some peculiarity of language, attribute its existence to the pleasure it gives a reader. A principle that has the merit of working well in default of any evidence*" (ibid).

Advocates of this view (non-constructivist thinkers) such as (Black, 1962) claim that a metaphor is based on a comparison of two terms: 'topic and vehicle', the so-called in traditional terminology 'principle and subsidiary subjects'. The V-term (vehicle) is substituting for a literal term, that the meaning of the metaphor can be discovered by replacing the literal term, and that metaphor was finally a sort of decorative (rhetorical) device (Black in Wen Xu and Jiang Feng, 2014: 67). This view centralises much the V-term at the expense of the tenor/topic. For example, the figurative expressions: (a) 'John is a rat', (b)

'Sally is an iceberg', (c) 'Pauline is a monkey' and (d) 'Peter is an elephant' substitute the literal expressions mentioned as follows:

(a) ⟶ The metaphoric frame substitutes the literal expression 'John is disloyal'.

(b) ⟶ The metaphoric frame substitutes the literal expression 'Sally is insensitive'.

(c) ⟶ The metaphoric frame substitutes the literal expression 'Pauline is mischievous'.

(d) ⟶ The metaphoric frame substitutes the literal expressions

$$\begin{cases} (\mathbf{d_1}) \text{ 'Peter is very strong'.} \\ (\mathbf{d_2}) \text{ 'Peter has an excellent memory'.} \\ (\mathbf{d_3}) \text{ 'Peter is very heavy'.} \end{cases}$$

Note that: in the '**elephant**' metaphor (e.g. (d)), different salient features from the 'elephant' are transferred to the primary subject a man named 'Peter'. So, the metaphoric concept 'elephant' could be identified or deciphered as: first, a feature possessing great physical strength. Second, having an excellent memory or as being extraordinarily heavy.

Consider one more time the sub-division or the semantic derivatives of the example (d): '**elephant**' metaphor.

- Peter easily pulled the carriage. Truly peter is an elephant.
- Peter remembered every person who attended the party. Truly peter is an elephant.
- Peter had hardly sat down when the arm chair collapsed. Actually Peter is an elephant.

Thus, we may conclude that each utterance picks out one isolated salient feature and leaves the others (remaining features) alone. In other words, 'Peter is an elephant' **metaphor** conveys us no clue which feature is to be transferred in the metaphor, unless we refer to the surrounding verbal context or the non-verbal situation context that leads us to choose the most adequate feature (it is the surrounding verbal context that determines which metaphor or implicature we are actually referring to). It is the interpreter's task to discover or even explore the most correct implicature via the selection of the correct feature (Forceville, 1996: 16). Charles Forceville quotes the following:

"*Put differently, the metaphor's 'frame' must be expanded beyond the sentence for the metaphor to be understood*" (ibid).

Consider the following expressions in Kabyle schematised on the basis of the substitution theory.

1- [χwæliːs ðiqərrɑ] lit-trans (His/her uncles are heads).

2- [ʌwæl   jətsnunu:θ] lit-trans (a word proliferates).

3- [ʌnni:s   tirṣaṣi:n] lit-trans (his/her eyes are bullets).

4- [juɤɑlæs   əʃɤəl   ðæðrær] lit-trans (working became for him/her a mountain).

5- ⎰ [uðmi:m   læjətsfədʒi:dʒ] lit-trans (your face is sparkling).

⎱ [uðmi:m   ðləmri] lit-trans (your face is a mirror).

6- [ʌmmi:s   ðæzgər] lit-trans (His/her son is a bull).

7- ⎰ [θæmətɒθinæ   ðʒæhənnæmæ] lit-trans (That women is the Gehenna/hell).

⎱ [θæmətɒθinæ   timəs] lit-trans (That women is fire).

Note that: the two utterances of example (2) target or share a common implicature.

8- [jelli:s   tæninnæ] lit-trans (His/her daughter is a female's eagle).

9- [ħɑkim   ðæqʒu:n] lit-trans (Hakim is a dog).

10- [Y   ðæwθu:l] lit-trans (Y is a rabbit).

11- [X   ðæɤju:l] lit-trans (X is an ass).

12- [Y   ðuʃʃən] lit-trans (Y is a fox).

13- [rɑmzi   ðizəm] lit-trans (Ramzi is a lion).

14- [əmmi:s   ðəlvæz] lit-trans (his son is an eagle).

15- [jəssi:s   tisəkri:n] lit-trans (his/her daughters are partridges).

16- [jəli:s   ðtərjəl] lit-trans (his/her daughter is an ogress).

17- [nətsæ / nətsæθ   ðəssæqʌ] lit-trans (he/she is thunder).

18- [ʌrgæzinæ   ðæzrəm] lit-trans (that man is a snake).

19- [X   ðævzi:z] lit-trans (X is a cicada).

Tenor / Topic (Subject)	V-term- (metaphorical expression)- (figurative)	The literal term (the denotative meaning)
1- [χwæli:s] (his/her uncles)	[ðiqərrɑ] (are heads) [ð] stands for auxiliary (to be) in plural present (are).	[ɤrɑ:n, fəhmən, zɑwrən ək ṣawdʒən] (Elite group, highly educated, clever and reaching an utmost degree of education = highly ranked status).

2- [Λwæl](A word).	[jətsnunu:θ] (Proliferates).	[Λwæl irənnud Λwæl](A word engenders/creates and evokes big problems).
3- [Λnni:s] (His/her eyes).	[tirʂaʂi:n] (are bullets).	[uriɖli:q / urθəɖli:q iwæʃʃəmæ] - [jəħrəʃ / θəħrəʃ](attentive/watchful/ heedful and vigilant).
4- [əʃɤəl] (Working).	[juɤalæs ðæðrær] (Became for him/her a mountain).	[urizmiræræ, urivɤaræ, Λðiχðæm / urθəzmiræræ urθəvɤaræ Λteχðæm] (not willing to work or be energetic = the difficulty to work).
5- [uðmi:m] (your face).	-[læjətsfədʒi:dʒ] (is sparkling). -[ðləmri] (is a mirror) .	[jəʂʂfæ] (a neat and luminous face = radiant face).
6- [Λmmi:s] (His/her son)	[ðæzger] (is a bull).	[ihəmməl kæn] (violent and careless).
7- [θæmətɒθinæ] (That women).	-[ðʒæhənnæmæ] (is the Gehenna/hell). -[timəs] (is fire).	[θwa:r] (being aggressive, quarrelsome, always disposed to attack).
8- [jelli:s] (His/her daughter).	[tæninnæ] (is the female's eagle)	[θzæð siʃvæħæ] (very cute, graceful and elegant).

9- [ħɑkim] (Hakim)	[ðæqʒu:n] (is a dog) – [ð] stands for auxiliary (to be) in singular present (is).	[lwɑ:ræ] (fearful and aggressive).
10- Y	[ðæwθu:l] (is a rabbit).	[ħitu:m] (Coward).
11- X	[ðæɤju:l] (is an ass).	[ujəħriʃæræ] (Stupid and ridiculed).
12- Y	[ðuʃʃən] (is a fox).	[ðæɤddɑ:r] (Cunning).
13- [rɑmzi] (Ramzi)	[ðizəm] (is a lion).	[ðləfħəl] (Brave, courageous).
14- [əmmɪ:s] (his son)	[ðəlvæz] (is an eagle).	[izæð] (Sublime beauty- and even 'being virile').
15- [jəssi:s] (his/her daughters)	[tisəkri:n] (are partridges).	[ʃəvħənt] (attractive , pretty and charming).
16- [jəli:s] (his/her daughter)	[ðtərjəl] (Ogress) 'Monster'.	[lwɑ:ræ] (Being remarkable for some bad or evil qualities).
17- [nətsæ / nətsæθ] (he/she)	[ðəssæqʌ] (is thunder).	[ðəssæħu:q], [ðəlwa:ræ], [ðzəgðiθənt] (Violent and aggressive).
18- [ʌrgæzinæ] (that man)	[ðæzrəm] (is a snake).	[ðæɤəddɑ:r], [iwa:r] (venomous, spiteful, full of hate and malice).
19- X	[ðævzi:z] (is a cicada).	[ulæʃ θæsusmi] (Talkative).

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Note that: most utterances in the above table start with the morpheme [ð] which stands for both for the article and the auxiliary 'to be' (singular or plural).

One main conclusion may be drawn from the preceding table: the relationship between the tenor/topic (subject) and the literal expression is indirect because it is already implied in the V-term (figurative or metaphorical expression). For example, the utterance [ʌmmi:s ðæzger] (his/her son is a bull), the relationship between the son and 'the state of being violent and careless' is indirect because it is already implied in [ðæzger] (a bull).

Thus, the substitution view suggests that the essence of the metaphor is the association between the 'tenor' and the 'vehicle'. This theory also claims that the aim of the interpretation of metaphor is the recovery of the meaning of the statement expressed by synonymous literal equivalent. Max Black (1962:35) puts:

"Once the reader has detected the ground of the intended analogy or simile (with the help of the frame, or clues drawn from the wider context) he can retrace the author's path and so reach the original literal meaning"

In the process of explaining what metaphors mean or function like, rhetoric has part in distinguishing four main stylistic virtues of diction that the substitution theory has considered as vital. Two of which are the product of Aristotle's study: Perspicuitas "clarity" and Aptum "appropriateness" as a single virtue of diction. They were later on revised by his student-successor, "Theophrastus of Eresus", to render them four important elements (Kirchner in Dominik and Hall, 2010:182). These four parts of speech or elements must be taken into consideration throughout the process of language production:

- Latinitas refers to "purity" or "correctness", i.e., "the good use of language" (sounds, words, rhythm and grammar) (Lenchak, 1993: 69).
- Perspicuitas refers to "clarity" ", i.e., the intelligibility of language, to the avoidance of ambiguity or unnecessary complexity. That is, language must be understood before it can persuade, and to be understood it must be clear (ibid).
- Aptum refers to "appropriateness" or "suitability". It concerns itself with the context of a discourse, i.e., Style must be suitable to the subject matter, the purpose, the occasion and finally the audience (ibid).

- Ornatus refers to "ornamentation", i.e., the decorative aspects of style, to what is pleasant to our senses (ibid).

Figure 9. The Four Virtues of Diction and Stylistic Functions of Metaphor.

Furthermore, it is important to mention that depending on the substitution theory's philosophy, though it is easy for any person to produce a metaphor in the form of "A is B" without facing any difficulty, and even transforming it to its literal origin that is "A is C" without any problem either, it is still difficult to give this relation between the literal and the figurative meanings a name or a title; it could be a paraphrase, a synonymy or again a comparison. So, other theories and views interfered to define this phenomenon (Kjärgaard, 1986: 60).

Two main terms play a great role in decoding the semantic relation that can exist in a metaphor to resume the meaning it carries. This distinction is made by the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege (1892) between Sense and Reference. Semanticists made two distinct ways in dealing with the meaning of words: sense and reference. It is considered as a relative theory to the substitutional one. First, sense is the

general, abstract meaning all human beings share and have in their minds about something around them in the real world. Sense represents the common dictionary we all use to define anything; it is without any references. Second, reference represents the specific and the concrete picture of a thing or a person existing in the real word (ibid: 46-59). As to illustrate what sense and reference are in general, the following example will sum up all the details:


Figure 10a. Explaining Sense and Reference.

Now, it is also important to illustrate one time more how a sense-reference relation could be in general. For instance, the two nouns: 'Batman' and 'Bruce Wayne' are two expressions with different senses, but they share the same reference.

Consider the following diagram on sense and reference: (one reference ⟶ two senses).

Figure 10b.

Furthermore, substitutionalists conclude three possible relations between two expressions, one of which substitutes the other, that is sense and reference relations. The first relation occurs when two expressions share the same sense and reference. This case is rarely found in a metaphor between the figurative and the literal meaning, whereby the substitution of one to another will result no change at the level of the context. Secondly, it is the case of two expressions that have different senses, but share the same reference which is the widely found in metaphors (ibid: 61); so here the substitution will result the change of the context's sense, For instance:

- "Man is a puppet" ⟶ metaphorical expression.
- "Man is without a free will" ⟶ literal expression.

We may illustrate "Man is a puppet" metaphor as follows:

Figure 11. A Case of a Metaphor with Different Senses and One Reference.

The third possible relation is the one whereby two expressions can have different senses and different references as well; the substitution of these two expressions will cause a change in both the context's sense and reference (ibid).

In this respect, two other theories, 'the dualistic and the monistic'[189] give their own descriptions of the way the substitutional theory manipulates the relation between sense and

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[189] J.J.A. Mooij (1976) tried to establish order out of chaos. He split all theories of metaphor into two main categories: Dualistic and Monistic theories. He plainly favoured the interaction view (theory of dualism). The distinction between dualistic and monistic is essentially based on their treatment of reference. Monistic theories (which include the substitution view) recognise one dominant referent of meaning in a given metaphorical description "hold that words, if used metaphorically, lose their normal referential capacity, but may get another reference instead" (Mooij, 1976: 31). Unlike monism, the dualistic theories emphasise that every metaphor contains both literal and figurative elements, and "hold that words, if used metaphorically, keep their normal referential capacity, thus retaining a reference to elements of their literal extension. Besides, they may carry a second reference because of their special (metaphorical) function... More often than not, ... they explicitly acknowledge such a dual reference" (ibid). Note that, the most common dualistic theories fall under the subcategory of comparison and interaction theories. Comparison theories are dualistic because they assume that metaphors should be interpreted as implicit comparisons between two non-apparent concepts (Erik Konsmo, 2010: 41).

reference in a metaphor. For instance, according to the monistic view, the process of substituting one meaning by another meaning means completely erasing the literal meaning, in order to shed lights only on the figurative one. The second view the dualistic one opposed to the monistic theory; argues that the literal meaning is not completely vanished; as a matter of fact, it stays as a reminder or as a semantic background for the figurative meaning which in fact develops an objective debate about this clashing relationship between the two: the literal meaning and the figurative meaning (Winfried Nöth in Paprotté and Dirven, 1985: 3).

One might sum up this theory by the following definition: "*Substitution theories treat metaphors as a deviant form of utterance- decorative and contributing to style, but obfuscating clarity*" (Ellen Winner, 1988: 20). Thus, the substitution perspective is problematic in almost four respects:

- First, the substitution view fails to recognise that a metaphor cannot be entirely reduced to a literal proposition (Searle, 1979), and that the best metaphors are open, i.e., they have an indefinite number of paraphrases. Moreover, a metaphor's power and its meaning, are inextricably related to its open-endedness (ibid).
- Second, it also fails to recognise that a metaphoric name does not always stand in for a literal name. In other words, metaphors do not always function to plug lexical gaps (ibid).
- Third, it fails to account for metaphors in which the literal and metaphoric names are stated (ibid).
- Fourth, this view ignores the issue of similarity. This issue resides in the heart of the comparison view of metaphor; hence, the comparison view represents an advance over the substitution view (ibid: 21).

Supporters of the substitution theories on the one hand, grant cognitive content but hold on the other hand that the content of a metaphor can be entirely replaced by some literal expression of similarity (Cornell Way, 1991:30). "*if the metaphorical term is really a substituted term,*" writes Ricoeur, "*it carries no new information ... and if there is no information conveyed, then metaphor has only an ornamental, decorative value*" (1977: 21).

2.4.3   The Interaction Theory of Metaphor

This theory traced its roots back to the 1930s with I.A. Richards (tension theory) who offered a new insight (a rudimentary form) on how metaphor works. He was the first who shook the classical notion of metaphor (1936) in his 'Philosophy of Rhetoric'. As a proponent, Richards holds that the essence of metaphor lies in an interaction between a metaphorical expression and the context in which it is used (Wen Xu and Jiang Feng, 2014:67). He writes: "*when we use metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction.*"[190] Metaphor, then, is a "*borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts.*"[191] In addition, he claims that not only the meaning of one word changes, but that several words or the whole sentence are concerned in the interaction which later bring about a new meaning. That is to say, Richards points out that single words have no meaning but they obtain meaning from their connections with other words in the discourse, which he calls the 'interanimation of words', i.e., the 'transaction' between contexts. In this light, Ivor Richards' definition of metaphor is worthy of consideration. He explicitly defines it as:

"*the use of one reference to a group of things between which a relation holds, for the purpose of facilitating the discrimination of an analogous relation in other group. In the understanding of metaphorical language, one reference borrows part of the context of another in an abstract form.*"[192]

Richards's main task on the interaction, or 'interanimation', of the 'two halves' or two contexts (tenor + vehicle) generates or creates an entirely new meaning beyond the comparison or substitution of similarities and dissimilarities, i.e., "*a meaning of more varied powers than can be ascribed to either ... that with different metaphors the relative importance of the contributions of vehicle and tenor to this resultant meaning varies immensely.*"[193] Moreover, it is noteworthy to mention that Richards' interaction process stresses on the notion of 'amalgam' or 'tension' (a sort of fusion) shared between the target and source domains

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[190] I.A. Richards (1936) quoted in Bobbitt, D, The rhetoric of Redemption: Kenneth Burke's Redemption Drama and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" Speech, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004, p.69.

[191] Ibid.

[192] I.A. Richards (1936) quoted in Brown, S, Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers, Vol.1, Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press, 2005, p.879.

[193] I.A. Richards (1936) quoted in Meyer, C, and Girke, F, The Rhetorical Emergence of Culture, New York: Berghahn Books, 2011, p.140.

(topic + vehicle) which, together, form a "*whole double unit*"[194] so that, it creates a new thought or even a new context (ground). In other words, the strong and close combination of the two halves of the metaphor constitutes or restates an extension of contextualism since metaphor is defined as a "*transaction between contexts*"[195] implied by the tenor + vehicle. Regarding metaphor, Richards emphasises that metaphor is far from being something deviant or special, a verbal affair or even something extra, but an "*omnipresent principle of language.*" [196]Indeed, metaphor permeates all language and, therefore, Richards introduces it as a matter of major concern, i.e., the principle by which thought and language operate. In the same line of thought Richards quotes Percy Shelley as follows:

"*language is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their apprehension, until words, which represent them, become through time, signs of portions or classes of thought instead of pictures of integral thoughts.*"[197]

Richards holds that a metaphor sets up a 'tension' between two contrasted subjects (T+V), a tension that is greater in proportion to the remoteness of the things presented as tenor and vehicle. The ambiance or the symbiosis shared or generated from the primary and secondary subjects, impresses, trikes, or seizes "*the state of mind of somebody who affirms a metaphorical statement*" (Black in Ortony, 1993: 31).

Consider the following schema 'T+V':

Figure 12.Tenor+Vehicle=Tension. Based on Richards' view.

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[194] I.A. Richards (1936) quoted in Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers, P.879.
[195] Ibid.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Taverniers, M, Metaphor and Metaphorology: A Selective Genealogy of Philosophical and Linguistic Conceptions of Metaphor from Aristotle to the 1990s, Gent: Academia Press, 2002, pp.16-17.

We may exemplify the above schema 'T+V' with the following utterances in Kabyle with their approximate equivalents in English:

1- [Λwæli:s tæmənt] lit-trans (his word is honey).

2- [læqðiʃi:s ðəlmelk] lit-trans (his/her work is angelic).

3- [enni:s tirʂɑʂi:n] lit-trans (his/her eyes are bullets).

4- [ldʒivi:Ḵ ðæħvivi:Ḵ] lit-trans (your pocket is your companion/your friend).

5- [Λduni:θ tæwənzæ] lit-trans (life is a parting).

6- [Λwæl ðəlmizæn] lit-trans (a word is a scale).

Utterances in Kabyle (metaphor)	Tenor	Vehicle	Tension	Common Ground (shared properties) (new effect/new meaning)
S1	[Λwæli:s] (His word)	[tæmənt] ('is' Honey)	(apparent incompatibility between tenor and vehicle)/the similarities and dissimilarities between T and V	**Softness + Sweetness:** a 'relief/recovering- sensation of well-being' and 'bringing comfort'.
S2	[læqðiʃi:s] (His/her work)	[ðəlmelk] ('is' angelic)		**Quietness+ Perfection:** goodness-purity-serenity and wisdom all together. He/she behaves like an angel.
S3	[enni:s] (His/her eyes)	[tirʂɑʂi:n] ('are'Bullets)		**Target:** the farsightedness- the exactitude in apprehending and grasping the situation.
S4	[ldʒivi:Ḵ] (your pocket)	[ðæħvivi:Ḵ] (is your companion) **note that**: the possessive adjective 'your' is included within the word companion		**Trustworthiness:** you rely on your pocket as your best partner.
S5	[Λduni:θ] (life)	[tæwənzæ] (is a parting)		**Chance+ misfortune:** life is a matter of chance and misfortune.

S6	[ʌwæl] (a word)	[ðəlmizæn] (is a scale)		**Great virtue + wisdom + valuableness:** a word should be weighted and analysed: either good or bad.

Note that: the auxiliary to be in present (with singular and plural) is implicit within the vehicles of all utterances.

We may notice, that the two terms tenor and vehicle (T+V) of each sentence in the above table, being compared, involve a dynamic interaction and a relation which soon create an 'absent or a hidden tension' and later shifts into the term 'ground' or 'common ground'. We may thus conclude that the notion of compatibility between T and V (the borrowings back and forth between T and V) creates or generates a new domain/resultant called a metaphor.

In his book, 'Models and Metaphors' (1962), the revisionist scholar Max Black highlighted, supported and extended Richards' interaction view. Black argues that metaphor "*has its own distinctive capacities and achievements*" and that sometimes it "*creates the similarity*" rather than formulating an antecedently existing one (Black in Bobbitt, 2004: 69). We may summarise the key elements of this theory that Black (1979) propounded as follows:

1- A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects- a "principal" subject (i.e., primary subject) and a "subsidiary" one (i.e., secondary subject).

2- These two subjects (primary and secondary) are often best regarded as "system of things," rather than individual "things".

3- The metaphor functions by applying to the principal subject a system of "*associated implications*," that are characteristic of the subsidiary subject. According to Black, "*the metaphorical utterance works by 'projecting upon' the primary subject a set of 'associated implication,' compromised in the implicative complex, that are predicable of the secondary subject*".

4- These implications usually consist of "commonplaces" about the subsidiary subject, but may, in suitable cases, consist of deviant implications established ad hoc by the writer.

5- The maker of metaphorical statements selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the principle subject by applying to it the system of implications (commonplaces) related the subsidiary subject.

6- This involves shifts in meaning of words belonging to the same family or system as the metaphorical expression; and some of these shifts, though not all, may be metaphorical transfers.

7- There is, in general, no simple "ground" for the necessary shifts of meaning- no blanket reason why some metaphors work and others fail (quoted in Senko K. Maynard, 2007: 162-163).

