

People' Democratic Republic of Algeria
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
University of Oran 2 Mohamed Ben Ahmed



Faculty of Foreign Languages
Department of English
A Doctorate Thesis in American Civilization

The United States Foreign Policy after September
11th, 2001
Case study: Iran (2001-2016)

Submitted by: BOUDJAHFA Nawal

Board of examiners:

President: Prof. CHAMI Nidhal
Director: Dr. CHORFI Fatima
Examiner: Dr. DEHMOUNE Amal
Examiner: Dr. OULDYEROU Saadia
Examiner: Dr. BENTALEB Ibtissem
Examiner: Prof LOUAHALA Nadia

Oran 2 University
Oran 2 University
Oran 2 University
University of Mascara
University of Chlef
University of Sidi Bel Abbes

Academic year: 2024/2025

Dedication

In memory of my beloved father who left this world with a strong desire to be with us today, to my mother to whom I am indebted. Million thanks to my husband, my children Maissaa and Aymen to whom I say that the best things are hard to get but worth to fight for.

To my brothers and sister for their constant encouragements.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I shall thank Almighty Allah for all His blessings.

I would like to express my deepest gratefulness to my supervisor Dr. CHORFI Fatima for the continuous support, patience and motivation throughout the writing of this thesis. Her guidance helped me in very difficult moments to accomplish it, even if she knew that I had almost abandoned undertaking research for the many obstacles I had encountered. I could not have a better mentor to help me to stand once again, gain self-confidence and accomplish this modest research work. Her patience, guidance and perfectionist orientations through years have been unshakable.

I am especially grateful to my colleagues and friends; they not only helped me with this work, but have over the years always provided assistance, advice, and performed chores above and beyond the call of duty.

Great thanks also to all the members of the jury for taking time to read my work and enrich it with their remarks and valuable criticism.

Others who warrant my thanks are Pr. Yacine Rachida the director of the Doctorate School without her, this work could have never started.

I wish also to spare a thought to Professor BENALI Mohammed Rachid and BOUHEND Mohammed Reda who are missed by all who had the honor to meet them.

Abstract

The relationship between the United States and Iran has undergone considerable changes over the decades, transitioning from a partnership to a contentious rivalry. Initially, U.S.-Iran relations were characterized by mutual interests, particularly during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the early 20th century. At that period, the U.S. was seen as a more trustworthy partner for the Shah comparing to Britain and Russia and Iran was considered as a key ally for the United States in the Middle East. However, both U.S and Iran quickly disenchanted after the 1979 Iranian Revolution which resulted in the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The revolution led to a sudden interruption of diplomatic relations and the U.S. adoption of a containment strategy aiming to limit Iran's influence in the region. Following the Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis, U.S.-Iran relations deteriorated further. The U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Iran, and the two nations became adversaries in various regional conflicts. Again, September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks have revived past grudge that contributed to the degradation of U.S.-Iran relations in several significant ways. What then President Jimmy Carter called "*an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world*" was framed as part of the broader "Axis of Evil," which included Iraq and North Korea. Following the attacks, the U.S. government adopted a more aggressive stance towards perceived threats in the Middle East. The Bush administration's "War on Terror" shed the light on countries that were suspected of sponsoring terrorism, including Iran. And even though this latter condemned the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. considered its support for groups like Hezbollah and its nuclear ambitions as serious threats, which further strained relations. In this regard, this study aims first to examine three basic elements of contemporary American foreign policy: unilateralism, preemption and military hegemony, and the way they impacted worldwide equilibrium especially in Iran. It then attempts to analyze the way 9/11 attacks catalyzed a series of events that led to a significant decline in U.S.-Iran relations, characterized by increased military tensions, negative perceptions, and a shift in U.S. foreign policy towards a more confrontational approach.

Key words: U.S. Foreign policy, Bush Doctrine, War on Terror, Terrorism, Weapons of mass destruction, Iranian Coup of 1953, Iran Hostage Crisis, The White Revolution, Iranian Revolution of 1979.

Résumé :

La relation entre les Etats Unis et l'Iran a connu des changements considérables à travers les décennies, allant du partenariat à une rivalité houleuse. Initialement la relation entre l'Iran et les Etats Unis était caractérisée par un intérêt mutuel, particulièrement durant le règne du Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi dans le début du 20 siècle. Durant cette période, les Etats Unis étaient considérés par le Shah comme un partenaire de confiance en comparaison à la Russie et la Grande Bretagne et l'Iran était vu comme un allié clé pour les Etats Unis au Moyen Orient. Cependant, les deux pays ont vite déchanté après la Revolution Iranienne de 1979 qui a donné lieu au renversement du Shah et la fondation d'une République Islamique sous la direction de Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Cette révolution a causé l'interruption soudaine de toute relation diplomatique et les Etats Unis adoptèrent une stratégie d'endiguement dont le but est de limiter l'influence de l'Iran au Moyen Orient. Suite à la révolution et la crise de la prise d'otages les relations ont encore empiré. Les Etats Unis ont imposé des sanctions économiques sur l'Iran et les deux pays sont devenus des adversaires sur différents conflits régionaux. De nouveau, les attaques terroristes du 11 Septembre 2001 ont ravivé de vieilles rancunes contribuant à la dégradation de la relation entre les Etats Unis et l'Iran de différentes façons. Ce qu'avant le Président Jimmy Carter appelait « Une île de stabilité dans la région la plus instable du monde » fait aujourd'hui partie de « l'axe du mal » qui inclut aussi l'Iraq et la Corée du Nord. Suite aux attaques, le gouvernement Américain a adopté une posture agressive envers les potentielles menaces au Moyen Orient. La guerre contre le terrorisme menée par l'administration de Bush a mis la lumière sur des pays suspectés de sponsoriser le terrorisme en incluant l'Iran. Et même si ce dernier a commandé les attaques du 9/11, les Etats Unis considèrent le soutien de l'Iran à certains groupes tel que Hezbollah et son ambition pour le nucléaire comme une sérieuse menace qui entache encore plus leur relation. A cet égard, cette étude a pour but d'examiner trois éléments basiques de la politique étrangère américaine moderne : l'unilatéralisme, la préemption et l'hégémonie militaire et comment ils ont affecté l'équilibre mondial précisément l'Iran. Ensuite, l'étude tente d'analyser la manière dont les attaques du 11/9 ont catalysé une série d'événements qui ont causé le déclin de la relation entre l'Iran et les Etats Unis caractérisée par des tensions militaires, des perceptions négatives et un changement vers une politique étrangère plus agressive.

Mots clés : La politique étrangère Américaine, la doctrine de Bush, la guerre contre le terrorisme, les armes de destructions massives, le coup d'état d'Iran de 1953, la crise d'otage Iranienne, la révolution blanche, la révolution Iranienne de 1979.

الملخص

مرت العلاقات بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وإيران بعدة تحولات مهمة خلال العقود الأخيرة منتقلة من علاقات شراكة إلى علاقات تنافسية، في البداية كانت علاقتهم تتميز بمصلحة تبادل خاصة تحت حكم الشاه محمد رضا بهلوي في بداية القرن العشرين. كانت آنذاك تعتبر الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية جديرة ثقة مقارنة مع بريطانيا والاتحاد السوفياتي وكانت إيران تعتبر حليفا رئيسيا بالنسبة للولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط لكن سرعان ما تحررا الاثنان من هذا لوهم بعد أحداث الثورة الإيرانية في 1979 التي سقط إثرها شاه إيران وتأسست الجمهورية الإسلامية تحت حكم آية الله روح الله الخميني. أدت الثورة إلى نهاية العلاقات الدبلوماسية بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وإيران وتطبيق سياسة الاحتواء الهادفة لتقييد تأثير إيران في المنطقة بعد الثورة الإسلامية وأزمة الرهائن في إيران تدهورت العلاقة أكثر حيث فرضت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية عقوبات اقتصادية على إيران ليصبح البلدان أعداء في عدة صراعات إقليمية. مرة أخرى أدت أحداث 11 سبتمبر 2001 لإحياء ضغينة الماضي لتزداد العلاقة سوء في عدة مجالات ما سمي بالماضي من طرف الرئيس جيمي كارتر " جزيرة استقرار في أكثر منطقة اضطراب في العالم" أصبحت عضو من "محور الشر" بجانب كوريا الشمالية والعراق بعد هذه الهجمات الإرهابية اتخذت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية موقف أكثر عدواني اتجاه أي تهديد من الشرق الأوسط. الحرب ضد الإرهاب التي طبقتها حكومة بوش سلطت الضوء على البلدان المشتبه بها برعاية الإرهاب من بينهم إيران وعلى الرغم من أن هذه الأخيرة نقدت أحداث 11 سبتمبر اعتبرت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية دعم إيران لحزب الله وطموحاتها النووية كخطر جدي وهذا أدى إلى تدهور العلاقة أكثر بينهما. في هذا الشيء هدف هذه الدراسة هو دراسة 3 عناصر من السياسة الأمريكية الخارجية وهي الاحتواء إجراءات استباقية والسيطرة وأثرها على توازن واستقرار العالم خاصة إيران. حاولت هذه الدراسة تحليل الطريقة التي عجلت أحداث 11 سبتمبر تسبب في سلسلة أحداث أخرى قادت إلى تدهور العلاقات بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وإيران مميزة بتوترات عسكرية وإدراكات سلبية وانتقال سياسه الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية الخارجية إلى سياسة تهجمية.

كلمات مفتاحية

سياسة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية الخارجية، عقيدة بوش، الحرب ضد الإرهاب، الإرهاب ، اسلحة الدمار الشامل، انقلاب 1953 ، أزمة رهائن إيران، الثورة البيضاء، الثورة الإسلامية في إيران 1979

List of acronyms and Abbreviations:

ABM	The Antiballistic Missile
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
ADC	The American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
AEOI	The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
ARAMCO	Arabian-American Oil Company
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DWB	Driving While Black
EEOC	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
ETA	Basque Terrorist Organization
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISA	The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
IAEA	The International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA	The International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	The International Criminal Court
ICCPR	The United Nation's International Covenant on civil and political rights
ICJ	The International Court of Justice
ICRO	The Islamic Culture and Relations Organization
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Services
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRIB	The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force

III

ISAF	The International Security Assistance Force
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCPA	Join Comprehensive Plan Action
JCPOA	The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSEERS	National Security Entry Exit Program
TNRC	The Tehran Nuclear Research Center
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TSC	Terrorist Screening Center
UN	The United Nation
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

List of tables:

Table n°1, page 19: American Foreign Policy Priorities: American Public Opinion, 2014.

Table n°2, page 110: Compagnies Members of oil Consortium and their Participation.

List of figures:

Figure n°1, page 37: Share of people who think the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs (Survey of 2,059 U.S. adults, 1974 to 2019).

Figure n°2, page 40: Distribution of Power in the U.S. Government.

Figure n° 3, page 55: Total number of registered lobbyists in the USA from 2000 to 2022.

Figure n°4, page 136: logo of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

Figure n° 5, page 158: Prejudice towards Muslims: Data reported from 2007 and 2009.

Figure n°6, page 159: Documented incidents of hate since the election of Donald Trump.

Figure n°7, page 162: Presidents' rating in Western Europe.

List of Maps:

Map n°1, page 63: Iran under the Qajar dynasty in the 19th century.

Map n°2, page 70: The Partition of Persia (1907-1915).

Map n°3, page 88: Iraq-Iran Disputed Territories.

Map n°4, page 89: Iran Assault on H-3.

Map n°5, page 91: Attacks on civilian areas of Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait targeted during the "War of the Cities".

Map n°6, page 165: Map of the main sites of Iran's nuclear program.

Map°7, page 174: U.S. presence influence in the Middle East.

Table of Contents

Dedication	I
Acknowledgements.....	II
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations.....	III
List of Tables.....	V
List of Figures.....	VI
List of Maps.....	VII
Table of Contents.....	VIII
Abstract.....	XI
General Introduction.....	1

Chapter I: Understanding the United States Foreign Policy

I-	Introduction.....	15
II-	Historical Overview.....	15
III-	U.S. Foreign Policy during the Formative Years.....	21
	III-1- The Monroe Doctrine.....	23
IV-	Containment and U.S. Foreign Policy After World War I.....	25
V-	U.S. Relations with the World since World War II.....	27
VI-	U.S. Foreign Policy during the Cold War (1947–1991).....	30
	VI-1- The Truman Doctrine.....	32
	VI-2 The Korean Invasion (1950 – 1953).....	34
	VI-3 The Vietnam War: A Turning Point in the U.S. Foreign Policy 1960-1975.....	36
VII-	The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy.....	39
	VII-1 Powers of both the President and the Congress.....	40
VIII-	The Genesis of the U.S. Foreign Policy.....	50
	VIII-1- National Security and Economic Interests in the making of U.S Foreign Policy...51	
	VIII-2-Public Opinion and Mass Media in the Making of U.S Foreign Policy.....	52
IX-	Political Movements and Lobbies.....	55
X-	Conclusion.....	57

Chapter II: Iran's Historical Background

I-	Introduction.....	58
II-	Milestone in the History of Iran.....	58
	II-1-The Pre-Islamic Era.....	58
	II-2-The Islamic Era.....	59
	II-3- Modern Era.....	61
III-	The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty.....	64
IV-	The Oil Nationalization Crisis.....	67
	IV-1-Iranian Coup of 1953.....	68
V-	The White Revolution.....	74
VI-	The Advent of the Islamic Revolution 1978-1979.....	76
	VI-1-Iran Hostage Crisis.....	80
	VI-2- Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988.....	85
VII-	The Aftermath of the Islamic Revolution and Present-Day Iran.....	93
VIII-	Conclusion.....	98

Chapter III: Understanding the USA and Iran Interactions in Shaping their Identities

I-	Introduction.....	100
II-	U.S. Iran Relations under the Pahlavi Dynasty.....	100
III-	The Fall of Mosaddeq Government and the Aftermath of the Coup.....	104
	III-1- The 1967 War and the Oil Weapon.....	107
IV-	Nixon and the Shah: from a Client to a Partner.....	113
V-	US-Iran Relations during the Presidency of Ford: The Beginning of the End.....	119
VI-	President Carter and the Tragedy of Foreign Policy.....	122
VII-	The Iran-Contra Affair.....	127
VIII-	Human Rights and Ideological Conflicts.....	129
	VIII- 1- Ideological Conflict and its Impact on U.S Iran Relations.....	131
IX-	Media's Role in Shaping U.S- Iran Relations.....	133
X-	Conclusion	139

Chapter IV- U.S. Foreign policy in Iran in the Aftermath of 9/11:

I-	Introduction.....	140
II-	The Bush Doctrine.....	143
III-	The War on Terror: Bush's Axis of Evil.....	149
IV-	U.S. Foreign Policy: The Great Return of Islamophobia.....	154
V-	Nuclear Issue and its Implications.....	163
VI-	U.S. Diplomatic Efforts and Challenges.....	168
VII-	Impact of U.S-Iran Relations on Regional Stability.....	170
VIII-	U.S. Foreign Policy Outlook with Iran.....	171
IX-	Conclusion	179

X- General Conclusion.....	181
XI- Bibliography.....	188
XII- Appendix.....	203

General Introduction

The Gulf region occupies a crucial part in the U.S. foreign policy. In fact, particular importance has been given to the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular to maintain an uninterrupted supply of oil. This interest started to take form in the early 20th century, particularly during and after the First World War. The discovery of oil in Persia (modern-day Iran) and the institution of American oil companies like the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) characterized the beginning of considerable U.S. interest in the region's energy sector. This economic involvement paved the way for further future political and military bonds. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the value of the Middle East became even more important because of its oil resources, which were decisive for the Allied war endeavors. After the war, the U.S. attempted to impose itself as a principal authority in the area, putting Britain in the shade and promoting the creation of Israel in 1948, which further strengthened U.S. concerns in the Middle East.

With the beginning and throughout the Cold War, the U.S. attention in the Middle East was led by the necessity to restrain Soviet progression. From Truman to the Reagan Administration, the U.S. foreign policy established alliances with several countries in the area, principally, to counter and contain Soviet influence, to maintain access to Gulf oil and finally to guarantee that no threat could put in danger the foundation of Israel.

The Iranian Crisis of 1946, also known as the Azerbaijan Crisis and the refusal of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Northern Iran, despite agreements made during the Second World War urged the Truman Administration to be intransigent towards Soviet leaders. Apprehending further transgressions, the U.S. introduced the Truman Doctrine, which affirmed that the United States should "*support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside powers*"¹. The announcement of the doctrine and the great deal of attention given to its allies consolidated the U.S. devotion to conserve the pro-Western inclination of states in countries bordering the Soviet Union. Furthermore,

¹ Charles A. Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf: The Dilemmas of Security*, (Boston: Allen & Unwin Press, 1987), p.13

The Truman Administration was obviously eager to maintain and protect pro-Western regimes in the Middle East.

The U.S. foreign policy during the presidency of Eisenhower in the Middle East was marked by a more proactive stance based on military and economic assistance to Middle Eastern countries resisting communist aggression. President Eisenhower's strategy marked a detachment from reactive approach, focusing on immediate threats that had emerged in the last years of the Truman Administration. Eisenhower considerably enhanced U.S. commitment in the Middle East restructuring the directions of the American foreign policy in the post-1952 period.

His administration was directly concerned in the overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, which was motivated by fears of Soviet influence and the desire to maintain Western control over oil resources. This was done with a sponsored coup d'etat in 1953 by the U.S. that fast-tracked the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi at the head of Iran. This incident obviously illustrate that the U.S. was desperate to use coercion to affect the foreign policies of the area to preserve its interests. Thwarting the Soviet threat in the region, Eisenhower declared, "*The existing vacuum in the Middle East must be filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia.*"² Parallely to Soviet influence, the Eisenhower Doctrine tried to restrain and cease the expansion of Arab nationalism and radical power through the use of armed forces.

During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East were shaped by the geopolitical context of the Cold War, regional dynamics, and their respective administrations' priorities. Kennedy was involved with the broader Arab world, specifically through actions directed to foster Pan-Arabism, which was advocated by leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. This strategy indicated an aspiration to equilibrate U.S. support for Israel with an acknowledgement of Arab nationalism and the necessity of stability in the region. Like his predecessor, Johnson's foreign policy was considerably influenced by his dedication to the containment of communism, particularly in the context of the Vietnam War. While he recognized the importance of the Middle East, his administration lacked the same level of engagement and enthusiasm for foreign policy as the one fulfilled by Kennedy.

² Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961: The White House Years* (New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1965), p.178.

In fact, Johnson favored national reforms over major foreign initiatives, largely due to his preoccupation with Vietnam and domestic preoccupations.

U.S. attention towards Iran indeed intensified following the withdrawal of British influence in the region in the 1970s. The then American President, Richard Nixon, announced “Nixon Doctrine”, which was built upon the « *the twin pillars strategy* ».³ This strategy relied on Iran and Saudi Arabia to manage the Gulf security. This means that the U.S. took the reins in the Gulf region. Along with his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Nixon undertook a policy of détente, which aimed to reduce Cold War tensions. In the Middle East, this implied “*shuttle diplomacy*,” where Kissinger multiplied his trips to negotiate peace and stability especially after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which emphasized the necessity for a more rigorous U.S. attitude in managing conflicts of the area. The twin pillar strategy of the Nixon Administration was to furnish military and economic aids to pro-Western nations in the region, with Iran assuming the main role to guarantee regional security. The main objective of Nixon’s Doctrine was to end direct American military implication in the Gulf conflicts while fostering allies to undertake more tasks for their own protection. In the case of Iran, this meant rising military aid to the Shah by affording advanced weaponry and training to the Iranian military. This support was part of a larger strategy to reinforce Iran's posture in the area and ascertain that it would act as a bulwark against Soviet power. Even though Nixon's strategy originally reinforced U.S.-Iran relations, it also contributed to the Shah's dependency on American aids. This reliance became a problem in the years driving to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, as the Shah was confronted to cumulative national resistance due to his incapacity to handle domestic socio-economic crisis. The late 1970s observed considerable modifications in the political matters of the Middle East with the Iranian Revolution and the fall of the Shah, who had been a crucial ally for U.S. interests in the region.

In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter’s policies towards Iran underwent significant changes influenced mainly by the shifting political landscape of the region. In fact, before the revolution, Carter's administration sustained a good relationship with the Shah of Iran, however, the situation deteriorated dramatically after the Iran Hostage Crisis. In response to this incident, Carter executed several actions, including the halt of oil imports from Iran on November 12, 1979, as a measure to pressure the Iranian government and protect U.S. vital interest in the region. In his own words:

³ Lori Lyn Bogle, *The Cold War: National security policy planning from Truman to Reagan and from Stalin to Gorbachev*, (Routledge, 2001), p. 291.

*"Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the 'vital interests' of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."*⁴ Initially, Carter's administration sought to interact with the new Iranian leader, including Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in an attempt to restore the situation. However, these efforts were in vain due to the growing anti-American sentiment in Iran. Besides, the administration's turn on human rights also aggravated its relationship with Iran, as Carter tried to foster democratic values while moving forward a new complex political landscape. Carter's approach to Iran was characterized by a transition from support for the Shah to a more defensive and reactive policy based on a re-evaluation of U.S. regional priorities and global military commitments. Consequently, the defense and security of the Middle East became crucial to the United States, a priority that no ensuing U.S. president has tried to change.

Afterwards, during Ronald Reagan's presidency, U.S. policy towards Iran restates the strategy of his predecessor which was a reiteration of the Truman Doctrine. Characterized by a complex interaction of indifference, hostility, cooperation, and confrontation, this U.S. strategy was largely influenced by key events, including the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the actions of Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah. The U.S. aspired to restrain Iranian influence in the region following the Islamic Revolution, which had engendered a theocratic regime inimical to the American interests. By providing aids to Iraq in its war against Iran, the U.S. expected to undermine Iran's position and impeded the expansion of its ideology throughout the Middle East. However, Regan's Presidency was controversial due to a dynamic and often contradictory approach of the Iran-Contra Affair which implied secret arms sales to Iran, despite an embargo, in exchange for the discharge of American hostages held by Hezbollah. The affair not only infringed Reagan's campaign promise but also led to a significant decline in public trust, increased congressional oversight, a reevaluation of presidential power, and a more cautious approach to foreign policy.

