



Université d'Oran 2
Faculté des Langues étrangères

THESE

Pour l'obtention du diplôme de Doctorat en Sciences
En Langue Anglaise


American Orientalism within the East/ West Dichotomy


Présentée et soutenue publiquement par :
Boukhatem Hassiba

Devant le jury composé de :

Yacine Rachida	Professeur	Université d'Oran 2	Président
Bouhadiba Malika	MCA	Université d'Oran 1	Encadreur
Larbi Youcef	MCA	Université de Mostaganem	Examineur
Ghenim Naima	MCA	Université d'Oran 2	Examineur
Bouhass Fawzia	MCA	Université de Sidi Bel Abbas	Examineur

Année 2016





Dedication

For Allah, my very own precious treasure and help.

For my family, top of them my mother, daughters, and my husband Mr.

Kermeche fetah who, all together, through different times, were the tender wind
that carried me where I am today.

Acknowledgement

I am eternally grateful to my supervisor Dr. Bouhadiba Malika for accepting to take my work in charge and her ongoing encouragement and support.

Mention should also be made of my husband, who, along with the kids especially the little Zahra the joy of my life, helped me through stressful times and tried to provide me with a safe haven for work with many enjoyable hours of intellectual discussions.

Abstract

This work places the East / West Dichotomy in cultural constructions informed by American Neo-Orientalism, in the context of relations of war and economic interests. In order to validate and naturalize domination and exploitation of the East, the orientalist ideology had been invented and developed throughout history. This ideology has been comprehensively and critically studied by Edward Said in *Orientalism* (1978). The world seems to have become much more interdependent and political interrelations between the West and the East have changed radically. Consequently the East/West dichotomy has been influenced by globalization, redistributed and reshaped in a different form in political and military domains, particularly those involving war between the West and the East, between powerful and powerless countries.

This thesis deals with the East /West dichotomy as an ideology that promotes an essentialist distinction between ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ and emphasizes an absolute superiority of the former and an essential inferiority of the latter. In the history of thought, the term refers to two mutually exclusive categories of things or principles. Dichotomy in the sense of Dualism versus Monism is a theory that maintains that there is not only one fundamental category necessary for the understanding of reality. Gaston Bachlar has a theory based on the link between knowledge and reality; this theory can be summarized as follow: knowledge is not a copy to or an expression of reality in its truth but is, in all the cases, a reproduction and a restructure of it. This meaning is easily grabbed in theology, where Manichean religions, interpreted all actions and events in the world through a bipolar perspective of Good versus Evil – or God versus the Devil.

Similarly, in modern philosophy of mind, dichotomy refers to the theory that states that the mental and the physical – or mind and body – are radically different kinds of things. In this research, however, the term is used to signify a way of thinking that promotes the relationship between ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ in order to justify, rationalize and naturalize domination and

exploitation. Undisputedly, the East/West Dichotomy is employed to legitimize some implications of hierarchical power and to show who gets what, when and how. Specifically, the dichotomy in this dissertation refers to the sphere of human interaction for the purpose of exploitation and domination.

Historically speaking, this Dichotomy was manifested by different ideologies which attempted to justify the domination of others by theorizing superiority based on sex, race, nation and class. The critical part of the dichotomous thought is not that there is merely a difference per se, but a dramatic one, a 'difference by nature', illustrating an essential otherness which makes a specific group of men less human and hence subject to domination by another 'complete' human being.

In the social and political fields, the main intention behind promoting the dichotomous thought is usually to justify the way 'we' treat them, even if we, as human beings, do not want to be treated in a similar way. The core of the argument, thus, is that 'they' are fundamentally different, totally releasing their cohesion with us as members of the human race. It is clear then that this argument predictably produces on the other side a counter-response which leads to a counter-counter-response, in a ferocious circle of hate. Here, in a brief historical summary I mainly focus on some recent historical examples starting from the Second World War until September 11TH/2001. Altogether show some general characteristics as well as specific ones of American Neo-Orientalism. Even though, at times, they masked themselves through up-to-the-minute justifications, they are indeed but a fraudulent and archaic way of thinking.

In the first place, the pragmatic materials for this humble work are the Orientalist elements of how political and military leadership dealt with the course of conflicts, and how they developed the popular, political and military discourses. American Neo-Orientalism has an irregular character properly defined through some interconnections between Orientalism and war and generates violent conflicts in eastern regions. Thus, war and conflicts have always been fundamental to its dominance. Furthermore, traditional Orientalism and American neo-Orientalism have interrelated characteristics;

the West represents the side that is always on the defensive. This is not only the framework of imperial conquest and domination but also the agenda of obscuring politics, aided by Films, paintings, and popular military histories aiming to profuse, catalog, regularly immortalize and celebrate the American themes in the popular narratives. Whenever the Orientals are attacking, the much obliterated fact is that the United States is invading.

Very linked to this scenario is Said's binary understanding of Orientalism as a way of grasping and finally domesticating the Middle East for American consumption. He argues that the Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture¹, it must be stressed that during the growth of consumerism in America, the aesthetics of the Orient became an integral part of American material culture as well. Exploited Orientalist images of exotic lands associated with luxury and sensuality in the Middle East influenced seriously the aesthetic expression of American Orientalism which is in essence material. Naomi Rosenblatt, in his work *Orientalism in American Popular Culture (1990)*, remarks that during the early period, European forms of Orientalism were adapted, creating a culture of aristocratic Orientalism. Hence, the American Orientalism version, turned out to be an expression of cultural superiority by means of material possession.

American Orientalism, cultivates this basic perception of an inherent division between the East and the West and more precisely here, the American identity and exceptional vision of itself and consequently of the other. A realist rationalization of American exceptionalism would start with America's exceptional global power since the 1940's. While Exceptionalism and Orientalism both set up similar discursive, ontological, and epistemological claims about the "West" and its non-western "others", they are ingrained to the core in American political thought that developed in contradistinction to Europe. In this work, I attempt to we demonstrate the different logics of othering at work between the West and the non-West in order to better understand US identity, foreign policymaking, and hegemony within a vision

¹ Said Edward . *Orientalism; Western Conceptions of the Orient*, London: Pantheon Books, 1978, p.5

strongly shaped by ideologies like nationalism, national interest and exceptionalism.

Nationalism, a product of modernity, is a mobile power-greedy ideology which makes false universal claims. It supposes for example that it is the natural order of things. Being based on friend-foe calculations, it attempts to simplify things and tries to show that it has strict boundaries with others, who are seen as unworthy of respect or recognition. The Second World War illustrated how dangerous and counter-productive this idea could be in world politics. Nationalism and national interest demonstrate, through Imperial interests in the Middle East and the War on Terror, the picture of the West's unscrupulous politics that leads to the twenty first century big event: September 11TH 2001.

The East/West Dichotomy has become an Islam/ West Dichotomy not dissimilar to the first in essence, because it is based on a binary opposition of superior and inferior religions, races and cultures. It has also been portrayed as an unusual epistemological framework through which the world could be seen as a battlefield between 'us' (the West) and 'them' (Muslims), with the former enjoying the absolute superiority over the latter. To deal with of the problem of the West and Islam dichotomy is logically to engage with the classic work of Edward Said (1978) *Orientalism*. A re-examination of his historical observations, his discourse and textual analyses of the dogmas he discovered in *Orientalism* shall be employed in this work as a consideration of Said's methodology since his work has its own limitations. After a critical evaluation of his work, I deal with the question of 'Neo- Orientalism'.

To illustrate some outcomes of the dichotomous thinking, Samuel Huntington's work *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1993), is an influential and interesting work that evaluates and shows that Western values and culture had been made appealing to the rest of the world only through Western power and the increases in military and economic power, being hard power, or soft power, compared to those of other peoples. Thus, the Islam/West Dichotomy is strengthened through such

mono-civilizational viewpoints, however, in a multi-civilizational world, it is a flawed, dangerous and destructive logic.

Thus, this research intends to critically investigate the crystallization of the paradigm of American neo-Orientalism in a broader sense through close examination of some outstanding events of this era. That is to say whether the above dramatic changes in world politics and global communications and the new conditions they have brought have caused the West and Islam dichotomy in traditional Orientalism to enter into a new paradigm which, although it inherits a set of structures from the past, it produces some new shapes, rules, and forms.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Dedication
- II. Acknowledgment
- III. Abstract
- IV. Table of contents

Introduction.....1

Chapter One: *American Orientalism within the Occident/Orient Dichotomy*

- A. Meaning and scope of Orientalism.....15
- B. Edward Said’s Orientalism under intellectuals’ glasses.....27
- C. The East/West Dichotomy.....40
 - 1- American Orientalism and Neo-colonialism46
 - 2- Missionary Expansionism and manifest destiny building American Exceptionalism.....52
 - 3- Orientalism and American Exceptionalism at work.....68
 - 4- American Orientalism and societal culture and civilization (consumerism).....80

Chapter Two: *American Orientalism and interests before, during, and after the Cold War*

- A- American Orientalism, nationalism and national interest.....88
 - 1- The development of American Orientalism within the nationalist thought.....98
 - 2- American Orientalism and the historical mental confusion between nationalism and patriotism.....102
 - 3- The special character of American Orientalism.....106
- B- American Orientalism and the Development of Strategic Interests in the Middle East after the Second World War.....119
 - 1- Saving Capitalism for Imperial Interests (1939-1945).....120
 - 2- The End of Imperialism during the Cold War Era.....125
 - 3- American economic interests: oil, Israel and the Middle East127
 - 4- American Military Interventions in the Middle East during and after the Cold War.....134
 - 5- Us Wars on Terror.....143

6- American Interest groups.....148

Chapter Three: *Understanding American Neo- Orientalism within the 21ST century's Political and Economic Challenges. September 11TH2001 as a case study*

A. Neo- Orientalism: a Re-examination

1- From Orientalism to Neo-Orientalism.....157

2- American Neo-Orientalism after September 11TH Events.....159

B. Islam versus West Dichotomy

1- Western Ethos and the Clash Between The West And Islam.....163

2- Samuel Huntington's Theory Deficiencies.....171

C. The 9/11TH Attacks on the World Trade Center of The United States

1- 9/11TH Fabricated Events by the Us Government.....178

2- The War on Terror.....182

D. The Upturn of American Orientalism and The Arab Spring

1- The Western Imperialist Needs for the Arab Spring Spring.....188

2- The Future of Orientalism and The East /West Dichotomy in the Age of Multipolarity.....200

3- Orientalism From East Versus West To North Versus South.....214

Conclusion.....219

Appendix 1.....234

Appendix 2.....236

Bibliography.....238

Introduction

Introduction

Orientalism, this theory that seems eminently subjective, can undoubtedly be associated with the first preoccupations of westerners, coming in contact with easterners. It interprets basically an intuitive quest for understanding this other. Hence, this perceptive and necessary worry to know and understand the other becomes an integral part of a whole process of study across history. Thus, for our first endeavor, it is of paramount importance to understand the evolution of this correlation: orient/occident which is explainable in historical terms. The west and the orient can be regarded as relational concepts that are regularly constructed through the negation of one another. The west is what the orient is not and vice versa. However, this oppositional relationship is also significant when mapping the matrix of power to understand how identities are defined and according to whose interests.

A brief historical review of the theory will help to get to the project's aim which is that of taking the term out of generalizations and combining it with the term American. America's understanding, use, and practice of the theory as a western world leader, are put under question and so the impact of such a theory on its foreign policy in eastern parts always at risk of all kinds of intervention- (political , military)- or conspiracy.

Orientalism as an epistemology perpetuates a relationship of unevenness between the Orient and the West and legitimizes domination by reproducing Orientalist historiography. Therefore, this research is an analysis of American Orientalism within the dichotomy of the Occident versus the Orient or the West versus the East. The major interest and effort of this work is not situated in the mere representation of Orientalism by a hyper power on the zenith of the western block, which is the United States of America, but in its real practice especially after 9/11 events, a date that was undisputedly a turning point and a

Introduction

spur to a new flow of critical analysis and review of Orientalism into the 21st century era. The American foreign policy in the last decades in the Middle East has resulted in indescribable misery and suffering for the people of the region. These policies on one hand are extremely short sighted for the US strategic interests; on the other hand, they have resulted in massive destruction of countries in the region. Afghanistan and Iraq, Libya are just examples.

Accordingly, it is clear that the United States can only see the Middle East region and the Muslim world at large through the windows that Edward Said called "Orientalism". This is the same spectacle that was invented by the Occident since centuries ago, and became the core of colonialist expansion to the Middle East and the rest of the "Orient" through the 18th and 19th centuries. Said's 1978 publication of *Orientalism* did not appear isolated from the political and cultural revisions that were going on at that time. The work was integrated into the debate opened during the first third of the 20th century, on how the West had manipulated European knowledge about the rest of the planet, and into the critical review that needed to be applied to the methods with which the West had studied the Orient from 1945.

Perhaps even more crucially today, is the contemporary enduring Arab spring. How has the American media reported the events? What is the significance of the term 'Arab Spring' itself? Do the mass gatherings and demands for political representation expose the practice of 'Orientalism'? This thesis is an attempt to review its argument in light of history and to excavate its perception, falsities and evolution into the twenty-first century.

Actually, the notable analogy of the concept's perception among the different generations of scholars during centuries ago adopt the concept without recognizing or identifying the deep rooted politics in a common cultural heritage besides the huge problem of communication (Arabic language). Thus, the argument of this research is in the synthesis of factual analysis of world history of Orientalism in relation to the east /west dichotomy and the tacit recognition of the central position of Islam in orientalist studies.

Introduction

Thus, Orientalism describes the various schools of thought and methods through which the West came to know the East. Edward said is the major figure who was through this discourse and its construction of knowledge emphasizing that the west has been able to legitimize and maintain its hold over the uncivilized other within the context of European imperialism then the unlimited American will to power in the pursuit of its interests. Thus, our research question is: what is the interpretation of neo-Orientalism in the American language of interests and how appropriate is this interpretation for the promotion of human rights if not only human security in the Middle East?!

Authors such as Anouar Abdel-Malek¹ and Jacques Berque² formed part of the new approaches to Orientalism, and their proposals could be cohesive to the later statements by Said. The Orient had to be studied from a dynamic contemporary perspective³, and it was necessary to investigate its irregularities all the way through going further than the exterior⁴ that is to say the picturesque, mysterious and aberrant. Only then, within this context, *Orientalism* analyzed and denounced the ways in which Europeans had represented the Orient as being “the other” configuration.

The resultant knowledge was a built rationale about The Orient. Said called these assumptions ‘*Orientalism*’ and defined the term using three characteristics. Firstly, he applied it to the academic discipline used to construct the field of knowledge regarding the Orient. Secondly, he used the term to describe the system of thought which ontologically and epistemologically distinguished the Orient from the Occident; a difference that had been already forged over centuries and which is found in the works of orientalist authors such as Esquilo, Flaubert and Marx... last but not least, Said employed it to denominate the projection of power by the West which sought to dominate, restructure and control the Orient in order to generate a discourse that would be at the service of imperial and colonial power.

¹ Abdel-Malek, Anouar. « Orientalism in Crisis ». London, *Diogenes* No. 44. (1963).

² Berque Jacques. *Dépossession du Monde*, Formats Dépossession du monde, Paris, Paris et La Haye, Mouton, 1957, p.87

³ Abdel-Malek. Anouar, Op cit

⁴ Berque Jacques. *Op.cit* p.87

Introduction

The first two Definitions were linked to the creation and construction of the Orient. Through texts, these definitions created a certain reality of the Orient, but did not allow its inhabitants the possibility of expression. Hence, the European textual representations were presented as forms with which the Orient was made to speak, but without granting it a voice. In other words, through foreign and exterior discourses, this prevented self-representation of the East. In this way, these texts went on to demonstrate the assumptions and doctrines of Europe itself, while at the same time they framed the forms of the study of the Europeans, instead of representing the inhabitants of the Orient.

The last definition of Said's *Orientalism* puts one of the theoretical keys prominent in the edition of 1978 in evidence: ideology and culture. The Orientalist ideology had been used to exercise dominance over the Orient. The culture and history could not be investigated without studying its force, that is to say, ideology's configuration of power. To believe that the Orient was created or orientalized by inspiration was to miss the reality: the relation of the West and the Orient was a relationship of power and of dominance.

Said had been inspired by the work of Foucault and acknowledged it as a source of his textual criticism. Foucault's work⁵ : *Archaeology of Knowledge*, suggested how a determined cultural order could be studied from its discursive definitions, which are common with habits, unwritten rules, and suppositions, and so could be considered as sources of social knowledge.

In this way, Orientalism, as an academic discipline, became an indication of the authority, the discourses and affirmations which were identified as certainty. The discourse of the Orientalist intellectual became its own self-reference. A strong example is Bernard Lewis⁶. What matters for Lewis first and foremost is his dualist mission, regardless of whatever contradiction or misinterpretation or even distortion of historical facts that elsewhere he has appreciated as a historian. In addition, it should be evident that due to his

⁵ Foucault, Michel. *Archaeology of Knowledge*. Translated by A. M Sheridan Smith. London, Routledge, 2002 p.21

⁶ Lewis, Bernard. *The Middle East and the West*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1964, p.113

Introduction

biases and emotions, Lewis is far from 'objectivity'. After all, the picture the late Edward Said has portrayed for Lewis seems to the point. Said notes:

Lewis is an interesting case to examine further because his standing in the political world of the Anglo-American Middle Eastern Establishment is that of the learned Orientalist, and everything he writes is steeped in the "authority" of the field. Yet for at least a decade and a half his work in the main has been aggressively ideological, despite his various attempts at subtlety and irony. I mention his recent writing as a perfect exemplification of the academic whose works purports to be liberal objective scholarship but is in reality very close to being propaganda against his subject material. But this should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the history of Orientalism; it is only the latest – and in the West, the most uncriticized – of the scandals of the scholarship.⁷

Thus, orientalist studies were narrowed down to assumptions which were completely opposed to the idea that *Said* had of the intellectual ⁸: he considered that the latter must act in the opposite way and that he had the duty to critically interrogate himself and involve himself socially and politically in order to have an influence on the society. In the orientalist discourse, the intellectual converted the Orient into an object which only benefited the image of its own culture. The whole Orient was homogenized in its values and images and was presented as a subject to be analyzed, and understood. This turned the Orient into a static and monotonous area, as opposed to a dynamic and variable West. Said argues:

... Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, "us") and the strange

⁷ Said Edward. *Orientalism*. London, Penguin Books. 2003, p.316

⁸ Said Edward. *The world, the text, the critic*, London, Harvard University Press, 1983, p.115

Introduction

(the Orient, the East, "them"). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived. Orientals lived in their world, "we" lived in ours. The vision and material reality propped each other up, kept each other going. A certain freedom of intercourse was always the Westerner's privilege; because his was the stronger culture, he could penetrate, he could wrestle with, he could give shape and meaning to the great Asiatic mystery, as Disraeli once called it. Yet what has, I think, been previously overlooked is the constricted vocabulary of such a privilege, and the comparative limitations of such a vision. My argument takes it that the Orientalist reality is both antihuman and persistent. Its scope, as much as its institutions and all-pervasive influence, lasts up to the present.⁹

With time, *Orientalism* put forward the need to question the studies and the representations of the Orient that had been generally accepted until 1978. From the time of its publication, the work stood out as one of the precursors of the theory of post-colonial discourse. At the same time, it introduced and developed the so-called cultures of “the Other” or secondary studies¹⁰ and recalled that in the orientalist debate it was necessary to include decolonization.

However, on account of some Arab intellectuals, such as Sivan,¹¹ Said’s theories were extremely westernized due to his choice of sources and interpretation of European texts. Some found his work related with an increase

⁹ Said Edward. *Orientalism*. London, Penguin Books. 1978, p.44

¹⁰ Turner, Bryan. *From Orientalism to Global Sociology in Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*. London: Routledge.1994, p.101

¹¹ Emmanuel Sivan., “Interpretations of Islam, Past and Present”, Princeton, NJ, Darwin Press, 1985, Ch. 5, p.95

Introduction

in the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam¹². Said replied by saying that his work was neither anti-western nor, a defense of Islam and the Arab world,¹³

I do want to affirm yet again that this book and, for that matter, my intellectual work generally have really been enabled by my life as a university academic. For all its often noted defects and problems, the American university—and mine, Columbia, in particular is still one of the few remaining places in the United States where reflection and study can take place in an almost utopian fashion. I have never taught anything about the Middle East, being by training and practice a teacher of the mainly European and American humanities, a specialist in modern comparative literature.

Important criticisms of Said's work concerned his reading of Foucault's works. For one, he was thought of as having a subjective and biased reading of the philosophers' ideas as Esquilo or Chateaubriand. As noted by Macfie¹⁴, Foucault had never included capitalist and pre-capitalist authors in the same category and Said added his own personal statements to Foucault's discursive statements. Foucault's concept of representation was limited, as it did not allow critical attention in order to go beyond what was written and to reach a political approach. Foucault seemed more interested in observing how power acted than in committing himself to trying to change the relationships of power in society while Said¹⁵ used Foucault's method as far as he deemed necessary to defend and organize his cultural assumptions about the Orient¹⁶.

In dealing with the Orient, Said applied the 'essentialist' reading that he himself had denounced, and he omitted the hybridism and heterogeneity that

¹² Abaza, M. and Stauth, G. "Oriental Reason, Orientalism, Islamic Fundamentalism in Globalization", New York: Basic Books. 1990,p.255

¹³ Said Edward, *Orientalism*. London, Penguin Books (1978), p.8

¹⁴ Macfie, *The Satanic Verses Post Festum: The Global, The Local, The Literary*. Reprinted in Alexander Lyon, New York, Macfie, Ed. *Orientalism: A Reader*, (2000), pp.28-38

¹⁵ Said, Edward. *The World, the Text, the Critic*. (1983), Op Cit, p.145

¹⁶ Said, Edward, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. London: Vintage Books. (1997), p.243

Introduction

were found within the colonial power.¹⁷ Orientalism, according to *Abaza and Stauth*,¹⁸ was a place of cultural exchange (intercultural and multicultural) until Said arrived and turned it into reductionism. The construction of orientalism encouraged thinking in binary terms: Westernism or Occidentalism also had to exist. Therefore another concept, that is the West, was also considered as a homogeneous notion, but as *Rodinson* remarked, “Westernism was not a response to Orientalism”.¹⁹ When all is said and done, Said was dichotomizing and therefore essentializing the concept of a field: Orient and West.²⁰ As is now well known, Said's revolutionary insight had the effect of politicizing the production of knowledge about the East. Far from being simply another object of inquiry for the West, Said argued, the Orient was an "internally consistent" representation produced within a relation of power. In this context, the Orient functioned as the antithesis against which values of the West were defined and deeply implicated in the dominating and coercive practices of colonialism.

Undoubtedly, the factual climax of this formulated and revitalized dichotomy between the West and the East was Islam moving to the center. It was developed by Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' theory. Huntington suggests a far more devastating version of dichotomy as a new paradigm for world politics. At first Huntington's theory was issued in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, and then, in 1997 he elaborated his thesis in a book entitled *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remarking of World Order*.

The West's universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China... The survival of the West depends upon Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve

¹⁷ Bhabha, Homi K. *Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse*, New York., M. Paul and W.S. Palmer, October 28, 1984, pp.125-133

¹⁸ Abaza, M. and Stauth, G. *Op Cit*, p.304

¹⁹ Maxime Rodinson. *On the General Nature of the Conflict* :chapter of *Israel and the Arabs*, London , Penguin Books Second Edition, 1980, p.58

²⁰ Clifford Geertz. "Issue: orient and west", *University Press Listing*. 1995, p. 17

Introduction

*it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilization depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.*²¹

Huntington's theory was articulated in terms of identity that is closely related to enmity and conflict. He maintained that in the process of seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are an essential functional part.²² In fact, competitions in business, rivalries in achievements and oppositions in politics are behind different kinds of self-definition and motivation. Thus, 'us' versus 'them' in the political field is a 'universal' fact.²³

Besides, the most important distinctions between people are not ideological, political, or economic, but they are cultural. That is to say, people define themselves in terms of cultural factors such as: ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions.²⁴ In the post-Cold War world, for instance, East Asian economic success had its source in East Asian culture, as do the difficulties East Asian societies had in achieving stable democracies. According to Huntington, Islamic culture explains in large part the failure of democracy to emerge in much of the Muslim countries.²⁵

Taking into account the decisive role of culture, civilization stands as the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity. Huntington argues that it played the major role in post Cold War era,

Civilizations are comprehensive, that is, none of their constituent units can be fully understood without reference to the surrounding civilization. Although a civilization has no clear-cut boundaries, it refers to the

²¹Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. pp. 20-21.

²² Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations", U.S.A, *Foreign Affairs*, v72, n3, 2002. p. 20

²³ Ibid, p.21

²⁴ Ibid, p.22

²⁵ Ibid, p.29

Introduction

*overall way of life of a specific branch of humankind. It is, therefore, in the first place a cultural entity, but once culture receives its central position in world politics, civilizations become fully political entities.*²⁶

Now, one must say that among all cultural factors, religion is the most pivotal. “*Millennia of human history have shown that religion is not a ‘small difference’ but possibly the most profound difference that can exist between people*”.²⁷ Certain investigations in the late twentieth century support the idea that there is a contemporary resurgence of religion and that this idea is a global phenomenon, and therefore, requires an extensive explanation. according to Huntington, the most outstanding and powerful cause of the global religious resurgence is exactly what was previously supposed to cause the death of religion: the processes of social, economic, and cultural modernization that swept across the world in the second half of the twentieth century.²⁸ The movements for religious revival are anti-secular, anti-universal, and visibly anti-Western.²⁹ Hence, the religion of Islam, with its ‘expansionism’ and ‘extreme sense of violence’, constitutes the most profound part of identity in Islamic civilization. In the post-Cold War era, Muslims have a much greater awareness of what they have in common and what distinguishes them from non-Muslims. The new generation of leaders that take over are not necessarily fundamentalist but will be much more committed to Islam than their predecessors. A sense of anti-Westernization is being toughened.³⁰

Huntington further expresses his idea by illustrating that the processes of modernization of the non-Western world, though started by Westernization, ended in indigenization³¹. In other words, in the early phases of change, Westernization promoted modernization. In the later phases, modernization promoted de-Westernization and the resurgence of indigenous culture- at the

²⁶ Ibid, p. 40-45

²⁷ Ibid, p. 254

²⁸ Ibid, p. 97

²⁹ Ibid, p. 100

³⁰ Ibid, p.117

³¹ Ibid, p. 118

Introduction

societal and individual levels- in two ways. At the social level, modernization enhanced the economic, military, and political power of the society and encouraged people to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generated feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations were broken and then led to crisis of identity to which religion provided the answer.³²

Huntington claims that only Western power has made Western values and culture appealing to the rest of the world. Increases in military and economic power (hard power) can produce self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superiority of one's culture (soft power) compared to those of other peoples. Thus, concepts of human rights, liberalism and democracy continue to be attractive as long as they enjoy Western power behind them.³³ Accordingly, Huntington visibly lacks capacity to have any possible understanding of the interesting mosaic of a world filled with a multitude of ideas, norms, beliefs and conceptions of how the world is. Consequently, Western universalism, namely, the universality of Western culture, is a completely wrong and politically immoral attitude. Since the imposition of an alien culture needs power, 'Imperialism' is necessarily a logical consequence of universalism.³⁴ If Westerners are to ignore the fact of uniqueness of civilizations, they will inevitably fall into the trap of double-standards. Said contends that,

In fact, whenever they wanted to promote values of democracy, free markets, limited government, human rights, individualism, and the rule of law for other civilizations, in practice double-standards were the unavoidable price to pay. As a result non-Westerners are not wrong if they consider universalism as Western imperialism.³⁵

³² Ibid, pp. 75-6

³³ Ibid, p. 92

³⁴ Said Edward. *Orientalism*. London, Penguin Books 1978, p. 310

³⁵ Ibid, p. 311

Introduction

In addition, Western universalism can be dangerous to the world because it can lead to a major inter-civilizational war between core states and it can be dangerous to the West too because it can lead to the defeat of the West.³⁶

For four hundred years inter-civilizational relations consisted of the subordination of other societies to Western civilization. The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.³⁷ Dag Tuastad argues that the new way of representing the violence of Muslims and Arabs in Western media is “new barbarism”. The new barbarism thesis implies explanations of political violence that omit political and economic interests and contexts when describing violence, and presents violence as a result of traits embedded in local cultures. Also, Tuastad argues that ‘new barbarism’ was intertwined with neo-Orientalist imaginaries that highlight a deep cultural dichotomy between Islam and the West. This ‘new barbarism’ and neo-Orientalism are to serve as hegemonic strategies contributing to legitimize continuous colonial economic or political projects, as can be witnessed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict³⁸ and the aftermath of the 9/11 fabricated attacks.

Thus, in this thesis, I try to select crises based on events within American history, and then to study the emergence of these crises and their relation to the ideology of nationalism, and exceptionalism to finally find the roots of Orientalism in the American identity.

Accordingly, the first chapter deals with the history of Orientalism and the East/West dichotomy from the eleventh century to the 18th century. Many writers represent a reference of Orientalist scholarship at that time, like Ignaz Goldziher’ (1850-1921) and Ernest Renan (1823-92), also Hamilton Gibb, definitely the most influential figure in Anglo-American Orientalism of the 19th century. Also, the 20th century orientalism as presented by Anouar

³⁶ Ibid, p. 312

³⁷ Ibid, p. 314

³⁸ Tuastad, Dag (2003). “*Neo-Orientalism and the New Barbarism Thesis: Aspects of Symbolic Violence in the Middle East Conflict(s)*”. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.24, No. 4.

Introduction

Abdelmalek, Abdul Tibawi, then to conclude, Edward Said critique of Orientalism, whose argument is summarized in the cultural hegemony imposed at home and abroad, emphasizing the fact that the westerners defined themselves against an inferior, Orientalized “other”. The same cultural sources allow and shape western involvement in the world outside the west, taking the form of imperial rule, informal empire or development enterprise. There is a stress on American popular culture where Orientalism remains too much a matter of cultural style, and a form of intellectual authority over the orient.

The second chapter focuses on the roots of Orientalism in the American political tradition of nationalism, national interest and exceptionalism, and on its rhetoric, beliefs and projects for powerful America, or the so called the “new American empire”. Both nationalism and exceptionalism ideologies aim at reconstructing imperialist theory advanced in the neoconservative Project of the New American Century (PNAC) Statement of Principles (1997).³⁹ The End of Imperialism in the Cold War Era: oil, Israel and the Middle East have become strategic US national interests, as it is witnessed in the US Military Interventions in the Middle East during and after the Cold War, and the “war on terrorism”, launched on the Middle East countries as a strong fabricated pretext for interest groups.

In the last chapter, I attempt to re-examine Said’s argument on Orientalism, neo-Orientalism and the East /West dichotomy critical development with a focus on Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* in Formulating the Islam / west Dichotomy. The 11 September 2001 events, the manipulation of the press, and the duplicity of those who were in charge, and the willpower especially of the American President (G. W. Bush), I will also attempt to demonstrate how this has been exploited by the American neoconservatives.

American Neo- Orientalism after the September 11 Events resuscitated the Imperialist greed and Need for the Arab Spring. Agreement upon a deeper understanding of definition of the US neo-orientalism is not

³⁹ Project for the New American Century (PNAC). 1997. Statement of Principles. In: <http://www.newamericancentury.org/>, accessed 5/6/2006.

Introduction

easy to achieve especially when it comes to “the War on Terror”. Though nobody can deny the impact of the neoconservatives on the formulation of contemporary foreign policy, there is no point in excluding the fact that the United States is oppressing and repressing the Middle East populations under the pretext that their leaders possess mass destruction weapons. These assumptions have entailed destruction and endless warfare in the Middle East.

This thesis attempts to show how American Neo-orientalism shaped the post-colonial narratives and drawn the line separating “Us” from “Them”, not only linguistically, culturally, racially, and ethnically, but also ethically. Neo-orientalism proved to be problematic for the Middle East countries. Why? Because when they are confronted with their own ‘otherness’, just as Said predicted, these societies are threatened by the perceived ‘danger to be menacing the security of the United States’. Our ‘own otherness’ moved us to a major question too: where do we go from here, I mean in studies and multicultural thought? The new global view of the world and the dissolution of cultural barriers would regrettably lead us to miscomprehension.

Chapter one

American Orientalism within the Occident/Orient Dichotomy

This chapter attempts to attach the ideological side of American Orientalism to the context of the political atmosphere in which the American discourse on the East permeates the American societal culture and enacts the cultural dichotomies between the West and the East.

A. Meaning and scope of Orientalism:

Orientalism is the study of the “Orient” and its arts, languages, sciences, histories, cultures, and peoples by Christian theological experts, humanist scholars, and natural and social scientists since the 1500s. Orientalist writers consider the “Orient” as consisting of societies geographically east of Christian Europe to be explored, and colonized for their raw materials, and abundant labor.

The Orient or East, in contrast to the Occident or West, is derived from the Latin word *oriens*¹ meaning "east," used as the word for "rising" to refer to the east where the sun rises; Geographically and historically, the orient included most of the Eastern Roman Empire from the eastern Balkans eastwards, its easternmost part was the Diocese of the East, almost corresponding to Greater Syria². Over time, the common understanding of 'the Orient' has continually shifted eastwards, as Western explorers traveled farther into Asia. It finally reached the Pacific Ocean, in what Westerners came to call 'the Far East', an area called 'oriental', whose people had an oriental style, character, and customs. Those Orientals are Indians, Arabs, and Asian peoples. However, Because of historical discrimination against Chinese and Japanese,

¹ Harbaugh, Rick. "東". *Chinese Characters: A Genealogy and Dictionary*. Han Lu Book & Pub. Co. (1998) p. 227. See Also Digital dictionary of Buddhism. ... l.u- tokyo.ac.jp/SAT/. Xuzangjing 續藏經. (Reprint of Dainihon Azuma Ry shin 東隆眞. H. *Han Yu and the Buddha's Relic: An Episode in Medieval Chinese*, MacMillan Publishing Company, Maryland, 1993

² Lockman, Zachary, "Contending Visions of the Middle East: the History and Politics of Orientalism", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004), p. 205.

in some parts of the United States, the term is considered offensive and derogatory even insulting such as the term 'negro', and is replaced by the word 'Asian' instead.³

Thus, Orientalism is a real investigation into the history of relations between the East and the West with a logic of colonial conquests. As a study, it is related to an accepted authority by a group or school of thought,⁴ examining all that relates to the Orient, its peoples, their history, culture, language, science, creeds, craft and art, by the western world.

Multiple are the studies on Orientalism and almost countless are the forms of scholarly organizations that contributed to its conception. Beyond this diversity in the approach, that constitutes different themes relatively essential for the ethnologist, the historian, and the sociologists' work, one can suspect, in the long term, the hidden regularities related to the deep-seated conception of the orient and Orientals in Western knowledge.

Thus, we thrive to review the evolution of Orientalism. Religious studies with the rise of Islam in the 7th century, as the first interest and area of oriental studies and the groundwork of the orientalist reasoning that took root in the ideational fundamentals of the study. Moreover, the debate in social science discourse beginning from the 18th century was incorporated in disciplines related to others like anthropology and historiography. The orientalist and postcolonial studies show the different and sometimes perverse foundations of the western conception of the Orient. According to a temporal axis, the revision of the history of Orientalism seems emblematic and very important for our purpose.

To begin with, representations of the Orient for centuries have been a permanent trait and a long-established tradition in western scholarship. The entrance was linguistic and religious at first but took a political turn afterward. Thus, Oriental languages were studied systematically in the early Middle Ages,⁵ Chief of which was the Hebrew language, Syriac, Chaldean and Arabic.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Michael Delahunt. "Artlex Art Dictionnary 1996". Oxford University press 2012.

⁵ Edmund Castell, "*Hebrew to Latin, Latin to Hebrew: the mirroring of two cultures*", Freie Universität Berlin. Institut für Judaistik – 2006, p.75

These languages were studied by Christian theologians especially during the Crusades' era. A signboard was the publication of the first Polyglot Bible in Spain in 1514, including the whole texts in Hebrew and Aramaic, in addition to Greek and Latin⁶. Since 1540, universities like Cambridge University, The University of Salamanca, and Oxford University had Professors of Oriental Languages since the 1570s and established chairs in Hebrew and Arabic. Important publications like that of Edmund Castell's *Lexicon Heptaglotton Hebraicum, Chaldaicum, Syriacum, Samaritanum, Aethiopicum, Arabicum, and Persicum*⁷. In 1669, some scholars like Edward Pococke had travelled to the East and wrote on the modern history and society of Eastern peoples. Though the scholarly work was linguistically and religiously focused on understanding languages entrenched in Christian literature, it also studied Arabic in order to understand and translate Arabic works in medicine, philosophy, and science into Latin.⁸

In the time of crusades, western scholarship has particularly focused on the historically 'dangerous' other, Islam and the Middle East or to be precise Islam in the Middle East. Since the birth of Islam, there has been scholarship and interest in the region. The earliest forms of knowledge which were produced in Europe were religious studies. So, the rise of Islam and Muslim conquests in the 7th century established a sharp resistance, even a sense of division between medieval European Christendom and the medieval Islamic world (covering all of the Middle East and Central Asia to North Africa and Andalusia).

During the middle Ages, Islam was often identified as a heresy, and the desire to define the nature of this Islamic heresy was part of a larger European thirst for convention and ideological reliability. This gave way over time to more systematic thinking about Islam, and asserted various notions of

According to the famous decision of the council of Vienne (1311-1312), Oxford was chosen as one of four universities (with Paris, Bologna and Salamanca) where Hebrew, Arabic, Greek and Aramaic were to be taught.

Edmund Castell (1606-1685) was an orientalist who spent 18 years compiling his great 4008 columns, and thus paged.

⁶Ibid

⁷Thomas Roycroft, *Aethiopicum, Arabicum, Coniunctim; Et Persicum, Separatim [2 VOLUME SET]* 1669, p.405

⁸ Ibid, p.416

incongruity between Europe and the Muslim world. The earliest forms of knowledge about Islam were religious studies generated by hostile encounters between Europeans and Muslims.

A typical example of this interest to know this Muslim ‘other’ is Robert of Ketton who undertook the first Latin translation of the Quran in the 12th century (1143)⁹. He was specially assisted by Spaniards, who were ardent to comprehend and nullify the religion of the Muslim conquerors of the Iberian Peninsula. The translation was full of mistakes, with many omissions and distorted additions not existent in the original text. It is also a testimony of the medieval Christian zeal to understand Islam and an initial recognition of Orientalist thinking.¹⁰

However, scholars took the greatest interest in Orientalism as early as the 17th and 18th centuries with the Napoleon invasion of Egypt, abiding all over the period of Western Europe’s military, scientific and industrial domination. A key reference of Orientalist scholarship at that time was Ignaz Goldziher’ (1850-1921) and his critique of Ernest Renan (1823-92)¹¹ in his argument that the “Semitic mind” is incapable of philosophical and scientific thinking. Goldziher in his classic: *Introduction to Islamic theology and Law*¹² maintains that the most important stages in Islam’s history were characterized by the assimilation of foreign influences. He wrote:

....The dogmatic development of Islam took place under the sign of Hellenistic thought; in its legal system the influence of Roman law is unmistakable; the organization of the Islamic state shows the adoption of Persian political ideas; Islamic mysticism made use of Neoplatonic and Hindu habits of thought. In each of these areas, Islam demonstrates its ability to absorb and assimilate foreign elements so thoroughly that their

⁹ G. Sarton, *Introduction To The History of Science* ,(Baltimore, 1931), pp.173-4.

¹⁰ Ibid, p.176

¹¹ Joseph Ernest Renan (1823-92) was a philosopher, theologian, and orientalist. He was educated at an ecclesiastical college in Treguier, Brittany.

¹² Ignaz Goldziher, “Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law”. Trans. from the German by Andras and Ruth Hamori, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.pp.4-5, 8.

foreign character can be detected only by the exact analysis of critical research... Thus It was with borrowed blocks that Muhammad built his eschatological message. He made use of Old Testament history (mostly in haggadic form), citing from it admonitory examples of the fate of ancient peoples who opposed and scoffed at the warners sent to them... The Christian elements of the Qur'an reached Muhammad mostly through the channel of apocryphal traditions and through heresies scattered in the Eastern Church... If any part of Muhammad's religious achievement may be called original, it is the part of his prophecy directed against the status quo...¹³

Unsurprisingly, this piece was denounced by Muslims like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani¹⁴ (1838-97), one of the leading Muslim thinkers of the nineteenth century. The latter wrote an unfolded refutation of Goldziher and Renan's theses that were entirely groundless and superficial but still very negatively consequential in the long run. Yet, the first real expert on Islam in American academia was Duncan Macdonald (1863-1943), a professor at the Hartford Theological Seminary. As a milestone in the study of Islam, and the father of the field of Islamic studies in America, Macdonald was driven by a plain agenda of essentializing the difference between the oriental and the occidental minds. He often introduced his proclamations by saying "the Oriental" thinks or behaves ... In one such pronouncement he says:

It is not really faith that is in question here, but knowledge; it is not the attitude to God, but the attitude

¹³ Ibid, pp. 13-14. See also Ahmad Dallal. *The Study of Islam in American Scholarship: the Persistence of Orientalist Paradigms*. Phd thesis unpublished yet.

¹⁴ Djamal eddine alafghani, « réponse de Renan », *Journal des Débats*, Paris, 18 mai 1883, pp. 402-409.

*to law. The essential difference in the oriental mind is not credulity as to the unseen things, but inability to construct a system as to seen things ...*¹⁵

This idea has a long story in Oriental studies, and has often been regarded as a dominant element in Muslim theology. The idea was later (in the early 20th century) developed by Hamilton Gibb, definitely the most influential figure in Anglo-American Orientalism. This Cambridge Professor wrote a book in 1932 entitled *Muhammadanism*,¹⁶ describing the religion of Islam, its status and metaphysical force as arbiter and key to everything in the Middle East. It is noteworthy that Gibb took Macdonald's adage for granted and then proceeded to explain the reasons why Muslim societies behaved in accordance with Macdonald's principles.

The debate continues over Orientalism concept, and this time it was incorporated into social science discourse and explored in the broader context of cross-cultural studies, and the essential dichotomies of "We/They" and "Self/Other". This suggests that the discourse of social science has undergone an evolution and an important contribution to anthropological debate over Orientalism. How? By organizing and exposing biases and attitudes that had long been an element of Western ideologies, and by presenting them in different disciplined ways, covering both theoretical and methodological considerations.

In this way, Max Weber appears as the pioneer and the first social scientist to recognize prevailing Eurocentric views about "the East" and see the dichotomy east/west being distinguished. This is seen in his works mainly in "Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion"¹⁷ and "Economy and

¹⁵ Duncan Black Macdonald. *The Attitude Of The Semites Toward The Unseen World. Prophecy As A Semitic Phenomenon And Especially Among The Arabs*, Vol. IV, p. 170, and Vol. VII, pp. 145- 169, of the Temple Classics edition, 1880

¹⁶Gibb, Sir Hamilton. *Muhammadanism*, Oxford Paperbacks (1 September 1969). See Also H. A. R. Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, London, 1962.

¹⁷Max Weber, *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion*, New York: Free Press, (1947), p.161.

Society”.¹⁸ In the former, Weber stressed that the West could only be understood in its historical context, which includes its relations with its Oriental neighbors. In the latter, Weber’s study is more sociological than historical, but elaborates further the dichotomy between East and West.

Weber's works include the dualisms of the "brother" or "insider" versus the alien/enemy/outsider; and that of "religion versus world" or "inner worldly asceticism" versus "otherworldly asceticism." Furthermore, his argument that Islam is to be blamed for the failure of the Middle East to generate capitalism, marked a decisive turn in the western thought about the relations between East and West, and emphasized further the misunderstanding and the shallow consideration of the socio-cultural environment.

The Algerian Mohamed Arkoun also did an important philosophical work on the description of Islam being himself a Muslim living in the US. From a historical and philosophical point of view, he wrote about the western orientalist view of Islam in works like: “Islam seen by Professor G.E.V. Grunebaum ("L'islam vu par le Professeur G.E.V. Grunebaum," (1964)¹⁹ and “Contribution à l’étude de l’humanisme arabe au IV-IX siècle, Miskawayh philosophe et historien”²⁰ In his works ,²¹ Mohammed Arkoun, advocates a

¹⁸Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Talcott Parsons (ed.), 1948, p.24

¹⁹ Arkoun mohamed, *Islam seen by Professor G.E.V. Grunebaum ("L'islam vu par le Professeur G.E.V. Grunebaum,"* (Paris: J.Vriu, Librairie philosophique (1964). G. E. Von Grunebaum *Classical Islam*, London, 1970. *Contribution à l’étude de l’humanisme arabe au IV-IX siècle, Miskawayh philosophe et historien* (Paris: J.Vriu, Librairie philosophique, 1970, (Rethinking Islam, 1994). p.16

²⁰Ibid,p.17

²¹Ibid, p.22

conception of Islam as a stream of experience encompassing majorities and minorities, Sunni and Shi'a, popular mystics and well-educated scholars. Nevertheless, Arkoun disagrees with the Islamic establishment and militant Islamist groups. As a student of twentieth-century social science in the West and an admirer of liberalism, he self-consciously distances himself from Western Orientalists and Western conceptions of liberalism. His work presents his responses to twenty-four misleadingly simple questions, including: Can one speak of a scientific understanding of Islam in the West or must one rather talk about the Western way of imagining Islam? What do the words "Islam," "Muslim," and "Qur'an" mean? What is meant by "revelation" and "tradition"? What did Islam retain from the previously revealed religions—Judaism and Christianity? What did it retain from the religions and customs of pre-Islamic Arabia?

In answering these and other important questions, Arkoun provides a biting, radical critique of Islamology as it has been practiced in both East and West. With his efforts, he applied contemporary thinking about anthropology, philosophy, semiotics, history, and sociology to the Islamic tradition and its relationship to the West and the problems and the befuddlement that ensued from, like the identity crisis that has left many Muslims estranged from both a modernity imposed upon them and a tradition challenged for nationalist and Islamist purposes.

In the late 1950s and early 60s, Oriental Studies departments in the US, USSR and UK were reorganized. As the European powers were out of the Middle East, the US began to fill the void, and its government needed experts on the region, so it began funding Middle East studies departments; (previously, such study was mainly confined to religious studies departments). This synchronized with the Cold War and the need to gain the East as an ally, so, anthropology was well received for more refined methods and studies that were cross-culturally communicable.

In 1963, Anouar Abdel-Malek, an Egyptian intellectual and former communist, published an article: "Orientalism in Crisis"²² where he attacked the essentialist Eurocentric conception of the orient, oriental countries, and their peoples in the area of human and social sciences. By doing so, he carried the anti-colonial struggle into scholarly production and proposed more specialized disciplines that could apply to both the Orient and Occident, which would make the humanities more universal rather than alienated objects of knowledge and domination.

Again, in a paper conference²³, he Addressed the previous methodologies for studying the Middle East starting from Weber's idealtypus and passing by neo-Marxist approaches, to finally come to the materialistic and developmentalist stance that emphasizes the socio-economic and humanistic reductionism and hegemony of the West in the Mideast. In presenting his own approach to Mideast study, Abdel-Malek stresses that at the heart of the matter, lies the organic interrelation between power and culture (Michel Foucault' emphasis) He argues that Pharaonic Egypt, Persia, the Indian Mogul empire, the Islamic empire and others, are to be accorded the same hegemonic status as Europe. "In short, never in history have we witnessed power without culture".

Very closely Followed by Abdul Tibawi's article²⁴ (1964): "English speaking orientalists: A critique of their approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism" in which he bitterly criticize the werstern scholarship on Islam. Also Jameela in 1971²⁵, and Asad 1973²⁶. Afterward, Marshall Hodgson

²²Abdel-Malek, Anouar. "Orientalism in Crisis." In *Orientalism: A Reader*, edited by A. L. Macfie, New York: New York University Press, 2000. pp.47-56. [Originally published in *Diogenes* 44, (Winter 1963), p. 104-112].

²³ Ibid, p. 97

²⁴Tibawi, A. L. "English-Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism. Part 1." *Islamic Quarterly* 8, 1 & 2 (January-June 1964): pp. 25-45. Also "English-Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism". *Islamic Quarterly* 8, 3 & 4 (July-December 1964): pp.73-87.

²⁵Djameela, Meryam,. *Journal on-line*. (December 1970). pp.544-547. Available from <http://www.geocities.com/orientalismorg/Kerr.htm>

²⁶Asad, Talal. "English Historical Review", *Islamic Quarterly*, (July 1980), pp.95, 376.

(1974) in “The Venture of Islam”²⁷ scornful critique of the ‘great books’ approach in which tragic fates like that of the Middle East’ civilizations were judged by their ancient texts. These authors probably did more than any others to outline the character of Orientalism.

Thus, it is fair and obvious to state that both Abdel-Malek's description of Orientalism and Tibawi's revelations on the orientalist' framework are very accurate, and served as a point of departure for many noted works like Said's “Orientalism; Western Conceptions of the Orient”²⁸ and Brian Turner's “Marx and the End of Orientalism”²⁹. These Works which were published in the same year (1978) were part of a general intellectual revolution, theoretical revisions and important criticism.

Said's book “Orientalism” defined Orientalism as a system of knowledge about oriental societies, based on a dichotomous model of the dynamic ‘occident’ and the ‘static’ Orient. Moreover, it was to discuss Orientalism within Foucault's model of discourse and its relation to the exercise of power over the "Orient", and Gramsci's notion of hegemony in understanding the pervasiveness of Orientalist constructs and representations in Western scholarship.

Furthermore and along the lines of Said's perception, Orientalism operates within a binary mindset which is “a style of thought based upon an

²⁷ Marshall Hodgson, “The Venture of Islam”, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974)

²⁸ Edward Said, *Orientalism; Western Conceptions of the Orient*, Orientalism. London: Pantheon Books, 1978. See also; *Arabs, Islam and the Dogmas of the West*. New York Times Book Review (31 October 1976). *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. New York: Pantheon, 1981. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. "East Isn't East: The Impending End of the Age of Orientalism." Times Literary Supplement (3 February 1995). "Introduction. In Raymond Schwab, *The Oriental Renaissance: Europe's Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680-1880*, vii-xx". New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. "Orientalism and Beyond." *In Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*". Edited by Bart Moore-Gilbert, pp. 34-73. London: Verso, 1997. *Orientalism Reconsidered. In Literature, Politics and Theory*". Edited by F. Barker, et al. London: Methuen, 1986. "Out of Place: A Memoir". London: Grants, 1999. "Reflections on Exile and Other Essays". Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000. *The World, the Text, and the Critic*". Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983. *"Said, Edward and Bernard Lewis"*. "Orientalism: an Exchange." The New York Review of Books (12 August 1982).

²⁹ Turner, Bryan S. *Marx and the End of Orientalism*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978

ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident.’” This basic perception of an intrinsic division between the East and the West is then used by scholars (such as those mentioned earlier) as the first point for involved theories, social descriptions, and political accounts with their far-reaching implications.

As a historical fact, Orientalism constitutes the foundations of Western culture, popular opinion, and even foreign policy especially during the years of imperial expansion, when the binary opposition places the two blocks against one another in order to highlight the colonial (and hence, cultural, civilizational) superiority of the Occident over the Orient.

Yet, unlike Abdel-Malek and Tibawi, Said on the one hand, wrote from the perspective of a Palestinian living in the West, and he is more polemical in the sense that he draws clear lines of difference between European and American views toward the Mideast. How? He notes that in both Europe and the U.S., "passion, prejudice and political interests" have been the context, in which the Middle East is viewed, but several European countries have had a colonial experience there, hence constant and direct contact; By contrast, the US has had modest contact with the Arab world until quite recently, either from colonial relations or immigrants, and the region has mostly been discussed only in crisis. This has been combined with "modernization theory" in which the Islamic world is seen as immature until the US came along.³⁰

Turner's book on the other hand, also portrays Orientalism in the same way, and practically in similar terms. The book is highly controversial and it reviews a wide range of orientalists: sociologists, Arabists, historians, and political scientists. Turner begins with the rejection of Weber's view of the Islamic ethic but agrees that the scope for despotism is large, since wealth cannot be accumulated as land because all land is the prince's. Furthermore, he accepted the mosaic model of society asserting that the ruling class of traditional Islamic empires reflected the state of equality and the peculiar

³⁰ Edward Said, *"Orientalism; Western Conceptions of the Orient"*, Op. cit p. 23.

version of nationality based on the unity of belief.³¹ This remains relatively true but modern autocracy in the Arab Muslim world undermined these principles!

It is noteworthy that a wide range of historiographical traditions, theoretical paradigms, and methodological debates after Said's Orientalism have been extremely influenced by the latter, and thus shaped the field of Middle Eastern Studies. A fundamental conflict between East and West was first advanced by many writers, to name a few of them: Bernard Lewis in an article entitled "The Roots of Muslim Rage",³² written in 1990.

Again, a work which was seen as a way of accounting for new forms and lines of division in post-Cold War international society. The 'clash of civilizations' approach involved another characteristic of Orientalist thought; explicitly, the tendency to see the region as being one, homogenous civilization, rather than as encompassing various different and diverse cultures. It was an idea that was elaborated notoriously by Samuel Huntington in his 1993 article in Foreign Affairs, called "The Clash of Civilizations".³³ In 2007, Robert Irwin published his critical book *For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and their Enemies*³⁴; Ian Almond's theoretical study of the Orientalism of leading post-modern thinkers in "The New Orientalists",³⁵ and Daniel Varisco's "Reading Orientalism",³⁶ which sought to critically engage and criticise Said's thesis.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that The post 9/11 world has presented new talking points on the subject then 2003 war in Iraq which was a violent Western imperialism in the Middle East with the related creation of an 'Other'

³¹ Turner, Brian, *Marx And The End of Orientalism*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1978

³² Bernard Lewis. "The Roots of Muslim Rage", *The Atlantic*; Sep 1990, p. 99

³³ Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order". New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. pp. 20-21.