As Ricoeur (1977:97) maintains, "*Richards made the breakthrough; after him, Max Black and others occupy and organize the terrain.*" In fact, Max Black contributed tremendous efforts in examining and elaborating "*how strong metaphorical statements work*" (1993: 27). Black points out the importance and awareness of metaphor's pragmatics that is still insufficiently shared by many contemporary commentators. He adds that metaphorical meaning cannot be adequately discussed without resorting to metaphorical use (Forceville, 1996: 4). Black focuses his concern on two notions, the so-called 'emphasis and resonance'[198]. According to him, metaphorical utterances are emphatic only if they cannot be reduced to (substituted by) any literal expression or paraphrased without a significant loss of meaning. Emphatic metaphors should be systematically tackled, explored and sorted out, in order to unriddle the unstated or hidden implications. This interpretative task, which Black terms "*implicative elaboration*" arouses creativity and fosters insight into the existence of unpredictable relationships (Rainer Guldin, 2016: 14). Accordingly, metaphors supporting a high degree of elaboration are in fact resonant and create a "*semantic resonance.*"[199] For example in Shakespeare's "the world is a stage" (metaphor) is resonant because it allows for many potent mappings from source to target: "*A metaphor is resonant, that is, if it allows for*

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[198] Max Black (1993: 25-26) introduced two main criteria for making a distinction between metaphors from each other. He explicitly differentiates between what he calls "*weak*" (dead or conventional) metaphors and what he calls "*strong*" (live) metaphors. Among those 'live', 'innovative', 'active' or 'strong' metaphors, Black argues that some are particularly "*emphatic*" and "*resonant*".
1-Emphatic metaphors (emphaticality): a metaphor is said to be emphatic to the degree to which its user allows no variation upon or substitute for the words used, especially the literal vehicle, i.e., "*the focus or the salient word or expression, whose occurrence in the literal frame invests the utterance with metaphorical force*". Black further adds that "*Emphatic metaphors are intended to be dwelt upon for the sake of their unstated implications.*" Thus, emphatic metaphors are not ornamental, but enable its user to elicit the reader's or hearer's understanding and response via cooperation in perceiving the hidden knowledge (the unstated implications) behind the words used. An absence of emphasis in any metaphorical utterance is therefore a characteristic or criterion for its weakness.
2-Resonant metaphors (resonance): are metaphors with a high degree of implicative elaboration. In other words, they denote the extent of possible background implications carried by a metaphor, i.e., "*the more interpretations a metaphor allows for, the more we can call it resonant*" (Buss and Jost, 2002: 278). Black (1993) gives more details on the characteristic 'resonance', explaining that the interpretive response to the metaphor will depend on the complexity (difficulty) and power of the metaphor, i.e., (the focus in question) (Paul McIntosh, 2010: 117).
[199] Metzner (1987) quoted in Olds, E, L, Metaphors of Interrelatedness: Toward a Systems Theory of Psychology, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, P.24.

a rich array of mappings from source to target" (Forceville, 2008: 180). So, "the world is a stage" metaphor is resonant, because we expect the world as life and the stage as a huge theatre where all people, men and women, serve as actors, playing their roles, make their exits and entrances in life, etc.

Max Black argues that the simile theories (the comparison and substitution together) render metaphors inessential and useless, since they can be replaced by similes. In this respect, Black (1993: 30) says: "*Implication is not the same as covert identity: Looking at a scene through blue spectacles is different from comparing that scene with something else.*" Accordingly, a metaphor and a simile are two distinct devices that can never switch roles. Moreover, the implication a metaphor performs, can never seem similar to the way a simile covers one part on the expense of the other. A metaphor as an indirect use of language (linguistic phenomenon) adds to communication or to some proposition certain eloquence which at its turn lets a great impact on the hearer.

According to Black (1993: 27), the assumption "*A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be identified as the 'primary' subject and the 'secondary' one*" defines two important elements/components that construct the metaphor: the primary and the secondary subjects which both correspond to Richards' tenor and vehicle. The primary and the secondary subjects originated from Black's early distinction the frame and the focus. First, the 'frame' indicates the term that the metaphor is meant for; it is positioned at the beginning of the sentence that is the primary subject. Second, the 'focus' is the part that signifies the term being metaphorically used; it is basically positioned in the last sequence of a metaphorical sentence which refers to the secondary subject. The diagrams bellow will show the different structures interactionists associated to metaphors:


**Figure 13.Black's Latest Interpretation of Metaphor Structure.**

Figure 14. Richards' (1936) and Black's (1962) Interactional Interpretations

about the Structure of Metaphor.

We may then gather both Richards' and Black's concepts on the structure of metaphor as follows:

Figure 15. Richards'+ Black's Nomenclature about Tenor-Vehicle.

(The Reintroduction of Terminology Tenor +Vehicle).

The figure above illustrates the different terminologies as suggested by Richards and Black. The term tenor corresponds to the primary subject and focus: the subject to which the metaphor is attributed, and the component vehicle stands for secondary subject and frame as proposed by Black (1962): it is the subject borrowed to offer the expression a metaphorical sense.

We note that this theory portrays one important actuality about metaphors; it is the nature of the relationship between the two subjects (primary and secondary) in the metaphor. There are no exact rules to guide on linking those terms together in one metaphorical expression. Obviously, the metaphor producer/maker can associate any frame to any focus, that he sees necessary to express what he/she has on his/her mind. The primary and the secondary subjects represent two different thoughts that can be linked; and their interaction will create a new knowledge or meaning. So, a metaphor is the only device that involves a sort of relation that gathers two distinctive contents. Another advantageous feature about the use of metaphors is that it encourages to develop cognitive abilities, and to generate new knowledge and insight. In other words, the production of metaphors does not count on pre-existing facts, rules, or already used metaphors; which are also referred to by Black as 'dead metaphors'. It rather requires cognitive thinking; since they are considered as indispensible cognitive instruments "*for perceiving connections that, once perceived, are then truly present*" (Black, 1993: 37). This cognitive instrument 'metaphor' brings a new meaning when two concepts are associated with each other. This new produced meaning obviously "*is not quite its meaning in literal uses, nor quite the meaning which any literal substitute would have.*"[200] It is a result of what Black (1993) describes as "*system of associated commonplaces*". This system works as a means to offer certain characteristics or qualities that both the primary and the secondary subjects attribute, in order to produce a metaphorical meaning, which is a new meaning far from the literal one.

In discussing this new concept, the following example would make things clear:

'Adam is a fox' metaphor.

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[200] Black (1954) quoted in Arduini, S, Metaphors, Roma: Edizioni Di Storia E Letteratura, 2007, P.96.

Figure 16. The Target/Source 'System of Associated Commonplaces'
[Adam (frame) + fox (focus)].

Note that: two different networks associations 'Adam + fox', interacting each other, systematically result a new system (a new meaning or a new context), i.e., '**Adam is a fox'** metaphor, brings us a new dimension (new thought), that of Adam own properties (common to human only) and that of a fox properties (common to animals/mammals) which at a certain time or level during the process of interaction, some characteristics of the animal (fox) such as ferociousness, solitude and some other behaviour, etc. become very blatant and thus are rendered prominent. In other words, all the properties between Adam and fox that seem impossible to share, will obviously fall away (-) via the process of "filtering"[201]; therefore, they will be rejected, and only some selected, meaningful and adequate characteristics between the two should be left. In 'Adam is a fox' metaphor ⟶ the fox metaphor "*suppresses some details, emphasizes others-in short, organizes our view of* [Adam]" (Black quoted in Lynn R. Huber, 2007: 73). We may conclude, then, that the two realities Max Black spoke about: the 'principle' and the 'subsidiary' (the primary and the secondary) subjects while interacting together do create a sort of a bi-directional link.

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[201] The terms 'filter', 'lens' and 'screen' all together as already coined by Black (1962) suggest that we use an entire system of commonplaces to filter or screen or even organise our conception or our perspective of some other system (Linda Berger, 2004: 176). Black employs the concept 'filter' to explain the way in which the target word (frame) or phrase of a metaphor acquires meaning (Riegner, 2009: 7). Metaphor, thus, functions exactly as a filter which blocks certain commonplaces not directly relevant. Furthermore, the 'implicative complex' (the system of associated commonplaces/associated implications) need not necessarily be empirically accurate: "*the important thing for the metaphor's effectiveness is not that the commonplaces shall be true, but that they should be readily and freely evoked*" (Black, 1981: 74).

Frame (Principle / primary subject) ◄─────► Focus (Subsidiary / secondary subject)

Man ◄─────► Fox

Consider once again the two concepts 'filtering' and 'association' in details through the following schema:

Figure 17. The Idea or Process of 'Filtering' the Primary Subject Through the Associated Commonplaces of the Secondary Subject.

Consider the following metaphorical statements in Kabyle:

1- [lævð ðuʃʃən] lit-trans: (the human being/man is a wolf).

2- [ergæz ðizəm] lit-trans: (the man is a lion).

3- [θæməɬɔ:θ ðtərjəl] lit-trans: (a woman is a monster/an ogress).

4- [Λduni:θ ɬɑqsi:ɬ / tæmæʃæhu:ts] lit-trans: (life is a tale/a story).

5- [əmmi:Ḵ / jəlli:Ḵ tiħðərθ pⱷuli:Ḵ] lit-trans: (your son / your daughter is a peace of your heart).

6- [ɑ:rqəntæs iwd̪əbьæl] lit-trans: (things are / became confused to the drummer) when referring to melodies ─► implies 'the person is confused'.

Note that: the word melodies is included within the word 'confused' [ɑ:rqəntæs].

Utterances in Kabyle	The primary subject (frame / principle subject)	The secondary subject / (the subsidiary subject / focus / modifier) = the word(s) used metaphorically.	The resulting meaning/(the tension)/ 'the parallelism drawn between the subject + the subsidiary'= the process of 'filtering'= the system of associated commonplaces of 'frame + focus' ⟶ Evoking or structuring a new dimension/context.
S1	[lævð] (the Human being/the man)	[ðuʃʃən] ('is' a wolf). Note that: the auxiliary 'to be' is implicit within the word [**ð**uʃʃən]	[lævð ðæχeddæ / jəqqəð] (Man is cunning/naughty/mischievous).
S2	[ergæz] (The man)	[ðizem] ('is' a lion). Note that: the auxiliary 'to be' is included within the noun [**ð**izem]	[ergæz ðləfħəl + ðəlhivæ+ ðəzwɑrɑ ək təzmerθ], [ergæz ðwin igzɑwrɑn fjimæni:s] (Man is brave/courageous and tenacious).
S3	[θæmətɔ:θ] (Woman)	[ðterjel] ('is' an ogress). Note that: the auxiliary 'to be' is implicit within the word [**ð**terjel].	[θæmətɔ:θ θwɑ:r ðʒæhənnæmæ] (A woman is ferocious / savage in behaviour and attitudes).
S4	[Λduni:θ] (Life)	[ɫɑqṣi:ɫ / tæmæʃæhu:ts] ('is' a story/a tale). Note that: the auxiliary 'to be' is implicit within the nouns [**ɫ**ɑqṣi:ɫ] / [**t**æmæʃæhu:ts].	[Λtɑ:ṣ Λθwɑli:ɖ] + [Λtɑ:ṣ Λθsædi:ɖ] (life is an introduction, a body and a conclusion/life is what everyone experiences (fortune and misfortune, etc.)- a beginning + an end – **life is an open book**).

S5	[əmmi:<u>K</u>/ jəlii:<u>K</u>] (your son / your daughter)	[tiħðərθ puli:<u>K</u>] (is a peace of your heart). Note that: the auxiliary 'to be' is included within the utterance [tiħðərθ puli:<u>K</u>]	[əmmi:<u>K</u> / jəlii:<u>K</u> ðlɑ:mri:<u>K</u>] / [ðmummu ntiti:<u>K</u>] / [ðənəfş nşɔ:rɑ:<u>K</u>] (your children are part of your soul/your pupil /part of your body) ⟶ 'the parental utmost love towards their children'.
S6	[ʌd̪əbbæl] (the drummer)	[ɑ:rqəntæs] (things are / became confused) / (melodies are confused).	[lʌjrəgi / lʌθrəgi kæn] (melodies got confused in his/her mind) – (Things, ideas, thoughts and deeds got confused) – 'a sensation of a mess in mind' – 'to feel lost'- having a variety of melodies in mind at a time. 'The lack or absence of **concentration**'.

Note that, this table demonstrates explicitly Black's interactionist model of metaphor. In each utterance above, we use a metaphor to explain another metaphor ⟶ Black's idea of 'filtering' the primary subject through the associated commonplaces of the secondary subject is, itself, a metaphor (Eileen Cornell Way, 1991: 50).

2.4.4 Donald Davidson's Major Criticism

2.4.4.1 Davidson's Arguments Against The Idea of Interaction

In this process, it would be better to consider Donald Davidson's account of metaphor. Davidson (1978) not only criticised black's major points, but he actually rejected the most significant and prominent view that metaphors can have or carry any sort of special meaning at all that differs from the literal one, and adds that Black's theory is nothing more than a confusion. In challenging this position Davidson plainly quotes: "*the theorist who tries to explain a metaphor by appealing to a hidden message, like the critic who attempts to state the*

message, is then fundamentally confused.no such explanation or statement can be forthcoming because no such message exists."[202]

Davidson strongly claims against semantic theories of metaphor, and thus asserts that (1) "*metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more*"[203], i.e., the concept of 'metaphorical meaning' never help us explain the functioning of metaphor simply because a metaphorical expression has no metaphorical meaning or, for the matter, any meaning whatsoever apart from the literal meaning of the words contained in that particular metaphorical expression (metaphor makers do not say anything beyond the literal meanings of the words they used); (2) metaphors do not convey a "special ", "second", or "figurative" meanings, i.e., metaphors are therefore devoid of meaning: they do not have a literal meaning at one level and then a figurative meaning at another one ; (3) metaphors hold no cognitive content. He accordingly argues:

"[metaphor] *is not meaning but use – in this it is like assertion, hinting, lying, promising, or criticizing. And the special use to which we put language in metaphor is not – cannot be- to "say something" special, no matter how indirectly. For a metaphor says only what shows on its face- usually a patent falsehood or an absurd truth. And this plain truth or falsehood needs no paraphrase – it is given in the literal meaning of the words.*"[204]

In fact, what seems very clear is that Davidson entirely endorses his view that in metaphorical usage linguistic expressions change their meanings (linguistic ambiguity):"*we can explain metaphor as a kind of ambiguity.*"[205] Furthermore, he maintains that metaphors categorically lack the right 'kind' of effects to count as meaning. Thus, he writes: "*We must give up the idea that a metaphor carries a message, that it has a content or meaning (except, of course, its literal meaning)*"[206], and states further: "*The concept of metaphor as primarily a vehicle for conveying ideas, ... seems to me as wrong as the parent idea that a metaphor has a special meaning*"[207]; (4) the final point Davidson puts stress upon is that there are no rules for producing or interpreting metaphors. In other words, the interpretation of metaphors comes out more irrational (Bartelborth and Scholz, 2002: 178). Thus, Davidson deliberately poses:

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[202] Davidson, D :"What Metaphors Mean" in Ezcurdia, M, and Stainton, R, J, The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy, Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2013, p.465.
[203] Ibid, p.453.
[204] Ibid, p.462.
[205] Ibid, p.455
[206] Ibid, p. 463.
[207] Ibid, p. 453.

"*Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator. The interpretation of dreams requires collaboration between a dreamer and a waker, even if they be the same person; and the act of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination. So too understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules ... There are no instructions for devising metaphors; there is no manual for determining what a metaphor "means" or "says"; there is no test for metaphor that does not call for taste.*"[208]

For Davidson, a metaphor gets stronger and powerful as soon as its influence or effect is shown on the hearer, that is when it is performed or used. As already said, Davidson largely disagrees with the previous theories, maintaining that it is wrong to make language the main focus in studying metaphors, and explicitly argues that those theories were not able to draw their aims in their process of positing metaphors. Thus, it is significant to say that Davidson counts on an extrinsic view of defining metaphors through focusing on their use as opposed to the previous views which have depended on an intrinsic study of metaphors. As Emily Ayoob (2007) explains: " *instead of looking inside the metaphor itself, we should be looking at those using language to produce effects on those listening. The hearer is "nudged," "incited," to recognize something, as an effect of the use of the words with their literal meanings.*"[209] Therefore, Davidson highlights an important aspect about metaphors; he basically studies the interaction of both the speaker and the listener. In other words, Davidson emphasises on the relationship between the originator; the one who creates the metaphor, and the hearer who is going to interpret it, and identify the true meaning, the metaphor hides.


Figure 18. Davidson's Interaction View on Metaphor: The speaker & the hearer.

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[208] Ibid.

[209] Ayoob, E, "Black and Davidson on Metaphor", Macalester Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 16, Issue. 1, 2007, P.59.

2.4.4.2 Davidson's 'prior' and 'passing' theories

Black views Davidson's explanation as vague, and the fact of studying the use of metaphor solely does not give a clear sight about the interaction between the speaker and the hearer in depth. Consequently, Davidson continues to clarify things through his 'Prior and Passing'[210] theories whereby he strikes to explain more about the kind of interaction the metaphor user and the listener will be like. So, he recommends that both sides (speaker and hearer) have a constant flux of 'prior' and 'passing' theories:

"For the hearer, the prior theory expresses how he is prepared in advance to interpret an utterance of the speaker, while the passing theory is how he does interpret the utterance. For the speaker, the prior theory is what he believes the interpreter's prior theory to be while his passing theory is the theory he intends the interpreter to use."[211]

It is now clear that the speaker through the prior theory knows that the first thing the hearer will think about is the literal meaning which is in fact the hearer's prior theory. Then, once we move to the passing theory, the speaker confirms that the hearer will use only the literal meaning to figure out the metaphor that is actually what happens, i.e., the hearer will decode the metaphor through the literal meanings of those words: this represents the hearer's passing theory.

Thus, the concepts 'prior' and 'passing' theories may be visualised through the following two diagrams:

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[210] Donald Davidson (1986) introduces the two concepts 'prior' and 'passing', and makes the distinction between the two. From the point of view of linguistic understanding, Davidson explains how interlocutors manage to speak and understand language at two levels: (1) a general level and (2) a context specific level.
'Prior theories' are linguistic capacities that precede all refinement of interpretative practices; whereas, 'passing theories' are context determined interpretative practices. In other words, natural languages which are enough and easy to understand are called 'prior theories'. Yet some other conversations need more concentration, thus they need a 'passing theory' (an extra thinking ➔ the interpretation process) (Prado, 2008: 187).
[211] Donald Davidson quoted in Malpas, J, Dialogues with Davidson: Acting, Interpreting, Understanding, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011, P.230.

Figure 19a. Davidson's Prior Theory.

Figure 19b. Davidson's Passing Theory.

Still Black is not satisfied because Davidson has not given a deep explanation of what really happens between the speaker and the hearer; he just explains the process it takes from the speaker and the hearer to have the metaphor understood, i.e., there is no speaker-hearer interaction. As a matter of fact, Max Black's system of associated commonplaces, which is a way to drop all the impossible common points of both parts in a metaphor creating a new focus that represents the possible commonplaces they share, has been connected to Davidson's prior and passing theories. Consider the following example 'James is a devil':

	Prior theory	**Passing theory**
Speaker	What he expects the hearer's pool of commonplaces to be for « James » and « Devil »	Intends the hearer to recognise new context and adapt his theory to make those unwanted commonplaces fall away.
Hearer	Has commonplaces associated with 'James' and 'devil' established before the interaction.	Adjusts the commonplaces of 'James' and 'devil' to fit in the context of the interaction.

This illustration shows how important is to use the system of commonplaces to reinforce the prior and passing theories, that is the speaker believes that the hearer will identify the commonplaces for both James and devil, so the hearer does so. Then, throughout the passing theory, the speaker also waits from the hearer to put the two words into a new context; that is the meaning the speaker wants to convey; through dropping the undesired commonplaces and asserting the ones that fit having the two contents together. In this way, there is a sort of interaction and through communication between the speaker and the hearer.

2.4.5 Some other Criticisms

Despite Black's great efforts and treatment of metaphor, he has been tremendously criticised by some other theorists such as Searle (1979 [1993]), Kittay (1987) and Cornell Way (1991) for not providing an adequate framework or details of how to put the theory into practice (vagueness). Indeed, Black's major work on metaphor provides a philosophical way of interpreting metaphors, but lacks any pragmatic pointers (A.S Karunananda et al., 1995: 123). John Searle radically opposes to the view that metaphors are comparisons, but he does not contest the view that knowledge of what we are familiar with provides the meanings of metaphors. In fact, he thinks that the main problem of metaphor concerns the relations between word and sentence meaning on the one hand, and speaker's meaning, or utterance meaning, on the other. Therefore, there are two meanings: each one located in a distinct expression, the explicit, i.e., 'literal' word or sentence and the speaker's 'metaphorical' utterance (Hausman, 1989: 41). Searle writes: "[the semantic interaction theories'] *endemic vice is the failure to appropriate the distinction between sentence or word meaning, which is never metaphorical, and speaker or utterance meaning, which can be metaphorical*" (Searle, 1993: 90). Eva Kittay (1987) at her turn provides some objections to each of Black's major

points. Among those the systems are not 'associated commonplaces' but rather 'semantic fields', and both the primary subject (topic) and the secondary subject (vehicle) belong to the 'system of associated commonplaces', not only the vehicle. In fact, Kittay argues that Black is too restrictive about the features (properties) of the secondary (subsidiary) subject that are actually projected upon the primary subject. Kittay (1987:31) goes on stating: "I have two modifications of Black's account: first, the systems are not 'associated commonplaces' but semantic fields; secondly both the vehicle and the topic belong to systems, not only the vehicle."

Cornell Way (1991) claims that the notion of 'filtering' the primary subject through the associated commonplaces of the subsidiary subject is itself a metaphor, i.e., the idea of filtering process is insufficient and remains obscure (vagueness), thus, the metaphor mechanism needs to be explained and unpacked since "*a filter can only reveal aspects of an object which already exist; it cannot create new ones*" (1991: 50). Cornell way goes further explaining that Black categorically forgot taking into account some cases where there are not two distinct subjects (primary and secondary). Accordingly, a metaphor may have more than one primary or secondary subject (ibid).

In sum, the interaction theory is quite distinctly different from the preceding views presented in this chapter. Black (1962) emphasises that both comparison and substitution metaphors could easily be changed to literal expressions, whereas interaction metaphors could not because they require the reader "*to make inferences and to draw implications rather than merely to react.*" [212] Frame and focus stand in dynamic interaction, i.e., the interaction operates via both similarities and dissimilarities of the topic and vehicle (relations between systems of associated commonplaces) showing the mediation and correspondence between them.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to investigate the phenomenon of metaphor use by old Kabylian speakers (70-90 years old) via a set of theoretical assumptions (comparison, substitution and interaction). We applied each classical theory to our corpus, then we analysed each metaphoric utterance in spoken Kabyle, so as to prove that some problems may rise while translating each expression.

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[212] Ortony, A, and Reynolds, R, E, and Arter, J, A, "Metaphor: Theoretical and Empirical Research", Psychological Bulletin, Vol.85, N°5, September, 1978, p.923.

We have noticed during our analysis that the task of translation was very hard and sometimes even a hindrance rather than a help for any native speaker or an experienced professional translator, since much of the lexis of Kabyle language has a cultural referent and is thus very specific to a speech community. We noted from time to time some semantic absurdities and grammatical anomalies within translation. Identifying metaphors is not an easy job. Thus, we most of the time feel incapable to solve the riddle

3.1 The Substitution and Interaction Theories (Reassessed)

3.1.1 Introduction

Chapter three is a window open onto a new approach, the so called 'cognitivism'. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in their book 'Metaphors We Live By' assert that the process of metaphorisation depends on cognition, in other words, metaphor, most often fulfils a cognitive function helping the recipient understand the message. Lakoff and Johnson present metaphor as an omnipresent element in our daily lives and experiences.