Thereafter, since the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War of 1990-91, U.S. strategy was characterized by a focus on preventing Iranian influence in the Gulf, strengthening and stabilizing alliances with regional partners, and maintaining a military presence to stop potential threats, particularly regarding oil supplies. In fact, the Gulf region has always been a major source of oil and natural gas, not only for the U.S. but also for many of its allies in Asia,

⁴ Zbigniew Brezezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1971-1981* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p. 426.

such as Japan and South Korea. These nations rely heavily on Gulf oil, with some drawing over three-quarters of their oil imports from the area. Apportionment of this vital resource could engender harsh repercussions for these countries and international energy markets.

Throughout the 1990s, U.S. policy towards Iran was globally noticeable by diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions. This strategy complying with the concept of "*rogue states*" became a significant focus in U.S. foreign policy during the presidency of Bill Clinton. The primary countries labeled as rogue states included Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Cuba due to the widespread claim of their aggressive actions, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and support for terrorism. Clinton's administration, particularly officials like Anthony Lake and Madeleine Albright who were influential figures in U.S. foreign policy during the late 1990s, stressed on the necessity of a more subtle tactic to dealing with these nations. Robert Litwak who is a prominent figure in the discussion of U.S. foreign policy, argued for "*differentiated strategies of containment*," recommending that a one-size-fits-all strategy was inadequate. Instead, each rogue state needed tailored strategies based on its unique situations and attitudes.⁵ Therefore, the notable "*dual containment strategy*" was implemented to simultaneously contain both Iraq and Iran. This policy was destined to discourage these countries from perturbing the Middle East, especially concerning the Palestinian case.

Adhering to a reevaluated soft attitude towards these states, the Clinton administration substituted the term "*rogue states*" in favor of "*states of concern*". This change reflected a recognition of the need for flexibility and a more sophisticated understanding of global dynamics acknowledging the complexities involved in international relations.⁶ While the dual containment strategy was a significant attempt to manage U.S. interests in the Middle East, in the case of Iran, its overall efficiency was overtly questioned, mainly due to a lack of international support. Even though this strategy tried to stabilize the Middle East by isolating Iran and Iraq, it often had the opposite result, driving to additional tensions and a more difficult regional dynamic.

Moreover, Iran's geostrategic position is another factor that makes the country so important for the United States. In fact, Iran's position near the Strait of Hormuz makes it an ideal location for U.S. interests, as this strait is a crucial transit route for oil shipments. The

⁵ Robert Litwak, *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy Containment After the Cold War*, (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), p. 96.

⁶ Alex Miles, *US Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine*, (Routledge, 2013), p. 144.

American economy depends heavily on stable energy provisioning, and any perturbation in this region could have considerable repercussions on global oil prices and energy security. Its strategic importance makes the security of the strait one of the most significant elements of U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf region.

After the electoral victory of the reformists over the conservatives in Tehran in May 1997 and the election of Mohammad Khatami as president in Iran, the Clinton Administration finally recognized that it was in its own strategic interest to seek to normalize relations with Tehran. Actually, Khatami, applied an important shift in Iran's foreign policy dominated by a proactive approach based on detente towards the United States. This strategy which intended to ameliorate relations and promote dialogue was the complete opposite to the aggressive position of former Iranian leaders. Driving away from confrontation towards conciliation, in an attempt to avoid a potential "*clash of civilizations*"⁷ a concept popularized by political scientist Samuel Huntington, which suggested that future conflicts would be driven by cultural and religious differences, Khatami put forwards approaches such as "*dialogue between civilizations*".

This concept aimed to foster mutual understanding and collaboration between Iran and the West, especially the United States through dialogues, public outreach, and reform. This approach was a departure from the more isolationist and confrontational stance of his predecessors, who often viewed the West, particularly the U.S., as adversaries. Khatami's detente policy paved the way for future discussions about U.S.-Iran relations, but it eventually strived to reach significant progress. Khatami's policies comprised endeavors to deal with issues such as human rights and regional stability, which were seen as decisive to establish trust and collaboration. By promoting dialogue and understanding, Khatami aimed to counteract the narrative of inevitable conflict between civilizations, instead advocating for collaboration and mutual respect. Despite the fact that the Clinton Administration's removed sanctions on some Iranian products and manifested remorse for some past U.S actions which had caused prejudice to Iran, the efficiency of this strategy was restricted by both internal and external obstacles, leaving a blended heritage in the history of U.S.-Iran relations.

⁷ The Clash of Civilizations is a theory proposed by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington in his 1996 book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. The theory emerged in the context of the post-Cold War era, where Huntington believed that ideological conflicts had diminished, and cultural identities would become the primary source of conflict. He suggested that the resurgence of religious and cultural identities would shape global politics, leading to a new kind of confrontation.

Ultimately, the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and their aftermath thwarted Khatami's initiatives to ameliorate U.S.-Iran relations, as the priority switched towards security and counterterrorism, eclipsing diplomatic overtures. Similarly to the attacks of Pearl Harbor in 1941 where 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 wounded, political scientists and many others have speculated about the reasons and causes behind the shocking attacks of 9/11, especially when nothing predicted such assaults. Approximately sixty years later, 2,977 people were killed during 9/11 attacks when suicide bombers bound to al-Qaeda hijacked four planes, crashing two into the World Trade Center in New York, one into the Pentagon and the fourth in Pennsylvania⁸. These events resulted in a worldwide war against terrorism led by the U.S. government and a widespread paranoia among the Americans. The attacks diffused a lengthy shadow over the population from which the nation has yet to fully arise, because what was improbable and almost unbelievable became suddenly a collective reality. After 9/11, the Americans have faced the truth that despite their strong military power they cannot be sheltered against potential terrorist threat, in spite of the fact that national security has always been a priority throughout the history of the United States.

Nearly after the end of the Second World War, the United States became a global power and its foreign policy started its mutation into a national security policy. A new era began; the age of nuclear power which led the country to spread a large military presence internationally and promising the American people to never allow the happening of another catastrophe such as Pearl Harbor. Today, the United States is considered as a superpower with its world's strongest military power, a colossal economy, and an outstanding role in worldwide organizations such as the United Nation (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover, the nation is a domicile for a huge number of entrepreneurs and has founded lot of worldwide popular products such as Microsoft, Apple and Facebook. However, the majority of the countries of the world view the U.S. strong military occupancy as a threat to the international quietude and peacefulness, a fact that led to the expansion of anti-Americanism sentiment especially in the Middle East.

The escalation of an anti-American ideology specifically among radicalized Islamic groups has proliferated as one of the most important security interests for the United States. The 9/11 attacks illustrated this anti-American sentiment and the menace posed by terrorism to the U.S. domestic and foreign interests. The attacks marked a turning point in history and were

⁸ Alexander Burak, *Russia's Visionaries: Direct Speech*, (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020), p. 176.

decisive both for the United States and how the American government will engage with the world. Lot of researches have examined the role that U.S. foreign policy has played in the proliferation of the hostilities among the Muslim world; in addition to the rise of tensions between some Islamic groups such as Boko Haram, Al Qaeda, Daesh and the West. In fact, after 9/11 attacks, U.S. foreign policy has had significant domestic and international consequences, as President George W. Bush made it clear in his speech immediately after the attacks that “*every nation had to be either against or with terrorists*”. What is most stunning, however, is the way anti-Americanism has expanded. In fact, it is not just bound to Western Europe or the Muslim world. Research made in Yale University states that in Brazil for example, 52% of the population expressed a positive opinion of the United States before 9/11 comparing with 2003 when that number dropped to 34%. A Eurobarometer⁹ research conducted in the European Union countries in October 2003, resorted that the majority of people in Europe considered the United States a threat to world peace, even the most reliable ally the United Kingdom, 55% of them perceive the United States as a danger to the international peace. Worse still, in Greece, Spain, Finland and Sweden, the United States is seen as the biggest menace to peace, and even more dangerous than Iran or North Korea¹⁰. Likewise, disapproval of the fervent American favor to Israel existed long before the election of George W. Bush and his War on Terror. For Muslims, it has been considered as an ultimate truth that the United States unjustly takes side with Israel in its conflict with Palestinians.

Noam Chomsky one of America's most notable critics of the U.S. imperial role in the world, has used his erudition and status to reveal and denounce U.S government's blunders since Vietnam War. The veteran activist has characterized the invasion of Afghanistan as "*one of the most immoral acts in modern history*"¹¹, which reenforced the jihadist movement around al-Qaida and significantly augmented the terrorist threat. Chomsky believes that with Obama's policy and the escalation of the war, it has become even obvious that the occupation is about the credibility of NATO and the worldwide American superiority. Chomsky argues that since government officials first formulated plans for a "grand area" tactic for U.S. international supremacy in the early 1940s, consecutive administrations have been managed by a "*godfather principle, straight out of the mafia: that defiance cannot be tolerated. It's a*

⁹ Eurobarometer surveys monitor the evolution of public opinion in all EU Member States. The aim is to assess EU citizens' awareness of and support for the European Union's activities.

¹⁰ Mustafa Aydın, Ifantis Kostas, *International Security Today: Understanding Change and Debating Strategy*, (SAM, 2006), p. 192.

¹¹<https://vancouver.sun.com/news/community-blogs/chomsky-afghanistan-invasion-one-of-the-most-immoral-acts-in-modern-history>, last accessed date (4/9/22)

major feature of state policy”¹². For Chomsky, the gap between the interests of those who dominate American foreign policy and the public is also attested by the U.S. resolute assistance to Israel. This is not due to the disproportionate power of the Israel and Jewish lobbies in the United States, but it is because of the strategic existence of an entirely devoted nation in the Middle East.

U.S. foreign policy after the attacks of 9/11 significantly relied on American internationalism, mainly in the Middle East. The whole world expressed compassion and support to the United States, including the Muslim nations. However, this empathy was misused and dissipated with the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, shortly after the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. troops invaded Afghanistan in order to strike the Taliban government and dismantle al-Qaeda. Again in 2003, the United States assailed Iraq and defeated President Saddam Hussein who was accused of producing weapons of mass destruction. American precipitation to launch these attacks engendered waves of anti-Americanism and disorder among the Islamic States and thus affecting the whole world.

Despite the overall hostile U.S-Iran relationship, there were moments of limited engagement after attacks of 9/11 when Iran expressed a willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in combating terrorism. This cooperation was seen as a potential opening for dialogue, although it was complicated by the broader context of U.S. policy towards Iran. Nevertheless, the culmination of the everlasting U.S-Iran adversarial stance came back to the point when President George W. Bush labeled Iran as part of an "Axis of Evil". This designation linked Iran with Iraq and North Korea, framing it as a state that posed a threat to U.S. national security due to its pursuit of nuclear weapons and support for terrorism. Unfortunately, this rhetoric reinforced Iran's position as a main adversary in U.S. foreign policy and set the stage for future confrontations.

In conducting this research, the choice of the attacks of 9/11 and the related case study as a reference point to examine the evolution of U.S. foreign policy in Iran and the reasons behind the degradation of the relation of the two countries. What makes Iran a more relevant case for the focus of American foreign policy, is its strategic location, historical ties, security concerns, economic resources, and its broader implications for regional stability.

¹² Seuma smilne, *US foreign policy is straight out of the mafia*, (The Guardian, 7 Nov, 2009), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/07/noam-chomsky-us-foreign-policy>, last accessed (29/9/22)

The history of U.S.-Iranian relations has engendered cycles of misunderstanding, recrimination, and disagreements. Both nations have contributed to the generation of national narratives that have constrained policymakers' decisions, impacted their political orientations, and prevented them to seize opportunities for diplomatic opportunities when they presented themselves. Thereafter the Islamic Revolution differing perspectives on its outcomes and its global impact have emerged. The revolution introduced Islam as a form of modern governance and had far-reaching effects on the Gulf Region, shaping global alliances and redrawing the geopolitical order in many ways. Islamophobia¹³ has emerged as a significant factor in shaping U.S. foreign policy since 9/11, influencing domestic attitudes, political strategies, law enforcement practices, and international relations. The intertwining of fear and policy has created a complex landscape where anti-Muslim sentiment continues to impact U.S.-Iran relations and global dynamics. The intertwining of negative stereotypes, political rhetoric, public fear, and the experiences of Muslim Americans has created a complex environment that hinders diplomatic efforts and perpetuates conflict.

The study advances several arguments about the essence of U.S. Middle East policy and the most determining forces that affected the course of its policy choices. The study argues that the history of U.S. foreign policy towards Iran is characterized by a pattern of unilateralism¹⁴, preemptive strategies¹⁵, and military hegemony¹⁶. From the early interferences to the post Islamic Revolution's challenges and Iran's nuclear ambitions, these elements have shaped a complex and often contentious relationship that continues to evolve. Indeed, the subsequent hostage crisis, where American diplomats were held captive, solidified anti-American sentiment in Iran and prompted a shift in U.S. policy towards unilateralism and military posturing in the region. The U.S. inflicted sanctions and wanted to isolate Iran diplomatically, reflecting a unilateral approach to foreign policy. In addition, 9/11 attacks further shaped U.S. foreign policy, conducting to the endorsement of a preemptive doctrine under the Bush

¹³ Islamophobia refers to the irrational fear, hostility, or hatred directed towards Islam and Muslims. It manifests as a form of religious or cultural bigotry, where individuals harbor negative stereotypes about Muslims, often viewing them as a geopolitical threat or a source of societal issues.

¹⁴ Unilateralism in international relations refers to the practice of a state making decisions or taking actions independently, without the cooperation or agreement of other states or international organizations.

¹⁵ Preemptive strategies in military and foreign policy refer to the anticipatory use of force to counter an imminent threat. Traditionally, preemption is considered legitimate under international law when there is a clear and immediate threat of attack. The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 expanded preemption to include preventive war, arguing that new threats necessitate a broader approach to anticipatory defense.

¹⁶ Military hegemony refers to a state's dominance in military capabilities, allowing it to project power globally and influence international relations significantly. A militarily hegemonic state possesses superior military capabilities and can exert control or influence over other states, often without their consent. It is usually criticized for fostering arms races, perpetuating global inequalities, and encouraging militarization over diplomacy.

administration. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was partly justified by the need to counter Iranian influence in the area, illustrating a desire to use military force unilaterally to attain strategic goals. After the Iraq War, U.S. military presence in the Middle East continued to mirror a strategy of hegemony aimed at containing Iran through various military operations often sidelining multilateral diplomatic efforts. The U.S. approach to Iran's nuclear program has also exemplified unilateralism. The negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 was a rare occasion of multilateral diplomacy, but the ensuing U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 constituted a restitution of unilateral sanctions and pressure strategies. This shift strengthened the image of the U.S. as a hegemonic power eager to act autonomously without international consensus. The Iranian nuclear issue remains a complex and controversial topic, implying a mix of historical grievances, geopolitical tensions, and differing interpretations of Iran's nuclear ambitions. The international community continues to grapple with how to address these challenges while ensuring regional stability and preventing nuclear proliferation.

The central argument this study advances is the U.S. foreign policy in the wake of the war on terrorism particularly in Iran. Ever since the attacks of 9/11, there has been an outpouring of literature about the kind of policies that the United States has to carry on, ranging from reinterpretation of the sense of '*isolationism*' to '*interventionism*', with a possible new genre of imperialism¹⁷. These two extremes have been discussed from theoretical and ideological perspectives. However, besides these distinct concepts some questions emerge about U.S. national interests and their fulfillments; What are the branches of government or forces that are implied in the U.S. foreign policy making? What are the real reasons behind Bush's War on Terror, and how did 9/11 reshape U.S. foreign policy principles toward Iran? What were the consequences of the pursued policies and how have they framed the development of the U.S. policy with Iran? And finally, how did U.S. unilateralism/preemption impact regional stability?

To achieve the research objectives and answer these different questions, the thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is a theoretical framework aimed to develop an understanding of the history of U.S. foreign policy and how the United States became what it is today in global affairs. While the President and the executive branch play a crucial role in

¹⁷ The relationship between theoretical and ideological perspectives is crucial. While theoretical perspectives provide structured ways to analyze and understand phenomena, ideological perspectives offer the foundational beliefs that can shape those analyses. Both are essential for a comprehensive understanding of complex issues.

formulating and conducting foreign policy, the process involves multiple stakeholders. In fact, significant input from Congress, various executive agencies, and public sentiment contribute to the development and execution of foreign policy, particularly in areas involving military action and intelligence. Tackling these questions through a neoclassical realist perspective, this chapter argues that U.S. foreign policy, or the way that the American government interacts with foreign nations and deals with their affairs says a lot about its economic prosperity, security, and international standing, making it a fundamental aspect of governance and international relations. This chapter also discusses the important shifts that the U.S. foreign policy had undertaken during the most important period of its history such as the Second World War, the Cold War, Korean Invasion of 1950 and the Vietnam War. Ever since George Washington, tackling with foreign policy in the United States has been a delicate subject: Be aggressive or be submissive? Interact or not? Lead or follow? America first or America alone? The answers have always been uncertain, especially under the presidency of Harry Truman and this is what makes the Truman Doctrine outstanding. Indeed, the post-World War II doctrine intended to restrain the expansion of communism and keep the Soviet Union under control. With the policy of Truman, America moved away from a mainly isolationist background, took the helm in struggling against communism, increasing democracy, and implementing durable strong relationships with other nations in several sectors.

Chapter two traces the development of the history of Iran and different events that lead to the Islamic Revolution. Despite the fact that it has often been vilified, Iran is characterized by its historical depth, cultural richness, and significant contributions to human development, making it a vital part of world history and one of the oldest continuing civilizations in the world. From the pre-Islamic era to the powerful ancient Persian Empires, to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the hostage crisis, and contemporary nuclear issues, this chapter gives an overview of key events that led to the current complex relations with the U.S. and the status of a volatile nation. Specific attention is given to explain the factors that led to the revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the controversies of its domestic and foreign policies.

Chapter three attempts to explain different interactions between the United States and Iran and how they have influenced the identities of both nations, particularly since the late 20th century. This relationship has been marked by conflict, disagreements, and contradictory narratives that have shaped national identities. Iran has been a strong political ally of the United States especially during the controversial reign of the Shah, facing the Soviets threats. However, this

very formally robust ally turned into a rogue state after the Iranian Islamic revolution. Henceforth Iran switches from a pro-American state preaching Western values to hardline Islamic State ruled by the Ayatollah strong hold vilifying Western values. The same scenario overwhelmed the American and Western politics towards Islamic Nation after 9/11 when Islam itself conjured up into a rogue religion. This very attitude resurrected the crusades spirits initiating old/modern religious conflicts which push us to wonder whether 9/11 stands as a history retelling itself through the '*either you are with us or against us*' basis of the American 'war on terror'.

Understanding U.S. foreign policy making in Iran is crucial for comprehending the country's strategic importance, the nature of U.S. alliances, counterterrorism efforts, conflict resolution strategies, and the broader implications for global relations. In fact, Since the Islamic Revolution, which ultimately brought to power Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his circle of conservative, U.S.-Iran relationship has never been the same. Subsequently, the coup de grace had been given by the Iranian takeover of the American Embassy. This event not only led to the severance of formal diplomatic engagement but also strengthened mutual perceptions of hostility and suspicion between the two countries.

In accordance to this, chapter three analyses the degree to which political identity has added to difficulties in the U.S.-Iran relations and the standards which have affected their mutual foreign policy. For Iran, the U.S. is usually perceived as a symbol of Western imperialism and intrusion in the Middle East. This impression has been consolidated by several incidents such as the Coup of 1952, the vigorous U.S. support for the Shah and sustained sanctions. Consequently, Iranian identity has been formed to counter U.S. influence and promote a sense of nationalism that reinforces supremacy and resilience against perceived foreign danger. On the other hand, in the United States, Iran is often depicted as a rogue nation, especially in connection with its nuclear ambitions and regional actions. This depiction has paved the way to a national identity that accentuates security and the necessity to prevent threats from inimical states. The chapter finalizes by analyzing how these perceptions are shaped by the media and the way this latter often focuses on conflict and tension rather than potential areas of cooperation.

Chapter four aims to scrutinize and analyze the continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy toward Iran since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It also evaluates the consequences of the impact of the JCPOA on the geopolitics of the region and its implications for U.S-Iran relations. In fact, what makes Iran a more relevant case for the focus of U.S. foreign policy, is its strategic

location, historical ties, security concerns, economic resources and its broader implications for regional stability. This last part of the research also traces the different strategic adjustments the U.S. government has adopted toward Tehran and the factors that led to these changes and when. Actually, U.S. foreign policy towards Iran after 9/11 transitioned from a brief phase of eventual collaboration to a period marked by conflicts and sanctions. Seizing this opportunity to reshape Iran's relation with the West, the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, was one of the first to express condolences to the Americans and condemned the attacks. However, Khatami's expectation quickly dissipated when the Bush administration categorized Iran as part of the "*Axis of Evil*", alongside Iraq and North Korea. This glimmer of hope was eclipsed by concerns over terrorism and nuclear proliferation, leading to a complex and often conflictual relationship that persists to grow until today.

These research objectives and questions aim to delve into a complex dynamics of U.S. foreign policy with Iran, encompassing historical, and identity-related aspects to provide a comprehensive historical analysis. An analysis that seeks also to link contemporary terrorism to the endless conflicts of history that will remain part of the human experience as long as the conditions that breed them such as ethnic, class conflicts, religious fanaticism, extreme ideologies and ancient hatreds remain. Likewise, terrorists' attacks of 9/11 have revived this animosity again and this research tries to highlight few of them.

Chapter I - Understanding U.S. Foreign Policy:

I- Introduction

The origin of U.S. foreign policy can be traced back to the period following the American Revolution and has evolved significantly over the centuries. The history of U.S. foreign policy reflects a complex interplay of isolationism, expansionism, and interventionism, shaped by historical events and varying international dynamics. The progression from a fledgling nation to a global hegemony demonstrates the evolving priorities and strategies that have characterized American diplomacy over the centuries.