³⁴ Irwin, Robert, "For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and their Enemies", London: Allen Lane, 2006.p.81 See also: "Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism and Its Discontents". New York: The Overlook Press, Peter Mayer Publishers, Inc., 2006.p.47

³⁵ Almond, Ian. "The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard ", London: I. B. Tauris, 2007.p.230

³⁶ Daniel Varisco, "Reading Orientalism: The Said and the Unsaid", (Washington, 2007), p. 29

to justify the war for domestic consumers. One example of important new work from the period is Hamid Dabashi's 2009 "Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror".³⁷

It is true to state that the present situation in the Middle East has resuscitated Orientalism doctrine putting it in the center of 21st century political agendas, speculations and debates. Yet, it is useful to scrutinize in Orientalism as a study starting from what scholars take as a source which is undisputedly Edward Said's Orientalism and coming to Daniel Varischo's new version and critique of Orientalism

B. **Edward Said's Orientalism under intellectuals' glasses:**

Orientalism and Orientalists were mere neutral associations and terms to everything concerning the Orient until the appearance of Said's book *Orientalism* (1978) where the latter describes the academic, ontological, historical and geographical connotations. According to Said, the complexity of this study is strongly tied to the historic imperialistic tendencies of the West or 'Occident' to colonize the East, an area that had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, and remarkable experiences.³⁸ Consequently, the Orient became a place to claim, own, and dominate and in this way, the West invented it as its other and defined it as its contrasting image, idea, personality, and experience.³⁹

Undoubtedly, this does not necessarily reflect the real state of things. Orientalists were drawing upon the othering idea which explains Orientalism as a style of thought based

on the distinction between the East and the West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels,

³⁷ Hamid Dabashi, "Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror", (Transaction, 2009), p. 13

³⁸ Edward Said, "Orientalism; Western Conceptions of the Orient", op.cit, p.

³⁹ Ibid, pp.1-3

*social descriptions and political accounts concerning the orient, its peoples, customs, mind, and destiny and so on*⁴⁰

Furthermore, Said sees Orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient⁴¹. With a harsh critical tone, Said brought the term of Orientalism from a neutral term to a new one, which means ruling, damaging and oppressing the East and their people. In this case, these ideas became virtually the founding of the academic study of orientalism and ‘*a system of knowledge about oriental societies, based on a dichotomous model of the dynamic ‘Occident’ and the static ‘Orient’*’.⁴²

Hence, the ontological and epistemological separation of the occident from the orient is clear. The binary of difference in Orientalism sets up a dominant and systematic discourse for describing, and ruling the orient politically, socially, ideologically, and artistically in the one hand, and in the other hand explaining, initiating, objectifying, and justifying the western colonial desires⁴³. Thus, *Orientalism* is represented on a mosaic of opposites where conquest is the natural and historical dream of empires.

It is worth mentioning here that Edward Said’s position demonstrates that many writers worked constantly within an orientalist problematic framework while dealing with the Orient, facilitating in turn western cultural hegemony, and creating a textual mind-set that the orient is incapable to perform itself, and therefore needs to be encountered, dealt with, and ruled over.

Said also, makes a distinction between latent and manifest Orientalism. Manifest Orientalism has been consisted of “the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology”⁴⁴ etc.

⁴⁰Ibid, pp.2-3

⁴¹Ibid, p. 5

⁴² Ibid, pp. 2-3-4

⁴³ Ibid, p. 3

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 205

whereas latent Orientalism has been more a stable, unanimous, common, and durable mode of thought.⁴⁵ In manifest Orientalism, the differences between Orientalist writers, their personal style and form of writing have been explicit, but the basic content of their writing, has reflected the more or less unified latent Orientalism. Moreover, latent Orientalism and race classifications have supported each other, especially in the nineteenth century.

Thus, Said's Orientalism, is largely diffused in colonial and postcolonial studies, it does nothing more than affirming that Western colonialism was a historical, inevitable necessity for the West as stated clearly by Carl Marx, who believes strongly in the universalization of the capitalist mode of production. Like many other orientalists, he supports colonialism as unavoidable in order to bring about capitalism to the orient, leading in this way to the emergence of a socialist social civilizing formation, through direct and complete control over oriental societies by western capitalist states.⁴⁶

Said's Orientalism traces the various phases of relationship of the West and the East, from the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, through the colonial period and the rise of modern Orientalist scholarship in Britain and France during the nineteenth century. It continues up to the end of European imperial hegemony in the Orient after the Second World War and then the emergence of American dominance. According to Said's view, the discipline of Orientalism is created of the West and Islam hostility in Western scholarship.

Furthermore, his main thesis is not to suggest that there is such a thing as a real or true Orient; nor is it to make an assertion about the necessary privilege of an 'insider' perspective over an 'outsider one'. On the contrary, he argues that

the Orient' is itself a constituted entity, and that the notion that there are geographical spaces with

⁴⁵Ibid, p. 206

⁴⁶ Carl Marx, "Capital", the New York Daily Tribune, 1973, p.486

*indigenous, radically 'different' inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some essence proper to that space is equally a highly debatable idea*⁴⁷

In addition, without such ideological classification, there would be scholars, critics, intellectuals, human beings, to whom the racial, ethnic, and religious distinctions seem less important than the common enterprise of promoting human community.⁴⁸ He further emphasizes the fact that he never suggests a binary approach not because it is against Islam, but because this approach to the world is a faulty ideology in itself, stating: "*the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism*".⁴⁹

A special attention is given by Said to the subjective nature of the big notions of 'Orient', 'Islam' and 'the West'. He believes that such concepts have no ontological solidity; each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, partly identification of the 'Other' to mobilize and organize collective passion.⁵⁰ He then elaborates how these terms were manipulated for creating a hostile discourse which is responsible for the current climate of global distrust. So long as there is a well-organized sense that people over there are not like 'us' and do not appreciate 'our' values, he argues, there will be global distrust and conflict.⁵¹

He states that Orientalism mainly sought to follow an idealist philosophy rather than a realist one which means that Orientalism deals principally, not with a connection between Orientalism and the Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient (the East as a career) despite or beyond any correspondence with a real 'Orient'.⁵²

⁴⁷ Ibid, p.487

⁴⁸ Ibid, p.322

⁴⁹ Ibid, p.328

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.328

⁵¹ Ibid, p. xii

⁵² Ibid, p. xv

However, he sometimes considers Orientalism as a radical realist philosophy: “*Orientalism very generally is a form of radical realism*”.⁵³ He can be right in both assertions, because idealism and radical realism are parallel to each other; they mutually use certain methods and lead to similar extremist results. Without a doubt, radical realists are idealists who overstate their conjectures and attempt to equate them strictly with reality. It can be shown that, in an ontological sense, radical realism would end up in the most radical form of idealism, namely *Solipsism*.⁵⁴

He further maintains that there is a difference between knowledge of other peoples and other times that is the result of understanding, compassion, careful observation and analysis for their own sakes, and on the other hand knowledge that is part of an overall campaign of self affirmation, hostility and outright war.⁵⁵

Although Said claims that he had already begun to lose interest in Foucault when he was writing *Orientalism*,⁵⁶ Foucault’s influence over his analyses is obvious throughout the book. Discourse, culture and the network of power make major themes in *Orientalism*. Said, however, goes farther than Foucault to investigate *who gains the power and how*⁵⁷. He highlights the role of power relations between West and East, suggesting that the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony.⁵⁸

⁵³ Ibid, p. 5

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 72

⁵⁵ **Solipsism:** an extreme form of subjective idealism that denies that the human mind has any valid ground for believing in the existence of anything but itself. The British idealist F.H. Bradley, in *Appearance and Reality* (1893), characterized the solipsistic view as follows: *I cannot transcend experience, and experience must be my experience*

⁵⁶ Said, Edward, *Power, Politics and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said*, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. (2001), p. 267

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.270

⁵⁸ Said, Edward, “The World, the Text, the Critic”. Harvard University Press (1983).p.221

He adds that although in theory the academic trend is to produce non-political knowledge; in practice the reality is much more problematic. No one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the necessities of life, from national identity, or from the fact that he is consciously or unconsciously involved with a class, a set of beliefs, or a social position.⁵⁹ His argument is that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient's difference with its weakness.⁶⁰

Said highlights the fact that empirical data about the Orient or about any part of it count for very little in Orientalism. Instead what matters is what he has called the Orientalist vision⁶¹. In fact, he argues,

*an Orientalist shares with mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system, in which objects are what they are because they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can either displace or alter.*⁶²

Hence, Orientalism regards the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place. As a result, the Orientalist expresses his ideas about Islam in such a way as to emphasize his, as well as the Muslims' resistance to change, to mutual comprehension between East and West, to the development of men and women out of old-fashioned narratives, primitive classical institutions and into modernity.⁶³

Since, it was commonly believed that the whole Orient makes perfectly good hermeneutical sense for the Orientalist scholar to regard the

⁵⁹ Said, Edward, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*, Penguin Classics, 28/08/2003, p.5

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 10

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 204

⁶² Ibid, p. 69

⁶³ Ibid, p.70

material evidence, he and his colleagues deal with as eventually leading to a better understanding of such things as the Muslim character, mind, ethos or spirit.⁶⁴ Thus every detached study of one bit would confirm in a summary way the situation of the rest. Based on this ultra-reductionist vision, which is prevalent in Orientalism, every writer on Islam assumes some Oriental precedent, some previous knowledge of the Orient, to which he refers and on which he relies.⁶⁵

Next to his extensive and comprehensive analysis, Said concludes that Western studies of Islam suffer from four prevalent widely-believed dogmas. First, the absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior; and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. Second, abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a classical Oriental civilization are preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. Third, the Orient is eternal, uniform and incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and even scientifically 'objective.'⁶⁶ Fourth, the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared, or to be controlled by pacification, research and development, or occupation⁶⁷.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p.263

⁶⁵ Ibid, p.255

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.20

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.177

However opinionated by some postmodernist schools of thought, Said's whole approach had been criticized, as it is noted by a number of critics like Bruce Robbins,⁶⁸ Bryan Turner,⁶⁹ Richard King⁷⁰ and Michael Richardson,⁷¹ about the validity of knowledge. For instance, he says that every representation, because it is a presentation, is rooted first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the presenter.⁷² He elaborates his point that Orientalism is not a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence – which he does not believe in. Rather its main weakness is that it operates as other representations, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic context.⁷³

This approach to knowledge, nevertheless, can only weaken Said's argument against Orientalism. The fact that "all representation is misrepresentation of one sort or another" is, definitely, the nature of human knowledge. No branch of knowledge can grasp the reality as it is. In Robbins's words "*If everything is a representation, then representation is not a scandal. Or if all representation is a scandal, then no particular representation is particularly scandalous*".⁷⁴

Nevertheless, what is expected from a constructive methodology is to produce a more expressive portrait of its subject by generating better theories, not simply refuting other theories as being different from reality because they

⁶⁸Robbins, Bruce. *The East is a Career: Edward Said and the Logics of Professionalism*, Michael Sprinker (ed.), *Edward Said: A Critical Reader*. Oxford, Basil, Blackwell. (1992).p. 54

⁶⁹ Turner, Bryan. *From Orientalism to Global Sociology in Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, London: Routledge. (1994), p.35

⁷⁰King, Richard. "*Orientalism and Religion, Postcolonial Theory, India and 'the Mystic East'*", London and New York: Routledge, (1999), p. 84

⁷¹Richardson, Michael. "Edward Said". In *Anthropology Today*, 6, 4, August 1990

⁷² Said Edward, Op.cit, p. 272

⁷³ Ibid, p.273

⁷⁴ Robbins, Op.cit, p.54

will be so perpetually. However, we must not ignore the fact that we can learn from our mistakes and gradually approach a better representation of reality through gradual corrections.

Said acknowledges that “*I had nothing to say about what the Orient was really like... That’s a fair criticism*”.⁷⁵ Possibly he also points to this fact when he says: “*Orientalism is a partisan book, not a theoretical machine*”⁷⁶. Sometimes, he humbly admits that his methodology merely destroys a corpus of knowledge, nullifying theories suggested for some real questions, but never substitutes a better set of theories. Perhaps the most important task of all, he admits, would be to think about some alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a non-repressive and non-manipulative perspective.

Yet, inclined towards Foucault’s work, he adds that one would have to rethink the whole complex problem of knowledge and power. Definitely, his epistemology will never be able to contradict itself by producing any sort of presentation of the world, so this embarrassment is not just for Orientalism, but has deeper roots in the deficit of his philosophy, that is highlighted by David Kopf who compares him with Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru in his “The Discovery of India”, written in the Ahmad Negar Front Prison camp, though agrees with many of Said’s complaints regarding the destructive impacts of the West, takes a constructive position on India’s future and admits the necessity of implementation of some Western inventions. He, unlike Said, does not merely

⁷⁵ Said, Edward, *Power, Politics and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said*, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. Op. cit, p. 268

⁷⁶Said, 2003, p.340

⁷⁷Kopf, David. “Hermeneutics versus History” in *Journal of Asian Studies*, (1980)

⁷⁸Ibid, p.3

⁷⁹ King, Richard. *Orientalism and Religion, Postcolonial Theory, India and the Mystic East*. Op.cit, p.86

⁸⁰ Al-‘Azm, Sadik Jalal. *Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse*. *Khamsin*, No. 8, (1981), p.171

indulge in a destructive dialectic, but tries to take a constructive position as well.⁷⁷

Moreover, as noted by many critics like Kopf,⁷⁸ King⁷⁹ and Sadik Jalal al-‘Azm,⁸⁰ it is almost not fair to attempt to refute others not in terms of what they say but of motives supposedly behind their theories. At times just being in a Western imperial camp has been interpreted by Said as generating a corrupt view of the oppressed Orient. He sometimes supports that a Western scholar cannot produce a neutral research:

*if it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author's involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances then it must also be true that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second*⁸¹

Such a person, Said believes, suffers an egoistic will of power that feeds his endeavor and corrupts it⁸². In a similar fashion, Aijaz Ahmed has argued that Said's half-hearted Foucauldian analysis is destructive of old regimes rather than constructive of new ones⁸³. In line with this presumption in the context of the nineteenth century Said adds: *"It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric"*⁸⁴

⁸¹Said, 2003, p. 11

⁸² Nehru, Jawaharlal. *The Discovery of India*. New York: Anchor Books (1946).

⁸³ Ahmed, Aijaz). *Between Orientalism and Historicism: Anthropological Knowledge of India*, in *Studies in History* Vol. 7, No. 1, 1991, p. 146-147

⁸⁴ Said, Op.Cit, p. 204

Considering his argument, one can logically say that apparently Said himself doggedly believes in an inevitable ontological opposition between the West and Islam since he affirms that the actuality of a Westerner is dramatically different from his subject of study in a way that he is a Westerner first and a human being second. Al-'Azm calls this way of thinking "Orientalism in reverse" which is a natural outcome of essentializing the occident in the same fashion that was done to the orient by Orientalism⁸⁵.

Again, as noted by many critics like Richardson⁸⁶, King⁸⁷ and Robbins⁸⁸, such an outlook is not useful. That is to say, one can condemn that whatever analyses Said has produced has no scientific value but was merely nurtured by a sense of vengeance upon the West which, to Said's eyes, has been responsible for the occupation of his homeland, Palestine, and for making him 'out of place'. Sometimes Said admits to being influenced by such a 'political' motive in the course of writing Orientalism:

*I don't think I would have written the book had I not been politically associated with a struggle. The struggle of Arab and Palestinian nationalism is very important to that book. Orientalism is not meant to be an abstract account of some historical formation but rather a part of the liberation from such stereotypes and such domination of my own people, whether they are Arabs, or Muslims, or Palestinians.*⁸⁹

One can say that, just based on that motivation and without any scientific and academic foundation, Said knot together writers, scholars, and

⁸⁵ Al-'Azm, Sadik Jalal. "Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse". *Khamsin*, No. 8, (1981), Op. cit

⁸⁶ Richardson, Michael. "Edward Said". In *Anthropology Today*, 6, 4, August 1990, Op. cit

⁸⁷ King, Richard. *Orientalism and Religion, Postcolonial Theory, India and 'the Mystic East*. 1999, Op.cit, p.94

⁸⁸ Robbins, Op.cit, p.50

⁸⁹ Said, Edward, "Power, Politics and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said" Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. 2001, p.374

journalists of very diverse character and origin, and thereby suggests, rather than asserts, that they are all the same uniform, and centrally directed by their identity.

The last weakness that was raised about Said's perspective is his notice of the fact that Western countries need to study their political rivals, i.e., Islam, Muslims, Islamic countries and Islamism as an ideology. For Said, however, any link between schools of area studies and government departments of foreign affairs can be translated into a corruption of scholarship. He questions why so many Islamic specialists actively work for Western governments whose aspirations are economic exploitation, domination or outright aggression.⁹⁰

This leads us to the use of the term "discourse" in Said's work which is already exceedingly problematic. While he derives the term from Foucault, Said's usage is very different. As Aijaz Ahmad⁹¹ claims, when Foucault uses the term discourse in dealing with a western episteme, he presumes the presence of modern state forms and institutional frameworks that arise between the sixteenth and eighteenth century. Said seems at points to refer to a singular, trans-historical orientalist discourse, tracing it back to ancient Greek theater, that really essentializes "the West" to a considerable extent.⁹²

Furthermore, it is easily noticed that Said intentionally and systematically omitted North Africa in his *Orientalism*. Said does not provide any explanation for such omission, but his definition of the Orient being adjacent to Europe and the locus of its myths and fantasies, its imperial desires and colonial policies would naturally and equally be appropriate to apply to North African countries. Yet, nowhere in the book does Said discuss European writings on North Africa or address European colonial experiences in this part of the world.

⁹⁰ Said, Op.Cit, p .345

⁹¹ Ahmad Aijaz, *Between Orientalism and Historicism*. Studies in History 7, 1 (1991): pp. 145-6. See Also Ahmad, Aijaz. "In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures". London: Verso, 1992.pp. 135-163.

⁹² James Clifford, "*The Predicament Of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art*", Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988, P.269

Hence, the centuries-long clashes between the North African populations (Algerians and Moroccans) alongside with the cultural dynamics which the Andalusian model represented, shaped Europe's early notions and images of Islam and Arabs. The naval warfare tactics which North African corsairs used against expanding European trade in the Mediterranean and beyond since the mid-sixteenth century gained North African cities (Salem, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli) the notorious reputation of being nests of pirates and the prison houses of thousand of white Christian captives⁹³.

Actually, there is a whole body of literature on captivity in Barbary dating back to the early seventeenth century that contributed to the perception of North Africans as fanatical populations ruled by brutal despots and misguided by a false religion. It is no coincidence that the Moor became an important figure in English drama. Also, the foundational fictional narratives of English, Robinson Crusoe, that contain an episode of captivity endured by Crusoe in Salé evocative of that described by Cervantes in Don Quixote.

It is even more striking that in his discursive reading of nineteenth-century French orientalist texts like Lamartine's and Louis Massignon's, Said chose to ignore the pervasive and omnipresent reality of French colonial presence in Algeria. The cultural effects of this colonial moment on the growth of European Orientalism were deep and far reaching as Patricia Lorcin demonstrates in her study, *"Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race In Colonial Algeria"*⁹⁴.

It is noteworthy that the French military expedition of 1830 transformed Algeria into a gigantic field of exploration and research conducted in institutes and poly-techniques newly established in Algiers and Oran. The impact of these scholarly pursuits not only consolidated colonial authority and supplied useful knowledge about indigenous populations, customs, and languages in North Africa but it helped shape

⁹³ Patricia. M. E. Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race In Colonial Algeria*, London & New York: I B Tauris Publishers, 1999.

⁹⁴ Ibid

new visions and policies of dealing with the Orient farther to the east in the Arab peninsula and Mesopotamia.

C. The East/West Dichotomy

Put within the Orientalist discourse, the East/West Dichotomy basically focuses on a discourse of the polar opposites of the Orient and Occident. Dichotomies like: Civilized vs. barbaric, rational vs. ignorant, secular vs. fanatical, enlightened vs. ignorant, scientific vs. superstitious and the list can be on tap. The occident represented all the formers and the orient or the east was given the latter attributes. This dichotomy was based on the notion of superiority that was further strengthened as the imperialist powers of Europe were controlling peoples around the globe under their hegemony by separating the geopolitical map into two hemispheres, one of which has and the other has not.

Accordingly, dichotomy is a division into two especially mutually exclusive, contradictory groups or entities, with apparently contradictory qualities. Symbolically, besides other explanations which are beyond our scope here, it means the phase of the moon or an inferior planet in which half its disk appears illuminated.⁹⁵

With the passage of time, Occident and orient concepts have taken on several meanings. Orient and occident constitute two axes fundamental to our conception of the world, whose nature is geographic as both terms point respectively to the East- where the sun rises- and the Occident- where the sun sets- . Though these two notions do not correspond to any precise place on the map, they must be thought of according to a certain number of general cultural criteria.

The occident being, since antiquity, the cradle of the Greek notion of 'Isonomia', that is a particular status for the individual, so he is 'citizen' in Rome or Greece, 'subject' in the orient. The occident is usually associated to the judeo-christian world despite the presence of important Christian

⁹⁵ From *Merriam Webster Dictionary*.

communities in the extreme orient and the near orient, whereas the orient is Muslim or Hinduist.⁹⁶

Hence, the East-West dichotomy is basically a sociological concept used to describe perceived differences between Western cultures and the Eastern world. Cultural rather than geographical in division, the boundaries of East and West are not fixed, but vary according to the criteria adopted by individuals using the term.

Starting from the beginning, the East-West dichotomy is omnipresent in world history, when described; Rome seems to be a major part of it. A town and a capital of a vast empire that covered all the Mediterranean shores and more or less farther in the interior of Hercules's lands of Gibraltar of Detroit until Palmyra in Syria, from Flevo (le zuiderzee) to Libya (le chott el-djerid). This vast and disparate whole was cemented by Rome itself as an Empire by conquering Italy, Europe, Asia, and Africa, the world! They transformed the peoples of their Empire into Roman citizens by the Antonian constitution of 212, promulgated by Caracalla.⁹⁷

Thus, for a long time, everything leads to Rome. However, Rome itself turned towards the Orient more than to the Occident being interested more and more to the Hellenic (Greek) Orient from the second century B.C, than to the barbaric Occident. Out of Italy, its fights against Carthage, Sicily, Sardinia, Corse, and Spain – those which were occupied by the second half of the third century B.C, were complemented with the conquest of Gaules (France) by Julius Cesar and were a real balancing of the Roman expansion towards the Occident.⁹⁸

This balance is well expressed politically after the dictator's death. In September 40 B.C, two of his lieutenants, Lepidus, and Antonio and his adoptive son Octavos shared the world between them: the first received Africa, the second the Orient, the third the Occident. The demarcation between East

⁹⁶ Turner, B.S., *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, London, Routledge, 1994, pp.101-117

⁹⁷ Olivier de Cazanove, "Rome et L'occident", *Histoire de la Civilisation Occidentale: Généalogie de L'europe de La Préhistoire au Xx Siècle*, Edition Atlas Hachette, 1994, pp.42-43.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p.45

and West went by Scodra (North Albania) where the linguistic frontier ends up between countries of Greek languages and countries of Latin languages.⁹⁹

Therefore, initially and conceptually, the boundaries are cultural, rather than geographical, as a result of which Australia is typically grouped in the West, while Islamic nations are, regardless of location, grouped in the East. The culture line can be particularly difficult to place in regions of cultural diversity such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose citizens may identify themselves as East or West depending on ethnic or religious background. Further, residents of different parts of the world perceive the boundaries differently; for example, Western Europeans have traditionally defined Russia as East, while Islamic nations regard it and other primarily Christian nations as West.¹⁰⁰

Hence, this dichotomy expands its scope to many fields such as human physiology, linguistics, religion, and philosophy. According to Pattberg Thorsten, the author of *The East-West Dichotomy* book, gender is an innate sense people have of themselves and others, including animals and objects and it is observed in most cultures, like the grammatical division of nouns into masculine and feminine, and in all cultures, the semantic division of names and objects into male and female as portrayed categorizations of things perceived in our world¹⁰¹. Likewise, categorizations of mind and matter which are causally determined or influenced by our linguistic system,¹⁰² called in philosophy: Cartesian dualism¹⁰³, and expressed in geopolitics in terms of a shared labor within a society, and this is beyond the Marxist or Weberian explanation of the community's shared labor theory, but for the labor shared among civilizations. To quote the German scholar Pattberg Thorsten who says:

⁹⁹ Ibid,p.46

¹⁰⁰ Ibid,47

¹⁰¹ Pattberg, Thorsten, *The East-West dichotomy*, (2009) at: <http://www.east-west-dichotomy.com>

¹⁰² Sapir, Edward, "Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality", edited by Mandelbaum, David G., University of California Press, Berkeley, (1983), p.27

¹⁰³ Cambridge Dictionary press 1999

To my knowledge, no Western culture has ever produced anything like the works of Confucius, and no Eastern culture has ever produced anything like Plato's ideals. The notion of the share of labor makes me think that the division of an analytically-based West and an integration-based East could be no coincidence in human evolution, but a collective behavior to fully exploit and develop all the cognitive capacities of the human race. Note that there is nothing in this world that is not shared by all humankind. It is just that the West grew up to excel at this, and the East grew up to excel at that and that all we should do is to bring it together in order to express all the knowledge.¹⁰⁴

Then, we come to Cognitive dualism, a notion that is derived from Dewey. In his book *Quest for Certainty* (1929)¹⁰⁵, where he discusses the 'doctrine of two truths', the sacred and the profane rightly explained in the simple terms of Dualism, which is basically a concept related to binary thinking, that is, to systems of thought that are two-valued: valid/invalid, true/false, good/bad or right/wrong. The doctrine of two truths however, is more concretely engaged in the dualistic response to the conflict between spiritualism and science, the spiritual and the secular. Dewey sees all problems of philosophy derived from dualistic oppositions, particularly between the spirit and the physical matter, but it is his conclusion that is most significant: Dewey proposes the rejecting of Hegel's dialectical idealism that recommended the synthesis of oppositions seen as theses versus antitheses on

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ Dewey, John, *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action*, Minton, Balch and Co., New York(1929),p.200

the grounds that the whole (synthesis) is never the sum of its parts (thesis and antithesis).¹⁰⁶

Accordingly, contradictions are universal: as for example 'ebb and flow', or 'Yin and Yang', and the list can be unlimited. This is clearly seen in works like Sartre's xenophobic masochism '*L'enfer, c'est les autres*',¹⁰⁷ Habermas' paranoid '*Der Blick des anderen*',¹⁰⁸ also, the Communist-Capitalist competition, all of them are simply saying: *I am not you, and you are not me. So, what is the argument?*

More to the point, Structuralism that is famously represented by Claude Lévi-Strauss. It does not only organize human thought and culture into binary oppositions but attaches hierarchies to them as well.¹⁰⁹ For some reason in European history of thought, 'rational' is usually privileged and associated with men, while 'emotional' is inferior and associated with women. 'Blond hair' in Western cultures is privileged and associated to goodness, while 'Black hair' is inferior and associated to evil, and so on.¹¹⁰ Surely, cultural values and prejudices vary over time. What does not is the underlying, psychological standardized device of all human reasoning: its cognitive dualism which seems to be a law of nature.

Thus, the East-West difference has been found every time in human history, from the Greeks to our present day, and it is unswerving with assumptions about human anatomy, the cerebral hemispheres, the dual nature of reasoning and the geopolitical concept of sharing labor (by way of collective consciousness) for the greater good and a higher competence in intellectual output. For the reason that the human geopolitical situation is a

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p.2004

¹⁰⁷ Jean-Paul Sartre, *l'enfer, c'est les Autres*. *Huis clos*, éd. Gallimard, (2000) (ISBN 2-07-036807-6), p. 92

¹⁰⁸ Habermas, Jürgen, "The Inclusion of the Other, MIT Press, Cambridge,(1996), p.12; also Habermas, Jürgen "The Future of Human Nature", Cambridge University Press, (2003),p.67

¹⁰⁹ Lévi-Strauss, Claude, "Race and History", UNESCO, (1952), also "Race and Culture", UNESCO (2006); "The divided West", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.184

¹¹⁰ Boon, James A. *From Symbolism to Structuralism, Lévi-Strauss in a literary tradition - Explorations in Interpretative Sociology*, Harper & Row, New York, (1972), p.55

mere greenhouse of our physical and cognitive systems inherent in each of us, it is believed that *societies will continue to be predominantly dualistic or dichotomous in the near future, with an integration-based Eastern hemisphere and an analytically-based Western hemisphere.*¹¹¹

Thus, historians like Arendt (1993),¹¹² Toynbee (1958),¹¹³ Tu (2003),¹¹⁴ Needham (1964),¹¹⁵ Nishida (1989),¹¹⁶ Kakuzo (1904)¹¹⁷ . Along with universal theoreticians, such as Bacon (1620),¹¹⁸ Hobbes (1671),¹¹⁹ Nietzsche (1909),¹²⁰ Marx (1848),¹²¹ and Huntington (1993)¹²² all did research on the conceptual contrast between Eastern societies and Western societies

¹¹¹ Goddard, David, Review: "The Age of Structuralism: Levi-Strauss to Foucault by Edith Kurzweil", *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Jan., 1982), pp. 989-991

¹¹² Arendt, Hannah, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Harvest Books, Fort Washington, (1973); also: "*Between Past and Future*", Penguin Classics, London (1993)

¹¹³ Toynbee, Arnold Joseph, Somervell, D. C. *Civilization on Trial and the World and the West*, Meridian Books Inc., New York, (1958)

¹¹⁴ Tu Wei-Ming *Multiple Modernities: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Implications of East Asian Modernity*, pp. 256-268 in *Culture Matters, How Values Shape Human Progress*, Basic Books (Perseus), New York, (2000),

¹¹⁵ Needham, Joseph "Human Law and the Laws of Nature in China and the West", Oxford University Press, (1951), Also: Review: *On the Logic of Togetherness – A Cultural Hermeneutic by Kuang-ming Wu, Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 50, No. 3, *The Philosophy of Jainism* (Jul. 2000), pp. 461-464, www.jstor.org.

¹¹⁶ Nishida, Kitaro. "Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious World View", translated by David Dillworth, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu,(1987); Also "*Complete Works of Nishida Kitaro*, Volume XIV, edited by A. Takeda and K. Riesenhueber, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo. (2006), pp. 402-417

¹¹⁷ Kakuzo, Okakura , *The Ideals of the East*, Tuttle Publishing, North Clarenton.& Ji Xianlin (1996), Also "The History of India after independence", Beijing University Press. 1st ed.(2000) p. 26

¹¹⁸ Bacon, Francis, *Novum Organum* (The New Organon – or True Directions Concerning the Interpretation of Nature), Volume I, (1620), p. 129, www.constitution.org

¹¹⁹ Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, Penguin Classics, London, 1989

¹²⁰ Nietzsche, Friedrich, "The Birth of Tragedy", Foulis Press, London, (1872)

¹²¹ Marx, Karl, *Communist Manifesto*, (1848)www.marxists.org, also *Critique of the Gotha Program*, , Progress Publisher, Moscow. (1875)

¹²² Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Touchstone, London, (1993); Also Huntington, Samuel P., *Culture Matters, How Values Shape Human Progress*, Basic Books (Perseus), New York. (2000)

and, either directly or indirectly, came independently from each other to the conclusion that there are two cultural mode of humankind: the more rational, deduction-driven West, and the more intuitive, induction-driven East.

Furthermore, there are some political analysts and economists who tried to define the relationship of Europe's big three (Germany, France, Britain) plus the United States, and Asia's big three (China, India, and Japan) plus maybe Russia, as only superficial, unsafe and imperfect, and thus cannot be dovetailed or fit together. It is suggested, as an alternative, to treat all nation-states as separate entities that form alliances at any time with whoever is able or willing, thus arbitrarily leading the world into uni-polarity (one center of power), bipolarity (two centers of power), or multipolarity (three or more centers of power), with no such thing as a permanent East-West divide.

Such a theory is an extension of Marxist's materialism, since the West still thinks it is all about who's got the oil, who's got the money, who's got the guns, or, better, who's got the biggest guns. Accordingly, the East-West dichotomy is all about equilibrium. This equilibrium may never be perfectly balanced and, at times, may pound more to one side than the other, yet the world according to this, can never be uni-polar or multi-polar.¹²³

1- American Orientalism and Neo-colonialism

As every empire created its own Orient, Orientalism has been the attitudes produced by a two-century age of European colonialism that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of progress and the East, writ large, to be a present theater of backwardness. For a simple reason: because from the outset of nineteenth-century, colonized peoples recognized and responded to the power of Western Orientalism by embracing the latter's underlying logic of time and progress, while resisting its political and colonialist implications. Just as European Orientalism both British and French, was based on an opposition between the Christian West and the

¹²³ Marx, Karl, *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Progress Publisher, Moscow, (1875), p.75

Islamic orient, it was believed that there were some essential differences that distinguished them from each other.¹²⁴

British imperialism with its burst of expansionism in the nineteenth century lost its empire in the twentieth century, France too. Both empires were commercial, basing their imperialistic policies on exploitation, Christianization and modernization of their indigenous peoples as key concepts of legitimatization of their empire.

Yet, this was not the case of the American Empire. The American empire is like none other. The reasons include but transcend America's refusal to consider itself an empire, and for that matter, its power and reach. One of its peculiarities is that because so rarely in U.S. history has it been willing to pay the price of empire as measured in human lives, administrative costs, and ideological "corruption." Once Americans acquired control over a territory, they preferred indirect rule.¹²⁵

It is well-known that after the fall of European colonialism, imperialism continued to operate in the neocolonial form through newer mechanisms of exploitation and control like transnational corporations and global institutional arrangements on trade and economy and the United States replaced Europe as the home of imperialism. We can therefore speak of the postcolonial period as a framing device to characterize the second half of the twentieth century.

The term "postcolonial" displaces the focus on "postwar" as a historical marker for the last fifty years. "Postwar" refers to the period after the Second World War and, although the war was central to "decolonization" and the division of the postcolonial world into what came to be called the first, second, and third worlds, it is used to periodize history much less frequently in the ex-colonial world than in the metropolitan worlds of Europe and America.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Fred Halliday, "Orientalism and its Critics", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1993), pp. 160

¹²⁵ Saul Richard "On the New American Empire", *Security Dialogue*, (2004), p.18

¹²⁶ Moore-Gilbert. *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*. London: Verso , (1997) , p. 223

So, to call the second half of the twentieth century postcolonial, then, is to call for a review of the way we frame contemporary world history and to emphasize the rupture in national and global relations created by the urge to build independent nation-states, first in the colonial world, and now in the "second world" of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It brings to our attention the relations between colonialism and nationalism in the politics of culture in both the societies of the ex-colonizers and those of the ex-colonized.

Yet, in the period after decolonization, it rapidly became apparent to the newly independent nations, that although colonial armies and bureaucracies might have withdrawn, western powers still intent on maintaining maximum indirect control over erstwhile colonies, via political, cultural and above all economic channels, a phenomenon which became known as *Neo-Colonialism*. It is clear then that the paramount concern was the ability to go on extracting profit from formerly colonized areas, and that the relation between colonialism and neo-colonialism made most sense in the context of even larger historical processes.¹²⁷

From the late fifteenth century, the expansion of capitalism from its west European base has been a constant of world history, to the point where there is now no part of the globe left unaffected by it. This larger project of the globalization of capitalism is what a number of postcolonial critics, especially those working with Marxist, or Marxist derived concepts, understand as Imperialism¹²⁸. For them, it is perhaps the key explanatory concept. With the framework it provides, colonialism can be seen to be a particular phase or modality of Imperialism, an appropriate form of intervention corresponding to capitalism's needs at that time, but which by the twentieth century had run its course. For Marx, the need for a constantly expanding market for its goods follows the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. *It must nestle*

¹²⁷ Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-colonial Literatures*. London: Routledge. (1989) p.193

¹²⁸ Ibid, p.14

*everywhere, settle everywhere, and establish connections everywhere.*¹²⁹ For others, however, a much more plausible explanation is the search for low cost labor forces.¹³⁰

The latter obviously was an important dimension of the colonialist phase, with the mass movements of millions of slaves from Africa and miserable laborers from Asia and the Indian subcontinent as the best known examples of a general pattern of directing cheap labor to places where it was needed. The end of colonialist control means that it is no longer possible physically to force workers to migrate to the place of work, while that does not automatically mean an end to the pattern of diasporic displacement which had been established.¹³¹

In the current phase of Imperialism, the most striking change is that instead of bringing workers to the point of production (South African diamond mines, Caribbean sugar plantations, etc.), Capitalism takes the point of production to the workers, as transnational corporations endlessly relocate factories to the zones of lower-cost labor, such as central America or the pacific rim, providing themselves with a workforce which is low-paid, non-unionized, and which will have job security only as long as it stays that way¹³².

While the directly forced migration of labor may not be part of current capitalist strategy, workers from economically disadvantaged areas like North Africa, Turkey, and the Indian subcontinent, converge on areas of core capitalist activity where they provide *a potential pool of low- cost labor*¹³³ and tend to be unwelcome and subject to obstructive or repressive measures by state authorities. Thus, the five hundred year expansionary dynamic of Capitalism as Imperialism is therefore the clear image of both colonialism and post-colonialism as historical periods that occur with the phase when the

¹²⁹ Ibid, p.20

¹³⁰ Ibid, p.25

¹³¹ Young, Robert . *Postcolonialism: an Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwells, (2001), p.17

¹³² Ibid , p.18

¹³³ Richard Freeman, "The Great Doubling: The Challenge of the New Global Labor Market", , *Innovation Policy and the Economy*, , August 2006, volume 6

colonial power inscribes itself onto the body and space of its others (Africa, or the orient).

Hence, Orientalism is the literary and scientific form of western cultural hegemony, and imperialism upon which American Orientalist perceptions, outlooks and guidelines towards the orient are based. Imperialism that requires the meeting with political, economic and military interests in the region concerned produces a discourse that puts in the picture the nature of American orientalism that hitherto replaced Europe's and took its position since the Second World War. Though the flow of continuity in both of Imperialism and Orientalism is handed over by Europe to the United States, the last successor still maintains much of the European orientalist tradition.

Nevertheless, American Orientalism is unique and clearly apart from the European one and this has been elaborated by Edward Said's Orientalism when he says in this vein:

"Granted that American expansionism is principally economic, it is still highly dependent and moves together with, upon, cultural ideas and ideologies about America itself, ceaselessly reiterated in public".¹³⁴

Furthermore, he elaborates the link between imperialism and culture by stating that culture is the characteristic of classical imperial hegemony but what

differs in the American century is the quantum leap in the reach of cultural authority, thanks in large measure to the unprecedented growth in the apparatus for the diffusion and control of information. ...The parallel between European and American imperial designs of the Orient (Near and Far) is obvious. What is perhaps less obvious is the extent to which the European tradition of Orientalist scholarship was, if not taken

¹³⁴ Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, (1979), chap 2

*over, then accommodated, normalized, domesticated, and popularized and fed into the postwar efflorescence of Near Eastern studies in the United States; and the extent to which the European tradition has given rise in the United States to a coherent attitude among most scholars, institutions, styles of discourse, and orientations, despite the contemporary appearance of refinement, as well as the use of (again) highly sophisticated-appearing social-science techniques.*¹³⁵

Such interested studies were to inform and assist US imperialism when it was fully grown during and after the Second World War. Peter Gran in his essay entitled "The Middle East in *The Historiography of Advanced Capitalism* attempts, by his turn, to place the scholarly realm of Orientalism in the proper context and conditions that shaped it, thus bringing forth the relationship between Orientalism and imperialism.¹³⁶ Gran's proposition is that the study of American history and Oriental studies are aspects of the totality of modern American culture, and as such have passed through phases reflecting contradictions that suggest that the framework of Oriental studies was always political, not simply scholarly.¹³⁷

Herein comes our argument that American Exceptionalism provides a specific context to the Orientalist ideology in the "making" of America. All nations have a "myth" of origin, but there is a particular ambivalence that troubles the idea itself of the American nation¹³⁸ ; A nation tapping into and relying upon particular narratives that must be continuously and creatively established. Hence, American Exceptionalism is a foundational fiction of

¹³⁵ Ibid, chap.2

¹³⁶ Ibid, chap3

¹³⁷ Gran, Peter, *The Middle East in the Historiography of Advanced Capitalism*, Review of Middle East Studies V. 1 (1975), pp. 135-44.

¹³⁸ Ibid, p.151

“America’s” coming into being, involving a “*rejection, displacement, exclusion, and cultural contestation*” in the colonial encounters between America and its Others (whether indigenous Americans, Filipinos, Latinos, Arabs, African slaves, etc.).¹³⁹

Thus, when examining the issue of Exceptionalism, it seems as a point of departure to integrate studies of Othering, nationalism, and imperialism, with studies of how the American nation created itself from Europe in order to surpass it.¹⁴⁰ Thus, founding the nation of “America” came into being with an ever present vulnerability; how could the United States establish itself as more humane and more successfully liberal than Europe yet suppress and conquer Amerindians and eventually others in the name of Western civilization? This desire to be both a recipient of centuries of Western civilization but to set a separate, unique course in the world has continued since the American Revolution and explains the stamina of the need of the United States, to continuously assert Exceptionalism and Orientalism.¹⁴¹

As every state bases its view of the world around certain notions, and these notions come from the identity it constructs for itself (‘a “we” needs to be established before its interests can be articulated.’). Therefore, representations of American exceptionalism are important to an understanding of US Orientalism, visibly expressed in its vision of power and foreign policy.

2- Missionary Expansionism and manifest destiny building American Exceptionalism.

Perhaps the commonly known Frontier Thesis would be much instructive in this discussion. First argued by Frederick Jackson Turner in 1896. He explained the metaphor of the frontier in terms of a driving force to improve and "civilize" unruly lands and peoples. Furthermore, he wrote that

¹³⁹ Homi K **Bhabha**: “*Nation and Narration*”, Routledge, (19 April 1990); chap.1 p.34

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, chap 5.

¹⁴¹ Nayak, Meghana. “Orientalism and “Saving” US State Identity after 9/11”. *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 8 (1), (2006),pp.42–61.

the expansionist impulse westward 'go west young man' was part of the American character and culture. It is understood in the context of progress fueled by idealistic principles of extending the boundaries of freedom¹⁴². This is evident in the idea of Manifest Destiny. Bearing a missionary expansionism, it was used to justify continental enlargement in mid- nineteenth century¹⁴³. American leaders bound America's democratic ideological imagery with the idea of accepting the guardianship of the liberty and justice of the world.

During the Second World War, Roosevelt described the United States as an 'arsenal of democracy' as was the case all throughout the Cold War, including the Truman doctrine, then Dwight Eisenhower's pursuit of '*peace and justice for all nations under God*'. Also, Lyndon Johnson's '*responsibility for the defense of freedom*' in Vietnam, and plenty of other presidential slogans. The message continues to take a significant part in the current foreign policy and to play a dangerous role in George W. Bush's '*quest for human dignity*' and the battle for Iraqi freedom. In these terms, America becomes not only exceptional with its superior vision and model of government; it also becomes uniquely responsible for '*defending freedom*' as a universal value. However, such proposition is neither clear nor acceptable, especially when an intervention abroad in the name of freedom is, when all is said and done, self-serving and even destructive.

But still, what did make the American people accept such an idea? Let us not forget that this attitude was strange to the American spirit before the World Wars. The public sentiment in the United States was mostly isolationist. Exceptionalism was widely used in the context of this perspective. Isolationists argued that the United States should stay out of wars and prosper internally and need not be concerned with the world or go about ensuring the application of universal values abroad. The obvious question to be raised is: why did Americans abandon the isolationist position provided that they had little room

¹⁴² Ibid, p.32

¹⁷² William O.Kellog: "Changing the life styles (1865-1914)", (American History, the Easy Way, Barron's, 3rd edition) p.166

for concern about the legitimacy or morality of other forces of the world? The reason for this shift was purely due to a conflict of economic interests.

American historian Charles A. Beard acknowledged that the American tradition of "splendid isolation" was only a fiction. Whatever its pretensions to distancing itself from the rest of the world, he noted, at no time had the United States refused to defend American commercial enterprise in any part of the globe. From the very outset, the United States had been a world power, as far as had been necessary.¹⁴⁴

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United States opposed the Haiti Revolution, released against France to obtain independence. It also provoked a war with Mexico in 1846, at the end of which they seized half of Mexican territory which would become New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, California, Nevada, and part of Colorado. On the pretence of helping Cuba to get rid of the Spanish guardianship, the United States installed themselves by imposing a military base, financial investments, and a right of intervention in the domestic affairs of the country. They also took over Hawaii, Porto Rico, and Guam. They waged a merciless war in Philippine, opened Japan for American trade with great supply of warships and threats, and did the same with China¹⁴⁵. As the United States required that the Chinese market be totally open for trade, they insisted on the other hand, that Latin America remained a closed market –closed to all but the United States. They also provoked a revolution in Columbia and invented the "independent" state of Panama in order to allow the building –and control- of the canal of the same name.

Starting with the First World War, President Wilson attempted to define America's role in international affairs within the context of American uniqueness and its complex system of values. All of his rhetoric concerned America's greatness and its destined path as a world leader. In March 28th 1915, Germany attacked the British steamer Falaba, in which an American civilian was killed. Shortly after, Germany attacked again, sinking the

¹⁴⁴ See Alexis De Tocqueville, "Democracy in America".

¹⁷⁴ Charles A. Beard, *the Rise of American Civilization*, (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1927) p.250

American steamer Cushing, Lusitania and many others during the next two years. These series of events raised the public debate over America's role in the war and Wilson used those attacks upon American ships as a catalyst for American intervention¹⁴⁶.

Though Wilson stated that America conducted a formal policy of neutrality, its actions were anything but neutral. The United States shipped to the allied forces needed supplies: food, medicine and most importantly weapons. It permitted Allied and other neutral ships to sail under its flag until 1917. When Wilson felt that America's involvement in the war could no longer be avoided, he declared that America's purpose in the war was superior to the aims of the powers involved, for the United States was fighting on the side of moral rightness. Wilson iterated that unlike the Axis powers and the Allied powers for that matter, the power of the United States is a menace to no nation or people. It will never be used in aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interest of our own¹⁴⁷

This declaration surely demonstrates Wilson's patriotism and loyalty to his country above all others, but he crossed the line when he consciously chose for his country a path that would lead it to transform the rest of the world to its own image, for it is then that he ceased to respect other nations as equals.

However, all that did little to disguise the reality that beneath Wilson's humanism and moralism lay a nationalist program bent on domination. The proof is his entry into the war after a series of attacks on American vessels had occurred, vessels of trade operating on what Wilson regarded as open seas. There is enough evidence in the fact that there was no reason for Wilson or for his cabinet members to assume that the United States was in danger.

The attacks upon American ships were acts of self-defense from Germany's perspective, for the United States, despite its public policy of neutrality, showed favoritism to the allies because of its economic interests

¹⁴⁶ Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States, 1492-present*, (HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), volume 7, p.140

¹⁷⁶ "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", January 16-March 12, 1918, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), volume 46, p.324.

with them. In 1914, American commerce with the allies totaled \$824 million and with the central powers \$169 million. After two years of fighting (1916), American commerce with the Allies had nearly quadrupled to \$3.2 billion, while commerce with the central powers fell to \$1.1 million. Thus, Wilson's high-sounding rhetoric was self-serving, reflecting an eagerness to cash in on Europe's misfortune. Phony neutrality permitted a massive trade in arms with the allies, propped up by American loans. The result at home was large profits for bankers and arms merchants and a general economic boom¹⁴⁸.

Once in war, Wilson stated publicly that the war would forever change the relationship of nations and that two points were necessary to rebuilding a peaceful world: (1)"No nation shall ever again be permitted to acquire an inch of land by conquest and... (2)There must be recognition of the reality of equal rights between small nations and great" ¹⁴⁹

Obviously, Wilson knew that the prevalence of those principles would create an international atmosphere favorable to American supremacy. For the first point, the United States is one of the largest countries geographically. Consequently, acquiring more territories was of little interest. For the second, Wilson desired a world of likeminded nations in order to facilitate international trade. Only then, the United States would continue at the top of power hierarchy, the primary goal of a nationalist, that of extending American interest in the form of trade reaching all corners of the globe.

America's racial and ethnic diversities were Wilson's great fear. This lack of unity in public understanding favored allegiance of Americans who were of the same nationalities with those engaged in the war. In order to unify the nation, Wilson made it seem that the United States, rather than being responsible for the actions leading to its intervention, was cast in the noble role of a savior, morally obligated to right the wrongs of others for the sake of the whole humanity.

The creation of the League of Nations-a Wilsonian idea- was never able to surmount the fierce feeling of national pride that pervaded Europe and

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p.325

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, p.326

the rest of the world following the war. Most European countries struggled for their survival, trying to collect or repay war obligations, and the stock market crash in 1929, worsened the situation. Like Wilson, Roosevelt believed that freedom of trade was of paramount importance to the American economy: *“It is perfectly clear economically that if you cut off the United States from all trade and intercourse with the rest of the world, you would have economic death in this country before long”*¹⁵⁰

But unlike Wilson, Roosevelt made clear his intentions about protecting the United State's interests. But as a tradition, he found himself obliged to explain to the American public the causes involving the United States in the Second World War, what was then viewed by most Americans as Europe's problems. It is no exaggeration to say that American leader's policies were far seeing. Roosevelt's policy of *“the good neighbor”* was undertaken on the basis of fear that if Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and most importantly the high seas, the condition of American safety.

It is indubitably not Hitler's barbarism vis-à-vis the Jews that forced the United States to enter the Second World War, not as much as the lot of the four millions of black slaves had not caused the war of Secession in 1861. The Italian aggression against Ethiopia, the invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia by Hitler, his offensiveness against Poland changed nothing for Roosevelt. It was the Japanese attack on the naval base of Pearl Harbor, in Hawaii, in the seventh of December 1941 which released the US entry in the war. This attack on American Imperialism in The Pacific provoked the immediate declaration of war by Roosevelt. According to Bruce Musset¹⁵¹, the United States had slightly resisted the Japanese advance on the Asiatic Continent but the South-West of the Pacific was of undeniable importance for the United States. In fact,

¹⁵⁰ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "From Wilson to Roosevelt: Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913-1945", the United States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (1963). p.133

¹⁵¹ Basil Rauch, "The Roosevelt Reader: Selected Speeches, Messages, Press Conferences and letters of Franklin D. Roosevelt", (New York, Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1957), p.129

the greatest part of steel and rubber used in America, as well as other important quantities of other raw materials came from this region.

Pearl Harbor was presented to the American public opinion as a sudden act, surprising and immoral as all raids. Nevertheless, this act was neither sudden nor surprising for the American government. Russett affirms that the Japanese aggression came to crown a long string of mutual aggressions between Japan and the United States. Many historians claim that Roosevelt had prior knowledge of the attack and let it happen in order to have at last a valid reason for entering the war; that of legitimate defense. Of course, the only proof of such theory is the testimony of those who were out in the field.

So this claim is based on speculation. However, if it were true that Roosevelt manipulated the enemy into an attack, just to have the opportunity to force his policy, putting American lives and resources at risk so he committed the ultimate betrayal of his people and his country. It is enough perceptible that Roosevelt behaved like James Polk did in the war of Mexico and like Lyndon Johnson would do later during the War of Vietnam. He lied to the public opinion for what he thought to be a good cause.

Aside from the accusations, Roosevelt was silent about his military build-up and used the idea of American exceptionalism and the feeling of insecurity as two primary elements of his foreign policy: the mission of America to bring democracy to the world and the need for America to protect the homeland from external threats, notably Nazism and fascism.

It is noteworthy that the Second World War was portrayed as a necessary war against an incredibly cruel enemy. Hitler's Germany represented totalitarianism, racism, militarism, and the aggressiveness. But were the allied governments –British, American, or Russian- so radically different that their victory could suffice to sweep Imperialism, racism, totalitarianism, or militarism away from the surface of the globe? This question deserves closer attention for the attitude adopted by the United States as the defender of nations in distress corresponds well to the image of America that we find in textbooks but not in antecedents of international politics.

The national legacy of the Second World War as a just and moral war is being used in the current period as an argument for unilateral intervention, reducing it to a simple battle of good vs. evil. As Howard Zinn put it, “*The usual motives of governments, repeatedly shown in history, were operating: aggrandizement of the nation, more profit for its wealthy elite, and more power for its political leaders*”¹⁵²

At that time, the media spoke only about war, the invasion of North Africa in 1942, Italy in 1943, while in the Pacific, in 1943 and 1944, the American soldiers progressed from one isle to another, creating military bases closer to Japan in order to bombard its towns. More discreetly, without making the FrontPages, American diplomats and businessmen sweated blood to make sure that the American economic power, once the war is over, would have no rival on the worldwide scale. The American trade was to surround zones, until then, dominated by the British. The "open door" policy and the equilibrated access to foreign markets were to be applied in Asia and Europe. In effect, the Americans had the firm intention to put the British offside and take their place.