"[Metaphors] *represent a fundamental way that human beings have evolved to express and organize their world, especially the world that lies beyond immediate perception.*"[213]

3.1.2 The Cognitive Approach to Metaphor (G. Lakoff and M. Johnson)

Metaphor has gone through a long way from being singly associated with literary works for language impact, into being linked to cognitive activity drawn out of everyday language; which suggests that there is more than one side to metaphor that one might think of…a much deeper one that links it with our whole cognition system. George Lakoff has shown great interest in the latter point and highlighted it in his collaborated work with Mark Johnson in '*Metaphors we live by*' (1980:6) stating in his introduction:

"*The most important claim we have made so far is that metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words. We shall argue that, on the contrary, human thought processes are largely metaphorical. This is what we mean when we say that the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured and defined. Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person's conceptual system.*"

As a matter of fact, it is absolutely thanks to G. Lakoff that metaphor acquired a new sense of identification as being a purely matter of thought rather than language. He is the first to

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[213] Kliebard (2001) quoted in Young, S, F, "Theoretical Frameworks and Models of Learning: Tools for Developing Conceptions of Teaching and Learning", International Journal for Academic Development, Vol. 13, N°1, March 2008, p.43.

observe that we tend to use metaphors in every aspect of language used, and thus, he states that "*…everyday abstract concepts like time, states, change, causation, and purpose also turn out to be metaphorical*" (Lakoff, 1993: 203). Indeed, Lakoff looks to conceptual metaphor theory as important and not marginal at all. His devotion to the study of metaphor led him to great success, and thus staged a revolution in the area of cognitive linguistics. In other words, he so far, views the contemporary theory as something quite different from the traditional Aristotelian thinking about metaphor. On Lakoff's view, metaphor is no more a figure of speech, merely restricted to "*novel or poetic linguistic expression*" (ibid: 202), but ubiquitous, automatic and most of the time communally shared in everyday language. Thus, our ordinary language is replete with almost an infinite variety of metaphors that we use without being conscious of their metaphorical character. These sets or varieties of metaphors are called conventional metaphors or as Lakoff labels them conceptual metaphors, to distinguish them from the novel constructions found in fiction, poetry, etc.

There is absolutely no doubt at all saying that our use of language defines us. One of the variants of a cognitive model of metaphor is the theory developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), in their book entitled 'Metaphors We Live By'[214]. Lakoff and Johnson have vociferously maintained that the links between metaphor and thoughts are extremely tightened. They emphasise that metaphors are more than just poetic devices; they are deeply rooted and embedded in our everyday language. Metaphors help us structure our experiences and activities, as well as they frame and condition our thoughts and attitudes, and affect the way we act and react in our entire life. In this way, Lakoff (1993: 244) argues that "*the contemporary theory of metaphor is revolutionary in many respects.*" Thus, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) sum up the contrast between the traditional and contemporary views of metaphor, and redefine metaphor as follows:

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[214]Metaphors We Live By: the seminal study considered today as the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (theory of cognition) which has now taken shape in linguistics as "Conceptual Metaphor Theory" (hereafter CMT). The CMT approach has provided the theoretical framework for most of the theorisations, applications and empirical investigations which thereafter ensued. Lakoff and Johnson's book 'Metaphors We Live By' has proved a productive framework for a large body of literature applying it (e.g., Koller, 2004; Deignan, 2005; Semino, 2008; Cameron and Maslen, 2010). The book itself is somehow revolutionary in that it systematically suggests that metaphor is not only a question of language but of thinking cognitively and consequently of behaving. For further readings, see Ponterotto, D, Studies in Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Roma: Aracne, 2014, Chapter 1, Mautner, G, Discourse and Management: Critical Perspectives Through the Language Lens, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp.80-91.

"*Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish — a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language… For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature*" (1980: 3).

Constructivist researchers such as (Reddy,1979; Lakoff and Turner, 1989; Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 2002; Sweetser, 1990) and some other scholars, working primarily on 'cognitive linguistics' have largely elaborated and explored the idea that people speak metaphorically because they think, imagine, feel, reason and act metaphorically (Tendahl and Gibbs, 2008: 1825).

3.1.2.1 Mapping

Lakoff introduces the concept of mappings laid across the conceptual domains; that is, metaphor is deemed as a part and parcel of our everyday language and our cognitive approach to semantics, conduct a sort of mapping between the concept "source domain", and the metaphorical expression "target domain". Lakoff in his theory recognises the "target domain as a source domain" or "the target domain IS the source domain", and this is clearly illustrated in his example of LOVE IS A JOURNEY where he draws the following mapping:

- *The lovers correspond to travelers;*
- *The love relationship corresponds to a vehicle;*
- *The lovers' common goals correspond to their common destinations on the journey.*
  (Lakoff, 1993: 207).

Therefore, the metaphorical expressions corresponding with the above mentioned mappings are:

- *The relationship isn't going anywhere.*
- *Our relationship is off the track.*
- *We can't turn back now.*
- *We may have to go our separate ways.*
- *We're at a crossroads.*
- *We're spinning our wheels.*
- *It's been a long, bumpy road.*

> – *Look how far we've come.*
>
> – *Our relationship has hit a dead-end street* (ibid: 206).

The fundamental tenet of the CMT approach operates at the level of thinking not language per se, i.e., Lakoff and Johnson claim plainly and directly that metaphor is a basic mental operation by which we understand the entire world through mapping from familiar domains to unfamiliar domains, and that some conceptualisations are metaphorically structured in our minds (Cameron, 2003: 19). Thus, metaphors are not linguistic expressions or a matter of interpretations, but are indeed cross-domain mappings in the conceptual systems (Stern, 2000: 177). One domain (source) is used to conceptualise a second (target), that is, metaphors link two conceptual systems or domains, **a)** the 'source domain' (typically consisting of literal and concrete entities and relationships)[215] and **b)** the 'target domain' (often a concept more abstract or less amenable to a simple description)[216]. Lakoff's CMT study proposes that the language is secondary and that the mapping is primary. Thus, he posits the following explanation:

"*The metaphor is not just a matter of language, but of thought and reason. The language is secondary. The mapping is primary, in that it sanctions the use of source domain language and inference patterns for target domain concepts. The mapping is conventional, that is, it is a fixed part of our conceptual system, one of our conventional ways of conceptualizing love relationships*" (Lakoff, 1993: 208).

And later he argues if metaphors were simply linguistic expressions thus,

"*we would expect different linguistic expressions to be different metaphors. Thus, "We've hit a dead-end street" would constitute one metaphor. "We can't turn back now" would constitute another, entirely different metaphor… Yet we don't seem to have dozens of different metaphors here. We have one metaphor, in which love is conceptualized as a journey. The mapping tells us precisely how love is being conceptualized as a journey. And this unified way of conceptualizing love metaphorically is realized in many different linguistic expressions*" (ibid: 209).

Thus, the principle of mapping adapted for the two concepts 'love' and 'journey' may be understood as follows: understanding the pattern 'love' (target) in terms of another pattern 'journey' (source) in our everyday conventional system creates in fact a systematicity in

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[215] Kats, A, N, and Taylor, T, E, "The Journeys of Life: Examining a Conceptual Metaphor with Semantic and Episodic Memory Recall", Metaphor and Symbol, Vol. 23, 2008, p.149.
[216] Ibid.

viewing 'love' as a long journey experience and love duration ———▶ which starts at a certain point, lasts for a long period progressing, and covers all the characteristics of the journey such as (distance covered, decisions made, impediments, passengers, reaching a target/destination, goals, choosing a direction, departure and arrival, beautiful/exciting adventure, surprises, etc.). All these aspects characterising the JOURNEY are indeed, conventional ways of conceptualising love relationships.

Consider how 'LOVE IS A JOURNEY' metaphor could be symbolically schematised:

Figure20. LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor (source target mappings).

'Journey' source key elements	LOVE In PROGRESS	'Love' target key elements
Passengers/travellers		lovers
Carriage/vehicle		love relationship
Journey/trip		entire events in the relationship
Distance covered		love in progress (progress made)
Impediments (troubles/challenges)		the amount of difficulties experienced (the troubles encountered) - e.g. wrong decisions/deceptions, breakups.
Destination of the journey (multiple directions)		reaching goals (Lovers join together for better and for worse)
Landmarks, guides, provisions and luggage.		talents: great efforts (devotion, wisdom, intense feelings, counsellors)

Journey/long circuit — DEPARTURE (Journey ◀—▶ Love)

SYSTEMATICITY

Love end journey (ARRIVAL)

179

In this way, we may conclude that lakoff could adequately determine or represent a metaphorical scenario in our mind which is brought by LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. In this respect Lakoff (1993: 208) states:

"[The ontological correspondences] *map this scenario about travel onto a corresponding love scenario in which the corresponding alternatives for action are seen. Here is the corresponding love scenario that results from applying the correspondences to this knowledge structure.*"

What Lakoff actually wants to demonstrate is that what constitutes the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is not simply any particular word or expression, but the mapping of the source domain of JOURNEY onto the target domain of LOVE (ibid). In other words, the systematic set of correspondences that exists between the target domain and source domain constitute the whole system mapping. Accordingly, such a cognitive mechanism is defined as:

"*The systematic set of correspondences that exist between constituent elements of the source and the target domain. Many elements of target concepts come from source domains and are not pre-existing. To know a conceptual metaphor is to know the set of mappings that applies to a given source-target pairing. The same idea of mapping between source and target is used to describe analogical reasoning and inferences.*"[217]

3.1.2.2 The Conventionality of Metaphor

In the aforementioned examples, it is clearly viewed that they are all metaphorical concepts since we use our experience of a journey, a path, and a dead-end street to conceptualise love. Lakoff dwells upon our deeply accepted yet unmentioned realisation that love without metaphors is not love; since it is thanks to metaphor that we link it to warmth, food to the spirit, passion…etc.

Lakoff and Johnson's studies on the CMT reveal that metaphors can be useful for communicating difficult or abstract meanings accurately, as well as they most of the time provide vivid information (concrete sources) that can be easily understood, i.e., one cannot think abstractly without thinking metaphorically. Lakoff and his colleague Johnson write:

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[217] George Lakoff quoted in Fez-Barringten, B, Architecture: The Making of Metaphors, Uk: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012, pp.96-97.

"*Because so many of the concepts that are important to us are either abstract or not clearly delineated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time, etc.), we need to get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms*" (1980: 115).

From the point of view of Lakoff and Turner (1989), conventional metaphors are exactly those frequently used within a speech community, i.e., long established (conventionalised and lexicalised). In other words, metaphors that have unconsciously been built into the language and that are progressively then deeply entrenched (automatic), are in fact, those most efficient, powerful and very important. Lakoff and Turner state:

"*At the conceptual level, a metaphor is conventional to the extent that it is automatic, effortless, and generally established as a mode of thought among members of a linguistic community. For example, DEATH IS DEPARTURE is deeply conventionalized at the conceptual level; we probably all have it. […] Conventionalization also applies to the connection between the conceptual and linguistic levels. When […] we speak of the degree to which a conceptual metaphor is conventionalized in the language, we mean the extent to which it underlies a range of everyday linguistic expressions. For example, DEATH IS DEPARTURE is not just conventionalized as a way of conceiving of death; it is also widely conventionalized in language, underlying a wide range of expressions such as "pass away," be "no longer with us," "gone," "among the dear departure," and so on*."[218]

We speak of conceptual metaphors as highly conventional or conventionalised concepts in the use of a linguistic community. In other words, speakers of each language community employ the most common and ordinary ways to talk about different subject matters. Conceptual metaphor thus "*are well worn or even cliched.*"[219]

Another example Lakoff mentions is the way we deal with arguments in a parallel sense with our concepts of war and battle. For instance, we say "defend an argument", "his argument lost ground due to many openings", or "the argument was inadmissible". Likewise, the way we regard time as a cherished commodity "TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE", or as a valuable means "TIME IS MONEY".

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[218] Lakoff, G, and Turner, M, More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp.55-56.
[219] Kövecses, Z, Metaphor: A Practical Introduction, 2nd Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p.34.

However, the same systematicity that enables us to understand a given concept in terms of another will necessarily conceal another aspect thereof. For instance, when we are too consumed into 'defending' or 'attacking' the opponent's argument, i.e., mapping an argument to war, we tend to overlook the other aspect of the whole argument; that is, the cooperative one. A person who is arguing with us is not necessarily 'attacking' our stance, but rather gives us their time, which is a valuable commodity, in an attempt to reach a common ground for communication and mutual understanding.

Lakoff and Johnson reinforce the conceptual metaphor 'ARGUMENT IS WAR' via a set of linguistic representations as already mentioned above. Arguments in fact, are structured, represented, performed, understood and talked about in terms of both war and battle or fights and quarrels, even though argument and war are regarded as two distinct things. Thus, the linguistic expressions which generally refer to the metaphorical concept ARGUMENT IS WAR allow us to understand and comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another. Through Lakoff and Johnson's CMT corpus analysis, one may look at any particular conceptual metaphor (target domain + source domain) as a systematic way of comprehending target and source concepts via projections or correspondences, mainly carried by sources (vehicles) being directly transferred to targets (topics) making the relatively abstract domain target more concrete than usual. Lakoff and Jonson together postulate:

"*This is an example of what it means for a metaphorical concept, namely, ARGUMENT IS WAR, to structure (at least in part) what we do and how we understand what we are doing when we argue. The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different kinds of things - verbal discourse and armed conflict - and the actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured*" (1980: 5).

We routinely speak of different concepts in life metaphorically and mainly unconsciously. So, we most of the time refer to people, objects, events, time, space, etc. metaphorically, in order to achieve our visions and ideas and make the abstract more or less concrete.

Consider the following schema representing the CMT, and how metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide variety of expressions:


Figure 21. Based on the CMT norms.

Note that:

One correspondence = one entity = Black's system of associated commonplaces

Here is a similar example in Kabyle in parallel with Lakoff and Johnson's CMT approach (following the figure 21) as a detailed schema:

'ARGUMENT IS WAR' conceptual metaphor

One domain 'source' is used to conceptualise a second domain 'target' =>cross-domain mappings:

ARGUMENT IS WAR

[jewθiθi:d swɑæwæl]
(He shot him with words).

[jeðmi:θ swɑæwæl]
(He massacred him with words).

[jerwi:θ slɑhɖɒr]
(He mixed him up with words).

[jənɣɑθ swɑæwæl]
(He killed him with words).

[iɣɑlvi:θ swɑæwæl]
(He won him with words).

Figure 21a. Based on the CMT norms.

3.1.2.3 The Conduit Metaphor

A clearer account of how a metaphorical concept can hide another is further discussed below in Michael Reddy's *The conduit metaphor*: *A case of frame conflict in our language about language* (1979).

From the point of view of the *Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology* (2009) the conduit metaphor is defined as follows: "*A metaphor about communication, which suggests that an addresser's ideas are objects contained in packages, known as words, that are directly sent to the addressee.*"[220] In other words, the conduit metaphor if well said, concerns the transmission model of communication (channel) which in fact involves the translation or simply the encoding of the message (or an idea) conveyed by the transmitter or sender via a signal transferred directly to the recipient or the receiver, who at his turn operates

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[220] Zappavigna-Lee, M, and Patrick, J: "Tacit Knowledge and Discourse Analysis" in Khosrow-Pour, M, Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology, 2nd Edition, Hershey, New York: Information Science Reference, IGI Global, 2009, p.3661.

at the level of decoding or deciphering, i.e., this later tries to unpack or unwrap the packed information (language) at the other end. Tolga Rosenfeld (1992) reflects on Reddy's conduit metaphor in the following passage:

"*Analyzing the metaphors we use to describe communication, Reddy points out that they correspond with a general underlying metaphor of communication as a system whereby one individual uses language to encode an idea and sends the idea to another individual who then decodes the language to receive the original idea of the speaker. Thus it is as if language is used to wrap up the actual ideas of speakers and send them through a conduit to hearers who can then unwrap the language and receive the idea.*"[221]

Consider how the conduit metaphor is presented by Reddy, and how it functions as a 'pipeline'[222] that relays information from the speaker to the hearer:


Figure 22. Based on Reddy's Conduit Metaphor function.

In this way, Michael Reddy sees the conduit metaphor so 'deeply embedded' in the everyday way English native speakers talk and think about language and communication, as seen in expressions such as '*try to get your thoughts across better*'; '*I couldn't extract the meaning from your writing*'; '*try to pack more thoughts into fewer words*'. He furthermore asserts that the conduit metaphor leads us to the 'bizarre assertion', i.e., the idea that words can carry meanings and, therefore, have insides and outsides:

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[221] Rosenfeld, T, E : "When and How Old Age is Relevant in Discourse of The Elderly: A Case Study of Georgia O'Keefee" in Alatis, J, E, Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics (GURT) 1992: Language, Communication, and Social Meaning , Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 1992, p.358.
[222] The concept 'pipelines' is mentioned by Reddy (1993: 170) who quotes: "*the conduit of language becomes, not sealed pipelines from person to person, but rather individual pipes which allow mental content to escape into, or enter from, this ambient space.*"

"The logic of the framework we are considering – a logic which will henceforth be called the conduit metaphor – would now lead us to the bizarre assertion that words have "insides" and "outsides." After all, if thoughts can be "inserted," there must be a space "inside" wherein the meaning can reside" (Reddy, 1993: 168).

It should be noted that there is a wide disagreement from the part of most recent scholarship that everyday metaphors do not represent 'bizarre assertions' but do instead represent fundamental cognition (Lakof and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Turner, 1991; Gibbs, 1994). Reddy's work on the conduit metaphor centralises two different categories: **1)** the 'major framework' which includes container metaphors, i.e., ideas described as residing in human heads (the mind is a box where ideas and thoughts reside, can get in and out automatically) or in words (words are containers of meanings which can be put into or retrieved from words like objects), and **2)** the 'minor framework' which does not evoke the container metaphors, but rather demonstrates that ideas, feelings and thoughts flow out into space between speakers' and hearers' minds/heads. Here is the description on 'major' and 'minor' frameworks of metaphor clusters for the conduit metaphor as proposed by Reddy (1993: 170):

"the major framework sees ideas as existing either within human heads or, at least, within words uttered by humans. The "minor" framework overlooks words as containers and allows ideas and feelings to flow, unfettered and completely disembodied, into a kind of ambient space between human heads."

Of the major framework Reddy states (1993: 170):

1- *"language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one person to another"*:
   e.g. *You still haven't given me any idea of what you mean* (ibid: 166).
   – I am waiting you to give me the best idea.
   – He got the concepts from his friend Peter.
   – He has presented us with some useful unfamiliar concepts.

2- *"i*n *writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts and feelings in the words"*:
   e.g. *Don't force your meanings into the wrong words* (ibid: 167).
   – It would be better if you insert this idea elsewhere in your thesis.
   – I advise you not to load the sentences more than they carry.

– Would you try to pack your ideas into fewer words, please!

3- "w*ords accomplish the transfer by containing the thoughts or feelings and conveying them to others*":

e.g. *The lines may rhyme, but they are empty of both meaning and feeling* (ibid: 168).

– Apparently, this idea shows up again and again.

– The letter he sent me was full of significance.

– Don't you think this poem is bursting with ecstasy?

4- "*in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings once again from the words*":

e.g. *Let me know if you find any good ideas in the essay* (ibid).

– I actually got a lot out of the books you gave me.

– Get this idea into your head, and take it for granted.

– The most prominent headings jump off the page to announce the topic.

Of the minor framework Reddy states (1993:170-71):

1- "*thoughts and feelings are ejected by speaking or writing into an external "idea space"* ":

e.g. *Lay your thoughts out on paper where you can see them* (ibid: 195).

– Put/drop down your ideas on your rough paper before you lose them.

– She had a very bad experience: "she poured out her sorrows".

2- "*thoughts and feelings are reified in this external space, so that they exist independent of any need for living human beings to think and feel them*":

e.g. *You won't find that idea in any bookstore* (ibid: 196).

– That idea has been floating around for decades.

– The news began circulating around right after your departure.

3- "*these reified thoughts and feelings may, or may not, find their way back into the heads of living humans*"

e.g. *Different ideas come to mind in a situation like this* (ibid: 197).

- I still can't catch your idea.
- Sorry! Can't call you a visit today. I've got to cram the concepts for tomorrow's quiz.

Indeed, Reddy's conduit metaphor is so ubiquitous. Most of the findings that Reddy studied an analysed remain amazing. To put it simply, Reddy has observed that more than 70% of the expressions we use to talk about the English language are metaphorical without noticing: "*a conservative estimate would thus be that, of the entire metalingual apparatus of the English language, at least seventy percent is directly, visibly, and graphically based on the conduit metaphor*" (Reddy, 1993: 177). The words can sometimes be regarded as objects, carriers of conceptualized meaning, and for the linguistic expressions carrying them to be containers thereof. Thus, Reddy offers an elaborated list of common examples (everyday expressions) similar to the following:

- I couldn't *extract* any meaning from what he said.
- I couldn't *find* any sense *in* his words.
- She actually didn't *get* any meaning *out of* his speech.
- His words *were empty* and 'devoid' of feeling.
- His promises *were hollow*.
- I just can't *convey* my love *in* mere words.
- Someone *gave* her an anonymous call this morning.
- Did you *receive* her call?
- I *got* the message. Don't worry.

Reddy's work remains very essential (a stimulus) for both Lakoff and Johnson who tremendously acknowledged his now classic '*The Conduit Metaphor*'. Lakoff (1993) admits:

"*The contemporary theory that metaphor is primarily conceptual, conventional, and part of the ordinary system of thought and language can be traced to Michael Reddy's now classic paper, The Conduit Metaphor ... Reddy did far more in that paper than he modestly suggested ... he allowed us to see, albeit in a restricted domain, that ordinary everyday English is largely metaphorical, dispelling once and for all the traditional view that metaphor is primarily in the realm of poetic or "figurative" language. Reddy showed, for a single very significant case, that the locus of metaphor is thought, not language, that metaphor is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world, and*

that our everyday behavior reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience"(1993: 203-204).

This is precisely the conventional way of viewing metaphors due to the difficulty to find the hidden aspect suggested by them, and indeed to begin with, to recognise them as metaphors. However, Lakoff dwells upon these examples to further support his theory of metaphor and show that the first version of Reddy's conduit metaphor is entailed and illustrates as follows:

1- THE MIND IS A CONTAINER (FOR IDEAS).
2- IDEAS (OR MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS.
3- COMMUNICATION IS SENDING.
4- LINGUISTIC EXPFRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS (FOR IDEAS - OBJECTS)[223].

Obviously, and by the above mentioned points, Lakoff wants to indicate that the first three points embody Reddy's first variant[224], whereas the fourth one entails all of them combined; for linguistic expressions do contain the ideas that are referred to as objects to "carry", "have", or "be packed". The usage of such conceptual metaphors is usually effective when the speaker wants to attract the attention of his/her hearer of impress them and stimulate their thinking.

3.1.3 Kövecses' account on Conceptual Metaphor

In his book '*Language, Mind, and Culture*' (2006) Kövecses adds to Lakoff's view point that metaphors are cross-domain mappings which are used to represent the "*relationships between two frames with the notion of A is B.*"[225] Kövecses extensively explored and deeply discussed the matter (metaphor comprises mapping between two different frames) and thus he reports the following:

"*A conceptual metaphor is such a set of correspondences that obtains between a source domain and a target domain, where metaphorical linguistic expressions (i.e., linguistic*

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[223] Lakoff, G: "Metaphor, Folk Theories, and The Possibilities of Dialogue" in Dascal, M, Dialogue: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Amsterdam: John Benjamin, 1985, p.68.

224 First variant "*represented by the sentence 'try to get your thought across better' (which involves understanding thoughts, ideas, emotions, subsumed under the generic term 'repertoire members', which can be sent directly from a sender to recipient)*" (Krzeszowski, 1997: 1613).

[225] Kövecses, Z, Language, Mind, and Culture: A Practical Introduction, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.116.

metaphors) commonly make the conceptual metaphors (i.e., metaphors in the mind) manifest."[226]

In order to properly understand Kövecses cross-domain mappings, the components[227] of conceptual metaphors need to be defined and illustrated. Although he provides twelve components in his book, only those closely related to our research are going to be discussed herein below.