II- A Historical Overview

Foreign policy traces back its origin to formative years. The beginning of foreign relations and the need for foreign policy to deal with other tribes is as old as the organization of human life in groups and communities. Today foreign policy, which is also called foreign relations or foreign affairs policy, refers to a self-advantage approach followed by a nation to defend and preserve its local matters and to promote self-interest internationally. The strategies are tactfully chosen in order to deal with foreign countries in the best possible way; this is what we call foreign policy analysis. Nowadays, transnationalism¹⁸ and globalization push different countries to cope with non-state actors¹⁹ and all the strategies are deployed to increase the multilateral international cooperation's advantages. Since the local interests are capital for any country, foreign policies' tactics are shaped strategically by the government and can bloom only after peaceful associations with other states.

Making foreign policy is the task of the chief of government such as the president, chancellor, or prime minister and the foreign minister or a country's representatives. Each country has different rates of change and scopes of intent concerning its foreign policy making, affecting in this way national interests. Thus, the foreign policy of numerous countries can have a deep

¹⁸ Transnationalism is an analytic lens used to understand immigrant and minority populations as a meeting of multiple simultaneous histories.

¹⁹ In international relations, non-state actors (NSAs) are individuals and groups that hold influence and which are wholly or partly independent of state governments; for example, among NSAs are corporations, media organizations, business magnates, people's liberation movements, lobby groups, religious groups, aid agencies, and violent non-state actors such as paramilitary forces.

and enduring effect on many nations, on a one hand, and on the course of international relations on the other, such as the Monroe Doctrine did²⁰.

When agreements are made between the United States and other nations, or when U.S. representatives are sent overseas, this shows one of the numerous aspects of foreign policy. The priority of the United States is to preserve and enhance its role as an autocratic and sovereign nation. When Thomas Jefferson stated firmly in the declaration of independence:

*When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.*²¹

One must assume that the American constitution turns around this goal and all other goals are bent to this declaration. Considering this fact, then who makes the U.S foreign policy?

In fact, the basis of the U.S. foreign policy is settled from the American constitution. It is also the one which impedes the United States to make any hazardous treaty; this is why foreign-policy making power is shared between the President and the Senate. In other words, the Constitution accords the Senate the power of “Advice and Consent” on potential alliances and treaties, while the President is in charge of negotiating. As an example, the Senate can give an opinion and agree on the nomination of ambassadors appointed by the President.

While the Constitution conserves foreign policy for the federal government, it gives Senators of different states an indirect but considerable impact in the making of foreign policy. Moreover, the House of Representatives has no separate powers in the realm of foreign policy, though it still has an impact on it. The President’s influence is obvious within the U.S constitution. It is him, neither the House, nor the Senate, who leads foreign policy. This is why the ability to make treaties and the authority to appoint ambassadors is clearly mentioned in Article II²² of the U.S. Constitution, where the power of the President is detailed. The

²⁰ Monroe doctrine made four basic points: (1) the United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of or the wars between European powers; (2) the United States recognized and would not interfere with existing colonies and dependencies in the Western Hemisphere; (3) the Western Hemisphere was closed to future colonization; and (4) any attempt by a European power to oppress or control any nation in the Western Hemisphere would be viewed as a hostile act against the United States.

²¹ Heather Whipps, *Declaration of Independence: Summary, Text & Signers*, June 12, 2012, <https://www.livescience.com/4995-declaration-independence-changed-world.html>

²² Refer to Appendix I, pp. 203-204.

President is thus the chief diplomat of the nation and the State Department is his executive agency in the conduct of American diplomacy.

The Senate's power to offer its "Advice and Consent"²³ on treaties and appointments is limited. However, within these restrictions, "Advice and Consent" decrees an important check on the decisions taken by the President concerning foreign policy. The purpose of this check is to guarantee the common U.S defense and prosperity. The goal of the American constitution whether concerning foreign and domestic policy, is to establish a strong but limited government. The main concern of the Senate's "Advice and Consent" dominance exists to impede the U.S. to make an international agreement that is simply deficient, or that jeopardizes the American status. The Senate's acquaintance of treaties is primordial and thus requires a super-majority vote of two-thirds of the Senate to be valid.

The Senate is not bounded to an up-or-down vote²⁴ concerning a treaty. Involving its 'Advice' power, the senate can approve amendments that modify a text of an arrangement. The impact of the "Advice" permits also to include other regulations that control the manner that the United States interpret and adapt the appellations of a treaty. These regulations are called "understandings and reservations," can lawfully enforce irrevocable conditions on the President if the treaty is finally applied. In the end, it is possible to the Senate to accept what is known as 'Declarations' which state for the record the views of the United States on matters about the treaty. To summarize, the function of the senate is not simply about "Consent" but also about its power of "Advice". Concerning the ambassadors' nomination, the Senate has the power to approve the President's candidates simply based on greater number of voters, or to disapprove its nomination according to special and strong reasons.

The United States is considered to be a sovereign nation thus its foreign policy obligation is to preserve this sovereignty. When the United States spread out diplomatic recognition to a state which is not qualified as sovereign, it erodes the legitimacy of all affirmations to sovereignty, as well as its own. Every country should have minimum standards to deserve the term sovereignty. Among these conditions, they must supply for the security of citizens, have an

²³ In the United States, "advice and consent" is a power of the United States Senate to be consulted on and approve treaties signed and appointments made by the President of the United States to public positions, including Cabinet secretaries, federal judges, United States Attorneys, and ambassadors.

²⁴ An up or down vote refers to a direct vote in the US House of Representatives or the US Senate (or indeed in a state senate) on an amendment bill. It is sometimes referred to as a "clean vote." Members vote yea or nay on the matter rather than voting on a related procedural maneuver.

equal and honest system of justice, and maintain a currency as well as a diplomatic service. There should be no relation with any states that do not apply these minimum standards.

It is interesting to comprehend the reasons behind the division of power that the Founding Fathers made between the President and the Senate without sharing it with the House of Representatives. At that time the Founders thought that a small senate was better and would be able to tackle critical matters of foreign policy with tact and guarantee that proper policies are put in place and properly affected. Alexander Hamilton alludes to this fact declaring that:

*Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, SECRECY, and dispatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous.*²⁵

The supervision of foreign policy is very important for any country this is why the American Constitution conveys and manages foreign matters through a system of checks and balances. Indeed, in the United States the influence of the President is consistent but not boundless; this is due to the very basis of the American constitution which is founded on the principles of liberty and freedom. For the Founding Fathers assigning too much authority to the President concerning foreign policy was contradictory with the basis of the U.S. Constitution and its citizens. (See table, page 32)

Therefore, the organization of the constitution checks power by separating it. In spite of the difficulty that rose for the founding fathers in the realm of foreign policy, they dispatched power tactfully. The founders ingeniously established a diplomatic connection between the President and the Senate finding a delicate manner to allow an efficient guidance of foreign relations and inflict liability on it. With the Constitution, the Founders created a strong but boundless government in order to be more productive internationally and preserve freedom on the national territory. In order to preserve and protect the American liberty, the American government must comply with the U.S. constitution especially concerning foreign matters.

Table 1: American Foreign Policy Priorities: American Public Opinion, 2014.

²⁵ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, *The Federalist, on the New Constitution*, (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1802), p 303.

Percent who believe -----should be ‘the top priority’ in American foreign policy	
Following moral principles	72
Being cautious	66
Being decisive	62
Being practical	58
Being compassionate	54
Being flexible	40
Following religious principles	33
Being idealistic	25
Being forceful	23

Source: Pew Research Center: ‘Foreign Policy Attitudes Now Driven by 9/11 and Iraq’ August 18, 2004, 23.

U.S. foreign policy refers to the manner in which it interacts with other nations and sets standards of corporation for its organizations, corporations and individual citizens. The officially established purposes of the foreign policy of the United States, including all the Bureaus and Offices in the United States Department of State, are "*To build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.*"²⁶

Moreover, the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs mentions some of its jurisdictional goals:

*Export controls, including nonproliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear hardware; measures to foster commercial interaction with foreign nations and to safeguard American business abroad; international commodity agreements; international education; and protection of American citizens abroad and expatriation.*²⁷

To sum up, under the Constitution, the President of the United States establishes and dictates U.S. foreign policy. The Secretary of State, assigned by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, is the President’s chief foreign affairs adviser. The Secretary fulfills the President’s foreign policies through the State Department and the Foreign Service of the United States.

The Department of State is the Senior Executive Department of the U.S. Government which was established in 1789 by the Congress as the successor to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The roles and functions of the Secretary of State concerning foreign affairs have not

²⁶Robert Longley, *Foreign Policy of the U.S. Government*, updated on April 03, 2021, <https://www.thoughtco.com/foreign-policy-of-the-us-government-4118323>, last accessed (1/10/22)

²⁷ Ibid.

seriously altered since then, however they have changed into far more elaborated with the proliferation of international engagement and responsibilities. These obligations and liabilities of the State Department comprehend several duties which are crucial in shaping and implementing the country's foreign policy strategies. They are responsible for advising the President on various international issues, coordinating between different government agencies, and ensuring that the President's foreign policy objectives are met. The National Security Advisor collaborates closely with other key figures in the administration, including the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, to ensure a cohesive approach to foreign relations and national security.²⁸

The Department also manages diplomatic relations with other countries. This includes establishing and maintaining embassies and consulates, engaging in negotiations, and fostering bilateral and multilateral relationships. As the head of the Department, the Secretary of State can serve as the President's chief foreign affairs adviser. This role involves providing insights and recommendations on international issues, likewise managing international crises, coordinating responses to global emergencies, and ensuring the safety of U.S. citizens abroad. This includes providing consular services and support during crises, including the appointment of ambassadors and diplomats.²⁹ Additionally, the Department also engages in public diplomacy, which involves communicating U.S. policies and values to foreign audiences. Besides it is involved in negotiating and ratifying international treaties and agreements ensuring that U.S. commitments are upheld and aligned with national interests.

Moreover, the Secretary of State maintains domestic duties that Congress assigned to the State Department in 1789. Among them there are the custody of the Great Seal of the United States, the arrangement of some presidential proclamations, the publication of treaties and international acts as well as the official record of the foreign relations of the United States, and the custody of certain original treaties and international agreements. The Secretary performs a role of a channel of communication between the Federal Government and the States on the extradition of fugitives from or to other nations.³⁰ In brief, the U.S. Department of State is essential for shaping and executing foreign policy, managing diplomatic relations, and addressing global challenges, all while advising the President on international matters.

²⁸ <https://www.internationalrelationsedu.org/foreign-policy-advisor/>, last accessed (1/10/22).

²⁹ <https://www.state.gov/duties-of-the-secretary-of-state/>, last accessed (1/10/22)

³⁰ David C. Ruffin, *The Duties and Responsibilities of the Secretary of the State*, (The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc, 2004), p. 49.

III- U.S Foreign Policy during the Formative Years:

After the end of the American Revolution, the Americans tussled to determine their foreign policy. This effort was characterized by a need to balance economic interests, navigate complex international relations, assert independence, and manage internal divisions. It was a delicate balance, as the nascent nation sought to maintain necessary commercial ties with European nations without being embroiled in political spirit and wars that characterized Europe at that time. Divergence within foreign policy became cornerstones for the establishment of political movements in the new world as the struggle engendered the Jeffersonians, headed by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson in opposition to the Federalists, led by the Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton.

On the one hand there were the Federalists who favored the improvement of a substantial worldwide trading with the development of a naval power, while on the other hand, the Jeffersonians supported Westward territorial expansion to strengthen the new nation. The two parties also quarrel about their foreign policy concerning European political affair. After the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789, the Federalists were suspicious of the French and urged for tightening commerce with the British, whereas the Jeffersonians favored to sustain France. Consequently, European tensions between Britain, France and Spain in the late 1790s, conducted to the President George Washington's proclamation of American impartiality.

For lot of Americans George Washington was more than just the first president of America. In many other aspects he was also a wise character whose advice was seen as exceptionally crucial. So, when he notified his compatriots to circumvent foreign involvement, those words were taken seriously. Effectively, for more than hundred years, the notice of Washington to conserve friendly rapports with other nations was applied as much as possible. Nevertheless, there were moments when his line had been overstepped. The major involvement that Washington was concerned about was the constant quarrel between Britain and France. Both nations fought for European dominance, and acted ruthlessly towards weaker nations. Americans tried to apply Washington's warnings to maintain cordial relations with foreign nations and remain neutral, but became entangled in the European conflicts afterwards. In fact, in the course of Washington's presidency, Britain and France launched a war with

each other. Soliciting an American assistance, France sent a representative, Citizen Genet³¹, to America. This latter was threatening a neutrality agreement made earlier that year with Washington and tried to bypass the American government by landing in South Carolina rather than the then-capitol at Philadelphia. Decried by Washington, the Americans rejected the assistance expected from France and signed the contentious Jay Treaty³² with England, which decreased animosity of the Revolutionary War and proclaimed amicable trade relations with Great Britain. The treaty and Americans' position of impartiality infuriated France. This added to the tension between the former allies which was worsened by significant episodes such as the Citizen Genet and XYZ Affairs³³, as well as the harassment of American vessels at sea by French privateers in 1796³⁴. All these incidents led to the Quasi War³⁵ when American neutrality, which had been advocated by Washington, was put to the test.

The Quasi War drove the United States into a significant controversy about the essence and scope of impartiality, the restrictions of presidential power, and the military duty in America. French Directory government was overthrown by General Napoleon Bonaparte who established a more hospitable diplomatic atmosphere between the two countries. While not openly working together, the British and the Americans had decreased the actions of the French Navy. With the Convention of 1800, the United States and France definitely put an end to hostilities.

George Washington accomplished much of what he had expected, keeping the United States out of the war and settling the centrality of the Navy in American foreign policy. Moreover, parallelly to the Quasi-War, the later Barbary Wars and War of 1812, appointed the United States as a strong naval power on the world stage³⁶.

³¹ Edmond-Charles Genêt, also known as Citizen Genêt, was the French envoy to the United States appointed by the Girondins during the French Revolution. His actions on arriving in the United States led to a major political and international incident, which was termed the Citizen Genêt affair.

³² The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, commonly known as the Jay Treaty assuaged antagonisms between the United States and Great Britain, established a base upon which America could build a sound national economy, and assured its commercial prosperity.

³³ The XYZ Affair was a diplomatic incident between French and United States diplomats that led to the Quasi War. (For more information see appendix I, p. 105.

³⁴ Phillips , Phillip, Mark. *Conversations in Early American History, 1492-1837*, (A.J. Cornell Publications, 2008), p.147.

³⁵ The Quasi-War (1798-1800), also known as "The Undeclared War with France," the "Pirate Wars," or the "Half War," was an undeclared naval war between the United States and France and was a formative moment for the United States.

³⁶ James M. Morris, Patricia M. Kearns , *Historical Dictionary of the United States Navy*, (Scarecrow Press, 2011), p 337.

III-1 The Monroe Doctrine:

Both U.S. foreign policy and foreign assistance have been the subject of much debate, praise and criticism either domestically or abroad. Even if the status of the United States as a “super power” could have been contested by some, today it is a fact that the country has a major role on the international scene. Ranking from economic, political, educational or military domains, American ascendancy is outstanding in every relevant field in the world. U.S. rank could seem evident for today’s generation, but few know that actually this was not predestinate and the best illustration is the Monroe Doctrine. Enacted nearly two centuries ago, the doctrine politically set apart the United States from the European Great Powers’ domination. This was the predominant political approach for almost a century, until the tardy participation in the First World War.

Throughout the American history, the isolationist inclination predominated its foreign policy. In its formative era, the American foreign policy was a reflection of the U.S. domestic concern in order to reinforce the newly obtained independence. During that time the European empire was split apart by other rivalries, consequently, the impartial tendency, the retirement, the perpetual endeavor to stay free of ancient ties abroad became the main features of the formative years’ American foreign policy. In the beginning of the formation of the United States, political leaders had the conviction to apply a policy of isolationism especially from Europe, this policy was consolidated by Benjamin Franklin declaration: *a virgin state should preserve its virgin character and not go suitoring for alliances, but wait with decent dignity for the application of others.*³⁷ The statement reflects a perspective on foreign policy and emphasized the importance of maintaining independence and integrity in international relations, particularly for a young nation like the United States. few years later in 1796 President George Washington wrote also asserted that: *the Great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations is in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible.*³⁸ In the same direction, Washington articulated his vision for American foreign policy, emphasizing the importance of maintaining commercial relationships while avoiding political entanglements with other nations.

³⁷Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, The Development of Foreign Policy, <https://history.state.gov/departments/history/short-history/development#:~:text=Years%20before%2C%20Benjamin%20Franklin%20had,for%20the%20applicatio n%20of%20others.%E2%80%9D>, last accessed (3/10/22)

³⁸ Ibid.

Historically speaking before the Second World War foreign policy theorists and political researchers deliberately disregarded historical episodes. Therefore, the U.S. foreign policy was seen simply as the sum of its Cold War events. It does not mean that before 1945 the United States did not have any foreign policy, and there are lots of events that prove so, such as: the Monroe Doctrine, the 1898 Spanish-American War, the endless clashes with the British, the Hawaiian Annexation in 1898, the conquest of the Philippines, the Open-Door policy toward China, and much more³⁹. Today lots of studies and researches have started to analyze American foreign policy within a more historical framework.

The Monroe Doctrine was the basis of the American foreign policy edited by President James Monroe⁴⁰. For him, the New World and Old World were completely distinct from one another and therefore, this latter should not interfere in the matters of the United States. Accordingly, the Doctrine was based on four basic tenets, which accordingly discourage the United States to involve itself in the internal affairs or wars of European nations. This principle aimed to assert American neutrality and independence from European conflicts. The doctrine acknowledged the existence of European colonies in the Americas and stated that the U.S. would not interfere with these established colonies. This was crucial for maintaining stability in the region while respecting existing colonial powers. Monroe also declared that the Western Hemisphere was closed to any further colonization by European powers. This was a significant assertion of U.S. influence in the Americas and aimed to prevent European expansion into territories that had recently gained independence or were in the process of doing so. The Monroe Doctrine was a pivotal declaration that sought to protect the sovereignty of the United States and its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere while asserting a clear boundary against European colonial ambitions. It laid the groundwork for future U.S. foreign policy in the region and has had lasting implications throughout American history.⁴¹

The doctrine was designed to meet the main concerns of that period, but it soon became a watchword of the American policy in the Western Hemisphere. The Doctrine was first cited in 1865 when the U.S. government supported the Mexican President Benito Juárez to command an efficient rebellion against the Emperor Maximilian, who was relieved by the

³⁹ Joseph A. Fry, *Lincoln, Seward, and US Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era*, (University Press of Kentucky, 2019), p.98.

⁴⁰ James Monroe was an American statesman and Founding Father from 1758 to 1831 who served as the fifth President of the United States from 1817 to 1825. Monroe was the last president of the Virginia dynasty, and his presidency ushered in what is known as the Era of Good Feelings.

⁴¹ Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America*, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012), p. 35.

French government. In addition, the reasons behind the emergence of Monroe doctrine were due to a rise of concern in Britain and the United States trying to restore the former Spanish colonies, many of which had taken their independence. There was also a U.S. interest about Russian lust in the northwest coast of North America; this is why the British foreign minister George Canning proposed a union between the Americans and the British forbidding future colonization in Latin America. Almost four decades later, in 1904, European creditors of certain Latin American countries threatened to employ the force to collect debts. President Theodore Roosevelt instantly enunciated the prerogative of his nation to employ an "international police power" to restrain such attitudes in his so-called Roosevelt Corollary (or extension) to the Monroe Doctrine.⁴² Roosevelt asserted that if any Latin American country acted illegally, the United States would interfere there.⁴³ Yet, the United States still exercises an important part in times of evident threat to its national security.

The Monroe Doctrine intentions have always given both reasons and clarifications for the majority of U.S. actions since its settlement in 1823 and throughout the most relevant events in the U.S. history. The Doctrine equipped policy makers with the excuse needed for operating on behalf of what they considered as being crucial or economically worthy for the United States.

IV-Containment and U.S. Foreign Policy After World War I:

During the presidency of George Washington, the United States underwent an era of containment and impartiality towards foreign affairs of other countries. Early U.S. politicians claimed that America would refrain as much as possible to have constant treaties that go against American interests and deviating its attention from national matters, with some exceptions concerning free trade, self-defense and humanitarian crisis. When the First World War was declared in July 1914, the United States strongly avoided any involvement and President Woodrow Wilson incited his country not to become implied with the war which was applauded by his citizens. After his re-election, President Wilson was determined to stay far from the war. However, after many years of witnessing offensive attacks done by the Germans, President Wilson was afraid that the ravaging war in Europe could propagate

⁴² Arthur Stanley Link, Stanley Coben, *The Democratic Heritage: a History of the United States*, (Pennsylvania State University 1971), p. 388.

⁴³ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, (New York: Oxford University Press 2008), p. 348.

through the Atlantic Ocean. The President started giving public declarations to justify the involvement in the war in order to re-establish the world order.

In fact, despite its official stance of neutrality, the U.S. economy became increasingly tied to the Allies, particularly Britain and France. American businesses profited from selling munitions and supplies to these nations, which created a vested interest in their success. This economic involvement gradually shifted public opinion towards supporting the Allies. The triggering factor came in 1917 when a series of events, including unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany and the interception of the Zimmermann Telegram (in which Germany proposed a military alliance with Mexico), led Wilson to seek a declaration of war against Germany.