According to Lloyd Gardner, *the "open door"*¹⁵³ policy was fruitful especially in the Middle East when finally in 1944, Great Britain and The United States signed an oil Pact, agreeing on the principle of an equal access to the oil of Saudi Arabia, the greatest oil reserve of the world and indeed the open door on the whole Middle East.

In the beginning of the war, Roosevelt's secretary of state Cordell Hull¹⁵⁴ declared that the principle role in a new system of commercial and economic international relations is due in great part to the United States, given its economic power, and that they must be in time to assume this role and the responsibilities that ensue from it, and this, before all, in the simple interest of

¹⁵² Bruce Musset, *No Clear and Present Danger*, New York, Harper & Row, (1972), p.49.

¹⁵³ The open door doctrine: a more sophisticated approach than the traditional colonization practiced by the Europeans which purports to go beyond the debate between imperialists and anti-imperialists by a consensus on the natural place of the American economic power in all the underdeveloped regions of the globe. However, in case the pacific imperialism was incapable of maintaining this informal empire, the elites agree on the necessity of a military intervention.

¹⁵⁴ Howard Zinn, *Declarations of Independence. Cross Examining American Ideology*, New York: HarperCollins, (1990) p.86.

the nation. Put differently, the post war peace was a Peace of oil, a Peace of gold, of commercial exchanges. In a nutshell, an immoral peace, without humanist concerns.

Between 1900 and 1933, the United States have intervened four times in Cuba, two times in Nicaragua, six times in Panama, one time in Guatemala, and not less than seven times in Honduras. In 1935 more than half of America's steel and cotton came from Latin America. In short, if the official motivation for entering the war was the worry about defending the principle of non-intervention in other people's affairs, the history of the country allows a great amount of doubt over their competence in this domain.

What appeared particularly in this epoch was the difference between the United States, a democracy endowed with liberties, and Nazi Germany, a dictatorship that persecuted the Jewish minority, imprisoned its dissidents, and proclaimed the superiority of the Aryan race. Nevertheless, to consider anti-Semitism in Germany, the American blacks -did not think undoubtedly that their situation in the United States was very far from the latter.

In fact, the United States had weakly opposed the persecution policies led by Hitler. Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, his Secretary of State, hesitated to criticize publicly the anti-Semite policy of the German dictator, and when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in 1935, the United States ordered an embargo on arms. The American companies could however continue to deliver oil in great quantity- oil without which Italy could not be able to wage a war.

When a fascist rebellion broke out in Spain in 1936 against the democratically elected government, Roosevelt's Administration voted a law of neutrality whose effect was to suppress all help to the Spanish government while Hitler and Mussolini provided a decisive support to Franco.

It is painless to deduce that the United States principal objective was not to stop fascism or Nazism but to make further advance of its imperialist interests. Unfortunately, too often, American political leaders took the position that a war was inevitable and worse. They presented it as a just war that must be waged to bring about peace. The same message used by both Wilson and Roosevelt was used by Truman during the Cold War when he argued that the

continued civil war in Korea would lead inevitably to another world war for the aggression of the North Koreans would only be finished when the communists attained world domination. Therefore, war must be fought by the United States as the defender of freedom, and fought quickly so that the aggression would be contained and peace could be established¹⁵⁵.

This time, the United States, rather than striking against a tangible enemy, declared war upon an ideology and chose to intervene in conflict that was the incarnation of its interests. As usual, the United States entered the Korean War with the same option: it made known to the rest of the world that it would intercede on behalf of oppressed peoples wherever they might be, particularly if in areas of political or economic consequence, and would make the world safe for democracy.

The Korean War was really an example of promoting national interest over the national rights of others. The objective of America's policy toward Korea was twofold: to strengthen the republic of Korea so that it could maintain the Soviet dominated regime of Korea contained, and to serve as a basis for the eventual unification of the entire country on democratic terms; in other words, creating an anti-communist Korea friendly to the United States.

National Security Council 48 (NSC-48) outlined many reasons why a friendly Asia was important. Allied with the United States, Asian countries would be obligated to deny resources to the Soviet Union, It should be our objective to take steps to prevent the Soviets and their satellites from obtaining, via trans-shipment in the Far East, strategic goods now denied them through direct channels¹⁵⁶.

More important than the strategic placement were the economic factors. Asia possessed many raw materials that were of strategic importance to the United States, in particular, South and Southeast Korea were sources of several basic commodities which could contribute greatly to the United States

¹⁵⁵ Arnold Offner, *American Appeasement, U.S. Foreign Policy and Germany 1933-1938*, New York, W.W. Norton, (1976), p12.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

security for stockpiling purposes and would be of great assistance in time of war if they remained available to it.

However, confusion in both Truman's wartime rhetoric and policies was created by the lack of a clearly defined enemy –was it communism, the North Koreans, or the Soviet Union –Truman's wartime speeches portrayed American involvement in Korea as a crusade against evil which was of course an open engagement in lies and subterfuges vis-à-vis the American people. The containment policy continued with the Vietnam War. It was Wilsonianism pure and simple, another crusade to make the world safe for democracy, guided by Messianism and misplaced ethics. Intervention in Vietnam was to be a continuation of the Truman doctrine and the policy of containment. As in Korea, it was made with little regard for facts and with no real justification offered to the American public as to why to intervene in what was essentially a civil war in a country of little consequence.

After the premature death of President Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and then Lyndon Johnson pursued Truman's policy of planting the fear of communist ideology in the minds of Americans. An ideology that threatened American security and could have been lost without firing a single missile. To cut a long story short, under four different presidents, four separate administrations, American involvement was a failure. They underestimated the tenacity of the North Koreans and failed to grasp the depth of their desire for independence from any outside powers. The Vietnamese had endured more than a decade of fighting and wanted the war to finish, and intervention only protracted it. The Vietnamese did not understand both ideologies and saw no advantage of one form of government over another –all they wanted was self-government. The United States tried to mold Vietnam after itself but the Vietnamese people had no desire to be westernized, and resisted the United States as much as they resisted other influences.

Following Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the presidency, and the war along with it. Like his predecessors, Johnson believed in American exceptionalism, in the nobility of his country's ideals and the supremacy of its destiny as a dominant global power. Also like his

predecessors, Nixon followed Wilson's idealism and introduced what became the basic premises of the Nixon Doctrine. He formally stated in February 1970 that the interests of the United States came before anything else:

"Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot –and will not- conceive all the decisions, design all programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest"¹⁵⁷.

In other words, the United States would select opportunities for intervention in light of its interests, whenever and wherever those interests were threatened. However, what is really exceptional about the United States is that wars depended upon the president in charge and the disasters were paid by thousands of men and billions of dollars

As most presidents of the United States, facing invasion and war crisis, George H.W. Bush, considering action against Iraq, argued that the preservation of international order was at stake in the Persian Gulf. Once the decision to intervene was made, the wartime rhetoric escalated: speeches replete with graphic imagery and strong moral overtones like describing America's role as to selflessly confront evil for the sake of good and to achieve *"a victory over tyranny and savage aggression"*, comparing Saddam Hussein to Hitler and telling horror stories of Iraqi soldiers killing infants. It was clear, good vs. evil. Saddam was the villain; Kuwait was the damsel in distress¹⁵⁸, and the United States, the prince capable to come to the rescue. This complete

¹⁵⁷ National Security Council, NSC-48/1-4, p.26, on: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/president>.

¹⁵⁸ United States, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard M. Nixon;" Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statement of the President, 1970, First Annual Report to Congress on United States foreign Policy for the 1970's", (February 18, 1970), p.611

¹⁸⁸ Betty Jean Craige, "American Patriotism in a global society", New York: State University of New York Press, (1991). p.91

¹⁸⁹ Ramsey Clark, *The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf*, Thunder's Mouth Press, United States Paperback, (May 1994), pp.12-13.

fabrication, however, is engaged in Ramsey Clark's book, *The Fire This Time*", where he provided a detailed history of American intervention into the Politics of the Arabian Peninsula dating back to the 1950's.¹⁵⁹

Kuwait was formed as an Independent province by the British government after the First World War to provide leverage against Iraq. Then Oil reserves were discovered in Kuwait in 1936, the production was controlled by Gulf Oil, a fact that makes the relationship between the West and Kuwait favorable. The U.S. military and the C.I.A. provided protection for the Kuwaiti royal family. In turn, Kuwait often altered production to keep the prices of the oil cartel, OPEC, in line with the requests of Western governments and it deposited billions of dollars in oil revenues in American banks¹⁶⁰.

In the months leading up to the Gulf War, tensions between Iraq and Kuwait had heightened; the day after a cease fire was declared in the Iran-Iraq War, August 8, 1988, Kuwait, by the influence of the United States, drastically increased its oil production, violating OPEC regulations and resulting in lower oil revenues for the OPEC countries, including both Iran and Iraq, which needed money to pay for wartime damages. In March 1989, Kuwait declared it would no longer be bound by quotas and increased production even more, extracting additional oil from the Rumaila field, which was located on the Iraq –Kuwait border and delivering an additional blow to Iraq.

During the Iraq-Kuwait War, Kuwait seized an additional 900 acres in this area while Iraqi troops were occupied. They had also begun to drill in that area, supplied by the United States. But what deteriorated the relations between the two countries was the debt of \$30 million owed to Kuwait. Kuwait demanded immediate repayment, and Iraq could not provide in light of too low oil prices, the result of Kuwaiti overproduction¹⁶¹.

At the end of the Iran –Iraq War, The United States began propaganda campaign against Saddam focusing on alleged military atrocities and the budding threat of Weapons of Massive Destruction (WMD). Bush relied not only on media dramatizations, but also on the overt dualism of nationalism and

¹⁶¹ Ibid, p. 14

Exceptionalism. Victory in the Persian Gulf made it sure that the United States would defend its national interests, with or without international support, an idea that increased American Exceptionalism whose best indication was military power. America spends more on defense than all the European countries combined. In fact; military might was only an indication of what makes America itself unusual. The country is exceptional in more profound ways notably in its unilateral foreign policy. Beside the fact that America is strongly individualistic than Europe, more religious and culturally more conservative, it reflects a certain way of looking at itself and the world.

Many explanations of American Exceptionalism have been advanced by scholars; among the most important explanations is the realist explanation. A realist rationalization of American exceptionalism would start with America's exceptional global power since the 1940. Exceptionally powerful countries get away with exemption in their multilateral commitments simply because they can. Human rights and humanitarian law instruments are weakly enforced in any event. The United States can exempt itself from all ICC-and try to block its operations-because no other country or group of countries has the power to stop it. No other state has the capacity to sanction the United States if it ducks compliance with the Vienna Law of Treaties, ignores the derogation procedures of human rights conventions, and delay ratification of other treaties for decades.

On a realist account, support for international law and willingness to submit to its constraints would be in inverse relation to a state's power. The less powerful a state, the more reason it would have to support international norms that would constrain its more powerful neighbors and the more powerful a state, the more reluctant it would be to submit to multilateral constraint. In other words, support for the international law is bound to be strongest among middling powers like France, Germany, and Canada. The United States wants to minimize constraints imposed on it by a multilateral human rights and humanitarian law regime. As Michael Ignatieff tries to explain in his book *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*¹⁶², a realist

¹⁶²Ibid, p.15

would argue that the United States seeks to maintain its power in a global order of states at the lowest possible cost to its sovereignty. The snag with this explanation is that the United States wants to do more than that. It has promoted the very system of multilateral engagements - human rights treaties, Geneva conventions, UN Charter rules on the use of force and the resolution of disputes – that ostensibly abridge and limit its sovereignty.

However, what realism fails to account for is the paradox of American investment in systems that constrains its power and at the same time its engagement in strict Isolationism or vociferous Unilateralism. Given its preponderant power and therefore its exceptional influence in the international order, it can dictate these terms and the rest of the world can choose to concede to these terms or to see the United States aside and take either a unilateralist or an isolationist turn.

Perhaps, the cultural explanation can clarify this paradox; though different as they can, Ignatieff observes¹⁶³, American leaders like Roosevelt or Reagan understood the relation between American constitutional values and human rights. Across the political spectrum since 1945, American presidents have articulated a strappingly messianic vision of the American role in promoting rights abroad. This messianic vision of the Massachusetts Bay colony was a "city upon a hill" in the sermons of the Puritan John Winthrop, through the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny that accompanied westward expansion in the nineteenth century, and became the Wilsonian vision of power making the world safe for democracy after the First World War, and Roosevelt's crusade for the four freedoms in the Second World War.

This global spread of human rights has coincided with the American ascendancy in global politics and has been driven by the messianic conviction that American values have universal significance and application. What is important here is the conflict between national interest and messianic mission. Messianism has propelled America into multilateral engagements that a more realist calculation of interest might have led the nation to avoid.

¹⁹²Michael Ignatieff, *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, Princeton University Press, (2005) p.12.

In American domestic politics, this sense of mission has refigured the ideal of a multilateral order of international law, not a system of constraints on US power, but as a forum in which U.S. leadership can be exercised and American intuitions about freedom and government can be spread across the world. This desire for moral leadership is something more than the ordinary narcissism and nationalism that all powerful states display. It is rooted in the particular achievements of a successful history of liberty that US leaders have believed is of universal significance, even the work of providential design, for most Americans, human rights are American values, the export version of its own Bill of Rights.

American Exceptionalism places bare the relation between nationalism and universalism in the rights cultures of all states that have constitutional regimes of liberty. The question to be asked is the following: if all nations are, at least to their citizens, exceptional, how will they preserve rights as universal values? In the case of the United States, Americans will not believe any truth to be self-evident that have not been authored by their own men and women of greatness, by Jefferson and Hamilton, Martin Luther King, and Lincoln.

The American creed itself –because it speaks of the equality of all peoples -enjoys Americans to deliberate, to listen, to engage with other citizens of other cultures-something they rarely do. Michael Ignatieff ends his essay on Exceptionalism and human rights with a pertinent statement saying:

...even for an exceptional nation: to listen, to deliberate with others, and if persuasive reasons are offered them, to alter and improve their own inheritance in the light of other nation's example. The critical cost that America pays for Exceptionalism is that this stance gives the country convincing reasons not to listen and learn. Nations that find reasons not to listen and learn end up losing¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it changed the world*, New York: The century Foundation, (2001), quoted in *ibid*, p.13.

Then, we conclude that American Orientalism, as a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and the Occident, cultivates this basic perception of an inherent division between the East and the West and more precisely here, the American identity and exceptional vision of itself and consequently of the other; a vision strongly shaped by ideologies like that of nationalism, national interest and exceptionalism.

3 - Orientalism and American Exceptionalism at work

When the United States looks overseas, it does so from an assumed position of moral and spiritual strength. For as long as the United States has existed, a professed sagacity of its exceptionalism has instilled the way that Americans view the rest of the world. In the twentieth century, this view has been toughened by the material reality of US economic and military strength. The essence of American Exceptionalism is a celebration of the uniqueness and special virtue of the United States. It rests on the belief that the United States has a special role to play in the world, and unique qualities to bring to this role.

American Exceptionalism has become a public myth that provides a philosophical foundation for debates on specific policies, including US foreign policy¹⁶⁵. At the very least, it takes for granted that the United States is morally and culturally operational to offer a model to the world. James Madison for example assumes that his own vision of good government was universal, that others would naturally share the same perspective. “*The free system of government we have established is so congenial with reason, with common sense, and with a universal feeling, that it must produce approbation and a desire of imitation*”.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Ibid

¹⁶⁶ Tami R. Davis and Jean M. Lynn-Jones, *City upon a Hill*, (New York, Foreign Policy 66, 1987) pp. 20-38, 23.

What Madison lacked in making such statement, is that what may seem reasonable to one person may be totally unacceptable to another. But Madison's perspective is typical of American Exceptionalism – rooted as it is in the basic and total virtue of the United States.

More positive interpretations of Exceptionalism support the sponsorship of American values abroad through the use of various aspects of US power and influence. The dichotomy between these two policy positions is a product of America's constructed identity: If Americans place their country on a pedestal, they give themselves two logical policy choices: They must either preserve America's image by shunning involvement with corrupt foreign countries and their sordid, hopeless quarrels, or attempt to reconstruct the world in America's own image. Exceptionalist beliefs and attitudes always will influence America's dealings with the rest of the world, because "*deeply ingrained myths cannot easily be expunged from the American psyche*".¹⁶⁷

So, what are the leading tenets of American exceptionalism? What does make the American exceptionalist identity that it may drive the construction and representation of US nationalism and national interest and hence American orientalism? The nature of these features is such that they have come to be taken for granted by vast numbers of Americans: their expression over the years has drawn most Americans to their way of thinking. All these features bring into play linguistic and ideational resources that saturate US culture, and which are easily reachable, indeed logical, to most Americans.

Undeniably, American exceptionalism is based around a future-oriented, intrinsically optimistic view of the world. Former Secretary of State George Shultz attempted to explain this phenomenon. In a 1984 statement he claimed that:

Unlike most other nations, we are not defined by an ancient common tradition or by ethnic homogeneity. What unifies us is not a common origin but a common set of ideals. . . . We Americans thus define ourselves

¹⁶⁷ Madison quoted in H. W. Brands, "What America Owes the World", (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 5.

*not by where we came from but by where we are headed: our goals, our values, our principles, which mark the kind of society we strive to create.*¹⁶⁸

A national identity based upon ideals is by its very nature somewhat transcendental – the identity does not rely upon a common heritage, language, or history for its inspiration, as do most forms of nationalism. American exceptionalism is not grounded in earthly roots: it is more transcendental – even spiritual – in nature. This sentiment results in an identity based around shared ideals, but such ideals are intrinsically less concrete than other indicators of national identity.

Cultural historian Loren Baritz describes exceptionalism as a public myth, a myth that is ‘soft-minded.’ Consequently American exceptionalism, because of its ethereal qualities, is very difficult to attack, and therein lies a secret to its durability. Baritz puts forward that the exceptionalist myth *“lays beneath the surface, more in the bloodstream than in the mind, in the national atmosphere rather than in specific policies.”* As such, *‘the city upon a hill myth is unassailable.’*¹⁶⁹

The continuity of American ideals in its foreign policy is explored in Michael Hunt’s book, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*. Historian Michael Hunt views the history of US foreign policy as a schema of America’s exceptionalist identity, which he refers to as *“an ideology that had been tested, refined, and woven into the fabric of the national consciousness”*.¹⁷⁰

The ideals that guide America’s worldview have remained extraordinarily steady over time since the founding of the Republic. President George Washington powerfully expresses his belief in America as a beacon of liberty in his president’s letter to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport in Rhode Island saying:

¹⁶⁸Tami R. Davis and Jean M. Lynn-Jones, "City Upon A Hill", op.cit, p.38

¹⁶⁹ Address by Secretary of State George Shultz at the 86th Annual Washington Day Banquet, "Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of US Foreign Policy", (United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D. C, February 22, 1984). Current Policy No. 551.

¹⁷⁰Ibid.

The citizens of the United States of America have a right to applaud themselves for having given to mankind examples of an enlarged and liberal policy—a policy worthy of imitation. . . . It is now no more that toleration is spoken of as if it were the indulgence of one class of people that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights, for, happily, the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens in giving it on all occasions their effectual support¹⁷¹.

These ideals of American Exceptionalism: ethereal, optimistic, future-oriented, and moralistic, collectively guided American policy but not precisely in the same way as they do now. They were nearly two hundred years ago, but the family resemblance is as easy to discern as it would be erroneous to ignore. The key point is that the exceptionalist identity is based upon common ideals – a common vision of America’s role in the present and future world – rather than common interests or a shared background. Abraham Lincoln's extraordinary speech, March 4, 1865 expresses this moralistic view:

‘With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all

¹⁷¹ Michael M. Hunt, "Ideology and US Foreign Policy", (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p.172.

¹⁴⁹ Jonathan, Foreman, *The Pocket Book of Patriotism*, (the United States, Sterling Publishing, October 2005), p.18.

*which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace
among ourselves and with all nations.*¹⁷²

Furthermore, in a 1996 article, David Sadler formulates Exceptionalism as an ‘idea-based’ identity (rather than heritage-based). Sadler suggests that Exceptionalism might be characterized by the belief that America is a “new society,” created by human will, not the arbitrariness of tyrants or history, and defined by “an idea rather than nationality. Together, these factors contribute to the conviction that the US has a moral mission which flows out of its identity.”¹⁷³

This moralistic vision of American exceptionalism leads us naturally to the dichotomy between good and evil. There must be a clear division between the two boundaries, and this leaves awfully little room for shades of grey in between. The American attitude toward the issue of good and evil stands in marked contrast to the views of other developed states. A 1990 World Values Survey asked individuals from several countries to choose which of two statements most accurately reflected their view of the world. The two statements were:

- 1: There are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. These apply to everyone, whatever the circumstances.
- 2: There can never be absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. What is good and evil depends entirely upon the circumstances of our time.

The test results showed that Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians preferred the second option. A majority of Americans (50% against 45%), however, chose the first statement¹⁷⁴. These results offer evidence that US citizens have a more clearly defined – and inflexible – view of right versus wrong, or good versus evil. Thus, we deduce that American Exceptionalism

¹⁷³ Ibid

¹⁵¹ David Sadler, "Defending the West: Ideology and US Foreign Policy during the Cold War", (United Kingdom, Philip John Davies (Ed), Representing and Imagining America, Keele: Keele University Press, 1996), p. 216.

requires an environment in which there is a strong nous of the dichotomy between good and evil. A society that is more casual about the good versus evil debate is much less likely to be persuaded by the articulation of moralistic gambits. On balance, Exceptionalism rests upon the notion that the United States is intrinsically more righteous than other states, a construction which turned out to be problematic, even flawed.

Accordingly, Exceptionalism nourishes the moralistic perception of the American people, while the rhetoric of Exceptionalism sustains that continuing moral perception. The effect, however, is a regular American tradition of representing the world in a black and white framework. Scholar Ronald Steel warns of the dangers of a worldview that rests upon a good versus evil dichotomy. He argues that the danger with such a bloated Universalist notion is that it obscures the way the world really works. It describes all disputes as those between good and evil, and turns them into crusades for the soul of mankind.

Quarrels between states are always defended on moral grounds, but usually have more mundane origins.¹⁷⁵ Steel takes the logic of a moralistic worldview to the next march, which is that 'if one's enemy is absolutely evil (as he usually is, by definition), then any means used against him becomes moral. If all aggression is a crime against humanity, there is little room for compromise.'¹⁷⁶

So there are some embryonic problems that can be tied with a clear-cut and sure perception of good and evil. The main problem is specifically that it is an issue of cultural perception, which varies from culture to culture, society to society. The United States, by constructing an exceptionalist identity, universalizes its own perceptions of good and evil. The side-effect of such a culture is the risk of intolerance for alternative views that do not construct the world within the same framework. As Davis and Lynn-Jones

¹⁷⁵ Ronald Inglehart, "1990 World Values Survey ". Quoted in Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double Edged Sword*, (New York, Norton, 1996) p.64.

¹⁵³ Ronald Steel, "Temptations of a Superpower", (the United States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p.93

¹⁵⁴ Ibid,p.94

point out, 'if Americans regard themselves as morally superior to the rest of the world, they can regard any criticisms only as unfounded and malicious.'¹⁷⁷

Although the United States preferred to lead by example for most of the pre-twentieth century period, the belief in their inherent goodness remained shining. Indeed, the fact that the United States generally did not interfere may have helped save the self-righteous aura. When Americans began to look abroad more comprehensively, they were armed with a firm conviction in their own inherent goodness. McDougall suggests that Americans were custodians of the spirit of righteousness, of the spirit of equal-handed justice, of the spirit of hope which believes in the perfectibility of the law with the perfectibility of human life itself.¹⁷⁸

Consequently, when this attitude was applied to US foreign policy, the implications were that power in the hands of virtuous guardians had to be good, and that all who defies that power were unconscious tools of the devil¹⁷⁹. Similar views are represented in America today. The 1990 World Values Survey, cited above, is an example of Americans continued belief that they are on the side of good versus evil. American leaders, especially in the Cold War era, have stressed the dichotomy between good and evil.

Then, while President Reagan labeled the Soviet Union as the 'evil empire', his Secretary of State George Shultz declared that we are proud of our country and what it stands for. We have confidence in our ability to do good. We draw our inspiration from the fundamental decency of the American people.¹⁸⁰

Referring to enemies as evil is a common story of US foreign policy. In recent years Saddam Hussein, Manuel Noriega, Osama Bin Laden,

¹⁷⁸ Davis and Lynn-Jones, *City Upon a Hill*, op.cit, p. 35.

¹⁵⁶ Walter. A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the world since 1776*, Boston, Mariner books, (1997), p.128.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p.130

¹⁵⁸ George Shultz, "Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of US Foreign Policy", New York, Current policy No.551, David P.Forsyth, (February 22, 1984).p.75

Slobodan Milosevic, Mamar el Kaddafi and several others have received the 'evil' ticket. The explanation for such behavior is twofold: First, in defining an opponent as evil, it creates a background more advantageous to the representation of America as good. Second, and building on the first point, a good versus evil battle is much more likely to gain the attention and approval of the American community, because it compresses a potentially multifaceted scenario into an easily accessible question of identity.

Undoubtedly, by considering the reification of exceptionalism, there is a risk that as a result, successful policies may be growingly defined as those that make Americans feel good about their country.¹⁸¹ Exceptionalism like nationalism is open to political abuse, and to corrupt policymakers. It will always seem easier to offer rhetorical reaffirmations of America's essential goodness than to build public support for sustained negotiations on complex and controversial issues¹⁸².

Of course if, as suggested, policymakers are equally interpolated into the exceptionalist fold, identity and interests are naturalized beyond perceivable separation and policymakers are thus incapable of falsely representing them. What remains significant is that the good/evil dichotomy can reduce foreign policy issues to a simplistic moral equation: "us" (good) versus "them" (evil). Thus, for the United States to be willing to commit to war, its 'good' role must be defined. Seymour Martin Lipset addresses this issue, in his claim that:

Protestant-inspired moralism . . . has determined the American style in foreign relations generally, including the ways we go to war. To endorse a war and call on people to kill others and die for the country, Americans must define their role in a conflict as being on God's side against Satan – for morality, against evil.

¹⁸¹ George Shultz, "Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of US Foreign Policy", New York, Current policy No.551, David P.Forsyth, (February 22, 1984), p.75

¹⁸² Davis and Lynn-Jones, *City upon a Hill*, op.cit, p. 37.

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*, p.39

The United States primarily goes to war against evil, not, in its self-perception, but in order to defend material interests¹⁸³. The key idea, however, is that the United States imagines that other states are able to see quite clearly how and why they should evolve in such a way. Clearly, many other states do not follow this logic, however natural it may seem to Americans. The American identity in this sense is both naïve and arrogant, philanthropic yet narcissistic.

Anyway, the belief that America serves as a moral paradigm, or model, for the rest of the world has continued to be a major component of the national conscience. It validates the convictions that the United States is morally qualified for world leadership.¹⁸⁴ It is interesting to see how Representations of American Exceptionalism tend to universalize the cultural bias that guides them. This builds upon the assumption that the American model is naturally desirable on a universal scale. Again, to presume that American values are equally applicable in all areas of the world is easily perceived by outsiders as arrogant and highly ethnocentric.

In a 1991 article, Michael Vlahos constructs a model that suggests the way that the US global culture operates. There are four key assumptions, or 'bedrock premises', that Vlahos asserts. First, others naturally yearn to become like "Americans." Second, once they embrace certain American technological norms in their way of life, they will have passed a cultural watershed. This is parallel to securing a basic foundation for progress. Third, once they get passionate about American movies and music, they will actually begin to think like Americans. This may seem like indoctrination, but according to Michael Vlahos, it is not, because finally, all cultural differences are at root a consequence of a lack of communication, perpetuated by miscommunication. Once the world is properly networked, cultural convergence toward America is inevitable.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Seymour Martin Lipset, "American Exceptionalism", op.cit, p. 20.

¹⁶² A. L. Jain and M. P. Logan, "A Liberal Democratic World Order: Renewing America's Strategic Mission", National Security Studies Quarterly 1, Issue 1, U.S.A, (1995), p. 10.

Vlahos outlines a fair portrayal of how exceptionalist attitudes can universalize American values. The elemental assumption is that the world will be a better place once all other states come to realize that America knows best, and adopt American values. So, basing on Vlahos understanding, American Exceptionalism is naturally geared toward an obligation for international paternalism.

But why is this the case? Perhaps the most simplistic answer is that “*if Americans didn’t bring the world up to their own standard, the world would bring Americans down to its*”;

As suggested by Historian Herbert. W. Brands.¹⁸⁶ This answer is certainly consistent with other features of the exceptionalist identity: whom else could the US trust to do the job? Another reason is that because American exceptionalism has survived for so long, certain assumptions have become ingrained in the American identity. The United States has taken on the role of “leader of the free world” at least since the 1940s, during which, Americans became used to hearing that their identity depends on a special responsibility for world order.¹⁸⁷ Since then, the American leadership role has been repeatedly represented and articulated, and so it is only natural that this role be incorporated into American culture until it is taken for granted.

No discussion of American Exceptionalism would be complete without reference to the classic debate between those who believe that the United States should merely set an example to the world (exemplars) and those that maintain that the United States must vigorously engage the world in order to fulfill its purpose (crusaders). The debate has taken a considerable part of American foreign policy thinking for as long as the United States has existed, and remains so today. However, it is noteworthy that both perspectives value the same elementary principles of American Exceptionalism – the good versus evil dichotomy, the assumption of American virtue, and the future-oriented optimism – they just differ on the policy that they infer from this identity.

¹⁸⁶ Michael Vlahos, "Culture and Foreign Policy". New York, Foreign, Policy 82, Spring, (1991), p. 69.

¹⁸⁴ Brands, "What America Owes the World", op.cit, pp.11-13.

Brands offers an intellectual history of the debate between these two interpretations of American Exceptionalism, recording the expansion of both bases of thought. Brands defines each perspective, beginning with the exemplars: On one side have been those who hold that the United States owes the world merely the example of a humane, democratic, and prosperous society. These exemplarists have argued that perfecting American institutions and practices at home is a full-time job. In attempting to save the world, and probably failing, America would risk losing its democratic soul."¹⁸⁸ Brands refers to the more interventionist school of thought as the vindicator tradition:

*On the other side of the debate have been those who contend that America must move beyond example and undertake active measures to vindicate the right. In a nasty world, these vindicators say, the sword of wrath must complement the lantern of virtue. Evil goes armed, and so must goo.*¹⁸⁹

Both sides share the same long-term goals: global achievement of the American perception of the “good life”. Their difference is one of method. In “Promised Land, Crusader State”, Walter A. McDougall explores the historical tension between each tendency, and in doing so, he produces perhaps the most expressive summary of the conflicting views: “*While America the Promised Land had held that to try to change the world was stupid and immoral, America the Crusader State held that to refrain from trying to change the world was immoral and stupid.*”¹⁹⁰

The Founding Fathers were jammed to John Winthrop’s model of America-as example, the classic 'City upon a Hill' vision, and the dominant idea of the early republic was that the United States should not dirty itself in

¹⁸⁸ Earl C. Ravenal, "Never Again: Learning from America's Foreign Policy Failures", (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1978), p.129.

¹⁶⁶ H.W.Brands, "What America Owes the World", op.cit, pp.12-13.

¹⁶⁷ Walter. A. McDougall, "Promised Land, Crusader State", op.cit, p.205.

¹⁶⁸ John Quincy Adams quoted in Michael M. Hunt, " Ideology and US Foreign Policy ", United Kingdom, New Haven: Yale University Press, (1987), p. 28.

foreign affairs. In a speech on July 4, 1821, John Quincy Adams ¹⁹¹ summed up the exemplar position, announcing that although the United States sympathized with people around the world that sought freedom, she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. Instead of direct involvement, the United States ought to *"recommend the general cause of freedom by the countenance of her voice and by the benignant sympathy of her example"*.¹⁹² Adams opposed American intervention, even for the cause of freedom, because the United States *"would involve herself beyond the power of extrication. . . . She might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit."*¹⁹³

American Exceptionalism is characterized by a contemplative nature, which can be viewed as self-consciousness. With regard to foreign policy, the United States tends to spend much more time than other countries simply contemplating its perceived role. Almost like a character actor, the United States carefully constructs its character on foreign policy issues, and once that character is created, it is very cautiously protected and justified.

It could be said that while all states act and react on the basis of an identity/interest calculus, the United States is peculiar in that it prefers to make this calculus public. Very little is simply acted upon in US foreign policy without a complementary flood of justifying discourse. The United States, it would seem, appears to require constant reminders of the cultural and ideational factors that are controlling a given policy.

But still, this case remains unclear. The haziness of the good versus evil dichotomy remained a major trauma to America's sense of identity. Even Exceptionalism was brought into question. The exceptionalist identity that has returned since Vietnam is more introspective, and asks many more questions of itself and its motives than before. The United States is very hesitant to commit itself to open-ended interventions, and even brief interventions are constantly interpreted and justified through representations of the American identity.

¹⁹² Ibid, p.29

¹⁹³ Ibid, p.30

In doing so, the United States is seeking support for its actions. The question is from whom? The key point here is that while the United States derives its foreign policy from its construction of identity and interests like any other state, it appears to have a greater need to articulate this construction, both to domestic and foreign audiences. Hence, compared to other states, the construction and representation of identity in US foreign policy at least appears to play a more significant role.

4-American Orientalism and societal culture and civilization (consumerism)

Orientalism rhetoric as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts is not simply a theoretical and academic concept; it is also a mindset with important implications clearly demonstrated in Western culture, popular opinion, and even foreign policy.

During the years of imperial expansion, Said argues, “*European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.*”¹⁹⁴

This binary logic does not set the East and the West on equal balance, but instead pits the two against one another in order to emphasize the colonial and, therefore, cultural superiority of the Occident over the Orient. A vital and necessary distinction must be outlined here between European and American traditions of Orientalism. Again, Said argues that while the French and the British had a long tradition of Orientalism, Americans only began to explore Orientalist thinking during their period of political ascendancy immediately following the Second World War, because Britain and France established deep colonial ties with the Middle and Far East, “*to speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enterprise.*”¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Michael Ignatieff, op cit, p.26

¹⁹⁵ Edward Said, “*Orientalism*”, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), chap. 3.

Historically, The United States had long been militarily, diplomatically, and economically involved with the Far East. According to Naomi Rosenblatt, in his work *Orientalism in American Popular Culture*, during this early period, European forms of Orientalism were adapted, creating a culture of aristocratic orientalism; a culture that is for the most part social, conferring status on those who possessed Chinese things and ideas¹⁹⁶. Hence, the American Orientalism version, turned out to be an expression of cultural superiority by means of material possession, largely linked to the Far East until approximately the mid-nineteenth century, then to the Arab lands of the Middle East.

At that point, Said's binary understanding of Orientalism as a way of comprehending and ultimately domesticating the Middle East for American consumption¹⁹⁷ goes further in arguing that "*the Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture,*"¹⁹⁸ it must also be stressed that during the growth of consumerism in America, the aesthetics of the Orient became an integral part of American material culture as well. Exploited Orientalist images of exotic lands associated with luxury and sensuality in the Middle East influenced seriously the aesthetic expression of American orientalism which is basically material.

Despite the fact that the United States did not have an imperial presence in The Middle East or a particularly strong diplomatic one, it nonetheless encountered the Middle East in a number of ways that would later have a distinct influence on the aesthetic expression of American Orientalism. How? According to Naomi Rosenblatt, During the eighteenth and nineteenth

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, chap 3,p.57

¹⁹⁷ John Kuo Wei Tchen, "New York Before Chinatown: Orientalism and the Shaping of American Culture 1776-1882", Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, (1999), pp.55-62. Quoted in Naomi Rosenblatt, *Orientalism in American Popular Culture*, University of Pennsylvania, rosenblatt@upenn.edu

¹⁹⁸ Melani McAlister, "Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and US Interests in the Middle East since 1945", Berkeley: University of California Press, (2000), p.12.

¹⁹⁹ Said, op.cit, chap 3.

²⁰⁰ Douglas Little, "American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945", Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, (2002), p. 12.

centuries, American travelers to the Middle East specifically to the Holy Land Of Palestine, were primarily missionaries, merchants, and tourists on religious pilgrimages and these periodic maritime adventures led to frequent naval encounters with Barbary pirates, a fact that led to the drawing and engraving of an image in the public imagination at large of Middle Easterners as barbaric, vicious, despotic, and uncivilized¹⁹⁹.

Worst, with the outbreak of the Greek rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in 1821, the highly popular literary journal, *the North American Review*, marked the ensuing struggle as ‘*a war of the crescent against the cross*’ and claimed that “*wherever the arms of the Sultan prevail, the village churches are leveled with the dust or polluted with the abominations of mahometanism.*”²⁰⁰

Consequently, American Orientalism, consciously or unconsciously chose a violent mode of action well illustrated as a historic crusade of a heroic Christian civilization against a repressive, authoritarian Islamic civilization.

But still, the lack of personal experiences caused befuddlement and prepared the ground for these cultural generalizations and bolstered the perception of the clash of civilizations. Yet, it did not prevent the United States from pursuing an economic relationship with the Middle East: “*by the 1870s American entrepreneurs were buying nearly one-half of Turkey’s opium crops for resale in China while providing the Ottoman Empire with everything from warships to kerosene.*”²⁰¹

The association of opium with the Ottoman Empire certainly played a significant role in the popular association of the East with luxury and opulence in American Orientalist aesthetics, but apparently, contradictory stereotypes of the Middle East, which were created and developed by American economic and military interactions with the Orient, intoxicated the American popular imagination through the popularization of Middle East and Holy Land travel

²⁰¹ Ibid. p.12

²⁰¹ McAlister, op.cit, p. 37

²⁰² Ibid, p. 90.

narratives; Stories that played a critical role in the development of these stereotypes.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, Americans increasingly “expressed a fascination with travel in their enthusiasm for museum and world’s fair exhibits, postal cards, magic lantern slides, stereographs, panoramas and dioramas, Hale’s Tours, actuality footage, and so forth.”²⁰² Undoubtedly travelogues played a serious role in developing and shaping the Orientalist aesthetics and contributing to public awareness about the Middle East²⁰³

Despite the relatively limited experience of Americans with the Middle East, the late nineteenth century was replete with memories like the memory of the Tripolitan wars, the popularization of travelogues, and popular contemporary Christian attitudes about Arabs. The “Orient” became synonymous with romance, mystery, and barbarism. All this was a precursor to the development of American consumer culture that first began to finally took on Orientalism as a distinctive aesthetic in American popular culture; A thing that was taken advantage from in this age of escalating consumerism by American vendors and businessmen in order to encourage consumer spending and indulgence.

Rightly in this pustule, Clemens uses his musings in *The Innocents Abroad* to criticize the superiority with which Western tourists approached the Middle East and acknowledges his feeling that he has been “swindled by books of Oriental travel”²⁰⁴ , and hardly ever could he fall prey to the Orientalist mindset himself:

To see a camel train laden with the spices of Arabia and the rare fabrics of Persia come marching through the narrow alleys of the bazaar...and the crowds drifting to and fro in the fanciful costumes of the East, is a genuine revelation of the Orient. The picture lacks nothing. It

²⁰⁴ Ibid, p.14

²⁰⁴ Mark Twain, *The Innocents Abroad*; or, the *New Pilgrims Progress*, New York: Signet Classic, (1966), p.278

casts you back into your forgotten boyhood, and again you dream over the wonders of The Arabian Nights; again your companions are princes, your lord is the Caliph Haroun Al Raschid, and your servants are terrific giants and genii that come with smoke and lightning and thunder, and go as a storm when they depart!

Even *The Innocents Abroad*, the great example of the travelogue that sought to dispel popular stereotypes about the Orient, somehow managed to simultaneously perpetuate those stereotypes. Basing on Naomi Rosenblatt analysis of the history of American Orientalist aesthetics, it was during the second Industrial Revolution that the rise of mass production of consumer goods, particularly during the 1890s, when the industrial production surpassed consumer demand. In light of this threat of overproduction where there were “*more goods to sell, and the limits of imperialism made conquering new markets less certain, then increases in the average consumption per person would, in time, become a favored answer to the overproduction dilemma.*”²⁰⁵

The growth of urban department stores presented a solution to the problem, as they turned increasingly to new methods of marketing in order to increase customer spending. Faced with a culture unfamiliar with generous materialism and excessive spending, “*department store designers sought to lower people’s resistance to purchasing, and advertising sought to trigger buying on impulse, aiming for the emotions rather than rational thought and calculation.*”²⁰⁶

This new attitude towards marketing led to the rapid emergence of the advertising industry and to visually assertive invitations to purchase mass-produced consumer products and a shift toward making the product seem desirable by visual rather than verbal means, that the buyer would find

²⁰⁶ McAlister, op.cit, p.21.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Holly Edwards, “Sold American!” *Noble Dreams, Wicked Pleasures*”, ed. Holly Edwards, 200-206 Princeton: Princeton University Press, (2000), 200.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 154.

appealing²⁰⁷. One of the earliest manifestations of visual enticement took on the form of Orientalist aesthetics.

For the sake of increasing consumption, ordinary American department stores were transformed into shops overloaded with enticing Orientalist displays of merchandise²⁰⁸. An Orientalist aesthetic highlighted the mystery and alluring sensuality of the Orient, through the use of deep, warm colors, exotic patterns, and depictions of oases, harems, mosques, and bazaars with other loaded details of Middle Eastern art evoking Orientalist fantasies about traveling to distant exotic places and indulging “sensual appetites.”²⁰⁹

Moreover, it featured romanticized elements from supposed “everyday” Middle Eastern life: “*belly dancers, Bedouins, camels, and donkeys...This was the Orient brought home for the delectation of privileged American audiences.*”²¹⁰ Nevertheless, this Oriental aesthetic presented a welcome “*counter to vulgar materialism so that the changing middle class might be assured that they still retained traditional genteel values*”²¹¹

A telling detail is how consumerism, linked with the Orientalist aesthetic, was remodeling, belittling and demeaning the Orient by anthropologists, fair organizers, and ultimately, the American public²¹². This Orientalist representation of the Middle East did not depict its subject with any truthfulness or respect towards its unique cultures. Instead, it sought to satisfy the physical and visual desires of its public.

Furthermore, this new fashionable accent on consumption served to underline the unification of gender roles by equating “*an expensive boutique in the public sphere with the privacy of a woman’s boudoir.*”²¹³ Thus, the Orientalist aesthetic was the catalyst that ultimately put shoppers at ease,

²¹⁰ Edwards, *A Million and One Nights*, p. 37.

²¹¹ Studlar, Op.Cit p. 103.

²¹² Edwards, *A Million and One Nights*, Op. Cit, p.17.

²¹³ Ibid, p.156.

²¹⁴ Ibid. p.91.

allowing them to comfortably break from old norms by equating the Orient with luxury and seeking to instill in them an impulsive, consumerist desire to open their wallets, and accumulate goods and purchase their own piece of the Orient.²¹⁴

Another expression of Orientalist aesthetic in American consumer culture is in the film industry that flourished in the early twentieth century. As film became the newest art and medium for the proliferation of culture and information and also the pursuit of new avenues of exploration, it had the capacity to show audiences what they would otherwise not be able to see, including exotic lands, peoples, and events. *Hollywood* with its Orientalist style was an important site of representing the world abroad to US audiences²¹⁵. These films typified all of the Orientalist stereotypes about the Middle East: the lands and cultures were depicted as beautiful, mysterious, and sexually alluring, while the inhabitants were barbaric, savage, and tyrannical.

Hence, American capitalists exploited and encouraged popular assumptions about the Orient as a means of encouraging impulsive consumer spending, which served as a precursor to modern marketing methods. Even the film industry exploited the Orient, transforming it into a commodity available for widespread visual consumption.

As the United States has engaged in more intimate diplomatic and cultural contact with the Middle East over the past century, however, the traditional Orientalist aesthetic has slowly begun to faint due to September 11th, 2001 events that have shed light on the necessity of a genuine cultural understanding of the Middle East on its own terms.

What is also of significance is that the United States has never gone to war solely for idealistic or moral reasons, nor has the American foreign policy ever been placed wholly in the service of ethical principles. That is not the American way any more than it is the British, Chinese, French, Israeli, or

²¹⁵McAlister, op.cit, p.31. Also , see Michael Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to Present*, (New York:W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), pp.166-168

Chapter one: American Orientalism within the East/West Dichotomy

Russian way. Governments, whether democracies or dictatorships, do not act out of altruistic motives but rather, out of calculations rooted in a conscious – though not necessarily correct-set of notions about the national interest which says nothing about ends or means. Nationalism and national interest ideologies are basic tenants of American foreign policy in The Middle East and therefore its Neo-Orientalist project that emanates from its hegemonic position in world politics.

Chapter two:

American Orientalism and interests before, during, and after the Cold War

A. American Orientalism, Nationalism and national interest

Nationalisms, in the larger sense, can vary in their conceptions of nation which are left implicit in the political discourse. Sometimes nationalism goes under the name of patriotism, a different usage that salts away patriotism as a valorization of civic community and loyalty to one's state, in contrast to nationalism, centered on ethno- cultural communities.

Nationalists claim that the centrality of nation for political action provide an answer to one crucial question: is there one kind of large social group that is morally of central importance or not? The nationalist answer is that there is just one, namely, the nation. When a critical choice is to be made, nation has priority.

According to the American historian Carlton Hayes,¹ the power of nationalism lies in its ability to achieve the status of civil religion. It functions as a religion in that it is emotional, sentimental, and inspirational; it offers faith in the collective power of the state, its mission and its destiny and would create in individuals the desire to protect the glory of the nation to the extent of a willingness to sacrifice themselves if required. Eternal life is bound to the continued survival of the nation, and in order to preserve the latter, the death of individuals may be necessary. On this point, Rousseau asked the question:

*“Does not the undertaking entered by the whole body
of the nation bind it to provide for the security of its*

¹ Carlton Hayes, *Nationalism as a Religion*, Essays on Nationalism, The MacMillan Company, New York, (1926), pp. 104-105.

members with as much care as that for all the rest? Is the welfare of a single citizen any less the common cause than that of the whole state?"

To which he replied:

"It may be said that it is good that one should perish for all. I am ready to admire such a saying when it comes from the lips of a virtuous and worthy patriot voluntarily and dutifully sacrificing himself for the good of his country. But if we are to understand by it, that it is lawful for the government to sacrifice an innocent man for the good of the multitude, I look upon it as one of the most execrable rules of tyranny ever invented, the greatest falsehood that can be advanced" ²

Nationalism also has a messianic feature. Religious ideas such as "chosen people" or "divine mission" are evident in all forms of nationalism. When needed, leaders always turn to biblical scripture, or other religious teachings to provide a religious foundation to promote national superiority or to enlist military power in the cause of defending sacred values and rights.

Sometimes, nationalism plays on patriotic sentiments and the people's need to feel as if they were part of a greater whole by exercising routine methods of indoctrination, activities honoring the national myth, like pledging allegiance to the national flag, or singing the national anthem at communal and official gatherings, displaying national colors and symbols at specific occasions and honoring past events with national holidays. It also includes, to varying degrees of Orwellian terror, persuasive public rhetoric designed to bring glory to the nation.

² Jean Jacques Rousseau, *A Discourse on Political Economy*, the Social contract and the Discourses, London: Everyman, (1999) p.144

But the danger of the mythology of nationalism, in Jack Snyder and Karen Balentine's analysis, is that it has a tendency to breed conflict³ :

"Conflict is inherent in typical nationalist myths because they overemphasize the cultural and historical distinctiveness of the national group, exaggerate the threat posed to the nation by other groups, ignore the degree to which the nation's own actions provoked such threats, and play down the costs of seeking national goals through militant means".⁴

This conflict is caused by the deliberate elite efforts to mobilize latent solidarities behind a particular political program, which falsified myths are used to justify. This power of the elite over the people constitutes a further danger of nationalism because the latter relies on their narrative. Presidents and their advisors have learned that by exercising their power over the people, they control the content and context of political discourse. They can manipulate public opinion, win support for policies and actions that seem to serve public interest but in actual fact are totally at variance to what people want or need.⁵

Paradoxically, both democracies and dictatorships need nationalism to legitimize the political authority of their governments. Hence, nationalism as the exaltation of the nation and support of its action becomes the national creed or even religion. As stated by Amit Bhaduri, It demands "the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interest."⁶

A nationalist thinks in terms of competence, his or her nation against all others, thinking about the actions necessary to secure a strong position, economically and politically in the international hierarchy as possible. Where

³ Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, *Nationalism and the market place of ideas*, International Security, Volume 21, (autumn 1996), p.11

⁴ *ibid.*, p.12

⁵ Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic societies*, United Kingdom, Pluto Press, (1989). chap 1, p13

⁶ Amit Bhaduri, "Nationalism in the Era of Globalization", in: <http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/wp188.pdf>

applying those concepts on American presidential rhetoric during the twentieth century, one sees that nationalism and national interest ideologies had been overtly and extensively displayed.

The United States as a nation was not one people, one religion, one economic system. It was an amalgamation of all; what tied this group of individuals together was a belief in what have become the defining characteristics of American values or liberties: *the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and the opportunity for anyone to succeed*. This emphasis on principles had a more pronounced role in shaping America's political policies and had been used by political leaders to implement varying, even conflicting, policies and manipulate rhetoric by using words like freedom, equality and justice to support isolationism or interventionism, free trade or trade embargoes, human rights or oppression.

Furthermore, politicians and pundits everywhere have used a phrase that captures the essence of the ends of nationalism: 'national interest', a phrase that gained political popularity during the 1980's in the United States under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, but whose guiding force was an integral part of American national and international policies. The primary dilemma, however, is that the national interest is vague, and confusing. Besides, its lack of substantive meaning makes it little more than a phrase of convenience for political leaders and pundits. Certainly, there are accepted meanings for general usage for individual terms "national" and "interest", combining the two would refer to an interest that is national in scope.

Samuel Huntington defines the national interest saying:

*A national interest is a public good of concern to all or most Americans; a vital national interest is one which they are wiling to expend blood and treasure to defend. National interests usually combine security and material concerns, on the one hand, and moral and ethical concerns, on the other.*⁷

⁷ Samuel Huntington, "In Search of National Interest", in: <http://is.ci-ce-ct.com:85/article/showquestion.asp?faq=3&fldAuto=90>

When adopting pragmatic considerations, we find that there is no single, overriding interest for any nation. The interests of nations change given the contexts in which they arise. Yet, who is defining the interests and the specific social and political circumstances that call for their definition? American presidents and their advisors consistently failed to offer the American people any clear demarcation of what were the interests of the United States. Consequently, they made the decisions upon those undefined interests that have cost the American nation thousands of lives and billions of dollars. Clearly enough, actions of today's America's political leaders show that US national interests are economic expansion and ideological conquest.

The Founding Fathers initially shaped America's interests as it can be clearly seen in Alexander Hamilton's words in the federalist n° 41. It was written that: *Security against danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American union ...*⁸

Further, Hamilton argued in Federalist n°11 that a strong government may oblige foreign countries to bid against each other for access to American markets and could also open foreign markets for America:

*Suppose, for instance, ,we had a government in America capable of excluding Great Britain from all our ports, would it enable us to negotiate with the fairest prospects for success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive kind, in the dominion of that kingdom?*⁹

Also Madison wrote that the regulation of relations with foreign nations "forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration"¹⁰. The creation of a strong energetic government, with the power and authority to negotiate with other nations and to build a navy, could best secure national interests.

⁸ Alexander Hamilton et al, "Federalist papers N° 41", General View of the powers Conferred by the Constitution, in: <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa41.htm>

⁹ Alexander Hamilton, et al, "Federalist N° 11", the utility of the union in respect to commercial relations and navy in: <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federal11.htm>

¹⁰ Alexander Hamilton, et al, "Federalist N° 42, in: <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa42.htm>

With this sense, American historian Charles A. Beard, though intensely criticized¹¹, concluded that the constitution

*was essentially an economic document based upon the concept that the fundamental private rights of property are anterior to government and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities.*¹²

Through this description, Beard characterizes politics as a bargaining process aimed at satisfying the interests of economic elites. Moreover, he scandalized patriotic-minded defenders of historical orthodoxy by arguing that the framers had pursued their task less under the spell of the high ideals of 1776 than with their eyes trained on the main chance, encouraging commerce and manufactures, protecting private property, establishing financial instruments essential for economic development - these were the issues that preoccupied those participating in the secret deliberations in Philadelphia - issues they themselves had a large personal stake; and the product of their labors preserved that stake¹³.

In his metanarrative¹⁴ of *The Rise of American Civilization*, Beard portrays U.S history as dialectic between the agrarian ideal of Thomas Jefferson and the capitalist vision of Alexander Hamilton. For Beard, the Civil War became the critical episode in the history of the Republic, resolving that competition and thus opening the way for the next phase in the nation's development. At root, this "Second American Revolution" was not a dispute over slavery, Union, or state's rights, but a competition between two irreconcilable economic systems, each pushing to expand and facing inevitable decline if denied the opportunity to do so. Although in destroying slavery, the

¹¹ A large proportion of historians and social scientists have not found Beard's theory of economic determinism, launched in 1913, wanting. Among them: Blinkoff in "the influence of Charles A. Beard upon American Historiography", (University of Buffalo Studies. No, 16, 1936). And Robert Brown in *Charles Beard and the Constitution. A Critical Analysis of: An Economic interpretation of the Constitution* (Harvard Law Review, vol.70, No 8, 1957), pp.1497-1505. Also Edward S. Corwin in *The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution; An Answer to the Economic Interpretation*, D.C. Heath And Company, the United States, (1956), pp.88-91.