3.1.3.1 Source and Target Domains

Kövecses (2006:117) refers to the more physical domain as "source domain"[228] or "letter B", and the rather abstract domain as "target domain"[229] or "letter A". The relationship between these two domains is recognised as A is B, i.e., Target is Source. Moreover, he states that one source may refer or apply to various targets and a target may attach to or associate with more than one source, i.e., a target can be understood by several sources (ibid: 120). Kövecses (2005) writes:

"*One of the remarkable features of metaphorical thought is that even our most basic target concepts can be construed in multiple ways. The metaphorical conceptual system is not monolithic – target concepts are not limited to a single source concept.* "[230]

There is no doubt that both target and source relationship is based on systematic correspondences (as already mentioned in the above quotation). Yet one has to notice that metaphor mappings construct from a source domain to a target domain but never the vice

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[226] Ibid, p.123.

[227] The Hungarian Professor Zoltán Kövecses puts that from the cognitive linguistic point of view, we can identify a number of aspects, or components that interact between two concepts (target and source), and these components include the following: 1) source domain, 2) target domain, 3) basis of metaphor, 4) neutral structures that correspond to 1and 2 in the brain, 5) relationships between the source and the target, 6) metaphorical linguistic expressions, 7) mappings, 8) entailments, 9) aspects of source and target,10) blends, 11) nonlinguistic realizations and 12) cultural models (ibid: 116-117).

[228] On the source domain Kövecses states: "*We use the source domain, a conceptual domain, to understand another conceptual domain (the target domain). Source domains are typically less abstract or less complex than target domains. For example, in the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, the conceptual domain of journey is typically viewed as being less abstract or less complex than that of life*" (Zoltán Kövecses, 2010: 328).

[229] On the target domain Kövecses poses: "*We try to understand the target domain, a conceptual domain, with the help of another conceptual domain (the source domain). Target domains are typically more reabstract and subjective than source domains. For example, in the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, the conceptual domain of life is typically viewed as being more abstract (and more complex) than that of journey*" (ibid: 329).

[230] Kövecses, Z, Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 27.

versa ("*unidirectionality*")[231]. In other words, the fundamental role of metaphor is to project inference patterns from the source domain to the target domain. At this stage, the concept of both source domain and target domain need an elaboration. Accordingly, by definition the source domains are derives from our direct embodied experiences (from both our sensory and subjective experiences), i.e., our knowledge about source domains (foci) is usually rich, and easy to understand. Thus, the source is typically more concrete and tremendously delineated (clearly and sharply understood than the target domains). In this regard, Kövecses (2010) posits:

"*the source domains are typically more concrete or physical and more clearly delineated concepts than the targets, which tend to be fairly abstract and less-delineated ones*" (2010:17).

This is to say, that Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff and Turner (1989) and many other researchers right after the 80's have highly elaborated and discussed the matter (source/target domains). They actually all endorsed the idea that target concepts tended to be more abstract, lacking physical characteristics and therefore remain more difficult to understand, and that source domains tended to be more concrete and thus more readily accessible and comprehensible. As Kövecses states it: "*Target domains are abstract, diffuse, and lack clear delineation; as a result, they "cry out" for metaphorical conceptualization*" (2010: 23).

In fact, source domains seem adequately shape and frame images of the target domains. The use of a metaphor with a specific source in a reflecting question decides exactly what image of the target domain will be transferred to the recipient. It is indeed very difficult, if not impossible to portray, identify and capture an abstract entity without the help of conceptual metaphor. This, of course, plainly implies that the most common target domains are highly abstract concepts (not grounded in our daily embodied experiences), such as emotion, morality, politics, desire, economy, human relationship, life and death, communication, time and so on (ibid:23-26). On the contrary, the common source domains are employed to conceptualise more than one target domain and they mainly include the human body, health and illness, buildings and construction, animals, machines and tools, cooking and food, games

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[231] On the Unidirectionality of conceptual metaphor Kövecses (2010) explains: "*In conceptual metaphors, the understanding of abstract or complex domains is based on less-abstract or less-complex conceptual domains. With metaphors that serve the purpose of understanding, this is the natural direction; metaphorical understanding goes from the more concrete and less complex to the more abstract and more complex. The reverse direction can also sometimes occur, but then the metaphor has a special noneveryday function*" (2010: 329).

and sport, heat and cold, light and darkness, forces, etc. (ibid: 18-22). Zoltán Kövecses (2010) gives us the following account:

"*despite the representative nature of the list, we get a sense of the most common source domains and the kind of world that our most common metaphors depict. In this world, it seems, there are people, animals, and plants; the people live in houses, they have bodies, they eat, they get sick and get better; they move around and travel; they live in a physical environment with all kinds of objects and substances in it; the objects and substances have all kinds of properties; the physical environment affects the people; and the people make tools, work, and engage in various other transactions with other people. This is an extremely simplified world, but it is exactly the simplified nature of this world that enables us to make use of parts of it in creating more complex abstract ones*" (2010: 22-23).

Consider how the common 'target domains' (hereafter TD) can be distinguished from the common 'source domains' (hereafter SD) in the two lists provided below:


Figure 23. TDs Versus SDs: Adapted from Kövecses' idea about different prototypes.

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Note that kövecses (2010: 29) findings on common target and source domains provide overwhelming evidence for the view that conceptual metaphors are unidirectional, i.e., they go from highly concrete to lower or categorical abstract domains; the most common source domains are concrete, whereas, the most common targets are abstract concepts. Consequently, conceptual metaphors can serve the purpose of understanding intangible concepts, and hence difficult to understand.

Among the multiple linguistic metaphorical concepts and expressions, we may state some noticeable examples in English then in Kabyle:

A) In English:

- I'm a bit worried. I don't think she'll be able **to shoulder** such a big **responsibility**.
- Instead, I would say, "he is a **sick-minded** person I had ever met."
- The two together **fit** for the job.
- You're making your students uncomfortable. Avoid **hurting** their **feelings**!
- Your advice and **fruitful** comment **pushed** me to do better all the time.
- She **took/spent** too much time to **warm-up** her class.
- Try to add some **ingredients** to your essay.
- I'll provide you with a best **recipe** for strengthening your poor memory.
- I **invested** too much in that point. You know!
- The plan **ran like clockwork**.
- Once she heard about her mum's arrival she stood up and **blossomed**.
- Their business is actually **in ruins**.
- You are too tired. Try **to save** energy for next week.
- She is **boiling** with anger.
- I really don't appreciate her **cold** welcome.
- A **faint** smile **escaped** despite his **dark** mood.
- Troublemakers **drove** the teacher crazy.
- We solved the problem **step by step**.
- **Listen** to me with your **heart**.
- Few students are **hungry for** knowledge nowadays.
- The longer she **resisted** the temptation, the stronger her temptation became.
- I think I can guess! I **see** your point now.
- Our ancestors **built** strong marriages and families than today's generation.

– That's a **dense** paragraph. I don't like it at all. I'll try to **reconstruct** it.

– Be patient! The baby **is arriving** soon.

B) In Kabyle:

1- [lʌjətsru wuli:w ɤər ðæχəl] lit-trans: (my heart is crying in the inside) implies ⟶ the state of being extremely sad.

2- [jətɑrɖɑq silferħ] lit-trans: (he exploded with happiness) implies ⟶ an intense feeling of happiness that surrounds us in different situations.

3- [læjetsæwəl sizzæf] lit-trans: (he is boiling with anger) implies ⟶ the state of reaching an utmost degree of anger/the state of being furious.

4- [jessæɤli:d igənwæn] lit-trans: (he let the skies fall down) implies ⟶ the state of getting out of mind/reason – reaching a state of madness/insanity.
    Note that: this specific instance in Kabyle may appear very absurd to certain foreign languages – the same way it sounds nonsense when it comes to translation. It is, thus, unique in its use. It is a culture-specific[232] metaphor, i.e.,(it sticks to the Kabyle language community).

5- [sers læqli:Ḵ] lit-trans: (put your mind) implies ⟶ control yourself/be wise.

6- [sers læqli:Ḵ urətsefgæræ] lit-trans: (put you mind and don't fly) implies ⟶ calm down – this utterance is uttered one someone is becoming aggressive or highly irritated (he flew into a rage).

7- [jenɤɑ:ts lχu:f] lit-trans: (fear/threat killed her) implies ⟶ reaching a high degree of panic.

8- [jerwæ ləħʃæjəm] lit-trans: (he is full of shame) ⎤ implies ⟶ the state of being
9- [nɤɑnt ləħʃæjəm] lit-trans: (shame killed him) ⎦ embarrassed.

10- [θəɤli:d θiti:s fəllæs] lit-trans: (his/her eye fell on him/her) implies ⟶reaching the utmost envy/to have envy for something (to manifest a great desire for something in terms of behaviour).

11- [θəsləv fθufɤa] lit-trans: (she is crazy for getting out) implies ⟶ the strong feeling or willingness or even a strong necessity to get out.

12- [θəħrɑq ʌtzɑr] lit-trans: (she is burnt to see him) implies ⟶ the great envy to see a person (e.g., especially in case of absence).

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[232] "*Cross-cultural variations among languages lead to non-equivalence and can be translation traps; they can also be a source of misunderstanding among target language audience*" (Hussein Abdul-Raof, 2001: 13).

13- [isæddæ usˌsæni:s] lit-trans: (he spent his days) implies ⟶ the person is agonising or very old person and has nothing more to offer to life (very faint and quite unable to perform).

14- [rɒħən læhli:s ʌdæɤən θæqʃi:ʃθ] lit-trans: (his parents went to buy the girl) implies ⟶ asking for her hand in marriage.

15- [jədʒudʒgəd wuðmi:s] lit-trans: (his/her face blossomed) implies ⟶ getting recovered /feeling at ease /being healthy or being happy.

16- [læðəzzɔ:n θægmæts gæræsən] lit-trans: (they sow brotherhood between them) implies ⟶ to establish a good and constant relationship.

17- [jənærnæ wæwæl] lit-trans: (the word grew) implies ⟶ the problem becomes more prominent.

18- [tiK̲li ʌdjawəd̪ əlɪɒfæn]
19- [tiK̲li ʌdjes əlɪɒfæn] ⎫ lit-trans: (soon the baby is arriving) ⎫ implies ⟶ the delivery of a baby
20- [lædiθəddu əlɪɒfæn] lit-trans: (the baby is coming) ⎭

21- [θəppwɒd̪ læmænæ vævi:s] lit-trans: (the trust arrived her owner) implies ⟶ the person is dead (the word trust is very significant – means in Arabic 'الأمانة'. And [vævi:s] stands for the almighty Allah).

22- [ʌrræwi:m huddend ʌduni:θ] lit-trans: (your children ruined life) implies ⟶ the state of being highly agitated/turbulent (very bad behaviour).

23- [θəɤli tʒɑres] lit-trans: (his business is falling down) – this utterance is equivalent to the following in English: his business is in ruins - implies ⟶ truly be in a financial failure.

24- [læθvənnu ʌduni:s] lit-trans: (she is building her life) implies ⟶ she is thinking of her future (job, marriage, success, etc.)

25- [θəɤli əṣṣɑhæs] lit-trans: (her health is ruined) implies ⟶ she/he is no more strong and healthy/her/his health has deteriorated.

26- [urðidʒædʒæræ ʌqəlwæʃinæ] lit-trans: (don't leave with me that billy goat) implies ⟶ take with you that mad person with you and don't leave him with me (aggressive person).

27- [ʌtɑṣ ilæθəssəglafəd̪ fəlɪæsən] lit-trans: (you are barking too much at them) implies ⟶ you are worrying too much about them/you are blaming them too much.

28- [læjhəbbəʒ ʌglimi:w]
29- [læjθəts ʌglimi:w] ⎫ lit-trans: (he is biting my skin) implies ⟶ he is stressing me too much/hardly leave me at ease/he is disturbing me.

Note that: the two verbs [læjhəbbəʒ] and [læjθɑts] have the same implication, but they do differ in sense. **1)** [læjhəbbəʒ] = to tear; whereas, **2)** [læjθɑts] = to bite.

30- [tæfunæsθ, urθəzri sænæθər] lit-trans: (a cow/she is a cow, she doesn't know where to go) implies ⟶ the insouciance/the nonchalance and carelessness.

31- [θəppwæ θæsæw] lit-trans: (my liver is cooked) implies ⟶ the state of being extremely anxious.

32- [Λwæl jətsunæwæl] lit-trans: (the word is cooked) implies ⟶ we have to be very careful in uttering words/nothing is said without reflection/never say things at random/think before you speak.

33- [urətslæværæ slɑhɔːr] lit-trans: (don't play with words) implies ⟶ you have to be fair with what you are saying (things can turn the other way round – be careful).

34- [ħmæn iðæmniːs] lit-trans: (his/her blood is hot) implies— The utterance may carry a:
1- negative aspect.
2- positive aspect.

1ˢᵗ implicature: a very irritating /aggressive/ hyperactive person.

2ⁿᵈ implicature: not lazy/hard worker.

35- [ʃæləntəd wænniːs] lit-trans: (his eyes lightened) implies ⟶ being conscious/aware.

Note that: in some other situations this utterance may imply something else (e.g., showing that the person is not satisfied/upset or angry).

36- [sæni igrɔːħ læqliːm?] lit-trans: (where did your mind go?) implies ⟶ being absent-minded.

37- [θəzzi jessi lqɑː] lit-trans : (earth twisted me) implies ⟶ I'm shocked/I'm confused.

38- [lætsæzzælən wussæn] lit-trans: (days are running) implies ⟶ the dimension of time is too short duration.

39- [lætswəχirən wussæn] lit-trans: (days are moving back) ⎤
⎟ implies ⟶ time is a
40- [lætsædin wussæn] lit-trans: (days are passing) ⎦ too short duration (unnoticeable).

41- [zriːɤ ðæʃæ diniːɖ] lit-trans: (I see what you are going to say)- its equivalent in English: I see what you mean - implies ⟶ I can guess/know what you mean.

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On the basis of examples/utterances selected above, we may conclude that a large set of figurative language expressions in Kabyle remain culturally unique in their use. In other words, a culturally unique conceptual metaphor as Kövecses (2005: 86) expresses is one that has both a culturally unique source domain and a culturally target domain. Conceptual metaphors derived from the target domain 'emotion' (abstract in nature), i.e., elusive and transient such as, anger, happiness, sadness, shame, and fear as exemplified here in Kabyle are in fact to a great extent conceptualised and expressed via metaphor grounded in bodily experiences (Fesmire, 1994; Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991; Lakoff and Kövecses 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987). Source domains for emotion as Zoltán Kövecses (2010: 23) explains, "*typically involve forces*" such as [**jətɑrɖɑq** silferħ] (he **exploded** with happiness), [**læjetsæwəl** sizzæf] (he is **boiling** with anger), [**jenɣɑ:ts** lχu:f] (she was **killed** by threat/fright) and [**nɣɑnt** ləħʃæjəm] (shame **killed** him).The verbs in bold carry out certain forces that show and highlight the intensity (high, moderate or low) of feeling and emotion. We unconsciously construct and create verbs like burst, explode, kill, boil, etc., in order to simplify, transmit adequately (more precisely) and finally exteriorise our sensations and feelings accurately as much as possible. Indeed, these verbs (emotional verbs) strongly strengthen the emotional impact: The more excitable we are, the more action verbs we will use. Metaphor thus operates at a number of different levels in our real life; it can make private matters (feelings and emotions) communicable and something shareable. Emotion is a fundamental component that usually refers to human's inner reaction and feelings. In short, emotion influences the interpretation of psychological arousal and situational context, as well as it involves a complex subjective experience (complex patterns), that is to say a combination of feeling and thought. Kumar Mishra (2016) gives a concise definition of the concept emotion stating the following:

"*Emotions are a complex pattern of arousal, subjective feeling and cognitive interpretation. Emotions, as we experience, move us internally and this process involves physiological and psychological reactions. Emotion is a subjective feeling which varies from individual to individual. When an emotion is produced, the stimulus situation is perceived and evaluated as significant. This obviously means that the present emotion arousing situation is related to past experience and is also seen as having implication for the future. For example, presence of a dangerous situation arouses fear or horror in us because, we perceive the situation as dangerous on the basis of past experience. Similarly, our emotions of anger is aroused because we perceive the situation as dangerous or insulting – threats of being*

attacked. The emotion of love is aroused because we perceive the love abject as positively affectionate. Hence, it is clear that the arousal of emotion depends upon subjective perception of (experience) the stimulus situation as emotion provoking based on sensing and evaluation, the situation as emotional. "[233]

Consider how Kövecses speaks of emotion in terms of forces:

Note that, this is Kövecses' highly elaborated prototype for anger (emotion metaphor) that constitutes native speakers' (of all languages) folk model[234].

| External events/stimuli that may disturb the self at any given time (e.g. anger).	**Cause**	Exerts a sudden impact on the self as emotion comes into existence.
	Emotion	Physical sensations inside the body (e.g. pressure, agitation, etc.).
Attempt to control emotion (the self exerts a counterpart).	**Control**	The self (person) performs actions to control the force '**anger**'.
Symbolises the great, unmeasured intensity of anger.	**Loss of Control**	Uncontrollable fury: permits and favours the use of frequent emotional metaphors.
Communicating anger verbally = a volcanic eruption.	**Behavioural response**	Verbal manifestations/ metaphorical expressions (e.g. expressing fury, revenge, hatred, etc.)

Figure 24. Adapted from Kövecses' Folk Theory of Emotions: five-stage scenario.

As already outlined and fully examined above, one may conclude that emotion and language together are viewed as a perfect symbiosis and fraternal connection with each other. Thus,

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[233] Mishra, K, B, Psychology The Study of Human Behaviour, 2nd Edition, Delhi: PHI Private Limited, 2016, p.464.

[234] On folk model (folk theory or cultural model) kövecses (2010) terms it 'folk understanding', i.e., states, events, actions, and passions. He defines the concept 'folk understanding' as follows: "*We have nonexpert, naive views about everything in our world. When this kind of naive, nonexpert knowledge comes in a more or less structured form, we call it "folk understanding" or "folk theory." These folk understandings of the world include our knowledge about the behavior of hot fluids in a closed container, about how machines work, about what a journey is, about what wars are, and a huge number of other things*" (2010: 325-326).

emotions and metaphor are in close relationship, serve each other at different levels (internally and externally) and seem to be an integrated part or system of our everyday experience. We may add that individuals with a high level of emotional expressivity (intensity of emotion increased) tend to use a large number of metaphors than do some others with a low level of emotional expressivity, i.e., they will automatically (unconsciously) resort to metaphor to describe their experiences much more specifically and accurately. Indeed, the force of emotions characterises either the comfort (joy, love, pride, pleasure, serenity, enthusiasm, etc.) or discomfort (anger, deception, fear, sorrow, anxiety, frustration etc.) of the self. On the one hand, it affects the container (the body/self) from the outside, causing a sort of a volcanic eruption (internal pressure contained in the body) which permits or favours negative reactions and behaviours, such as verbal manifestations (emotional metaphors), irritation, agitation, rage and fury, i.e., physiological and psychological responses. On the other hand, positive stimuli affect the self, and may create ecstasy which invades the container and submerges it somehow to let create or open loosely the production of specific emotional metaphors. Either positively or negatively, emotions are constantly infused into our everyday lives in various ways. Emotions progressively animate our whole experiences, they may even broaden our thinking (facilitating flexible thinking, decision making and creativity), may help people place the events in their lives, shape and transform them from a broader to a more appropriate and specific context, adding to them knowledge and tangibility. In the same line of thought David Mayers (2004) defines emotion as involving "*physiological arousal, expressive behaviors, and conscious experience.*"[235]

Consider how the structure of the container metaphors is sufficiently presented by Zoltán Kövecses (2000: 164) via the basic correspondences or mappings:

- *The container with the fluid is the person who is angry.*
- *The fluid in the container is the anger.*
- *The pressure of the fluid on the container is the force of the anger on the angry person.*
- *The cause of the pressure is the cause of the anger force.*
- *Trying to keep the fluid inside the container is trying to control the anger.*
- *The fluid going out of the container is the expression of the anger.*

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[235] David Mayers (2004) quoted in Bibri, S, E, The Human Face of Ambient Intelligence: Cognitive, Emotional, Affective, Behavioral and Conversational Aspects, Vol.9, Paris: Atlantis Press, 2015, p.406.

- *The physical dysfunctionality of the container is the social dysfunctionality of the angry person.*

Target domains in Kabyle such as 'life', 'death' 'thought', 'time' and 'desire' are spoken and expressed metaphorically. In other words, such target domains can be described by several different source domains, for example: birth [θælælli:θ] in spoken Kabyle is conceived of as [ʌdjɑwəd] + [ʌdjes] (is arriving) or as [lædiθəddu] (is coming) in examples 17,18 and 19. Thus, the delivery of the baby as expressed by the Kabyle community, is described as arrival or coming like in English and in French; whereas, death is viewed differently: [θəppwɒdꞎ læmænæ vævi:s] (the trust arrived her owner) in e.g., 20 is cultural specific metaphor because such a conceptualisation may be viewed absurd and nonsense, and may not even be expressed the same way in other languages. In fact, the concept [læmænæ] (trust) symbolises dead persons who just left us and the word [vævi:s] (owner) refers to the Almighty Allah.

The target domain desire in spoken Kabyle is manifested linguistically via metaphoric expressions such as in e.g., 10 [θəɣli:d θiti:s] (his/her eye fell down). The metaphoric utterance [θəɣli:d θiti:s] as such may not correspond, or correlates in no way with other languages. Manifesting a great desire or reaching an utmost degree of desire for something or for someone in Kabyle is concretised and structured as 'the eye fell down' which seems once again weird and insignificant. There is no much equivalence in such a case, comparing it with English or French, i.e., there is no approximate metaphoric expression like 'the eye fell down' in English or in French to express an intense envy towards something. This is to show that indeed, culture[236] has a profound impact on the way in which people unveil, display, perceive, and experience their entire life. As human beings, we all are extremely dependent on our culture, and culture is intricately very tied to us, the reason why we take it for granted.

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[236] Culture is known to be one of the most complex concepts to define. It is generally viewed as a shared way of life. Although cultures vary greatly, they all have common elements, including language, symbols, values, norms, etc. Ralph Linton (1945) defines culture stating that "*the culture of a society is the way of life of its members; the collection of ideas and habits which they learn, share and transmit from generation to generation*" (quoted in Anubhav Walia, 2008: 107). Consider how the English anthropologist Edward Tylor (1871) defines the concept culture more specifically: "*culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society*" (ibid: 108). In other words, culture is everything which is socially learned and shared by the members of the community (**the design for living**). Each individual receives culture as a part of social heritage and later may reshape it over time and introduce changes which at their turn become part of the heritage of succeeding generations. Therefore, culture is not a biological heritage, but rather sociological (ibid), i.e., culture is no more an innate quality but it is acquired by an individual as a member of society (ibid). The sociologist, Ann Swidler (1986: 273) plainly and explicitly posits that "*culture consists of such symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories, and rituals of daily life*". Note that these are some extra information on culture.