On April 2, 1917, President Wilson asked the Congress for permission to join the conflict and promote democracy, by April 6th, the resolution was accepted and the U.S. officially declared war on Germany, framing its involvement as a fight for democracy and peace.⁴⁴ Over 400,000 U.S. soldiers lost their lives during the war and because of the emotional and financial costs of war, the Americans started to put in doubt their participation to the war.⁴⁵

In 1919 the Senate denied and rejected the Treaty of Versailles⁴⁶, which had officially ended the First World War, in part because the U.S. government refused to join the League of Nations and because President Woodrow Wilson had failed to take senators' objections to the agreement into consideration. Therefore, what came next was a drastic change in the U.S. foreign policy, which advocated an attitude of isolationism that would continue until the Second World War. Warren Harding won the presidential election of 1920 with the commitment of staying away from foreign matters, and by asserting that his country needed stability and a focus on domestic issues. This was largely due to disillusionment with international engagements and the devastating consequences of the war. This period manifested an aversion from the U.S. to foreign intervention abroad. The rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the refusal to join the League of Nations exemplified this shift, as many Americans believed that involvement in European conflicts was not in the nation's best interest. This withdrawal allowed the U.S. to concentrate on domestic issues and economic recovery during the 1920s particularly in the wake of the economic challenges of the Great

⁴⁴ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*, (Oxford University Press, USA, 2007), p. 36.

⁴⁵ Neil A. Hamilton, *Presidents A Biographical Dictionary*, (Facts On File, Incorporated, 2005), p. 236.

⁴⁶ The Treaty of Versailles is a significant peace treaty that was signed on June 28, 1919, marking the formal end of World War I between Germany and the Allied Powers.

Depression. Attempts were also made to restrain immigration flow especially because of a strong anti-European sentiment that emerged after the war. The U.S. sought to stimulate national growth through economic policies that favored domestic industries and infrastructure development. This focus on internal growth laid the groundwork for the later expansionist policies that characterized the U.S. approach during the Cold War, as the nation aimed to project its influence globally while maintaining a strong domestic economy.

Consequently, until the Second World War, the U.S. foreign policy was marked by the proclamation and establishment of isolationist policies which set the stage for the Cold War dynamics that followed.⁴⁷ However, the Treaty of Versailles and the subsequent instability in Europe, including the rise of totalitarian regimes, highlighted the need for a more proactive approach to international relations. In fact, the interwar period saw the emergence of fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, alongside the establishment of a communist regime in Russia. The U.S. government began to recognize the threat posed by these ideologies, particularly communism, which was seen as a direct challenge to democratic values and capitalist economies.

The experiences and lessons learned during and after the First World War laid the groundwork for U.S. foreign policy in the subsequent decades. The isolationist tendencies of the 1920s and 1930s would eventually be challenged by the realities of the Second World War, leading to a more interventionist and engaged U.S. foreign policy in the latter half of the 20th century.⁴⁸

V- U.S. Relations with the World since WWII:

After the Great Depression and the trauma left by The First World War, non-interventionism took a new turn and paved the way to economic hysteria. The United States started to focus mainly on putting back its economy on the right track by ignoring international affairs. It rejected the idea to integrate the League of Nations, and the Congress adopted a set of bills in the 1930s that dictated a policy of impartiality towards foreign issues. Meanwhile, foreign democratic nations were absorbed by re-establishing their economies within their borders, the European and Asian fascist powers moved their armies in order to launch the Second World War. The almost total humiliation of Germany in the wake of the

⁴⁷ Albin Kowalewski, *Asian and Pacific Islander Americans in Congress, 1900-2017*, (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2017), p. 167.

⁴⁸ <https://www.ushistory.org/gov/11a.asp>, last accessed (3/10/22).

First World War, as the Treaty of Versailles placed the whole cost of indemnity of the war on the nation, prepared the ground for a pride-hungry German people to embrace Adolf Hitler's rise to power.

On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, consequently Britain and France declared war on Germany, officially marking the beginning of the Second World War.⁴⁹ A year after, Germany, Italy, and Japan (Axis Powers) concurred on a military agreement in the Tripartite Pact which was principally destined to dissuade the United States from entering the conflict. Addressing his citizens, President Roosevelt confirmed he would do all he could to keep them out of the war, splitting American people into two distinct groups: non-interventionists and interventionists. Nevertheless, on December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The attack aimed as a preventive action in order to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet from impeding with military actions the Empire of Japan was preparing in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. The following day, the United States declared war on Japan sweeping away national support for non-interventionism. Ensuing actions made by the Americans, Germany and Italy declared war on the U.S. on December 11 which was replied by the U.S. government the same day. During the final stages of the Second World War in 1945, the United States launched two atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan to put an end to the Japanese's resistance and thereby the war.

At the end of the Second World War, in 1945, the global imperialist ground had been completely altered and the old balance was completely messed up; the United States arose as the most powerful nation in the world. Indeed, during that period the United States had significantly increased its Gross National Product, and by the end of the war, the country possessed 50% of the manufacturing capacity of the world⁵⁰. Moreover, the United States paved the way to a variety of technological innovations primordial to the prosperity of modern world. The ownership of broad national oil supplies and control of the wide oil deposits in Latin America and the Middle East afforded the U.S. supremacy over the world. *"The imperialist war "destroyed the old balance of power, leaving Germany and Japan crushed and impotent and reducing Great Britain and France to second or even third- rate powers."*⁵¹

⁴⁹ Tim McNeese, *The World at War*, (Lorenz Educational Press, 2000), p.15.

⁵⁰ David Painter, *The Cold War: An International History*, (Routledge, 2002), p.112.

⁵¹ George C. Herring, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, (Temple University Press, 1986), p.162.

The American foreign policy after the Second World War marked the end of isolationist policy that characterized the inter-war period. President Roosevelt presented the idea of creating a new international organization that would be more effective in resolving the world's problems, a kind of extension of the former League of Nations which was called later on the United Nations⁵². The main purpose of the United Nations was to conserve the world peace by applying agreements between different countries, with boycotts, sanctions and even military interventions. Its establishment portrayed a new attitude towards international diplomacy and cooperation. Nevertheless, the perception of pacification of the United Nations became hazardous since the international structure was disturbed by the use and testing of nuclear weapons by the majority of the industrialized countries.

In an essay on reality's corrective qualities of Cliff Staten, concerning U.S foreign policy since the Second World War, he states that:

*America has a split personality when it comes to foreign policy. On one side we are pragmatic. If one method does not work, we try another until we believe the problem is solved. Our pragmatic or realist side teaches us to respond to the facts of the situation and apply a rational decision-making process to problems. Its logic tells us that in order to be successful we must, at a minimum, balance our resources and capabilities with our objectives and liabilities. The other side of our personality grows out of the mythology of American exceptionalism – that shining beacon for the rest of the world to see, the New World. It is this Wilsonian idealism that leads us to believe that we can and should remake the world in our image. We become missionaries. This split personality of realism and idealism has historically manifested itself in our foreign policy.*⁵³

In 1946, George Kennan, a young State Department expert stationed in Moscow, sent his famous "long telegram" about 8,000 words to the Department of State giving detailed aspects on the Soviet Union, and the American attitudes to communism. Kennan aversion to communism was no a secret. In his message, he presented Russia as an "intractable" foe obsessed by the expansion of its philosophy⁵⁴. Kennan's warnings were soon fortified by the growing domination of Moscow throughout the world. At the end of 1940, Kennan's writings influenced the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of containment as he states in his famous article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" where he asserted that the regime of the Soviet was determined to expand and that its impact had to be "contained" urgently. Kennan's

⁵² John Allphin Moore, Jr., Jerry Pubantz, *The New United Nations: International Organization in the Twenty-First Century*, (Upper Saddle River, Taylor & Francis, 2015), p.52.

⁵³ Cliff Staten, US Foreign Policy Since WWII: An Essay on Reality's Corrective Qualities, August 2005, <https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2005/08/us-foreign-policy-since-wwii/>, last accessed (3/10/22)

⁵⁴ Kennan's analysis provided one of the most influential underpinnings for America's Cold War policy of containment.

role in the Cold War expansion and more specifically the Marshall Plan⁵⁵ clearly outlined the American policy on controlling the Soviet Union; it was through the policy of Containment applied afterward by the Truman administration to block any further spread of Russian power.⁵⁶

VI- U.S Foreign Policy during the Cold War (1947–1991)

The period from the late 1940s until 1991 was characterized by interventionism. There were no huge conflicts, but instead, a great number of local wars as well as perpetual menace of a disastrous nuclear war. The United States desperately looked for allies that could subsidize with military and economic foreign support. The majority of states took part with the Western or Eastern camp; nevertheless, after 1960 the Communist movement split into different parts with the clash between China and the Soviet Union⁵⁷.

Indeed, years after the Second World War, the world preoccupations were controlled by the Cold War, during which the United States and its allies opposed the Soviet Union and its abettors. Dividing the world into two distinct groups, the war led the United States to a new strategy that fiercely rejected the gearing towards Communism by avoiding the risk of nuclear war. This transformation implied to the United States to pass a bill which restructured its military and intelligence agencies. In fact, the Democratic Party took a severe anti-Communist direction and sustained wars in Korea and Vietnam. Subsequently, many "hawks"⁵⁸ proponents for war, joined the neoconservative movement⁵⁹ and began to assist the Republicans, mainly Ronald Reagan's foreign policy. Since then the Republicans have been distinguished by American nationalism, strong aversion to Communism, and undeniable support for Israel.

When the National Security Act was passed in 1947, the explosions of Pearl Harbor still echoed in Washington. The act mirrored reforms by unifying the U.S. military power

⁵⁵ The Marshall Plan was an American initiative to aid Western Europe, in which the United States gave over \$12 billion in economic assistance to help rebuild Western European economies after the end of World War II.

⁵⁶ Gary B Nash, Julie Roy Jeffrey, John R. Howe, Allan M. Winkler, Allen F. Davis, Charlene Mires, Peter J. Frederick, Carla Gardina Pestana, *The American People: Creating a Nation and a Society, The Volume I*, (Pearson Education, 2016), p. 825.

⁵⁷ Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, (Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 156.

⁵⁸ In modern American usage "hawk" refers to a person or political leader who favors a strong or aggressive military policy, though not necessarily outright war.

⁵⁹ Neoconservatism is a political movement that began in the United States and the United Kingdom during the 1960s during the Vietnam War among foreign policy hawks who became disenchanted with the increasingly pacifist Democratic Party and with the growing New Left and counterculture of the 1960s, particularly the Vietnam protests.

establishing a National Security Council and a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). President Harry Truman and many of his assistants, firmly believed that the stupefying attack could have been prevented if there had been coordination and sharing among the different chiefs and departments. These reforms had no precedents. For the first time, the Council comprised the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other members (such as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency). They gathered at the White House to converse both long-term problems and urgent national security crises. First and foremost, in 1953, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs directed this staff, but 1961 marked the end of that era as presidents began turning to their national security assistants for advice on foreign policy.

One of the most significant results of the Second World War was the enormous energy deployed for the militarization of the Cold War. In fact, after four years of global conflict and two world wars, the impact led was momentous. Armed forces from both the Soviet Union and United States were constantly present in Europe. Even if at that time the Soviet Red Army possessed the biggest ground force, the United States had a daunting ocean navy and the strongest air force of the world. While the rest of the globe was trying to reborn from the damage of war, the economy would lead the formation for the emergence of a dreadful military power in the United States.

The U.S. superiority was strengthened by the exclusive proprietorship of the atomic bomb and the U.S. shocking performance in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In spite of the overwhelming atomic strike, the effect on the Soviet Union was insignificant. While the United States and Great Britain were sharing atomic secrets and thought that the Soviets were unaware of it, the reality was completely different. In fact, atomic information was divulged by Soviet secret agents who had infiltrated the experimentation program of atomic research creating a global consternation.

The United States started to reconstitute their resistance strategy under the National Security Act, whereby a new Department of Defense and departments of Air Force and Marines were established in Washington to join the Army and the Navy. National Security Council Paper NSC-68 (entitled "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" and usually referred to as NSC-68) was a 68-pages top secret policy paper made by the United States

National Security Council presented to President Harry S. Truman in 1950. It is considered as being one of the most crucial statements of American policy that caused the Cold War.⁶⁰

It was throughout that period that the United States developed its strategy of containment to counter Communism. In fact, the strategy labeled the Soviet Union as an aggressive, anti-Western power that required containment, a peculiarity that characterized the American foreign policy for the next decades. In the course of the Cold War, the American foreign policy obsession was to halt the spread of communism and limit the Soviet influence globally. This implied the United States and its allies' intervention in the Korean War, the defeat of the Iranian government, the Vietnam War, the Six Days War and Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, in addition to the support of anti-Soviet Mujahideen forces in Afghanistan with the Operation Cyclone⁶¹. At that time, there were some instabilities in the United States due to the program of extensive military spending and an opening policy led by President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, which paved the way to the dismantlement of the Soviet Union.⁶²

VI-1 The Truman Doctrine:

The Truman Doctrine was an American foreign policy that marked the end of the traditional isolationist of the United States and set up the main principles that stifled the spread of the Soviet during the Cold War. After the end of the Second World War, many countries, mainly in Europe, underwent economic chaos among them were Greece and Turkey. President Truman entered the scene addressing the congress on the issue concerning the economy of Turkey and Greece. The president pointed out Greece's current government situation, mainly the Greek Communist Party. This, was a turning point of the Soviet expansion which generated a huge interest from the United States that provided support to any nations affected by foreign pressures i.e., communism, hence outlining U.S. foreign policy for the following forty years.

At that time, incapable to sustain the other nations, Britain was struggling to get a new lease of life after World War I and the only alternative for the Greeks and Turks was the United

⁶⁰ See appendix I, p 206.

⁶¹ Operation Cyclone was the code name for the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) program to arm and finance the Jihad warriors, mujahideen, in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, prior to and during the military intervention by the USSR in support of its client, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

⁶² Patrick M. Morgan, Keith L. Nelson, G. A. Arbatov, *Re-viewing the Cold War: Domestic Factors and Foreign Policy in the East-West Confrontation*, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000), p.180.

States. The Truman Doctrine became the basis of the U.S. foreign policy, and conducted the establishment of NATO in 1949, a military alliance in effect until today. Truman's speech on the 12 of March 1947, is usually considered as the trigger of the Cold War since it outlined what became known as the Truman Doctrine; *I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.*⁶³

The Truman Doctrine was a crucial feature of the Cold War, both in how the clash of attitudes and puppets began, and how it evolved over the years. Overall, the containment doctrine was extremely effective during the Cold War in impeding the spread of communism just as it was designed to. With the Truman Doctrine, the United States shifted its sight from a predominantly isolationist saga. It took an overall control in fighting communism, spreading democracy, and constructing strong ties with other nations in many fields; militarily, economically and others that exist until now.

Launching an unprecedented foreign policy initiative that went against habitual isolationist tendencies, Truman was struggling to apply his proposition from a Congress governed by a resistant party and American people exhausted by the war. Enjoying bipartisan support, at last, the Greece-Turkey Aid Bill was passed in a persuasive way and the bill was signed by President Truman in May 1947⁶⁴. It paved the way to the United States to contemporary and different perspectives in Europe and worldwide. In 1948, the European Recovery Plan known as the Marshall Plan⁶⁵ was signed into law. Established to sustain the reconstruction of Western Europe and impede any communist advancement, the plan became a cornerstone of Truman Doctrine. Parallely, in order to preserve security and freedom, the U.S. and 11 other countries from North America and Europe, established in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which today comprehend 30 nations⁶⁶.

In 1954, long after the initiation of the Truman Doctrine, President Dwight Eisenhower worn his government about "domino" effect in case communists overcame in Southeast Asia. The

⁶³ David Welch, *Modern European History 1871-2000, A Documentary Reader*, (Taylor & Francis, 2003), p.129.

⁶⁴ William Z. Slany, *U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations*, (Department of State], Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, 1998), p.135.

⁶⁵ The Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) was an American initiative passed in 1948 for foreign aid to Western Europe.

⁶⁶ William Z. Slany, *U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assets and U.S. Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime Ustasha Treasury: Supplement to Preliminary Study on U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II*, (Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, 1998), p.135.

Cold War policy insinuated that a communist government in a specific country would rapidly lead to communist takeovers in neighboring nations, each falling like a perfectly aligned row of dominos. In this case, the United States would have to be prepared to take part in the Vietnam War. Afterward, President Ronald Reagan, based on the Truman Doctrine and the Reagan Doctrine of the 1980s, required the end of the Soviet development and the spreading of anti-communists worldwide.

The Truman Doctrine and its isolationist policy have impacted ensuing American engagements in situation of crisis like the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War. The doctrine and its relative "domino theory" steered the American foreign policy for the next four decades, modeling U.S. attitude to international crisis. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the Cold War. The foundation of the Truman Doctrine' principles: containing communist ideas, promotion of democratic values and offering assistance to others abroad, are still very important to lot of contemporary politicians. It represents an example for the principle of 'collective security' establishing a structure of allies and fraternal relationship with other states to which the United States gave military aid free of charge.

VI-2 The Korean invasion (1950 – 1953):

The Korean War was a turning point in the course of the U.S. policy during the Cold War. The conflict consolidated the policy of containment and its enforcement. The War started on June 25, 1950, when almost 75,000 soldiers from the North Korean army rushed from across the 38th parallel⁶⁷ to invade South Korea.⁶⁸ Scandalized, President Truman reportedly reacted, "*By God, I'm going to let them (North Korea) have it!*"⁶⁹ Truman did not ask the Congress for a declaration of war, and he was later criticized for this decision. The United Nations, with the United States as the principal force, came to the succor of South Korea in one hand. China, with assistance of the Soviet Union, came to aid of North Korea in another one. The war resulted from the division of Korea just after the Second World War and from the international tensions that emerged from the Cold War which arose promptly after the Second World War. This assault was the first military action of the Cold War.

⁶⁷ The 38th parallel north is a circle of latitude that is 38 degrees north of the Earth's equatorial plane. Japan had ruled the Korean peninsula between 1910 and 1945. When Japan surrendered in August 1945, the 38th parallel was established as the boundary between Soviet and American occupation zones.

⁶⁸ Congressional Quarterly, inc, Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Staff, *China: U.S. Policy Since 1945*, (Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p. 90.

⁶⁹ Malkasian Carter, *The Korean War*, (The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc, 2008), p. 14

At a first sight, the war was launched to help South Korea to get rid of Communism. The war, took a bad turn for the Allies, mainly because the North Korean army was much more prepared, disciplined and particularly well accoutered. Alongside, the South Korean army were terrorized, disoriented and much less qualified in front of their neighboring enemy. Furthermore, it was one of the hottest and driest summers ever recorded which did not let any other alternatives to the American soldiers than to drink water from rice paddies. Unsuitable for consumption, the water caused dramatic sicknesses and losses among U.S. troops and its allies.⁷⁰

The U.S. and UN intervention in the Korean War, with an obvious sustainability to South Korea, was mainly a team effort carried out in group interests. However, it is still worth noting the internationalist or world policeman aspects of their actions, especially the Korean War being part of the American containment policy. American implication in the war was actually made against the forces of international communism. The war, however, drew on with uncertainty the end of Truman's presidency, finally alleging the lives of more than 33,000 Americans and leaving a residual animosity at home.⁷¹ Moreover the United States imposed an almost total economic embargo on North Korea which has impacted US-North Korean relations and led to the isolation of North Korea from international scene.

Over time, the war prolonged, losses escalated and American agents scrambled desperately to impede the proliferation of the war to Russia and China, thereby provoking a third World War. At last, the Korean War ceased in July 1953 with almost 5 million victims among soldiers and civilians, in what was called by the Americans "the Forgotten War"⁷². This was due to the little of consideration comparing with the First and Second World War and the Vietnam War.

Consolidating diplomatic relations between the United States and South Korea, the Korean War had a considerable impact on the evolvement of the U.S. foreign policy, especially concerning the well-known philosophical trilogy: anti-militarism, isolationism, and anti-statism which were forgotten⁷³. The United States embarked in a more engaged policy of concerning national crisis of other nations, especially with the recourse of military action. Even if there had been ambiguities around the rationalization of the war, there was a certitude

⁷⁰ United States. Department of the Army. Office of Military History, *United States Army in the Korean War*, (Office of the Chief of Military History, 1987), p. 340.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Andrew Birtle, *The Korean War Years of Stalemate*, (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), p. 136.

⁷³ William Thomas Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990-91*, (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2012), 118.

that the United States got out victorious at the end of the conflict and nowadays the Korean peninsula remains separated.⁷⁴

VI-3 The Vietnam War: A Turning Point in the U.S. Foreign Policy 1960-1975:

The Vietnam War was a military combat fought between North Vietnam, supported by their Communist allies, and South Vietnam, supported by the United States and other anti-communist allies (Australia, South Korea Thailand, and the Philippines).⁷⁵ The U.S. played an important role in this deadly conflict, combating besides the South Vietnamese Army in order to impede the communist expansion. During the course of the Vietnam War, the majority of the U.S. public opinion opposed the American involvement in the conflict, by 1970, only a third of Americans declared that the U.S. had not been wrong by sending their soldiers to fight in Vietnam⁷⁶.

The origin of the opposition to the American enrolment in Vietnam went back to the Geneva Conference of 1954⁷⁷. In response to this animosity against the War in Vietnam, President Nixon needed to make a strategy to get back American troops from Vietnam. Nixon decided to launch a new policy called "Vietnamization". This strategy stated that it would begin to withdraw 25,000 troops from Vietnam and another 60,000 in December of 1969.⁷⁸ The main principle of this policy was to boost the South Vietnamese to take more responsibility of the war. The United States was frightened to lose the war, so the only manner to accomplish the strategy of 'Vietnamization' was to discuss about a peace agreement in Paris. To prove successful in these agreements, Nixon and his advisors came up with the "Madman Theory"⁷⁹. This tactic was put in to practice with the intention to end the U.S presence in Vietnam. The Vietnam War had far-reaching consequences for the United States to such extent that President Ronald Reagan launched the term "Vietnam Syndrome" to refer to the aversion of the Americans and politicians to support other international interventions after Vietnam. The

⁷⁴Eun-Jeong, Han Min, Wha Han, Jong Hwa Lee, *Korean Diaspora across the World: Homeland in History, Memory, Imagination, Media, and Reality*, (Rowman& Littlefield, 2019), p. 56.

⁷⁵ Michael Lind, "Vietnam, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict", (New York Times, 2014), p. 64.