¹² Charles Austin Beard, *Economic Origins of the Constitution*, "conclusions", New York: the Macmillan Company, (1952), chap.13, p.324.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.325

¹⁴ Cf. Jean François Lyotard. *Post Modernity*. See also Appendix 2.

North's victory brought some modest benefit to those freed, the real winners were greedy capitalist of industry in the North, and to a lesser extent, the South, the result was the Gilded Age, a convulsion of creativity, plunder, and excess that gave rise to the powerful nation we see today.

But yet, what are the implications of that emphasis on economic growth which is a fundamental component of US policies? The answer is rooted in the theoretical problem of why do nations expand? Clearly they cannot do so until they acquire the requisite material power vis-à-vis their victims or rivals. Mere measures of strength cannot account for the motives or timing of a nation's expansion and that is the weakness of the classical school of realism which holds that nations define their interest more broadly as their power expands, and that increase of power forcibly yields assertive policies.¹⁵

The twentieth century brought the explanation that nations expand their interests when they feel less secure, when they perceive threats that demand a response. So they invoke "national security" whether it is endangered or not, and purport that interests come first and that power is mobilized when those interests are threatened. However, the bitter observer cannot explain why the United States projected its power with zeal after 1890 despite the relative absence of serious threats.

This technique of governance, has secured the power held by presidents beyond what American constitutional authority grants. The election of Woodrow Wilson brought what is called by modern political scientists "the rhetorical presidency". The president gives speeches as a means to be in direct contact with the people, playing on their emotions, and then persuades them to support his legislation and make a pressure on Congress to act in accordance to his wishes.¹⁶

Obviously, people are manipulated and are seldom given complete facts on which to base decisions or form opinions. This technique of governing paved the way for what historian Fareed Zakaria named in his book "From

¹⁵ Cf. Michael J. Shapiro. "Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as textual Practice", Minneapolis: MN: University of Minnesota Press, (1992).

¹⁶ See Harley Notter. "The Origins of the Policy of Woodrow Wilson", Baltimore, MD: the Johns Hopkins Press, (1937).

Wealth To Power: the Unusual Origins Of America's World Role", *'Imperial Presidency'*, which means that the executive possessed all powers needed to enforce "the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the constitution itself" namely international relations and all the protection implied by the nature of government under the constitution Zakaria timed this shift with the Supreme Court decision "In re Neagle" in 1890 ¹⁷ by holding in a case not connected to foreign affairs, that the executive had all powers to act when the interests of American people required that a certain act or change should be done, unless it was specifically prohibited by law. This extraordinarily broad decision –Zakaria says-

*Placed in the hands of a president like Benjamin Harrison, not to mention Theodore Roosevelt, the lever needed to move a nation. Whereas Seward and the embattled president Andrew Johnson had to beg and bribe congress to acquire Alaska in 1867, Roosevelt could boast about Panama that he took the Canal Zone and let congress debate*¹⁸

This shows that the American state and its resources had now passed to the hands of the central decision makers who actually not only appealed to the masses for support but also to the definition and direction of the public will.

The First World War shaped the new international age of ideology. Two ideologies emerged: one under Woodrow Wilson termed "*Liberal Internationalism*", sought to abolish national conflict by granting self

¹⁷ Re Reneagle No1472. Argued March 4, 5, 1890-Decided April 14, 1890: Mr. Neagle was appointed by Marshal Franks as a deputy marshal for the Northern District of California, and given special instructions to attend upon Judge Field both in court and while going from one court to another, and protect him from any assault that might be attempted against him by a certain people threatening him. Accordingly, Mr. Neagle shot a man when he was engaged in the business of protecting judge field. Thus the court discharged the prisoner Neagle, that he was *held in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, and in custody in violation of the constitution and laws of the United States*, there does not seem to be any doubt that, under the statute on that subject, he was properly discharged by the circuit court.

¹⁸ Fareed Zakaria, "From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America's World Role", quoted by, Walter A.Mc Dougall, "American Empire", in: http://www.polity.co.uk/content/BPL/Images/Content_store/Sample_chapter/0745633463%5CHel_d_sample%20chapter_American%20power%20in%20the%2021st%20century.pdf

determination to all colonized countries and creating peaceful worldwide community by international law. In the opposite side, stood the Marxist – Leninist ideology of the Soviet Union under Vladimir Illitch Lenin. This in turn, sought world peace through a global communist order aiming at destroying Capitalism, which according to it was the cause of national conflicts. This tension between the two contradictory ideologies created the Cold War and guided American foreign policy essentially till its end.

Perhaps Capitalism triumphed but in point of fact, Wilson's ideology was destroyed. After the defeat of the United States during the Vietnam War, another ideology crammed the blank: Neo-Conservatism. This doctrine expands Wilson's liberal internationalism and embraces the idea of national interest as a means to realize the US potential for popular government and economic prosperity. The practicality of this idea had disastrous consequences on both America and the whole world.

The followers of contemporary nationalism are Machiavellians. They believe that the ends justify the means. But which noble ends are justified by war? Lying to the public (Iraq is just one among the examples), rule by the elite (Bush and his neo-cons advisors (meritocracy)), limiting civil liberties (Patriot Act), imperialism, and unilateralism (acting without approval from allies). It is no secret that this doctrine has often placed the US leaders in difficult political situations. By manipulating political discourse, they push people to risk their lives in international conflicts.

Many American theorists, and before them Rousseau, condemned this attitude that bears an important tenet contrary to democratic theory. It is the manipulation of political discourse by the ruling elite. Particularly since the 1980's, the wealthy have played a significant role in the selection of Americans leaders: they proclaim the golden rule of politics "whoever has the gold rules". This was overtly seen in Woodrow Wilson's thought that the flag followed trade and oil industry.

At any rate, wartime rhetoric of twentieth century presidents demonstrates that what is in the national interest is not defined by the people of the nation, but by their leaders, who decide upon what the national interest is.

Then they tell the people what their best interest is. Americans need not to be reminded that this situation of unchecked power is simply opposed to the constitutional heritage bequeathed to them by the Founding Fathers. In fact, the concept of nationalism did not achieve a stranglehold in political vernacular until the 20th century, for it is then that the material conditions essential to give birth to this powerful ideology were present: the consolidation of populations into masses by means of mass communication, industrialization, commerce, transportation and education.¹⁹

Political leaders learned quickly that the endurance of their nations depended upon being able to create a cohesive national consciousness bent on achieving the ends they desired. This was certainly true of modern American presidents, as the leaders of the nation that, in less than a century, rose from the debris of international war to global political, military, and economic supremacy.

The nationalist programs of American presidents have all contained analogous elements²⁰ – lying to the American people, limiting civil liberties, and seeking warfare- elements that have been pooled into the contemporary nationalist ideology of neo- conservatism. Their success has rested upon their ability to manipulate the tenor, content, and context of public discourse by using the mechanism of demagoguery-appealing directly to the people and using persuasion, emotion, and innuendo rather than fact –political leaders have been able to mold the public will to their own needs.

National interests have provided convenient cloaks to disguise the desires of those in power;

*We speak of national interests, national capital,
national spheres of interest, national honor, national
spirit; but we forget that behind all this there are hidden
merely the selfish interests of power loving politicians*

¹⁹ David Little, "Belief, Ethnicity, and Nationalism". United States Institute of Peace on: <http://www.usip.org/esearch/rehr/blethnat.html>

²⁰ Noam Chomsky, op.cit, chap 1, p.10-26.

and money loving business men for whom the nation is a convenient cover ²¹

But the danger of America's nationalist ideology is not merely that national interests are economic interests in disguise. The danger lies in the requirements necessary to pursue and preserve those economic interests. Economic interests need access to markets and opportunities in non industrialized, "uncivilized" countries; indeed, modern economics of production have made the entire world the source of raw materials as well as the essential market.²² Such policies require a secure military that bolsters the power of the nation in international dealings, making it an even more efficient guardian of commercial interests and an authoritarian imperialistic state.

With each war in the twentieth century, America's vision of power has developed upon Wilson's premise of making the world safe for democracy and its causal drive to make the world safe for free trade. This ideology has also been allowed to take root without question, creating political and economic structures that twisted the course of American foreign policies. In the United States, national survival has come to mean economic preeminence, and accent has been placed on cultivating optimal economic opportunities no matter the cost in lives or dollars.

1-The Development of American Orientalism within the nationalist thought:

Naturally, we would like to be able to theorize the genesis and development of the American Orientalism through the country's national idea and of its nationalist outgrowth. Here, however, the basic point is that most of the paradigms which, social scientists have evolved to think about nationalism

²¹ Rudolf Rucker, "Nationalism and culture", St. Paul, MN: Michael E. Coughlin, (1978). On: <http://www.anarchosyndicalism.org/rocker/nc.htm>.

²² Lowrie S. Gale, *Nationalism, international journal of Ethics*, issue1 (oct.1930) vol.41, p.40.

generally, only serve to underline the “exceptionalism” of the American experience as the major Neo-Orientalist thought based on superiority.

All in all, then, theorizations of nationalism have had little to say about the American case; and, one is tempted to write, almost inescapably so, because most historians of this “nature of nationality problem” have been basically concerned to show how and why “pre-modern” societies have managed – or have failed to manage – their transition to modern democracy, be it “formal” democracy (with sham elections) or “constitutional” democracy (with the rule of law).

Most developmental theories of nation by far have focused on the rise of contemporary nationalisms, many of them motivated either by the exemplary rise at the end of the 19th century of Zionism in Europe as a gesture of self-defense against anti-Semitism of European nationalisms; or by the rise in the second half of the twentieth century of anti-Zionist or anti-European Arab and Asian nationalisms, works that are therefore focused on the often sudden and unprecedented appearance of national consciousnesses.²³

By a stunning contrast, however, the most eye-catching, incompletely theorized aspect of American Orientalism has been, to the contrary, not in its inauguration – but in its ability to subsist and its ability to develop through the ideology of nationalism. Historically, what has mattered in America’s growing and unchallenged self-perception, was not innovation – however curious and imagined or not - but stability. So as a case in point, Bernard Bailyn,²⁴ one of the leading twentieth-century historians of America’s colonial period, claims that

the distrust of power”, generated deep within the ideological origins of the Revolution runs through the entire course of American History and is as potent an element in the American national life today as it was two hundred years ago, and this judgment, could be

²³ Samuel Huntington. *Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two and the Many*, New York, Political Science Quarterly, March, (1974) vol.89, N.1, p. 26.

²⁴ Bernard Bailyn, “The Central Themes of the American Revolution: an Interpretation,” *Essays on the American Revolution*, Stephen Kurtz, Ed, North Carolina Press, (1973), p.27.

duplicated for many other themes and moments of American History.

“America,” wrote Walt Whitman grandly in 1855,

*does not repel the past or what it has produced under its forms or amid other politics or the idea of castes or the old religions. America accepts the lessons with calmness and is not as impatient as has been supposed. America still sticks to opinions and manners and literature while the life which served its requirements has passed into the new life of new forms.*²⁵

The birth and development of America’s national consciousness obviously deserve close attention. But, again in Bailyn's point of view, its most arresting trait is less in the nature of its origins than in its ability to move through time as a regular mixture of encrusted themes that can be either complementary or antithetical, as in Orientalism, or in the juxtaposition of communitarian religiosity and economic individualism; or again, of universalist Enlightenment values and the sense of America as a divinely elected place,²⁶ a dangerous Neo-Orientalist idea that will prove later to be so.

Obviously, this “American creed” has not been stationary. Its nucleus has developed, by removing itself for example of its more detrimental prejudices through the gathering and acceptance of labor organizers, for example, during the 1930’s; or, yesterday, of African-Americans; of homosexuals today; and tomorrow, only God knows.

But America’s endless wrangles and debates about what is right and proper have not proved conflicting with the forging of a wide agreement on the larger meanings of Americanism. Indeed, it is perhaps because they agree on so many fundamental issues that Americans can afford to quarrel ad infinitum about which legalistic procedure best will give body to their imagined sense of self.

²⁵ Quoted in *ibid*, p.29.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p.31

The United States had the chance after the 9/11 terrorist attacks to create a concert of all the world's major states (including Muslim ones) against Islamist revolutionary terrorism. Why instead did it choose to pursue policies which divided the west, further alienated the Muslim world, and exposed America itself to greatly increased danger?

Perhaps the most important reason is the nature of American nationalism. This might explain why many Americans reacted in the way that they did to 9/11 and why it was possible for the Bush administration later to extend the "war on terror" to Iraq (an overloaded Neo-Orientalist project), and in doing so to retain the support of a majority of Americans. Nationalism has not been the usual prism through which American behavior has been viewed. Most Americans have spoken of their attachment to their country as "patriotism", or in an extreme form, super patriotism.

Yet, Why this large and remarkable attitude in America of present national values? A first account is that American patriotism has made a great deal of historical sense to millions of migrants who have found in their new homeland two things that mattered to them: an improvement in their material life; and the freedom to be themselves. These were the goals in the seventeenth century of English Congregationalists in New England, as they were also of late nineteenth-century Jews and Italians in America's major cities²⁷ as they will surely be tomorrow of today's migrants and refugees from Latin America, Africa or the Middle East.

In the United States, the plight of the defeated has merely strengthened the happy optimism of the victors. To Americans, looking inward to the state of their union, a patriotic devotion to country has always seemed to make sense; as it also does when they compared their country to her rivals: it used to be that America's American neighbors to the north and south were weak, that European powers were at least one ocean removed, and that distant Asian neighbors were of no consequence at all. From its location alone, America was born triumphant and a model for the whole of mankind: the bias

²⁷ See Jean de Crèvecoeur, *To Be American*.

of Americans,” writes Roberto Unger, *is that the rest of the world must either languish in poverty and despotism or become more like them.*²⁸

3-American Orientalism and the historical mental confusion between nationalism and patriotism:

So determining is this conviction that American foreign policy has often been conducted in a state of crowded and mental confusion, because such mental confusion and ignorance are held to be of no durable consequence. From Chomsky's point view, understanding the American experience was enough. The principles that had prevailed in Ohio would sooner or later prevail in Manila also. History – or so assume most Americans - has likewise confirmed their sense of superiority: and of course, it is quite true that no other polity on any continent has ever experienced anything like the Colossal -to paraphrase Niall Ferguson’s phrasing- development of American society, and in so short a time, from the weakness of the European colonies in the early 1600’s to an American century that began in 1917 and to global dominance today.

Britain, it is true, also moved from relative insignificance on the edge of Europe in the late 1600’s to world dominance in 1815, but 19th century Britain was no more than a *primus inter pares*, unable to defeat the French at Waterloo without the help of the Russians, or the Russians in the Crimea without the help of the French, or the Germans in two world wars without the help of the United States. For continental Europe, the end-point of Napoleonic or Hitlerian policies of national aggrandizement has been loud and legendary defeat. But America’s victorious trajectory has been a happy Pilgrim’s progress through presumably boundless space, from one ocean to the other in the nineteenth century, and in presumably boundless time also.²⁹

In short, then, for America, we have progress without end in three successfully waged twentieth-century World Wars that in one way or another have proved disastrous for all of the other states which they overwhelmed. For

²⁸ Unger Roberto, *What should the Left Propose*, Verso: London, (2005), p.99

²⁹ Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic societies*, United Kingdom, Pluto Press, (1989), chap 2, p.36.

many Americans, the question has come to be not “why being an American nationalist” but instead, “why not being one.” In America, nation, nationalism and imperialism have usually been paying propositions.³⁰

Yet, critical to the argument of this essay, is the idea that these common American values - never wholly denied but often revised by massive social or economic change – have seldom been expressed by a single voice. A patriot feels warmly about his country because –ideally – his homeland respects the equal rights of all its citizens. Patriotism – ideally, again - guarantees every citizen’s fair right to public space. It works for the common good but also respects social, ethnic, religious and philosophical diversities. It works to create the material circumstances that give these rights practical and civic significance. In foreign affairs, it is pacific. And domestically, it works to create good government.³¹

Nationalists, by contrast and by instinct, lean to separation of countries other than their own in international affairs and of some of their fellow citizens at home where, in Orwell’s celebrated phrase, all are equal but where some are more equal than others. “Patriotism,” writes John Lukas,

*is defensive; nationalism is aggressive. Patriotism is the love of a particular land, with its particular traditions; nationalism is the love of something less tangible, of the myth of a people, justifying many things, a political and ideological substitute for religion.*³²

Paradoxically, since patriotism is localized and practical, where nationalism is more abstract and ideologized, inward looking patriotisms are in the end more universalist than are nationalist particularisms, which, again, on the surface of things, falsely seem more broadly and abstractly conceived. So, American patriotism and nationalism can be imagined in this same doubled

³⁰ Henry Kissinger. *American Foreign Policy*, W.W.W. Norton and Company Inc., New York, (1969), p.91.

³¹ John Lukas, "Democracy and Populism, Fear and Hatred ", Yale University Press: New Haven, (2005), p.36.

³² *Ibid*, p.90

context of practical affection for one's country and unthinking aggression directed to other nations and oftentimes to one's own compatriots as well.

But another key to understanding the history of American Neo-Orientalism within the ideology of nationalism is that, in America, the relation of patriotism and nationalism to each other has been wholly different from what has been true elsewhere, and in continental Europe especially. The origins and nature of American Neo-Orientalism can be traced easily from nationalism and imperialism, two components that have roots in American civility.

In the Old World, Patriotism and Nationalism have been clearly distinct, the one, pacific; and the other, warlike. But in the very particular case of the United States, the two strands – which have a common origin-, have been much closer, and in consequence, the temptation to move from the one to the other has been stronger in America than in other countries. For example, in a classic text on American Foreign policy at the turn of the nineteenth century, Robert Osgood observed of Roosevelt, Mahan, and of their internationalist orientalist antagonists that they were not that far apart: *Few who embraced expansionism as a kind of nationalistic orgy comprehended the practical results of their ambition*³³.

In general, nationalists were not more troubled than the extreme idealists with the facts of world politics as they impinged on American security. America's egoistic and philanthropic impulses were equally free of a sense of limitation prescribed by the realities of world politics. Accordingly, national self-assertiveness and national idealism displayed the same susceptibility for extravagance, and were as capricious as the other."³⁴

In that frame of propinquity, Senator's Kerry famous statement on George Bush's Iraqi war: "*I voted for it before I voted against it*" is no more than the comic restatements of a profound Neo-Orientalist conception, given the fact that Americans who dislike recourse to "hard power" are not ordinarily isolationist: they simply prefer to guarantee the assertion of America's

³³ Robert Osgood, *Ideals and self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1953), p.56.

³⁴ Ibid

imperial presence abroad through what is commonly labeled the “*soft power*” of culture and sentiment.

In America, the origins of patriotism and nationalism as well as their propinquity have been very specific to that country’s history; and in consequence, so has been the relationship of the one to the other. In Europe, nationalism and internationalism have ordinarily been at odds,³⁵ and widely removed in their inspiration. By contrast, American history shows us that Americans, as individuals and as a people, have frequently moved from nation to nationalism, without real understanding: what should they make, for example, of Woodrow Wilson when he proclaimed that the message of America’s Declaration of Independence should henceforth be applied to the world at large: was he then an American patriot, or an American imperialistic and the “bi-partisan” herald of the “American century?” Nationalistic or patriotic? Or just simply Neo-Orientalist?

Time and again, America’s historical experience has shown that in response to what is collectively perceived as an unjust denial of America’s right to moral supremacy, even a peace-loving American can suddenly veer towards aggressive imperialist demand. Half a century ago, John Foster Dulles, then secretary of State, wrote that:

*American foreign policy was set around two “significant facts...: (the) first is that our policies have developed as a reflection of deeply ingrained national characteristics. The second is that our policies have been influenced and modified by changing world conditions...”*³⁶

Sometimes for the good, but not always for the best! As the jocose saying goes, in America, “*a conservative is a liberal who’s been mugged by reality.*” America, wrote Randolph Bourne in his “Trans-National America” of 1916,

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ John Foster Dulles, *Challenges and Response in United States Policy*, quoted in Harold K. Jacobson *America’s Foreign Policy*, Random House: New York, (1960), p.327.

is a unique sociological fabric, and it bespeaks poverty of the imagination not to be thrilled by the incalculable potentialities of so novel a union of men. To seek no other goal than the weary old nationalism, - belligerent, exclusive, inbreeding, the poison of which we are witnessing now in Europe, - is to make patriotism a hollow sham, and to declare that, in spite of our boasting, America must ever be a follower and not a leader of nations. ³⁷

4-The special character of American Orientalism:

At those moments, even conservative American nationalists will momentarily rally to what were originally patriotic or even leftist causes. Universalism is after all a part of America's overall heritage. To love the Constitution is to accept the Bill of Rights. Many of the isolationists who opposed America's entry into the First World War claimed nonetheless to be aware of America's democratic role in the world: in the Senate, George Norris, an isolationist who had already opposed Wilson's interventionist Mexican policy, first supported and then opposed America's membership in the League of Nations. This shared background of "Americanness", the closeness in that country of nationalism and patriotism (or in the terms of Robert Osgood, egoism, and altruism) ³⁸ is one of the most distinguishing characteristics of American history. As Abraham Lincoln amusingly and wisely pointed out, "*You can not only fool some people all the time, you can also fool all the people for some of the time*". ³⁹

It is important for us to have in mind the explicit events or decisions - the catalyst that have so frequently pushed America from patriotic self-control to imperialist and brutal, destructive Neo-Orientalism. The deportation of the

³⁷ Terms used by Robert Osgood, op.cit, p.5

³⁸ Lincoln, Speeches and Writing, Don Fehrenbach, cited by Gary Wills, *Under God: Religion and American Politics*, New York: Simon and Schuster, (1990), p.85.

³⁹ John Lukas, op.cit.

Cherokee people, for example, was a cruel and unnecessary brutality. Much the same can be said about the cruel and unnecessary decisions to drop the atomic bomb on a worn out and defeated enemy in 1945,⁴⁰ or as regards the generalized use of cruel torture in Iraq, and perhaps the bombing of Iran tomorrow.

In brief, ideological tradition matters critically, but changing circumstances cannot be ignored. After this, another and quite different task will be to locate within these complex and shifting elements, the range of political choices that have been open to the political leaders of the American Republic: in a nation where patriotism and nationalism are so close to each other, much, has depended on the arbitrary choices between the two which America's leaders and political class have chosen for reasons of their own.

True enough, what has happened in politics has often depended on larger themes, on what Americans as a nation, heard, read, and saw. But much also has depended on the groups of insiders, the manipulation of the press, the duplicity of those who are in charge, and the willpower especially of a sanctified President. As the leader of a chosen people, every American President is in some sense divinely designed.⁴¹ Cardinals elect their pope; and Americans elect a president who, like the head of the Roman Church, promises to preserve a doctrine.

It is not at all fortuitous that much of America's political history has so often been recounted by many of its most gifted historians as a succession of presidential moments: by instinct, we often feel that the logic of History was at work when we read about Washington, Jefferson, or Lincoln, and perhaps also, alas, when we read about George W. Bush, father and son and the list would be on tap.

Thus, the old seventeenth-century idea of Americans of divine election stays irrefutable. Herman Melville, the author of the archetypal American novel *Moby Dick* of 1851 put it nicely in his *White Jacket* of 1850:

⁴⁰ In *The Works of Herman Melville*, Russell and Russell edition, (1963), volume VI, chapter 36, p. 189.

⁴¹ Robert A. Strong. *Reading and Misreading Presidents, in the Credibility of Institutions, Policies and Leadership*, volume 20, Kenneth W. Thompson, University of Virginia, (2000)

*We Americans are the peculiar, chosen people – the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world... God has predestined, mankind expects, great things from our race; and great things we feel in our souls. The rest of the nations must soon be in our rear... Long enough have we been skeptics with regard to ourselves, and doubted whether indeed, the political Messiah had come. But he has come in us.*⁴²

It is evocative also that all of these ideological legacies left their mark on the thinking of America's greatest Presidents as well as the whole American political realm. Still, what distinguished American politics in the twentieth century from what had happened before, however, was not the existence or the intensity of a renewed political rivalry but the length of the rivalry that opposed patriotism to nationalism. On one side, we have the patriotic Wilsonianism with – after Wilson - Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and James Carter, as well as Dwight David Eisenhower, and aligned against them we have the nationalist modern Presidents, beginning with Hoover, followed by, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and the Bushes, "father and son".⁴³

But what does make American nationalism really different and so American Orientalism? Similar to other nationalisms, American nationalism has several different expressions. Erik Erickson wrote that "*every national character is constructed out of polarities.*"⁴⁴ This is certainly true of the United States, which symbolizes along with other things, both the most modern and the most conservative society in the developed world. The clash between the two is contributing to the growing political division of American society. At the time of writing, the American people are more sharply and more consistently divided along party lines than at any time in modern American

⁴² Erick H. Erickson, *Children and society*, New York, W.W.Norton & Company, (1963), p.85

⁴³ Anatol Lieven, "America Right or Wrong", New York, Oxford University Press, (2004), p.12

⁴⁴ Anatol Lieven. *Ibid*, p.18

history. This political polarization in turn reflects larger differences in social and cultural attitudes than at any time since the Vietnam War.

It is however not the opposition, but the combination of these different strands which determines the overall character of the American national identity and mostly shapes American attitudes and policies towards the outside world. The first of these strands stems from American Creed or the “American Thesis” in the words of the Financial Times Columnist Anatol Lieven⁴⁵ which is the set of great democratic, legal and individualist beliefs and principles on which the American state and constitution is founded. These principles form the foundation of American civic nationalism, and also facilitate bind the United States to the wider community of democratic states. They are shared with other democratic societies, but in America, they have a special role in holding an incongruent nation together. As the term Creed implies, they are held with an ideological and almost religious zeal.

The second element forms what Lieven⁴⁶ called the American nationalist “antithesis”. It stems above all from ethno-religious roots. Aspects of this tradition have also been called “Jacksonian nationalism” (after President Andrew Jackson (1767 -1845)). Because the United States is so outsized and complex compared to other countries, and has changed so much over time, this nationalist tradition is in the same way complex rather than the simple monolithic identity of a French or an Italian ethno-religious nationalism. This tradition in the United States forms a disperse mass of identities and impulses, including, nativist sentiments on the part of America’s original white population, the particular culture of the white South, and the beliefs and agendas of ethnic lobbies.

Nonetheless, these nationalist features can often be clearly distinguished from the principles of the American Creed and of American civic nationalism; and although many of their features are specifically American –

⁴⁵ Irving Kristol, *Foreign Policy in an Age of Ideology*, the National Interest, number 1, (1985), p.6-13

⁴⁶ *History of the United States (1964-1980)*, Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia in: <http://www.answers.com/topic/1973-oil-crisis>.

notably, the role of fundamentalist Protestantism – they are also related to wider patterns of ethno-religious nationalism across the world.

These strands in American nationalism are usually subordinate to American civic nationalism stemming from the Creed, which dominates America’s official and public political culture. However, they have a natural tendency to rise to the surface at times of crisis and conflict. In the specific case of America’s attachment to Israel, ethno -religious factors have become dominant, with extremely dangerous consequences for the War on Terror, and that, leads us to say that the American Orientalism is the one and the same Israeli one.

In 1983, one of the fathers of the neo-conservative school in the United States, Irving Kristol drew a distinction between a patriotism that,

*“springs from love of the nation’s past” and a nationalism that “arises out of hope for the nation’s future, distinctive greatness. American foreign policy is the national interest of a world power, as this is defined by a sense of national destiny.”*⁴⁷

In the standpoint of such thinkers, nationalism has always had a certain radical edge to it. In American political culture at the start of the 21st century, there is certainly a very strong element of patriotism, of attachment to American institutions and to America in its present form; but as Kristol’s words indicate, there is also a revolutionary element, a commitment to a messianic vision of the nation and its role in the world. It is this feature that links the American nationalism of today to the discontented, late-coming nationalisms of Germany, Italy and Russia, rather than the satisfied and status-quo patriotism of the British.

Even if one strand of American nationalism is radical because it looks forward to “the nation’s future, distinctive greatness”, another is radical because it continuously looks backwards, to a vanished and idealized national past. This “American antithesis” is a central feature of American neo-

⁴⁷ Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic societies*, op.cit, p.54.

conservatism: the world of the Republican right and especially the Christian right, with their rhetoric of “taking back” America, and restoring an older, purer American society.

This ancient tendency in American culture and politics reflects the ongoing conservative religiosity of many Americans. However, it also has been an expression of orientalism in terms of social, economic, ethnic and above all racial apprehensions which in part, stem from the progressive loss of control over society by the “original” white Anglo - Saxon and Scots-Irish populations, later joined by other similar groups. Connected to this are class anxieties: In the past, the hostility of the small towns and countryside to the new immigrant-populated cities; today, the economic decline of the traditional white working classes.⁴⁸

One way of looking at American nationalism, and America’s troubled relationship with the contemporary world, is to understand that many Americans feel threatened by and are in revolt against the world which America itself has made.⁴⁹ American culture historically has embodied a strong tension of isolationism. This isolationism is, however, a complex phenomenon, which should not be understood simply as a desire to withdraw from the world. Rather, American isolationism forms another face, both of American chauvinism and American Messianism –united by a belief in American Exceptionalism presenting America as a unique “*city on a hill*”.

The result is a view that if the United States really has no option but to involve itself with repulsive and inferior foreigners, it must absolutely control the process, and must under no conditions subject itself to foreign control or even advice. Again, unlike previous empires, the American Orientalism, US national identity and what has been called the “American Creed” are founded on faithfulness to democracy.⁵⁰

However badly democracy may be practiced at home, and deceitfully moralized abroad, this democratic faith does set bona fide restrictions to how

⁴⁸ Daniel Boorstin, *The Americans, The Democratic Experience*, Random House, Inc., New York,(1987), p.550-556.

⁴⁹ Anatol lieven, op.cit

⁵⁰ *History of the United States (1964-1980)*, Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia in: <http://www.answers.com/topic/1964-80-oil-crisis>. , op.cit

far the United States can exercise direct rule over other peoples. Therefore, since 1945, it has been an indirect empire, resembling more closely the Dutch in the East Indies in the 17th and 18th centuries than the British in India.

Even an indirect American empire is still an empire in denial. In presenting its imperial plans to the American people, the presidential administrations have been careful to enclose them as something else: on one hand, as part of a munificent strategy of spreading American values of democracy and freedom; on the other, as a critical part of the defense not of an American empire, but of the American nation itself.

The United States has driven towards empire, but the domestic political fuel fed into the engine was that of an injured and vengeful nationalism mainly after 9/11, this sentiment is entirely sincere as far as most Americans are concerned, and it is all the more dangerous for that. In fact, to judge by world history, there is probably no more dangerous element in the entire nationalist mix than a sense of righteous victim hood. In the past, this sentiment helped destroy Germany, Serbia and numerous other countries, and is now in the process of destroying the Middle East.⁵¹

Undoubtedly, Americans from this tradition generally believe strongly in the American democratic and liberal Creed. However, they also believe – consciously or unconsciously, openly or in private – that the Creed is the product of a specific white Christian American civilization, and that it is threatened by immigration, racial minorities and foreign influence. The many contemporary trends that can be seen as justifying this belief naturally leave its adherents feeling besieged, disillusioned, and defensive.⁵²

American Protestant fundamentalist groups also do not reject the Creed as such. But their attitudes to culture and the intellect mean that their rejection of contemporary America is even deeper, for they refuse key aspects of modernity itself. For them, modern American mass culture is a form of daily assault on their passionately held values; their reactionary religious ideology in turn reflects the sense of, social, cultural and racial embattlement among their

⁵¹ James R. Gusfield. "Symbolic Crusade Status. Politics and The American Temperance Movement", The United States, University of Illinois Press, (May, 1986), p.17-18.

⁵² "History of the United States (1964-1980)", op.cit

white middle class constituency. For America is the home of by far the deepest, the most Widespread, and conservative religious belief in the western world, including a section of society possessed by untamed millenarian hopes, fears and hatreds.⁵³

Perhaps of equal importance in the long term will be the relative decline in recent decades in the real incomes of the American “middle classes”, where these groups are situated socially. This decline and the wider economic changes which began with the oil shock of 1973 have had the side-effect of forcing more and more women to go to work, thereby undermining traditional family structures even among those groups most devoted to them.⁵⁴

In the United States’ context, it is also crucial to remember that the two elements combining to produce this system, work together rather than in opposition. In a curious paradox, the political representatives of Protestant America’s old conservative religious and cultural communities are encouraging the much unrestrained free-market capitalism that promises to dissolve those communities.

This was not always so. In the 1890s and 1900s, this sector of America formed the backbone of the Populist protest against the excesses of American capitalism, and in the 1930s it voted solidly for Roosevelt’s New Deal. Today, however, the religious right (infiltrated by the Israeli Likud party) has allied itself solidly with extreme free-market forces in the Republican Party – although it is precisely the workings of unanchored American capitalism which are eroding the world that the religious conservatives wish to defend.⁵⁵

Now it seems that the threat to America is America itself. In the vision set out in its National Security Strategy of 2002 (NSS 2002),⁵⁶ embodying the so-called Bush doctrine, American sovereignty was to remain absolute and unqualified. The sovereignty of other countries was to be heavily qualified by

⁵³ James R. Gusfield. *Symbolic Crusade Status. Politics and The American Temperance Movement*, op.cit, p.19

⁵⁴ NSS, 2002 in: <http://www.war.org.uk/military/resources/nss-2002/nssintro.htm>.

⁵⁵ Ron Paul. "Neo-Conned", *Free American*, September, (2003), p.20 - 27

⁵⁶ Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden", quoted in the journal of American history, (June 1989), vol. 76, N.1, p167.

America, and no other country was to be allowed a sphere of influence, even in its own neighborhood.

In this conception, “balance of power” – a phrase used repeatedly in the NSS – was a form of Orwellian doublespeak. The clear intention actually was to be so strong that other countries had no choice but to rally to the side of the United States, concentrating all real power and freedom of action in the hands of America.

This approach was basically an attempt to extend a tough, interventionist version of the Monroe doctrine (1823) to the entire world. This plan is extremely fanatic, completely impracticable (as the occupation of Iraq has shown) and totally unacceptable to most of the world. Because, however, this program was expressed in traditional American nationalist terms of self-defense and the messianic role of the United States in spreading freedom, many Americans found it entirely acceptable, and indeed natural. The Bush administration, then, like European elites before 1914, has allowed its own national chauvinism and limitless ambition to compromise the security and stability of the world capitalist system of which they are the custodians and greatest beneficiaries.

In other words, they have been irresponsible and dangerous not in Marxist terms, but in their own. This point is vitally important in relation to the stability of the world and of United States hegemony in the world. A relatively benign version of American hegemony is by no means unacceptable to many people round the world – both because they often have neighbors whom they fear more than America, and because their elites are to an increasing extent integrated into a global capitalist elite whose values are largely defined by those of America.⁵⁷

But American imperial power in the service of narrow American nationalism draws exactly the American Orientalism as an extremely unstable base for hegemony. It involves power over the world without accepting any responsibility for global problems and the effects of US behavior on other

⁵⁷ Gale S.Gale. "Nationalism", *International Journal of Ethics*, Volume 41, Issue1, (October 1930), p.37-48.

countries – and power without responsibility was defined by Rudyard Kipling⁵⁸ as “*the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages.*”

Furthermore, American nationalism has already played a key role in preventing America from taking advantage of the uniquely beneficent world-historical moment following the fall of communism. Instead of using this moment to create a “concert of powers” in support of regulated capitalist growth world stability, and the relief of poverty, preventable disease and other social ills, nationalism has helped direct America into a search for new enemies.

Such nationalism may encourage its adherents to cultivate not only specific national hatreds, but also hostility to all ideals, goals, movements, laws and institutions which aim to transcend the nation and speak for the general interests of mankind. This form of nationalism is therefore in direct opposition to the universalist ideals and ambitions of the American Creed – upon which, in the end, rests America’s role as a great civilizational empire and heir to Rome and China; and upon which is based America’s claim to represent a positive example to the world.

The historical evidence of the dangers of unreflecting nationalist sentiments should be all too obvious, and are all too relevant to US policy today. Thus, American Orientalism thrives on irrational hatreds and so does the American nationalism, on the portrayal of other nations or ethno -religious groups as congenitally, hopelessly immoral and hostile.

Yesterday, many American nationalists felt this way about Russia. Today those or other nationalists may regard the Arab and Muslim worlds, and to a lesser extent any country that defies American wishes, in the same way. Hence the astonishing explosion of chauvinism directed against France and Germany in the approach to the war in Iraq. When other nations are declared to be irrationally, incorrigibly and unchangingly hostile, it is obviously pointless to seek compromises with them or to try to accommodate their interests and views. And because they are irrational and barbarous, America is free to

⁵⁸ Cf. Hans Kohn. *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., (1995)

dictate to them or even conquer them for their own good. This is precisely the discourse of nationalists in the leading European states towards each other and “lesser breeds without the law” (Kipling again) before 1914, which helped draw Europe into the great catastrophes of the 20th century. It was also a central part of the old ugly discourse of Orientalism.

If such visions spread in the United States, they will be disastrous not only for American interests and American security but for America’s soul. Pathological hatred and fear of the outside world will feed the same emotions in American domestic politics, until the nation’s moral and cultural greatness lies in ruins, and its legacy to the future is wrecked beyond repair.⁵⁹ Thus, we can deduce that the success of the neoconservatives lay not in their originality, but, on the contrary, in the fact that they took deep and ancient strains in the American national tradition and then used particular events to give these strains a radical twist.

The first of these is the old American belief, rooted both in the Protestant tradition and in American civic nationalism, in America's right and duty to spread its democratic model to the rest of the world (the "American Nationalist Thesis"). The second, antithetical strain is a strong degree in many American quarters of hatred, contempt, and fear directed at the rest of the world - the "paranoid style" of American populist nationalism analyzed by Richard Hofstadter and his intellectual descendants.⁶⁰

Another vital element is the existential needs of the military-industrial and academic-bureaucratic security structures that grew up during the Cold War and were orphaned and endangered by the end of that struggle. Finally, there is the passionate defense of Israel that is, for them, a legitimate and praiseworthy motive in itself. Tragically, however, a belief that this means backing the Israelis unconditionally in their confrontation with the Palestinians inevitably points toward a wider confrontation with the Arab and Muslim worlds.

⁵⁹ Gale S.Gale. "Nationalism", *International Journal of Ethics*, Volume 41, Issue1, (October 1930), p.37-48

⁶⁰ Cf. Hans Kohn. *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*", Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., (1995)

The historical conjunctures the American Orientalists, namely neoconservatives, exploited so brilliantly were the end of the Cold War and, of course, September 11. The end of the Cold War deprived the American establishment of its only real intellectual paradigm for understanding the world and the conduct of U.S. world policy. The collapse of Communism appeared to leave free-market liberal capitalism as the only global model for progress; and most dangerously, the collapse of the Soviet superpower appeared to make the United States practically omnipotent on the planet, free to do anything if only it possessed the "will" to do so.

The problem confronting those neoconservative orientalists was to create that will among the American people. On the whole, these are a generally moderate, peaceful, and pragmatic lot who, although they have both generous international impulses and certain messianic dreams, also have a whole set of reasons to distrust global missions that will be paid for by their taxes and the lives of their children. September 11 gave the United States the chance - rather briefly, as it turns out - to exploit and mobilize that will. They have tried to power a program of American liberal imperialism with the fuel of a wounded and vengeful American nationalism.⁶¹

To be clear, the occupation of Iraq has crippled both America's ability to use its military might elsewhere in the world and the willingness of the American people to support further such interventions. Far from being omnipotent to shape the world, the United States cannot even control Fallujah. Nonetheless, because their approach was founded not in new thought, but in the intensification of old American traditions, there also remain the terrible problems for America and the world that the neoconservative orientalists have helped to create.

To take the most obvious example: As Bush's speeches make clear, the messianic rhetoric of spreading "democracy" and "freedom" is more than ever the core of the administration's "strategy" in the Muslim world. It is highly doubtful that this really represents the beliefs of Dick Cheney or Donald Rumsfeld, or even Condoleezza Rice, in a way that it really did represent the

⁶¹ Anatol lieven, op.cit.

core beliefs of Paul Wolfowitz. Rather, the administration is emphasizing democratization because it does not have anything else to do or say. It cannot adopt a sensible diplomatic strategy toward a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict or toward détente with key regional players like Iran. And with Iraq crippling the U.S. budget, it is impossible to ask Congress for the kind of economic aid for Muslim countries that would give the long-term construction of democracy there a real chance.⁶²

The problem with emphasizing democratization in this way is that it is radically incompatible with the actual policies of the United States in the war on terrorism, as fully encouraged and supported by the neoconservatives. This contradiction between ideals and realpolitik was always there in U.S. policy. The United States and the neoconservatives, however, have raised this contradiction to surreal, virtually Orwellian heights. They believe in spreading human rights and the rule of law, so they kidnap suspected terrorists and have them tortured in illegal U.S. prisons and in those of Muslim dictatorships whose human-rights records they publicly profess to despise. They want to bring democracy to the Muslim world!?! So they act with brazen contempt for the opinions of the vast majority of ordinary Muslims in democracies like Turkey and Indonesia.⁶³

The Americans purport to believe in free elections, so every time this seems likely to bring victory for Islamist forces, they veer back to support for dictatorship. They pretend to respect ordinary Iraqis and believe they are ready for democracy so much that they try to foist Ahmed Chalabi on them as a U.S.-backed dictator, and they share the general approach of the U.S. military, which respects them so much that it doesn't bother to count how many of them it accidentally kills.⁶⁴

This does not reflect real belief in democracy, but what might better be called democratism. It bears the same relationship to real democratic thinking as Soviet Communism did to the original ideals of Marxism. History

⁶² Samuel P. Huntington. "How Countries Democratize. Democratization in the late 20th century", University of Oklahoma Press, (2004), p.149

⁶³ Ibid, p.150

⁶⁴ Ibid, p.151

being what it is -- a complex cacophony, a concert of mixed voices and ambiguous meanings in which one is never, except in extreme cases, a total angel or a total devil – this paper recognizes that these neo-conservative orientalists have a single real merit; that of making politics with ideas or reintroducing the old philosophical consideration of the “types of regimes” in conducting international politics.

But, one must say it; they are real politicians but politicians without scruples. it is the great reproach that the world makes against the United States: that, with their bad war, their bad policies, their absurd democratic Messianism, their errors of perspective and judgment, they have compromised, wasted, and perhaps even discredited this magnificent and necessary duty to intervene and have caused the United States, from this point of view, to take a gigantic step backward. ⁶⁵

Though, everywhere people believe in the possibility and the quality of democracy, they absolutely reject the idea of “Western universalism.” An expression that implies superiority in the way of thinking, according to which human rights and principles of secularism and of parliamentary democracy, would be ontologically and inevitably related to the soil of the Western culture.

Moreover, by a whole set of actions at home and abroad, neoconservative orientalists have badly damaged the image of American democracy in the world. By doing so, they have, also damaged the attractiveness of democracy in general, and strengthened the arguments of democracy's enemies⁶⁶ This has been their fundamental betrayal of the ideals of which they profess to be the guardians. This differentialism is nothing but contempt disguised as respect, or violence embroidered with the cryptogram of an untruthful and suspect love of others.

⁶⁵ Paul Gilbert. *Criteria of Nationality and the Ethics of Self Determination*, History of European Ideas, Vol. 16, N. 46, (1993), p. 515-521.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p.522

B. American Orientalism and the Development of Strategic Interests in the Middle East after the Second World War

1- Saving Capitalism for Imperial Interests (1939-1945):

From here, we come to say that American world strategy had always been complex and cautious, what seemed obvious for a superpower of the first order, directed by a dominant group (neo-conservatives), narrow enough and having a clear sense of hierarchy. As it is the case in most human societies, the members' power of this social group rests on the principle of propriety and their capacity to lead the economy. Thus, our discussion will now move from documented ideational theory towards documented practicality of this ideology, to finally deduce the factors of American Orientalism's originality (Neo-Orientalism).

During the Second World War, conscious that the United States would become a world power of the first class, destined to exercise a hegemonic influence almost without equivalence in history, American strategists represented by this group, worked to help it raise the challenge.

Beginning from 1939 to 1945, Foreign Relations Council and American State Department started deep analyses. A group of studies called 'War-Peace Studies', worked on during six years just to produce detailed analyses and geopolitical strategies. Foreign Relations Council represented in fact a personal contribution of the American business milieu in the elaboration of the American foreign policy and we would find within this group of studies all the decision makers of the state department except however the secretary of state himself.⁶⁷ It was them who made the project of "*The Big Domain*". This big domain covers all the regions destined to supply the United States' economy with all its needs.⁶⁸ This world space is strategically crucial to guarantee the control of the world.

Thus, the Big Domain should include, at least, the occidental hemisphere, the extreme orient or the Far East, and the old British Empire

⁶⁷ Howard Zinn, *Which Popular Wars? Saving Capitalism In The Interior And The Exterior*, Chapter XVI, Agone,(2002), pp 33-37

⁶⁸ Ibid, p.33

which should be exploited by the United States and that is what American universities call 'anti-imperialism'. The Big Domain should also include south and west Europe and countries which are producers of oil in the Middle East⁶⁹

Concerning the Far East, the plan was more often than not the following: knowing that Japan is poor in terms of natural resources, it would become sooner or later the heart of industry in the region, South Asia, And South East would be both outlets and providers. The same was done in Latin America which was up to them, "*a small sector, in a corner, that never really interested anyone.*"⁷⁰

One of the clearest demonstrations of this strategy is in the work of George Kennan. Considered to be a designer who is particularly humane, liberal and thoughtful- reasons for which, rightly, he was supposed to quit the State Department. Kennan directed the team and was given the task of political blueprints in the State Department by the end of the 1940's. In a top secret document, from which, the above information had been taken out, Kennan indicated the leading principle of his work, he wrote:

With only 6.3% of the world population, we represent nearly 50% of the world wealth. In this situation, it is impossible not to awaken envy and resentment; our principal task, in the coming years, is to put in place a system of international relations that permits us to maintain this disequilibrium. We should not mislead ourselves by imagining that we can today afford the luxury of altruism and charity. We should stop evoking principles as unrealistic and blurred as the human rights, the improvement of living standards and the democratization. The day is not far where we will have to position ourselves in terms of simple power links and

⁶⁹ Ibid, p.34

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.35

*the less we will be bound by idealist slogans, the better
we will find ourselves*⁷¹

The obvious question inspired from the sayings of Kennan is this: does he seriously think in what he suggests: that the human rights, the improvement of living standards and the democratization, should be abandoned as objectives and that they have nothing to do with America's foreign policy?

In fact, if we return to U.S history, we find ourselves in front of a vigorous, violent policy, clearly opposed to these principles and it is particularly true from the founding of the nation (from the Indian removal until now). These generous principles cannot be coupled with the drastic measures destined to maintain the disparity of situations and the exploitation of world resources. Succinctly, in order to guarantee the fifth liberty (there are four, but we use to forget one): the liberty to Steal, the only one that really matters, the other liberties serve to undertake the show. In order to guarantee this liberty, one has to oppose harshly to the democratization, to the improvement of living standards and to the human rights. These points are essential for the American policy: for the protection of 'their' raw materials.

But from whom should 'their' raw materials be protected?! From indigenous populations of course, that can have their word to say about the improvement of living standards, democratization, and human rights. Every principle that is completely opposed to the safeguarding of economic disparities. The new question now is: how to protect these raw materials from indigenous populations? The obvious answer is police repression established by local governments. It would be better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government conciliated and infiltrated by communists. But who are the communists? Another important question in this discussion. The term communist is habitually used in the American political theology to designate

⁷¹ The pentagon papers, Defense Department (confidential document of 7000 pages, published by Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, who made a photocopy in June 1971 before sending a copy to some Congress members and to New York Times), (23 February 1948).

people who think seriously that the government is directly responsible for the well being of people.⁷²

At this level of analysis, we deduce that American Orientalism rests on a general geopolitical conception of the United States, well defined and established since decades and deeply rooted in the American institutions. In August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met to finally present to the world the Charter of the Atlantic to the world. It fixed noble objectives for and after the war and stipulated that the two nations desired to never search territorial expansions or others and that they would respect the right of all people to decide which government under which they wanted to live. This chart was celebrated like an acknowledgement of the right of nations to auto-determination. However, two weeks earlier, before the announcement of the chart, the American Secretary Of State, Sumner Welles, guaranteed to the French government that France would conserve its empire: "*our government, respectful of the historic friendship with France, had understood the desire of the French people to conserve the integrity of its territory*".⁷³

It is noteworthy then, that in the chart of the Atlantic and other public declarations, the United States gave their support to the principle of auto-determination and national independence while during the war, at many occasions guaranteed to the French their intention of giving back to them their colonial empire after the war and that is what happened exactly, and the butchery of 08 May 1945 in the Algerian colony is just an illustration among many of the disillusionment of the colonized populations and the imperialistic Orientalist plan.

By the end of 1942, the personal delegate of Roosevelt declared to the French general Henri Giraud: *it is obvious in our intentions to see the French sovereignty regained (recovered) as soon as possible on the whole metropolitan territories and colonies in which its flag wove in 1939*.⁷⁴

⁷² Howard Zinn, Op. cit, p.37

⁷³ Mark Curtis, *The Ambiguities of Power*, (Zed, 1995), p.146

⁷⁴ P.P.S (UHP), Op cit, p.551.

These documents as other extracts of Pentagon papers are classified TOP secret.

In 1945, this ambivalent attitude disappeared. In May, Truman assured the French that he will not put again in question their sovereignty in Indochina. In the fall, the United States rushed the nationalist china, temporary charged of the Northern past by *the Potsdam* conference, of restituting it to the French despite the evident wish of the Vietnamese to accede to independence.⁷⁵

Beyond favors made to the French government, what about the imperial ambitions proper to the United States? And territorial expansions and others to which Roosevelt had given up in the chart of the Atlantic? Besides what had been said in the press, discreetly and without being the object of the hour, diplomats, and American businessmen sweated blood and water to make sure that the American economic power, once the war is over, would have no rival at all on the world ladder. The American commerce should invest in zones until then dominated only by the English. The open door policy and the equilibrated access to foreign markets should be applied from Asia to Europe. In fact, the Americans had the intention to put the English out of the game and take their place.⁷⁶

That is exactly what happened in the Middle East and its oil. In August 1945, a state department responsible declared: “*A survey in the diplomatic history of the last thirty five years gives the proof that oil played a role in the foreign policy more than any raw material*”.⁷⁷

Saudi Arabia was the biggest reserve of oil in the Middle East with the oil producing ARAMCO. By the intermediary of the American secretary of the interior, Harold Ikes convinced Roosevelt to agree to a commercial lease to Saudi Arabia, defining the American interests in the country. In 1944, Britain and the United States signed an oil pact, agreeing on the principle of equal

⁷⁵ Ibid, p.558.

⁷⁶ Noam Chomsky, “World Orders Old and New”, Columbia University Press, (1996), p.16.

⁷⁷ Lloyd Gardner, “*Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy*”, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, (1964), quoted by Howard Zinn in: Op cit, p.18

access. According to Lloyd Gardner: “*the open door policy had finally triumphed in all the middle east*”⁷⁸

The historian Gabriel Kolko concluded by his turn that: “*the economic objective of America during the war was to save capitalism in the interior as in the exterior of its frontiers*”⁷⁹. The imperial English domination having disappeared during the Second World War, the United States prepared itself to fill the void. Hull declared in the debut of the war:

*The principle role in a new system of international economic and commercial relations will be in its biggest part, accredited to the United States. Given our economic power, we should be in the measure of assuming this role and the responsibilities that result from, and this is first and foremost, in the simple interest of the nation.*⁸⁰

2- The End of Imperialism during the Cold War Era:

The end of the Second World War is thought to mark the end of an era. Not only were the ultra-nationalist ideologies of Fascism, Nazism, and racism overcome, but 1945 also marked the beginning of the end of imperialism. This fact was not fully accepted by European imperialists, who made several last efforts to retake their colonies, especially in Southeast Asia and Africa. But by 1960, there were few Europeans who believed in the need for colonies.⁸¹ Yet, the decolonization movement had triumphed and the post-war world order was preserved in the United Nations ideal of national self-determination and global development.

Up till now, the reduced power and severe indebtedness of the British produced by the Second World War, not only increased their dependence upon

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World the United States Foreign Policy From 1943-1945*, Random House, New York, (1968), Chap 2.

⁸⁰ Quoted In: Howard Zinn, *A People's History Of The United States, 1492- Present*, (Harper Collins Publishers), p.199

⁸¹ William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, *Empire Preserv'd: How the Americans put anti-Communism before anti-imperialism*, London: Routledge, (2004), pp. 155-157.

the United States, but also renewed their need for empire to service the American debt. The principal means used was to increase the dollar earnings of British colonial and dependent states and exchange these at an imperially mandated, below-market, Sterling rate just to be disposed to maintain the status quo with regards to the old empires. Thus, the British Empire was rescued and transformed as part of the Allied front in the Cold War, especially in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia.⁸²

In this period, a major hegemonic rhetoric was designed to give a defensive cast to the project of global management: Containment⁸³. The core assumption beneath is that there is a stable international order that the United States must defend and develop. Recognizing the remarkable scale of U.S. power, a global system was to be constructed so that the United States would dominate and within which the United States' business interests would prosper in as much of the world as possible and would constitute a Grand Area, as it was called, which would be subordinated to the needs of the United States' economy. Within this 'Grand Area', other capitalist societies would be encouraged to develop, but without protective devices that would interfere with U.S. privileges.⁸⁴

That is to say: only the United States would be permitted to dominate regional systems. Therefore, the United States moved to undertake effective control of world energy product and organize a world system in which industrial centers function as markets and sources of raw materials, or as dependent states pursuing their regional interests within the overall framework of order managed by the United States.