The sociologist, Professor Macionis (2014) speaks about culture and quotes:

"*Culture is the ways of thinking, the ways of acting and the material objects that together form a people's way of life. Culture includes what we think, how we act, and what we own. Culture is both our link to the past and our guide to the future.*"[237]

Thus, we may look at culture in the following way:

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                    ┌──────────┐
                    │ Culture  │
                    └──────────┘
                         │
                         ▼
                ┌─────────────────┐
                │ Design for living│
                │  (the way of life)│
                └─────────────────┘
                    │         ▲
         ┌──────────┘         └──────────┐
         ▼                               ▼
┌──────────────────────┐    ┌──────────────────────────┐
│ Material culture / objects.│  │ Nonmaterial culture / objects.│
│ Physical objects = 'artifacts'│ │ Non-physical objects = 'mantifact'│
└──────────────────────┘    └──────────────────────────┘
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In short, culture covers the two terms material (tangible human made objects) and nonmaterial (non-physical aspects) which are regarded as two distinct things. The nonmaterial culture (mental culture) by definition refers to all the non-physical products of society that are created over time and shared. These non-physical products include: language, knowledge, ideas, customs, attitudes, feelings, emotions, beliefs, values, morals, symbols, as well as, they include common patterns of behaviour and the forms of interaction appropriate in a particular society, that is to say, the so called "*design for living*" (David Newman, 2010: 45). Whereas, the material culture is represented by all the physical artifacts that shape or reflect the lives of members of a particular society (all kinds of things which can be seen or felt by senses). It includes: tools, buildings, automobiles, food, invention, artwork and so on (ibid).

Conceptual metaphors derived from the source domains 'money/Economic transactions', 'plant', 'buildings/construction', 'animals', 'food/cooking', 'heat', 'light', 'movement and direction' in spoken Kabyle may vary from one utterance to another . For example the source domain 'money/Economic transactions': the metaphorical utterance [isæddæ ussæni:s] (he spent his days) as shown in e.g., 13 is quite familiar for a non-native speaker, simply because such an utterance exists in his mother tongue. Whereas the

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[237] Macionis, J, J, Sociology, 15th Edition, Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2014, p.66.

metaphoric utterance number (14) [rɒħən   læhliːs   ʌdæɤən   θæqʃiːʃθ] (his parents went to buy the girl) may appear a bit strange for non-native speakers, i.e., such an utterance may seem ordinary and very common in use in our daily spoken Kabyle, but may sound very ridiculous, anomalous and very difficult to understand. This is due to the differences in cultural backgrounds. Thus, if a non-native speaker wishes to translate such cultural specific metaphors, he will automatically feel unable and stands unaware of standard meanings of figurative multiword expressions and thus, attempts to decode these metaphorical instances or phrases word by word. This of course leads him directly to misinterpretations. In the same line of thought, Ning Yu (2008) points out:

"Empirical studies of conceptual metaphors have revealed that some of them are potentially universal, and widespread, and still others culture-specific ... primary metaphors derive directly from our experience and very often our common bodily experience and therefore are more likely to be universal, whereas complex metaphors are combinations of primary metaphors and cultural beliefs and assumptions and, for that reason, tend to be culture-specific."[238]

Utterances number (15) [jədʒudʒgəd   wuðmiːs] (his/her face blossomed), (16) [læðəzzɔːn θægmæts   gæræsən] (they sow brotherhood between them) and (17) [jənærnæ   wæwæl] (the word grew) are related to the source domain 'plant'. 'His/her face blossomed' metaphorically spoken in Kabyle is classified conventional rather than culture-specific, i.e., this utterance may be considered universal or near- universal, but not unique in use. [jədʒudʒgəd   wuðmiːs] implies that the person regained happiness, self-confidence, self-esteem and self-belief ⟶ 'A HUMAN BEING IS A PLANT', but if it is used in the context 'health', the utterance then would be understood as 'HEALTH IS A PLANT'. Thus, [jədʒudʒgəd   wuðmiːs] becomes culture-specific and thus carries or holds the meaning of 'getting recovered'/ 'feeling well' and 'being healthy'.

The examples (16) [læðəzzɔːn   θægmæts   gæræsən] (they sow brotherhood between them) and (17) [jənærnæ   wæwæl] (the word grew) are both culture-specific metaphors, since no equivalent mappings exist in other languages such as French and English. Such metaphor use is related to a particular background and a particular language community. [θægmæts] (brotherhood) is seen and understood as 'plant' or 'seed' that we sow because plants and

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[238] Ning Yu: "Metaphor from Body and Culture" in Gibbs, R, W, The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.248.

seeds involve physical growth and brotherhood involves social relationship growth. [ʌwæl] (word) in the metaphorical expression [jənærnæ wæwæl] (the word grew) focuses on the notion of growth as in plants. Thus, the verb [jənærnæ] (grew) involves the process of natural growth and sprouting as in plants ⟶[ʌwæl] (the word) grows and increases so as to become a prominent problem. Köveces (2010: 19) in the same context, states:

> "*People cultivate plants for a variety of purposes: for eating, for pleasure, for making things, and so on. When we use the concept metaphorically, we distinguish various parts of plants; we are aware of the many actions we perform in relation to plants; and we recognize the many different stages of growth that plants go through.*"

The source domain 'buildings and construction' in spoken Kabyle is mapped differently. [θəɣli əşşɑħæs] (her health is ruined) as shown in e.g., 25, is conceived and structured as 'HEALTH IS A BUILDING'. 'Health' in everyday spoken Kabyle is particularly constructed and seen as a brittle building, an old house or ancient edifice that can collapse at any time. Thus, the human body and buildings share the same characteristics, i.e., bodies, of course, grow old, become ill, and finally collapse the same way old buildings and edifices get demolished. We conclude then, that health gets worse, declines and deteriorates in parallel with very old buildings that get ruined. As Zoltán Kövecses (ibid) puts it,

> "*Human beings build houses and other structures for shelter, work, storage, and so on. Both the static object of a house and its parts and the act of building it serve as common metaphorical source domains.*"

The source domain 'animals' in everyday spoken Kabyle is mapped specifically (culture-specific): [urðidʒædʒæræ ʌqəlwæʃinæ] (don't leave with me that billy goat), e.g., 26, [ʌtɑş ilæθəssəglɑfəɖ fəllæsən] (you are barking too much at them), e.g., 27, [læjhəbbəʒ ʌglimi:w] (he is biting my skin), e.g., 28 and [tæfunæsθ, urθəzri sænæθər] (a cow/she is a cow, she doesn't know where to go), e.g.,30 are categorised unique, i.e., 'culture-specific' since no equivalents are found in the culture of other languages. The reason behind this use may go back to the intimacy that links the Kabylians to nature (animals, insects, springs, waterfalls, plants, mountains, rocks, etc.). All these elements suggest and make the Kabyle man, 'a man of his own nature'. In other words, the constant unity of man and nature creates a perfect interaction, reinforces the touch and assesses a vital dimension. Thus, Köveses (ibid)

writes: "*The domain of animals is an extremely productive source domain. Human beings are especially frequently understood in terms of (assumed) properties of animals.*"

The source domain 'cooking and food' in Kabyle language is mapped as [θəppwæ   θæsæw] (my liver is cooked), e.g., 31 and [Λwæl   jətsunæwæl] (the word is cooked), e.g., 32. Some organs of the human body in everyday spoken Kabyle are conceptualised mainly emotionally. Kabyle people use liver, heart, eye, belly, bowels and so on, to intensify, delineate and reinforce their ideas and thoughts. Things may differ in other languages when using the same organs. The utterance [θəppwæ   θæsæw] does not mean that liver is cooked, which seem quite absurd, but implies that the person is extremely anxious and troubled. Whereas, in utterance [Λwæl   jətsunæwæl], the verb [jətsunæwæl] (is cooked) does not convey us the action of cooking or preparing meals in kitchen, but instead conveys us the idea that [Λwæl] (the word) should be carefully thought and reflected on before pronouncing it. In fact, [Λwæl] is represented as an ingredient that could be carefully cooked or prepared the same way food should be cooked at low heat.

The source domain 'movement and direction' is represented metaphorically in spoken Kabyle as: [sæni   igrɔːħ læqliːm?] (where did your mind go?), e.g.,36, [θəzzi   jessi   lqɑː] (earth twisted me), e.g.,37, [lætsæzzælən   wussæn] (days are running), e.g.,38 and [lætswəχirən wussæn] (days are moving back) , e.g.,39. Utterance number (36) symbolises a direction. The mind [læqəl] never moves, walks or runs, but rather operates as a machine with non-stop. We treat the human mind as if it is a person who walks, runs and moves towards different directions. Thus, 'mind' moves and goes metaphorically, so as to describe its entire absence. The metaphorical expressions number (37), (38) and (39) all suggest a movement that involve a change of location. The verbs [θəzzi] (twisted), [lætsæzzælən] (running) and [lætswəχirən] (moving back) are used metaphorically to make move some static or abstract objects [lqɑː] (earth) and [ussæn] (days). Metaphors in fact, enable us to express ideas that simply cannot be easily or clearly expressed with literal speech. In his book *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*, Kövecses puts:

"*Movement can involve a change of location, or it can be stationary (as in the case of shaking, for instance). When it involves a change of location, it is associated with direction: forward and backward, up and down. Changes of various kinds are conceptualized metaphorically as movement that involves a change of location*" (ibid: 22).

3.1.3.2 Basis of Metaphor

In this section, Kövecses (2010) explains with certainty that the link between the source and target domains cannot exist, unless there has to be some sort of similarity that is perhaps formulated by our own experiences. Thus, he clarifies why a certain source has to represent a given target or for the latter to be embodied by the former. Kövecses (2010) in his own words maintains:

"*there is a similarity between the two entities denoted by the two linguistic expressions, and hence, between the meanings of the two expressions. Thus, the constraint that limits the excessive production of metaphor is that there must be a similarity between the two entities compared. If the two entities are not similar in some respect, we cannot metaphorically use one to talk about the other*" (ibid: 77).

Through careful analysis Kövecses has proved that metaphors are not a matter of prediction, but rather a matter of motivation. Our bodily experiences even the most universal ones, might not be perceived the same way as in other cultures, in this context Lakoff (1993: 241) writes: "*Experiential bases motivate metaphors, they do not predict them.*" Here is Kövecses' quote which reinforces the same idea:

"*In this last case, the source may be either the biological or the cultural root of the target. Conceptual metaphors have motivation (i.e., are motivated), not prediction (i.e., cannot be predicted). The source domains for a particular target cannot be predicted within a given language. The source-to-target mappings are merely motivated by the factors mentioned above. The same applies to cross-linguistic comparisons. We cannot expect the exact same metaphors to occur in all languages, but we cannot expect metaphors that contradict universal human experience, either*" (2010: 88).

Kövecses argues that the unconsciousness of our experiences paves the way to a smooth understanding and correlation of metaphor and meaning. For instance, a metaphor like "AFFECTION IS WARMTH" is quickly accepted and understood since we immediately form a sort of correlation between affection and bodily warmth. Hence, we tend to imprint abstract notions with our own physical experiences in order to unconsciously understand them.

Kövecses (2010), has plainly shown that conceptual metaphors are grounded in, or motivated by human experiences. According to him:

"*The experiential basis of metaphor involves just this groundedness-in-experience. Specifically, we experience the interconnectedness of two domains of experience, and this justifies for us conceptually linking the two domains. For example, if we often experience anger as being connected with body heat, we will feel justified in creating and using the conceptual metaphor anger is A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. The experiences on which the conceptual metaphors are based may be not only bodily but also perceptual, cognitive, biological, or cultural. The interconnectedness between the two domains of experience may be of several types, including correlations in experience, perceiving structural similarities between two domains, and so on*" (ibid: 325).

Indeed, metaphor provides information from the perspective of human experience and makes this embodied perspective available for grasping abstract experiences and concepts. Therefore, metaphor is intimately related to human experiences (Elizabeth Hayes, 2008: 135). In other words, the so-called 'bodily based conceptual structure' which lies at the basis of linguistic articulations of conceptual metaphor, is grounded in a deeper ontic structure for the world and of human experience. As Elaine Botha (2007: 50) quotes: "*conceptual domains and metaphors are constrained and conditioned by a deeper, ontic framework which conditions the 'itineraries of meaning'.*"

3.1.3.3 Mappings

Zoltán Kövecses (2010: 45) at his turn elaborates Lakoff's major idea of demarcation (differentiation) between metaphors as mappings and metaphor as metaphorical expressions, emphasising that expressions are solely the representation of the mappings. Frames (domains ⟶ mental spaces[239]) "*are mental constructions for organizing knowledge and experience, and serve as source domains from which (a part of) a concept is taken to show similarities with the target structure, and therefore is used to talk about the target domain*" (Carolina

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[239] In his book '*Metaphor: A Practical Introduction',* Kövecses defines the concept 'mental space' as: "*a conceptual "packet" that gets built up "online" in the process of understanding sentences (or other nonlinguistic messages). Mental spaces are not the same as conceptual domains, although they make use of them in the process of understanding. Mental spaces are created in particular situations for the purpose of understanding and thus are smaller and more specific than conceptual domains*" (2010: 327).

Pasamonik, 2012: 81). The frames (target and source) never exist as isolated entities, but constitute complex models which form a system of culturally influenced meanings. Kövecses explains that these conceptual systems found in every native speaker in each society are partly reflected by their ways of linguistic and other behaviour (ibid). Kövecses (2006: 138), therefore, states that particular metaphors:

"*are created not only because we see similarities between entities or because there are correlations in experience but also, and in combination with these, because the particular communicative, cultural, and historical situations in which we think metaphorically shape the metaphors we create.*"

Consider how metaphors as cross-domain mappings are characterised and proposed by Kövecses (2010: 140):


Figure 25. Based on Zoltán Kövecses' Characteristics of central mappings.

Zoltán Kövecses (2010: 4), therefore, portrays metaphor as "*understanding one conceptual domains in terms of another conceptual domain*", .i.e., the conceptual domain from which we draw correspondences (metaphorically expressions) to understand another conceptual domain is known as the source domain while the conceptual domain that is understood this way is the target domain. In short, the relation between the source and target domains is quintessentially

mapped. An example of mapping (LOVE IS A JOURNEY) has already been presented and explained in details hereinabove under Lakoff's theory of metaphor (see pages177-80).

3.1.3.4 Metaphorical Linguistic Expression

Metaphorical linguistic expressions manifest the target "abstract" domain by being derived from the source "concrete" domain. In the example "LIFE IS A JOURNEY" provided in Lakoff's '*Metaphors We Live by*', life is the abstract target domain and journey is the source from which several metaphorical expressions derive. Kövecses summarises the following:

"*Metaphorical linguistic words and expressions (e.g., idioms) come from the terminology of the conceptual domain that is used to understand another conceptual domain. For example, when we use to be at a crossroads to talk about LIFE, this metaphorical expression comes from the domain of JOURNEY. Usually, there are many metaphorical linguistic expressions that reflect a particular conceptual metaphor, such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY*" (2010: 327).

Taking into account Kövecses' interpretations on the statement of the relationship between conceptual metaphor and the metaphorical linguistic expressions, we may come up with the conclusion that a linguistic expression is a way of speaking, while the conceptual metaphor is a way of thinking. Thus, the metaphorical linguistic expression stands as the manifest of the former, i.e., the conceptual metaphor. Kövecses resumes the following:

"*We have made a distinction between conceptual metaphors and metaphorical linguistic expressions. In conceptual metaphors, one domain of experience is used to understand another domain of experience. The metaphorical linguistic expressions make manifest particular conceptual metaphors*"

3.1.3.5 Cultural Models

Kövecses argues that conceptual metaphors are considered as the harbingers of different cultural models that shape our thoughts. He gives the example of time to show our cultural understanding of the abstract term. For instance, expressions such as "to waste time", "to run out of time", or "to gain time" are derived from the conceptual metaphor of "TIME IS

MONEY". However, in some other cultures, Kövecses argues that time can be a different thing that has nothing to do with money, and thus, it would follow different cultural references.

As a form of language, metaphors are subject to social and cultural norms that determine their sources, targets and meanings. The meanings attributed to metaphors reflect the conceptions and perceptions hold by the users of the languages those metaphors originate in. It implies therefore, that metaphors can be either universal or culture-specific. The culture-specific metaphors are those that are the result of culture-specific representations and understandings of human experiences. The cultural variation in metaphors is usually described in terms of cross-cultural (intercultural) variation and within-culture (intracultural) variation. The variations that metaphors exhibit reflect the variations in the representations of human experiences within and across cultures. Speakers of different cultural backgrounds exhibit differences in the metaphoric expressions they use. Kövecses (2004: 165) argues that:

"… *members of different cultures cannot conceptualize their emotions in a way that contradicts universal physiology (or maybe even their conceptualization of universal physiology); but nevertheless they can choose to conceptualize their emotions in many different ways within the constraints imposed on them by universal physiology. These limits leave a lot of room for speakers of very different languages to conceptualize their intense emotions in sometimes very different ways.*"

The cultural variation in metaphors is, in other words, the result of culture-specific preferences and attitudes that language users rely on in conceptualizing their inner and external worlds.

Kövecses used the term '*divisions*' to refer to those cultural variations. Those divisions, as he noted, consist of several dimensions that include social, cultural, regional, and other dimensions. Kövecses (2005: 231) suggested that the causes of variation can be grouped into two large classes: '*differential experience*' and '*differential cognitive preferences or styles*'. Put differently, as Kövecses explained, the variation is the result of both the variation in human experiences and variation in '*the cognitive preferences and styles*' humans employ '*for the creation of abstract thought.*'

Kövecses listed "*awareness of context, differential memory, differential concerns and interests, and their various subcases*" (ibid: 232) as the main causes of differential experience resulting in different metaphors.

The awareness of context refers to the perceptions that humans hold about the environments they live in. The context, as Kövecses demonstrated, can be physical, social or cultural. The physical context refers to the ambient concrete world and all its components. The cross-cultural and within-culture variations that metaphors exhibit reflect the difference in physical settings that has an impact on the language users conceptualisations. René Dirven (1994) demonstrated through comparing metaphors used in '*Dutch*' to those used in its derivative language, '*Afrikaans Dutch*' how the difference in physical settings can result in differences of metaphorical conceptualisations, despite the strong and *direct* relatedness of the aforementioned linguistic codes. Dirven (1994) writes:

"*Afrikaans not only seems to have developed many more expressions based on the domain of nature, but the new metaphors also depict a totally different scenery; this may contain mountains, heights and flattened or levelled-off rises or it may be a flat or hilly landscape, used as grazing or farming land (= veld); there are no permanent clouds or shadows, but the "clouds bulge heavily downwards"; all sorts of familiar animals provide the stereotypical images for human behavior or appearances*" (quoted in Kövecses, 2005: 95).

The social context refers to the social dimensions of the language users lives. The social context, according to Kövecses (2005: 233), "*can exert an influence on the kinds of metaphors we have in a language or variety*". The social context influences the users of language metaphorical conceptualisations through '*power relations*' and '*social pressures*'. The '*power relations*' are results of the categorization of society into, for instance sex, age, or occupation groups. Such categorization creates groups that differ in their social status and the range of '*social powers*' that each group holds and since language is a social construct, it implies therefore that the linguistic choices each group makes are in part influenced by its social status. '*Social pressures*' on the other hand refer to the pressures a society imposes on its members. Those pressures control the range and nature of metaphoric expressions the members use (ibid).

The '*cultural context*' refers to the culture itself. The metaphoric expressions that a speech community uses are to a large extent shaped by the community's culture. The '*cultural*

context' controls both the process of creation and the understanding of the metaphoric expressions (ibid: 234).

The second cause of variation that Kövecses (2005) listed, '*differential memory*', refers to the role of history and past experiences in shaping language speakers conceptualisations and perceptions and consequently the metaphors they develop. The history can be either at the social shared level or at the individual personal one. Kövecses explains:

"*What I call memory here is history – the major or minor events that occurred in the past of a society/culture, group, or individual. I call this memory because the society, group, or individual "remembers" these events through its collective unconscious (in the case of societies or social groups) – embodied in language. The memory of the events is coded into the language. Because of the past-oriented nature of the language, many of the metaphors we use may reveal a certain time lag between our experiences of the world today and the experiences of the source domain in the past*" (2005: 241).

'*Differential concerns and interests*'[240] are another cause of metaphor variation. This factor corresponds to the socio-cultural preferences that govern speech communities linguistic conceptualisations and choices. Those '*concerns*' and '*interests*' can be either socially shared or personal ones (ibid: 243).

The second category of causes that Kövecses (ibid: 246) termed '*differential cognitive preferences or styles*' refers to the mental conceptualisations that language users hold about the external world and the impact of those cognitive processes on metaphor creation and variation. Users of languages usually exhibit cognitive preferences that differ among and across cultures. Those cognitive preferences play an important role in determining our conceptualization of our inner and external worlds. With language being the means to talk about these worlds, it implies therefore that the linguistic choices we make are in part governed by our cognitive preferences and styles.

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[240] Kövecses (2005: 243) defines the concepts 'Differential concerns and interests' as "*The differential concerns and interests that societies, groups, or individuals may have also seem to have an impact on the kinds of metaphors people use. This factor may not always be easily distinguished from the history of a society, group, or individual discussed previously. Aspects of events that happened in the past may remain with us, and we may remain intensely concerned with them in our present life.*"

The metaphoric expressions, as it has been demonstrated throughout this discussion, exhibit, as a form of language, both universal and culture-specific characteristics. While the universal character that a number of metaphors exhibit is the result of common source domains and common target domains, the culture-specific characteristics encountered in other metaphoric expression are the result of cultural variation. Such variation can be either '*cross-cultural*' (*intercultural*) variation or '*within-culture*' (*intracultural*) variation. Several of factors, as it has been demonstrated, are at the origin of the variation encountered in culture-specific metaphoric expressions. The variation encountered in metaphors reflects the socio-cultural differences encountered in the speech communities where these metaphors originate.

Metaphors are not only useful or interesting because they simply tell us about how the brain functions or processes new information. Metaphors are also manifestations in everyday practical use in different languages which are determined by the corresponding cultural models, i.e., our metaphor use reveals the way we perceive the world, and act in different ways. According to the CMT, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 57) overtly state the value of culture by acknowledging that:

"*It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our "world" in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself.*"

The relationship between metaphor and cultural models is not an either-or-one, but a bilateral one. In other words, they are tied to each other, intertwined, and interactive in that some cultural models, especially for those abstract concepts, are largely conceptualised metaphorically, while on the other hand what linguistic manifestations are in practical use in different languages is determined by the corresponding cultural models (Yuanqiong, 2009: 116). As Basso (1990) comments:

"*For it is in metaphor - perhaps more dramatically than in any other form of symbolic expression - that language and culture come together and display their fundamental inseparability. A theory of one that excludes the other will inevitably do damage to both.*"[241]

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[241] Basso, K, H, Western Apache Language and Culture: Essays in Linguistic Anthropology, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1990, p.79.

3.1.4 Kinds of Conceptual Metaphors

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) as well as Kövecses (2002) explored the conceptual metaphor further and thus, introduced three main amended categories of metaphors that shape our metaphorical thoughts and linguistic expressions. On the basis of different functions, conceptual metaphors can be divided into structural, orientational and ontological.

3.1.4.1 Structural Metaphors

Structural metaphors are mappings of structures between two domains (target and source), one of which is more abstract than the other. In other words, they are instances that allow us to structure one concept in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 14). This type of metaphors is regarded as the richest and the most flexible of all since it can be structured on different concepts through a series of "entailments". For instance, the conceptual metaphor 'TIME IS MONEY' entails that 'TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE', which in turn, entails that 'TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY'… etc. However, they stress that the described metaphorical structuring can only be partial since time is neither money (a limited resource) nor a valuable commodity. In other words, time is not money but because everyone of us perceive both as valuable commodities and limited resources. Kövecses (2010) defines this kind of metaphors as follows:

"*Structural conceptual metaphors enable speakers to understand the target domain in terms of the structure of the source domain. This understanding is based on a set of conceptual correspondences between elements of the two domains*" (2010: 329).