⁷⁶ William Conrad Gibbons, *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part III: 1965-1966*, (Princeton University Press, 2014), p.142.

⁷⁷ The Geneva Conference of April 26-July 20, 1954 was a conference which took place in Geneva, Switzerland, whose purpose was to attempt to find a way to settle outstanding issues in the Korean peninsula and discuss the possibility of restoring peace in Indochina.


⁷⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's involvement and extrication from the Vietnam War*, (Simon & Schuster, 2003), pp. 81-82.

⁷⁹ The madman theory was a feature of Richard Nixon's foreign policy. He and his administration tried to make the leaders of hostile Communist Bloc nations think Nixon was irrational and volatile. According to the theory, those leaders would then avoid provoking the United States, fearing an unpredictable American response.

war led the Congress to substitute the military draft with an all-volunteer force and the country to shorten the voting age to 18. In addition to that, it inspired the Congress to attack the "imperial" presidency through the War Powers Act⁸⁰, limiting the capacity of the President to send American troops into a battle without the agreement of the congress.

Moreover, the war greatly damaged the U.S. economy. Unwilling to raise taxes to pay for the war, President Johnson unleashed a cycle of inflation. Indeed, the requirements of the conflict effort diminished the production of the United States, conducting to disequilibrium in the industrial sector. Most of the factories that were intended to produce consumers' good were being exploited to supply military products, resulting into debates about the way the U.S. government would tackle its economy. Furthermore, the Vietnam War diminished the morale of the American military and abated for a while the American commitment to internationalism. Moreover, public opinion was persuaded that the Pentagon had exaggerated enemy casualty images, neglecting the possibility that the United States was heading for a disaster. From 1970s to 1980s, the Americans were frightened about any implication somewhere of fear of another Vietnam.⁸¹ (see figure 1, page 51)

Figure n°1: Share of people who think the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs (Survey of 2,059 U.S. adults, 1974 to 2019).



Source: Chicago Council of Global Affair, Chart Axios Visual.

⁸⁰ The War Powers Resolution is a federal law intended to check the president's power to commit the United States to an armed conflict without the consent of the U.S. Congress.

⁸¹ Neil A. Hamilton, *The 1970*, (Info base Publishing, 2009), pp.145-146.

After the Vietnam War, the United States continued to follow an active policy in foreign affairs, approaching matters in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. However, serious problems emerged in the late 1970s with the Soviet Union, and particularly with Iran. President Ford pursued the Nixon administration detente policy⁸² with the Soviet Union. In November 1974, Ford met with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Vladivostok. The meeting resulted in an initial accord on further U.S.-Soviet arms control measures. It also paved the way for the largest summit meeting in European history in Helsinki, Finland, in 1975. Thirty-five European countries were present in addition to the United States and Canada. The conference approved the continuity of the modifications in European borders after the Second World War, a recognition that Moscow had long searched for. The Helsinki Final Act also comprised guarantees to recognize and respect individual rights and human liberties. In fact, Western nations effectively used periodic "Helsinki Review Meetings" to draw attention to numerous abuses of human rights by communist regimes of the Eastern bloc.

On the other side the Soviet Union reacted to justify their domestic policies on human rights by criticizing American assistance of nations like South Africa and Chile, which were recognized to transgress and violate the same human rights issues. Détente came to an end after the Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan, which led to the U.S. boycott in the 1980s Olympics in Moscow. Ronald Reagan's election in 1980, relied on an anti-détente campaign, characterized the cessation of détente and a return to Cold War tension.⁸³

The aftermath of the end of Vietnam War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the post-Cold War world was generally seen as unipolar, with the United States the only remaining superpower. The war led to a serious reassessment of U.S. military interventionism and a growing skepticism towards their government foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, the conflict had a huge impact on domestic affair and political parties, particularly the Democratic Party. The reasons behind this turnaround were the huge turmoil due to inflation, the incompetency of the Democrats in the area of foreign policy and the significant divergence within the party. Besides, the Vietnam War conducted to restrain the president's power to perpetrate military operation without congressional support. Consequently, the Congress

⁸² It was the policy of relaxing tensions between the Soviet Union and the West, as promoted by Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and Leonid Brezhnev, between 1969 and 1974. With the United States showing weakness at the top that forced Nixon out of office, Brezhnev used the opportunity to expand Soviet influence.

⁸³<https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/postwarera/1960s-america/a/the-vietnam-war,last> accessed (9/10/22).

passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 which aimed to limit the president's ability to commit any military interventions without congressional approval.⁸⁴

Generally speaking, the Vietnam War had a deep effect on the American foreign policy which was usually referred to the expression the "ghost of Vietnam", paving the way to several reforms in the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, shaping public opinion, and impacting future presidential discourse and policy-making.

VII- The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy:

The American Constitution does not precise anything concerning foreign policy; however, it is very explicit about who is responsible of U.S. official relationship with foreign nations. Presidents have more power and responsibility in foreign and defense policy than in domestic affairs. They are the commanders in chief of the armed forces; they decide how and when to wage war. In the United States, the President has the title of the chief diplomat; he has the authority to compose treaties to be approved by the Senate. In addition to his position as the head of state, he has the power to speak in the name of the nation to other countries' chiefs. In the United States, foreign policy reflects the president mandate's triumph. As long as the Congress has a regard on U.S. foreign policy making, it is less tempted to impede the president's decisions in foreign policy than in domestic one. The fact that the president has much more freedom in foreign than domestic policy, is called the "*Two Presidencies Thesis*."⁸⁵ This theory arose in the University of California; Berkeley professor Aaron Wildavsky states that there are two different and apparent presidencies, the first is concerned with foreign policy and the second is concerned with domestic one, and that presidents are more successful in foreign than domestic policy.⁸⁶

The U.S. Constitution gives much of the foreign policy decision-making to the presidency, but the Senate has a role in ratifying treaties, and the Supreme Court interprets treaties when cases are presented to it. In the majority of the cases, the U.S. Presidents always point to foreign policy as an illustration of their presidency's success. Congress is less predisposed to dispute presidential decisions concerning foreign policy than in the domestic one. State and

⁸⁴ Stephen W. Stathis, *Landmark Debates in Congress From the Declaration of Independence to the War in Iraq*, (SAGE Publications, 2009), p. 405.


⁸⁵ The "two presidencies" thesis claims modern presidents fare much better with Congress on their foreign policy agenda than on domestic policy.

⁸⁶ Douglas L. Kriner, Eric Schickler, *Investigating the President: Congressional Checks on Presidential Power*, (Princeton University Press, 2016), p.176.

local governments exercise significantly a special brand of foreign policy. Most of the time this is linked to trade and agricultural matters. The immigration, environment policy, and other affairs are also implied. Non-federal governments would mainly work through the U.S. government on these issues and not directly with foreign governments since foreign policy is especially the liability of the American government.

There are also other significant contributors in making U.S. foreign policy who are external to the government. Non-governmental associations and think tanks have a significant function in elaborating and assessing American relationships with foreign nations. These organizations and other associations are usually counting ancient American presidents and certain ancient powerful position officials or scholars who can bring recommendation on international affairs.

Figure 2: Distribution of Power in the U.S. Government.



Source: resourcesforhistoryteachers.pbworks.com

VII-1 Powers of both the President and the Congress:

The United States Constitution separates foreign policy powers between the President and the Congress so that both share in the making of foreign policy decisions. The two branches have continuing opportunities to initiate and change foreign policy, and the interaction between them continues indefinitely throughout the life of a policy. The following

part illustrates twelve principal manners that can shape foreign policy in the United States and indicates that elaborating it is complex process. Indeed, the support of both branches is necessary for a good and competent U.S. foreign policy. The executive and legislative branches each play important roles that are different but often connected. The legislative branch makes the law, and the executive branch, performs (enforces or executes) the law, they are separate and independent of each other. The executive branch is governed by a president who is chosen independently of the legislature. The following list illustrates twelve main ways to shape the U.S. foreign policy, some of which are the president's actions and the others of then congress. (see figure 2, page 53)

It is possible for the President or the executive branch to make foreign policy through several actions since the U.S. Constitution grants the President significant powers in foreign affairs. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and has the authority to negotiate treaties (which require Senate ratification) and appoint ambassadors. Parallely, the Secretary of State, appointed by the President, serves as the chief foreign affairs adviser. This position is pivotal in developing and executing the President's foreign policy. The Secretary of State also oversees the Department of State, which is responsible for diplomatic relations, representing the U.S. abroad, and managing foreign assistance programs. Moreover, the President can react swiftly to international crises, using executive orders or military action without immediate Congressional approval. He can negotiate treaties and executive agreements with other nations, which can be implemented without Senate approval in certain cases. Furthermore, it is possible for the President to propose legislation related to foreign policy, seeking Congressional support for initiatives such as foreign aid or military funding.⁸⁷

For almost all of these situations, there is a possibility for the Congress to support the decision of the President or to reform it. In the circumstance when the president takes independent action, it will be very hard to reform policy in the short term; in the case of a legislative proposal by the executive branch or treaties and international agreements submitted to the Senate or Congress for approval, Congress has a decisive voice. In most cases, Congress supports the President, but it often makes significant rectifications in his initiatives in the process of approving them.⁸⁸ The U.S. Constitution grants Congress specific powers that directly impact foreign policy. Notably, the Congress has the authority to declare war, which is a critical aspect of military engagement and foreign conflict. The congress has also the

⁸⁷Ernest Simone, *Foreign Policy of the United States, Volume I*, (Nova science Publishers, 2000), 3-22.

⁸⁸ Ibid. p 44.

power to ratify treaties and enact laws that shape foreign policy including appropriations and legislative directives. In fact, the Senate must approve treaties negotiated by the President with a two-thirds majority, ensuring legislative oversight of international agreements. Congress has the power to conduct hearings and investigations into foreign policy decisions. While Congress often supports the President's foreign policy initiatives, it can also exert pressure to modify or change those initiatives. This can occur through bipartisan coalitions that advocate for specific foreign policy approaches, reflecting the diverse interests of constituents.⁸⁹

In these circumstances, the executive branch can either support or try to change policies taken by congress as it interprets and carries out legislative decisions and limitations or to take into account advice or suggestions. According to the American Constitution, the power of the President and Congress is shared between them, however not in an absolute approach:

What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer on the President certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and certain other powers of the same general kind on the Senate, and still other such powers on Congress; but which of these organs shall have the decisive and final voice in determining the course of the American nation is left for events to resolve.⁹⁰

History has proved that both the President and the Congress constitute foreign policy; nevertheless, there is an ambiguity about who really takes final decisions and then makes policy. Either the President or the Congress apportions a responsibility in the making of decisions playing different roles. The ambiguity about who is the possessor of foreign policy power is due to several reasons. The complexity of U.S. foreign policy power is a result of the interplay between constitutional authority, global interdependence, evolving threats, diverse stakeholder interests, historical context, and technological advancements. This multifaceted environment requires careful navigation to effectively address the challenges and opportunities that arise in international relations.

Secondly, the complex process of determining foreign policy makes it difficult to decide who should be credited with initiating or altering any particular foreign policy. American foreign policy is subject to constitutional checks and balances. The U.S. constitution highlights part of this dynamic; the President negotiates treaties with other countries, but the Senate has the power of “Advice and Consent,” and is responsible for consenting to treaties. The Founders

⁸⁹ <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/congress-influence-foreign-policy-for-better-or-worse>, last accessed (15/10/22)

⁹⁰ Edward S. Corwin, *The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1957*. (New York University Press, 1957), p.171

crafted a system that serves the interests of the Americans abroad and preserves freedom for its own people at home.⁹¹

At last, there are other factors that impact the making of foreign policy such as the personality of the President, Members of Congress, in addition to the overwhelming political party: the democrats or republicans. Actually, U.S. history has witnessed instability in the ascendancy between the President and the Congress concerning foreign policy and then went through different stages. The first stage happened between 1789 and 1829, under Presidential initiative, the great rule of conduct in regard to foreign countries was limited to commercial transactions, having as little as possible political connection with them. The second period started from 1829 to 1898 and witnessed a great congressional supremacy. Actually, this period highlighted the conflict between the United States and Europe, warning this latter not to interfere in the Western Hemisphere, as Napoleon Bonaparte stated about the ceding of Louisiana to the United States: *This accession of territory strengthens forever the power of the United States and I have just given to England a maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride.*⁹²

The third stage began in 1899 until the immediate post-World War II era which represented one of a growing presidential power. For a century, America had an isolationist foreign policy apart from European conflicts and permanent alliances until the 20th century, focusing on internal issues. It was not until World War I that America lived its first truly global conflict. There had been three other moments of congressional dominance, 1837-1861, 1869-1897, and 1918-1936, with another period beginning toward the end of the Vietnam War in 1973.⁹³ As the world was quickly drawn into World War II, the United States' isolationist policies were replaced by more interventionism abandoning gradually its isolationism. The last stage of government instability occurred during the Reagan and Bush Administrations with an overwhelming Presidential dominance attaining its peak with the end of the Cold War. The foreign policy's goal of the Ronald Reagan administration was victorious during the Cold War and the withdrawal of Communism which was attained in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 with the war against Iraq.⁹⁴

⁹¹David A. Baldwin, *Congressional Initiative in Foreign Policy*. (The Journal of Politics, 1966), pp. 754-773, last accessed (15/10/22)

⁹²Missouri. State Board of Agriculture, *The Missouri Year Book of Agriculture: Annual Report*, Volume 35, 1903), p. 106.

⁹³ Thomas M. Franck, Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 357.

⁹⁴ John Prados, *How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History*, (Potomac Books, 2001), p. 244.

Nevertheless, there are six main procedures where the executive branch can take decisions concerning U.S. foreign policy. In these situations, the Congress can give the green light to the decisions of the President or inverse their consequences. The president of the United States is in charge of responding to foreign events and thus initiates the American policy. The Congress ordinarily supports the President, but on occasion seeks a change in policy. One of the best illustrations of this case happened when the Congress sustained President Ronald Reagan concerning the Falkland Islands conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina. It started on Friday, 2 April 1982, when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in an attempt to create the sovereignty it had claimed over them. The immediate reaction of the U.S. executive branch was to intervene and act as an arbiter to the conflict. Therefore, when the United States' conciliatory proposal was rejected by Argentina, Alexander Haig, the Secretary of the State, declared publicly that the U.S. government will not sell weapons and showed blatantly its sustainment to the British government. Both the House and the Senate were determined to support the United Kingdom.⁹⁵

Another example is when Congress intervened in the president Administration decisions illustrated in the events of 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, during the Lebanese Civil War. Two truck bombs hit buildings hosting American and French military forces members of the Multinational Force in Lebanon, causing a number of victims: 241 Americans and 58 French servicemen died during the attacks. A group called 'Islamic Jihad' assigned responsibility for the attack that was perpetrated to discharge the U.S. and French military forces from Lebanon.⁹⁶ Consequently, President Reagan declared after the attack that his country's presence in Lebanon was primordial and therefore would not quit the Lebanon territory. The majority of the Congress members criticized the president's policy leading them to cut participation fund off completely. Even if the proposition of the amendment was rejected, Regan's policy endured continuous criticism from both Public Opinion and the Congress. Nevertheless, early in 1984, President Reagan declared that American Marines would be withdrawn from the coast of Lebanon, ending the presence of the Multinational Force there.

Another illustration of the president supremacy was interpreted on the day of 2 August 1990, when President George H. W. Bush reacted instantly to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq

⁹⁵ Op.cit.p86.

⁹⁶ Bret, Stephens. *"Iran's Unrequited War / The mullahs are at war with us. Maybe we should return the favor"*, *Wall Street Journal* (October 22 2012).

assigning severe economic sanctions toward this latter.⁹⁷ The United States deployed U.S. Armed Forces in order to secure Saudi Arabia against a possible assault. Supported by the Congress through the United Nations, the Congress allowed the resort to the U.S. Armed Forces in the beginning of 1991 to carry out United Nations Security Council resolutions⁹⁸. President Bill Clinton was confronted to the problem of whether and how his nation could solve and intervene in conflicts internationally, even if it implied the use of military force to protect civilians, state collapse, or dictatorial governments, such as in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, and in Haiti.⁹⁹ The president also applied his foreign policy on long lasting crisis in Northern Ireland, and the Middle East, especially in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ¹⁰⁰ used actions in order to stop Bosnia's crisis supported by the President Bill Clinton. This latter gave the permission to the deployment of over 20,000 American combat troops to Bosnia as part of a NATO led peacekeeping force to help enforce the Dayton peace accords¹⁰¹ in order to resolve the Bosnian clash in 1995. Consequently, a year after that event, President Clinton gave the approval to furnish 8,500 American soldiers to take part in a NATO implication in Bosnia, in order to sustain Stabilization Force (SFOR)¹⁰². These decisions were made by the President without congressional approval, ignoring contradictions between the Congress and the President over the proper course of action for the United States' implication in the Bosnian crisis.¹⁰³

⁹⁷F. Gregory Gause, III, *The International Politics of the Gulf*, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.263-274, last accessed (15/10/22)

⁹⁸ Clyde R. Mark. *Congress and Iraq*, (Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress,1990), pp. 21-53.

⁹⁹ Daniel W. Drezner, *Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions*, (University of Michigan Press, 2003), p. 105.

¹⁰⁰ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on 4 April 1949. The organization constitutes a system of collective defense whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party.

¹⁰¹ known as the Dayton Accords is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States, on 21 November 1995, and formally signed in Paris, on 14 December 1995. These accords put an end to the three-and-a-half-year-long Bosnian War, one of the Yugoslav Wars.

¹⁰² SFOR was a NATO-led multinational peacekeeping operation deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the Bosnian War.

¹⁰³ Steven L. Burg, Paul S. Shoup, *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93*, (Taylor & Francis, 2015), p. 222.

After the 1991 Haitian coup d'état that took place on 29 September 1991¹⁰⁴, a group of peaceful negotiators was sent by the U.S. Government to Haiti to speed up a treaty that would push the military junta without any violence. Fearing a U.S intervention, this latter accepted to quit the Haitian territory. Consequently, nearly 1,000 military forces were sent to Haiti to supervise Haitian military decommissioning, and sustain U.N. nonviolent disarmament operations bringing back order in Haiti. The decision to intervene in the Haitian crisis was taken by President Clinton without waiting the approval of the Congress the fact that caused him lots of criticism from the Congress. As a result, this latter passed S.J. Res. 229¹⁰⁵ in October 1994 which was a significant legislative measure that underscored the U.S. commitment to restoring democracy in Haiti during a critical period in the country's history. Nevertheless, members of Congress expressed frustration and concern over the unilateral nature of Clinton's decision. Critics argued that military interventions should require Congressional authorization, as mandated by the War Powers Resolution. This led to debates about the appropriate balance of power between the President and Congress in foreign policy decisions

The American Constitution gives a detailed definition about the powers of Congress, yet without giving particular borders to the powers of the President. Considering this, one may say that a war declared without Congressional approval has no sense. If the executive branch wants to make a foreign policy schedule, it is necessary to get legislation or approval from the Congress. In addition, this latter can have a very important function in the improvement of the legislation.

The best illustration of a legislation promoted by the Legislative and executive branches is the European Recovery Program (ERP) which is also called the Marshall plan of 1947. George Marshall, the Secretary of State during that period, suggested an American support for the reconstruction of Europe with a promise that this latter signed an agreement for an aid program.¹⁰⁶ The U.S. purposes were to reconstruct war devastated areas, omit all commerce barriers, promote the European industry, and impede the communist expansion after the Second World War. In response the Western European governments answered with a

¹⁰⁴ The event took place when President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, elected 8 months earlier in the Haitian general election, 1990–1991, was deposed by the Haitian army. The coup was led by Army General Raoul Cédras, Army Chief of Staff Phillipe Biamby and Chief of the National Police, Michel François. Aristide was sent into exile, his life only saved by the intervention of US, French and Venezuelan diplomats.

¹⁰⁵ See appendix I, p.207.

¹⁰⁶ Anthony Carew, *Labor under the Marshall Plan: the politics of productivity and the marketing of management science*, (Manchester University Press, 1987), p. 76.

suggestion of a program of American collaboration for the duration of four years. The aid program was approved and passed by the Congress in 1948.¹⁰⁷ After that a Selected Committee on Foreign Aid was settled by the Congress in order to examine the degree of help needed in Europe.¹⁰⁸ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee¹⁰⁹ and House Foreign Affairs Committee¹¹⁰ introduced a legislation that was the result of the collaboration of the two branches together.

The executive branch has a controlling and dominant role in the power of negotiation concerning foreign policy; however congressional opinion has to be taken into consideration by the president since presidential agreement should be validated by the Senate or Congress. In addition, the Congress influences accords by adjusting legislation instructions about international arrangements, and modifications or conditions when an agreement is being approved.

The Yalta Agreement of 1945, the Vietnam Peace Agreement of 1973, the Iranian Hostage Agreement of 1981, and the Afghanistan Settlement Agreement of 1988 are also historical illustrations about events when the president concludes a treaty by his own authority without the agreement of the Senate or the Congress.¹¹¹

The Congress participates in some extent to foreign accords and the Senate should agree to these accords by a two-thirds majority. The majority of executive accords are accredited by the Congress or accepted after their completion and can be named congressional executive agreements. For example, the Congress has allowed the executive branch to set forth arrangements concerning military and economic aids, treaties on nuclear energy and international commerce, and has set forth goals, guidelines, and characteristics in the legislation authorization. Concerning the North American Free Trade Agreement (GATT)¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*, (Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp.26-53.

¹⁰⁸ N. O. Kura. *Congress of the United States: Powers, Structure, and Procedures*, (Nova Publishers, 2001), p.22.

¹⁰⁹ The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is a standing committee of the United States Senate. It is charged with leading foreign-policy legislation and debate in the Senate.