On the other hand, it then becomes necessary to overcome any deviation by economic, ideological, or military warfare, or by terror and subversion. The domestic population must be rallied to the cause, in defense

⁸² Allister Hinds, *Britain's Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. (2001), pp.11, 29-30, 196-7.

⁸³ See William S. Borden, *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955*, Wisconsin, (1984); Andrew J. Rotter, *The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia*, Cornell, (1987).

⁸⁴ Ibid

against “Communism.” These are the basic elements of containment in practice abroad, and of its domestic counterpart within.

With regard to the Soviet Union, it has been considered the major threat to the planned international order, for a good and simple reason: In part, this follows from its very existence as a great power controlling an imperial system that could not be incorporated within the American ‘Grand Area’ in part from its occasional efforts to expand the domains of its power, as in Afghanistan, and the suspected threat of invasion of Western Europe, if not world conquest.⁸⁵ Of course, the Soviet Union is a threat to world order if it supports people opposing U.S. plans. So, “*containing the Soviet Union*” has been the dominant theme of U.S. foreign policy and since the United States became a truly global power after the Second World War, the Soviet Union had been considered an intolerable threat to order since the Bolshevik revolution.

U.S. interests in the Middle East were minimal before the Second World War since it was considered a region dominated by Britain and that the United States did not have much to gain from the region. Some private individuals and groups, such as protestant missionary bodies, had clearly defined interests in the region, as did the Zionists who were working for the creation of a Jewish homeland.

3- American economic interest: oil, Israel and the Middle East:

During the Second World War, the United States and its European allies recognized the long-term strategic value of the region’s oil resources. They found out how critically important petroleum was to fighting a modern conflict. At the same time they realized that Middle East oil could serve European postwar recovery. The Second World War definitely was the turning point for the United States regarding its interests in the Middle East. Therefore, three main issues were to influence American foreign policy in the Middle

⁸⁵ Lippmann and Merz, “A Test of the News, Supplement”, New Republic, Aug. 4, (1920), p.25.

East for the rest of the Twentieth century. The fundamental issues were the Arab-Israeli conflict, the importance of Middle East oil, and the Soviet Union's threat to the United States and its allies.⁸⁶

First, *the Arab-Israeli Conflict*: Hitler's extermination of European Jews became the orbit for the Zionist movement. The American people and American Jews intensified lobbying in political circles and the success of the lobbying effort became evident. This is specifically demonstrated by President Roosevelt's 1944 campaign pledge:

*I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give them their support to this aim. If reelected I shall help to bring about its earliest realization.*⁸⁷

After the Second World War, the Allies were facing a huge refugee problem with the holocaust survivors assembled in camps in Europe, which drove the question of a Jewish state. In 1947, the United Nations took over the question of Palestine, which was under a British mandate, and proposed that Palestine should consist of two states, one Jewish and one Arabic. This proposal came after extensive pressure on the British government from the Truman administration. The British were opposed to an independent Israel but were forced to obey because of economic pressure from the United States. However, even in the U.S. administration there was strong opposition against the creation of Israel, for example, from Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Secretary of State George Marshall.⁸⁸

On May 14 the establishment of Israel was declared and British troops withdrew. Immediately the Jews captured Jewish western Jerusalem, driving out all Palestinian inhabitants. The fighting between Arabs and Jews turned

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ T. G. Fraser, "The USA and the Middle East since World War 2", Hong Kong: Macmillan Press LTD, (1989), p. x-xii.

⁸⁸ T. G. Fraser, Op cit, pp. 4-12.

Jerusalem into a war zone and destroyed the United Nations' ability to work in the city. The swift action by the Jews created a huge Arab refugee problem by displacing 780,000 Palestinians.⁸⁹ The Arab states were not willing to handle the refugee problem partly because they were afraid it would leave Palestine without Arabs forever and partly because of the economic burden it would put on their limited economies.⁹⁰

From the creation of Israel, the administrations of all American presidents, from Truman to Clinton, thought the Zionist dream of a Jewish homeland worthy of American support.⁹¹ Another significant event in the history of Arab-Israeli conflict was the *Suez crisis of 1956*. *Israel*, having a deal with the United Kingdom and France, attacked Egypt to seize the Suez Canal, and an Anglo-French military intervention to protect the Suez Canal was condemned by the United States and the United Nations. The Anglo-French forces withdrew under a threat of war from the Soviet Union and UN troops occupied the Suez Canal zone.

One of the consequences was that the Soviet Union's influence in the Middle East increased significantly and British and French influence declined.⁹² During the Six-Day War in 1967 Israel attacked Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. After, Egypt's President Nasser, through military alliances, had tried to surround and stop Israel. The war ended with a total Israeli victory as Israel seized the Sinai, Golan Heights, the old parts of Jerusalem, and the West Bank and Gaza areas of the Palestine mandate. The Soviet Union in turn helped the Arab states to rearm their armies'.⁹³

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt and Syria surprisingly attacked Israel during its celebration of Yom Kippur. Israel suffered at the beginning of the war, but with extensive help from the U.S. in airlifting ammunition and supplies, managed to turn the situation around and surround the Egyptian

⁸⁹ Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* Bern: Peter Lang AG, (1998), p. 39.

⁹⁰ Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, (1979), p.163

⁹¹ Lorenza Rossi, *Op.cit*, p.17

⁹² *Ibid*, p.17

⁹³ Forum, *När hände vad?, Världshistorisk uppslagsbok 1500-1992*, Sweden: Bokförlaget Forum,(1993), translated version in english,p.378

army.⁹⁴ The October 1973 war had taught Kissinger and the Israeli leadership that Egypt could not simply be dismissed with contempt, as had been assumed in the mood of post-1967 triumphalism. They therefore moved to the next best policy of excluding the major Arab deterrent from the conflict so that Israel would be free, with U.S. support reaching phenomenal levels, to integrate the bulk of the occupied territories and attack its northern neighbors while serving the United States as a “strategic asset”.

At the same time, the United States and the Soviet Union acted through the United Nations’ Security Council and enforced a truce which was supervised by UN troops. The important consequences of that war were that the United States became the leading western supporter of Israel and that the Arab oil states started to use oil as a strategic weapon. They started to raise oil prices and sent an emissary to Washington to deliver a clear message: “*Unless Israel returned to the 1967 lines and the United States stopped its arms supply to Israel, an embargo would be placed on all oil shipments to the United States*”.⁹⁵

This was the first explicit connection between the United States’ two principal national interests in the Middle East, access to oil and the support of Israel. Partially as the result of the oil embargo, the United States began to participate more actively in the peace process and publicly admitted the need for a Palestinian homeland.⁹⁶ Other important issues have and will continue to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict. Religion, which historically has played a significant role in Arab and Jewish societies, especially in Jerusalem, it is a unique problem because of religious differences of Islam and Judaism. Jews believe that God gave the land of Israel to them and them alone. Muslims also claim Jerusalem and believe that the concept of a Jewish state is against the

⁹⁴ Following an Egyptian refusal to accept a cease-fire and a Soviet military airlift to the Arab states, the Nixon Administration sent a United States airlift of weapons and supplies to Israel enabling her to recover from earlier setbacks. Starting on October 14, 1973 U.S. Air Force "Operation Nickel Grass" flew resupply missions to Israel for a full month, until November 14. See http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_ykwar_course.php .

⁹⁵ Kelly, J. B., *Arabia, the Gulf and the West*, New York: Basic Books, A division of HarperCollins, (1980), p.397, quoted in Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* Op cit, p.397

⁹⁶ Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, (1979), pp. 166.12.

philosophy of Islam.⁹⁷ The Palestinian refugee problem, created by the 1948 war and the 1967 Six Day War, also contributed to Arab nationalism and added impetus to the Palestinian resistance movement. These issues are clearly interrelated and show the complexity of the American Orientalist quest to provide Israel with Palestine as a homeland.⁹⁸

Second: *The Importance of the Middle East's Oil.* Before the Second World War, the United States did not have much interest in Middle East oil. The American oil companies in the region represented purely commercial concerns since the United States remained the world's largest oil producer and exporter.⁹⁹ At the end of the Second World War, Middle East oil became very important and a strategic necessity to American and European war efforts for fueling planes, ships, tanks, and trucks. The increased American diplomatic, economic and military involvement in the Middle East during the war ensured that American oil companies came to play a leading role in the region after the Second World War. In fact, American oil companies played a major role in carrying out United States' foreign policy with Arab states until 1973. In 1945 Truman stated:

*Thus the world oil center of gravity is shifting to the Middle East where American enterprise has been entrusted with the exploitation of one of the greatest oil fields. It is in our national interest to see that this vital resource remains in American hands, where it is most likely to be developed on a scale, which will cause a considerable lessening of the drain upon Western Hemisphere reserves.*¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 162-163

⁹⁸ Ibid, p.107

⁹⁹ Lorenza Rossi, *Op cit*, p.27

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.29, see also: *Report of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee's (SWNCC) "Near and Middle East Subcommittee"*, (September 20, 1945), quoted in Palmer, Michael A., "Guardians of the Gulf. A history of America's expanding role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992", (New York: the Free Press, 1992).

In the late 1940s, the Middle East oil became strategically important to the United States since America saw its share of world oil production fall from seventy percent to fifty-one percent while the Middle East share rose from seven to sixteen percent.¹⁰¹ The United States, which so far had been the world's greatest oil exporter, could not maintain this position after the Second World War. The United States needed Middle East oil in peacetime as well as in wartime to keep the industrial advantage it already possessed, plus the fact that the American military had become heavily dependent on oil.

However, until the oil crisis in 1973, following the Yom Kippur War, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East did not devote much attention to Arab demands. The Arabs used oil as a political weapon against the United States' support of Israel and the quadrupled oil price intensified the energy crisis in the Western world.¹⁰² At this time the United States realized that its foreign policy in the Middle East had to become more balanced, away from a singular focus on support of Israel.

Third, *The Soviet Union's Threat to United States and Its Allies*: After the Second World War, the Soviet Union's influence the Middle East also increased for several reasons. The strategic importance for its national defense with the Middle East as a buffer zone against Europe and the United States is one reason. The Soviet Union was more or less defenseless against a nuclear attack launched by submarines located either in the Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet Union also lacked warm water seaports near its industrial centers, which made it strive for seaports in the Middle East to enhance both its commercial and military capabilities.¹⁰³ This led to the establishment of a significant Soviet naval presence in the region.

In its "ideological" struggle against the West, the Soviet Union needed to balance the Western powers. Both sides had global ambitions at the time and struggled for increased power and a widened sphere of influence. The

¹⁰¹ Statistical Office of the United Nations). (Statistical yearbook, 1949-1950. Second issue, Table 43. New York: U.N. Publications, (1950), pp.146-147

¹⁰² Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, Op.cit, p. 137

¹⁰³ Ibid, p.166

Soviet Union tried to deny Western states influence, and to expand trade with the Middle East. The Soviet Union was self-sufficient in oil production but wanted to undermine Western influence and access to Middle East oil. The Soviet Union gained political influence in the region principally by exploitation of the Arab-Israeli conflict through arms deliveries to a number of Arab countries such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and South Yemen.¹⁰⁴

The Soviet Union, acting with the Warsaw Pact, began to increase its influence in the Middle East in 1955. This was when the West denied arms sale to Egypt. Egypt instead turned to Czechoslovakia, which agreed to provide Egypt with all weapon systems that Israel was acquiring from a secret arms sale with France. The Western monopoly on arms supply was broken. This action from Egypt brought the Soviet Union into the region and gave the regional actors more room to maneuver.¹⁰⁵ This situation led to the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 in which the Soviet Union played a role, which significantly increased its influence in the region. The Soviet Union was an important actor in the Middle East throughout the Cold War.

When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, one of the most important national interests of the United States in the Middle East disappeared, and the Soviet Union's threat to the United States and its allies ended. The two most historically important national interests of the United States in the Middle East remained valid which are: Access to Middle East oil and support of Israel. At the end of the Cold War, other national interests also arose for the United States in the region. It soon became clear that the need for stability in the region was important. Additional national interests of the United States during this period consisted of the security of friendly Arab allies, specifically the Gulf States.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p.167

¹⁰⁵ Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* Op cit, p. 61.

¹⁰⁶ William Clinton, *National Security Strategy of the United States: A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington D.C.: The White House, July (1994), p.5.

4-American Military Interventions in the Middle East during and after the Cold War:

In our quest to understand the contemporary political map and the American Imperialist and Orientalist activity in the Middle East, we found it necessary to review the chronology (yet not exhaustive) of the American interventions in the Middle East in the pursuit of its national interests.

In 1953, after the Iranian decision to nationalize its petroleum and renew its confidence in the Prime Minister, Mossadegh, the British organized a blocus and organized a boycott of Iranian oil companies. Consequently, a great part of the army besides the big business land proprietors participated in 1953 to a political coup orchestrated by the CIA. Supported during twenty five years by Americans, the shah of Iran had to escape in 1978 in front of the Islamic revolution. Two years later, the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) was a real stroke of luck for the industries of armament around the world particularly the United States.¹⁰⁷

In 1958, millions of American marines were sent to Lebanon in order to avoid overthrowing the pro- American government and protect its interests in this region rich in oil resources.¹⁰⁸ In 1970, supported by American advisers, Iranian troupes try to invade the Sultanate of Oman. In the same year, a strong diplomatic and military implication of Americans nearby Israel during the wars, took place in the area of the near orient.¹⁰⁹

Between 1975 to 1999, and supported by the United States, Indonesia invades and annexes oriental Timor in 1975, killing one third of its population, the war took twenty-five years before the fall of Suharto in 1999. 80% of the population chose independence. Teleguided by the army, Indonesian militias made terror reign.¹¹⁰

From 1982 to 1984, American soldiers witnessed, as spectators to the expulsions and massacres of the Palestinians by phalanges' troupes of Lebanon

¹⁰⁷ Goerge Kahin, *Intervention*, Knopf, (1986), p.74

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p.215

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p.216

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p.218

supported by the United States.¹¹¹ In 1986, the American aviation bombarded Libyan towns, making hundreds of victims.¹¹² In 1998, American missiles destroy firms of pharmaceutical production in Sudan, supposed to serve as places of production of chemical armament for terrorist ends.¹¹³

In 2001, following the attacks committed in September 11 in the United States attributed to Al-Qaida that disposes of training camps in Afghanistan, the United States formed a coalition of massive bombardment of this country from bases implanted in Pakistan, provoking the death of millions of civilians. Victory was for the combatants of the Alliance of the North and the fall of the regime of Taliban who were eradicated. However, bombardment continued despite the protestation of the transitional government. The prisoners of war were denied all the rights recognized by the international conventions and some of them were deported to the American base of Guantanamo in Cuba where they undergo an exceptional regime in violation of all international and legal principles recognized by the American legislation itself.¹¹⁴

In March 2003, and without being able to obtain the consent of the Security Council, the United States invaded Iraq with its principle allies, the United Kingdom and Spain. In the preceding months, an abundant campaign of propaganda, and a series of lies to convince the opinion that the regime of Saddam Hussein represented an immediate threat to the United States, notably by the arms of mass destruction (AMD) which they never found a trace. After the fall of Baghdad, Washington faced a strong resistance and finally imposed on the country a legislation acquired for the American firms' investments. Here, we cannot miss the evident illustration that the war on terrorism is a minor question in comparison with the control of the Middle East.¹¹⁵

In this period, Bush imposed new sanctions against Syria, putting in practice the Syria accounting act voted by the congress in December 2003.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p.219

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda, "The Age of Terror: America and The World after September 11, An Introduction", Basic Books & Yale University Centre For The Study Of Globalization, New York Times, (2001), p.78

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p.100

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p.102

This law is the equivalent of a declaration of war against Syria in case it challenges the United States and disobeys it. Syria is on the official list of states that support and finance terrorism. Despite the fact that the CIA admits that there is no evidence of implication of this country since many years and that it proves cooperative in the fight against terrorism, notably by providing Washington with important information on al-Qaida and other radical Islamist groups. Clinton proposed to suppress Syria from the list of states supporting terrorism if it accepts the terms of agreement on peace proposed by Israel and the United States. But as Syria insisted, in spite of everything to get back its territories conquered by Israel, it continued to be on the famous list. If it was not the case, Syria would have been the first precedent since Iraq 1982.¹¹⁶

The application of Syria accounting Act deprived the United States of a major source of information on the radical Islamist terrorism for an objective that is more crucial: impose in this country a regime that accepts the Americano-Israeli demands. It is a flagrant practice of the United States to attain its priorities and national interests.¹¹⁷

Steven Zunes, a specialist of international relations, notes that the Syria accounting Act of December 2003, says more on the American national priorities. This decree invokes the 520 resolution of the security council of United Nations that forces the respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. Syria still maintains its troupes there. In fact, this resolution concerns explicitly Israel and not Syria and since twenty two years or more that Israel violates this resolution and others adopted by the Security Council about Lebanon. Never had been any sanctions or a cutback of the unconditional and considerable economic and military aid given to Israel. There was a requited silence, condemning Syria for the violation of the UN resolution that orders Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. Therefore, there is a very clear principle: the Lebanese sovereignty should be defended when the

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ George Shultz, *Moral Principles and Strategic Interests*, Current Policy, N°820, (1987) p.86; See Also: Noam Chomsky, *Deterring Democracy*, Verso, London- New York, (1991), p. 24

occupier is a state to which the United States is hostile but it does not matter at all once the occupier is an ally.¹¹⁸

Classically, violence induces violence in return. Serious studies on al-Qaida and Ben Laden, inform us that they were completely unknown until Clinton bombarded Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. Moreover, according to the rare reliable estimations, the consequences of Sudan bombardment made tens of thousands of victims. This human calamity as observed by the director of the organization of human rights did not attract any attention. The reaction could have been different if a terrorist attack had destroyed the principle resources of medications, American, British, or Israeli-or any other location that matters; what should have been less severe in a rich country, which could easily restore its capacities of production. Time and again, those who are in the bad side stimulate strongly the recruitment and the fervor for the cosmic war of good against evil. But still, what seems problematic in this discussion is obviously the concept of terrorism and its relationship with the arms of massive destruction, a hypothesis studied well before the 11 September 2001.

The collapse of the Cold War brought about a double transformation in world politics, a change in the structure of power, and simultaneously a change in the principles of order. The structure of power is the classical realist question, which is who defines the order, who are the major states, and what the relationship among them is. The collapse of the bipolar world raised the question then of what took its place. Uni-polarity, multi-polarity, or a multidimensional international system. Again, a debate that never found resolution. Perhaps the more complex debate was the change in the principles which had a longer lineage than simply the Cold War. But what do we mean by the principles of order?

By the principles of order we mean those basic ideas that often are referred to as the Westphalian legacy in world politics. Arising out of the seventeenth century, crystallized over four centuries, and embodied in the United Nations. The Westphalian legacy is composed of three actors: first of

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

all, the primacy of the sovereign state as the principle actor in world politics; secondly the principle of nonintervention as the governing norm among states; and thirdly, a conviction that religion ought to be separate from politics because prior to the Westphalian order, that religious wars of Europe had decimated one third of the population of central Europe. In a process that dates back at least to the 1950's, all three of these principles of sovereignty, nonintervention, and to some degree the separation of religion and politics, all had been eroded by the time we got to the end of the 1990's, but never exhausted.¹¹⁹

States were still and are still the dominant actors in world politics, but this formal sovereignty does not translate into operational sovereignty. Sovereignty exists indeed. It is held by more numerous states than ever before in history, but it does not produce the classical results that sovereignty used to yield in terms of self-control of one's own destiny. Nonintervention was not eroded as quickly as sovereignty, but the challenges of the 1990's raised arguments that it should be eroded somewhat. Finally in terms of religion and politics, it might seem wise to create an absolute abyss between the two. By the last quarter of the twentieth century, it was practically impossible to do good briefing on foreign policy without understanding the nature of religion as a public force. How did one understand Latin America and Central America without the Catholic Church? And how did one understand the Middle East without Islam? These are the kind of questions that drove the religious factor on the surface of public debate namely surrounding the theme of terrorism.

The concept of terrorism plays today a primeval role in the elaboration and analysis of American foreign policy. Let us take a recent example of Iraq's crisis of April 1998¹²⁰ when Washington and London qualified Iraq as a rogue state and considered it a threat to its neighbors and to the whole world, a nation out of law ruled by some kind of a Hitler reincarnated and which should be contained by the "*guardians of the international order*". What is striking is the non-debate on the possible solutions. It seems like if the essential question is

¹¹⁹ Wikipedia, "The Westphalia Legacy", the Free Encyclopedia, in: <http://www.com/answers/Westphalia.htm>

¹²⁰ Noham Chomsky and Edward W. Said, "Open Media Pamphlets Series: Acts of Aggression: Policing "Rogue" States", New York, Seven Stories Press (2002), p.15-20.

the following: Though the Cold War ended, the United States has always as a mission the defense of the world. But of what exactly? Of course, it became evident that the habitual technique of mobilizing masses through the recourse to the legendary pathetic monolithic conspiracy or the "*Empire of Evil*" had lost its efficiency. The United States had to find new enemies. ¹²¹

Joseph S. Tuman thinks that, unlike communism during the cold war, terrorism cannot be regarded as an ideological adversary; it exhibits no fixed set of beliefs, although a particular ideology can give primacy to terrorist strategies and its practitioners nearly always possess an ideology, no matter how rudimentary or visceral. To maintain, as some leaders do, that terrorism is a kind of spontaneous act of evil, devoid of serious political objectives, is to consign terrorism to the category of aberrant, irrational behavior- its practitioners are nothing more than sociopath mass murderers. ¹²²

But this emotionally satisfying distortion is a dangerous oversimplification, underestimating the terrorist adversary and weakening efforts to combat terrorism effectively. If true, it would be better dealt with by local police and psychiatrists than international intelligence and security networks and military operations. Yet, war may be more usefully cast as politics by other and very bloody means.

Terrorism, by definition, is not an attack on an enemy military target, even by suicide bombers. Armies are trained precisely not to be terrorized by violence. We recall that Japanese Kamikaze pilots were not considered terrorists, but rather fanatical members of the enemy's air force. US soldiers who disregarded their own lives to attack the enemy in virtually suicidal missions were considered heroes, not terrorists. Yet the US military and the media still refer to many attacks on US and Iraqi soldiers as acts of terrorism. George Bush, for example, continually praises those Iraqis engaged in defeating terrorists, casting all armed Iraqi opposition into the same antisocial and criminal category. ¹²³

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Joseph S. Tuman. *Communicating Terror. The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism*, Sage Publications, New York, (2004) p.30

¹²³ Ibid, p.40

War, as the pacifist slogan would have it, is not simply terrorism with a larger budget. Nevertheless, since the creation of civilian fear and uncertainty in the pursuit of political or military objectives is the principal characteristic of terrorism, it is empirically obvious that states and their armed forces may at times engage in a form of terrorism. Any definition of terrorism should therefore include the use of tactics by armies and states which intentionally or unintentionally, directly or indirectly, terrorize a civilian population. The saturation bombing of German and Japanese cities in the Second World War, as well as the use of the atomic bomb against a civilian population in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had the objective of undermining the resistance of these governments by terrorizing their populations. Incursions by the Israeli security forces in the occupied Palestinian territories would qualify as terrorism.

Indeed, in the United States, fear of crime –particularly of drug- had been caused by an amalgam of factors that have little to do with crime itself, according to the national commission on criminality¹²⁴. Among those factors, we find the media and the role of government and private industry in the perpetuation of this fear among the citizens, and this by the exploitation of racial tensions for political ends. Not to mention the racist character of police control and the condemnations that devastates black communities and creates a racial damage that confronts the nation to the risk of a social disaster. Criminologists speak of an "American gulag" and of "new apartheid": the Afro-Americans constitute for the first time in the history of the United States a majority of the population-with a rate of seven times superior than the whites, without any link to that of arrests that view all particularly the blacks.¹²⁵

Abroad, dangers would come from international terrorists, from Hispanic illegal of high strategic commandment (Responsible of the Strategic Nuclear Arsenal) rendered public by decree virtue on the freedom of information, and entitled *"Elementary principles of post Cold War*

¹²⁴ American Testimony Journal, in: http://www.tbr.org/lac/testimony_090105.htm

¹²⁵ Donald Cole, *the New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism*, New York, Harvard Civil Rights, Civil Liberties Law Review, (2003), p.52.

Dissuasion". It shows how the United States changed the target for their dissuasive strategy and abandoned a defeated Soviet Union for the ostensible rogue states such as Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea (associated press). This document proposes that the United States exploit their nuclear potential to give the image of a state which is

Irrational and vindictive as soon as its vital interests are threatened. This must be one of American national identity aspects that we should present to all our adversaries and particularly to rogue states .it is not good to present ourselves as very rational and thoughtful- and even less as a nation that is very respectful of stupidities such are the law and international treaties. ¹²⁶

The fact that certain elements of American government might appear potentially uncontrollable can allow creating and implanting fear and doubt in the minds of adversary rulers. This report resuscitates "the theory of the fool" cherished by Nixon: "*Our enemies must understand that we are unpredictable fools, holders of an incredible strike force. Thus, they will submit to our will*".¹²⁷

This concept had, apparently, been forged in Israel in the fifties. Taken up again down to the world super power- that does not consider itself beyond the laws and on which its own elites have little means of control- this attitude poses a serious problem to the rest of world.

Therefore, it appears important to contemplate how the term terrorism has developed. Indubitably, the terrorist attacks of September 11 were a dreadful assault on the American homeland and they will remain a key date in terrorism annals. Everywhere through the world, those terrible acts were condemned and considered as severe crimes against humanity. For every

¹²⁶ Lorenzo Murawiec, "Innovation: Element of Power", (Geopol, C.A.S.E, January 07th, 1998), in: <http://www.innovativeelementofpower.org/125478.htm>.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

nation, terrorism is a virus propagated by insidious foes of civilization, which constitute a return to barbarity which is perfectly intolerable.

In order to respond to those attacks, the American official definition of "terrorism" evokes The United Nations definition of terrorism as:

*any act, besides those specified and in force in the conventions and agreements on particular aspects of terrorism, the Geneva accords, and Resolution 1566 (December 1, 2004) of the National Security Council of the UN, which is aimed at causing death or grave physical harm to a civilian non-combatant, when the purpose of said act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or oblige a government or an international organization to take an action or refrain from one.*¹²⁸

In other words, terrorism is a planned violence to reach objectives of political or else nature to intimidate, pressurize and spread fear. This definition, however, let suspense on a good many of interrogations, among which those touching to the legitimacy of acts having objectives to guarantee "the right of auto determination, for freedom and independence, as it ensues from the United Nations Chart –people deprived of this right by force and notably peoples who are subject to colonial or racist regimes. Strikingly enough, in its stricter resolution given over to the denunciation of terrorism, the General Assembly of the United Nations recognized the legitimacy of such acts.

The fact that nobody pretends that terrorism is an absolute evil, and that it deserves consequently to be treated in return according to "the doctrine of reciprocity" which means the recourse to ferocious military operations matching perfectly to the neoconservative theory, favorably commented in "The Age of Terror": *"If you protect a terrorist, you are a terrorist- and if you*

¹²⁸ The United Nations definition of terrorism, in: <http://www.jackgrantham.blogspot.com/>

help or assist a terrorist, you are a terrorist; and you will be treated as such"¹²⁹

This publication reflects the 'educated westerners' opinion, which considers the Anglo-American response an appropriate one and even rightly measured. However, it is difficult to find someone who accepts the idea that massive raids constitute an appropriate response to terrorist crimes –whether of September 11 or others even worse, which unfortunately are not difficult to find. At least, if we adopt the principle of universality: if what others do is bad/good, it is equally bad/good when it is we who act. Those who do not abide by this minimal moral requirement, which consists of applying on oneself the principle that we apply on others, do not decidedly deserve to be taken seriously when speaking about the appropriate character of the response to terrorism, indeed even of good and evil.

5- Us Wars on Terror

A university journal collaborator, Charles Hill, recognized that September 11 opened the second war on terrorism. The first was declared twenty years ago, by Reagan's administration and "*we won*", proclaimed triumphally, "*Though the terrorist hydra has been just injured but not brought down*"¹³⁰. The former terrorist era turned out to be one of the major problems of international politics throughout the 1980's decade, mainly in Latin America but also in the Middle East.

We can understand quite a lot of things concerning the actual war on terrorism by studying attentively the former period and the way we speak of it today. As usual, all the analyses show the United States like a hapless victim constrained to defend itself against the terrorism of others: Vietnamese, Nicaraguan, Libyan, Iranian, and other anti-American factions throughout the

¹²⁹ Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, *The Age of Terror: America and the World After September 11*, Basic Books & Yale University Center for the Study of Globalization, New York, (2001), p.5

¹³⁰ Edward Price, *The Strategy and Tactics of Revolutionary Terrorism*, Comparative Studies in Society and History, (2002), chap.1, p.19

world. However, not everybody sees things in the same manner, September 11 attacks were firmly condemned but not without stimulating certain memories.

According to Managua's Jesuit research journal¹³¹, September 11 events evoke the "*Armageddon*", but Nicaragua has, by the United States fault, just as well known the Armageddon during a long period and it still suffers its mortal results. Others go farther in time, till the formidable terrorist epidemic of state that swayed away the whole continent from the début of the 1960's and which the responsibility returns to Washington. An Uruguayan writer, Eduardo Galeano made the remark that if the United States purports to oppose terrorism, it supports it in fact, just about anywhere, including Indonesia, Cambodia, Iran, South Africa, and in the countries of Latin America, which underwent the dirty war undertaken with the "*Condor Plan*",¹³² set up by South American military dictators who made terror reign with the United States support.

Those facts bring us to the second target of the first war on terrorism: the Middle East. The biggest crime committed in this region was incontestably the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982, which made nearly 20 .000 dead and let the entire country in ruin and particularly the capital Bayreuth¹³³. Just as the murderous and destructive attacks of 1993 and 1996 ordered by Rabin and Peres, the invasion of 1992 could hardly be justified by any necessity for self-defense. This is a tacit illustration of terrorism as it is officially defined.¹³⁴

So those operations led with the crucial military help and diplomatic support of both Reagan and Clinton administrations, surely enter in the definition of international terrorism. The United States was also implicated in other terrorist crimes that struck the region during the 1980's including the terrible terrorist attacks of the famous year of 1985: Car-bombing organized with the assistance of the CIA in Bayreuth, which made 80 dead and 250 people seriously injured; bombardment of Tunis with 75 dead, ordered by

¹³¹ Ricardo Stevens, "Report on the Americas", (Managua, UCA Journal, December 2001).

¹³² Edward Galeano, "Voices of time", in:

<http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?said=06/05/19/1324216>.

¹³³ "Why did Israel invade Lebanon" in 1982? In:

http://www.paletinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_lebanon_198x_backgd.php.

¹³⁴ Ibid

Shimon Peres, encouraged by the United States and highly prized by Secretary of State George Schultz. Though generally condemned and qualified by the United National Security Council as an armed aggression.¹³⁵

This calculated brutality and arbitrary assassinations, all those acts, let us repeat it, fall within the province of terrorism. This recent story has more significance that certain protagonists of the new war on terrorism already played an important role in the precedent. The diplomatic side of the actual war is confided to John Negroponte, ambassador of Reagan in Honduras, as to the military side of it, it was confided to Donald Rumsfeld, special correspondent of Reagan to the Middle East in the worst moments that the region was living as regards terrorism.

Initiated and supported by the American government, the atrocities of that type have not ceased in the course of the following years. The contribution of Washington in the intensification of violence in the Israeli Arab conflict continues. Forged by the president Bush in person, this expression intended for, following the rhetoric in use, terrorism of others. All we have to do is to go out of this routine to find other examples enough evocative of the American attitude. They can for instance enforce violence by participating in it: to deliver helicopters destined to attack civilian targets or launch murderous operations. They can also block the sending of the international force to settle conflicts. The United States recently, has made its position known, by opposing their veto in the resolution of the security council of December 14, 2001, which suggested the deployment of the UN peacekeeping (the blue helmets)¹³⁶.

Strikingly enough, following September 11 attacks, the Anglo-American reaction has benefited of a considerable international support, but unfortunately, by force of circumstance, had renounced to the basic moral principle of conforming to criteria that it applies on others. In time when the first bomb was released on Baghdad, Arthur Schlesinger—who is perhaps the

¹³⁵ Stephen Zunes, "The United States and Lebanon: A Meddlesome History", Foreign Policy in Focus, April 26, 2006, in: <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3237>.

¹³⁶ Robert Freedman, "The Bush and the Arab Israeli Conflict: The Record of its first four years", New York Times, (September 19, 2003)

most respected American living historian-called back the words of F.D.Roosevelt concerning the Japanese raid on pearl harbor :

"A day which will remain forever struck with infamy", wrote Schlesinger, "it is Americans who live in infamy given that their government follows in imperial Japan path" ¹³⁷

He added that Bush and his neocon advisors have succeeded to transform a worldwide fervor of sympathy toward the United States to a worldwide wave of hatred directed against American arrogance and militarism. According to international polls, the opposition to Bush reached 87 %. As expected, the war amplified the terrorist threat. Specialists of the Middle East who sound out the Muslim world have been dumbfounded by an upsurge of a "jihadist Islam" which was until then in decline, the recruitment of al Qaeda network augmented. Iraq which had never had any link with terrorism, has become, according to Jessica Stern (Terrorism Specialist and Teacher in Harvard) a haven for terrorist ¹³⁸. In 2003, suicide operations in the world reached their historical record, in the United States, the year ended on a state of terrorist alert of a severity without precedent. We mean here terrorism which is not of US doing and that takes the United States as target.

The invasion of Iraq was a case of a school, classically, violence induces violence in return. Serious investigations on al Qaeda and Ben Laden show that he was queasily unknown until Clinton bombards Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, those raids doped the support, recruitment and the financing of networks of al Qaeda's type. They made of Ben Laden a major figure and enforced his ties with the Taliban until then distant even hostile.

Moreover, the few reactions that followed the bombardment of Sudan teach us something on the western civilization. According to the rare credible estimations, its consequences amount to ten thousands of dead. A humanitarian disaster as described by the Director of Human Right Watch Organization. All

¹³⁷ Cited by Ian Williams, Middle East International, (21december, 2001).

¹³⁸Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, HarperCollins Publishers, (august, 2003), p.38.

that as stated before strongly stimulated the fervor of the cosmic fight between good and evil. Through the examples we tackled, we have queasily paraphrased the most serious and precise study that exists on al Qaeda, the book in question is for the British journalist Jason Burke who, by using numerous examples, he comes to the conclusion that "*Any recourse to violence is a small victory into the bargain for Ben Laden*"¹³⁹, an already dead man now.

Yet, there are still a number of questions to brood over rather than answer: Is too much included under the rubric of terrorism? Are we overusing or misusing the word? If it were an issue in 1945, how many aspects of the Second World War, including aerial fire bombings of German and Japanese cities and the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would fit into a broad category of terrorism? Terrorism of course, is generally considered a means to an end, a weapon in the service of a political agenda, and not an end in itself. It is the dramatic and terrible expression of the power of violence unleashed against non-combatants in order to intimidate and pressure an antagonist, weaken or cause the capitulation of an enemy, promote a political agenda, and attract allies and recruits to the cause of its perpetrators.

Other nations like Russia in combating Chechnyan terrorism, and Algeria in repressing domestic Muslim extremists, have not hesitated to employ their militaries and police forces to sow fear among populations deemed threatening to the state. Similarly, it could be said that the US air assault on Baghdad in March and April of 2003, was a military campaign designed to spread terror and therefore discourage the Iraqi people—military and civilian—from resisting. Code-naming it “Shock and Awe”. Not surprisingly, in the discussions surrounding United Nations reforms, the United States opposes the UN adopting a definition of terrorism that includes states and formal militaries.¹⁴⁰

In fact, anyone can have his opinion on the question, but the real question is not here, if we do not give the possibility to the population to

¹³⁹ Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, IB Tauris, penguin Books, (26 august, 2004), chap.5, p.102

¹⁴⁰ Noam Chomsky. *Terror and Just Response*, op.cit.

overthrow a bloodthirsty tyrant, there is no justification that a foreign power undertakes to do it by force. This principle is sufficient to eliminate the last doubt of legitimacy that doctrines like neo-conservatism want to assume itself with the heels of the collapse of all the official pretexts advanced in order to justify this war. Even if we suppose that the messianic doctrine of the president, which consists of spreading democracy in Iraq, the Middle East and the rest of the world, is generous and noble, it turns out to be a lie of the first category since it affirmed in the moment of engaging the country to war, that the only question that counts was to know if Iraq was going to disarm.

6-Interest groups:

Until now, this dissertation tries to demonstrate the impact of ideological foundations of the Orientalist thought and it would be more useful to touch the practical side of it notably the idea of interest. As has always been the case in the American foreign policy-making process, some interest groups have a far greater influence than others: Two interest groups, in particular, have been useful in pushing the neoconservative agenda into the mainstream. The first is big business, especially companies within the military-industrial complex. Most of the neoconservatives in government have extensive business interests and have taken benefit of the rotating door between the highest echelons of the public and private spheres.

The most tarnished case concerns the multinational company Halliburton. Halliburton has had the ear of the White House at least since 1992, when its auxiliary Kellogg-Brown & Root (KBR) was awarded the lucrative 'Logistics Civil Augmentation Program' (LOGCAP) contract, described by Briody as "*effectively a blank cheque from the government*"¹⁴¹.

In 1997, Halliburton missed out on a bid for the LOGCAP contract to rival DynCorp. But the Army still gave Halliburton a no-bid contract to set up some bases in the Balkans, and Halliburton so impressed government leaders

¹⁴¹ George Thielmann, "Interview". PBS Frontline: "Truth, War and Consequences", (July 10, 2003). In: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/thielmann.html>. In addition, updates on the continuing investigations into the intelligence failures leading to war can be found on the Iraq Update page of the BASIC web site in: http://www.basicint.org/iraq_update.htm

that then-Vice-President Al Gore gave it a "Hammer" award for efficiency. The close ties between the government and the company perhaps explains why career politician Cheney, with almost no business experience, was made chief executive from 1995 until his nomination in 1999. It was under Cheney that Halliburton gained its greatest leverage in Washington: LOGCAP funding increased from \$144 million in 1994 to \$423 million in 1996, and in 2001 KBR once again won LOGCAP, this time for twice the normal term length of five years¹⁴². During the first two years of Cheney's tenure, its expenditure on lobbying to Congress dropped from \$1.2 million to just \$600 000¹⁴³. Cheney will continue to receive a tardy salary from his former employer until 2005.

The Afghanistan and Iraq wars have been particularly profitable for Halliburton: KBR built the 1,000 detention cells at Guantanamo Bay, as well as the permanent bases at Bagram and Kandahar, Afghanistan. In what was broadly criticized as a mutually respectful bidding process, Halliburton won the biggest contract awarded to a company to restore Iraqi oil infrastructure (it is the largest oilfield services firm in the world).

Part of Halliburton's power stems from the proliferation of military outsourcing. According to Singer, the US government in Iraq employs at least 15,000 private civilian (often formerly military) contractors, from more than 30 countries¹⁴⁴. And plans to create 14 enduring bases in Iraq have created decades of work for private military companies (PMCs)¹⁴⁵. Their relative numbers in the two Gulf Wars illustrate the increase in the use of PMCs: during the first Gulf War in 1991 for every one contractor there were 50 military personnel involved. In the 2003 conflict the ratio was 1 to 10. Aside from the potential conflict of interest problem (a vested interest in continued conflict may conflict with the desire to serve one's country), this trend also created problems of control and liability within the armed forces, as the Abu

¹⁴² Dan Briody, "Profits of War". The Guardian, July 22, 2004. p. 17.

¹⁴³ Paul Singer, "Warriors for Hire in Iraq." (The Brookings Institution, April 15, 2004). In: <http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/singer20040415.htm>.

¹⁴⁴ See, as one example, CBS. "New Fuel to Halliburton Fraud Fire". (CBS Evening News, August 18, 2004). In: <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/17/eveningnews/main636644.shtml>, Also Chatterjee, P. Iraq, Inc: "A Profitable Occupation". New York: Seven Stories Press, (2004).

¹⁴⁵ Christine Spolar, "14 Enduring Bases' Set in Iraq." Chicago Tribune, (March 23, 2004).

Ghraib debacle most graphically showed ¹⁴⁶. Contractors are increasingly at the front lines of combat, in "mission-critical" roles, without proper protection, regulation of their actions, or public awareness of their expanding role.

Other companies, to boot, exploit their connections with prominent neoconservatives. In 2002, Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman-America's Big Three weapons manufacturers-received more than \$42 billion in Pentagon contracts ¹⁴⁷ The Carlyle Group, a Washington-based private equity fund, has a reputation for hiring ex- public officials such as George H.W. Bush and James Baker, the former Secretary of State who led the legal campaign to stop the Florida recount in 2000.¹⁴⁸ The Economist has accused the company, which also administers some of the Bin Laden family's wealth, of cronyism and monopolistic practices¹⁴⁹ .

General Jay Garner was appointed as Director of the Pentagon's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq due to his experience in securing Kurdish refugee areas in Northern Iraq at the end of Desert Storm in 1991. His appointment was controversial, however, because he is the President of an arms company that sells, among others, the Patriot missile used to great effect in Israel and Iraq. As one analyst remarked,

It seems inappropriate for somebody to step into a humanitarian and administrative role from a company with a role in providing equipment which, albeit defensive, is vital to the success of the US operation. ¹⁵⁰

The war in Iraq played an important role in the rise-from \$315 billion to \$379 billion-in the defense budget between 2001 and 2003. ¹⁵¹ Countless of these corporations and others like them, thus, had equally the motive and the

¹⁴⁶ See David Isenberg, "A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq". (BASIC Research Report 2004. 2 September). In: <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC.htm>.

¹⁴⁷ David Walker Hartung, "Making Money on Terrorism". The Nation, February 5. 2004. In: <http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040223&c=2&s=hartung>.

¹⁴⁸ The Economist. "C for Capitalism". (The Economist, June 26, 2003), p. 24.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 24

¹⁵⁰ Armstrong as quoted in Morgan, O. "US Arms Trader to Run Iraq". New York, The Observer, (March 30. 2003). In: <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,6903,925309,00.html>

¹⁵¹ Rogers, op cit, p. 83

means to be powerful advocates for the war. One particularly compelling motive deserves particular mention in this regard. Petroleum has long been central to the US existence in Saudi Arabia and much of the Gulf region. US dependency on oil is increasing: in 2000, the US imported 60% of its total oil needs, compared with 42% in 1990¹⁵². The petroleum industry is one of the major backers of the Bush campaign.

Economic spurs definitely played a role in influencing decision-makers, but it is easy to overrate the extent to which this was true. Later changes to the neoconservative cause were possibly motivated more by such concerns than were Perle, Wolfowitz and their peers. One of the trademarks of true neo-conservatism is its lack of concern for the financial implications of policies. Its organizations are more often funded directly by decades-old conservative trusts and foundations than by corporations. Even Cheney and Bush are career politicians and figureheads more than they are genuine Texas 'oilmen'.¹⁵³ Their conservative, nationalistic political and social views predate their involvement in the private sector.

This makes the second interest group, namely the Israeli lobby, even more relevant. Several neoconservative decision-makers have close ties to Israel's right-wing Likud party and/or domestic pro-Israel organizations such as the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The relevance of the Israeli lobby to the war in Iraq is a controversial issue, but there is much to suggest that desire to surround Israel with more sympathetic, democratic neighbors played a role in the decision to invade. In 1996, Perle and Feith authored a now-famous advisory paper for the Likud Prime Minister Netanyahu entitled "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm". The paper explicitly requested that the United States and Israel jointly focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq - an important Israeli strategic objective in its own

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 59

¹⁵³ Lind, op cit

right - as a means of foiling Syria's regional ambitions, and warned that Iraq's future could affect the strategic balance in the Middle East profoundly.¹⁵⁴

Wolfowitz's assertion that the road to the Middle East goes through Baghdad, which refers to Hussein's aiding of the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, contains the notion that Hussein was the greatest obstacle to the peace process and that toppling him would bring peace to Israel.¹⁵⁵ The Israeli lobby, which should not be associated with the far more diverse Jewish-American community, has followed the practices of economic lobbies to become far more powerful than any other ethnic lobby groups. It is often divided on domestic Israeli policies, but is far more united on the matter of US policy towards Israel. It generally supports major US funding for Israel-the country has received over \$70 billion since 1979-and unconditional US diplomatic protection in UN and other ventures¹⁵⁶.

At its worst, it has been recognized to engage in whisper campaigns and blacklisting of critics in the government and elsewhere. This is not helped by the fact that critics of Israel in the United States tend to estrange Americans by being either right-wing (Buchanan) or equally left-wing (Chomsky). This lack of a middle ground means that informed centrist censure that asserts Israel's right to exist in peace and security but seeks to make aid provisional to the behavior of Israel is often missing¹⁵⁷. As the author puts it, although the role of the pro-Israel lobby is often greatly exaggerated- with some even claiming it is the primary factor influencing U.S. policy-its role has been important...in helping to create a climate of intimidation among those who seek to moderate U.S. policy, including growing numbers of progressive Jews.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. 1996. "Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000: A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm." in: <http://www.israeleconomy.org/strat1.htm>.

¹⁵⁵ Quoted in Drew, op cit

¹⁵⁶ Michael Lind, *Distorting U.S. Foreign Policy: The Israel Lobby and American Power*. New York, Prospect, (April, 2002).

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Stephen Zunes, "Why the US Supports Israel". New York, Foreign Policy in Focus, (2004) In: http://www.fpif.org/papers/usisrael_body.html.

This is not to imply, subsequently, as some critics do, that the Israel lobby completely controls America or its foreign policy. As stated earlier in this essay, the foreign policy of the United States continues to be informed by a range of other actors. However, the military-industrial-petroleum complex and Israel lobbies undoubtedly furnished two further reasons to go to war in Iraq. The variety of motives and interests behind the decision is clear in Wolfowitz's statement in a Vanity Fair interview that, "*For reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason*".¹⁵⁹

After all their machinations, the neoconservatives ultimately still needed, if not the support, then at least the acquiescence of the American public. Those who argue that foreign policy has been usurped completely against the will of the people have to face the fact that polls show that the majority of Americans backed the war.¹⁶⁰ The same public which had vehemently rejected Wolfowitz's draft-and with it his vision of the world-only a decade earlier, barely noticed it in 2003, or if they did, raised few objections.¹⁶¹

Thus, the invasion's motivation comes under what, in the distinguished circles, they refute as "the plot theory". It is understandable given the privilege the United States has, with all the crimes it committed and continues to commit, it has never been condemned by the international court of justice of international terrorist acts –in more technical terms "illegal use of force". Perhaps it is not a question of democracy, its nature and its future anymore; it is rather a question of survival, no more, no less.

When discussing Orientalism from this perspective, it is essential to stress two aspects of it as Said describes it. The first is the fact that Orientalism

¹⁵⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ For example, in Donald Lambro, "Americans Support War in Iraq 2-1, Poll Finds". *New York, The Washington Times*, (December 22, 2003). In: <http://washingtontimes.com/national/20031222-120239-5311r.htm>

¹⁶¹ Of course, the American public, in common with most Western public opinion, invariably thinks more in concrete terms: terrorists hadn't attacked the US homeland in 1992-they had in 2001. That is the kind of concrete immediacy that gets people's attention, rather than abstract policy papers.

essentially invokes an imaginary space, a space that finally produces the East in the minds of a Western audience as it was identified in the first chapter through the American consumerist culture. The second thing that needs stressing is that Orientalism both then and now is intimately connected with economic and military practice. In many ways, British Orientalism enabled the colonization of the East. Similarly, American neo-Orientalism appears to justify –ideologically (nationalism and national interest ideologies) and even encourage and produce American military and economic practices in the Middle East.

Now, it is important to state that the twentieth century is over, with its three World Wars excepting perhaps one: the War on Terror, and Uni -polar world order of the United States. The twenty first century is another period with new American national interests and new strategic Orientalist projects within a multi-polar world order and irrelevant civil wars in the Middle East specifically the Arab Spring. Hence, the new political and economic challenges will be very expressive of the American Neo-Orientalism especially in the Middle East.

Chapter Three

Understanding American Neo- Orientalism within the 21ST century's Political and Economic Challenges. September 11TH 2001 as a Case Study

Orientalism, being one of the greatest titles that have been published in the twentieth century, significantly challenged the corpus of the Orientalist literature and showed that what was thought to be a genuine branch of knowledge has been in many ways some grand narratives fabricated in favor of Western political dominance, all for or against the thesis suggested by Orientalism. Besides its theoretical significance, the published work was quite judicious and timely. As Abdel Malek notes, in the twentieth century specialists and the public at large became aware of the time delay, not only between Orientalist science and the material under study, but also between the methodologies and the instruments of work in the human and social sciences and those of Orientalism ¹

Orientalism, as developed by Edward Said and later used by different scholars to explain similar reality in regards to different regions and groups of people from around the world, is a concept that explains how Europe_ or the West in general, and its knowledge production, including literary production, viewed the peoples in societies of the Orient. In Said's view, Arabs and Muslims are represented as passive, backward, chaotic, violent, even less than human, and always in need of Western intervention or help in order to become, 'if possible', modern and rational beings.²

This approach as explained by Said has been taking place on two markers: in ideas about knowledge production, and representation of people and societies in the Arab/Muslim world. Accompanying that, and influenced

¹ Abdel-Malek, Anouar. "Orientalism in Crisis". *Diogenes* No. 44. 1963

² Said, Edward, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*, Penguin Classics, London, 28/08/2003, p.7

by it, was also the direct practices of interventions, colonization, and wars against the people of the region; from the French colonization of Egypt in the end of the 18th century, the Israeli colonization of Palestine in the 20th century, to the colonization of Iraq and Afghanistan in the 21st century. All these wars, with the major theme of neo-imperialism were purportedly on behalf of progress and civilization.

In the early 1990s when postcolonial studies began to invade the academic arena in Anglo-Saxon universities in India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, the seminal work of Edward Said was brought into further attention. *Orientalism*, in particular, was turned almost into a manifesto by scholars who identified themselves as post colonialists. Even today, accounts of the rise of postcolonial studies as a discipline continue to acknowledge the profound influence of Said's work on a whole generation of scholars and critics. A number of critics have found fault with Said's method which they accused of being at once inconsistent, naïve, departing from foregone conclusions and leading to sweeping judgments and monolithic constructs. These are complex responses and it will require pages to spell out their theoretical orientations.

But the genuine value of *Orientalism* is in the specific intellectual issues addressed in the book and the particular strategies of analysis adopted. Also, the amount of emotional investment laid in every page. It may be argued that *Orientalism* is not just a specialized study of western representations of Muslims and Arabs, but also a vehement personal response to what has come to be seen as a recurrent pattern of denigration and denial of "the other" in western cultural discourses.

Thus, considering what we know and what we think about Said's *Orientalism*, a reevaluation is necessary in order to bolster our argument that American neo-Orientalism is based on the ideology of nationalism and national interest detected from the 1940's until now. While the world seems in a huge mess, things could be unstated but partially explained. The 21ST century, started with September 11th 2001, as a major event in the political landscape of the near past, wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, after that, the

Arab spring events in 2011. In order to understand Orientalism in its new fabric, we will explore the interwoven ideological, political, and strategic details that gather and characterize the present American Neo-orientalist scheme within the East/West dichotomy.

A-Neo- Orientalism a Re-examination:

1-From Orientalism to Neo-Orientalism:

The position of Islam as a crucial element in the Orientalist East versus the west dichotomy has changed dramatically since *Orientalism* publication in 1978 and moved ever closer to the center of world politics. The Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, then the hostage crisis of US diplomats in Tehran, the unresolved Palestinian question and the use of Islam as a main force of resistance in the course of intifadas besides the victorious resistance of Arab Afghan Mujahedin over the former super power's occupation ³ and an increasing Islamic resurgence worldwide, all put both the West and Islam in new positions.

Moreover, some political and social factors have greatly influenced interrelations between the West and Islam, among them: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the void threat for the West, the growing presence of Muslims with full right of citizenship in the West, both in academia and in the marketplace and the emergence of global mass media, diverse satellite channels and the internet.

Likewise, some events of this new era have challenged the traditional Western perception of Islam, such as: the actual democratic participation, and sometimes, victories of Islamic political movements. The growing voices of Islamic modernism and the rise of a democratic government led by Hamas, as well as the democratic political participation of Hezbollah, which both of them have been regarded as terrorist movements. Also, the emergence of modern global terrorist networks in the name of 'Islam' and escalating Western publications on Islam, with a huge diversity of attitudes, that they reveal in Western scholarship.

³ Pipes, Daniel. "Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam". Middle East Quarterly, winter 2003. p .269

These events have become intertwined with huge changes brought by globalization. Although there are disagreements on how to define globalization, most contemporary social analyses show a consensus about some basic bare bones of the concept; among them are deterritorialization and the growth of interconnectedness.⁴ Under the influence of these two important factors, territory, as a basic element of civilization in traditional Orientalist thought, no longer constitutes the whole of 'social space' in which human activity takes places. Thanks to modern technologies, distance or space undergoes compression, and distant events and decisions influence to a growing degree on local life.

In reacting to the above dramatic changes, two academic trends have emerged. The first is an increasing tendency to think of Orientalism as an ideology which belonged to a period of history that is now behind us. Hence, we are now moving 'beyond Orientalism' and are in fact in the "post-Orientalism" era. Then, The emergence of a global communications system and the development of a form of global sociology have ended the history of social-centered analyses⁵. Equally, the sharp contrast between Occident and Orient is hopelessly out of date⁶.