Consider the following metaphorical instances in Kabyle:

1- [Ʌduni:θ ðæqəmmɑr] lit-trans: (LIFE IS A GAMBLE).
2- [Ʌduni:θ ɫɑqṣi:ɫ] lit-trans: (LIFE IS A STORY/ THEATRE).
3- LIFE IS DRAMA
4- [Ʌduni:θ ðæmʃəʧəw] lit-trans: (LIFE IS QUARREL/FIGHTT/WAR).
5- [Ʌduni:θ ðjəppwæs] lit-trans: (LIFE IS A DAY/ONE DAY).
6- [ləhdɔ:r ðæmʃəʧəw]
   [Ʌmsəfhəm ðæmʃəʧəw] } lit-trans: (DISCUSSION IS WAR/ARGUMENT IS WAR).
7- [lwəqθ ðiðrimən] lit-trans: (TIME IS MONEY).

8- TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE.

9- TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY.

10- [luwqɑ:θ ðlæħwæjədʒ] lit-trans: (TIMES ARE THINGS).

11- THE PASSING OF TIME IS MOTION.

3.1.4.1.1 Table One: Conceptual Metaphor [ʌduni:θ ðæqəmmɑr]

Conceptual Metaphor (hereafter **CM**)[ʌduni:θ ðæqəmmɑr] (LIFE IS A GAMBLE)	
The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (correspondences/mappings)	**Interpretation/implicature**
[ʌduni:θ ðəlæv] (life is a game/play).	[ʌduni:θ ʌməlɪæv ðərrəvħ ək ðləχsɑrɑ] (Life is a game, a chance ⟶ winning or losing). This is to say that life is a gamble metaphor that suggests: life's decisions have the same structure/shape as a game of chance. Thus, life's decisions do not often come nicely and carefully packed.
[ʌduni:θ ðərrəvħ ək ðləχsɑrɑ] (life is winning and losing).	
[ʌduni:θ θəsrusu: θrəffəð] (life holds and puts down) ⟶ culture-specific .	

3.1.4.1.2 Table Two: Conceptual Metaphor [ʌduni:θ taqşi:t]

CM:[ʌduni:θ taqşi:t] (LIFE IS A STORY/THEATRE)	
The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (correspondences/mappings)	**Interpretation/implicature**
[ʌta:s inlæv ðidduni:θ] (too much we played in life).	We got too much pleasure/joy in life. We spent some agreeable moments as well as we felt comfortable. We forgot about serious/important events, as well as we neglected major situations.

[Λduniθi:s θæddæ Λmθəħkæjθ] (his life passed like a story/tale).	This is culture-specific: Kabyle native speakers talk about their entire life story as episodes and tales. We narrate our life the same way we narrate a story. We speak about, and experience our daily life in terms of long and short stories. Our whole life comprises good and bad things. 'LIFE IS A STORY' metaphor is rooted deep in Kabyle culture. Thus, it is assumed that everyone's life is structured like a story, and the entire biographical and autobiographical tradition is based on this assumption: our life is an entire narration:
[qi:m ħkuji:d θimuʃuhæ nəduniθi:Ḵ] (sit down and tell me the stories of your life).	The past ⟶ present ⟶ future.
[θəvɤi: d̪ ΛḴəwθæɤ Λfu:s!] (you want me to applaud you!) ⟶ culture-specific.	Committing faults intentionally in some special cases are seen or perceived metaphorically by Kabyle native speakers positively. We clap hands to somebody who made mistakes, defrauded, cheated or behaved wrong the same way we applaud an excellent performer on a stage (a player) ⟶ the person who uses the utterance [θəvɤi: d̪ ΛḴəwθæɤ Λfu:s!] is completely shocked by the unbearable behaviour or action.

3.1.4.1.3 Table Three: Conceptual Metaphor LIFE IS DRAMA

CM: LIFE IS A DRAMA	
The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (correspondences/mappings)	**Interpretation/implicature**
[usəmɤɑrɑræ Λduni:θ] (don't make life bigger) ⟶ culture-specific.	When Kabyle native speakers wish to express that something doesn't need to be exaggerated or overstated (make from small things huge

	problems) they pronounce or opt for the utterance [usəmɣɑrɑræ Λduni:θ]. We speak of life in terms of measurement. The verb [Λsəmɣʊr] (enlarge) characterises or structures the concept 'life'. Life in spoken Kabyle is strengthened and accounted metaphorically for the expression 'long life'. Turn simple little things/matters into enormous problems, so us to make one's life more difficult ⟶ make life a drama.

3.1.4.1.4 Table Four: Conceptual Metaphor [Λduni:θ ðæmʃətʃəw]

CM: [Λduni:θ ðæmʃətʃəw] (LIFE IS QUARREL/FIGHTT/WAR)	
The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (correspondences/mappings)	**Interpretation/implicature**
[Λduni:θ ðækipᵖwæħ] (life is a struggle).	[Λduni:θ ðækipᵖwæħ, ðəlfɑrħ ək ðəlqɑrħ: θæswæθ ðləħvæv ək ðæθmæθen, θæswæθ niɖən ðæðæwən => ðərrəvħ ək ðləχʂɑrɑ] (Life is a battlefield where we have to treat people either as friends or foes/and where we have to fight death with a wide range of weapons => life is one time a victory and one other time a defeat). To survive, one has to strive and suffer all along his existence. Thus, [Λduni:θ] (life) here is seen as an enemy, a foe, or even a monster/beast.
[lænetsmæfær ðəduni:θ] (we are wrestling with life).	We all the time struggle with life the same way we fight adversaries. We make great efforts, work hard, get ready to meet an enemy, and wish to vanquish, as well as seek how to get out of a

	critical situation. So, the utterance [lænetsmæfær ðəduni:θ] should be ranked culture-specific since it is derived from particular cultural experiences.
[θənɣajæɣ ʌduni:θ] (life killed us).	Life can never kill, but perceived and shared by the Kabyle community as a fatal weapon (culture-specific). Because we have many troubles in life; because we live in a harsh world, full of miseries, injustices, impediments, and so on, we tend to be exhausted and finally can't endure harm any more.
[ʌduni:θ əteg ləɣrɔ:r] (life makes deceit/betrayal)	As Kabyle native speakers, we attribute the characteristic of mischievousness [ləɣrɔ:r] to life. We personify life as a traitor/betrayer since this latter threatens our well-being. He sometimes smiles to you and let you down some other time, and this is the case with life: we can't trust it, i.e., we have to be vigilant all the way
[ʌduni:θ θətsɣɒrrɔ:] (life betrays / deceives).	⟶ culture-specific metaphors

3.1.4.1.5 Table Five: Conceptual Metaphor [Λduni:θ ðjəpρwæs]

CM: [Λduni:θ ðjəpρwæs] (LIFE IS A DAY/ONE DAY)	
The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (correspondences/mappings)	**Interpretation/implicature**
[Λduni:θ tæʂɒvħi:θ ək tmədɖi:θ] (life is a morning and evening). [Λduni:θ θətsædi emjəpρwæs] (life passes as/like a day)	The concept 'life' spoken metaphorically is presented and conceived as a 'day', knowing that the whole day is morning and afternoon. As human beings, we conceive or structure 'life' in different ways depending on the way we live and share the beliefs, values, thoughts, ideas, norms, etc. Kabyle native speakers speak of their lives in terms of 'one day'. They most of the time refer to their existence as morning and evening. That is, the morning stands for youth; whereas, evening symbolises old age: This is the way the Kabyle utterance [Λduni:θ tæʂɒvħi:θ ək tməddi:θ] is structured. Whenever a Kabyle native speaker wants to advice someone he refers automatically to the notions morning and afternoon to emphasise and highlight the importance of working hard in the morning and resting at the end of the day. Thus, working hard in the morning symbolises 'youth'; whereas, resting in the evening portrays 'old age' ➝ culture-specific metaphor.

3.1.4.1.6 Table Six: Conceptual Metaphor [ləhd̪ɔːr   ðæmʃətʃəw]/[ʌmsəfhəm ðæmʃətʃəw]

CM: [ləhd̪ɔːr ðæmʃətʃəw] / [ʌmsəfhəm ðæmʃətʃəw] DISCUSSION IS WAR / ARGUMENT IS WAR	
The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (correspondences/mappings)	**Interpretation/implicature**
[jəwθiːθ səlməðfæ] (he shot him with a cannon). **Approximate metaphorical translation in English (hereafter AMT)**: 'he bombarded him with words'.	In spoken Kabyle, words such as [jəwθiːθ] (shot) and [jæðmiːθ] (massacred) used metaphorically tend to intensify the meaning. The way we discuss, and the way we argue in our daily conversation is the same way we engage in war. Verbs like [jəwθiːθ] and [jæðmiːθ] (shot + massacred) symbolise, represent and structure the dimension of fight, quarrel and massacre. Indeed, these verbs entail an idea of war. Being engaged in discussion with others is in fact being engaged in war. Thus, those people with whom we converse or discuss are seen as enemies or foes. Words are structured and built in terms weapons which wound like bullets. We win and we lose all along the discussions.
[jæðmiːθ slæhd̪priːs] (he massacred him with his words). **AMT**:'he massacred him with arguments'.	
-[jəwθiθiːd sθərşɑːşθ] (he shot him with a bullet). -[ʌwæliːs ɬarşɑːşθ] (his word is a bullet).	
[jənɣæθ sləhd̪ɔːr] (he killed him with words). **AMT**: 'as far as your argument is concerned, you won'.	Verbs like [jənɣæθ] (killed), [θərləvd̪iji] (have beaten), [jesraːji] (knocked), [iqərħijiːd] (hurt), and [iʒərħiːθ] (injured) are constructed in terms of battle. People are killed, knocked, injured and massacred as in a battle square. We speak of words or use them the same way we handle weapons, and transform them into sharp swords. Words are sharp-edged,
[θərləvd̪iji ðiləhd̪ɔːr] (you've beaten me with words).	
[jesraːji sjiwən wæwæl] (he knocked me down with one word). **AMT**: 'he knocked me down with a word'.	

-[iqərħiji:d swæwæl] (he hurt me with a word). -[iʒərħi:θ swæwæl] (he injured me with a word)	harmful and venomous. They leave serious wounds and impacts the same way poison [əssəm] affects the whole body. Thus, words are powerful, affect minds and activate a lethal (extremely dangerous) semantics. The words that come out of our mouths are indeed a direct indicator of what is in our hearts: (culture-specific).
[θsərsæs əssəm] (she puts him/her poison). **AMT**: 'her words are poisonous / venomous'	
-[jɑrzɑ:ṣ Λwæl] (he demolished his words). -[jæfsæs Λwæli:s] (he mashed his word).	The two verbs together [jɑrzɑ:ṣ] (demolished) and [jæfsæs] (mashed) emphasise and reinforce the degree of fury and rage in Kabyle. We speak of demolishing and mashing words in everyday spoken Kabyle either in terms of war or abhorring someone. Words can't be demolished or mashed, but do reinforce the idea of hatred. This implies simply that the person uttering these words in such circumstances (depending on the situation and the setting) is showing disrespect, disobedience and disloyalty all together.
[jəsqɑ:ð imæni:s iləhdɔ:r] (he stood up to discuss). **AMT**: to have a good command of the discussion.	Implies to be ready to attack, i.e., to answer accurately. To feel very confident to face someone to convince: (culture-specific).
[jərwəl siləhdɔ:r] (he escaped from the conversation). **AMT**: 'he retreated from conversation'.	Implies that the person retreated from conversation, the same way the enemy retreat from a position (to abandon a conversation).
[jərwi:θ sləhdɔ:r] (he mixed him up with words). **AMT**: 'to marshal one's argument'.	These two utterances are most often used among the Kabyle people to enhance the

[ursizmiæræ ðilæhdɔ:r] (he can't overcome him in words). **AMT**: he has never won an argument with him.	degree of offence, hurt, attack and threat. The verbs [jərwi:θ] (mixed up) and [ursizmiæræ] (overcome) are mapped in terms of war/battle so as to understand the patterns of strong argumentation and effective speech (the case of debate): 'culture-specific'.
[ərrəd fjimæni:Ḵ æggəd] (defend yourself !, shout !).	Implies: say something – don't be passive/react and respond.

3.1.4.1.7 Table Seven: TIME Conceptual Metaphor

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (correspondences/mappings)	Interpretation/implicature
a)- CM: [lwəqθ ðiðrimən] TIME IS MONEY	
[sæddæɣ snæθ nəswæjæ ðəgχəmməm] (I spent two hours (in) thinking.)	[χəmmæɣ Λta:ʂ] (I reflected on the matter for a long duration/it took me too much time to think it over).
[nsæddæ θæswæθ ʒmæ] (we spent a while together).	Implies simply we were together /we stayed together for a while.
[Λhækæn! læḴʒəmmæɣ ussæn](Be careful! I'm saving you the days.)	[lætsgelæɣ ðək] (I'm angry with you/declaration of an intention to punish).
[lætsənɣasən wussæn] (days are diminishing).	Short duration – expressing the notion of speed – we speak of days in terms of money; the days are diminishing the same way the money diminishes.
b)- CM: TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE	
[fkiji Λsuggæs æḴerræɣ iðrimni:Ḵ] (Give me one year to pay you back.)	[Λsuggæs sinnigəs ulæʃ] / [lwəqθ jətsunəhsæv] (one year, no more is added) / (time is counted).
[θeqqimæɣd əssæ Λnawəd] (One hour is remained / (is left) to us to get	[urθətsæddæræ əssæ Λnawəd] / [mæjħæwəl əssæ Λnawəd] (it doesn't surpass one hour, and

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there.)	we arrive) / (It's all about one hour, no more and we get there).
-[dʒiɤɑ:s Λmæjen Λðiffəɤ silħɑɾɑ] (I left him two years to get out of home/ move). -[uḴɾənuɤɑɾæ lwæqθ, qəvlæɤ Λθnidserṣɑḏ ðəgæguɾæ] (I don't add you time, I want you to put them (money) this month).	Expressing a limited duration – no more time added beyond this time limit.
c)- CM: TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY	
[əlwəqθ jeswæ] (Time is valuable / precious).	[lwəqθ ɤlæj Λtɑ:ṣ jeddæ ədhəv] / [Λzæli:s (nəlwəqθ) jəɤləv ədhəv] (Time is overvalued / its price goes beyond than gold's price) – expressing preciousness and great value (time entity).
[əlwəqθ juɤɑ:l ðæzi:z] (Time became venerated /cherished.)	[lwəqθ Λtəsħurmθəḏ əm lævð Λmɒqɑ:n] (Time should be honoured / highly respected the same you respect and honour a wise person) – time should be treasured the same way gold, sapphires and rubies.
d)- CM: [luwqɑ:θ ðlæħwæjədʒ] TIMES ARE THINGS	
[fkiɤɑ:Ḵ Λtɑ:ṣ nəwəqθ] (I gave you too much time).	Time is given and taken as any other physical entity. Time is a matter of exchange, i.e., a transaction. We take it, give it, pick it up, and steal it the same way we give, take, and pick up concrete things. We speak of time in terms of enormous quantities, and we even ask for it or lend it and then give it back as if we are handling it and care about it – 'time' component is of a key importance in our everyday structural and physical experiences.
[fkiji silwəqθi:k] (give me from your time) **AMT**: 'give me a few minutes of your time'	
[jeksæs ənɒfṣ əpwæs] (he took / picked up him half a day).	
[jəssæχṣɑr lwæqθi:s] (he destroyed/	The verb [jəssæχṣɑr] (destroyed) as a specific

messed up / mangled his time). **AMT**: 'he wasted his time'. **Note that**: 'he wasted his time' metaphor in English is classified as a VALUABLE COMMODITY.	entity attributed to time is viewed and perceived metaphorically so as to connote time as precious things that should be cared and preserved reasonably and rationally (culture-specific metaphor).
[ujufiʁæɑ lwæqθ] (I didn't find time)	Time is an object subject to loss in spoken Kabyle

e)- CM: THE PASSING OF TIME IS MOTION

-[jæddæ wæs] (the day passed). -[jæddæ usəggæs] (one year passed) -[θæddæ θəfsu:θ] (spring passed). -[ilæħqəd / iqɑrvəd unəvðu] (summer is in the threshold / approaching / moving forward). **AMT**: 'summer is arriving soon'. -[θæddæ θɑʃɔ:rθ] (Ashoura passed) – a sacred moth of Zakat. -[θæddæ θmɑʁɑ θfu:k] (the wedding passed and finished).	Time (hours, minutes, days, years, months, seasons, events and so on) as an entity or an object, passes and moves in present and future. We refer to time structured according to motion and space (TIME IS MOTION). People conceive of time in terms of some basic elements: physical objects, their locations and their motions. Time may be seen universal, but in fact different cultures interpret it very differently according to different circumstance. The verbs [ilæħqəd] (nearly arrived), [iqɑrvəd] (approaching/moving forward) and [jæddæ] (passed) in Kabyle are mapped differently: seasons in spoken Kabyle move backward and forward all along the year in front of the observer. Thus, the passage of time is continuous and one dimensional since the concept 'motion' is continuous and one dimensional.
-[jufəg lwəqθ] (time flew). -[θufəg θşəvħi:θ] (the morning flew). -[jufəg wæs urənfu:kə ʃʁəl!] (the day flew, we didn't finish the task!). [lætsæzzælen wussæn] (days are	Motion verbs in Kabyle such as [jufəg] (flew) and [tsæzzælen] (running) entail how quickly time passes. We often experience time, days and mornings in terms of a 'swift flight' of a bird, i.e., Kabyle native speakers express their own feelings of the rapid passage of time by saying: [læjetsæfəg

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running).	lwəqθ] (time flies). Thus, the notion 'flight' takes on the connotation of rapid passage in relation to the physical movement through the air.
[jəzzi:d usəggæs] (the year turned around).	This utterance Connotes the notion of rapidity / speed – the verb [jəzzi:d] (turned around) states an abrupt, unpredictable and incalculable action with 'years' and 'days' (motion). Time is often represented as moving through space (a non-stop representation) as in the expression [læθəzzin wussæn rənnun]. Thus, time is visualised as an object moving through space.
[θəzzi:d əʃʃəθwæ] (winter turned around).	
[læθəzzin wussæn rənnun] (days are turning around and they continue).	
[æsəggæs jetsækæɣ iwsəggæs] (year is passing us to another year).	In this case we feel ourselves as 'objects' held by years. A year is passing us through another year which is completely absurd. We are moving with the help of time (years, months, days, etc.) and there is a sort of a 'relay' in action and movement through space ⟶ culture-specific metaphor. Implies nothing new is done, but routine.
[læntsrɑdʒu læjð Λdɑwəd] (we're waiting El Aid to arrive).	In this instance, time is visualised or conceived as a moving object. We look forward to the arrival of El Aid, thus the target event 'El Aid' is not fixed in time.

Time as an abstract concept is invisible and intelligible. Conceptualising time is universal across cultures and languages: time is regarded as the most common and dominant noun in the Kabyle language, with other temporal words like 'day', 'morning', 'afternoon', 'year', 'season', etc. Thus, the concept of 'time' remains ubiquitous yet ephemeral. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 61) state on the matter that:

"*Structural metaphors allows us to do much more than just orient concepts, refers to them, quantify them, etc., as we do with simple orientational, and ontological metaphors; they*

allow us, in addition, to use one highly structured and clearly delineated concept to structure another."

3.1.4.2 Orientational Metaphors

Orientational metaphors have to do with the orientation of objects in space. They organize a whole system of concepts with respect to one another. These metaphors (spatial orientations) are derived from our physical or cultural experiences involving: 'up-down', 'in-out', 'front-back', 'high-low' and so on. Thus, we may conclude that, such binary opposites are no more than matters of our daily living and our lived experiences with physical and social entities. This category of spatial orientation is reflected by a great deal of metaphorical expressions such as: 'he is in top shape', 'I'm really on a high these days', 'she is over the moon', etc. In short, these linguistic examples illustrate that an upward orientation usually goes with a positive impact/evaluation which directly corresponds to 'happiness' (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 14-21).

3.1.4.2.1 Table One: Happy / Cheerful And Good Are 'UP' (cultural experiences)

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of an Upward representation/orientation => (positive connotation/impact/evaluation) = positive dimension feeling.
-[læjetsæfəg] or -[læjetsferfi:r] } [silfərħ] He is flying (with happiness). -[læjətsnəgi:z sigəni] (he is jumping to sky/up to the sky).	[lferħ Ʌmɒqrɑ:n] (extremely happy).
-[ulinti:d iðæmmən] (Blood rose in him).	[jəfrɑħ / ihənnæ] (being happy/at ease and very relaxed) ⟶ culture-specific metaphor.
[θadṣa ðəɡɡuðmi:s θuli:d] (smiling in his/her face rose).	Implies ⟶ a sudden change passes over the face (happiness) – culture-specific metaphor.
[tiḴli Ʌdidəɡɡɑr iʃətidni:s] (He is at the point of throwing up his	In case we feel ourselves flooded with joy, peace and

clothes). **AMT**: 'to throw up one's cap/to throw up one's cap in the air'.	comfort, we tend to attain the degree of ecstasy. Then we speak of it (ecstasy) metaphorically to express the utmost positive sensation and use the verb [ʌdiɖəgɡɑr] (to throw up) unconsciously to reinforce the increasing sensation of happiness ⟶ culture-specific metaphor.
[ħulfæɤ ðəʂʂɒrɑ:w χfi:fəθ] (I feel my body light).	In spoken Kabyle the metaphors expressing 'happiness' are most of the time related to space and orientation. The word [χfi:fəθ] (light) evokes a further vision and dimension of a 'well-being', satisfaction, relaxation and vivacity. The metaphorical utterance 'light body' reflects somehow an empty body that can float over air and space. The verbs stated above such as [læjetsæfəg] (fly), [læjetsferfi:r] (flap up), [læjətsnəgi:z] (jump/leap), [ulinti:d](rose), [ʌdiɖəgɡɑr] (throw up) and the word [igəni] (sky / heaven) are all related to '**UP**' and often used to expressed joy and ecstasy. The upright posture of the human body is very often accompanied by positive emotions ⟶ culture-specific metaphor.

Note that: the differences in metaphorical expressions result from different thinking modes and value concepts. Dai Mingzhao (1996) writes:

"*the language itself is a kind of cultural force and cultural mode, people acquire this language from childhood, and the cultural symbols including all the cultural concepts, values, norms and customs are molded into their own thought and behavior*" (quoted in Peilei Chen, 2010: 173).

3.1.4.2.2 Table Two: Sad/Depressed /Unhappy And Bad Are 'DOWN'

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of a Downward representation/orientation =〉 (negative connotation/impact/evaluation) = negative dimension feeling.
[jeɣli:d fəllæs igənni] The sky fell on him/her.	[jeħzən / jeslæv] (being sad/depressed or unhappy)
-[səɣli:nt ləmħæjən] -[jessæɣli:θ lhəm] (Troubles/miseries and worries led him to downfall / miseries knocked him down).	[juɣɑl ðæmɣɑ:r / θfu:k θəzmærθ] (he took a shot of old/no strength remaining/very weak body)=〉 sad/unhappy ⟶ Culture-specific metaphor.
[ɣli:ɣd ɣər θəlqa:ts] (I fell on the floor/I fell deep into the ground).	Metaphorically speaking, somebody who feels shocked, sad and depressed often exhibit a drooping/slouching posture of all members of the body (drooping shoulders, corners of the mouth turning down and so on). Utterance verb such as [ɣli:ɣd] (fell/fell deep into/dropped down) is considered very strong, since the words down and low directly bring in to play by Kabyle native speakers to express their severe sadness and sorrow, such as [ɣli:ɣd ɣər θəlqa:ts]. Thus, this correlation between the state of sorrow and behavioural responses motivates the metaphors 'SAD IS DOWN' and 'SADNESS IS LOW' which both are closely linked to our everyday physical experience while feeling these kinds of emotions. Being depressed means being pressed down to the ground.