¹¹⁰ The House Foreign Affairs Committee is a standing committee of the United States House of Representatives which has jurisdiction over bills and investigations related to the foreign affairs of the United States.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² (NAFTA) is an agreement signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States, creating a trilateral trade bloc in North America. The agreement came into force on January 1, 1994.

and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs¹¹³, Congress has given the green light to prior negotiations with the condition that it accepts the agreement before its fulfillment.¹¹⁴

The legislative enforcement of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the GATT Uruguay Round agreements¹¹⁵ was submitted under special fast-track procedures¹¹⁶ between 1993 and 1994, under which neither chamber could modify it. Under the Fast Track, the President communicates a trade agreement to Congress. After that, bulk representatives of the House and Senate have to present the performing bill made by the President on the first day on which their House is in session. Then, Senators and Representatives may not amend the bill of the President in the committee, the Senate or House. The committees to which the bill has been applied have 45 days after its presentation to report it; otherwise, it would be discharged, and both Houses must vote within 15 days after the bill is reported or annulled.¹¹⁷

In other words, when the bill is a revenue one, it has to originate from the House, then the Senate is given the House-passed bill. After that, the Finance Committee would be given no more than 15 days to report or absolve it, and another 15 days will be given to the Senate to pass it. Both Houses, the House and Senate may discuss the bill in 20 hours, beyond this period; members of the Senate have no right to impede the bill to pass. Consequently, under “fast-track” procedures, the Congress has 90 days to resolve or introduce the bill; this is why it cannot be amended.¹¹⁸

The Administration persists to form policy as it clarifies and executes the various provisions of law, even when the Congress constitutes foreign policy by legislation. Since 1974, the United States Congress has enacted several Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) acts to guarantee fast ratification of a treaty or written agreement in the United States, conserving, at the same time, a congressional oversight on target goals. TPA outlines the circumstances and methods for using smooth or accelerated methods, also known as the fast-track procedure, to

¹¹³ (GATT) was a multilateral agreement regulating international trade. According to its preamble, its purpose was the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis.

¹¹⁴ Lenore Sek, *Congress and Trade Negotiating Authority*, (In Congress and Foreign Policy, 1991), pp.103-117.

¹¹⁵ The Uruguay Round was the 8th round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), spanning from 1986 to 1994 and embracing 123 countries as "contracting parties".

¹¹⁶ The fast-track authority for brokering trade agreements is the authority of the President of the United States to negotiate international agreements that Congress can approve or deny but cannot amend or filibuster.

¹¹⁷ William Cooper, "Trade Promotion Authority and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy" (PDF). Congressional Research Service, Retrieved 30 July 2014.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

vote in Congress concerning international agreements negotiated during a specific defined period of time.

It is primordial to the Congress to keep a close oversight over the arms trade, especially to prevent the arms sale to some areas such as the Middle East regions¹¹⁹. Nevertheless, in some cases, before acquainting the Congress, the president of the United States engages an abrupt foreign policy procedure. In this case, the Congress can, then, either sustain the President's choice or be accused of discrediting him. The president is usually bound by the Congress, however, occasionally, this latter attempt to filibuster the president's decision in order to confine him from comparable operations. The best illustration took place in 1983, when President Ronald Reagan, responding to the menace posed to American nationals on the Caribbean nation of Grenada in the North of Venezuela by its Marxist regime, ordered the Marines to invade and secure the country. The U.S. Army Rapid Deployment Force, U.S. Marines, U.S. Army Delta Force, and U.S. Navy SEALs and other combined forces constituted the 7,600 troops from the United States, Jamaica, and members of the Regional Security System that defeated Grenadian resistance and in little more than a week, Grenada's government was overthrown.¹²⁰

Reagan's military invasion was mostly sustained by the Congress; thus, avoiding a communist settlement in Grenada. In spite of the different proceedings taken by the House and the Senate to appeal the War Powers Resolution¹²¹, none was passed by the Congress. This latter was reassured that the U.S. troops would be on the ground for no more than two months. Popular public support appreciated the performance of the President and was also a factor in determining the congressional response.

Historically, presidents and Congress have tackled their constitutional powers to control foreign policy. Early American presidents had a serious illustration of their role when shaping U.S foreign policy. The methods described in this part of the work prove that making U.S. foreign policy is a complex process. The legislative and executive branches are two important pillars and even if their functions are different from one another, they usually overlap. Each

¹¹⁹Richard F. Grimmett, *Executive-Legislative Consultations on U.S. Arms Sales*. (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 39.

¹²⁰ Nikolaos Theotokis, *Airborne Landing to Air Assault: A history of air Military Parachuting*, (Pen and Sword Military, 2020), p. 14.

¹²¹ The War Powers Resolution of 1973 is a federal law intended to check the president's power to commit the United States to an armed conflict without the consent of the U.S. Congress.

branch has its footprint in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy and this interaction will last permanently.

Both the president and Congress have an influence over the development and implementation of foreign policy. The President as the chief spokesman of the United States of America, conducts government officials with diplomacy, and has the full authority to take decisions in the interest of the U.S. foreign policy. Meanwhile the Congress is in charge of affecting the course of policy due to enactment of legislation controlling external relations and due to authorization or refusal of funds. To sum up, shaping U.S. foreign policy is complicated, and the maintenance of the two branches is necessary for a robust and adequate one.

VIII- The Genesis of the U.S. Foreign Policy:

As it has already been mentioned, the roots of the American foreign policy go back to the formative years era, when U.S. diplomats were steered by the idea that European powers should not interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. This isolationist policy was guided by the wish to escape any involvement in European dispute and prioritize domestic fulfilment. Across the ages, the U.S. foreign policy has been forged by different events such as national security, economic concern and changes in the international political scene. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the United States started to impose itself as an international super power. Whether it was during the Revolutionary War in 1812 or the Spanish-American War in 1898, these early historical episodes were crucial to American history. These periods also witnessed a shift from isolationism to interventionism, particularly during the First World War and the Second World War where the United States played a major part in the molding of the post-war global order. Moreover, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union marked a turning point in U.S. foreign policy, when the American government strove to prevent the spread and propaganda of communism and advocate democracy and capitalism around the world.

Foreign policy commences on the national level and in the United States the domestic pilots of foreign policy are switching in essential ways. Political parties' disagreements, economic crisis and terrorist threats, all highlight the necessity of grasping the factors affecting U.S. foreign policy. In the same perspective, a survey of the national and international determinants of foreign policy decision making in the United States will be further studied for a better understanding the U.S. foreign policy framing.

VIII-1- National Security and Economic Interests in the making of U.S Foreign Policy:

The shaping of foreign policy is driven by national security apprehensions. National security concerns represent a fundamental role in making foreign policy by leading the defense of a nation's interests overseas. Assessing eventual risks to national safety is primordial in establishing priorities of foreign policy. The diagnosis of eminent threats as terrorism, cyberattacks and nuclear proliferation can conduct to the elaboration of legislations in order to anticipate these danger and counter them for a national security. Thereby, for its own security, the United States initiate the establishment of defensive league and military alliances to dissuade and track down any danger. It may also promote democratic actions and human rights' proponents as an element of its domestic security tactic. Strengthening diplomatic alliances with other nations to consolidate its security and advocate common principles serves as a pillar for an international coordination. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which was established in 1949 to afford communal security against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Likewise, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, an enduring cornerstone to secure and maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region¹²². The U.S has deployed several tactics, measures, and actions to avoid conflict and promote security. Alliances are part of the making of U.S. foreign policy because they represent the structure on which the United States deals with international issues in order to protect its national interests. Alliances typically imply joining security commitments where member nations acquiesce to help each other in times of crisis. National security considerations often determine the foreign policy decisions of allied nations. The necessity to sustain a united front against common menaces can paved the way to agreed diplomatic efforts and military tactics, straightening the alliance's overall effectiveness in tackling with security concerns.

Alongside with national security, economic interests are decisive in the making of foreign policy. The pursuit of economic prosperity, access to markets, and the protection of American economic interests shape heavily diplomatic strategies and international relations. One of the main purposes of U.S. foreign policy is to increase open markets for American goods and services. By fostering free trade agreements, decreasing trade barriers and providing aids to

¹²² www.state.gov/2023-u-s-japan-security-consultative-committee/, last accessed (18/12/22)

other countries, the U.S. aims to develop its economic growth and create jobs at home. This strategy is rooted in the belief that economically prosperous nations are more likely to maintain peace and stability. This assistance is often tied to U.S. interests, ensuring that it aligns with broader foreign policy objectives.

Nevertheless, many scholars state that neoliberal approach¹²³ to worldwide politics put forwards the decisive influence of organized interest groups on foreign policy (e.g., Keohane 1984). In fact, Neoliberals think that the state should have limited implication in the economy and that free-market standards must take precedence. Whether it is through trade agreements, negotiations or economic sanctions, the United States often resort to these strategies to expand its economic interests. The American government tries to set foot in foreign markets, encourage fair trade habits, and particularly preserve U.S. economy and industries from inequitable rivalry. In fact, the United States may inflict economic penalties to pressure other nations that undertake actions vowed to impede U.S. economic interests in order to respect international principles. Furthermore, supporting strategies and aids can also be provided to promote economic growth in developing areas. These strategies may be seen unfavorable by lot of countries since they guarantee a substantial and permanent source of energy, such as petroleum and natural gas which are vital for American economy. The U.S. policymakers are increasingly recognizing the prominence of incorporating economic priorities into foreign policy to ascertain that the U.S. remains competitive in a constant changing global landscape.

VIII-2 Public Opinion and Mass Media in the Making of U.S Foreign Policy:

The problem of public opinion and its impact on foreign policy has been a matter of dispute between scholars of different schools of thought. One of the main issues in democratic theory is the real impact of public opinion in the course of external matters. The ability of the citizens to make cognizant opinions about intricate issues has been uncertain. Moreover, the effect of public opinion on foreign policy has been questioned. Some describe public opinion as volatile and incoherent, not only nescient about international issues, but also as erratic, expressing changeable feelings rather than analyzing current events objectively. Even though, certain theorists such as the realist, apprehend that incompetent population would seriously harm the perspectives of a rational foreign policy, others attest that public opinion, rarely affect foreign political decisions. However, there is the Vietnam War which served as a

¹²³ Neoliberalism is an economic ideology that favors private enterprise and seeks to limit the influence of the state on the economy. It is primarily concerned with markets and the policies and measures that influence the economy.

catalyst for severe reconsiderations of political interventions abroad. An avant-garde study was led by John E. Mueller, an acknowledged American political scientist in the field of international relations. In his research, Muller puts forward the Vietnam and Korean Wars as a case study in order to demonstrate and prove that public opinion counts in time of crisis, especially if the public pay the price of war in 'blood, sweat, tears, and tax dollars'¹²⁴. In spite of the fact that the population is usually sidelined from the political scene, the reality nevertheless questioned the theory that public opinion on foreign affairs matters is nescient and erratic especially among the liberalist theory. One crucial question that many ask nowadays is whether it is still convenient to assert that the public is weakly cognizant with all the contemporary mass media, the public is undeniably well notified on both domestic and foreign issues. Julian Woodward, who had a position in the Office of War Information during the Second Word War declared that:

*Sooner or later the government itself will have to go into the polling field and provide both its administrators and its legislators with adequate and sound information on what the public thinks. Eventually this sort of information will become as necessary as census data and will be provided by an agency with a reputation for unbiased research equal to that now enjoyed by the Census Bureau*¹²⁵.

As far as realism is concerned, the population can agree or disagree to a government's decisions, nevertheless, it cannot manage a it. The government always take the reins, likewise policymakers and leaders with the assistance of the media can also conduct citizens to a certain state of mind. In fact, the government can create paranoid atmosphere in order to persuade citizens to approve their decisions. The media is usually the public's main source of information, especially on foreign policy affairs. It has the capacity to forge public impressions and outlooks towards international issues. For instance, the British and the American governments deployed all the necessary energy and means to prove to the public that Saddam Hussein owned weapons of mass destruction and that he represented a threat to the international security.¹²⁶Even though these accusations were never justified, the New York Times' article stirred the sentiment of terror among the public who stayed static toward the war in Iraq. The media's coverage of foreign actions has long been pointed out by scholars for its conspiracy in some foreign political decisions. The attacks of September 11, for example, have enhanced the relationship between media spectacles of the horror and the shock of the

¹²⁴ The phrase "blood, sweat, and tears" is often used to convey the idea of hard work, sacrifice, and dedication. It is commonly employed to emphasize the effort and commitment put into a particular endeavor.

¹²⁵ Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, (University of Michigan Press, 1996), p.23.

¹²⁶ Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Timothy Dunne, *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 103.

attacks¹²⁷. The U.S. broadcasting channels became a tool to promote Bush's administration on both the national and international level. There have been reports to denounce the use of social media to manipulate public opinion. Agencies associated with the U.S. Department of Defense have been criticized about interposing in public opinion especially in the Middle Eastern by altering images and information and inciting fallacious propaganda on mass media platforms.¹²⁸

Generally speaking, the realist theories claim that politicians either conduct their citizens to approve and follow their decisions or disregard public viewpoints. Therefore, there is little correlation between public opinion and foreign policy. However, Liberal theories, most notably the democratic peace theory, argue that presidents take into consideration citizens viewpoints in specific situations. Undesirable foreign or domestic policy actions can decrease a president's perspective for a re-election, consequently presidents make sure not to get involved in thoughtless actions that alienate the electorates.¹²⁹ Ole R. Holsti another well-known American political scientist carried out notable research that affirm previous standpoints. His publications about the impact of public opinion on the American foreign policy, demonstrate that the First World War displaced the role of the citizens from a theoretical into a practical one. This role was reinforced after the Second World War. For Holsti, the demise of bipartisan foreign policy consensus in the aftermath of the Cold War, paved the way to the increase of partisan divides in the United States, hence challenging the impact of public opinion on foreign policy¹³⁰. After substantial research and information about public attitudes towards foreign issues, Holsti came to the conclusion that, in spite of the fact that American citizens are not fully aware of all details of foreign matters, their judgment was mostly stable rational and had a critical impact on foreign decision-making.

There are several proponents who refer to *the Conditional Theory of Political Responsiveness* and claim that the two contrasting hypotheses that public opinion matters or not do not have a blatant response. The Conditional Theory of Political Responsiveness implies that the responsiveness of political leaders to public opinion is conditioned to certain factors and not

¹²⁷ Douglas Kellner, *Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy: Terrorism, War, and Election Battles*, (Routledge, 2015), p. 28.

¹²⁸ Richard Rogers, Sabine Niederer, *The Politics of Social Media Manipulation*, (Amsterdam University Press, 2020), p.165.

¹²⁹ Chan, S., & Safran, W. Public Opinion as a Constraint against War: Democracies' Responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom. *Foreign Policy Analysis*. 2, 137-156; Shamir, *Introduction*; Knecht, *Paying attention to foreign affairs*; Kegley and Wittkope, *American foreign policy*, 2006.

¹³⁰ Op.cit. pp. 1-21, pp. 23-37.


absolute. Consequently, presidents could command or comply according to certain cases, circumstances or on the president in question. The hypothesis has highlighted certain elements that enhance or reduce a president's responsiveness to public opinion. As an example, when a major part of the population tends to opt for certain cases or subjects (especially in times of crisis), the president or political leader feel undeniable constraints to meet public opinion's expectations. Nevertheless, in case when the population is overwhelmed by doubt and is inattentive, or divided on the issue, political leaders' responsiveness declines drastically.

The theory of political responsiveness puts forward those political leaders, in their attempts to maintain social control while claiming legitimacy for their actions. Moreover, government responsiveness is influenced by domestic determinants but not in a homogenous manner and depending on different cases. The theory also emphasizes that the responsiveness of political actors to public opinion, specific demographic or ethnic groups, electoral cycles, and other factors are determined by several conditions, reflecting the complex dynamics that consolidate the relationship between public preferences and political decisions.¹³¹

IX- Political Movements and Lobbies:

Lobbying in the United States is a complex and influential practice, with several specific interests preserving lobbying firms to impact the government and federal agencies. In 2022, the total number of unique, registered lobbyists who have actively influenced in the United States amounted to 12,644. The power lobbying organizations in the U.S. are considerable, as they equip a means for individuals to affect legislative attention and the course of U.S. foreign policy. **Figure n° 3:** Total number of registered lobbyists in the USA from 2000 to 2022:

¹³¹ Ruth Dassonneville, Fernando Feitosa, Marc Hooghe, Jennifer Oser. *Policy responsiveness to all citizens or only to voters? A longitudinal analysis of policy responsiveness in OECD countries*. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 60, Issue 3, pp. 583-602, August 2021.



Source: Statista Research Department, Nov 3, 2023.

Various lobbies have been noticed as significantly powerful and determinant in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Among these lobbyist groups, there are around 38 ethnic Lobbies that have exceptional influence on foreign decision-making concerning immigration policy and human rights issues. Corporate Interests lobby and Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF)¹³² also play a significant role in influencing U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, the Jewish and the Israel Lobbies, particularly represented by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)¹³³, are widely regarded as the most influential lobbies in the United States. AIPAC is known for its significant ascendancy within Washington, and while it may not always prevail on every matter, it is considered as hugely powerful in framing U.S. foreign policy in a more pro-Israel direction. Wielding significant financial and political power, they have been described as a major influence on U.S. foreign policy, particularly regarding issues related to Israel and the Middle East. A situation that suits the American government since Israel represents a strategic asset which underpins rather than undermines U.S. domination of the Middle East.¹³⁴ Besides lobbies, political movements also play a substantial role in shaping U.S. foreign relations. The Progressive movement, for example, was concerned by fostering social and political reform, curbing political corruption, and limiting the political influence of large corporations. Some Progressives saw U.S. power in a

¹³² CANF is a prominent organization founded in 1981 by Cuban exile Jorge Mas Canosa. It was established in the context of increasing political engagement among Cuban-Americans, especially after the election of President Ronald Reagan.

¹³³ AIPAC is a prominent pro-Israel lobbying group in the U.S., established to advocate for policies that strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship. The organization works to influence legislation and policy decisions that affect Israel's security and diplomatic standing.

¹³⁴ David M. Paul, Rachel Anderson Paul, *Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), p. 261.

foreign arena as an opportunity to enact the Progressive domestic agenda overseas, while others were concerned about the adverse effects of U.S. interventions and colonialism.¹³⁵

The events of September 11, 2001, had a deep impact on the American foreign policy and paved the way to the rise of various political movements that guided the nation's attitude on the international scene. The Neoconservative movement¹³⁶ was on the increase after the terrorist attacks and urged the government for a more vigorous and interventionist foreign policy. Neoconservatives claimed for the advocacy of democracy and the use of military power to reinforce American interests and security. This ideology had a great impact in the decision to launch the War on Terror and invade Iraq in 2003.

X- Conclusion:

Due to the complexity of the American foreign policy, it would be extremely hard to depict the manner in which each branch handles foreign policy. Nevertheless, the way that the U.S. foreign policy has responded to different conflicts mentioned above puts forwards the way individuals within each branch contribute to the making of foreign policy. Likewise, the research paper does not examine the influence of groups outside the executive and legislative branches, but the illustrations show that such groups, including the judiciary, interest groups, the press, and the public at large, can sometimes play an important role. George Washington declared that the U.S. ought to have the most successful foreign policy of any country in the world because it had so many self-styled secretaries of state¹³⁷. From that moment, the arduousness of improving a united and efficient foreign policy has intensified significantly. In theory, the process of elaboration should start with a coherent determination of the national interests, followed by an outline of the policies that would support those interests and the course of action by the numerous departments that would promote those policies, as well as the allowance of the resources required to carry them out. Public opinion is also a crucial element in foreign policy. It was Woodrow Wilson, an indefatigable vindicator of democracy, who was decided to “*democratize*” diplomacy and get rid of “secret deals” arrived at “*behind*

¹³⁵ <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/108646.htm>, last accessed (18/12/22)

¹³⁶ The neoconservative movement emerged in the United States during the 1960s and is characterized by a shift from leftist ideologies to a more conservative stance, particularly in foreign policy. It began as a response to the perceived failures of liberal policies, especially in foreign affairs. Many of its early proponents were disillusioned former liberals or leftists who became critical of the Democratic Party's approach to communism and international relations during the Cold War. They advocated for a more assertive U.S. foreign policy to combat totalitarian regimes and promote democracy abroad. Their key figures played significant roles in shaping U.S. foreign policy, particularly during the George W. Bush administration, which saw the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a key example of neoconservative ideology in action.

¹³⁷ Nancy Hoepli-Phalon, *Great Decisions: Foreign Policy Association*, (Foreign Policy Association, 2006), p. 8.

the backs of the people” in favor of “*open covenants openly arrived at.*”¹³⁸ His opinions had huge effects on the American ways of interaction in foreign affairs long after his era. During the Second World War and throughout the Cold War, when public assistance for U.S. foreign policy was critical and vital, the role of public opinion rose to new eminence.

U.S. foreign policy is a complex and dynamic process that improves over time. Past experiences and historical events can also determine the American foreign policy. Lessons learned from previous conflicts, diplomatic engagements, and policy outcomes inform decision-making processes. It is crucial to put forward that these factors are not exhaustive, and the prioritization of these factors may vary depending on the specific situations and administrations in power.

Chapter two: Iran’s Historical Background

I-Introduction:

Iranian political identity has been built on many aspects, which characterized it as being a complex venture. The bonds that connect Islamic Iran and pre-Islamic history and how they lead to the national identity is of particular pertinence in this chapter. The history and the experiences of the nation have contributed to define its political identity and the manner in which it considers its position and role internationally. Moreover, an investigation has been attempted on the evolvement of the Iran in order to comprehend the links between political interest and identity, in addition to the consequences of certain historical events and various political myth which impacted the norms and the establishment of its political status.

II- Milestone in the History of Iran:

Former Iran referred to the historic region of southwestern Asia that is only approximately adjacent with modern Iran. Ancient Iran, historically known as Persia, was the dominant nation of western Asia for over twelve centuries, with three successive native dynasties. The appellation “Persia” was employed for centuries, particularly in the West, to indicate regions where Persian language and culture prevailed, but it more properly refers to a region of southern Iran formerly known as Persis, alternatively as Pars or Parsa, contemporary Fars. Parsa was applied to an Indo-European nomadic people who migrated

¹³⁸ Ibid. p.19.

into the region about 1000 BC.¹³⁹ Iran has one of the richest historical heritages of any contemporary nation. Its history can be dispatched into three main distinct eras: the pre-Islamic ancient period (BC 559 to 651 AD); the Islamic era (651 AD to 1800 AD); and the modern era, characterized by its confrontation with the Western World around 1800.