The second trend, however, holds that although many preconditions which were responsible for crystallization of the Orientalist discourse are no longer in place, it would be naive to think that the old patterns of human history and destiny which had shaped the West-and-Islam dichotomy were simply removed. Far from it: they have been reconstituted, reorganized, and redistributed in a globalized framework and have shaped a new paradigm which can be called "Neo-Orientalism".

Few scholars have attempted to show some features and characteristics of the new epitome of Orientalism. Yahya Sadowski shows how after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Western experts quickly reversed their

⁴ Scheuerman, William. Globalization", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 2006,p.65. Retrieved at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/globalization>.

⁵ Robertson, R. *Globalisation and Social Modernisation: A Note on Japan and Japanese Religion. Sociological Analysis*, (1987),p. 37

⁶ Turner, Bryan . *From Orientalism to Global Sociology*, in his *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*. London: Routledge. (1994), p.345

views on interrelation between society and state in the context of Muslim world. Although, according to traditional Orientalism, the state was stronger than society and thus despotism was a norm in the Muslim context, the 1980s witnessed a dramatic change in Western analyses. “Younger Orientalists” like Patricia Crone, Daniel Pipes and John Hall, whom Sadowski calls neo-Orientalists, though chose to change the appearance of their argument and assumed society to be stronger than state, the core of their idea was similar to that of classical Orientalism.

For both groups Islam was incompatible with democracy. They both tried to essentialize “otherness” – and dichotomy – in one way or another. Sadowski concludes:

It is long past time for serious scholars to abandon the quest for the mysterious ‘essence’ that prevent democratization in the Middle East and tend to the-matter-of-fact itemization of the forces that promote or retard this process⁷

2-American Neo-Orientalism after the September 11 Events

A number of Neo Orientalist writings have been initiated after the attacks of 11 September in the United States, in which, nearly all Arabs and Muslims were represented as potential terrorists and enemies of the West. These Neo Orientalist writings are based on the same perception of Islam, which is mostly a restitution of the classical Orientalism, designed to justify the American imperialism and its aggressive acts towards Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. However, this interest in Islam marks the great difference between classical Orientalists and new ones. Unlike classical Orientalists, the New Orientalists seek Islam and its movements as their main target, and regard Islam as a global threat to Western civilization and its values. As Shahid Alam puts it:

⁷ Sadowski, Yahya. “The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate”. *Middle East Report*, July-August. (1993), p.83

What make this repackaged Orientalism new are its intentions, its proponents, and the enemy it has targeted for destruction.... The target of the war that the new Orientalists want to wage is what they variously call Islamists, Islamic fundamentalists, Islamic militants, Islamo - fascists, or Islamic terrorists. Whatever the term, it embraces all Islamicate movements - no matter what their positions on the political uses of violence.⁸

Accordingly, many Muslims are considered Islamic fundamentalists who are irreconcilable with the contemporary Western democratic values and culture. This makes of fundamentalism, as a whole, a dangerous propaganda for the idea that Islam is the enemy. Unquestionably it suits the needs of the American Empire worldwide especially the Muslim lands in the Middle East and Central Asia which are the most strategically important regions of the world, having the world's largest reserves of oil and gas. The United States could never justify its attacks on these nations without first convincing Americans that Muslims need either to be attacked - because they are "dangerous terrorists" - or liberated because they are under tyrannical and oppressive regimes.

Definitely, the fear and hatred of all things Islamic can be traced much further than to September 11th. Edward Said's *Orientalism* outlined how European colonial masters viewed their Muslim subjects with contempt and disgust. This attitude is still incompatible with the values of civil society and the Western vision of civilization, political order, and society"⁹. These Neo-Orientalist views about Islam are reaffirmed, and further sustained, by Bush administration after 11 September attacks. According to President Bush¹⁰, Islamic fundamentalists are "*ideological extremists who do not believe in free*

⁸ Alam, Shahid. "Scholarship or Sophistry? Bernard Lewis and the New Orientalism" (2003). At : <http://www.counterpunch.org/alam06282003.html>

⁹ Cheryl Benard, "Civil democratic Islam, partners, resources, and strategies", RAND Corporation, (2003), p.4

¹⁰ George W. Bush: "Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks," September 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. At: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057>.

societies and who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world".

Islam is, according to Neo Orientalists, doomed to be eternally associated with violence, intolerance, backwardness, and despotism, not with peace, tolerance, progress, and democracy. As Cheryl Benard puts it:

The Islamic world has been marked by a long period of backwardness and comparative powerlessness; many different solutions, such as nationalism, pan-Arabism, Arab socialism, and Islamic revolution, have been attempted without success, and this has led to frustration and anger. At the same time, the Islamic world has fallen out of step with contemporary global culture, an uncomfortable situation for both sides.¹¹

Accordingly, Muslims as determined to destroy America, all fight for "God against America"¹². So, Neo-Orientalists, believe that Muslims, especially of Middle Eastern origin, hate the American system of freedom simply because, Islam encourages dictatorship:

The enemy [Arabs] cannot believe that democracy and consumerism are fevers in the blood of Everyman, an outgrowth of each individual's instinctive optimism and desire for freedom...they hate the light...like cockroaches, like bats.¹³

Furthermore, Neo-Orientalists refer to the Arab world as the new barbarians whose cultures, rather than anything else, perpetuates violence. As Dag Tuastad¹⁴ has said:

The basic ideological assumptions of ...Neo Orientalism, are consistent with the tenets of new

¹¹Cheryl Benard, Op.cit.p. 40

¹² Ibid, p. 45

¹³ Ibid, p.47-48

¹⁴ Tuastad, Dag. *Neo-Orientalism and the New Barbarism Thesis: Aspects of Symbolic Violence in the Middle East Conflict(s)*. Third World Quarterly, Vol.24, No. 4. (2003), p.541

*barbarism, where violence is seen as deeply rooted in local culture, which means that political and economic situations and structures are irrelevant.*¹⁵

Thus, Dag Tuastad regards the new ways of representing the violence of Muslims and Arabs in Western media, as “new barbarism”. The “new barbarism thesis” implies explanations of political violence, that omit political and economic interests and contexts when describing violence, and presents violence as a result of traits embedded in local cultures. Furthermore, Tuastad argues that new barbarism has intertwined with neo-Orientalist imaginaries that highlight a deep cultural dichotomy between Islam and the West.

These waves of “new barbarism” and neo-Orientalism are to serve as hegemonic strategies when the production of enemy imaginaries contributes to legitimize continuous colonial economic or political projects, as can be witnessed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict¹⁶.

Christina Hellmich borrows the term neo-Orientalism from Tuastad. She finds that the most important particularity of neo-Orientalism is the fact that it neglects local and specific aspects of regional movements, and instead, it attempts to portray a homogenous Islamist terrorist enemy. In this “Manichean model”, al-Qaeda is essentially not very different from Hamas, Hezbollah, or Islamic Jihad: they are, first and foremost, enemies of the civilized world. A telling illustration of this perspective, can be found in psychological profiling efforts that fuel the image of Islamic terrorists as “crazy madmen”, acting under the influence of mental disorders, rather than being motivated by a rational logic related to social, political, or religious conditions¹⁷

In world politics, perhaps the Soviet Union’s collapse which ended the paradigm of the Cold War was the most critical change after *Orientalism* was published. Said points to this and compares it with the first confrontation

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 595

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 597

¹⁷ Hellmich, Christina. *Creating the Ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypocrites to Salafi-Jihadists*, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 31: No. 2. (2008), p.26

between Islam and Christianity. In the supposed intellectual vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, he argues, the search for a new foreign devil has come to rest, as it did at the beginning of the eighth century for European Christianity on Islam, a religion whose proximity seemed immensely problematic to the West. The situation is as befuddled and violent now as it was then.

B- Islam versus West Dichotomy:

1. Western Ethos and the Clash Between The West And Islam

The factual apex of the newly-formulated and revitalized binary between the West and Islam was worked out by Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' theory. Huntington, himself a former Cold War warrior, unconditionally appreciates Said's criticism of Orientalism¹⁸, but suggests a far more devastating version of the dichotomy as a new paradigm for world politics.

Nevertheless, Said is against Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations, considering it as a "Clash of Ignorance"¹⁹. Yet it is worth looking at his version of dichotomy in some detail, because it covers some important aspects of the main thesis of this research.

Huntington's theory is articulated in terms of the following five propositions. Firstly, *identity* is closely tied in with enmity and conflict. In the process of seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are an essential functional part²⁰. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against²¹. "*It is human to hate*"²². In fact, competitions in business, rivalries in achievements and oppositions in politics are behind different kinds of self-definition and motivation. Thus 'us' versus 'them' in political arena is a 'universal' fact²³.

¹⁸ Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster, 2002, pp. 33, 109

¹⁹ Said, Edward, "The Clash of Ignorance", 2001, accessible at: <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said>

²⁰ Huntington, Op. cit, p.20

²¹ Ibid, p.21

²² Ibid, p.130

²³ Ibid,p.133

Secondly, in the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political, or economic. They are *cultural*. That is to say, people define themselves in terms of cultural factors such as: ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions²⁴. The role of culture, as the most decisive factor, could be examined in major differences in political and economic developments in different cultural contexts. For instance, East Asian economic success has its source in East Asian culture, as do the difficulties East Asian societies have had in achieving stable democracies. Islamic culture explains in large part the “failure” of democracy to emerge in much of the Muslim countries²⁵.

Taking into consideration the critical role of culture, *civilization*, the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity, will play the major role in post Cold War era. Civilizations are comprehensive, that is, none of their constituent units can be fully understood without reference to the encompassing civilization. Although a civilization has no clear-cut limits, it refers to the overall way of life of a specific branch of humankind. “A *civilization is, therefore, in the first place a cultural entity, but once culture receives its current crucial position in world politics, civilizations become fully political entities*²⁶.”

Among all cultural factors, *religion* is the most pivotal²⁷. Certain investigations in the late twentieth century support that there is a contemporary resurgence of religion which it is a global phenomenon, and therefore, requires a global explanation. The most relevant and powerful cause of the global religious resurgence is exactly what was previously supposed to cause the death of religion: the processes of social, economic, and cultural modernization that swept across the world in the second half of the twentieth century²⁸. The movements for religious revival are anti-secular, anti-universal, and obviously, except in their Christian forms, anti-Western²⁹

²⁴ Ibid, p.21

²⁵ Ibid, p. 29

²⁶ Ibid, pp. 40-45

²⁷ Ibid, p.254

²⁸ Ibid, p.197

²⁹ Ibid, p.100

Thirdly, *the religion of Islam*, with its expansionism and tremendous “sense of violence”, constitutes the most profound part of identity in Islamic civilization. Muslims, in the era of the post-Cold War, have a much better understanding of what they have in common and what distinguishes them from non-Muslims. The new generations of leaders are not necessarily fundamentalist but will be much more dedicated to Islam than their predecessors. A sense of anti-Westernization is being reinforced. The – ‘renaissance’- leaves a network of Islamist social, cultural, economic, and political organizations which promote the idea that Islam is the solution to all sorts of problems today’s world faces³⁰.

And so, political loyalty among Muslims is mainly religious, then tribal, but not national. That is due to the fact that the idea of sovereign nation states is incompatible with belief in the sovereignty of Allah and the primacy of the Ummah. Islamist movements reject the nation state in favor of the unity of Islam as Marxists once rejected it in favor of the unity of the international proletariat³¹.

Fourth, there are *civilizations*, each of which is unique. According to Huntington, the seven existing civilizations are: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Orthodox, Latin American, African³². No civilization can fully embrace another’s culture. For instance, among major industrialized countries, the Japanese economy is unique because Japanese society is uniquely non-Western³³. The West is quite unique. “*The West was the West long before it was modern*”³⁴. “*Europe as Arthur M. Schlesinger, has said, quoted by Huntington in his book, “the source - the unique source of the ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom...These are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption”*”³⁵. Such ideas are deeply rooted in Western civilization, shaped by its Greco-Roman and Judeo- Christian

³⁰ Ibid, p.121

³¹ ibid, p.175

³² Ibid, p. 45

³³ Ibid, p.226

³⁴ Ibid, p. 69

³⁵ Ibid, p.311

heritage, best qualified by the separation of the spiritual and the sequential authorities.

In view of that, the “Westernization of the Universe” is a myth. Only naivety and arrogance can lead Westerners to assume that non-Westerners will become westernized by acquiring Western goods³⁶. “*Modernization, in short, does not necessary mean Westernization*”³⁷. Although modern scientists have much in common, the assumption that modern society must approximate a single type that is the Western type. That modern civilization is Western civilization and the Western civilization is modern civilization “*is a totally false identification*”³⁸. So the cool message, promoted by many Western intellectuals, that “*To be successful you must be like us, our way is the only way*” is merely an illusion³⁹.

In addition, Huntington advances his idea by illustrating that the processes of modernization of the non-Western world, though started by Westernization, ended in indigenization⁴⁰. This is to say that Westernization promoted modernization as the early phases of change. In the later phases, modernization promoted de-Westernization and the reappearance of indigenous culture through the development of the economic, military, and political power of the society and the social diffusion of confidence and self-assurance in one's culture. Modernization besides, generated the feeling of alienation then led to a crisis of identity to which religion provided an answer⁴¹. Huntington gives an example: in 1953, when less than 15 percent of Iranians were literate and less than seventeen percent urban, Roosevelt and a few CIA operatives rather easily suppressed an insurgency and restored the Shah to his throne. In 1979, when 50 percent of Iranians were illiterate and 47 percent live in cities , no amount of US military support could have kept the Shah in his throne ⁴².

³⁶ Ibid, p.58

³⁷ Ibid, p.78

³⁸ Ibid, p. 69

³⁹ Ibid, p.73

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 75

⁴¹ Ibid, p.75

⁴² Ibid, p.86

Hence, Huntington claims that Western values and culture had been made appealing to the rest of the world only through Western power and the increases in military and economic power, being hard power, producing self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superiority of one's culture or soft power, compared to those of other peoples. Thus, all the moral concepts of human rights, tolerance, liberalism, and democracy continue to be beautiful as long as they have Western power at their backside.⁴³ Every civilization naturally sees itself as the centre of the world and writes its history as the central drama of human history.

Perhaps the West has been worse in this sense. Such mono-civilizational viewpoints, however, have declining relevance and usefulness in a multi-civilizational world⁴⁴. To justify his argument, Huntington observes the experience of modernization in non-Western countries.

*The first generation who attempted to modernize their society in the post-independence era often received their training in foreign universities in a Western language. Partly because they first went abroad as receptive teenagers, their absorption of Western values and life-styles might well have been profound.*⁴⁵

Most of the second generation, however, got its education at home in universities created by the first generation, hence they often succumbed to the appeals of the native way of life⁴⁶. Another case is the course of integrating democracy by non-Western countries. Once a non-Western society adopts Western democratic institutions, it will bring to power nativist and anti-Western political movements. In other words, democratization, which is a

⁴³ Ibid, p.92

⁴⁴ Ibid, p.55

⁴⁵ Ibid, p.57

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 93

part of modernization, conflicts with Westernization, that is because “*democracy is inherently a parochializing not a cosmopolitanizing process*”⁴⁷.

In the Muslim world, for instance, the paradox of democracy brought an interesting irony. Support for Saddam Hussein was most ‘*fervent and widespread*’ in those Arab countries where politics was more open and freedom of expression less restricted⁴⁸. Furthermore, the prescription of Westernization is wrong because so far all attempts to alter one country’s civilization have failed. Observing cases of countries which have tried to shift their civilization, like Russia, Mexico, Australia and Turkey, one can come to the conclusion that this kind of attempts to modernize has been unsuccessful. In Turkey, for example, the growing Islamism of the mainstream, the failure of joining the European Union and the current situation of democracy are signs of the failure of its Kemalist movement⁴⁹.

In other words, if non-Western societies are to be modernized, they must do it in their own ways not in the specific way that the West experienced. They have to build upon and employ their own traditions, institutions, and values all like Japan did⁵⁰. Therefore, Western *Universalism*, explicitly, the universality of Western culture, is a completely wrong and politically immoral approach since the imposition of an alien and foreign culture needs power, “*Imperialism’ is necessarily a logical consequence of Universalism*”⁵¹.

Then, if the uniqueness of civilizations is ignored by Westerners, they will definitely fall into the trap of double-standards. In fact, whenever they wanted to promote values of democracy, free markets, limited government, human rights, individualism, and the rule of law for other civilizations, in practice, double-standards were the obligatory penalty to pay. So non-Westerners are not wrong if they consider Universalism as Western Imperialism⁵². Also, Western Universalism is dangerous to the world as it can

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 94

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 248

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 144

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 154

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 310

⁵² Ibid, p.184

lead to a major inter-civilizational war between core states, and it is dangerous to the West as well, because it can lead to its defeat⁵³.

Huntington's final proposition is that the West is in a process of gradual decline. Thirty five percent of the earth's land surface was controlled by the West in 1800, sixty seven percent in 1878, and eighty four percent in 1914. For three hundred years or more, inter-civilizational relations consisted of the subordination of "other societies" to Western civilization. By forcing its ideas or values or religion, the West tried to win the world not by the superiority of its culture but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. "*Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do*"⁵⁴

From early twentieth century, however, the West began to decline. Its decline has been gradual, and could be illustrated by examining the factors of power such as territory, population, economic product, and military capability. Regarding all of these factors, there has been a gradual but considerable decline since the glorious days of the West in the early twentieth century⁵⁵.

The Western ethos, as a result, began to lose its appeal. One can forecast that the West will remain the most powerful civilization well into the early decades of the twenty-first century. Beyond then, it will probably continue to have a substantial lead in scientific talent, research and development capabilities, and civilian and military technological innovation. Control over other power resources, however, is becoming increasingly dispersed among the core states and leading countries of non-Western civilizations⁵⁶.

Apart from political, military, demographic and economic decline, Huntington adds that the moral decline of the West could be observed in the following points: increases in antisocial behavior, such as crime, drug use and violence generally; family decay, including an increased rate of divorce, illegitimacy, teen-age pregnancy, and single parent families; at least in the United States, a decline in "social capital", that is, membership in voluntary

⁵³ Ibid, p. 311

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 51

⁵⁵ Ibid, pp.83-91

⁵⁶ Ibid, p.91

associations, and the interpersonal trust associated with such membership. General weakening of the “work ethic” and rise of a cult of personal indulgence; decreasing commitment to learning and intellectual activity, manifested in the United States in lower levels of scholastic achievement⁵⁷.

An important consequence of all this, Huntington suggests, is an inevitable and dangerous clash between ‘the West’ and ‘Islam’. This clash will be much worse than that of the Cold War. Because differences in secular ideology between Marxist-Leninism and liberal democracy could at least be debated, if not resolved. However, The deep seated cultural differences, could not even be negotiated⁵⁸.

Although some Westerners, including President Bill Clinton, have argued that the West does not have problems with Islam but only with a sector of violent Islamist extremists, but

fourteen hundred years of history demonstrates otherwise. The relations between Islam and Christianity, both Orthodox and Western, have often been stormy. Each has been the other's other⁵⁹. The central issue between the West and Islam is ‘who is right and who is wrong. So long as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains the West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations in the future even as it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries.⁶⁰

Finally he concludes:

The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, different civilizations whose people is convinced of the ‘superiority of their culture

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.303

⁵⁸ Ibid, p.130

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 209

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 212

and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.’ On the other side ‘The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense’. It is the West, a different civilization whose people is convinced of the universality of their culture and believes that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world.⁶¹

2. Samuel Huntington’s theory deficiencies

It is useful here to highlight briefly some of Huntington’s theory deficiencies. First, in highlighting enmity and otherness in the constitution of political identity, Huntington, seemingly without knowing it, owes much to a certain school of political philosophy founded by philosophers like Machiavelli and Hobbes.

The West’s Universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China... The survival of the West depends upon Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilization depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi-civilizational character of global politics.⁶²

This approach of the friend-foe towards politics has been theorized clearer by Carl Schmitt, a German philosopher who sympathized for a time with Nazism during the early 1930s. In a classical essay published first in 1927 and then 1932 (second edition) and later translated into English under “The

⁶¹ Ibid, p.217

⁶² Ibid, pp. 20-21.

Concept of the Political” title, Schmitt considers that all political actions and motives can be reduced to that between friend and enemy.⁶³

That is to say, if we assume that in the realm of morality, the basic distinction is between good and evil, and in aesthetics between beautiful and ugly, in politics the main function is to distinguish between friends and foes. As a result, concepts like “stranger”, “alien”, “other” and particularly “war” are central to his political philosophy⁶⁴. For Schmitt, the world is a dangerous jungle of self-interested partnerships, open disagreements, shifting tactical alliances, even outbreaks of violent conflicts. Weapons are of great importance. The essence of a weapon, Schmitt elaborates, is that it physically kills human beings. Just like the term enemy, the word combat, too, is to be understood in its original existential and literal sense. It does not mean competition, nor does it mean pure intellectual debate, nor symbolic wrestling. Terms like friend, enemy and combat receive their meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. It is the existential negation of that enmity⁶⁵.

Furthermore, He argues that even liberalism, which could successfully change “otherness” in economics to competition and in intellectual matters to public debates, has failed to remove the essence of enmity of the political⁶⁶. This concept of the political is not limited to the foreign enemy, but includes domestic enemies as well. Hence, every state has to take into consideration internal enemies and perhaps civil wars⁶⁷. These phenomena reflect the fact that human beings are dangerous creatures⁶⁸.

From this view, dialogue, rational debate, ethical values, acceptance of differences, understanding and compassion for others, all seem to be foolish political acts and values. From here it could be argued that the friend enemy concept of politics, especially when Schmitt extends it to domestic politics, has some fundamental problems in bearing with democratic systems. Thus,

⁶³ Schmitt, Carl. “The Concept of the Political”. Translated by George Schwab. Rutgers University Press. (1976), p.20

⁶⁴ Ibid, p.26

⁶⁵ Ibid, p.33

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 28

⁶⁷ Ibid, p.46

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 64

Orientalists who tend to follow Schmitt and ideologically institutionalize enmity as an essential component of identity cannot be honest proponents of democracy. Although they frequently employ it as a guise or as a tactical consideration, they are not real adherents of democracy. We saw some traces of such an attitude towards democracy in Huntington and will see more from other Orientalists. Overall, Schmitt's approach neglects many political achievements employed to minimize violence on the political scene.

The second deficiency of Huntington's theory is that although cultural aspects are important, there are many other important factors as well. If Muslims hate the West, or vice versa, each side is complaining about certain indiscriminate actions, including concrete matters. Politics is responsible for finding appropriate solutions to the problems. The insight into world politics that religion is going to be more important from the late twentieth century is correct. However, the way people understand and interpret religion is relevant to their economic, political, social and international conditions. Thus it is not correct to neglect other concrete factors in play.

Huntington sometimes admits that a single culture can contain two contradictory tendencies. For instance, he elaborates how, paralleling Weber, Chinese intellectuals considered Confucian culture as the main root of their backwardness in the early twentieth century, while in the last decade of the century it was considered as the main root of their prosperity. A similar analysis was proposed regarding democracy which is considered by many Chinese as a foreign imposition while it is, to Taiwanese eyes, rooted in their Sinic culture. Huntington notes: "*Whether they wish to justify authoritarianism or democracy, Chinese leaders look for legitimating in their common Chinese culture not in imported Western concepts*"⁶⁹.

His observation that culture has tended to play a decisive role in world conflicts has not been confirmed by empirical evidence. Bruce Russett and his colleagues in an empirical research illustrate that Huntington's theory is untenable. All interstate wars between 1950 and 1992 are reviewed by them. They analyzed the data in order to understand the possibility of war between

⁶⁹ Huntington, Samuel P, Op.cit, p.106

each pair of states based on different variables, including: civilization, contiguity, alliance, balance of military capability, level of democracy and bilateral trade. They concluded that such traditional realist influences of contiguity, alliance, relative power, and liberal influences of joint democracy, and economical interdependence, provide a much better account of interstate conflict than simply belonging to or not to the same civilization⁷⁰.

Third, Huntington's understanding of Islam is superficial, hostile and unrealistic. He is not an expert in Islam and his ideas just come from the bulk of Orientalist literature. Fourth, both the West and Islam are heterogeneous, they both contain huge diversities and dynamism. It is a grave oversimplification to ignore different and conflicting streams of thought in both Islam and the West. They include both rationalism and religiosity, moral Universalism as well as Relativism, egalitarian as well as hierarchical tendencies. In addition, it would be an unforgivable ignorance to dismiss all historical facts that show frequent exchanges of ideas between Islam and the West throughout fourteen centuries of their encounter.

Last, but not least, Huntington's view is biased ideologically. He chooses the worst strand in other civilizations and the best in his own to portray a perfect dichotomy. Why are the historical facts that show brutal violence in the West, like the two World Wars of the twentieth century dismissed, while those of Islam are highlighted? His final conclusion of an inevitable clash is as ideological as the Marxist theory of historicism. As Popper notes,

“an important distinction should be made between ‘scientific prediction’ on the one side and ‘unconditional historical prophecies’ on the other. The former is scientific and the latter is ideological⁷¹.”

⁷⁰ Russett, M.R., J.R. Oneal and M. Cox “Clash of Civilisations or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol 37, No 5, (2000), pp 583-608. quoted from ibid

⁷¹ Popper, Karl R., *Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of scientific Knowledge*, Routledge, (2002), p. 456

What one can appreciate in Huntington's rhetoric is his absolute frankness. His version of dichotomy is deep, dangerous, devastating but candid, clear and straightforward. One needs not to search among ironies and metaphors to find out that Huntington believes that modernity, democracy and scientific talent are inherent in the West whereas backwardness, authoritarianism and ignorance are essential to Islam. It is evident, for him that the West had all of its capacities even 'long before it was modern' and Islam's disadvantages are rooted in its 'Prophet', in its inherent 'violence' and in its 'bloodiness.' Each is the "other's" "Other". The problem is not the CIA or al-Qaeda. These are just symptoms of a deep hostility – the clash is rather the ontological outcome of being 'the West' and 'Islam'. His theory, as a result, is an evident, expressive, and an easy to understand example of Neo-Orientalism.

Because in many parts, Huntington precisely follows an Orientalist example, but at times he shows profound differences with the school as well. His interpretation of identity and "otherness", his ultra-reductionism, his overestimation of the role of culture and religion, his understanding of the religion of Islam as the most decisive part of the civilization, as a violent, aggressive and unchangeable entity, his neglect of what we do, his focus on what they are, all are in line with the traditional Orientalist mentality and his theory of the decline of the West, seems merely employed to persuade his Western audience by showing that they are in real danger coming from the dramatic economic growth of the Sinic civilization and the demographic expansion of Islam.

Hence, the West should follow more conservative policies, develop its military capacities and protect its current cultural and political boundaries. So the decline is used to fuel the engine of dichotomy, similar to what Said counted as the fourth dogma of Orientalism. However, Huntington also shows some fundamental differences from classical Orientalism. Once he talks of civilizations (in plural) and about different ways of modernization, his philosophy looks contrary to ethos of Orientalism, conveyed in colonialist slogans such as "*the white man's burden*" and "*mission to civilize*".

Moreover, his relativist opinion about culture (soft power) and his idea that Western organized violence (hard power) has been solely the logic behind the attractiveness of Western ethos and it is in contrast with traditional Orientalist teachings. Apart from similarities to, and differences from Orientalism, Huntington's theory of clash of civilizations is similar to that of *Orientalism*. Once he appreciates different ways of modernization, he then, reinforces the "otherness" of others. If traditional Orientalism employed the above slogans as blanket terms for Imperialism and Colonialism, Huntington's philosophy suggests that "others" will never be capable of receiving Western rationalism, rule of law, social pluralism, democracy and individualism. These are exclusive to Western culture.

However, he does not believe that the West can leave others as they are. In his view, this cannot happen because of "others'" essential violence. There will be a clash, this time not to civilize "others" – because they are incapable of that – but to safeguard superiority of Western culture which is synonymous, for him, with Western hard power.

The 9/11 attacks on the United States were a key event in the debate about the role of cultural and religious difference – especially, 'Islamic fundamentalism' – in international conflict, especially in the way that they focused attention on al-Qaeda's brand of globalized cultural terrorism. For some scholars, analysts and policy makers – especially but not exclusively in the United States – 9/11 marked the practical onset of Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' between two cultural entities: the 'Christian West' and the 'Islamic world', with special concern directed at those entities which might attract the taxonomy 'Islamic fundamentalists.'

This is not to claim of course that Huntington had it all his own way. Many have addressed his claims of global cultural conflict between the 'Christian West' and the 'Islamic fundamentalists' by a counter-argument⁷². 9/11 was not the start of a clash of civilizations but rather the last gasp of "transnational Islamist radicalism". (It remains to be seen as the start of a new

⁷² Dallmayr, Fred R. "Beyond Orientalism : Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter". Albany: State University of New York Press, (1996), p. 32

phase.) It is hard to disagree with the claim that the events of September 11 drive culture on to the forefront of the international agenda, providing as a result Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis with a new charter of life.

Henceforth, many commentators were no longer inhibited in attributing essentialist characteristics to the 'Christian West' and 'Islam'. After 9/11, there was a pronounced penchant to see the world in a Huntington-inspired simplistic division, with straight lines on maps – 'Islam has bloody borders', he claimed – apparently the key to understanding what were increasingly portrayed as definitively ethnically and racially defined lines across the globe.

September 11, 2001, as well as many subsequent terrorist outrages, were perpetrated by al-Qaeda or its followers, or else; all involved extremist Muslims that wanted to cause destruction and loss of life against 'Western' targets that nevertheless often led to considerable loss of life. The US response – the Bush administration's 'war on terror' – targeted Muslims, some believe rather indiscriminately, in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Some have claimed that these events 'prove' the correctness of Huntington's thesis on the 'clash of civilizations'. In such views, the 9/11 attacks and the US response suggested that Huntington's prophecy about clashing civilizations was now less abstract and more plausible than when first articulated in the early 1990s.

Others contend, however, that 9/11 was not the start of the clash of civilizations – but, as already noted, the last gasp of radical Islamists' attempts to stimulate revolutionary change in Algeria and Egypt in the 1980s, and early 1990s. We can also note, however, that 9/11 not only had major effects on both the USA and international relations, but also contributed to a surge of Islamic radicalism in Saudi Arabia. This was a result not only of the presence of US troops in the kingdom, as highlighted by bin Laden, but also due to a growing realization that the function of Saudi Arabia's Umma was and is overwhelmingly to support and explain the unearned and unrepresentative dominance of the ruling king, his extended family and sponging entourage.

A dozen years after 9/11 and 20 years since the publication of Huntington's article, what do we know now about the 'clash of civilizations'?

Huntington did note in his article that he was aware of differences of opinion and outlook within 'civilizations' but he appeared to think this was much less important than an apparently clear 'clash' of values, norms, and beliefs which for him characterized the division 'between' the 'West' and 'Islam'.

It is clear – to most of us, at least – that the very idea Huntington stated in his book of a world divided into 'seven or eight major civilizations' is absurd. Time has already shown, frequently, that anyone who takes seriously the idea of a world divided into seven or eight major civilizations lacks capacity to have any possible understanding of the fascinating variety of a world crammed with myriad ideas, norms, beliefs and conceptions of how the world is.

C. The 9/11TH 2001 Attacks on the world trade center of the United States: the Truth

1. 9/11th Fabricated events by the Us Government

The twentieth century was a century full of ideas that turned out to be fanatical like communism and Nazism. Strangely enough, the totalitarian bracket seemed to be closed for ever with the end of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of the ideal of democracy. Everyone who lived the September 11 day was horrified and fascinated, while the images forwarded in tape on the screens, decomposing the tragedy into three sequences: the planes crashing into the towers, the bodies toppling over the edge, and the ultimate collapse. Here, a new enemy is already identified: "Islamic terrorism", obviously succeeding communism.

A person has to be willingly blind to deny that 9/11 was an inside job⁷³. Let us contemplate the facts: the world trade center network is composed of seven buildings, three of which had been completely shattered the day of the attacks. The twin towers and the building 7, or WTC 7, a skyscraper that was steel structured of 47 floors. The latter, though of a modest size of 173 m of

⁷³ "Without Precedent : The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission", Vintage, April 2007

height, compared to the twin towers, did not accommodate less, besides the financial companies which carry a lot of weight: Solomon Smith Barney, American Express or Standard Chartered, offices of the CIA- the most important after those of Washington-, Department of Defense, the Secret Services (United States Secret Services- USSS), Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange with its 3000 to 4000 files of investments that were destroyed and hence causing the Enron bankruptcy, as well as the center of commandments of emergent situations of New York Town Council that occupied a strengthened floor against bullets and bombs. *Frank De Martini* director of works of the world trade center, declared:

The buildings were conceived in such a way they could take a real hammering on a Boeing 707 fully loaded. It was the biggest plane of the era. I think that the buildings can put up with multiple impacts of planes because this structure is like a mosquito net of the door: a dense gate, a plane is but a pencil that would pierce this gate; it has no effect on the rest of the gate”⁷⁴

After the second plane impact at 9:30, the electricity of WTC7 had been cut and its occupants were evacuated. Around 4 P.m, the alert of the collapse was given, and at 5:20 P.M the building is reduced to a whole load of dust and rubble, in 6.5 seconds, without causing victims⁷⁵. The management of its fragments gave rise to some interrogations; why, as long as there was no corpses to research, not to take time to examine closely the fragments and the pieces of steel's beam? Why getting rid promptly of an eventual criminal scene?!

The world trade center 7 was 90m close to the tower north and did not suffer but offices were destroyed by fire and no impact of plane. Yet, it collapsed in a heap on itself systematically starting from the bottom in a

⁷⁴ “9/11 Mysteries – demolitions, min 06:58 »

⁷⁵ Official video of the Free Fall of wtc7,corrected after simple questions of two physicians, at : www.reopen911.info

similar way to the controlled demolition of buildings. The question now is: how does it come that its 82 pillars of steel could collapse simultaneously?

The official report of the National Institute of Standards And Technology (NIST) attributes essentially the total destruction of the skyscraper to ordinary fires of offices⁷⁶ that stay the unique fact of this day for this type of buildings. Furthermore, the NIST declares that the WTC7, a skyscraper, that had not been crushed into by any plane⁷⁷, fell down only by the fact of fires, a fact that never until then in history had caused the collapse of a skyscraper and more, a steel structured one. If this was the case, the destruction would have been progressive but the WTC7 fell down in a speed close to a nose dive and in a manner perfectly symmetric and vertical. Hence, the amount of energy required to completely destroy a skyscraper is simply not found in a plane filled with jet fuel, most of which is kerosene. And how do 2-planes bring down 3-buildings? No plane ever struck WTC building 7, yet it imploded completely to the ground in 6.5 seconds. That can only be caused by a controlled demolition, which is exactly what the 9/11-attacks were. The building's owner, Larry Silverstein was asked later by New York's fire chief if they could "pull" the building. It requires months to plant enough explosives to pull a 47 story skyscraper and this has been showed by the scientific analysis; it is impossible without explosives for a steel structured building.

However, the temperature released by the kerosene and desk fires cannot exceed 1000 degrees Celsius. Yet, metals that melted in the twin towers: steel, iron, and molybdenum, do not melt, respectively in less than, 1482 C°, 1538 C°, and 2623 C°⁷⁸. The pieces of metals melted found in the rubbles of the WTC stay a mystery if we believe the official version.

Now, what about the pentagon? The report of the same commission NIST says that the Boeing 757 of the flight 77 of American Airlines had been

⁷⁶ NCSTAR 1-9 voll1, "Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7", August, 2008, p.330

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 357

⁷⁸ Niels H. Harrit, Jeffrey Farrer, Steven E. Jones, Kevin R. Ryan, Frank M. Legge, Daniel Farnsworth, Gregg Roberts, James R. Gourley, and Bradley R. Larsen, « Active Thermitic Material Observed in Dust from the 9/11 World Trade Center Catastrophe », The Open Chemical Physics Journal, 2009, pp.2, 7-31. See also: Steven Jones, « chain of custody », in 9/11 the video: Explosive Testimony Exclusive, 1st part, 3 min 30 s & 7 min 58 s, & in 0 minute in the 2nd part.

projected against the pentagon by the pilot of al-Qaida Hani Hanjour: after disengaging the automatic pilot, he executed a twist from 330 degrees descending to 2.5 km in about three minutes, then he was crushed against the pentagon's wind 1 between the ground floor and the first floor, in a speed of 850 km/h. however, many old pilots declared that Hanjour could not maneuver this way a plane of this dimension, and this without touching the lawn⁷⁹. Moreover, the façade of the pentagon was intact and it was evident that a plane of this size could not pass through the window as long as the doorway remained standing upright, and if there is any, it crashed into somewhere else but not there. And what about Cameras? Disappeared! And the missile not Boeing filmed by the lawyers' office, besides the pentagon? There's no hard evidence that Flight 77 struck the Pentagon-photos, videos, and other evidence is being withheld by the U.S. government⁸⁰

Hence, the official 9/11 story has been proven a fraud! The firefighters who were there on 9/11, who saw and heard the bombs going off in the buildings (bombs that were planted in the 2 years leading up to 9/11) have been silenced by a New York judge (threatened with imprisonment). Marvin Bush (former President George W. Bush's younger brother) administered the electronics security firm handling the World Trade Centers for the 2 years leading up to the 9/11 attacks. That's how they planted the bombs.⁸¹

Now let us mull over the details. Larry Silverstein, owner of the WTC buildings, secured an insurance policy prior to 9/11 worth billions of dollars⁸². Silverstein publicly admitted that the Fire Commissioner asked if they could "pull" WTC 7 -a common term used in the demolition industry for imploding a building by controlled demolition. There are over a thousand bits of concrete evidence indicating that the 9/11-attacks were an inside job, i.e., that The

⁷⁹ Ralph Omholt, old pilot of Boeing 757 affirms that «the idea that an amateur pilot can follow this trajectory is too ridiculous to be taken into consideration».

⁸⁰ National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, Friday, 23 may, 2003

⁸¹ Michael Fullerton, « A Scientific Theory of the WTC7 Collapse» Foreign Policy Journal, 14 February 2011.

⁸² Allen M. Poteshman, « Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 », Journal of Business, 79 (2006) & Wing-Keung Wong, Howard E. Thompson & Kweehong Teh, « Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks? », Multinational Finance Journal, 15/1-2 (2011), p. 43.

White House and other key members of the U.S. government orchestrated the attacks.

President George W. Bush's younger brother, Marvin Bush, was on the board of directors of the electronics security company that monitored the WTC towers in the 2-years preceding the 9/11-attacks⁸³. That would have been a perfect cover to plant all the necessary explosives to bring down 3 WTC buildings. Planting explosives (thermite charges) to bring down 3-skyscrapers would require months of preparation. However, hundreds of firefighters and rescue workers who were there have testified that they heard multiple explosions before the buildings came down. There were bombs in the buildings.

2. The War On Terror

Hundreds of books have already been written concerning the 9/11-attacks and the truth is already becoming self-evident. The average person is afraid to study the existing evidence or ask questions. Unfortunately, it may never be possible to prove anything, because all the evidence has been removed. However, the phony story that radical Muslims caused the 9/11-attacks simply does not add up. Most of the provided names of the 9/11 attackers onboard the airplanes that purportedly crashed into the Trade Towers have been found alive and well. It's all lies and more lies.

Worse, of all people, the 9/11 Commission appointed Henry Kissinger (a warmonger and eugenicist) to lead the investigation. The American public protest⁸⁴ was so great that they picked someone else. Of course, the 9/11 Commission was spearheaded by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), which is like having the fox investigate the disappearance of chickens from the hen house. This is irrefutably the biggest conspiracy theory of all that a group of Muslims hijacked 2-jumbo jets and flew them into 2-buildings, thus causing 3-buildings to perfectly implode to the ground in just few seconds.

⁸³ "The Ground Truth: The Untold Story of America Under Attack on 9/11", Riverhead Hardcover, September 2009

⁸⁴ Ibid

The War on Terror is bogus, a scam to destroy the Middle East. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq on the premise of the 9/11 attacks, which turned out to be a pack of lies. Over 1,300,000 Iraqis and thousands of U.S. soldiers have needlessly been murdered as a consequence. The profits from the stolen oil in Iraq have gone straight into a Federal Reserve Bank in New York which is privately owned by the Banksters. Meanwhile, Americans have been stuck with a billion dollar bill from the Iraqi War. 35,000,000 Americans are on Food Stamps and welfare, unable to find a decent job, and tens-of-millions have either lost, or are about to lose, their homes. As former Governor Jesse Ventura said: "*When we lie, we go to prison; when the government lies, we go to war.*"⁸⁵

The theoretical analysis of this episode brought together Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony with Michele Foucault's notions of 'true discourse' and 'positional superiority.' The negative images of Islam and Muslims that are dominant in North America can best be understood through Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Gramsci argues that hegemonic knowledge is a system of thought that is formed over time and that is representative of the interests of the dominant class that manages to universalize its own beliefs and value systems to subordinate classes⁸⁶.

Such beliefs are formulated and reformulated by the intellectual elite, the intellectuals of the dominant class, and result in controlling structures that are imposed through 'civil society' rather than through the state. Negative stereotypes of Muslims as part of the dominant ideology of North America are reinforced through institutions independent of the state such as the mainstream mass media.

One of the main features of imperial oppression is control over language. Language becomes the medium through which a hierarchical structure of power is perpetuated, and the medium through which conceptions of 'truth', 'order', and 'reality', become established. Such power is rejected in

⁸⁵ Jesse Ventura with Dick Russell, "American Conspiracies Lies, Lies, and More Dirty Lies that the Government Tells Us" Skyhorse Publishing, 2011, paperback, p. 154

⁸⁶ Antonio Gramsci . *Selections from the Prison Notebook*, Quinton Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (Eds), New York: International Publishers,(1971), p.90

the emergence of an effective postcolonial voice⁸⁷. A strong example is Guantanamo American prison, which provides great insight into a model of the state at work in its goal to censor, imprison and restrict the free flow of information, people, and ideas.⁸⁸

Wars, invasions and civil wars in the Middle East: Libya, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, North Africa... what is next? In order to make sense of one's world view, one has to detach the latter from the propaganda controlled by the mass media. Once one knows the real motives of the powers in place, he would be able to understand but before, he has to stand tall to see further, by taking a look at history since history is real teaching by examples.

In 1945, Breton Wood's agreement⁸⁹ established the dollar as the world reserve currency, which meant international commodities will be paid in dollars. This agreement, which gives the United States a financial advantage which was on the condition that those dollars would remain immutable for gold with constant grade of 35 dollars per gram. The United States promised not to print very much money because of the system but the federal system refused to allow any verification or supervision on the process.

In the years preceding the 1970's, spending of the Vietnam War made numerous countries conscious that the United States was printing far more money than it has in gold. Consequently, they began to ask for their gold back⁹⁰. Of course, this caused a rapid decline of the dollar value. This situation attained its paroxysm in 1971 when France attempted to have its gold back but the president Nixon refused. In august 15, he pronounced:

⁸⁷ Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths & Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures*, London: Routledge, 1989, p. 7

⁸⁸ Guantanamo Bay, of 45 Square-Mile Piece of "American" Territory Rented from Cuba, has been the Recent Object of much writing by American Studies Scholars interested in Mapping the problem of "Empire". Guantanamo has served as the Site for detaining Many Prisoners Who Are innocent victims of American Power. See Braziel, Jana Evans, "Haiti, Guantanamo, and the Indispensable Nation": US Imperialism, apparent States, and Postcolonial Problematics of Sovereignty", *Cultural Critique*, fall 2006, pp.127 -160

⁸⁹ A landmark system for monetary and exchange rate management established in 1944. The Bretton Woods Agreement was developed at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from July 1 to July 22, 1944.

⁹⁰ Although gold initially served as the base reserve currency, the U.S dollar gained momentum as an international reserve currency that was linked to the price of gold.

"I have directed the secretary of the treasury to take the actions necessary to defend the dollar against speculators. I directed the secretary Connelly to suspend temporarily the convertibility in the dollar or other reserve access except for the amounts and conditions in the monetary stability and in the best interest of the United States".⁹¹

This is obviously not a temporary suspension as he claimed, rather a permanent default, for the rest of the world that gave the United States their gold. It was pure and simple theft.

In 1973, President Nixon asked Feisal, king of Saudi Arabia to accept only US dollars as payment for oil and to invest in US treasury bonds, notes and bills. In return, Nixon offered a military protection of Saudi oil fields.⁹² The offer was extended to key countries producers of oil. In 1975,⁹³ the United States invaded Iraq in the first Gulf war and after crashing Iraqi military and destroyed their infrastructures, including expurgation stations, and hospitals, crippling sanctions were imposed, preventing infrastructures from being rebuilt. These sanctions that were initiated by Bush Senior and sustained throughout the entire Clinton administration, passing for over a decade, and it is estimated to have killed over than 500.000 children. Clinton administration

⁹¹ It was a Sunday, and President Richard Nixon suspended convertability of the US dollar into gold, effectively ending the 25-year Bretton Woods era of fixed currency exchange rates against the US dollar. US gold reserves were facing enormous pressure due to balance of payment concerns, the Vietnam War debt and Great Society programs, and the ensuing monetary inflation. A growing number of countries began to redeem their dollar holdings for gold. France sent a warship to New York harbor in early August 1971 with instructions to bring back its gold from the New York Federal Reserve Bank. It was, after all, French President Charles de Gaulle who remained consistently skeptical about the US dollar, saying at a press conference on February 4, 1965, that it was impossible for the dollar to be "an impartial and international trade medium . . . It is in fact a credit instrument reserved for one state only." (Cited in Benn Steil's *The Battle of Bretton Woods*. Princeton University Press, (2013), p.60

⁹² Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, "Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations", Congressional Research Service, (December 16, 2009). See also See Aaron David Miller, "Search for Security: Saudi Arabian oil and American foreign policy, 1939-1949", University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1980; and, Simon Davis, "Keeping the Americans in line? Britain, the United States and Saudi Arabia, 1939-45: Inter-Allied Rivalry in the Middle East Revisited," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Volume 8: Number 1, 1997, pp. 96 -136

⁹³ Miles Igotus, "Seizing Arab Oil," *Harper's Magazine*, March 1975; and, Congressional Research Service, "Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study," Committee Print Prepared for the House Committee on International Relations Special Subcommittee on Investigations, August 21, 1975.

was fully aware of these figures; it is more than children who died in Hiroshima!

In November 2000, Iraq began selling its oil exclusively in Euros.⁹⁴ It was a direct attack on the dollar and on the US financial dominance, and this was not tolerated. In response, the American government, with the assistance of the news media, began a massive propaganda, affirming that Iraq possessed arms of mass destruction. The 9/11 September big conspiracy project and bogus attacks were a precursor for a series of wars in the Arab Muslim world in the pursuit of the national interest: oil, more accurately the petrodollar.

First, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and once the United States had controlled the country, all oil sells were immediately switched back to dollars. This is particularly remarkable in the sense where coming back to dollar caused a loss of 15 to 20% on the revenue of the Euro entire value.⁹⁵ The movement consisted of taking out the dollar of its parity gold by attaching it to foreign oil, instantly forcing all countries importing oil of the world to maintain a constant supply of federal reserve paper, and in order to get their paper, they had to send real physical goods for America. This was the birth of the petrodollar. Hence, paper went out and everything America needed came in and in this way the United States became very very rich. It was the largest financial con in the course of history.⁹⁶

The Cold War race for armament was a real game of poker; military expenditures were the chip. With the petrodollar expel, they succeeded to rise expel higher and higher and spend more than any country in the planet. That is why the Soviet Union never had a chance; the collapse of the communist bloc in 1991 removed the last enemy balanced to American military power. General Wesley Clark stated in March 2, 2007,

Today, in the office of the Secretary of Defense, I was informed about a plan describing how we could destroy 7 countries in 5 years starting with Iraq, Syria,

⁹⁴ CNN.com - "U.N. to let Iraq sell oil for euros, not dollars", edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/.../iraq.un.euro.reut/

⁹⁵ Peggy J. Crawford, Terry Young, and Julia Takhtaroy. The Dollar vs. the Euro, Pepperdine university, Graziado school of business and management, (2004), volume 7, Issue 1

⁹⁶ Henry C K Liu, "Dollar Hegemony", finance journal, (on April 11. 2002)

*Lebanon, Libya, Somali, Soudan, and to finish off, Iran.*⁹⁷

If we look at events of the last decade for example, in Libya, Kaddafi was in the process of organizing a bloc of African countries to create a gold based currency called the dinar, which these countries have the intention to use to replace the dollar in this region.⁹⁸ U.S and the UN forces helped destabilize and topple Libyan government in 2011 and after taking control of the region, the United States armed the rebels to kill Kaddafi in cold blood and immediately set up Libyan Central Bank.

In this moment, Iran has been actively campaigning the end of sells of oil in dollar and is recently securing agreements in order to start selling its oil for exchange for gold.⁹⁹ In response, the American government with the assistance of mass media, tried to create an international support to encourage military strikes under the pretext of preventing Iran from building a nuclear weapon. In the meantime, they established sanctions in order to cause the collapse of the Iranian economy.¹⁰⁰

Syria is the closest ally of Iran. Both are bound by mutual defense agreements. The country is actually being destabilized by the secret help of UN and if Russia and china have warned the United States not to get involved in this adventure, the White House made many declarations indicating they were considering a military intervention.¹⁰¹

The United States were actively working to create a context which gives them a diplomatic cover to do what they had in plan. The motives of these

⁹⁷ In an interview with Amy Goodman on March 2, 2007, U.S. General Wesley Clark (Ret.), explains that the Bush Administration planned to take out 7 countries in 5 years: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. From ANGLO AMERICA, MILITARISM, SHORT VIDEO CLIPS, (4 February 2013) by Democracy NOW! – TRANSCEND Media Service

⁹⁸ Alex Newman, “Gadhafi’s Gold-money Plan Would Have Devastated Dollar”, (Friday, 11 November 2011) 10:15, in New American magazine

⁹⁹ Dominique Guillaume, Roman Zyteck, and Mohammad Reza Farzin , “Iran–The Chronicles of the Subsidy Reform”, (July, 2011), IMF working paper

¹⁰⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, Bryan Gold, Sam Khazai, and Bradley Bosserman, “U.S. And Iranian Strategic Competition. Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change”, Centre for Strategic & International Studies, (April 19, 2013),

¹⁰¹ Jason Ditz, “Russia, China Warn US Against Attacking Iran », (November 07, 2011), Anti War. com

invasions and clandestine actions become clear when we look at the global context then connect the dots. Those who control the United States understand that even if few countries began to sell their oil within another currency, this could set a chain reaction and the dollar would collapse. They understand that absolutely nothing else is holding the dollar value up in this moment and so for the rest of the world. But rather than accepting this fact that the dollar is close to its life end, the powers in place calculated a gambit, they decided to use the brute force of the American military to crush each state resistant in the Middle East and Africa. The dinar itself would be bad enough, but what we need to understand is that this is not going to end with Iran.

China and Russia stated publicly and in serious tone that they will not tolerate an attack against Iran or Syria¹⁰². Iran is one of their key allies, one of the last underpinning independent oil producers of the region, and if Iran falls, they would have no way to escape the dollar without going to war, and this is what the United States is pushing for despite the warnings. What we see here is a neo- imperialist trajectory that was mapped years before, a route that leads straight away to a Third World War, the Armageddon, the worst scenario for a passive world society, for the secrets of 9/11 attacks have not been revealed and covered completely. The official silence is indeed a greater tragedy for both peoples of the United States and of the Middle East.

D-The Upturn of American Orientalism and The Arab Spring

1. The Western Imperialist Needs for the Arab Spring:

Undoubtedly, the Arab spring gave a new birth to neo-Orientalism in North Africa and the Middle East, opening new perspectives resurrecting the old Orientalism, and so its old vision of the Orient dating back to two centuries ago, and ironically revealing the continuity of the Orientalist reading, characterized by its ability to represent every happening in the Arab and Muslim worlds in this reductionist prism.

¹⁰² Ibid

This Orientalist rhetoric is noticed through insinuations, that the revolts would have been generated by external inspiration and founded by occidental political thematic linked to social and economic developments in the region. By the fall of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Causes are directly identified in works like “*From Dictatorship to Democracy*” for the American Gene Sharp¹⁰³. The book is a kind of a non violent political guide for action, as a matrix of the democratic movement in the region.

Reactions were immediate and multiple on the Arab blogs, indicating that the Arab manifestations do not have the faintest link or knowledge of this American manual, the New York Times persisted to present the American think tanks action working in the Arab world like Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy¹⁰⁴ – as supposedly- having contributed to shape the revolutions.

In fact, these inheritors of cultural societies of the last twentieth Century had been misdoing, in dissocializing democracy, delaying in this way the initiation of an autonomous democratization of the Middle East and North Africa, by insisting on the primacy of elections as a procedure.

Thus, the neo-orientalist new structural design is illustrated in the late reaction to transformations enacted in this region, first by retaking and reworking on the past immutable thought lines, proceeded with regard to this part of the world, and launched in embarrassment and panic by the acceleration of an Arab democracy that put down all their scenarios of a waning society. This seemed impossible in the Arab world but admirable with certain watchfulness. According to Alain Finkielkraut¹⁰⁵ who clearly seems cautious to admit that the tenants and effects of these upheavals are after all, of the

¹⁰³ Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 1st Edition, May 2002, 2nd Edition, June 2003, 3rd Edition, February 2008, 4th Edition, May 2010

¹⁰⁴ Carl Gershman, President of The National Endowment for Democracy, “Aiding Democracy Around the World: The Challenges After September 11”, the 39th Annual Hoemle Memorial Lecture.