Conclusion: drooping postures as seen and analysed in table two above typically go along with sadness, depression and sorrow; whereas, in table one, an upright/a standing posture implies and suggests a positive emotional state. Physical basis for personal well-being such as happiness, health, life and control, i.e., things that principally characterise what is good for a person, all are '**UP**'. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 15) state that a "*drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state.*"

3.1.4.2.3 Table Three: Health And Life Are 'UP'

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of an Upward posture / representation / orientation. (positive connotation/impact/evaluation) = the state of recovery/becoming healthy/alive (resurrection).
[jekred silmu:θ] (He rose from death.)	[θuɣaliθi:d ʌrru:ħ]/ [jeħlæ] (being resurrected/healthy and alive).
[krən wussæni:s] (His/her days rose.)	[ʌduni:θi:s θseɡɡæm] (His life blossomed/regaining one's physical strength/vitality and dynamicity) = prosperity (nearly everything is okay for him/her).
[θəkkər duniθi:s] (his / her life rose or woke up)	Implies after being for a long time inactive, passive, apathetic and indolent, everything in his life turns into the opposite direction, i.e., life becomes prosperous, blossoming, successful, very beautiful and great. Kabyle people make from 'life' an active or a passive person – the metaphorical expression can even be structured further in spoken Kabyle and thus make from life a 'wasted' and 'barren' life such as [θəttəʂ ʌduniθi:s] (his/her life is sleeping) ➝ culture-specific metaphor.

3.1.4.2.4 Table Four: Sickness And Death Are 'DOWN'

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of a Downward posture/ representation/orientation. (negative connotation/impact/evaluation) => The decline of physical strength/serious illness forces us to lie down physically.
[ħulfæɣ ðəʂʂɒrɑ:w θæɣli](I felt my body dropped down). **AMT**: he sank to his knees.	Implies the sensation of discomfort, pain and sorrow (no more strength is left). [ʌji:ɣ / urəzmirɣaræ] (Great fatigue/ health decline).
-[ɣli:ɣ əmⅿuθəɣ] (I dropped dead). -[ɣli:ɣ ðæʃəti:d] (I fell (like) a cloth). -[ɣli:ɣ ðæqəʒmɔ:r] (I fell (like)	These are common examples in Kabyle. They are explained by the physical basis common to every Kabyle native speaker. In other words, during an illness we tend to take a lying position, while feeling better and getting recovered from one's illness suggests getting up and thus

a log).	taking an upward position (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 16) The two utterances [ɣliːɣ ðæʃətiːd̪] and [ɣliːɣ ðæqəʒmɔːr] are culture-specific since the lexical items here (the two distinct metaphorical mappings) in spoken Kabyle invoke and remind us Sickness and exhaustion [æggu].
[ɣliːnt θujæθiːw, ðæjən urəzmirɣæræ !] (my shoulders fell, it's enough, I can't !). **Note that**: this metaphor may occur in different contexts.	**1-Context one:** 'to shoulder a burden / a task or a responsibility'. **2-Context two:** 'health is declining'. The metaphorical verb [ɣliːnt] (fell) in Kabyle symbolise the total fatigue.
-[jʌssæɣliːθ ɑtɑːn] -[jʌssæɣliːθ lħəs] (sickness dropped him down).	These are common metaphorical utterances in Kabyle. The word [ɑtɑːn] or [lħəs] (sickness) is associated with a sudden downward direction (the falling dimension) of health. Thus, the dropping down of health symbolises and categorises the entire decline or fall apart of health: [ɑtɑːn] is personified and attributed strength and ability in order to apply or perform a force or power on the human body, i.e., on health.
[θəɣli θəzmərθ] (health fell (down))	'health is declining' implies ⟶ 'the end point of strength' (for old persons mainly)
[jeɣli ʌmmuqəʒmɔːr] (he fell like a wood log).	Implies ⟶ he is dead.

Conclusion: Physical basis such as a serious illness forces us to lie down physically, and when we are dead, we are also physically down. We have some metaphorical expressions in Kabyle in relation to health, life, sickness and death which seem a bit odd or odd enough while translating them into English. They even sound completely ridiculous and nonsensical. This is the way the Kabyle native speakers report some culture-specific metaphors among their community.

3.1.4.2.5 Table Five: Conscious is 'UP'

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of an Upward representation/orientation (implying positive connotations/implications).
[krəɣ vərrænt wænni:w] (I waked up my eyes wide opened)	'I'm up and my eyes are wide opened' implies ⟶ 'I'm conscious'.
[zi:Ḵ igətsnəkkær] (he rises early in the morning)	Implies ⟶ being resourceful, active and dynamic.

3.1.4.2.6 Table Six: Unconscious is 'DOWN'

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of a Downward posture/ representation/orientation (implying negative connotations and implications / impacts).
[θətsΛḍ! urθəkkirḍɑræ!] (you are sleeping!, aren't you awaked!).	'not being awakened or asleep!' implies ⟶ 'unconscious'.
[jərwæ θæguni: ilæqæs Λðikkər θuræ] (he slept a lot, he has to wake up now!)	'he slept a lot, he must wake up now!' ⟶ implies 'try to look a little bit around you and be conscious'.

Note that: in tables (5), (6) humans and most other mammals sleep lying down (unconscious) and stand up when they awaken (conscious).

3.1.4.2.7 Table Seven: High status is 'UP'

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of an Upward representation/orientation (implying positive connotations/implications).
[θuli: taridʒæs] (his/her step rose). **AMT:** his/her grade rose.	Implies ⟶ to be well positioned/ the process (of) improvement in well doing.
-[læθətsæli mku:l Λsuggæs] (she is rising up each year).	Implies ⟶ improvement, success and constant progress (process of progress).

-[sɪmmæl læjətsæli] (still he's getting upward). **AMT**: he is rising to the top.	Utterances in Kabyle representing upward orientations imply progress and high status.
[jəʃɑːwəḑ ðiθχəddɪmθiːs] (he attained the top in his career). **AMT:** he's at the peak of his career.	Implies ⟶ 1-covering the work/finishing work on time and make ends meet.(culture-specific context). 2- Retirement.

3.1.4.2.8 Table Eight: Low Status is 'DOWN'

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of a Downward posture/ representation/orientation (implying negative connotations and implications / impacts).
-[θəɤliːd swɑtɑːʂ] (she fell a lot). -[θʂɒbbəḑd ɑtɑːʂ] (you got down a lot).	Verbs like [θəɤliːd] (fell) and [θʂɒbbəḑd] (got down) express a downward posture which at its turn proposes a low status. Indeed, such verbs in spoken Kabyle do operate negatively, i.e., they reflect negatively over the sentences or utterances in so many contexts and in different set of circumstances. Implies ⟶ a sudden decrease in status. **Note that:** the word [ɑtɑːʂ] (a lot) in such contexts covers the meaning of a sudden regression /failure.
[jəɤliːd ɤər θqɑːts] (he fell on the floor). **AMT:** he is at the bottom of the social hierarchy.	Implies ⟶he lost his status/good standing.
[θəɤli jəs duniːθ] (life led to his/her downfall). **AMT:** he is at the bottom of the social hierarchy.	Implies ⟶he/she is no more active; thus, his/her life is no more prosperous.

Note that: for social and physical basis: status is correlated with (social) power and (physical) power is UP (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 16).

3.1.4.2.9 Table Nine: Virtue is 'UP'

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of an Upward representation/orientation (implying positive connotations/implications).
-[məqqɒr læqli:s] (his mind is big). **AMT**: he's high-minded. -[jərwæ læqəl] (he's filled up with mind). **AMT**: he's high-minded.	Kabyle people speak of wisdom in terms of high mind or mind quantity as in utterances [məqqɒr læqli:s] and [jərwæ læqəl]. They express themselves by introducing verbs like [məqqɒr] (is big) and [jərwæ] (is filled up) mainly to emphasise the degree of carefulness, reason and wisdom. Implies ⟶ 'having high ideals and principles' – 'a mature and experienced person' – 'wise'.
-[ðærgæz gərgæzən! iqɑ:ð lsæsi:s] (he's a man of men! His foundation is up-right). **AMT**: he's an up-right. -[iqɑ:ð lsæsi:s](his/her foundation is up-right)	Implies ⟶ **context 1:** 'honourable' – 'straightforward in behaviour', studious, reliable and trustworthy. (Culture-specific metaphor). **Context 2:** keep promise.
[tæmətɔ:θ igvədðən fjimæni:s / fəduniθi:s] (she is a woman who stands for herself). **AMT:** she's an up-right - also she's an outstanding person/woman.	Implies ⟶ 'brave/skilful and straightforward'. Kabyle people speak of a skilful, pretty and coquettish woman in terms of a physical upright posture. (culture-specific).

3.1.4.2.10 Table Ten: Depravity is 'DOWN'

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of a Downward posture/ representation/orientation (implying negative connotations and implications / impacts).
[urӄənnuɣæræ ɣurəʂ] (I wouldn't lean/stoop to her).	Implies ⟶ maintaining personal dignity - not going backward 'having moral scruples'- the total refusal come back to him/her (no way for changing once decisions).

[urqəbbəlɣæræ ædəɣliːɣ siffæsniːs] (I wouldn't accept to fall in his hands).	This expression may seem odd and nonsensical to non-native speakers. Implies ➔'I don't accept to be humiliated/manipulated or be scorned'
[θiliːn ʌddæw uɖɑːr] (to be under one's foot) – **note that:** the same figurative expression is used in English.	Implies ➔ 'to be one's slave' – 'to be obedient and deprived of one's rights'.

3.1.4.2.11 Table Eleven: Future is 'FRONT' and Past id 'BACK'

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle (spatial metaphors)	Production of Front and Back Orientations implies positive and negative connotations/impacts
[muqəl ɣər zðæθ] (look to the front).	The front - forward / back - behind metaphorical expressions in spoken Kabyle characterising temporal structures represent the future/past dichotomy (future versus past). Spatial temporal metaphor tends to be used for understanding mainly abstract temporal concepts. Thus, Kabyle people adopt 'time moving metaphor' in which the past is in the back [ɣər ðəffiːr] and the future is in the front [ɣər zðæθ]. We may then draw the following conclusion: **front ➝ future.**
-[urətsmuqulæræ ɣər ðəffiːr] (don't look to the back). -[urətsuɣælæræ ɣər ðəffiːr] (don't move to the back/don't go back).	**back ➝ past.** So, the verbs looking to the front/back and moving to the back in Kabyle symbolise or collocate with the past, present and future. This may be different in some other languages and with other circumstances in comparison with ideology, cultural tradition and language system.
[enwæli sisjæ ɣər zðæθ] (we'll see from here to the front). **AMT**: we'll see from now on / onward.	Implies ➝making decisions later on/still thinking and reflection on the matter/planning the future, etc.

[læssæræmæɤ ɤər zðæθ æðsæwɤ θævħi:rθ] (I'm wishing to the front to own a farm).	Implies ⟶ wishing and planning to own a farm in the future.
[əʤ ləʃɤɑlægi ɤər zðæθ] (let those things to the front).	Implies ⟶ don't think/no need to get troubled let the future plan for you.
[ḏəgɡɒr ɤər ðəffi:r] (throw away to the back).	Implies ⟶ forget everything/get rid of the troubles.

Orientational metaphors are more based on special dimensions and on our experiences of our bodily movements and the surrounding environment.

3.1.4.3 Ontological Metaphors

Those metaphors allow us to conceive of abstract concepts as concrete entities. In other words, one abstract concept is represented in terms of another concept, where the latter is more concrete than the former (Anna Jelec, 2014:28). Zoltán Kövecses (2010) went further and sought out this kind of metaphor stating that "*Ontological conceptual metaphors enable speakers to conceive of their experiences in terms of objects, substances, and containers in general, without specifying further the kind of object, substance, or container*" (Kövecses, 2010:328).Thus, we may deduce that there is a great variety of ontological metaphors with different purposes:

a) The concept 'abstracts are things': 'I have too many ideas', 'this is an accumulation of problems', and 'sadness is seen in her face'.

b) The concept 'the mind is a container': 'I can't get this idea/this tune out of my mind', 'I need/try to clear my mind'.

c) The concept 'states and emotions are containers': 'he fell in love', 'I have almost fallen into a depression'.

d) Another group of ontological metaphors, those that describe specific things as persons (personification): 'life betrayed him', 'the movie goes on', and 'the rules prohibit these actions' (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:25-29).

3.1.4.3.1 Table One: Ideas, Words, Feelings, Problems and heart Are Objects

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle	Ontological metaphor with different purposes/implicatures
a-Ideas and Words Are Objects	
[sqaːð Λwæliːḵ / lahdᴅriːḴ] (Erect/set upright your word/words).	[Λwæl Λməlmizæn] [Λwæl Λmθərşaːşθ] (A word is like a scale / bullet – one has to keep and honour his word) – taken decisions once and for all – to hum and haw/ to hesitate.
[ʔmħu Λwæl] (Crush / grind the word).	Implies ➔ don't add any more/forget the problem – give no importance to the matter.
[usətsrɒzaræ Λwæl] (don't break him/her the word).	Implies ➔ don't disobey him/her – a matter of great respect.
[dᴅəggər Λwæl] (Throw the word away).	Implies ➔ don't think too much (neglect)/ don't pay attention.
[uqəlværæ lΛhdᴅːr] (Do not turn the words over).	Implies ➔ misunderstanding and confusing.
-[uzəlgæræ Λwæl] (Do not twist the word). -[uzəlgæræ Λwæl, iniːd θiðəts] (Do not twist the word, tell the truth).	Context 1: implies ➔ speak properly. Context 2: implies ➔ don't change the facts.
[Λwæliːḵ mɒkkəːr] (Your word is great/big).	Implies ➔ you are a reasonable/right – showing great respect.
[iwəznæzd ləhdᴅːr] (He weighed him words).	Implies ➔ he taught him/her wisdom – he showed him/her the right from wrong.
[ʔsəḴðəm Λwæl uqvəl Λdilæl / Λdjiliː] (work the word out before it comes into existence).	Implies ➔ reflect before you say anything/don't be stupid – just be wise and careful with words you may utter.
[Jefkæjezd / Jerræjezd lΛhdᴅːr] (he gave/gave back words).	Implies ➔ he explained and put him/her in his/ her place (scold someone for rude or bad behaviour).

-[əzɑːj wæwæl ɣɑrʂ] (the word is heavy towards him/her).	Implies ➤ can't speak to him/her (for a matter of respect) – antipathetic.
-[χfiːf wæwæl ɣɑrʂ] (the word is light towards him/her).	Implies ➤ very friendly/sympathetic and sociable.
[ʃərffəd ʌwæl θurræ] (cut the word now).	Implies ➤ have the final word (clarify and determine).
b- Feelings Are Objects	
[ivenəd leħzen fuðmiːs] (Sadness appeared/is seen in her/his face).	[ʌʂifæ nlævð ʌtvəddəl] = [ləmlæməħ ppuðem / uqaðuːm ʌðvədlənt] (The features of the face are tightened and quite blackened –tense face- the face changes). Implies ➤ very sad.
[ðelχuːf kæn iʧfəɣ] (I just caught fear).	Implies ➤ I'm really scared.
[θəkkəs ləħzən] (she took off sorrow).	Implies ➤ she is no more sad.
[lætsnæðiɣ ləhnæ pwæχɑmiːw] (I am searching the peace of my home).	Implies ➤ I don't want any problem/avoid problems.
c-Problems Are Objects	
[jeksiji θækəmθ] (he took from me the load/charge/burden).	Implies ➤ soothing, appeasing and reassuring.
[rəfðæɣ ləmħæjən] (I lifted the troubles). **AMT:** I shouldered the troubles.	Implies ➤ I suffered and was very patient.
[rniːɣd lhəm iwqərrɒjiːw] (I added troubles to my head).	Implies ➤ I'm trapped by particular circumstances
d-Heart Is An Object	
[ʌʈɑːʂ irriːɣ uliːw ðiʈʈɑrf] (too much I let my heart aside).	Implies ➤ being miserable/helpless and powerless.
[ʌfsæɣ əffuliːw] (I crushed my heart).	Implies ➤ ignoring hatred and overcoming the problems.

Conclusion: four conceptual metaphors are investigated and selected, namely 'Ideas and Words Are Objects', 'Feelings Are Objects', 'Problems Are Objects' and 'Heart Is An Object'. We close by saying that ideas, words, feelings, and problems are abstract entities which entail physical objects. First, words and ideas can be erected, crushed, broken, thrown away, turned over, twisted, weighed, worked, given, cut, etc. Second, Feelings can be appeared, seen (apparent), caught, taken off, searched and gathered. Third, problems can be taken, lifted and added, and finally, heart can be let aside and crushed. These are culture-specific utterances used by Kabyle native speakers, i.e., each culture has specific metaphors coined by its history. We may also add that any metaphor cannot be understood unless we have certain background knowledge about certain specific history and culture.

3.1.4.3.2 Table Two: Mind, Heart, Eyes, Blood and Troubles Are Containers

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle	Ontological metaphor with different purposes/ viewing mind/heart as a container where we can fill and pull things out.
a-The Mind Is A Container	
[jət͡ʃɔːr uqɑrrɒjiːw] (My head is full).	Implies → [ðæjen urəzmirɤɑræ] / [jæjæ uqərrɒjiw] (It's enough, I can't bear any more/no more problems/ I'm fed up).
[fɤənt θiʒunæn səgqərrɒjiːw] (The problems / (trivialities) got out of my mind).	Implies → [rəkðæɤ] / [hennæɤ] (I'm okay/ I feel all right – I have no problems).
[lædiʒəbbəð səgqərrɒjiːs] (he is pulling from his head).	Implies → imagining or lying.
[tiK̠li ʌdiffəl uqərrɒjiːw] (nearly my head is going overflow).	Implies → can't bear the situation any more.
b-Heart Is A Container/Recipient	
[jeK̠ʃəm suliːw] (he got into my heart).	Kabyle native speakers look at the heart from a different angle. They look at it as the central organ of the body and the seat of the soul. Thus they often speak of it metaphorically. Implies → I like it/I appreciate him (socialise with someone).

[lesmæræjeɣ suliːs rənnuːɣ] (I am pouring in my heart and adding).	Implies → long time endurance.
-[θuɣɑl θæðiːmθ ɣɑffuːl] (the cover is put on heart). -[ərriɣɑs θævlɑː̵ iwuːl] (I put the pebble to my heart).	Implies → no way to do, say something and even protest – being powerless and incapable in facing some situations (being oppressed) – culture-specific.
[jəffeɣ səgguliːw] (he got out of my heart).	Implies →no consideration/no more positive feelings.
[jət͡ʃɔːr / wuliːw] (my heart is full).	Implies → I am very sad/upset.
[utseræræ suliːm] (don't put in your heart).	Implies → to drive away one's cares and woes.
[jekkæd səgguliːw] (it came from my heart).	This is an exception: this utterance may be interpreted as 1) heart is a container or 2) heart is a location. The verb [jekkæd] (came from) metaphorically spoken in Kabyle denotes both a direction and a location. Implies →to be sincere.
-[nusæd Ʌnəssəwsæ ulæwən] (we came to widen the hearts). -[nusæd Ʌnəssəwsæ / Ʌnəkkæs ilχɑtɑr] (we came/arrived to widen/take off to heart). -[nusæd Ʌnəssəwsæ / Ʌnəssiχfəf ulæwən] (we came to lighten the hearts).	Culture-specific metaphor. Kabyle native speakers use these similar utterances in different contexts: **Context 1:** in case persons are in dispute. **Context 2**: to relieve/ease and sooth someone in trouble.
c-Eyes, Blood Are Containers	
[uɣɑlənt wæniːs tigðuriːn iðæmmən] (his eyes became pots of blood).	Culture-specific. Kabyle native speakers speak of 'eyes' in terms of containers/pots. When eyes weep with non-stop, very tiny and thin vessels appear on the surface of the eye (bloodshot eye) then the eyes become too red. Thus, we associate the reddened eyes with full blood pots.

	Implies ➔ an intense reddish crimson colour (eyes) – reference to sadness and sorrow (in case of suffering some type of loss). **Note that:** Eyes are containers not only for emotions, but anything we can picture in our head.
[lwɑrɑ θəzðæɤ / θəlIæ ðəgðæmmən] (severity dwells in blood).	Culture-specific metaphor. Scientifically speaking blood is the conduit that transmits human characteristics via enzymes to the offspring; the reason why Kabyle people speak of 'severity' as an entity that dwells in blood. Implies ➔ when somebody is harsh and severe, change is out of question.
d-Troubles (States) Are Containers	
[θəḴʃəm læmbuqɑ:θ] (she entered / got in huge problems).	Implies ➔ to be extremely busy.
[sufɤɑd imæmi:Ḵ siθərwæji:n] (get yourself out of mishmash).	Implies ➔ avoid problems.

3.1.4.3.3 Table Three: Communication Is Sending

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle	Ontological metaphor with different purposes/viewing communication as sending.
[ʃəggæɤæs Ʌwæl] (I sent him/her a word.)	[Ʌwæl Ʌmθəvrɑ:ts jətsuʃəggæn] (a word is like a letter which is sent) => speaking/communicating is sending. Implies ➔ blaming.
[siwɖɑ:ʂ Ʌslæm] (Bring (send) him/her greetings.)	[suðni:θ əgəvðili:w] (kiss him/greet him on my behalf) => Greeting is sending. Implies ➔ greeting someone.

3.1.4.3.4 Table Four: Words, problems, Human Organs and Skin are Food

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle	Ontological metaphor with different purposes/implicatures
a-Words Are Food	
[ətʃ / ətʃæs Λwæl] (eat the word/eat him the word).	Implies ⟶ to show oneself mild and patient/unprotesting – forget about the incident. culture-specific.
[Λwæl jətsunæwæl] (the word should be cooked).	Implies ⟶ be careful before you utter words – think and reflect before you speak. culture-specific.
[Λwæli:s ðləħlu] (his word is sweety).	Implies ⟶ he is wise/being correct and just.
-[Λwæli:s tæmənt](his word is honey) -[Λwæli:s ðuði ək tæmənt](his word is butter and honey)	Implies ⟶ reassuring and soothing. culture-specific.
[rzɑ:g wæwæl ɣɑrṣ](bitter the word towards him/her)	Implies ⟶to cut off links/to break off contact with. culture-specific.
b-Problems Are Food	
[iʃəʧæs θimɑrzɒgæ] (he got him / her eat bitterness).	Culture-specific metaphor. Implies ⟶ to be unfair and unjust – to ill-treat someone.
-[jeṣṣɑrwæjes θilufæ] (he overfed him/her problems/troubles). -[rwi:ɣ θimɑrzɒgæ] (I am full with bitterness).	Implies ⟶ the state of being oppressed and extremely sad.
c-Human Organs and Skin Are Food	
-[θətʃi:ḍ uli:Ḵ!] (you ate your heart!). **Case 1** -[jeʧæd uli:w] (he ate my heart). **Case 2**	Implies ⟶ you are too lazy - the state of being passive/a person with no response at all. Implies ⟶ he drove me mad. culture-specific.
[pwæn wulæwən] (the hearts are cooked).	This metaphorical utterance corresponds to another utterance: [ʔssəpwən wulæwən] (the hearts are

	infected) which implies the same. Implies ⟶ to be fed up with everything. culture-specific.
[jeʧæd əglimi:w] (he ate my skin).	Implies ⟶ to annoy and harass somebody. culture-specific.
[jeʧæd θabbʋti:w](he ate my belly).	Implies ⟶ I'm up to my nerves. culture-specific.
[θʃɑ:ɖ θæsæs fəllæs] (his/her liver is overcooked for him/her).	Implies ⟶ he/she is extremely worried and sad. (In case of the loss of a loved person).culture-specific.