II- 1-The Pre-Islamic Era

Iran is home to one of the oldest civilizations in the world, with a rich artistic and cultural heritage. Its history started with the migration of the Iranian tribes from Central Asia onto what is called today as the Iranian plateau in the second millennium BC. However, a more coordinated human settlement evolved long before and Elamite civilization¹⁴⁰ in south western Iran (southern Iraq today) arose in the third millennium. By the 1st millennium BC, two important Iranian states appeared in the form of the Medes and Persians and their impressive introduction onto the world stage began with the accession of Cyrus II in 559 BC¹⁴¹.

The Persian Empire developed in order to become the biggest one of the world history, mainly due to its amiable administration based on religious ideas that would later be related to Zoroastrianism, the pre-Islamic religion of Iran¹⁴². The Persian Empire predominated the Western mind because of its disastrous efforts to conquer the Greek states and its ensuing defeat facing Alexander the Great some 150 years later in the 330s BC. The Seleucid Empire that existed during the Hellenistic rule under Alexander's successors lasted a century until the arrival of a new Iranian dynasty from the east, the Parthians.

The Parthian Empire redefined Iranian history by introducing myths and legends from the east. At its peak, the Parthian Empire stretched from the northern reaches of the Euphrates, in what is now central-eastern Turkey, to present-day Afghanistan and western Pakistan. The empire, located on the Silk Road trade route between the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean Basin and the Han dynasty of China, became a center of trade and commerce. This decentralized kingdom was considered as a significant threat to the rising Roman empire,

¹³⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/ancient-Iran>, last accessed (2/6/2022).

¹⁴⁰ Elam was an ancient civilization centered in the far west and southwest of modern-day Iran, stretching from the lowlands of what is now Khuzestan and Ilam Province as well as a small part of southern Iraq.

¹⁴¹ Cyrus the Great or Cyrus the Elder by the Greeks, was the founder of the Achaemenid Empire, the first Persian empire.

¹⁴² Zoroastrianism, ancient pre-Islamic religion of Iran that survives there in isolated areas and, more prosperously, in India, where the descendants of Zoroastrian Iranian (Persian) immigrants are known as Parsis, or Parsees.

inflicting upon it one of its biggest defeats. After 500 years of glory the Parthians were overthrown in their turn in 224 A.D by the Sasanians.

The Sasanians were certainly the heirs of the Parthians and was the last Iranian empire before the early Muslim conquests of the 7th–8th centuries AD. In time Sasanian kings, particularly Khusrau II, would come to symbolize all that was good about pre-Islamic Iran and its administration. Like their antecedents, the Sasanians were excellent rival to the Roman and then Byzantine Empires, embarking in a series of clashes which ultimately irritated both empires and made them vulnerable potential attacks.

II-2-The Islamic Era

The Islamization of Iran occurred as a result of the Muslim conquest of Persia in 633-654 AD. It was a perilous and long process by which Islam, though initially rejected, was progressively accepted by the people. On the other hand, Iranians have maintained certain pre-Islamic traditions, including their language and culture, and adjusted them with Islamic codes. Finally, these two customs and traditions merged as the "Iranian Islamic" identity.

The Islamization of Iran was to lay the groundwork to profound transformations within the cultural, scientific, and political structure of Iran's society: The flourishing Persian literature, philosophy, medicine and art became essential component of the new Muslim civilization. Joining a legacy of thousands of years of civilization and being at the "crossroads of the legendary cultural highways" have contributed to the emergence of Persia at the forefront of what culminated as the "Islamic Golden Age"¹⁴³. Indeed, the distinct impact of the Iranian world was obvious with the appearance of the Abbasid Caliphate in 749 AD and the transfer of the capital from Damascus to the newly founded city of Baghdad (around 762 AD), not far from the old Sasanian capital. This Iranian turn was represented by the evolvement of the 'new' Persian language, now strengthened with the adoption of the Arabic alphabet to become the lingua franca of the Eastern Islamic world, and in time one of the great literary languages of the world.

The history of Iran witnessed another significant improvement with the arrival of the Turkic peoples from central Asia during the 11th century, but more intensively with the invasion of the Mongols (nomadic warriors from the steppes of inner Asia) in the 13th century. The

¹⁴³ R. N. Frye, William Bayne Fisher, Richard Nelson Frye, Peter Avery, Ilya Gershevitch, John Andrew Boyle, Ehsan Yarshater, Peter Jackson, *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 3*, (Cambridge University Press, 1975), p.398.

Mongol conquest paved the way to the migration of the Turkic tribes onto the plateau significantly altering the political economy of the country from one which was largely inactive to one with an important nomadic component, mainly in the northern parts of the country.

Iran was indeed assimilated into the Caliphate¹⁴⁴ following the Muslim conquest and despite this political integration, the country managed to maintain its own language and culture. This has played a crucial role in preserving Iranian identity and culture despite the overarching influence of the Caliphate. Even the Turkic nomads would in turn come to acknowledge the cultural essence that Iran and the Persian world represented, embracing and changing many of its cultural characteristics involving the Persian language. With the progression of the Safavids¹⁴⁵ in the 16th century this cultural confidence was given political form once again and in order to reinforce their rank the Safavids inflict the minority branch of Islam, Shiism, as the new state religion from 1501.

Followed by about 10 per cent of all Muslims today, Shi'ism is the minority branch of Islam. It emerged due to a dispute over the succession to the Prophet Mohammad but has developed a distinct approach towards scriptural interpretation which lends weight to the scriptural authority of its 'Imams' descended from the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, the first Imam, Ali (from which the term 'Shi'a' party of Ali, derives), and in the absence of the Imams, those religious scholars who are held in high esteem by the community¹⁴⁶.

The adoption of Shiism helped distinguish the Iranian state from its Ottoman rival to the West, but it also served to handicap political bonds with the Persianate world of the east. Nevertheless, more than two centuries the Safavids oversaw a blooming of Iranian civilization, especially under Shah Abbas I (1587–1629), the only king after the Islamic conquest to be known as 'the Great'. In fact, just as Iranians assigned all pre-Islamic accomplishments to the reign of Khusrau I, so too was Shah Abbas assigned with all and any accomplishments during

¹⁴⁴ The Caliphate refers to a religio-political system of governance in Islam, where the territories of the Islamic empire were ruled by a leader known as a Caliph (Arabic: Khalifa, meaning "successor"). The Caliph was considered the political and spiritual successor to the Prophet Muhammad, responsible for upholding Islamic law and leading the Muslim community.

¹⁴⁵ The Safavid dynasty was one of the most significant ruling dynasties reigning from 1501 to 1736. From their base in Ardabil, the Safavids established control over parts of Greater Iran and reasserted the Iranian identity of the region, thus becoming the first native dynasty since the Sasanian Empire to establish a national state officially known as Iran.

¹⁴⁶ Sayyid Husayn Muhammad Ja'fari, *the Origins and Early Development of Shia Islam*, (CreateSpace Independent Pub, 2014), p.32.

the Islamic period. At that moment the first contacts were made between Iran and Europe, as European merchants came to implant commercial, and at a certain degree, political, ties.

II-3- Modern Era:

Unfortunately, during the era of the most dramatic expansion of European and Western power in the 18th century, Iran was undergoing political agitation. The damaging collapse of the Safavid dynasty¹⁴⁷ in 1722 engendered decades of conflict. Moreover, the collapse of the Safavid dynasty coincided with environmental crises, which had a huge effect on Iran's economy, religion and political landscape. This period also witnessed a decline in textile production and a marked change in the textiles produced as Iranian weavers adapted their methods to suit the tastes and economy of the declining regime.

At first with the defeat of the Mughal Empire, Iran arose more powerful during the Afsharid dynasty (1736–47), stretching from Iraq to northern India. Under the leadership of Nader Shah who was one of the most powerful military commanders in Persia, Iran reached its greatest extent since the Sasanian Empire, only to once again collapse after his assassination and the advent of the Qajar dynasty. (see map n°1, page 76). This later was an Iranian royal dynasty of Turkic origin, specifically from the Qajar tribe, ruling from 1789 to 1925. The Qajar family took total command of Iran in 1794, dethroning Lotf 'Ali Khan, the last Shah of the Zand dynasty, and re-asserted Iranian sovereignty over large parts of the Caucasus. The dynasty's rule saw the division of Iran into five large provinces and a large number of smaller ones at the beginning of Fath Ali Shah's reign. Moreover, in the Caucasus, the Qajar dynasty permanently lost many of Iran's total regions to the Russian Empire over the course of the 19th century, including today eastern Georgia, Dagestan, Azerbaijan and Armenia¹⁴⁸. In spite of the loss of its territories, Qajar Iran kept its political autonomy and reconceived the Iranian apprehension of kingship.

In fact, the overthrown of the Mughal Empire paved the way to European invasion in India in the 18th century, at the same time Iran emanated from its agitation facing an unusual confrontation with the Russian and British empires. European authority approached the world

¹⁴⁷ The Safavid Empire, was one of the greatest Iranian empires after the 7th-century Muslim conquest of Persia, ruled from 1501 to 1736 by the Safavid dynasty. It is often considered the beginning of modern Iranian history, as well as one of the gunpowder empires. The Safavid shahs established the Twelver school of Shia Islam as the official religion of the empire, marking one of the most important turning points in Muslim history.

¹⁴⁸ Timothy C. Dowling, *Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond* [2 volumes], (ABC-CLIO, 2014), pp.728-730.

with contemporary and unfamiliar suggestions concerning the organization of the state, laws and constitutionalism. In spite of the novelty of ideas, they gained popularity among group of intellectuals who saw the deliverance of Iran in the endorsement of these unfamiliar and new forms of political and economic organization. Throughout the 19th century Iranian intellectuals attempted to support and develop but were confronted by fierce rejections (a monarchy reluctant to concede power).

The Qajar dynasty underwent lot of changes and modernizations in education and the arts, modifying women's condition. This period also underwent important religious and cultural tendencies, among which the advent and the affluence of the Babi movement. The religious movement emerged in Iran during the mid-19th century. It was followed by a period of significant social and political reforms, marked by the decline of the Qajar dynasty and the arrival of new religious and ideological movements. The Babis sought to replace Qajar rule with a Babi theocracy advancing social progressiveness, interreligious peace and social equality between the sexes. It also promoted revolutionary anti-monarchism, expressing an urge for considerable political reforms which provoked great turmoil from the ulama with several areas witnessing massacres and violent suppression of the movement.¹⁴⁹

Map n°1: Iran under the Qajar dynasty in the 19th century:

¹⁴⁹<https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/iran/iran-under-the-qajars/92481EB94C07D3715DF4E763A87EA859>, last acceded (3/6/2022).



Source: <https://iranpoliticsclub.net/maps/maps10/index.htm>.

The escalating disappointment abided until the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911. The revolution paved the way to the inauguration of a parliament, the National Consultative Assembly (the *Majlis*), and approval of the first constitution. In spite of the fact that the constitutional revolution was successful in abating the autocracy of the Qajar regime, it was defeated to bring a powerful alternative government. Consequently, in the following decades with the settlement of the new parliament, numerous of critical affairs happened. Reza Khan, a military officer in Persia's Cossack Brigade, orchestrated a coup backed by the British against the Qajar Dynasty and named himself shah of Persia in 1921¹⁵⁰. With the support of the British, Reza Khan enacted several reforms in order to modernize the country, including building a national railroad system and implementing a secular education system. Moreover, Reza Khan, who later adopted the last name Pahlavi, was voted in as the new shah after the

¹⁵⁰ <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-u-s-iran-relations>, last acceded (4/6/2022).

Qajar dynasty's final ruler, Ahmad Shah, was deposed in 1925.¹⁵¹ Reza Khan asked other nations to call Persia "Iran" in formal diplomatic correspondence, indicating a switch in the nation's identity and worldwide relations, particularly Britain and the United States.

The previous order, which King Nassereddin Shah Qajar had fought for to maintain, was finally supplanted by new institutions and a new social and political order established on the British model with a constitution and separation of powers. It was a historical moment that changed the political landscape of the country, but the task was tough and its promise stayed uncompleted as a new dynasty (the Pahlavis) tried to force revolution from above.

III- The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty:

The first European contact with the world was through revolutionary perception about the arrangement of the state and laws and constitutionalism. Several areas which were unfamiliar to the Iranians but had attention and regard among certain intellectuals who envisaged the redemption of Iran in the endorsement of these different and new kind of political and economic reforms. All over the nineteenth century, Iranian scholars and militants tried to establish and encourage improvements but encountered oppositions especially from a monarchy thirsty for power. Finally, in 1906 a parliamentary system was set up on the British model during one of the first Iranian revolutions (the Constitutional Revolution) based on a constitution and separation of powers. It was a turning point that changed the political scene of Iran.

Persian coup d'état of 1921 refers to several major events in Persia, which eventually led to the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty as the ruling house of the country in 1925. In fact, by 1921, the dominant Qajar dynasty of Persia had become corrupt and inefficient¹⁵². The oil-rich nation was somewhat military and economically dependent on the nations of Britain and Russia. Former civil wars had threatened the government, and the only regular military force at the time was the Cossack Brigade.¹⁵³ The Qajar shah who had been crowned in 1921 at the age of eleven was judged weak and inept to rule, especially after British, Russian and Ottoman occupations of Persia during the First World War. Britain, which had a crucial position in Persia, was troubled by the Qajar government's incompetency. This

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Captivating History, *The Afsharid and Qajar Dynasty: A Captivating Guide to Two Iranian Dynasties Who Ruled Persia from 1736 to 1925*, (CH Publications, 2019), pp.30-34.

¹⁵³ The Persian Cossack Brigade or Iranian Cossack Brigade was a Cossack-style cavalry unit formed in 1879 in Persia. It was modelled after the Caucasian Cossack regiments of the Imperial Russian Army.

ineptitude was the background of a power struggle between Britain and Soviet Russia over the leadership of Persia.

On 14 January 1921, the British General Edmund Ironside chose to promote Reza Khan, who had been leading the Tabriz battalion, to lead the entire brigade. A month later, under British control, Reza Khan's 3,000-4,000 strong detachment of the Cossack Brigade reached Tehran.¹⁵⁴ In the aftermath of 1921, Reza Khan was put on the throne by constitutional assembly in 1925, and all those who participated to the coup were assassinated or put in jail. General Sepahbod Amir Ahmadi attempted in vain to resist against the establishment of a new monarchy, nevertheless, his efforts were defeated by the British.¹⁵⁵ Taking the surname of Pahlavi and thus founding the Pahlavi dynasty, Reza Khan was consequently proclaimed Shah of Iran.

With the installation of the Pahlavis in 1925, the revolution of 1906 was adopted with some force by the new monarch. Reza Shah's regime managed the evolution of his nation but the changes he conducted were partially accomplished especially with a rise in the state's authority that did not correspond with a rise in civil society and civic rights. Reza Shah represented an authoritarian regime that cherished nationalism, militarism, secularism and anti-communism associated with firm censorship and state propaganda.¹⁵⁶ He set up several socio-economic reforms, reorganizing the army, government administration, and economy.

To his partisans, his ascendancy engendered "law and order, discipline, central authority, and modern infrastructures, schools, transports, radios, cinemas, and telephones". However, his efforts of modernization have been severely disapproved for being hasty and cursory, in addition to the oppression, corruption and taxation that spread dramatically.¹⁵⁷ Lots of these new reforms generated animosity among the clergy and fervent Muslims. For instance, mosques were obliged to use chairs; men were asked to wear western clothing, including a hat with a brim; women were incited to neglect the hijab; men and women were allowed to congregate freely, violating Islamic mixing of the sexes.

¹⁵⁴ Spencer C. Tucker, *Modern Conflict in the Greater Middle East: A Country-by-Country Guide*, (ABC-CLIO, 2017), p. 85.

¹⁵⁵ <https://www.iranchamber.com/history/pahlavi/pahlavi.php>, last acceded (2/6/2022).

¹⁵⁶ "Reza Shah Pahlevi". *The Columbia Encyclopedia* (Sixth ed.). Archived from the original on 1 February 2009.

¹⁵⁷ Noel Scott, *Tourism in the Muslim World*, (Emerald Group Publishing, 28 oct. 2010), p.169.

In addition, fed up with the opportunistic policies of both Britain and the Soviet Union, the Shah restricted links with foreign embassies, which deteriorated relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, in 1932, the Shah aggravated the situation by canceling the agreement under which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company produced and exported Iran's oil. Worse still, in order to limit British and Soviet influence, Reza Shah prompted German commercial plan in Iran and in the beginning of the Second World War, Germany was Iran's biggest commercial associate. His foreign policy strategy of setting the Soviet Union against the United Kingdom, collapsed when those two powers associated in 1941 to fight the Germans. Consequently, the two allies together invaded and occupied Iran in August 1941 accusing the Shah of supporting Nazi Germany. Later on, Reza Shah was obliged by the invading British to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who took the throne of his father as Shah on 16 September 1941.¹⁵⁸

In the beginning, there were expectations that post-occupation Iran could change into a constitutional monarchy. Therefore, the newly appointed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi practiced leading policy and authorized the parliament to hold lot of authority. Elections were maintained for few years, in spite of the fact that they were marred with corruption. Parliament underwent lot of instability reflected in the procession of six different prime ministers over the period ranging from the 1947 to 1951. Pahlavi amplified his political strength by persuading the Iran Constituent Assembly¹⁵⁹ which at last established the Senate of Iran (a legislative upper house allowed for in the 1906 constitution but never brought into effect). The new senators were predominantly favorable of Pahlavi, as he had planned.¹⁶⁰

Later on, in 1951 Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq obtained the necessary agreement from the parliament to nationalize the British-owned oil industry; the operation is more known as the Abadan Crisis¹⁶¹. Regardless of an economic blockade and several British constraints, the nationalization was maintained. Mosaddeq was taken away momentarily in 1952 but immediately took up the reins of parliament because of his blatant popularity,

¹⁵⁸ Richard A. Stewart, *Sunrise at Abadan: The British and Soviet invasion of Iran 1941*, (the University of Michigan, 1988), p. 115.

¹⁵⁹ In 1949 a Constituent Assembly was held in Iran to modify the Persian Constitution of 1906. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi convened the assembly in April; he sought a royal prerogative giving him the right to dismiss the parliament.

¹⁶⁰ Farhang Rajaee, *Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran*, (University of Texas Press, 2010), p. 39.

¹⁶¹ The Abadan Crisis occurred from 1951 to 1954, after Iran nationalized the Iranian assets of the BP controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and expelled Western companies from oil refineries in the city of Abadan.

thereby obliging the Shah into a quick exile in 1953, after a missed military coup by Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri¹⁶².

Even though the plight about the persistent Soviet occupancy of Azerbaijan was an ancient history, Iran faced a more critical crisis over its oil business. The crisis provoked an Anglo-American organized coup to reverse the nationalist prime minister Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq who had recommended the Shah to be in charge of his monarchy and let the prime minister dealing with politics. Similarly with the revolution of 1906, the coup of 1953 gave the Shah a hard time, though the purpose was to throw a spanner in Iranian politics.

The Pahlavis ruled in Iran until the revolution of 1979, when the government was toppled and replaced with that of the Islamic Republic of Iran, headed by Ruhollah Khomeini. The day after the Shah left Iran, the revolutionary leaders declared Colonel Mohammad Taghi Pessian the first Martyr of the Revolution although Pessian was a Secularist.

IV- The Oil Nationalization Crisis:

When Mohammad Reza Shah had access to the throne, Iran was occupied by foreign powers and weakened by wartime escalation and growing factionalism. Ironically, the occupation and the conflict generated the establishment of various economic activities, freedom of speech and political transparency. Lots of political parties were established at that time questioning the power of the young shah, who did not exercise the total authority of his father. In the aftermath of the war, division and discords among nationalists, clerics, and noncommunist left-wing parties, known as the National Front merged under the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddegh, who aspired to decrease the authority of the monarchy and the clergy in Iran, particularly, the National Front¹⁶³. Mosaddegh had tried to scrutinize the reports of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British corporation (now part of BP¹⁶⁴), to check whether the AIOC was honoring the payment of contracting royalties to Iran, and to restrict its supremacy over Iranian oil reserves. After the expected refusal to cooperate of AIOC and exasperated by years of foreign exploitation, the parliament (Majlis) under the leadership of Mosaddegh decided to nationalized Iran's oil industry and to oust foreign

¹⁶² Andrea L. Stanton, *Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa: An Encyclopedia*, (SAGE, 2012), p. 249.

¹⁶³ Bailey Maxim, *Colonial and Postcolonial Middle East*, (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016), p. 53.

¹⁶⁴ BP is a British multinational oil and gas company, one of the largest in the world and headquartered in London.

corporate representatives from his country.¹⁶⁵ Consequently, Britain provoked an international boycott of Iranian oil to undermine Iran's economy. Judging Mosaddegh as being irrepressible and apprehending expanding impact of the communist Tudeh party, UK prime minister Winston Churchill and the Eisenhower administration concluded to reverse the Iranian prime minister. An action largely supported by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).¹⁶⁶

The growth of the communist Tudeh Party in Iran and Mosaddegh social democratic policies fragilized assistance of his few allies among Iran's religious class. In August 1953, after a political dispute between Mosaddegh and the shah the Iranian monarch fled the country. Promptly, despite a solid public support, the Mosaddegh government collapsed after the coup orchestrated by the CIA. Mohammad Reza Shah returned to Iran and appointed a new prime minister¹⁶⁷.

Nationalization under Mosaddegh had collapsed, and after 1954 a Western multinational agreement directed by British Petroleum boosted the development of Iranian oil. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) engaged on an intensive amplification of its oil-production faculties. Petroleum revenues were to sustain Iran's economy for the next quarter of a century which created tensions within Iran and the monarch. Consequently, in 1957, the shah with the help of U.S. and Israeli intelligence services assembled a special section to watch and track domestic dissenters. The secret police of the Shah (the Organization of National Security and Information) known by the acronym Savak evolved into a strong coercion and became a source of terror through which the Pahlavi regime reigned on Iran.