¹⁰⁵ Alain Finkielkraut, « *Derrière le romantisme du « Printemps arabe* », Politis. fr

doing of locals. Surprisingly enough, Bernard Henry Lévy¹⁰⁶ like many others, could not deprive himself of insisting on the “duties” of occidental intellectuals in regard to the new revolutionaries, *first and foremost, the respect of the Israelo-Egyptian peace treaty should be underlined!*

Expressed in this way, the Orientalist articulation arranged the Arab jump and moved in the space of one season to three stages : first: identification of causes, second, warnings against threats, and third, the programmed disenchantment. In this context, many insist on the qualitative difference of situations between the countries of the region, but still conciliate their judgments about the nature of the phenomenon. Others like Emmanuel Todd¹⁰⁷ try to explain it in demographic dynamics terms, but underestimate the fact that the democratization access is concerned.

The first level of analysis is basically illustrated in the fast communication of arguments, concerning the failure of a totally outdone Al-Qaida, insisting on its political death since it reached no one of its objectives. Besides, it has nothing to say about these Arab revolutions; Nonetheless, it is erroneous to forget that the first objective of al-Qaida was eminently political ; the withdrawal of American troupes in the Middle East, the stopping of the support of Israel, and cessation of aid to Arab dictatorships. Perhaps al-Qaida's terrorist actions have forced some societies to look at themselves from the front, that the regain of Authoritarianism caused by the regimes adjusting in an opportunist way to the “war against terrorism”, contributed to regenerate the Arab oppositions, putting all repression of autocrats nude; and at last, that these revolutions were willingly open to the decentralized mode since many years. ¹⁰⁸

Let us be clear, al-Qaida was in retreat before the revolutions and linking its exhaustion to the Arab spring would be a simple analytical mistake.

¹⁰⁶ SPIEGEL Interview with Bernard-Henri Lévy: “We Lost a Great Deal of Time in Libya Because of the Germans”, March 30, 2011 – 02:18 PM

¹⁰⁷ SPIEGEL interview, “Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate: A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution”. In a SPIEGEL interview, French social scientist Emmanuel Todd discusses the demographic roots of the Arab revolution, which he argues was spurred by rising literacy and rapidly shrinking birth rates. He also muses on the ghost of Osama bin Laden, arguing *al-Qaida was already dead*, and on why he believes Germany is not a part of *the core West*.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

Here, the so called Islamo-fascism inherited from the American neo-cons, and so be it the Obscurantism of totalitarian Islamists, doubled by a “Nazi-Islamism”, and the disappearance of Ben Laden in the higher bid for what is a mere politico-religious terrorist movement, but revealing the Orientalists’ alarms not for an Islamist radical project promised to failure, but from a possible success of a spring that would have been emancipated from Authoritarisms’ equipment without consulting the auto-proclaimed producers of the universal democratic ideal.¹⁰⁹

According to historian R. T. Naylor

*Al-Qaeda itself does not exist, except in the fevered imaginations of neo-cons and Likudniks . . . who find it extremely useful as a bogeyman to spook the public and the politicians to acquiesce in otherwise unacceptable policy initiatives at home and abroad. Very simply, what you have are loose networks of likeminded individuals. .. They conduct their operations strictly by themselves, even if they may from time to time seek advice.*¹¹⁰

Beyond the stage of terrorism, there is the problem of the idealized fatality of an Islamism; the deadlock of this ideology is prophesied in the context of timid Arab electoral openings before the FFS gain the Algerian legislative elections aborted in December 1991.¹¹¹ In the beginning of the 2000, the Islamists are again troubling before the fabricated attacks of al-Qaida in 2001, ‘*the biggest internal bomb attack in the history of terrorism*’. Today, thirteen years later, the precision of the use of political Islam plan is brought into play again; before, we could only bet that it would go out of the fall of dictatorships even stronger. As a point of fact, Islam is present in all these revolutions, as it were in ancient regimes, the difference in the second case is that it is instrumentalized and now it is manifesting freely. In fact, Islamism

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰ R. T. Naylor, *Counter Punch*, Standard Schaeffer, June 21, 2003, p.122

¹¹¹ Mustapha Mohamed , “Algerian legislative elections: False specificity, a dangerous status quo and reform in waiting”, Arab Reform, At : www.arab-reform.net/IMG/pdf/SSR_Algerie_M-Mustapha_May12_Final_Fr.pdf.

accompanies Islam since its birth and it is forged from identities that were reformative –sometimes- dogmatic, even repressive and radical, ungratefully to eras and political contexts. Its reemergence during the second half of the twentieth century is linked to its frustration, due to its failure in the battle of decolonization, where nationalists and the military have controlled the state apparatus.¹¹²

A second parameter of the Neo-Orientalist arsenal is the formulation of dangers, watching for these revolutions with the threat of Islamism always in ambush, but equally the chaotic tribalism, the overwhelming emigration, the responsibilities potentially negative over Israel and the advantage (we do not know precisely which one) that Iran would take from these changes. Here we are invited to temper the enthusiasm and be careful against any illusion.

From then on, the suicidal escape of the Libyan Mouammar Kadhafi, faced with the revolutionist momentum initiated in mid February in his country, opens logically the way to a reevaluation of the nature of these changes. The intellectual armed hands of Neo-Orientalism, the activism of humanitarian mismanagement in Libya, will weigh heavily to dissolve the initial matrix of revolutions, which from now on the marginalization frames more easily with the Orientalist natural polarization; we see it obviously without the rehabilitation of the Orientalist rhetoric, since its predictions are immediate and sometimes the same ones that bring the information back.

Moreover, if there is no possibility to go to the country of Bahraini's black gold, tropism of Realpolitik obliges Orientalists to suppose the fact of an immature Libyan revolution. As highlighted by Pierre Guerlain, *the idolizers of the intervention were applauded for the massacres in Iraq or Gaza and are realist enough for not recommending an intervention against a state that is militarily strong like Russia or china*".¹¹³

The occident has the late scruple to nourish the Neo-Orientalist rhetoric with the rationalization and the reformulation of the disordered revolutions' perception. In the beginning though, the positive sentiment of occidental

¹¹² ibid

¹¹³ Quoted in John Turner, "Great Powers as Client States in a Middle East Cold War", Fall 2012, Volume XIX, Number 3, p. 37

populations, observing these revolts with fascination and admiration changed suddenly after the intervention in Libya when The image of the Arab spring becomes problematic, confirming in this way a messianic diagram to occidental democracies. Strangely enough, the international community is not able to face a military conflict anymore, all the same as an emancipating revolution, and this is telling before anything, about an international grammar where the armed violence is from now on normalized.¹¹⁴

At that time, Neo-Orientalists open the way to a justified disenchantment by the violence that seized the region, asking terrorists to interrogate: would the Arab Spring lead to the summer of assassins? Making of the region a desert of despotisms, all as advanced by Montesquieu, stigmatizing miserable and migrant masses to be saved by the French or the British.¹¹⁵

Here, we underline explicitly, sometimes implicitly, the historical capacity of occidental societies to receive the separation of powers, contrasting in this way with the epidemic problem of Islam as a mode of life and a sacred and legal space. As noted by many writers like Clifford Geertz,¹¹⁶ the effort to understand Islam, localize it, describe it, and reduce it to an intelligible summary, taken in the excitement of the moment, can only lead to responses and reactions of warnings, assurances, and advices, and eventually attacks.

Orientalism did not change, according to said's four aspects of systemic rhetoric, the hierarchical relation to the occident, a whole paralyzed, that does not meet the demands of modernity, an external representation as this whole can not show up autonomously, and the necessary control direct or indirect, colonial or pacific.¹¹⁷

The need for the Arab Spring is an idea advanced by Tariq Ramadan, a writer who is the implantation of an important Islamist family. His grandfather, Hassan al-Banna, founded the Muslim Brotherhood, and is

¹¹⁴ Samir Amin, "The Arab revolutions: a year after", in: The season of revolution: the Arab Spring Interface: a journal for and about social movements, Volume 4 issue 1 (May 2012), pp. 33 - 42

¹¹⁵ Vijay Prashad, « *Dream history of the global South* », in: *ibid*, pp. 43 – 53

¹¹⁶ Clifford Geertz. *Interprétation et Culture*, Edition Broché, Paris, p. 102

¹¹⁷ Claudia Moscovici, *Double Dialectics: Between Universalism and Relativism in Enlightenment and postmodern thought*, Rowan & Littlefield publishers, USA, p.13

considered by many to be the father of modern Islamism. Ramadan's parents were exiled from Egypt, and they raised him in Switzerland. Despite his lineage, the European environment, in which he was educated, led him to a more moderate understanding of Islam.¹¹⁸ His views on the relationship between Islam and the West, or the ability for Muslims to integrate with non-Muslims, are far less confrontational than those of his grandfather. Some have even championed Ramadan as one of Islam's brightest reformers—a mantle that Ramadan has readily adopted in books such as *Radical Reform*.¹¹⁹

The Arab Spring, as put by Ramadan are protests led, at least primarily, by young liberals and leftists whose ideas Ramadan considers to be at best inauthentic, and at worst residues of Western imperialism. Those activists were decidedly secular. Some raised the banner of liberalism and even, dare we say it, feminism.¹²⁰

Ramadan's new book¹²¹ is his attempt to wiggle out of this puzzle. With events still in change, the book is obviously a rushed analysis designed to strike while the iron—and public interest—is hot, rather than a carefully considered study. In fact, the main text is only 144 pages, the remaining 65 pages of the book consist of 28 previously published and only loosely related articles written as the Arab Spring unfolded. One imagines that Ramadan included these articles not simply as filler, but because they demonstrate something important about his analysis. What they, along with the main text, repeatedly reveal, however, is that the anti-imperial lens through which he sees the region, consistently leads him off course.¹²²

Though Ramadan probably did not intend them this way, the articles that he appends to *Islam and the Arab Awakening*, vehicle the evolution of his thought on the Arab Spring. Initially, he was excited and optimistic: “*Tunisians, you are right to revolt.*” And “*All honor and praise to the people of Tunisia!*” Yet these were the early days of the revolutions, before he

¹¹⁸ Tariq Ramadan, “ On Ethics and Understanding” Commentaries on: <http://tariqramadan.com/english/biography/>

¹¹⁹ Ibid

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Ibid

realized that they would not take the anti-Western tone he had imagined. The protesters somehow did not understand that to be authentic to *their own history* and *their values*, they needed to reject secularism, equality for women, and friendly relations with Western governments.¹²³

When the revolutionaries indeed turned out to be secular, internet-savvy youth who did not hate the United States, Ramadan changed his tune. He later derides the Arab Spring's "secularist intellectuals" and "secular elites." These phrases, coming from his pen, seep with despise. He also denounces the "internet culture" of the youth activists, calling it a "cult."¹²⁴ He then ties these young so-called Twitter revolutionaries to an American-led imperialist plot to control the Arab World. *In point of fact*, he warns, *Google, Twitter and Yahoo were directly involved in training and disseminating information on the Web promoting pro-democracy activism*. Why is this troublesome?

Because Google's position throughout the uprisings has been virtually identical to that of the US government or of NATO." This forces him to ask, "Are the most prominent activist's truly apolitical young people?" And "What has been the extent of financial support from the governments and private transnational corporations that control large swaths of internet activity?"¹²⁵

He has no answers to these questions; like any decent peddler of conspiracy, he is just asking.

Remarkably, as Ramadan traveled throughout the Middle East in the wake of the uprisings, he was somehow surprised when youth activists and revolutionaries who had risked their lives standing up to dictators, strongly rejected his theory that they were pawns of Western imperial designs¹²⁶.

¹²³ Ibid

¹²⁴ Samuel Helfont, "Tariq Ramadan's Arab Winter", The New Republic, October 1, 2012, p.08

¹²⁵ Ibid, p.09

¹²⁶ Ibid, p.10

Ramadan's problematic views are also evident in the book's sloppy analysis and inconsistencies. *Arguments that the -Muslim Brotherhood- has been repeating for fifty years offer nothing new*, he asserts when he wants to prove the Brotherhood has been intellectually stagnant¹²⁷. Yet six pages later, he insists that the Brotherhood *has undergone substantial development over questions like democracy, women, political pluralism and the role of civil society*. So what is it? Has the Brotherhood evolved, or hasn't it?

Similar problems become evident as he struggles with the West's role in the region. On one hand, he wishes to argue that a deep-seated Islamophobia is at the root of Western policy toward the Muslim world. Yet, he has trouble reconciling this with U.S. support for the conservative Islamic regime in Saudi Arabia or support for revolutions that eventually brought Islamists to power.¹²⁸ His beliefs awkwardly confront the facts, leading to more inconsistencies. At one point he insists that Western governments prefer *"to support despots than deal with Islamists of whatever stripe*. But on the very next page, we learn that Western governments have *no problem with political Islam* and that *Western governments' best friends are those who best serve their interests, no matter whether they are "dictators or Islamists."*¹²⁹

In this example and many others, Ramadan has considerable trouble coherently explaining Western actions. His insistence that Western, and especially American, foreign policy, is nothing more than an immoral game of greed, power, and interests. It is the heart of his problematic analysis.¹³⁰ Unfortunately, some of Ramadan's cynicism contains more truth than many in the United States would like to acknowledge. The hubris and the naivety that led to the invasion of Iraq are impossible to deny.

At times, the United States has made costly mistakes and even worse, carried out indefensible policies. When the United States tortured prisoners, it was not a rogue element, or some untrained private carrying out a random

¹²⁷ Ibid, p.12

¹²⁸ Ibid, p. 13

¹²⁹ Ibid, p.12

¹³⁰ Ibid, p.13

act; water-boarding was a policy that came from the highest echelons of the American government.¹³¹

Yet Ramadan focuses almost exclusively on these American shortcomings, reducing the entirety of American foreign policy to a string of human rights violations and the pursuit of power. Surely, even the most immature analysis of American policy must recognize that it vacillates between two often contradictory drives: American interests (security, power and oil), and American values (democracy and human rights). One simply cannot explain American actions by relying solely on one motivation or the other. Yet, this is precisely what Ramadan attempts to do.¹³²

One might expect that Western actions during the Arab Spring would take a pause. After all, the United States supported the expulsion of its ally Mubarak, and helped to overthrow a cooperative Qaddafi regime, while not intervening militarily against its longtime adversary in Syria. Ramadan ignores these contradictions and, without giving any serious thought as to how to explain them, simply asserts, "*The uneven response to the Arab uprisings by the U.S. and European governments indicate that nothing has changed.*"¹³³ Why does the "*uneven response*" indicate that "nothing has changed"? If nothing had changed, shouldn't the United States have continued to support pro-Western dictators such as Mubarak? Ramadan himself had argued that American strategy was to prop up despots in exchange for stability and power. So what happened? He refuses to grapple with this issue. Instead, he simply asserts nothing has changed, offers no explanation, and moves on.

Whatever name we assign to the events in the Arab world, we end up locking ourselves in one limiting, or problematic framework or another for example, the concept of seasons that is implanted in a long history of Orientalizing the region, as if what happened in the history of the Arab world before 2011 did not matter. There is no difficulty in predicting and understanding the Arab Spring as a struggle, and fight for a better life, that the Arab people have been waging against western colonialism, intrusions, and

¹³¹ Ibid, p.14

¹³² Ibid, p.15

¹³³ Ibid, p. 17

unjust local governments for over 100 years. From Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, to Palestine, the Arab people have been putting up a hard fight for over a century against western colonial, and neo-colonial capitalist and racist modernity. But this is almost not indexed in a western-centric mindset and in the dominant discourse, neither among many, in the Arab world itself.

Despite the fixation in the West with the Arab World and involvement in it for centuries, and despite the claim of superior knowledge, the Arab people continue to be “misunderstood,” and western-centric established academic “theories” continue to fail to explain, or predict developments in the region. With every failure, a more arrogant wave of “theories” comes to the forefront by the same deteriorating western-centric expertise, which comes to replace and continue to regenerate the old paradigms of “knowledge” as if nothing had happened.

In fact, there were many studies and commentaries in the last two decades, concerning the possible explosions of youth, with their over-representation demographically. But these were more warnings or fear of possible “chaos” and “extremism”; warnings about the younger generation’s lack of job opportunities and fear from what might lead to. In other words, it was also fear of the change of the status quo, especially when it comes to economic, political and security concerns, that are at the heart of western interests in the region. It is also an Orientalist and racist framework that sees peoples’ possible needs as alarming, and possible danger. What matters here, is not people’s needs, aspirations, and their self-determination, rather western’s interests only.

Central to all arguments is whether these were “real” revolutions, and whether these revolutions were of the making of the West (Europe, U.S., and Israel). Hence, both concepts of Orientalism, and Euro/Western-centrism, are worth taking into account, as ideas and practices of intervention in the Arab world, politically, militarily, and culturally. This prototype of misunderstanding and judging of historical developments in the region, and the Arab people likewise have been at work since the ascendance of the West to global hegemony and capitalist western modernity.

Thus, with a western-centric approach to knowledge, that not only universalized “theories” and explanations of questions, related to human societies, but also was entrenched in a project of western global domination. The aim was to uphold western supremacy and the subjugation of the rest of the world, and to preserve its dependence. This modern western-Eurocentric knowledge and approach to knowledge was and continue to be shaped, as it is related to the Arab world and the global South in general.¹³⁴ Of course, nothing is expected from the U.S. and Britain and their western NATO allies, as old colonial rule was replaced with imperialist and neo-colonial structures of domination and exploitation.¹³⁵

In the many reports, talks, and conferences, about the Arab revolution, old Orientalist and Neo-Orientalist narratives and perspectives continue to present the Arab world as dangerous, chaotic, passive, and always in need for help from the outside (from the West), which represents the official discourse of Western governments. Therefore, the struggles of peoples in the South seem to continue to be ignored, manipulated to fit western interests, or when impossible, it is censured as work of “fanaticism.” However, when it manages to succeed, these revolutions are celebrated to be drafted in as the work of “Western influence.”

Given that the West came to believe that western knowledge is the “real accurate and useful” knowledge, which led not only to the feeling of supremacy, but also to the prevention of taking alternative knowledge seriously, which would have been useful in explaining human societies and their changes. The outcome was negative, for it marginalized diverse and more

¹³⁴ Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978. See also: Salaita, Steven.. “Corporate American media coverage of Arab revolutions: the contradictory messages of modernity.” *Interface: a journal for and about social movements*. Vol. 4, No1, May 2012, pp131-145. & Lowe, Lisa.. “Turkish Embassy Letters,” in *Orientalism: A reader*, edited by Alexander Lyon Macfie. New York University Press, (2000).

¹³⁵ Mignolo, Walter.. “The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options”. Duke University Press, (2011). & Dussel, Enrique.. “Eurocentrism and Modernity.” *boundary 2*, Autumn, Vol. 20, No. 3, (1993), pp.65-76, & *Financial Times*. “US non-violence center trained Egypt activists”, (February, 15, 2011) At: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/89a67d42-3ae9-11e0-8d81-00144feabdc0.html>.

democratic knowledge, and insisted on paradigms and frameworks that continue to prove their failure.

The history of western interventions in the South, not only militarily, politically, and economically, but also intellectually have not only created a blemished “Oriental” minds, but also Western ones. Not only those who were made to believe that their history of knowledge production was not valid or irrelevant have often ended up only copying, and imitating western paradigms, and distanced themselves at last from their local knowledge, as they came to see it as “backward,” immaterial or just for neither here nor there.

This pattern continues to shape discourse today about all issues including the developments in the Arab world, where constant writing, conferences, talks, books, and workshops shaped by this same western-centric approach, continue to insist on shaping the understanding and the outcome of events there, to fit the interests of the west (including Israel), and continue to lecture about how things should be, as if people there are like instruments in their hands and will listen and behave accordingly.

In fact, for the usefulness of the research findings, I proceeded all the way through the historical approach in order to make sense of these events and bolster my argument based on the idea of American ideology of national interest, even Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations discussed earlier, is in fact about the clash of interests. All this is grooving around the American Neo-Orientalist picture of the Orient in general and the South in particular.

2. The Future of Orientalism and The East/ West Dichotomy in the Age of Multi-polarity:

The period of Uni-polarity that followed the end of the Cold War was one of relatively unrestrained American superpower, in capitalism and finance and geopolitical expansion. In the twenty-first century, we enter an era of multi-polarity, which is shaped by two markers: the weakening of American hegemony and the rise of emerging societies.

Thus, American hegemony and Anglo-American capitalism slowly and gradually emerge in East Asia, China, Singapore, the Arabian Gulf and Latin America¹³⁶ In development studies, the conversation is about the BRIC (Brazil Russia India China) and other emerging economies, several of which have been upgraded to investment grade. In international affairs, the talk is of 'the rise of the rest'¹³⁷ and the transition from the G7 to the G20 as a leading forum in the world economy.

This current seismic shift, in the global balance of economic weight and power from the developed world in the North and the West to the developing world in the South and the East, has been driven primarily by the rapid growth of increasingly vigorous **Emerging Market Economies (EMEs)**, as vividly depicted by the spectacular rise of China, as opposed to the moderate and tepid growth of recently crisis-prone developed economies.

An excellent quantitative analysis of this sweeping economic transformation is offered by the World Bank (WB) released edition of 174-pages entitled "Global Development Horizons (GDH)2011—Multi-polarity: The New Global Economy, (GDH)"¹³⁸ This annual report joins the WB's two existing annual reports, "Global Development Finance" (**GDF**) and "Global Economic Prospects" (**GEP**). It takes over the thematic analysis that used to appear in the GDF and the GEP in order to serve as a medium for stimulating new thinking and research on anticipated structural changes in the global economic landscape. The initial edition of the GDH focuses on points discussed in three chapters: 1st chapter- "*Changing Growth Poles and Financial Positions*," 2nd chapter: "*The Changing Global Corporate Landscape*", and 3rd chapter: "*Multi-polarity in International Finance*."

The major empirical findings and projections in these discussions offer useful definitions of terms. Multi-polarity is defined *as the concurrent existence of more than two global growth poles*. "Gr²owth pole" is defined as *an economy that drives global growth through its size, dynamism and linkages*

¹³⁶ Nederveen Pieterse, *Globalization the Next Round: Sociological Perspective*, futures, (2008), p.230.

¹³⁷ Zakaria, Fareed, *The Post-American World*, W. W. Norton & Company, (2008), p.290

¹³⁸ Global Development Horizons [GDH]: "Multi-polarity: The New Global Economy". The World Bank (WB) Released Edition, (2011)

with the rest of the world. These quantitatively based definitions by GDH depends on an economy's contribution to global growth, adjusted by the strength of the spillovers from domestic to global growth through three distinct channels: international trade, investment and technology diffusion.¹³⁹

Theory and history both indicate that Global growth leadership has varied over the last two centuries. China and India were the dominant growth poles until the first half of the second century. Historically, Western Europe, beginning in the 1500s, captured the leadership in global growth. But during much of the first half of the last century, Western Europe began to share its growth leadership with Japan, the United States and the former USSR, which emerged as new growth poles. Toward the end of the second half of the last century, however, the EMEs, led by China, began to evolve as the newest growth poles as measured by their multidimensional growth polarity indices. China is the only EME that is now an indisputable growth pole.

Furthermore, among the top 15 economies, ranked globally by their 2004-2008 average multidimensional polarity indices, China captures the top spot with an index of 26.20, followed by the United States and the Euro Zone, with indices of 20.33 and 10.86, respectively. Turkey is ranked 13th with an index of 3.07. In the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region, however, Turkey is ranked second among 30 countries after Russia, which is ranked seventh globally.¹⁴⁰

Hence, three scenarios are offered by the "GDH 2011" over the 2011-2055 forecasting period. The first is that the EMEs are projected to evolve as increasingly significant engines of global growth. They will account for 45 percent of global real output (compared with 37 percent in 2011 and 30 percent in 2004) as their average annual 4.7 percent growth rate will exceed the developed world's rate of 2.3 percent. The second is that the EMEs will increase their share of international trade to equal that of the developed world. The evolving landscape of the global economy will result in more diffuse distribution of economic size and power in a multi-polar world. The third

¹³⁹ Ibid, "Changing Growth Poles And Financial Positions", Chap 1, p.27

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p.76

scenario is that China, already a growth pole, and India are likely to lead the EMEs as new growth poles. Other potential growth poles among the EMEs, besides India, are Russia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Turkey.¹⁴¹

In these circumstances, most American scholars still believe that uni-polarity and American hegemony would be enduring features of international politics far into the future. However, in the Great recession's outcome, it is apparent that much has changed since 2007. The Great Recession has had a two-fold impact. First, it highlighted the shift of global wealth and power from West to East, a propensity illustrated by China's spectacular rapid rise to great power status. Second, it has raised doubts about the heftiness of US primacy's economic and financial underpinnings.

Thus, one can obviously argue that the Uni-polar moment is over, and so the Pax Americana. The era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945 is fast chilling out. This means that the distribution of power in the international system is no longer Uni-polar. Nevertheless, the Pax Americana's legacy institutions would stand still for some time and the United States can perpetuate the essential elements of the international order it constructed following the Second World War.¹⁴²

To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by US foreign policy namely in the Middle East. However, it is fair to say that the Great Recession has only accelerated the process and its causal forces. So, there are two drivers of American decline, one is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro Atlantic area to Asia where China's rise signals uni-polarity's end. The second driver of change is the relative decline in America's economic power, which is the alarming fiscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar's long-term hold on reserve currency status.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, "The Changing Global Corporate Landscape", chap 2, p.81

¹⁴² Ibid

In the near past, just after the end of the Second World War, the United States, by virtue of its overwhelming military and economic supremacy, was incontestably the most powerful actor in the international system. Indeed, 1945 marked the United States' first Uni-polar moment, where this latter used its commanding, hegemonic position to construct the postwar international order (the Pax Americana) which endured for more than six decades. Yet, during the Cold War, the Pax Americana reflected the fact that outside the Soviet sphere, the United States was the preponderant power in some regions of the world it cared most about: Latin America, East Asia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Consequently, The Pax Americana rested on the foundational pillars of US military dominance and economic leadership and was buttressed by two supporting pillars: America's ideological appeal ("soft power") and the framework of international institutions that the United States built after 1945.

Following the Cold War's end, the United States used its second uni-polar moment to consolidate the Pax Americana by expanding both its geopolitical and ideological ambitions. However, in the Great Recession's aftermath, the economic foundation of the Pax Americana has crumbled, and its ideational and institutional pillars have been weakened.

Although the United States remains preeminent militarily, the rise of new great powers like China, coupled with US fiscal and economic constraints, means that over the next decade or two the United States' military dominance will be challenged. The decline of American power means the end of US dominance in world politics and a transition to a new group of world power. Without the "hard" power (military and economic) upon which it was built, the Pax Americana is doomed to fade in the early twenty-first century. *"The balance of power is like perpetual motion, or any of those impossible things which some men are always racking their brains and spending their time and money to accomplish."*¹⁴³

What does this mean? This means simply that the United States is no longer an economic hegemon and its national interests are not the same

¹⁴³ Bullock, Alan. *On the Pax Americana*, London: Macmillan, (1998), p.65

anymore. Since, naturally, the hegemon is supposed to be the lender of last resort in the international economy. As a matter of fact, the United States has become the borrower of first resort and the world's largest debtor. Also, when the global economy weakens, the economic hegemon is supposed to take responsibility for kick-starting recovery by purchasing other nations' goods. From the Second World War's end until the Great Recession, the international economy looked to the United States as the locomotive of global economic growth.

As the world's largest market since 1945, America's willingness to consume foreign goods has been the fire wall against global economic downturns. However, this is not what happened during the Great Recession, The US economy proved too fragile to lead the global economy back to health. Others—notably a rising China—had to step up to the plate to do so. The United States' inability to galvanize global recovery demonstrates that, it no longer is capable of acting as an *economic hegemon*.

Apparently, China fits the description of a rising and credible challenger to the United States. However, not only does China fail to meet the requirements of a hegemon, given that its power is still largely one-dimensional (economic), but it is not yet in a position where the benefits of attempting to challenge the system are more important than the risks. More to the point, China refuses to find itself in such a position even in the near future, perhaps when its military will be better developed and its economy more mature.

Therefore, Hegemony and challenges to existing power structures are dependent not only on a state's capacity to bring about such change, but also its willingness to exercise its power to such an end. At the very least, one can say that China and the United States are in competition, though not necessarily hostile competition. Even if China had hostile intentions, there is plenty standing in its way, like the obstacle of the existing balance of power and international structure.

In fact, this was acknowledged by President Barak Obama at the April 2009, G-20 meeting in London, where he admits that the United States is no

longer able to be the world's consumer of last resort, and that the world needs to look to China (and India and other emerging market states) to be the motors of global recovery. Thus economically, it offers public goods by opening its domestic market to other states, supplying liquidity for the world economy, and providing the reserve currency.

So, because a Hegemon is supposed to solve international crises, not to cause them, and to be the lender of last resort, not to be the biggest borrower, the United States no longer fits the part, faced with wars it cannot win or quit, and an economy begging rescue, and China refusing to assume the burden of hegemony and global recovery.

Yet, many in the mainstream foreign-policy community see these as temporary setbacks and believe that the United States' primacy will endure for years to come. The American people are awakening to a new reality more quickly than the academy. According to a December 2009 Pew survey, 41 percent of the public believes that the United States plays a less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did a decade ago. The epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close, and international politics is entering a period of transition: no longer Uni-polar but not yet fully multi-polar.

President Barack Obama's November 2009 trip to China provided both substantive and emblematic evidence of the shift. As the Financial Times observed,

*Coming at a moment when Chinese prestige is growing and the U.S. is facing enormous difficulties, Mr. Obama's trip has symbolized the advent of a more multi-polar world where U.S. leadership has to co-exist with several rising powers, most notably China.*¹⁴⁴

In the same Pew study, 44 percent of Americans polled, said that China was the leading economic power; just 27 percent chose the United States.

¹⁴⁴ Robert Kagan, *The World America Made*, Alfred A. Knopf. (2013), p.71

A major question poses itself in this phase of analysis that is: why did the United States decline so suddenly? Much of the answer can be attributed to America's own self-defeating policies, but as the United States slips, others—notably China, India, and Russia—are rising. This shift in the global balance of power will dramatically affect international politics: like for example: intense great-power security competitions, war will increase, the current era of globalization will end, and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by an international order that reflects the interests, values, and norms of the emerging powers.

The American neo-conservative Robert Kagan, a foreign-policy adviser, addresses “the myth of American decline”¹⁴⁵ in *The New Republic* magazine where he emphasizes the importance of the United States' maintaining its “global responsibilities.” That essay was based on his new book *The World America Made*, a book that turns out to be a much more outspoken than the magazine article, a book that undermines its more potent arguments with unclear generalizations, controversial declarations and obvious statements: “*It is premature for us to conclude, after ten thousand years of war, that a few decades and some technological innovations would change the nature of man and the nature of international relations*”.¹⁴⁶

The book does make a strong case for the notion that the most important features of today's world, including the great spread of democracy, the prosperity, and the extended great-power peace, have depended on power and influence exercised by the United States. It also suggests that when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power supports will decline too. Similar points are made by the articulate writer Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter in his recent book, “*Strategic Vision*.”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Robert Kagan, “*The Myth of American Decline*”, in *The New Republic* magazine: February 2, (2012)

¹⁴⁶ Robert Kagan, *The World America Made*, Op. cit, p.77

¹⁴⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski , “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power”, Paperback – September 10, 2013

Robert Kagan also observes that the United States has never been omnipotent and astutely notes that

*in every single decade since the end of the Second World War, Americans have worried about their declining influence and looked nervously as other powers seemed to be rising at their expense.*¹⁴⁸

He writes that pundits and foreign-policy makers have frequently bemoaned the foreign and domestic problems besetting the United States in the past, and points out that some recent commentators have been quick to bring down their assessments of America's fortunes. Kagan's efforts to place America's current difficulties within a historical perspective by comparing, , the challenges posed by China today to the threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be instructive, and others added as odd exercises in relativism or deliberate rationalizations of current woes.

*Today the United States lacks the ability to have its way on many issues,... but this has not prevented it from enjoying just as much success, and suffering just as much failure, as in the past.... for all the controversy, the United States has been more successful in Iraq than it was in Vietnam Anyone who honestly recalls the 1970s, with Watergate, Vietnam, stagflation and the energy crisis, cannot really believe the present difficulties are unrivaled.*¹⁴⁹

Decidedly, it must be said, Mr. Kagan's sometimes vague reasoning is combined with a failure to grapple convincingly with crucial problems facing America today, the very problems that observers who worry about American decline have cited as clear and present dangers, including political standstill at

¹⁴⁸ Robert Kagan, *The World America Made*, Op. cit, p.83

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p.102

home, falling education scores, lowered social mobility and most important, an inflation deficit.

Kagan emphasizes on the military aspects of power as a measure of a country's health and global sway, "*The balance of power is like perpetual motion, or any of those impossible things which some men are always racking their brains and spending their time and money to accomplish*".¹⁵⁰

With the burgeoning financial clout of China which already holds more than \$1 trillion in United States debt, Kagan asserts that it has implications for American power in the future only insofar as the Chinese translate enough of their growing economic strength into military strength. He finally declares that "great powers rarely decline suddenly". However, the historian Niall Ferguson argued the exact opposite in his 2011 book "Civilization". He proceeds to offer illustrations showing that the decline of the British Empire occurred over a few brief decades.

In another section of this book, Mr. Kagan writes that the United States "*enjoys a unique and unprecedented ability to gain international acceptance of its power.*"¹⁵¹ The expectation of global support for American military intervention, he goes on, "is so great that in the Iraq war of 2003, Americans were shocked and disturbed when only 38 nations participated in either the invasion or the post-invasion occupation of Iraq. It was almost unbearable to find democratic allies like France and Germany withholding their endorsement." Such statements about the so-called coalition of the willing play down just how controversial the Iraq war (and the Bush administration's policy of pre-emptive war) was among allies, and how negatively the invasion affected perceptions of the United States abroad.

In many cases Mr. Kagan seems to be referring to Francis Fukuyama's frequently disputed thesis that liberal democracy will inevitably triumph around the world, or the psychologist Steven Pinker's contested argument that violence has fallen drastically over thousands of years, but he does not always

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, p.88

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p.140

identify them or their followers by name. Actually, and beyond America's sensitivities, China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession, leading economic forecasters to predict that it will overtake the United States as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020.

Already in 2008, China passed the U.S.A as the world's leading manufacturing nation—a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century—and this time China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia.

Undoubtedly, the United States of 2015 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1940's. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of writers—notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace, who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps.

The Nobel Prize-winning Columbia University economist *Joseph Stiglitz* and his co-author *Linda Bilmes*¹⁵² have estimated that the direct and indirect costs of the Iraq War exceeded \$3 trillion. According to the New York Times, when presented with an OMB projection that showed existing troop deployments and nation-building expenses combined with the cost of sending an additional 40,000 troops to Afghanistan for a decade, would total \$1 trillion, the president seemed in sticker shock, watching his domestic agenda vanishing in front of him.

¹⁵² *Joseph Stiglitz* , “The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict”, with Linda Bilmes, Harvard University, (2008), p.96

So, that the United States needs a post-Pax Americana foreign policy should be obvious. But there is no guarantee that the United States will adjust to a transforming world. Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations' identity and place in world politics. More than most, America's foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States' hegemonic role. To move successfully to a post-Pax Americana foreign policy, Americans will need to move beyond these myths.

Changes from Uni-polarity towards Multi-polarity have undoubtedly radically altered the traditional perspective on the East-West dichotomy. American scholars have produced a set of new generalizations on distinct cultures from a wealth of hard data. They have even carried anthropological relativism to its ultimate and in the process; they have made bona fide findings because they have come within reach of other cultures. Some even believe, they went beyond the imperialist philosophy and finally placed to rest the persisting, and destructive myth of East and West.¹⁵³

Representations which have been removed by scholars may still be manipulated for political reasons. The encounter between East and West is still very much alive, firstly because of the Israelis, and secondly, because the so-called Oriental cultures of today were perverted creations by the West, to maintain its world dominance. Up till now, myths and ideas diehard with the new conditions which produced them. Even if the conditions disappear, persisting perceptions may not.¹⁵⁴

Said did not believe that imperialism ended with the fall of West European empires in Asia; on the contrary, America and her Asian scholars have extended it with new forms of dominance and myth-making about Orientals¹⁵⁵. More recently, East and West, though no longer identified as such, have been seen from a new perspective. The fact that China has won enormous respect for her potential power seems to suggest that older political

¹⁵³ C.N. Parkinson, *East and West*, New York: Mentor Book, (1965), pp. 53-56.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.43

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p.44

and economic disparities between the West and the East are becoming increasingly insignificant to a certain degree.¹⁵⁶

The disparities between higher and lower standards of living, military strength, industrialism and high technology, seem much more evident between North and South than between West and East. Japan, China, Russia, Europe and North America constitute the North whereas Southeast and South Asia, West Asia and Africa, Central and Latin America, constitute the South that, despite all its attempts to articulate a new position in world affairs, cannot change the fact that the object of its wrath remains the West which is still, the source of all the evils that torments the “have-not nations”.¹⁵⁷

It is only the East which has seemingly disappeared but has actually been absorbed in a larger community of peoples, cultures, and nations who share in common an acute sense of frustration at having remained backward and underdeveloped. Following the First World War, the Third World started using the West as a representative for its own inability to achieve modernization in our own time and this was well expressed in the Arab spring revolutions.¹⁵⁸

After all, western-centrism, western modernity and Neo-Orientalism are basic cultural and intellectual conventions characterizing the East/West Dichotomy. A powerful /powerless dichotomy in which, a racist representation portrays Arab and Muslim peoples as lazy, lacking the vitality for change, and lacking the spirit of initiative. They were deemed consequently, as lacking the power to make a history of their own creation, and always in need for outside forces – ‘the West’ - to achieve change, and "progress." This representation, and image of the Arabs continue to frame the discourse of Neo-Orientalism¹⁵⁹

Moreover, This Neo-Orientalist created division put these eastern populations in a situation of flagrant inferiority, aggravated by the fact that

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p.47

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p.50

¹⁵⁸ Toby Dodge, “

From ‘*the Arab Awakening*’ to the Arab Spring: *the Post-colonial State in the Middle East*, Lund University , Department of Political Science.p.7

¹⁵⁹ Steven Salaita, “Corporate American media coverage of Arab revolutions: the contradictory message of modernity”, a journal for and about social movements Article, (May 2012),Volume 4, pp.131 - 145

both winners and losers- westerners and easterners, only depend on two totally different systems: religious ones of course as shown in the beginning of this thesis, (Islam/Christianity...etc). That is why all the conditions were present that might drive people to revolt in the Arab world for a long time, such as economic, social, and political oppressions, and consciousness of that oppression. If there is anything different about the time these current revolutions started to take place, it was the exhaustion of the U.S. Zionist led empire both in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the time when such revolutions were not expected, attention and resources were directed elsewhere, mainly on Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran. That is why these revolutions took western powers by surprise, not only the local dictators, who were mostly supported by western governments.

Yet, after the revolutions were hard to stop, Western rhetoric (official and non-official alike) was framed through the Neo-Orientalist culture of "knowledge."¹⁶⁰ Some liberals argued that the "non-violence" nature of the revolution in Tunisia was largely influenced by the fact that some individuals involved in the revolution came to the U.S. for training and learning of the methods of non-violent activism and the theory of Gene Sharp, among others, on peaceful transformations.

According to this narrative, not only Western thought and ideas helped the revolution, but also, the power of western technology (the Internet, Facebook, Twitter, phone messaging...etc.), which supposedly shaped these revolutions. This is of course without any serious and critical study about the number/percentage of users, and also as if without such technology, the revolution would not have happened. As a matter of fact, the history of revolutions in the region has been taking place there for decades without such technology if not shaped by direct or indirect western intervention.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p.142

¹⁶¹ Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Second Arab Revolt: Winners and Losers." Commentary No. 298. (February. 1, 2011). At <http://www.iwallerstein.com/the-second-arab-revolt-winnersand-losers/> (Accessed on July 15, 2012).

3. Orientalism From East Versus West To North Versus South

In 1978, the book of "Orientalism" happened to be a highly politicized and militant, by the Palestinian author Edward Said. For Edward Said, the encounter between East and West was still very much alive because of the Israelis, and the so-called Oriental cultures of today which were perverted creations by the West to maintain its world dominance.¹⁶²

Said did not believe that imperialism ended with the fall of West European empires in Asia, on the contrary, America and her Asian scholars have extended it with new forms of dominance and myth-making about Orientals. Said, has used or misused *Orientalism* as a sewer category for all the intellectual rubbish Westerners have exercised in the global marketplace of ideas. Though westernized, he admitted that he never "*lost hold of the cultural reality of the personal involvement, in having been constituted as an Oriental.*"¹⁶³

It is precisely because men like Said feel that their identity has been lost in the network of Western myths and illusions created out of the East, that they have revived the myth of East-West polarity. As with V.S. Naipaul, also an eloquent and sophisticated Westernized writer, Edward Said's quest for the true Asia is a projection of his own identity crisis.

More recently, East and West, though no longer identified as such, have been seen from a new perspective. The fact that Japan has become the equal of any Western nation or that China has won enormous respect for her potential power, seems to suggest that older political and economic disparities between the West and the East are becoming increasingly meaningless.¹⁶⁴

The disparities between higher and lower standards of living, military strength, industrialism and high technology seem much more evident between

¹⁶² Memoona Sajjad, "Non Western' Reading Of The 'Clash Of Civilizations' Theory: Through The Eyes Of 'The Rest'", International Journal of Political Science and Development Vol. 1(2), University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. October, (2013), pp. 42-104

¹⁶³ Bill Ashcroft & Paul Ahluwalia, *Edward Said*, Routledge Critical Thinkers, *Essential Guides For Literary Studies*, editors: Robert Eaglestone, Royal Holloway, University of London, p. 76

¹⁶⁴ Phil, "Globalization and the Third World", Issue 81 of International Socialism Journal Published Winter 1998

North and South than between West and East. Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Europe and North America constitute the *North* whereas Southeast and South Asia, West Asia and Africa, Central and Latin America constitute the *South*.¹⁶⁵

All the concepts or frameworks, which frame my research, were used, often together, as a justification for European/Western colonization of peoples and societies around the so called global South. They also justified not only colonization, a term that meant in the past to 'help' these people to become rational, modern, and developed, but also justified slavery, conquest, and killing in the name of getting rid of barbarity, chaos, and irrationality.¹⁶⁶ Thus, Western Empires (Spanish, Portuguese, French, British, and US/American) since the 16th century have colonized and dominated the world /East or South in the name of stability, peace, development, progress, liberation, human rights, humanitarian aid, democracy promotion, and other.

When formal Empires and colonization was no longer accepted, new forms of control, domination, and hegemony, came to replace old forms of rule, all to maintain what Immanuel Wallterstein¹⁶⁷ and Samir Amin¹⁶⁸, and many other scholars, described as western hegemony and *dominance* on the one hand, and dependency of the global South on the other. While in the past empires and colonial powers ruled directly, of course always with the help of some locals, working as compradors or middle men as they were named, since mid-twentieth century, the domination was shaped by global international bodies (UN, World Bank...etc.) with local leaders, acting as local persecutors of policies (economic, political...etc.) to keep up western hegemony and interests.

¹⁶⁵ Ankerl, Guy, *Coexisting contemporary civilizations: Arabo-Muslim, Bharati, Chinese, and West*. INU societal research. Vol.1: Geneva: INU Press. (2000).

¹⁶⁶ Mbembe, Achille.. "Necropolitics." *Public Culture* 15:1, (Winter 2003), pp. 11-40.

¹⁶⁷ Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Second Arab Revolt: Winners and Losers." Op.cit

¹⁶⁸ Amin, Samir.. "*The Arab revolutions: a year after.*" *Interface: a journal for and about social movements*. Vol. 4, No1, (May 2012), pp. 33 – 42. At: <http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Issue-4-1- , Full-PDF.pdf> June 8, 2011.

All this combined, besides to the selective interventions of the West in many countries, and the selective support for some “revolutions.” The support western governments give to brutal regimes such as Saudi Arabia, and the support they give to the Israeli military settler colonial project, and their war crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, is a part of their long history of crimes against native peoples and peoples in general in the South, their history of exploitation of resources in the South, and of maintaining underdevelopment and dependency there, all make the situation in the Arab world unpredictable, and not much understood.

The modern Arab history shows the unfulfilled promise of Arab independence, a promise disfigured both by "the West" and by a whole range of enemies, like Arab reaction and Zionism. Conversely, in the American view of the past, the United States was not a classical imperial power, but a righter of wrongs around the world, in pursuit of tyranny, in defense of freedom, no matter the place or cost. The war inevitably eroded these versions of the past against each other.

On the basis of our supposedly benign intentions and inherent superiority we allow Western policymakers to shape the world as they please, ignoring the continuous militaristic violence produced from this approach.¹⁶⁹

Assuming those things happen, what has really changed? Will the U.S. government have renounced to its global policeman role? Hardly. It will still be bombing Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen, and it will continue to claim the authority to intervene anywhere, with or without the blessing of Congress, NATO, or the UN Security Council. So it is fundamental not to be fooled by appearances. The policymakers will not be using bin Laden's death as grounds to dismantle the thousand U.S. military installations around the world, or to stop supporting torture-loving dictators, when they serve "American interests."

¹⁶⁹ Richman Sheldon, senior fellow at The Future of Freedom Foundation, “After Ben Laden,” Counterpunch, May (2011), pp.20-22, at: <http://www.counterpunch.org/richman05202011.html/>

Thus, demand creates its own supply. The Neo-Orientalist machine is lead by an empire-builders' dream. The 9/11 attacks were monstrous crimes, but they were not out of the blue. If Americans are to free themselves of the burdens of empire, they have to go to the root. Government must not be allowed the role of shaping the world to the policymakers' liking. Freedom is something that must come from the grassroots if it is to be genuine and enduring, and oppressed populations will not have decent nations built by outsiders. They will have to make their own nations decent.

Anyway, having good goals is not enough. The policymakers would also have to know what they are doing. If they are incapable of planning the domestic economy, they certainly will not be able to reconstruct a foreign society. Behind, we, time and again, find an agenda that serves particular political and economic interests. American foreign policy has long been the tool for arranging the world in just such a way as to ensure power and wealth for itself.

The practices stemming from this attitude are on equivalence with the worst genocides of the century. They make the territorial list of structural problems, in the Middle East, inevitable¹⁷⁰. Accordingly, there is a conscious hypocrisy in believing oneself the great citadel of freedom while massacring Cambodians, financing terrorist thugs, embargoing Iraqi children to death, and being in effect a one-party state, since the belief and the deeds belong to, and nurture the dichotomy of the "other".

Following September 11 attacks, the United States owes much to the power of the stereotypes and simplifications on which the American war rhetoric was constructed. Its Neo-Orientalist discourse complemented the clash of civilizations theory, which tells a story of fundamentally incompatible and geographically enclosed ideals. The West is defined in terms of its most agreeable principles: Enlightenment, rationalism, individualism, democracy, tolerance, all without reference to pogroms or the Holocaust, while the non-West is depicted as emotional, despotic, and violent. These grotesque

¹⁷⁰ Marrouchi, Mustapha, *Introduction: Colonialism, Islamism, Terrorism*, College Literature 30.1 (Project Muse, 2003.), pp.6-55.

caricatures obscure sociopolitical diversity. Hence, the distortion has always formed a crucial element in colonial and neo-colonial domination. Neo-Orientalism succeeded in defining and promoting the twenty-first century version of the “white man’s burden” through Middle Eastern “Islamist terrorism”, affirming in this way the discursive structures of the East/West dichotomy, and putting its hand on the continuing economic exploitation that deepens political domination of the Arab Middle East.

Conclusion

Conclusion

American Orientalism, as a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between ‘the Orient’ and the Occident, cultivates the perception of an inherent division between the East and the West and more precisely in this thesis, the American identity and exceptional vision of itself and consequently of the other; this vision is strongly shaped by ideologies like nationalism, national interest and exceptionalism.

Said’s *Orientalism*, as one of the greatest titles that have been published in the twentieth century, significantly challenged the corpus of the Orientalist literature and showed that what was thought to be a genuine branch of knowledge, was in many ways, some grand narratives fabricated in favor of Western political dominance, and copiously pointing up the importance of *Orientalism*’s message.

Besides its theoretical significance, Said’s work was quite judicious and sensible. It changed the position of Islam and moved it ever closer to the center of world politics, creating some political and social factors which have greatly influenced interrelations between the West and Islam. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the void threat for the West besides the growing presence of Muslims with full right of citizenship in the West, both in academia and in the marketplace, have become so noticeable with the emergence of global mass media, diverse satellite channels and the internet.

A number of Neo Orientalist writings have been initiated after the attacks of 11 September in the United States, in which, nearly all Arabs and Muslims are represented as potential terrorists and enemies of the West. These Neo-Orientalist writings have been based on the same perception of Islam that was the restitution of the classical Orientalism, designed to justify American

Conclusion

imperialism and its aggressive acts towards Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. However, the interest in Islam marks the great difference between classical Orientalists and the new ones. Unlike classical Orientalists, the New Orientalists consider Islam and Islamic movements as their main target, and regard Islam as a global threat to Western civilization.

Although the works of Edward Said, Huntington, and others, by no means, represent all Western literature on the East/West dichotomy, they can be regarded as primary sources of the most important trends. These particular cases cannot be generalized about all literature which has been considerably expanding during the last decade. Both perspectives of Said and Huntington, however, can show some important and influential tendencies in this new context and can illustrate some important routes to the crystallization of a neo-Orientalist discourse.

Taking them into consideration, I should agree with Said's thesis that latent Orientalism, - or in the terminology underlying dichotomy- is more or less observable. Moreover, manifest dichotomy is still in place. Many of the commonly accepted dogmas are still working in the background, and time and again in the foreground. Some new methodological and epistemological trends in Western scholarship can suggest the crystallization of a new paradigm of the West and Islam dichotomy which can be considered as Neo-Orientalism.

It can be shown, perhaps without much difficulty, that Huntington, fully believing in the principles of dichotomy, is still a persistent follower of the old-fashioned school of dichotomy. His dismissal of the diversity and dynamism of Islam and his reliance on historical evidence made him unwilling to look directly at modern Muslim societies. His exaggeration of the religious part of Muslim identity and his overestimation of radicalism and his discourse of rage, clash and fear, raise his confident objectivity. All of these elements are part of the heritage of his Orientalist predecessors.

Many of his intellectual stances are, in fact, politically motivated. Although he believes that Islam and democracy are mutually exclusive, once the political situation changes and his allies need to justify their "war on terror", he changes his mind and speeches about the vast and rich Islamic

Conclusion

political literature, encouraging the belief that it may well be possible to develop democratic institutions. When he speaks about US interests in the Arab-Israeli conflicts, his political philosophy follows a rigid statist political approach, but once his neoconservative allies see that the promotion of democracy in the Middle East is in line with their political agenda, his philosophy radically changes and he advocates a Universalist mission for the US through the “War on Terror”.

In this work, I have attempted to show that some essential factors of the East/West dichotomy are still more or less in place in this new era. Some changes have some negative elements that reinforce dichotomy and crystallize a neo-dichotomous ideology, or one can say, neo-Orientalism. The main cases that I studied demonstrate some inevitable outcomes of the East/West dichotomy;

Firstly, a dichotomous perspective cannot be a sincere proponent of democracy. As in the case of Huntington, a dichotomous builds his/her political philosophy on a friend-enemy basis. In an ultra-reductionist way, he sees the world in black and white, and therefore, his political philosophy ultimately leads to conflict, hate and war. Such a quality is far from a democratic way of life which entails the appreciation of complexity, tolerance, and pluralism.

Secondly, Dichotomy is not merely an inter-civilizational matter, but once a political philosophy employs it, it covers the domestic realm as well. In Huntington’s approach, this would be clear if we consider his overestimation of the Western essence of America, he maintains that “*a non-Western America is not an America*”,¹ and his emphasis on the religious essence of America. These two qualities, he argues, are inseparable from and rooted in US civic identity. In other words, he assumes that, American civil society, while remaining American, cannot select any other direction for itself. Accordingly, American people who insist on any other direction will be considered as a threat.

¹ Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations”, *Foreign Affairs* (1993) , p.49

Conclusion

Thirdly, a dichotomous philosophy views modernity as a pure Western product, which will remain forever exclusively under its original brand; different forms of modernity are unthinkable. This is more than apparent in the case of Said. Huntington's case is different. His affirmation of different versions of modernity, by no means can be translated into tolerance for, and acceptance of other models, but he means that 'Others' are basically incapable of reaching the level of Western modernity.

Fourth, since dichotomy harbors enmity at its core, it intertwines with fear. Given the fact that dichotomy is built on an ideological binary, i.e., Good and Evil, and considering that conflict is inevitable between Good and Evil, and taking into account that Evil will remain in the world till the End of Time, unending fears and wars are the inevitable consequences of any dichotomous outlook. Huntington, Said, Schmitt's world views, often show some symptoms of fear. When Huntington talks about Muslims as individuals, his world is favorable. But when he does so according to an Orientalistic big picture, he overstates Islamic extremism. His perspective is filled with terror and horror.

Fifth, since dichotomy is originally built as a political idea and rests on descriptive and ethical realms to justify that political idea, it is unbalanced. That is because once political interests change, everything changes radically. This point is more than evident through Huntington's changed attitude towards Islam and democracy. Islamic democracy, once logically impossible and politically not viable, could be easily assumed by Huntington and his political allies for the "War on Terror", as something probable and compatible with Islamic traditions.