3.1.4.3.5 Table Five: Words Are Substances

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle	Ontological metaphor with different purposes/implicatures
[lʌjrəgi: lʌhɖɔ:r] (He is mixing up words).	Implies ⟶talking nonsense. culture-specific.
[ʌwæli:s ðədwæ] (his word is a remedy).	Implies ⟶ being a just person.

3.1.4.3.6 Table Six: Time, Words, Problems, Heart, Feelings and Part of The Body Are Persons

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle	Ontological metaphor with different purposes/implicatures
a-[lwəqθ ðlævð] Time Is A Person	
[i:ɖ jəssəgæð / jəssuwħæʃ] (The night frightens/scares).	[i:ɖ ʌməlwæħʃ jəssægəð] (Night is like a beast that frightens). Implies ⟶ being frightened. Culture-specific metaphor.
[ðəlwəqθ igəvrɑ:n ʌkkæ] (It's time who wants this).	[ðəlwəqθ igħəkmæn / iħəkkəm ʌmlævð] (It's time (who) is ruling and governing) / (he reigns (time) the same way a human being does. Implies ⟶ nothing to do against time. (we have to

	synchronise with time). Culture-specific metaphor.
[jəggunikəm lwəqθ, əkkər!] (Time is waiting for you, wake up!).	[lwəqθ jətsraʤu: lævð ʌðikkær ʌðiʃʃiruw] (Time is waiting a person to get up, to be active and resourceful). Implies ➤ time is very short (in doing tasks). Culture-specific metaphor.
[juꞢrær lwəqθ] (time has stolen us).	Implies ➤ not having enough time because time is sovereign over people – time is regarded as a robber/burglar.
-[ikəlχɑ:s lwəqθ] (time made fun of us). -[jækkæjeɤ lwəqθ] (time played us a bad trick).	We speak of time as a human being who constantly takes control and laugh at us: [læjħekæm ðəgnaɤ lwəqθ] (time takes control over us). Implies ➤ time passes without noticing it. (time is very short).
-[əlwəqθ / əzmæn jesɤaraj] (time / the era teaches). -[ðəlwəqθ iðæɤimmælen] (it's time who shows and guides us). -[ðəlwəqθ iɤimmælæn ivərðæn] (it's time who shows us the ways/the roads). -[jessəlħæjeɤ lwəqθ] (time guides us).	We all know that acquisition of knowledge and ability to teach are exclusively human attributes. Kabyle native speakers think of time as their best teacher from whom they learn too much and rely on. Verbs like [jesɤaraj] (teaches), [jemmæl] (shows) and [jessəlħæjeɤ] (guides) connote dynamic actions or a driving force toward a goal. Implies ➤ life experiences teach us – we learn too much from life. Time governs our activities and behaviours. We can't move without it. Everything is calculated and measured by time itself.
[urətsræræ fəθṣɒvħiθi:Ꞣ ru: fəθməddiθi:Ꞣ] (don't cry your morning, cry your evening).	Culture-specific metaphor. The two notions [θæṣɒvħi:θ] (morning) and [θæməddiθ] (evening) in spoken Kabyle correlate with youth and old age. Here in this context the metaphorical utterance proposes 'personification'; we cry the morning and the evening the same way we cry a loved person. Implies ➤ don't cry for anything (problems during

	youth), but cry for something serious (when you get old especially), i.e., it's worthy to worry about our old age than our youth because we're still strong and young for a certain age, and then we start becoming unable and weak.
[iḴəʃməd ji:ḑ] (the night came in).	Implies ➜ night-time.
[jæwqiji lwəqθ] (time bothered / hampered me).	Implies ➜ my timetable is completely disrupted. Culture-specific.
[ðæjen jəpḑəd lwəqθ Λtrɒħəm] (it's over, time arrived to let you go).	Implies ➜ it's time to go.
[ðæʃu: letsraḑʒu:n ussæn!] (what are waiting the days!).	Implies ➜ days are full of surprises (negatively speaking). Culture-specific.
[jəşşawḑi:θ lwəqθ Λðivədæl] (time let him arrive to change) / (time guided him to change).	Implies ➜ he's forced to change his behaviour.
[jəpḑəd Λrħi:l] (the departure arrived)	Implies ➜ it's time to leave.
[ivəddəl lwəqθ , θvəddəl Λduni:θ] (time changed, life changed).	Implies ➜ everything changes with the change of the era (behaviours, beliefs, moralities, ethics, etc.)
[zħæn wussæni:s] (his days are cheerful).	Implies ➜ he/she is very happy.
-[lwəqθ Λmʃu:m!] (time is a demon!). -[lwəqθægi ðæmʃu:m] (this time is a devil/demon). -[lwəqθ urnətşəḑħi] (shameless time).	Culture-specific metaphor. Kabyle people speak of time in terms of 'demon' because they know that the 20th century is the beginning of the cataclysm. (The 20th century brought too many changes all over the world and exerted strong influences upon succeeding generations). Implies➜ impossible to get along with the situation.

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b-Words Are Persons	
[sərræħ iwæwæl] (Let the word released).	Implies ➞ leave the situation, it doesn't deserve to reflect on it - (forget about the problem). Culture-specific.
-[ʔnɣ ʌwæl] (kill the word). -[fru: ʌwæl] (clear up the word).	Implies ➞ end up the discussion/erase it from your memory. Culture-specific.
[irəwliji wæwæl] (the word run away from me).	Implies ➞ I forgot about it.
[ʌwælʌki jæddæ fəlli] (this word passed over me).	Implies ➞ I can remember it. (This reminds me something).
[ʌlqərnæki jessərhæv] (this century frightens).	Implies ➞ all what we expect is negative. (no more good expectations).
c-Problems Are Persons	
-[jəffæɣ lhəm ʌχɑ:m] (sorrows, and troubles got out of home). -[rɒħən iɣəvlæn] (problems and troubles went).	Implies ➞ joy and happiness flooded home once again – joy spread over home again.
d-Heart Is A Person	
-[tiḴli ʌdiffəɣ uli:w] (nearly my heart is going to get out). -[tiḴli ʌdinəɡɡez uli:w] (nearly my heart is going to leap).	Implies ➞ I can't bear the situation any more (impatience).
[lʌjətsru wu:l ɣar ðæχəl] (the heart is crying in the inside)	Implies ➞ the degree of sadness (pack of sorrows) is unbearable. Culture-specific.
[jugi:θ uli:w] (my heart refuses him / rejects him / denies him).	Implies ➞ I hate him/ don't like him.
-[jəvɣɑ:θ wuli:w] (my heart wants him) -[jəvɣɑ:θ uli:w ʌθəzrɑɣ] (my heart wants to see him).	Implies ➞ I miss him too much.

[ʌsvər ʌjuli:w!] (be patient my heart!).	Implies ➝ hold out/tolerate.
[jəqvər wuli:w] (my heart suffocates)	Implies ➝ to be fed up with the living situation. Culture-specific.
-[u:l æmʃu:m] (devil heart). -[u:l ðæmʃu:m] (heart is a demon/devil).	We speak of heart in terms of demon: this means that we attribute to the heart the characteristics of 'wickedness', 'harshness', 'curse' and 'rudeness' to make of it a very bad nature which in fact brings the self or the soul (the human being) a constant turmoil (instability) concerning personal feelings and emotions, i.e., the heart as a central core part of our being, extremely vital for our entire life is somehow very spoiled, fussy and irritable. Thus, being spoiled, the heart never let the self/soul delighted and released. The heart in spoken Kabyle is 'sovereign' – it has the total control of our inner self. Implies ➝ delicate/fragile person (in terms of feelings). Culture-specific.
[jənnæjid wuli:w] (my heart informed /told me)	Implies ➝ I guess/prediction.
[jəzrɑ:θ wuli:w] (my heart saw him/it)	Implies ➝ I knew about the thing early before it happened.
[θənɣi:d̪ uli:ḵ, θətsɔ:d̪ imæni:ḵ] (you killed your heart, you forgot yourself)	Implies ➝ you have to be careful with yourself. (all depends on the context).
e-Feelings Are Persons	
-[ənnəʒmænd lfɒrɔ:ħ] (joys gathered themselves). -[dukləntəd lfɒrɔ:ħ] (joys came together).	Implies ➝ reaching an utmost feeling of happiness (felicity) – happiness surrounded us.

f-Parts of The Body Are Persons	
[θənəqlæv θɑbbɒti:w] (my belly somersaulted/turned over)	Implies → great fear until to be shocked/horrified.
[jusæd uħvi:v pwælⅼən] (the lover/the sweetheart of my eyes came)	Culture-specific metaphor. Such an utterance may seem very absurd among other utterances. The notion of sleep is attributed the feature of a 'lover' to the personified 'eyes'. Nothing is worthy for the eyes than 'sleep' – the word [Ʌħvi:v] (sweetheart) symbolises the great intimacy that relates eyes to [Ʌħvi:v] (lover). This means that when the sweetheart is present the mind is somehow absent: nothing is precious to eyes except [idəʂ] (sleep). Implies → to be very sleepy.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 33) have noted that "[p]*erhaps the most obvious ontological metaphors are those where the physical object is further specified as being a person. This allows us to comprehend a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human motivations, characteristics, and activities.*"

Note that: different cultures lead us to different conceptual systems and thus to different world perceptions of reality. Verena Haser (2005: 144) asserts: "*ontological metaphors enable us to view immaterial phenomena as physical objects. They confer "entity or substance status" on concepts that are not intrinsically entities or substances.*" In the same vein of thinking Professor G.M. Megson (2011: 214) recalls that:

"*Ontological metaphors rely on the principle that you will physically experience the nature of things in the same way that someone else experiences those things and so that meaning will be transferred by the utterance. The ontological form allows us to relate a wide range of rational experiences using rich sensory experiences by quantifying and referring to familiar things. Ontological metaphors can be expanded by noticing that when we refer or quantify one thing in terms of another physical something we inherit the properties and relationships associated with that something.*"

3.1.5 Other Culture-Specific Metaphors

The metaphorical expressions in Kabyle	Implicatures
[juzæ wuðmi:s] (his/her face is stripped).	Implies ⟶ impudent/insolent and shameless (ill-bred).
[qðən wærræwi:s] (his/her children are cauterized).	Implies ⟶ to be clever and mischievous at the same time.
[wθæɣ θifæwθi:n urəsli‡ɑɣ] (I hit clothing scraps and I didn't manage).	Implies ⟶ I'm always the victim/I'm always wrong (can't manage with the person with whom I'm dealing or treating).
[ɑqlæɣ lænəkæθ θifæwθi:n nrənu] (we are hitting clothing scraps again and again).	Implies ⟶ we are trying to arrange things (trying to solve the problem/trying to save the situation).
[Λʃimi θəqnəɖ lħənɲi fjimi:m?] (why did you bandage the henna on your mouth ?).	Implies ⟶ you have to speak and just express yourself
[θərræ læθmæθ fəlli] (she put pressure/weight on me).	Implies ⟶ she shouldered me the responsibility.
[θimuʃuhæs mɒqri:θ / ɣəlvənt] (his stories/tales are big/surpasses him/her).	Implies ⟶ annoyable/naughty person.
[θəfləɖ iwəvri:ð] (you deviated/got out of the road).	Implies ⟶ to be wrong and mistaken – bad behaviour.
[læθrəffəð θəsrusu swænɲi:s] (she is lifting and putting with her eyes).	Implies ⟶ she is analysing/reflecting and speculating.
[urænt ðəgɢənjiri:w] (they are written on my forehead).	Implies ⟶ this is it and not the other way/this is my destiny.
[θæsusmi ðəslæm ðlemæn] (silence is peace and safety).	Implies ⟶ nothing is better than to keep one's mouth closed.

-[əʃɤəl ʌnæjvu:] (a disabled job/handicapped activity). -[wæki ðəʃɤəl unæjvu] (this is a disabled /handicapped job/work).	Implies ➞ this a half done and mediocre job.
[juɤɑlæs tæqləndʒəts] (he became a wheelbarrow for him/her).	Implies ➞ to manipulate someone the way we like.
[θəpwæ θəχɑ:mθ] (the room is cooked).	Implies ➞ very hot.
[jərwi ʌdɖuni:θ] (he mixed up life).	Implies ➞ the state of furiousness and madness.
[jərwi wəχɑ:m] (the house/home is mixed up).	Implies ➞ there is a quarrel.
[θuqɑ:jæs θməlɪælt] (an egg is trapped in him).	Implies ➞ being curious.
[ʧɒɤənd θæppu:rθ] (they filled the door).	Implies ➞ to get in by surprise/unexpectedly.
[θərwi liħelæs] (his state is mixed up).	Implies ➞ he is not well at all.
[uzmæɤk ʌzmæn] (I blamed / reproached you era/time).	Implies ➞ to put the blame on time.
[ʌtsæn θækəmθ fzæguri:w] (here is load on my back).	Implies ➞ having problems.
[ʌrræwi:s ðimʃumən] (his children are demons).	Implies ➞ very naughty/unruly/turbulent.
[irɑmli:θ] (he Buried him in the sand).	Implies ➞ to involve someone in a difficult situation.
[timəs urnətsnusu] (it's fire that never dies out).	Implies ➞ a very difficult/harsh and hard person – (wayward).
[ʌməḴ ʌjessæli iʃləm?] (how is he going to rise the epicarp ?)	Implies ➞ he will never manage to succeed in his life (in terms of money and business).

[iħemləd wæsi:f fəllænəɣ] (the river flooded on us).	Implies � to many people came.
-[θvərnæs θijersi ijælli:s] (she twisted her daughter's neck). -[θwərmi:ts] (she pinched her).	Implies ➤ her daughter is well-raised.
[θəҜʃəm θæqats] (she got in the floor).	Implies ➤ she became a member of family – she intervened (to share a conversation or something else) depending on the context and the situation we are in.
[isersæs lfingæ fqarrɔ:ji:s] (he put the guillotine on his head).	Implies ➤ to be helpless and hopeless.
[θəʒmæ θaʁa:t æjefki:s] (the goat gathered her milk).	Implies ➤ she is no more generous/he/she stops given or helping.
[ðiləf igʒərħɜ:n] (it's an injured boar).	Implies ➤ very furious.
[jetsæl jimi:w] (his/her mouth is bandaged).	Implies ➤ I couldn't speak.
[θəҜθæl θəqra:ts] (the bottle is full).	Implies ➤ can't bear the situation any more.
[əldʒərħ jeqqa:z iħællɪu, mæ ðæwæl jeqqa:z irənɴu] (the injury digs and heals, but the word digs and continue).	Implies ➤ when somebody hurts you verbally, bad things remain irrevocable in the memory.
[limi:n ugugæm ðæggəðmænɴi:s] (the swearing of the dumb is in his chest).	Implies ➤ be careful from a silent person when he is furious - (he swears privately).
[uriqri:ħ ħed ʌsənɴæn ʌlæ ʌda:r iddæn ħæfi] (no one is hurt by a thorn except a bare foot).	Implies ➤ no one can feel the harm but the persons who live it.
[ulæ mazgaʁ səllæɣ, ulæ mædreʁlæɣ tswæli:ɣ] (even if I am deaf I hear, even if I am blind I see).	Implies ➤ everything is under my control.
[ʌsi:f iðæmmən gæræneɣ] (a river in	Implies ➤ keep the secret.

between us).	**Note that :** This metaphoric utterance could be used in different contexts.
[lætswəhimæɣ sæni idærɾi:ɖ izɒrɑ:n!] (I am wondering where did you put the roots). **AMT:** black sheep - in French 'brebis galeuse'.	Implies ⟶ you are different/you are so bad.

3.2 Conclusion

We may conclude that this research is an argument in favour of the cognitive approach, in describing conceptual metaphors as mappings across conceptual domains that structure our reasoning, our experience and our everyday language (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999:47). That is to say, metaphors manifested in language are seen as reflecting patterns of cross-domain mappings already present in thought. As native speakers, we use a large number of metaphors when communicating about the world. Such metaphorical concepts and metaphorical processes may vary considerably from culture to culture, from society to society, and range from universality applicable to language-specific metaphorical mappings. Thus, some metaphorical mappings may represent potential 'metaphorical universals', and many others might be highly culture-and language specific. We may come to another conclusion that metaphors in Kabyle language are in many cases specific at a high degree, and this is verified on the basis of the specific examples we dealt with in this paper.

In short, as Mary Catherine Bateson (1994) points out:

"*Metaphors are what thought is all about. We use metaphors, consciously or unconsciously, all the time, so it is a matter of mental hygiene to take responsibility for these metaphors, to look at them carefully, to see how meanings slide from one to the other. Any metaphor is double-sided, offering both insight and new confusion, but metaphors are unavoidable*" (cited in Taylor and Marienau, 2016:61).

General Conclusion

Humans are social beings, they are in need of constant contact to understand and be understood, to reach a shared or common understanding of the number of great deal of concepts that describe or may describe and define their proper target. This contact which is called language, wraps in it a powerful tool which manifests itself in different cases and almost in all disciplines. This cognitive concept is called 'metaphor'.

We may conclude that this research is a strong argument in favour of the cognitive approach, in describing conceptual metaphors as mappings across conceptual domains that structure our reasoning, our experience and our everyday language (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999:47). That is to say, metaphors manifested in language are seen as reflecting patterns of cross-domain mappings already present in thought. The omnipresence of metaphoric expressions in everyday language shows evidence that metaphors are more than mere tropes that are used to make a phrase sound clever. Thus, we may add that metaphors are dominant and that they have tendency to expand to cover as much ground as possible.

"*Far from being merely a matter of words, metaphor is a matter of thought - and all kinds of thought: thought about emotion, about society, about human character, about language, and about the nature of life and death. It is indispensable not only to our imagination but also to our reason*" (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: Xi).

The cognitive accounts on the nature and use of metaphors demonstrated that they are conceptual devices that our minds employ to both form and express the perceptions that we hold about the world around us. Furthermore, nearly all cognitivists claim that metaphors are regarded as adding a complementary layer of meaning to the concept they refer to, i.e., metaphorical expressions extend meaning beyond the literal interpretation.

From a purely theoretical point of view, it has been discerned to us that the CMT is the most commonly applied model. In other words, the CMT offers a theoretical framework and empirical method for deepening our understanding of pervasiveness of metaphor in our language and cognitive system across a wide range of cognitive domains and cultural and linguistic environment. The CMT has brought metaphor centre stage, to the top level of theoretical discussion in cognitive science.

The cognitive character that the conceptual metaphor theory attributed to metaphors led to the consideration of the impact of culture on the sources, targets and meanings of metaphoric expressions. The cultural approach to the study of metaphors revealed that, as aspects of language, metaphoric expressions exhibit both universality and cultural specificity. The universal character that certain metaphoric expression exhibit either in terms of the common source domains or common target domains they share, reflect the universality of the human experiences that they depict. The cultural specificity of metaphor on the other hand reflects the peculiarities of the cultures that they originate in.

After we applied the model 'cross-cultural variation' as expounded by Zoltán Kövecses, we come to the conclusion that the everyday spoken Kabyle abounds with metaphoric expressions that are both shaped by and reflect the socio-culturally oriented beliefs that the Kabylians hold about the world around them.

The metaphoric expressions found in Kabyle language display and attain a certain high degree of specificity and uniqueness that renders their accurate translation into other languages a difficult task due to the absence of equivalent metaphors that depict exactly the specificity of Kabylian communities and their language.

We have noticed during our analysis that the task of translation was very hard and sometimes even a hindrance rather than a help for any native speaker or an experienced professional translator, since much of the lexis of Kabyle language has a cultural referent and is thus very specific to a speech community. We noted from time to time some semantic absurdities and grammatical anomalies within translation. Identifying metaphors is not an easy job. Thus, we most of the time feel incapable to solve the riddle.

The cultural variation that metaphors manifest demonstrates that, as conceptual devices, metaphoric expressions are the mirrors of the cultures they origin in. The specificity of Kabylian metaphoric expressions explored in this present study is a vivid illustration of the impact of culture on the metaphors we employ to both depict and understand the world around us. Despite the universality of human understanding, peculiarities and differences are inevitable. Cultural factors can exert an important influence on the figurative meaning, such as material life, the environment, and spiritual factors (myths, religious, legends, history and customs). Language (metaphor) is not simply a mere device for communication, but it is the major representation of a culture, a source of pride for the speaker, which makes it possible to identify one community from another; as pointed out by the English philology specialist

David Crystal (2004) in his book '*The Language Revolution*': "*cultures are chiefly transmitted through spoken and written languages. Encapsulated within a language is most of a community's history, and a large part of its cultural identity.*"

This means that language and culture are interrelated in a way which the two cannot exist without each other. They combine to form a living organism. If we compare the language to a body, culture would be the soul, for the soul is the spirit of the human being that embodies identity.

Language and culture represent phenomena with very strong relations. The two work together and play a highly relevant role in people's life. Obviously, it would be sketchy to talk about culture without mentioning the language, for this latter one determines a whole culture and civilisation of a nation. Thus, the role of language in the transmission of culture is greatly significant. Let's take for example the manifestation of language that is seen in literature, which is a reflection of life: writers use language artistically to write about people's lives. It is by the quality of their writing that we are able to see and feel their way of thinking and the angle from which they perceive the world around them, like a mirror reflecting the shape of a culture.

Judging from what have been mentioned so far, culture and language combination creates meaning through the strong obvious connections between the two in many metaphorical concepts, which construct the knowledge representation in mind, with a variety that may produce differences in the use of language in general.

Words are tools that we too often assume possess just a single prescribed functionality in language. An important function of the metaphor is special for its generative powers to communicate a seemingly endless range of meanings, affect metaphoric language use and understanding. Significant metaphors draw out deep-rooted similarities between their topics and their vehicles. When creative individuals see an existing resemblance between two objects or ideas, they structure an appropriate metaphor to only reveal hidden aspects of their cultural identity. Thus, metaphors do more than conveying propositions; they convey feelings about those propositions, which resonate with emotion and personal beliefs so that the listeners resonate to the same frequency. These senses are not an improvisation of the moment, but the result of the combined effects of a variety of cultural factors. Once the figurative sense id formed and recognised in a certain cultural society, it has an interiority and an independence. As Kövecses states:

"…*metaphor plays a role in human thought, understanding, and reasoning and, beyond that, in the creation of our social, cultural, and psychological reality. Trying to understand metaphor, then, means attempting to understand a vital part of who we are and what kind of world we live in*" (2010: Xii-Xiii).

Therefore, metaphor underpins and altogether grander system of multiplying the meaning of words and plays an important role in conveying the aspects of culture through language.

Our target in this thesis is to raise awareness among native speakers about preserving heritage culture and family ties because we certainly believe that this will lead us to an effective solution to preserve some of our history and maintain the language heritage for the future generations. In short, preserving our heritage cultures and languages requires great attention and permanent efforts because this might be the best way for the process of reviving our identities, roots, traditions and beliefs.

"*Preserving and developing linguistic proficiency among heritage speakers stands to benefit both the individual (by helping maintain connections with family and the home language community) and society at large (by strengthening national linguistic and cultural reasons)* " (Fairclough and Beaudrie, 2016: 1).

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