The "War on Terror" proved to be phony, a trick to destroy the Middle East. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq on the premise of the 9/11 attacks. Over 1,300,000 Iraqis and thousands of U.S. soldiers have needlessly been killed as a consequence. The profits from the stolen oil in Iraq have gone straight into a Federal Reserve Bank in New York,² which is privately owned by the Banksters. Many Muslims are considered Islamic fundamentalists who

² Alex Newman, "Gadhafi's Gold-money Plan Would Have Devastated Dollar", Friday, 11 November 2011 10:15, in New American magazine

Conclusion

are conflicting with the contemporary Western democratic values and culture, and this makes of fundamentalism as a whole a dangerous propaganda considering Islam as the enemy. Unquestionably it suits the needs of the American Empire worldwide especially in the Muslim lands in the Middle East and Central Asia. These regions are the most strategically important ones of the world, having the world's largest reserves of oil and gas. Hence, the United States could never justify its attacks on these nations without first convincing Americans that Muslims need either to be attacked - because they are dangerous terrorists - or liberated because they are under tyrannical and oppressive regimes.

A telling assumption in this thesis is that the Orient, linked with the Orientalist aesthetic and Consumerism, was remodeled, belittled and degraded by anthropologists, fair organizers, and ultimately, the American public. This Orientalist representation of the Middle East did not describe its subject with any truthfulness or respect towards its cultures. Instead, it sought to satisfy the physical and visual desires of its public through the film industry, which flourished in the early twentieth century. It became the newest art and medium for the proliferation of culture and information and also the pursuit of new avenues of exploration, epitomizing Orientalist stereotypes about the Middle East: the lands and cultures were depicted as beautiful, mysterious, and sexually alluring, a commodity available for widespread visual consumption while the inhabitants were considered as barbaric, savage, and tyrannical.

Thus, the invasion's motivation comes after the disproved "plot theory". It is understandable given the privilege the United States has. It has never been condemned by the international court of justice of international terrorist acts –in more technical terms "illegal use of force". Perhaps it is not a question of democracy, its nature and its future anymore; it is rather a question of survival.

When discussing Orientalism from this perspective, it is essential to stress two aspects of it highlighted by Said. The first is the fact that Orientalism essentially invokes an imaginary space, a space that finally produces the East in the minds of a Western audience through the American consumerist culture.

Conclusion

The second thing that needs stressing is that Orientalism both then and now is intimately connected with economic and military practice. In many ways, British Orientalism enabled the colonization of the East. Similarly, American neo-Orientalism appears to justify –ideologically (nationalism and national interest ideologies) and even encourages and produces American military and economic practices in the Middle East.

After all, western-centrism, western modernity and Orientalism are basic cultural and intellectual conventions characterizing the East/West Dichotomy. A powerful /powerless dichotomy in which, a racist representation portrays Arab and Muslim peoples as lazy, lacking the vitality for change, and lacking the spirit of initiative. They are people deemed as lacking the power to make a history of their own creation and always in need for outside forces - the West - to achieve change, and "progress." This representation of the Arabs continues to frame the discourse of neo-Orientalism

Moreover, this Orientalist created division put these eastern populations in a situation of flagrant inferiority, aggravated by the fact that both winners and losers- westerners and easterners, only depend on two totally different systems: religious and cultural ones. That is why, for a long time, all the conditions were gathered to drive people to revolt in the Arab world. The economic, social, and political oppressions and consciousness of that oppression were the major causes of the Arab spring. These current revolutions started to take place after the exhaustion of the U.S. Zionist led empire both in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the time when such revolutions were not expected, attention and resources were directed elsewhere; mainly on Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran.

Even if the conditions disappear, persisting perceptions may not. Discarded Symbols by scholars may still be usefully manipulated for political reasons. In 1978, for example, Said's *Orientalism* happened to be a highly politicized and militant. For Edward Said, the encounter between East and West is still very much alive. Firstly because of the Israelis' occupation of Palestine, and secondly, because the so-called Oriental cultures of today were perverted creations by the West to maintain its world dominance.

Conclusion

The disparities between higher and lower standards of living, military strength, industrialism and high technology, seem much more evident between North and South than between West and East. Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Europe and North America constitute the North whereas Southeast and South Asia, West Asia and Africa, Central and Latin America constitute the South.

The South, for all its attempts to articulate a new position in world affairs, cannot betray the fact that the object of its wrath remains the West which is still the source of all the evils that plague the have-not nations. It is only the East which has seemingly disappeared but has actually been absorbed in a larger community of peoples, cultures and nations who share in common an acute sense of frustration at having remained backward and undeveloped.

In point of fact, the globalization and communication revolutions of the twenty-first century have provided humanity with more opportunities of mutual understanding. Direct contacts can provide Western scholars with opportunities to make close observations and can remove one of the main obstacles mentioned by Said, like the lack of empirical observation. But what concerns us here is the fact that the nature of these new notions of our interdependent world rejects old dichotomous worldviews. They also reject ideological monist attitudes. What they suggest, instead, is the recognition of plurality as a first principle of our globalized world, where Global mass media and the internet are two unprecedented players of this age.

Said observed Western media and the way they selectively cover Islam in the early 1980s. Since then, however, two important changes have occurred. The advent of the Internet has provided an acute evolution in global communications, and has brought an unprecedented plurality to a globally accessible ocean of information. Likewise, diverse satellite channels have been playing an outstanding role. Al-Jazeera has been one of significant players throughout the “War on Terror”. *“For the first time in the contemporary period, the major account of History-in-the making was narrated by a voice and in a language that did not belong to the West”*.³

³ Kepel Gilles. *La revanche de Dieu. Chrétiens, juifs et musulmans à la reconquête du monde*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2003, p 85

Conclusion

Muslim communities residing in the West, with full right of citizenship have been influential. Their presence in a democratic society has put a question mark over Western liberalism and its ability to deal democratically with this non-liberalist community. The way the West answers this question domestically is relevant to the way it is going to deal with it at a global level. As Parekh observes, attitudes to cultural diversity within and between societies are closely related.⁴ In fact any society can cope with the global cultural plurality of the contemporary world, only if it is used to living with its own internal diversity.⁵

Hence, the experience of having Muslim communities inside has been useful for enhancing a novel global vision. For peoples in frequent contact with Muslims as their colleagues, neighbors, friends and at times, a member of their family, the bipolar perception of “us” and “them” seems to be much less meaningful than for previous generations.

There are some negative factors that are reinforcing the dichotomy of the West and Islam and that have crystallized a brand of neo-Orientalism. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the highest symbol of Marxism brought the West to a threat vacuum in both political and ideological realms. The worldview of the dichotomy of the West and Islam seemed to be capable of filling both vacuums. Huntington was quite timely in getting the point. He attempted to replace the dichotomy of the Cold War with the dichotomy of the West and Islam. Huntington among some other intellectuals produced a totally hostile philosophy for the new political paradigm.

The emergence of the state of Israel in the twentieth century and the ongoing existence of the unsettled Palestinian question as an open lesion helps maintain dichotomy in both the West and Islam. During the Cold War era, Western support of Israel was justified by the fact that Israel was in the Western camp, while its enemies, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, were in the Soviet bloc.

⁴Bhikhu Parekh. *A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World*, Palgrave Macmillan, 15 April. 2008 , p.152

⁵ Ibid, p. 165

Conclusion

In the post-Cold War era and even before that, when the intifada occurred, however, the main ethos of Israel's enemies was painted by Islam, and therefore, the Western support of Israel could be easily translated into Western hostility towards Islam. The United States more than any other issue has vetoed in the Security Council, or resisted against the will of majority in the General Assembly, for Israeli and against Palestinian interests. American national interests standing behind intellectual postures, mentioned by Said, are still observable but in some different patterns.

The idea that the unconditional support of Israel is one of the most important sources of hostility, and hatred between Islam and the West. Russett confirms that that issue has been quite at the centre. He claims that, "*The substance of the purported clash between the West and Islam is simply the familiar Arab-Israeli conflict*".⁶ Such an approach, can gravely fuel dichotomy.

The global resurgence of religiosity, observed by many intellectuals, top of them Edward said, then Huntington and others like Kepel and Roy,⁷ can reinforce dichotomy in both Islam and the West. Given the fact that religious belief has a lesser chance of negotiation and compromise, and considering that both Christianity and Islam, believe in a Universalist mission, and taking into account that horizontal forms of religiosity– can be dangerous. Because of their superficial and selective nature, the rise of religiosity in these two civilizations can easily be translated into the rise of dichotomy.

These changes in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century can potentially reformulate old ways of dealing with others and lead the world either towards a brighter or towards a darker future. If the change is considered as an opportunity to embrace the plurality, to recognize diversity and to respect others, the world will witness a brighter future. However, if the new situation

⁶ Quoted in, Olivier Roy, "Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah", *International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1, *Turkey: Myths and Realities*, Winter, 2005/2006, pp. 243-252

⁷ Cf. *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* by Gilles Kepel; "Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah" by Olivier Roy; "Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad" by Natana J. Delong-Bas; "Understanding Islamism: Middle East/North Africa" Report 37, in: *Paul Kingston, International Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1, *Turkey: Myths and Realities* (Winter, 2005/2006)

Conclusion

is reorganized according to the old methodology of dichotomy, to produce hate, rage, conflict and war, a darker future is yet to come.

Undoubtedly, everyone wants to help the former, but some philosophies, perhaps not deliberately, tend to lead the world to the latter. Their main fault seems to be applying a dichotomous model, which, with its dangerously simplistic and Manichean view of the world can ultimately change the West into the mirror image of its terrorist enemies, and profoundly corrupt its way of life. To avoid such a dark future, the key factor is how a philosophy manages to reject dichotomy, by creating a new account of identity and by recognizing global plurality.

There is much more than one's religion, one's gender, one's place or one's nationality. To be recognized merely by these identifications is to reduce the actual value of humanity. To read them in political terms, they consider humanity as the major part of identity. Other social labels are secondary and are easily changeable, and thus, unimportant identifications.

A tentative way for the categorization of people, social identity involves interpretation and judgment, and is not a matter of an empirical description of a solid fact. It matters greatly how people are being categorized. The world looks differently when it is seen based on different categorizations. We need to be careful how we classify people officially, with what motivations and for what purposes. We have to leave some room for those who wish to identify themselves differently for people have the right to look at the world differently and to change their views dynamically.

As a result, it would be a false assumption to utter the dichotomous doctrine that *either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists*. Perhaps one does not see the world in such black-and-white terms and wants to put oneself in a third position. Such a dichotomous view is embedded in the idea, in which identity is a vehicle for asserting a preexisting typology. We need a transformative and reflective politics in which all human beings enjoy the possibility to challenge their so-called inherent identity, as suggested by the Arab Spring, and create the conditions conducive to self-determination.

Conclusion

For obvious reasons, dichotomous ideologies tend to insist that their members should be identified with their group, internalize the identity and relate to it in an identical way. They also alienate “others”, dissociating themselves from them and trying to produce some sort of demarcation in line with their egoistic interests. When a single identity becomes dominant, insiders guard it fiercely against external threats from outsiders and purge it of ‘alien’ internal elements, taking an excessively simplistic and ultimately unsustainable view of it. Parekh elaborates this strict tendency: “*Far from possessing an identity, they are possessed and virtually enslaved by it*”.⁸

This view was responsible for the crystallization of neo-Orientalism in which the factor of being powerful played the first role. Said explains this phenomenon in the Orientalism paradigm that

*“The construction of identity is bound up with the disposition of power and powerlessness in each society, and is therefore anything but mere academic wool-gathering... Human identity is not only not natural and stable, but constructed, and occasionally even invented outright”*⁹.

In dichotomy, the collective identity plays a dangerous role. It tends to essentialize identity and impose on the two sides a unity they do not and cannot have. Through reductionism, and oversimplification, a solid “us” is generated in opposition to a monolithic “them”. As a result, since the consciousness of differences is accentuated and reinforced, it generates conflicts, and the politics of identity becomes the politics of hate, rage and conflict. Ignoring all actual commonalities, dichotomy exaggerates minor differences and even engineers conflicts when none exists.

Hence, Dichotomy is a false identification, and by no means represents the reality of social life. Since human life is inherently plural, different identities cannot be reduced and subordinated to any one of them, however far-reaching it might be. Parekh rightly notes in this line, “*Human*

⁸ Parekh. Op.cit, p. 24

⁹ Said Edward. *Orientalism: “Western Conceptions of the Orient*, Penguin Classics , 28/08/2003, p.332

Conclusion

beings have plural identities, and this is not a contingent but a necessary factor about them. Their identities further do not co-exist passively but interact and shape each other".¹⁰ He then suggests that global interdependence requires us to act in the spirit of human solidarity and activate our commonalities and indeed our human identity. At the same time, we are also members of different political, cultural and other communities. Since these are rich sources of moral energy and mean a great deal to us, human solidarity should not be constructed on their ashes or behind their backs. Instead, we should respect these identities but redefine and reconstruct them in the light of, and bring them into harmony with the global human identity.¹¹

The increasing human interdependence brought about by globalization has made the cultivation of common human identity necessary to a degree previously unimagined. The allegedly opposed identities could be seen, in fact, as interdependent and products of a common system of social relations. Black makes no sense without white, nor West without East. Thanks to modern technologies, nowadays peoples from different civilizations are increasingly becoming closer to each other and this facilitates further cultural exchanges. Since they are not self-contained and irreducible wholes, they share much in common and are best seen as partners in a global coalition and dialogue.

By the consideration of global plurality, the West knows that its ethos, its values and its way of life is not necessarily the best solution for humanity, regardless of time and place. Theories like Fukuyama's *The End of History*, which puts Western liberal democracy as the ultimate solution for all, ignore its actual limits and do not appreciate plurality, diversity and dynamism. Such theories, identified by Keane as 'conceptual imperialism',¹² are just heirs of the Orientalists' dogma, that modernization is nothing but absolute Westernization. If liberals want to convince Muslims that their values are correct, they need to give trans-culturally compelling reasons.

Accordingly, the liberal society at most, represents one good way to organize human life, and that is a strong enough moral basis to stand up for it.

¹⁰ Parekh. Op.cit, p. 37

¹¹ Ibid, p.3

¹² Ibid, p. 29

Conclusion

Nevertheless, this by no means could be employed to provide compulsion on Muslims, or any other society, that the liberals' choice is unavoidable and imperative. No evidence supports that liberalism is universally the best, the most rational, or the only valid form of a good society. Hence, advocating Western values should be modest and limited in the sense of defending a particular society rather than issuing a universal prescription. The West must globally promote its invaluable experiences, but simultaneously it must recognize that one size does not fit all and also has to bear in mind deficiencies of its model.

Western ethos should be promoted with humbleness and solidarity, not through aggressive actions and terms like waging war for 'exporting democracy', which revives old Colonialist slogans such as 'mission to civilize'. The limits, shortcomings and deficiencies of the West should not be ignored either. Keane asserts that '*North Atlantic culture*' is '*morally superior*' because it has an ingredient of "*a culture of hope – hope of a better world as attainable in the here and now by social and political effort – as opposed to the cultures of resignation characteristic of the East*"¹³. It goes without saying that subjective notions of 'hope' and 'resignation' and the way Keane evaluates them has no more value than traditional approach of Orientalism.

Progress in the direction of democracy, leaves much to be desired. The deficiencies of the West are appropriately understood by outsiders who at times are victims of unjust Western actions. This is perhaps more than anything else evident when Muslims look at how the West for its own interests easily sacrifices its values, advocates a brutal tyranny, keeps silent before a military coup, unconditionally advocates violent Israeli actions and wages a totally illegal war in Iraq in contrast to Western public's will.

Democracy, thus, needs to be promoted not only outside the West, but also within it. Since the West, in practice, attempts to follow its interests first and foremost, its promotion of democracy is therefore episodic, self-serving, half-hearted, selective, and often designed to embarrass inconvenient regimes or to provide a moral justification for its imperialist ambitions.

¹³ Kepel Gilles. Op.cit, p. 184

Conclusion

“The War on Terror” is another example for seeking Western interests under the guise of Western values. As mentioned by Kepel in detail, US neo-cons opportunistically used September 11 to achieve their imperialist plans.¹⁴ But military actions have largely failed and showed that anti-terrorist policies need to consider other strategies. Terrorists require not only finances and training, but also a supportive group of people, a justifying ideology, and widely perceived grievances around which to mobilize support!

As dichotomy of the West and Islam was first theorized in the European intellectual sphere of the eighteenth century, the same sphere seems to be responsible for refuting this flawed and harmful ideology. Now, more than three centuries on, Western academia is one of the most cosmopolitan spheres. De-territorialized intelligentsia – regardless of race, religion, nationality, cooperating closely with each other – play an important role in producing values, teachings and worldviews adapted to globalization.

Drawing on a host of contemporary social and critical theorists, Edward Said has written an impressive and truly cross-disciplinary study that tackles some of the field’s most deeply ingrained yet troublesome presumptions. Orientalism is therefore a crash course in intellectual self-defense, a basic coverage for those who have long suspected that there is a powerful yet largely undetected politics moving within rhetoric concerning the experiences of the real, like the nuclear hypocrisy and racism.

If we reframe the analysis of the long-term interests of the United States in the Middle East, along the lines suggested in this thesis, it will not change the longstanding and irrevocable U.S. commitment to protect Israel’s right to exist, nor its support for a viable Palestinian state. What such a reframing will do is address how the United States (of course, taking into consideration the interests of its closest allies) set its strategic priorities.


It is clear, that no world society, can endure, so long as a few countries possess nuclear weapons and seek to prevent, by political and economic sanctions, other countries from securing them. Knowledge and technological capacity cannot be suspended. So, only pressure can be applied to enforce non-

¹⁴ Ibid, p.197

Conclusion

proliferation. Nations which are close allies of the nuclear powers may agree to such renunciation, at least in the short term; but there is no logic in this position and it cannot therefore be maintained for long. In particular, those countries which attach value to independence and self-reliance cannot be expected to stand for a position which enables some countries to build up nuclear stockpiles, while forbidding others even to undertake nuclear testing. This implies the acceptance of a hierarchy, of a new category of haves and have-nots, which cannot be part of an image of a fair and equitable world society and worse, it aggravates the East / West or South/North Dichotomy forever.

Appendix 1



Appendix 2

Appendix 2

Metanarrative

In critical theory, and particularly postmodernism, a **metanarrative** (sometimes **master-** or **grand narrative**) "is a global or totalizing cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience".¹ The prefix *meta* means "beyond" and is here used to mean "about", and a narrative is a story. Therefore, a metanarrative is a story *about* a story, encompassing and explaining other 'little stories' within totalizing schemas.

The concept was criticized by Jean-François Lyotard² in his work, **The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979)**. He refers to what he describes as the *postmodern condition*, which he characterized as increasing skepticism toward the totalizing nature of "metanarratives" (or "grand narratives," typically characterized by some form of 'transcendent and universal truth').

Examples of metanarratives

1. Many Christians believe that human existence is innately sinful but offers redemption and eternal peace in heaven - thus representing a belief in a universal rule.
2. The Enlightenment theorists believed that rational thought, allied to scientific reasoning, would lead inevitably toward moral, social and ethical progress.
3. Marxists believe that in order to be emancipated, society must undergo a revolution. Just as the *bourgeoisie* (whose living depends on the control of capital or technology) took power from the noble class (whose wealth was based on control over land), they believe that the present system of capitalism will fall and the *proletariat* (who live by selling their labor) will take over. This change will be driven by the unstable and cyclical nature of capitalism, and by the alienation felt by the laborers who keep the system working.³
4. Freudian theory holds that human history is a narrative of the repression of libidinal desires.

Appendix 2

5. An uncritical belief in the free market is a belief that, through humanity's acquisition of wealth, all who work hard and are afforded the right opportunities will succeed materially.⁴
6. Categorical and definitive periodizations of history, such as the Fall of the Roman Empire, the Dark Ages and Renaissance are rejected by postmodernists.

Replacing grand, universal narratives with small, local narratives

According to the advocates of postmodernism, metanarratives have lost their power to convince – they are, literally, stories that are told in order to legitimize various versions of "the truth". With the transition from modern to postmodern, Lyotard proposes that metanarratives should give way to 'petits récits', or more modest and "localized" narratives. Borrowing from the works of Wittgenstein and his theory of the "models of discourse", Lyotard constructs his vision of a progressive politics that is grounded in the cohabitation of a whole range of diverse and always locally legitimated language games. Postmodernists attempt to replace metanarratives by focusing on specific local contexts as well as the diversity of human experience. They argue for the existence of a "multiplicity of theoretical standpoints" rather than grand, all-encompassing theories.⁵

¹ Stephens, John (1998). *Retelling Stories, Framing Culture: Traditional Story and Metanarratives in Children's Literature*.

² Lyotard, Jean-Francois. *Introduction: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, 1979: xxiv-xxv.

³ Callinicos, Alex. *Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

⁴ From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, in: "<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metanarrative>"

⁵ Habermas, Jürgen. *Modernity versus Postmodernity*. New German Critique, No. 22, Special Issue on Modernism, pp. 3-14. 1981.

Bibliography

Primary Sources :

- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. Penguin Books, London, (1978)
-"The World, the Text, the Critic". Harvard University Press (1983).
-*Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. London: Vintage Books, (1997)
-*Out of Place: A memoir*. Granta Books, London, (2000)
-"The Clash of Ignorance" accessible at: <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said>, (2001) [accessed on 7/11/2008]
-*Power, Politics and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said*". Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. (2001)
-"Arabs, Islam and the Dogmas of the West." New York Times Book Review (31 October 1976)
-*Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*". New York: Pantheon, London, (1981).
-*Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, (1993).
-"East Isn't East: The Impending End of the Age of Orientalism." Times Literary Supplement (3 February 1995)
-*Introduction*. In Raymond Schwab, "The Oriental Renaissance: Europe's Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680-1880, vii-xx". New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
-"Orientalism and Beyond". In *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*. Edited by Bart Moore-Gilbert, London: Verso, 1997.
-"*Orientalism Reconsidered. In Literature, Politics and Theory*". Edited by F. Barker, et al. London: Methuen, 1986.

..... "Reflections on Exile and Other Essays". Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000.

..... Said, Edward and Bernard Lewis. "Orientalism: an Exchange." The New York Review of Books (12 August 1982).

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Touchstone, London (1993).

..... *Culture Matters, How Values Shape Human Progress*, Basic Books, New York (2000)

Books

Abaza, M. and Stauth, G., *Oriental Reason, Orientalism, Islamic Fundamentalism. In Globalization*, New York: Basic Books(1990)

Adams John Quincy quoted in Michael M. Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, United Kingdom, New Haven: Yale University Press, (1987)

Aijaz Ahmad, *Between Orientalism and Historicism: Anthropological Knowledge of India*, in Studies in History Vol. 7, No. 1 (1991)

..... *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*. London: Verso, (1992)

Al-'Azm, Sadik Jalal. *Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse*. *Khamsin*, No. 8, (1981)

Almond, Ian. *The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard*. London: I. B. Tauris, (2007).

Arendt Hannah *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Harvest Books, Fort Washington, (1973).

Arkoun mohamed, *Islam seen by Professor G.E.V. Grunebaum* ("L'islam vu par le Professeur G.E.V. Grunebaum," (Paris: J.Vriu, Librairie philosophique (1964).

G. E. Von Grunebaum, *Classical Islam*, London, (1970).

..... *Contribution à l'étude de l'humanisme arabe au IV-IX siecle, Miskawayh philosophe et historien* (Paris: J.Vriu, Librairie philosophique, (1970).

Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-colonial Literatures*. London: Routledge,(1989)

.....Ashcroft Bill & Paul Ahluwalia, *Edward Said*, Routledge Critical Thinkers, Essential Guides For Literary Studies, editors: Robert Eaglestone, Royal Holloway, University of London, (2006)

L. Jain and M. P. Logan, *A Liberal Democratic World Order: Renewing America's Strategic Mission*, National Security Studies Quarterly 1, Issue 1, (1995)

Austin Beard Charles, *Economic Origins of the Constitution, conclusions*, New York: the Macmillan Company, (1952)

..... *the Rise of American Civilization*, New York: the Macmillan Company, (1927)

Bailyn Bernard, *The Central Themes of the American Revolution: an Interpretation*," in *Essays on the American Revolution*, Stephen Kurtz, Ed, North Carolina Press, (1973)

Basil Rauch, *The Roosevelt Reader: Selected Speeches, Messages, Press Conferences and letters of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, New York, Rinehart & Co., Inc., (1957)

Bhabha, Homi K. *Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse*.October 28, M. Paul and W.S. Palmer, New York ,(1984)

....."Nation and Narration", Routledge, (19 April 1990)

Bhikhu Parekh, "A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World", Palgrave Macmillan, (15 April. 2008)

Berque Jacques, *Dépossession du Monde*, Formats Dépossession du monde, Paris, Paris et La Haye, Mouton, (1957)

Blinkoff, *The influence of Charles A. Beard upon American Historiography*, (University of Buffalo Studies. No, 16, 1936).

Boorstin Daniel, *The Americans, The Democratic Experience*, (Random House, Inc., New York, (2005)

Boon, James A., *From Symbolism to Structuralism, Lévi-Strauss in a literary tradition - Explorations in Interpretative Sociology*, Harper & Row, New York. (1972)

Borden William S., *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947–1955*, U.S.A, Wisconsin, (1984)

Brown Robert, *Charles Beard and the Constitution. A Critical Analysis of: An Economic interpretation of the Constitution* , Harvard Law Review, vol.70, No 8, (1957)

C.N. Parkinson, *East and West* New York: Mentor Book, (1965)

Moscovici Claudia, *Double Dialectics: Between Universalism and Relativism in Enlightenment and postmodern thought*, Rowan & Littlefield publishers, USA, (2011)

Marx Karl (1848), “*Communist Manifesto*”, www.marxists.org, -

.....“*Critique of the Gotha Program*”, (1875), Progress Publisher, Moscow Marx Karl (1848), “*Communist Manifesto*”, www.marxists.org, -

.....“*Critique of the Gotha Program*”, (1875), Progress Publisher, Moscow

Conlin and Luce, *A historical analysis of three main issues affecting United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, (Ohio: Master Thesis USAF, 1979)

Cheryl Bernard, *Civil democratic Islam, partners, resources, and strategies*, the RAND Corporation, (2003)

Chomsky Noam, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic societies*, United Kingdom, Pluto Press, (1989)

.....Chomsky Noam and Edward W. Said, "Open Media Pamphlets Series: Acts of Aggression: Policing "Rogue" States", New York, Seven Stories Press (2002)

Corwin S. Edward, *The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution; An Answer to the Economic Interpretation*, (D.C. Heath And Company, the United States, (1956)

Dabashi Hamid, *Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror*, London, Transaction ed., (2009)

Davis Simon, "Keeping the Americans in line? Britain, the United States and Saudi Arabia, 1939-45: Inter-Allied Rivalry in the Middle East Revisited," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Volume 8: Number 1, (1997)

De Cazanove Olivier, *Rome Et L'occident, Histoire de la Civilisation Occidentale: Généalogie de L'europe de La Préhistoire au Xx Siècle* », Edition Atlas Hachette, (1994)

Dewey, John, *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action*, Minton, Balch and Co., New York(1929),

Dodge Toby, *From the 'Arab Awakening' to the Arab Spring; the Post-colonial State in the Middle East*, Lund University, USA , Department of Political Science, (2012)

Durkheim, Emil and Mauss, Marcel. *Primitive Classification*. Translated from French by Rodney Needham. The University of Chicago Press. (1963)

Duroselle Jean-Baptiste, *From Wilson to Roosevelt: Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913-1945*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (1963)

Duncan Black Macdonald. *The Attitude Of The Semites Toward The Unseen World, Prophecy As A Semitic Phenomenon And Especially Among The Arabs*", Vol. IV, and Vol. VII, , of the Temple Classics edition, (2005)

Edwards jack "A Million and One Night" Penguin books, (1986)

Erick H. Erickson, *Children and society*, New York, W.W.Norton & Company, (1963)

Foster Dulles John, *Challenges and Response in United States Policy*, quoted in Harold K. Jacobson *America's Foreign Policy*, Random House: New York, (1960)

Foreman Jonathan. *The Pocket Book of Patriotism*, (the United States, Sterling Publishing, (October 2005)

- Foucault, Michel. *Archaeology of Knowledge*. Translated by A. M Sheridan Smith. Routledge (2002)
- Gale S.Gale. "Nationalism", *International Journal of Ethics*, Volume 41, Issue 1, (October 1930)
- Geertz Clifford *Interprétation et Culture*, Paris, Edition Broché, (1995)
- "Issue: Orient and West", University Press Listing, (1996)
- Gilles Kepel, *La revanche de Dieu. Chrétiens, juifs et musulmans à la reconquête du monde*, Paris, Le Seuil, (2003)
- Guillaume Dominique, Roman Zytek, and Mohammad Reza Farzin , *Iran–The Chronicles of the Subsidy Reform*, July, 2011, IMF working paper
- Gusfield R. James. *Symbolic Crusade Status. Politics and The American Temperance Movement*, The United States, University of Illinois Press, (May, 1986)
- Gilbert. Paul. *Criteria of Nationality and the Ethics of Self Determination*, History of European Sharp Gene, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 4th Edition, (May 2010) Ideas, Vol. 16, N. 46, (1993)
- Gramsci Antonio, *Selections from the Prison Notebook*, Quinton Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (Eds), New York: International Publishers,(1971)
- Guy Ankerl, *Coexisting contemporary civilizations: Arabo-Muslim, Bharati, Chinese, and West*. INU societal research. Vol.1: Geneva: INU Press. (2000).
- Gran. Peter, *The Middle East in the Historiography of Advanced Capitalism*, Review of Middle East Studies V. 1 (1975)
- Gibb, Sir Hamilton. *Muhammadanism*, Oxford Paperbacks (1 September 1969).
- Goldziher Ignaz, "Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law". Trans. from German by Andras and Ruth Hamori, Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1981)
- "Studies on the Civilization of Islam", London, (1962)
- Hinds Allister, *Britain's Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization", 1939-1958* , Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. (2001)

H. Cordesman Anthony, Gold Bryan, Khazai Sam, and Bosserman Bradley, *U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition. Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change*, April 19, 2013, Centre for Strategic & International Studies

Hayes Carlton, *Nationalism as a Religion*, Essays on Nationalism, The MacMillan Company, New York, (1926)

H. W. Brands, "What America Owes the World", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1998)

Halliday Fred, *Orientalism and its Critics*, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1993)

Hunt, Michael M. *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987)

Hans Kohn. *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., (1995)

Harley Notter. *The Origins of the Policy of Woodrow Wilson*, Baltimore, MD: the Johns Hopkins Press, (1937).

Habermas Jürgen. *The Inclusion of the Other*, MIT Press, Cambridge; (1996)
*The Future of Human Nature*, Cambridge University Press (2003)

Hobbes, Thomas *Leviathan*, Penguin Classics, London (1989)

Hodgson, Marshall, *The Venture of Islam*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974)

Ignatieff Michael, *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, (Princeton University Press, 2005)

Irwin, Robert, *For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and their Enemies*, London: Allen Lane, (2006).
 *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism and Its Discontents*. New York: The Overlook Press, Peter Mayer Publishers, Inc., (2006).

Irving Kristol, *Foreign Policy in an Age of Ideology*, the National Interest, number 1, (1985)

J. Rotter Andrew, *The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia* (Cornell, 1987)

J. Shapiro Michael. *Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as textual Practice*, Minneapolis: MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

Kopf David. *Hermeneutics versus History*, in *Journal of Asian Studies*, London, (1980)

Kuang-ming Wu, *On the "Logic" of Togetherness – A Cultural Hermeneutic by Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 50, No. 3, *The Philosophy of Jainism* (Jul. 2000), www.jstor.org.

Kakuzo, Okakura, *The Ideals of the East*, Tuttle Publishing, North Clarenton.& Ji Xianlin (1996),

.....“*The History of India after independence*”, 1st ed. Beijing University Press, (2002)

Kipling Rudyard, *The White Man's Burden*, *The journal of American history*, (June 1989) vol. 76, N.1

King, Richard. *Orientalism and Religion, Postcolonial Theory, India and 'the Mystic East*. London and New York: Routledge, (1999)

Kelly, J. B., *Arabia, the Gulf and the West*, New York: Basic Books, A division of Harper Collins, (1980)

Kuo John Wei Tchen, *New York Before Chinatown: Orientalism and the Shaping of American Culture 1776-1882*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, (1999)

Lévi-Strauss, Claude, *Race and History*, UNESCO, (1952),
..... “*The divided West*”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2006)

Lewis Bernard, *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*. Vol. 1. London: Fitzroy Dearborn.1989.

..... *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, London, The Atlantic, (Sep 1990).

Lieven Anatol, *America Right or Wrong*, New York, Oxford University Press, (2004)

Little Douglas, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, (2002)

Lind Michael, "*Distorting U.S. Foreign Policy: The Israel Lobby and American Power*". (New York, Prospect, April, 2002).

Lloyd Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, (1964)

Lukas John, *Democracy and Populism, Fear and Hatred*, Yale University Press: New Haven, (2005)

Lowrie S. Gale, *Nationalism, international journal of Ethics*, issue1, vol.41 (oct.1930)

Lincoln, Speeches and Writing, Don Fehrenbach, cited by Gary Wills, *Under God: Religion and American Politics*, New York: Simon and Schuster, (1990)

Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, (1998)

Lowrie S. Gale, *Nationalism, international journal of Ethics*, issue1, vol.41 (oct.1930)

Lincoln, Speeches and Writing, Don Fehrenbach, cited by Gary Wills, *Under God: Religion and American Politics*, New York: Simon and Schuster, (1990)

Lorenza Rossi, *Who shall guard the guardians themselves?* (Bern: Peter Lang AG, (1998)

McDougall Walter. A , *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the world since 1776*, Boston, Mariner books, (1997)

McAlister Melani, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and US Interests in the Middle East since 1945*, Berkeley: University of California Press, (2000)

Macfie john. *The Satanic Verses Post Festum: The Global, The Local, The Literary*. Reprinted in Alexander Lyon Macfie, Ed. *Orientalism: A Reader* New York, (2000)

Mark Twain, *The Innocents Abroad; or, the New Pilgrims Progress*, New York: Signet Classic, (1966)

Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, (1974)

Marrouchi, Mustapha, *Introduction: Colonialism, Islamism, Terrorism*, College Literature 30.1 (Project Muse), 2003

Marx Carl, *Capital*, the New York Daily Tribune, 1973

M. Blanchard Christopher, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, *Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service, (December 16, 2009).

Miller Aaron David, *Search for Security: Saudi Arabian oil and American foreign policy, 1939-1949*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1980

Moore Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, and Politics*. London: Verso (1997)

Mbembe, Achille. Winter. *Necropolitics*. Public Culture, New York (2003)

Musset Bruce, *No Clear and Present Danger*, New York, Harper & Row, (1972)

Nayak, Meghana. *Orientalism and "Saving" US State Identity after 9 / 11*. International Feminist Journal of Politics 8, (2006).

Needham, Joseph, *Human Law and the Laws of Nature in China and the West*, Oxford University Press, (1951)

Nietzsche, Friedrich, *The Birth of Tragedy*, Foulis Press, London, (1872)

Nishida, Kitaro, *Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious World View*, translated by David Dillworth, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu(1987)

“*Complete Works of Nishida Kitaro*, Volume, XIV, edited by A. Takeda and K. Riesenhueber, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, (2006)

Offner Arnold, *American Appeasement, U.S. Foreign Policy and Germany 1933-1938*, New York, W.W. Norton, (1976)

Oren Michael, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to Present*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, (2007)

O.Kellog William. *Changing the life styles (1865-1914)*, American History, the Easy Way, Barron's, 3rd edition, (1999)

Palmer, Michael A., *Guardians of the Gulf. A history of America's expanding role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992*, New York: the Free Press, (1992)

Paul Gilbert. *Criteria of Nationality and the Ethics of Self Determination*, History of European Ideas, Vol. 16, N. 46, (1993)

Rousseau Jean Jacques, *A Discourse on Political Economy, the Social contract and the Discourses*, London: Everyman, (1999)

Rodinson Maxime, (1980) *On the General Nature of the Conflict :chapter of Israel and the Arabs"* Second Edition), Penguin Books (1982)

Robbins, Bruce. *The East is a Career: Edward Said and the Logics of Professionalism* in Michael Sprinker (ed.), *Edward Said: A Critical Reader*. Oxford, Basil, Blackwell. (1992)

Ron Paul. *Neo-Conned*, Free American, September, (2003)

Rosenblatt Naomi, *Orientalism in American Popular Culture*, University of Pennsylvania Press , (1995)

Ramsey Clark, *The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf*, Thunder's Mouth Press, United States Paperback, (May 1994)

Roger Louis William and Robinson Ronald, *Empire Preserv'd: How the Americans put anti-Communism before anti-imperialism*, London: Routledge, (2004)

Russell Mead Walter, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it changed the world*, New York: The century Foundation, (2001)

Osgood Robert, *Ideals and self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations"*, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, (1953)

Sapir, Edward, *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture, and Personality*, edited by Mandelbaum, David G., University of California Press, Berkeley(1983)

Saul Richard *On the New American Empire*, Security Dialogue, (2004)

Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism A Double Edged Sword*, (New York, Norton, 1996)

Sartre Jean-Paul, *l'enfer, c'est les Autres . Huis clos*, éd. Gallimard, Paris (2000) (ISBN 2-07-036807-6)

Snyder Jack and Ballentine Karen, *Nationalism and the market place of ideas*, (International Security, Volume 21, (autumn 1996)

R. Gusfield James. *Symbolic Crusade Status. Politics and The American Temperance Movement*, The United States, University of Illinois Press, (May, 1986)

Sadler David, *Defending the West: Ideology and US Foreign Policy during the Cold War*, United Kingdom, Philip John Davies (Ed), (1996)

Shultz George, *Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of US Foreign Policy*, New York, Current policy No.551, David P. Forsyth, (February 22, 1984).

S. Turner Bryan, *Weber and Islam*, London, Henley and Boston, (1974).

Steel Ronald, *Temptations of a Superpower*, (the United States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995)

Strong Robert A. *Reading and Misreading Presidents*, in *the Credibility of Institutions, Policies and Leadership*, volume 20, edited by Kenneth W. Thompson, University of Virginia, (2000)

Tami R. Davis and Jean M. Lynn-Jones, *City upon A Hill*, New York, Foreign Policy 66, (1987)

Tibawi, A. L. *English-Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism. Part 1*. Islamic Quarterly 8, 1 & 2 ,(January-June 1964)

.....*English-Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism. Part 2.*" Islamic Quarterly 8, 3 & 4 (July-December 1964)

Toynbee, Arnold Joseph, Somervell, D. C., *Civilization on Trial and the World and the West*, Meridian Books Inc., New York, (1958)

Turner, Bryan S., *Marx and the End of Orientalism*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978

.....*From Orientalism to Global Sociology* in his *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*. London: Routledge. (1994)

Tu Wei-Ming, *Multiple Modernities: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Implications of East Asian Modernity*, in *Culture Matters, How Values Shape Human Progress*, Basic Books (Perseus), New York, (2000)

Tuastad, Dag. *Neo-Orientalism and the New Barbarism Thesis: Aspects of Symbolic Violence in the Middle East Conflict(s)*. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.24, No. 4. (2003)

Unger Roberto, *What should the Left Propose*, (Verso: London, 2005)

Vlahos Michael, *Culture and Foreign Policy*. New York, *Foreign, Policy* 82, Spring, (1991)

Varisco Daniel, *Reading Orientalism: "The Said and the Unsaid"*, Washington, (2007)

W. Montgomery Walt, *Muhammad at Mecca, & Muhammad at Medina*, Oxford, (1962)

Weber Max, *Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion*, (New York: Free Press, 1947).

..... *Economy and Society* (New York: Free Press, 1948).

.....*The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*,
Talcott Parsons (ed.), (1950)

Young, Robert *Postcolonialism: an Historical Introduction*. London, Oxford: Blackwells, (2001)

Zinn Howard, *A People's History of the United States, 1492-present*, HarperCollins Publishers, (1999)

Articles& Interviews:

Abdel-Malek, Anouar. "Orientalism in Crisis." In *Orientalism: A Reader*, edited by A. L. Macfie, New York: New York University Press, 2000. [Originally published in *Diogenes* 44, (Winter 1963)

Alafghani Djamal eddine, *Journal des Débats*, Paris, (18 mai 1883), réponse de Renan

Earl C. Ravenal, "Never Again: Learning from America's Foreign Policy Failures", Philadelphia, Temple University Press, (1978)

Edwards Holly "Sold American!" Noble Dreams, Wicked Pleasures", ed. Holly Edwards, Princeton: Princeton University Press, (2000)

Freedman Robert, "The Bush and the Arab Israeli Conflict: The Record of its first four years", New York Times, (September 19, 2003)

Freeman, Richard "The Great Doubling: The Challenge of the New Global Labor Market", *Innovation Policy and the Economy* volume 6 August 2006

Gershman Carl, President of The National Endowment for Democracy, "Aiding Democracy Around the World: The Challenges After September 11", the 39th Annual Hoemle Memorial Lecture, (2002)

Lloyd Gardner, " Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy", University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, (1964)

Richardson, Michael. "Edward Said". In *Anthropology Today*, 6, 4, August 1990

Roy Olivier, "Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah" , International Journal, Vol. 61, No. 1, Turkey: Myths and Realities (Winter, 2005/2006)

Sivan. Emmanuel. "Interpretations of Islam, Past and Present", Princeton, NJ, Darwin Press,(1985)

The Economist. "*C for Capitalism*". The Economist, (June 26, 2003)

SPIEGEL Interview with Bernard-Henri Lévy: '*We Lost a Great Deal of Time in Libya Because of the Germans*', March 30, 2011 – 02:18 PM

SPIEGEL interview, "Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate: A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution".

In a SPIEGEL interview, French social scientist Emmanuel Todd discusses the demographic roots of the Arab revolution, which he argues was spurred by rising literacy and rapidly shrinking birth rates. He also muses on the ghost of Osama bin Laden, arguing "al-Qaida was already dead," and on why he believes Germany is not a part of the "core West."

Wing-Keung Wong, Howard E. Thompson & Kweehong Teh, « Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?», *Multinational Finance Journal*, 15/1-2 (2011)

Newman Alex. "Gadhafi's Gold-money Plan Would Have Devastated Dollar", Friday, 11 November 2011 10:15, in New American magazine

Poteshman Allen M, « Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 », Journal of Business, 79 (2006)

Spolar Christine, "14 Enduring Bases' Set in Iraq." Chicago Tribune, (March 23, 2004).

Lambro Donald, "Americans Support War in Iraq 2-1, Poll Finds". New York, The Washington Times, (December 22, 2003). In: <http://washingtontimes.com/national/20031222-120239-5311r.htm>

Said, Edward, "Power, Politics and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said", Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. (2001)

Theses

Ahmad Dallal. "The Study of Islam in American Scholarship: the Persistence of Orientalist Paradigms". PhD thesis

Internet Resources

Alain Finkielkraut, « Derrière le romantisme du « Printemps arabe », Politis. .Fr
Amit Bhaduri, "Nationalism "in the Era of Globalization", in: <http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/wp188.pdf>

Alexander Hamilton et al, "Federalist papers N° 41", *General View of the powers Conferred by the Constitution*, in: <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa41.htm>

..... "Federalist N° 11", *the utility of the union in respect to commercial relations and navy* in: <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa11.htm>

..... "Federalist" N° 42, in: <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa42.htm>

Alam, Shahid. "Scholarship or Sophistry? Bernard Lewis and the New Orientalism" (2003). At : <http://www.counterpunch.org/alam06282003.html>

CNN.com - "U.N. to let Iraq sell oil for euros, not dollars", edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/.../iraq.un.euro.reut/

Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. 1996. "Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000: A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm." in: <http://www.israeleconomy.org/strat1.htm>

"Without Precedent : The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission", Vintage, April 2007

"9/11 Mysteries – demolitions, min 06:58 , Official video of the Free Fall of wtc7,corrected after simple questions of two physicians, at : www.reopen911.info

Amin, Samir. 2012. "The Arab revolutions: a year after." Interface: a journal for and about social movements. Vol. 4, No1, May, pp. 33 – 42. At: <http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Issue-4-1-Full-PDF.pdf> June 8, 2011.

Astrong, O. "US Arms Trader to Run Iraq". (New York, The Observer, March 30. 2003). In <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,6903,925309,00.html>

Bacon, Francis, "Novum Organum" (The New Organon – or True Directions Concerning the Interpretation of Nature), Volume I, (1620) at: www.constitution.org

David Little, "Belief, Ethnicity, and Nationalism". United States Institute of Peace on: <http://www.usip.org/eseach/rehr/blethnat.html>

Djameela, Meriam, (December 1970), 544-547. Journal on-line. Available from <http://www.geocities.com/orientalismorg/Kerr.htm>.

Pattberg, Thorsten (2009), The East-West dichotomy, <http://www.east-west-dichotomy.com>

Richman Sheldon, senior fellow at The Future of Freedom Foundation, "After Bin Laden," Counterpunch, May, pp.20-22, at: <http://www.counterpunch.org/richman05202011.html/>

Rudolf Rocker, "Nationalism and culture", (St. Paul, MN: Michael E. Coughlin, 1978). On: <http://www.anarchosyndicalism.org/rocker/nc.htm>.

"History of the United States (1964-1980)", Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia in: <http://www.answers.com/topic/1973-oil-crisis>.

Wikipedia, "The Westphalia Legacy", the Free Encyclopedia, in:
<http://www.com/answers/Westphalia.htm>

Stephen Zunes, "Why the US Supports Israel". (New York, Foreign Policy in Focus, 2004.). In: http://www.fpif.org/papers/usisrael_body.html.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Second Arab Revolt: Winners and Losers." Commentary No. 298. February. 1, 2011. At <http://www.iwallerstein.com/the-second-arab-revolt-winnersand-losers/> (Accessed on July 15, 2012).

Walker Hartung, "Making Money on Terrorism". The Nation, February 5. 2004. In: <http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040223&c=2&s=hartung>

American Testimony Journal, in: http://www.tbr.org/lac/testimony_090105.htm

The United Nations definition of terrorism, in:

<http://www.jackgrantham.blogspot.com/>

Fareed Zakaria, "From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America's World Role", at:

http://www.polity.co.uk/content/BPL_Images/Content_store/Sample_chapter/0745633463%5CHeld_sample%20chapter_American%20power%20in%20the%2021st%20century.pdf

Archives

Address by Secretary of State George Shultz at the 86th Annual Washington Day Banquet, "Human Rights and the Moral Dimension of US Foreign Policy", (United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D. C, February 22, 1984). Current Policy No. 551

United States, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard M. Nixon;" Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statement of the President, 1970, First Annual Report to Congress on United States foreign Policy for the 1970's", (February 18, 1970), p.611

The pentagon papers, Defense Department (confidential document of 7000 pages, published by Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, who made a photocopy in June 1971 before sending a copy to some Congress members and to New York Times), 23 February 1948.

NCSTAR 1-9 vol1, “Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7”, August, 2008, p.330

Niels H. Harrit, Jeffrey Farrer, Steven E. Jones, Kevin R. Ryan, Frank M. Legge, Daniel Farnsworth, Gregg Roberts, James R. Gourley, and Bradley R. Larsen, « Active Thermite Material Observed in Dust from the 9/11 World Trade Center Catastrophe », *The Open Chemical Physics Journal*, 2009, pp.2, 7-31. See also : Steven Jones, « chain of custody », in *9/11 the video: Explosive Testimony Exclusive*, 1st part, 3 min 30 s & 7 min 58 s, & in 0 minute in the 2nd part.

Statistical Office of the United Nations (1950). (Statistical yearbook, 1949-1950. Second issue, Table 43. New York: U.N. Publications)

William Clinton, “National Security Strategy of the United States: A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement”, (Washington D.C.: The White House, July 1994)

Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda, “ The Age of Terror: America and The World after September 11, An Introduction”, (Basic Books & Yale University Centre For The Study Of Globalization, New York Times, 2001)

A landmark system for monetary and exchange rate management established in 1944. The Bretton Woods Agreement was developed at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from July 1 to July 22, 1944.

It was a Sunday, and President Richard Nixon suspended convertability of the US dollar into gold, effectively ending the 25-year Bretton Woods era of fixed currency exchange rates against the US dollar. US gold reserves were facing enormous pressure due to balance of payment concerns, the Vietnam War debt and Great Society programs, and the ensuing monetary inflation. A growing number of countries began to redeem their dollar holdings for gold. France sent a warship to New York harbor in early August 1971 with instructions to bring back its gold from the New York Federal Reserve Bank. It was, after all, French President Charles de Gaulle who remained consistently skeptical about the US dollar, saying at a press conference on February 4, 1965, that it was impossible for the dollar to be "an impartial and international trade medium . . . It is in fact a

credit instrument reserved for one state only." (Cited in Benn Steil's The Battle of Bretton Woods. Princeton University Press, 2013.)

“On the Difficulty in Predicting and Understanding the Arab Spring: Orientalism, Euro-Centrism, and Modernity”, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 17, Number 2, Winter 2012

Intitulé : L'Orientalism Américain à L'intérieur de la Dichotomie Est/ Ouest

Résumé :

Il est indéniable que L'Orientalism, en tant que discours spécifique du Siècle des lumières, a été une carrière de base pour les notions occidentale de son être et des non-occidentale de l'autre, qui ont amené des propositions infalsifiables autour de la supériorité des occidentaux sur les non-occidentaux. De cette façon, les orientalistes ont participé dans l'élaboration de l'identité culturelle moderne de l'occident. Comme L'Orientalisme traditionnel a produit des courroies qui ont aidé la colonisation de l'Orient en donnant des prétextes idéologique, la nouvelle version de l'orientalisme a utilisé des implications politiques directes dont la vision manichéenne met un Islam rigide, traditionnel et totalitaire dans un conflit avec un Occident illuminé, démocratique, égalitaire et libéral. Notre intérêt est de s'adresser à ce problème urgent et contemporain de notre temps et l'effort serait de faire une catégorisation des orientalismes ; un Orientalisme traditionnel et un néo-Orientalisme Américain. Aussi, pour fouiller dans l'histoire du conflit, les réalités politique contemporaines, des mis- conceptions erronés cousues par des représentations médiatiques systématiquement corrompues. Plus précisément, le travail se concentre sur la distinction épistémologique entre l'Orientalisme traditionnel et le néo- Orientalisme Américain et comment l'Islam y opère.

Mots clés : Occident et non-occident, Orientalisme et néo-Orientalisme, Islam, idéologie, intérêt, colonisation, dichotomie.

Title: American Orientalism within the East/ West Dichotomy

Abstract:

It is undeniable that as a species of Enlightenment discourse, Orientalism has been a carrier of basic Western notions of the Western self and the non-Western other which generated unfalsifiable propositions about the superiority of Westerners to non-Westerners. In this way, orientalistes participated in the elaboration of modern Western cultural identity. While the earlier Orientalism had produced areas that aided the colonization of the Orient by providing ideological pretexts; the new version of Orientalism has employed forthright political implications. Their Manichean view posits an unchanging, traditional, totalitarian Islam in perpetual conflict with an enlightened, democratic, egalitarian and free West. Our point is to address this pressing and current issue of our time and our effort would be to make a categorization of Orientalisms; a traditional Orientalism and a neo- American one, also to dig into the history of the conflict, contemporary political realities, to the misconceptions and fallacies sown through a systematically distorted media representation. More precisely, the work focuses on the epistemological distinction between the traditional and the US neo-Orientalism one and how Islam is operating within.

Key words: West and non-West, Orientalism and neo-Orientalism, Islam, ideology, interest, colonization, dichotomy.

العنوان :

الاستشراق الأمريكي في خضم ثنائية الشرق و الغرب:

إن ثنائية الشرق و الغرب تحولت إلى ثنائية الإسلام و الغرب ، ثنائية ليست مختلفة على الأولى في الصميم لأنها تعبر عن تعارض ثنائي في مبدأ الأفضلية بين الديانات، السلالات و الثقافات، هي أيضا ممثلة في تفكير إبستيمولوجي غير عادي يجعل العالم ساحة معركة بين " نحن" (الغرب) " وهم" (المسلمین) أين الأول يتمتع بأفضلية مطلقة على الثاني. بغض النظر عن " من " يستعمل هذا التأثير ضد " من " فهذا منطق خاطئ، خطير ومدمر.

وعليه فهذا البحث يعني بطريقة تبلور فلسفة الاستشراق الأمريكي عن طريق التدقيق في بعض أحداث هذه الحقبة التي أدت إلى تغيرات خطيرة في العالم السياسي و الإعلامي و الظروف التي أدت بثنائية الغرب و الإسلام إلى الدخول في طريقة جديدة رغم أن تركيبها هي ميراث الاستشراق التقليدي إلا أن قوانينها و أشكالها بعيدة كل البعد عن الماضي و هذا ما يسمى الاستشراق الأمريكي "الجديد" الذي عبر عنه بعض الباحثين مثل صامويل هانتقنتن بصراع الحضارات، و

هذا لا يعدو أن يكون نقطة انطلاق فحسب قامت الإمبريالية الأمريكية إلى تحديد هويات و ثقافات الآخرين و حرمانهم في نفس الوقت من إنسانيتهم.

كلمات مفتاحية :

الغرب و الشرق, الاستشراق التقليدي و الاستشراق الجديد, الإسلام , ايديولوجيا , مصالح , احتلال, ثنائية