IV-1- Iranian Coup of 1953:

The 1953 coup d'état in Iran, promoted by the United States and the United Kingdom, was a turning point in the Iranian society. It caused the overthrow of the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh from power and the reestablishment of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi as Iran's ruler. The coup was a secret mission sponsored by the American government (under the name of Operation Ajax) and the British (under the name of Operation Boot). Historically, the coup characterized the first recourse of covert action by the United States and has had a perpetual effect on the political history of Iran and

¹⁶⁵ Milani Abbas, *The Shah*, (St. Martin's Publishing Group, 2012), p. 321.

¹⁶⁶ Bailey Maxim, *The Colonial and Postcolonial Middle East*, (Rosen Publishing Group, 2016), p. 44.

¹⁶⁷ Chester J. Pach, *A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower*, (John Wiley & Sons, 2017), p. 358.

its relationship with foreign powers.¹⁶⁸ The event remains a contentious topic in both Iranian and American historical narratives. It is frequently referenced in discussions about U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and is seen as a critical event that shaped modern U.S.-Iranian relations.

In 1901, the fifth Shah of Qajar Iran; Mozzafar al-Din Shah Qajar accorded a 60-year petroleum search concession to William Knox D'Arcy.¹⁶⁹ This latter paid £20,000 (almost £2.1 million nowadays), and promised identical ownership shares, with 16% of any future net profit as calculated by the company.¹⁷⁰ Six years later, D'Arcy drew back from his private holdings in Iran, and displaced them to the British-owned Burmah Oil Company.¹⁷¹ The company expanded gradually until the First World War, when Persia's critical prominence induced the British government to buy a determining share in the company, mainly nationalizing British oil production in Iran.

Consequently, resentment rose dramatically because of the British intervention in the Persian domestic affairs, including in the Persian Constitutional Revolution.¹⁷² General protestation had forced Mozzafar al-Din Shah's hand to establish the Constitution of 1906, which restricted his powers. The parliament Majlis was finally created, however, the new constitution provided the shah several executive authorities to dismantle Parliament. Contrasted by the British and Russians, the Constitutional Revolution was aimed to be overthrown. (see map n°2, page 83).

Map n°2: The Partition of Persia (1907-1915).

¹⁶⁸ Mansoureh Ebrahimi, *the British Role in Iranian Domestic Politics (1951-1953)*, (Springer, 2016), p.54.

¹⁶⁹ William Knox D'Arcy was a British businessman who was one of the principal founders of the oil and petrochemical industry in Persia (Iran).

¹⁷⁰ Gwilym Roberts, David Fowler, *Built by Oil*, (Ithaca Press, 1995), p.11.

¹⁷¹ The Burmah Oil Company was a leading British oil company which was once a constituent of the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index.

¹⁷² The Persian Constitutional Revolution took place between 1905 and 1911. The revolution led to the establishment of a parliament in Persia (Iran) during the Qajar dynasty.



Source: Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origin of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, (Princeton University Press, 2014), p.132.

After the First World War there was a general political discontent with the royalty terms of the British petroleum compromise, under the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC)¹⁷³, through which 16% of profits was acquired. After several years of mishandling under the Qajar reign, a coup d'état brought general Reza Khan as being the prime minister of Iran. By 1925 under his control, Parliament voted to dislodge Ahmad Shah Qajar from the throne, and Reza Khan was crowned Reza Shah Pahlavi, of the Pahlavi Dynasty.¹⁷⁴ This latter embarked on an intensive modernization of his country; however, he was also known to be a rough and severe ruler who did not tolerate resistance. One of his opponents was Mohammad Mosaddegh, who at that time was just a zealous nationalist. After being released from a long imprisonment, Mosaddegh was filled with resentment and absolute aversion for the monarchy which led him to the nationalization of Iran's oil industry. In March 1951 Mosaddegh obtained passage of a bill in the Majles (parliament) to nationalize the large British petroleum concern in Iran.

¹⁷³ APOC was a British company founded in 1909 following the discovery of a large oil field in Masjed Soleiman, Iran. The British government purchased 51% of the company in 1914, gaining a controlling number of shares, effectively nationalizing the company. It was the first company to extract petroleum from Iran.

¹⁷⁴ Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, (Wiley, 2003), p. 204.

Mosaddegh's popularity rose significantly, and by the end of April Mohammad Reza had been obliged to appoint Mosaddegh premier. A two-year term apprehension and crisis came after and in August 1953 the shah attempted and failed to discard Mosaddegh. However, weeks later, Mosaddegh's rivals, with the secret assistance of the United States and the United Kingdom, brought back Mohammad Reza to power.

Reza Shah tried to diminish the authority of the colonial power in Iran, and triumphed at a certain point. Nevertheless, he also required their assistance to modernize the country and used it by adjusting the domination of many colonial powers such as Britain and Germany. The Reza Shah also attempted to cease the APOC concession that the Qajar dynasty had assigned, but Britain firmly opposed it. The accord was readjusted in favor of the British, even though the D'Arcy Concession was lightened. In 1935, Reza Shah renamed the country from Persia to Iran and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was then renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)¹⁷⁵.

In the aftermath of the coup of 1953, a government directed by General Fazlollah Zahedi was assemble which permitted the last Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to direct more strictly as monarch. Consequently, between 200 and 300 people were assassinated because of the opposition and Mosaddegh was condemned for a life imprisonment who was replaced by Zahedi.¹⁷⁶ Lot of Mosaddegh advocate were put in jail, and many were sentenced to death. After the coup, the British and American governments reinforced the monarchy in Iran and the Shah pursued his reign 26 years, until he was dethroned in the Iranian Revolution in 1979. This period witnesses the Western control of Iran's petroleum resources and restrained the Soviet Union from competing for Iranian oil.

The 1953 coup could undoubtedly be considered as an example of two sides construing an event contrastingly. The Mossadegh coup characterizes the expiration of popular approval in Iran for American politics. Even though the diplomatic relationship at the elite level advanced rapidly under Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, the United States lacked awareness that this relationship no longer held the approval of the Shah's people. In spite of the fact that Mossadegh's government did not accordingly fix Iran's political or economic problems,

¹⁷⁵ Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origin of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, (Princeton University Press, 2014), p 130.

¹⁷⁶ Steven R. Ward, *Immortal, Updated Edition: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces*, (Georgetown University Press, 2014), p. 189.

Mossadegh has always been allotted 'mythic status in Iranian political folklore'¹⁷⁷. His policy summarized the foreign-suspicious general memory that had evolved through decades of foreign intervention in Iranian affairs. He also promoted an end to foreign commitment in Iran in general and the unfair relationship between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in particular.

The coup is still a subject of ongoing historical and political debates in Iran, including students and the political class. It has been the symbol a perpetual threat and constant suspicion between the United States and Iran since the deposition of the shah. The event had also helped the shaping of Iran's perception of foreign interference and has influenced the country's domestic and international policies. The role of the United Kingdom in the 1953 coup has also been a subject of deep investigation. A current revealed report of an interview with a British intelligence officer asserted that Britain was the mastermind behind the overthrow of Mossadegh and that Britain had persuaded the U.S. to take part in the coup.¹⁷⁸

Nevertheless, the U.S. role in the coup is not lesser. In fact, based on CIA document delivered to the National Security Archive in response to a Freedom of Information request, "*Available documents do not indicate who authorized CIA to begin planning the operation, but it almost certainly was President Eisenhower himself. Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose has written that the absence of documentation reflected the President's style.*"¹⁷⁹ In August 2013, on the 60th anniversary of the coup, the American administration discharged reports proving its implication in organizing the coup. The reports also reveal the motives of the coup and the tactics deployed to orchestrate it. The UK had sought to stifle information that implicate them and substantial amount of data were confidential¹⁸⁰. The CIA gave a huge amount of money to fulfill the operation which is evaluated from \$100,000 to \$20 million. CIA offers to the government of Zahedi \$5 million after the coup with an extra million to Zahedi himself.¹⁸¹ The discharge of these information, which were considered as being the first U.S. official recognition of its implication, was seen as a goodwill gesture from the Obama's administration.

¹⁷⁷ Alexander T.J. Lennon, Camille Eiss, *Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and US Policy toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea*, (Alexander T.J. Lennon, Camille Eiss, 2004), p. 265.

¹⁷⁸ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/18/uks-lead-role-in-1953-iran-coup-detat-exposed>, last accessed (5/6/2022).

¹⁷⁹ *Eisenhower, vol.2, The President* Stephen E. Ambrose, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 111.

¹⁸⁰ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup>, last accessed (5/6/2022).

¹⁸¹ Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran*, (Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 90.

Motives behind the stage of the coup differ from different scholars. Middle East historian Ervand Abrahamian labeled the coup d'état as "*a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World*". He states that Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted the "'Communist threat was a smokescreen" replying to President Eisenhower's allege that the Tudeh party was about to undertake power. Abrahamian declared that for both the British and the Americans, Iran's oil was the main reason of the coup, even though the pretext which was given was the communist threat. Abrahamian stated, "*If Mosaddegh had succeeded in nationalizing the British oil industry in Iran, that would have set an example and was seen at that time by the Americans as a threat to U.S. oil interests throughout the world, because other countries would do the same.*"¹⁸²

In 2004, Middle East political scientist Mark Gasiorowski edited a book on the coup asserting that "*the climate of intense cold war rivalry between the superpowers, together with Iran's strategic vital location between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf oil fields, led U.S. officials to believe that they had to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent Iran from falling into Soviet hands.*"¹⁸³ In other words, the coup was done because of geopolitical reasons rather than overthrow Mosaddeq's government. Moreover, the Americans thought that solving the oil crisis was crucial for re-establishing stability in Iran, and after a while, it occurred that it would be possible with sacrificing either of Britain or of Mosaddeq. The choice was made quickly, because of the common interest of the two nations. Indeed, Britain was the closest ally of the United States, and both were joining their forces on several international important areas at this time. Maintaining this mutual understanding was more important than saving Mosaddeq's nationalist regime. On 11 May 1951, long before the overthrown of Mosaddeq, Adolf A. Berle advised the U.S. State Department that U.S. "*control of the Middle East was at stake, which, with its Persian Gulf oil, meant 'substantial control of the world'*".¹⁸⁴ These statement sum up the long and perpetual U.S. interest and involvement in the Middle East. The oil nationalization law¹⁸⁵ which led to a direct conflict of interests between Mosaddeq and the British and the American, and the latter internally proposed to retake its control over the oil industry in Iran by following a tactic intended at

¹⁸² https://www.democracynow.org/2003/8/25/50_years_after_the_cias_first#transcript, last acceded (6/6/2022).

¹⁸³ Malcolm Byrne, Mark J. Gasiorowski, *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, (Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 274.

¹⁸⁴ Lloyd C. Gardner, *Three kings: the rise of an American empire in the middle east after world war*, (ReadHowYouWant.com, Limited, 2011), pp.141,142.

¹⁸⁵ The nationalization of the Iranian oil industry resulted from a movement in the Iranian parliament (Majlis) to seize control of Iran's oil industry, which had been run by private companies, largely controlled by foreign interests.

either "pressuring Mosaddeq into a positive agreement or by deposing him from the government.

V- The White Revolution 1963:

Implemented in Iran from 1963 to 1979, the White Revolution was a vigorous modernization plan fulfilled by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The program aspired to upend the affluence and power of traditional landowning classes, reform rural economies, and undertake a fast urbanization and Westernization of Iran.

Developed by the Pahlavi's regime, the resulted reforms ensued in monumental sharing wealth to the working class, explosive economic growth, fast urbanization, and deconstructed Iran's feudalist customs. The reforms were constituted by excessive economic growth rates and fundamental investments in infrastructure. The economic growth and education progress contestably laid the groundwork for the Shah's military arms build-up and the foundation of Iran as a great geopolitical power in the Middle East. It also consisted of several elements, including land reform¹⁸⁶, sale of certain state-owned factories to fund the land reform, foundation of an extended road, rail, and air network, several dams and irrigation plans to rise the industry. The reforms also encouraged the enfranchisement of women, nationalization of forests, formation of literacy and health corps for rural isolated areas, and institution of profit-sharing schemes for industrial workers. Moreover, during this period, the Shah tried to promote a more independent foreign policy and established working relationships with the Soviet Union and eastern European nations.

The land reforms were a foretaste to the shah's White Revolution. Indeed, the revolution projected government-subsidized land accorded to millions of working-class families and the composition of Iran's Literacy corps who augmented the nations literacy rates. The Shah had the ambition that all Iranian citizens would be able to live an educated and wealthy lifestyle. The White Revolution in Iran served as a new effort to institute improvement from above and maintain traditional power methods. The reason behind the Shah's land reform which was the core of the White Revolution, was to collaborate with the peasantry in the countryside, and consolidate ties with the aristocracy in the city.

¹⁸⁶ Land reform is a form of agrarian reform involving the changing of laws, regulations, or customs regarding land ownership.

In late 1978, there had been a general disappointment among Iranian farmers concerning land reforms which were supposed to enrich them. Mismanagement and corruption ensued in the loss of lot of funds planned for agricultural involvement. The move to cities impacted in more demand than could be met by production and even if reforms allowed many peasants to become land-owners it imposed on them high taxes and expenditures. Moreover, the revolution underlined a new mandate that circumvented the old structure of power, effectively undermining intermediaries who stood between the Shah and the people.

The White Revolution perceived most of its disapproval from two distinct groups: the clergy, and the landlords. The landlords denigrated the land reforms because their land was bought by the government and then sold in smaller plots to the citizenry at a lower price. They also disliked the government weakening of their authority when it came to dealing with peasants. Additionally, the Shah's revolution was sustained by the United States, which accentuated animosity among religious groups. In fact, the strong Shia clergy was exasperated by the reforms that erase much of their traditional powers concerning education and family issues, especially in the rural areas. The organization, or more specifically the person who overtly took a stand against the modernization and the Shah, was Ruhollah Khomeini. This latter, an Iranian political and religious leader who served as the first supreme leader of Iran from 1979 until his death in 1989 was the father of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which caused the overthrow of the last Shah and the collapse of the Persian monarchy. Khomeini underwent a serious change of thoughts from the traditional role and practices of Shiite clergy, and openly confronted the new reforms of the Shah. Moreover, he also disapproved clauses of the amendments that would authorize members of Iran's non-Muslim minority to be designated to local offices:

*"I have repeatedly pointed out that the government has evil intentions and opposed to the ordinances of Islam. ... The Ministry of Justice has made clear its opposition to the ordinances of Islam by various measures like the abolition of the requirement that judges be Muslim and male; henceforth, Jews, Christians, and the enemies of Islam and the Muslims are to decide on affairs concerning the honor and person of the Muslims"*¹⁸⁷.

The White Revolution's economic success cannot be refuted, but the benefits were inequitably divided which led to pervasive alteration of social norms and traditional institutions. With the spreading evidence of government corruption and fulfillment of aggressive reforms, the White Revolution was the detonator for Khomeini's revolt who turned

¹⁸⁷ Kamran Scot Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran*, (University of Washington Press, 2011), p.78.

out as an abrupt political adversary of the Shah. As soon as he began to overtly confront the Shah and call for his dethronement, Iranians all over the country started to see Khomeini as a leading figure to follow. Moreover, the deficiency of certain land reform programs, absence of democratic reforms, and strong aversion towards the revolution from the clergy and landed elites conducted to the inevitable Shah's downfall and the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

VI- The Advent of the Islamic Revolution 1978-1979:

The Iranian revolution or Islamic Revolution witnessed several movements of different interests and political groups in order to overthrow the Shah. This led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in April 1979 and the creation of a new constitution that December. Political stagnation besides aggressive social and economic reforms turned out to be an explosive mixture which was fueled by religious reawakening centered on the character of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. By 1978 the Shah was confronted with lot of opponents from nationalists, the left and the religious groups. Gradually losing his credibility, the shah was no longer the leader of his nation.

After the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had allied with the United States and the Western Bloc¹⁸⁸ to command more strictly as an absolute monarch. He firmly counted the American support to stay in the position he held for a more than 26 years. This led to the 1963 White Revolution and the arrest and exile of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1964. It began with tough hostility between Khomeini and the Shah, then demonstrations started in October 1977, evolving into a campaign of civil resistance implying both secular and religious elements. The revolt quickly enhanced in 1978 as a result of the burning of Rex Cinema which was seen as the trigger of the revolution.¹⁸⁹

The revolution that conducted many Iranians from various social categories, originated from Iran's long history. These categories, which comprehended clergy, landowners, intellectuals, and merchants, had already joined together in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–11. Arduous attempts in order to revolutionize the government were perpetually repressed, but, social pressure reemerged again with external help from Russia, the United Kingdom, and, later, the United States. The United Kingdom assisted Reza Shah Pahlavi constitute a

¹⁸⁸ The Western Bloc was a coalition of countries that were officially allied with the United States during the Cold War of 1947–1991. It was spearheaded by the member states of NATO, but also included countries that advocated anti-communism and anti-socialism.

¹⁸⁹ Roy P. Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran*, (Oneworld, 2000), p. 375.

monarchy in 1921. Together with Russia, the U.K. constrained Reza Shah into exile in 1941, then he was replaced by his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Later on, a coup was organized by the United States and United Kingdom against Mohammad Mosaddegh.

Years later, in 1949 a Constituent Assembly was made in Iran to reform the Persian Constitution of 1906. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi gathered the assembly in April of the same year. He sought a royal prerogative according him the power to dissolve the parliament and launched the aggressive modernization of Iran through the White Revolution that turned upside down Iranian society. The plan was economically successful, however the advantages were not assigned equitably, though the metamorphosis on social norms and institutions were obvious. Hostility towards the shah's policies was aggravated during the 70s, when world monetary fluctuations in Western oil consumption dramatically impacted the country's economy, still fiercely conducted toward high-cost enterprise. Ten years of massive economic growth, huge government spending, and a rise in oil prices caused to high scale of inflation and the stagnation of Iranians spending power.

Captivated by Khomeini's call and for the first time since decades, Iranian intellectuals renounced to their objectives of decreasing the power of the Shiite ulama (religious scholars) and consider that, with their assistance, the shah could be reversed. With this in mind, representatives of the National Front, the Tudeh Party¹⁹⁰, and their numerous proponents decided to unite with the ulama in extensive resistance to the shah's regime. Ayatollah Khomeini persisted to deliver his sermon in exile about the viciousness of the Pahlavi regime, accusing the shah of being atheist and completely submissive to foreign powers. The shah's dependence on the United States, his familiarity with Israel aggravated hostilities with the overwhelmingly Muslim Arab states and his populations.

With a promptly developing economy and an apace modernizing country, everything was going well in appearance, but in less than a generation, Iran had metamorphosed from a conventional, conservative, and agrarian to one that was industrial, progressive, and urban. The abrupt way under which agriculture and industry were altered, along with the government incompetence in fulfilling the pledges promised were all conveyed in 1978 manifestations. Amidst massive tensions, the nascent Iranian awakening started to threaten the concept of Westernization as a privilege that was the core of the Shah's secular reign. Thus, new

¹⁹⁰ The Tudeh Party of Iran is an Iranian communist party. Formed in 1941, with Soleiman Mirza Eskandari as its head, it had considerable influence in its early years and played an important role during Mohammad Mosaddegh's campaign to nationalize the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and his term as prime minister.

ideology began to flourish claiming that Western culture was a gangrene that should urgently be stopped and that Islam is the right path to the Third World to get rid of oppressive colonialism, neo-colonialism, and capitalism.

On 7 January 1978, an article entitled "*Iran and Red and Black Colonization*" was anonymously published by a government agent in the national daily *Ettela'at* newspaper. The article accused Khomeini of being a "British agent" and a "mad Indian poet" machinating with neo-colonialists and communists on the detriment of Iran.¹⁹¹ Furious upon what they believed to be defamatory towards Khomeini, religious seminary students in the city of Qom filled the streets complaining about the regime's excesses. They were imitated by thousands younger Iranian mainly jobless newly settled from the countryside. The shah, diminished by cancer and stupefied by the unexpected effluence of animosity against him, hesitated between assent and authoritarianism, believing that the revolt was the product of foreign conspiracy against him. More than 70 were killed and over 500 were injured by government's patrol in the protestation, kindling hatred against the Shah and stirring violence in a Shite nation where martyrdom is a way to express religious faith.¹⁹² In fact, Khomeini cultivated the ideology of Islamic government (*Velayat-e faqih*), that every Muslim required guardianship of Islamic jurist or jurists. This ideology is a system of governance that has become the pillar of Iran's way of operating since the country's 1979 Islamic Revolution. It is rooted in Shia Islam, legalizing the authority of the clergy over the state which is essential in comprehending, not only how the Iranian system works, but also how Tehran can influence religious and political Shia networks above its boundaries¹⁹³.

Causalities were succeeded by manifestation to celebrate the traditional Day of Arbacen¹⁹⁴ in Shiite tradition, and additional fatalities happened. Consequently, and in spite of government efforts to appease the situation, a cycle of tumult started in which each death inflamed more protest among the secular left and religious right. The vehemence and chaos remained in a

¹⁹¹ Abbas Milani, *The Shah*, (St. Martin's Publishing Group, 2012), p. 65.

¹⁹² Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, *Behind the War on Terror: Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for Iraq*, (CLAIRVIEW BOOKS, 2003), p. 44.

¹⁹³ Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, (Transaction Publishers, 1993), pp.419-443.

¹⁹⁴ The Arabic word 'Arbaeen' (*pronounced Arr-ba-een*) translates to forty (ie fortieth day). The Day of Arbacen marks forty days after the Day of Ashura, the day Hussain ibn Ali was killed in the Battle of Karbala. As such, millions of people around the world mark this day by remembering the story of Hussain, his family and his companions.

constant amplification. On September 8, 1978, the Shah' government decreed martial law¹⁹⁵, thus the armed forces shot protestors in Tehran, killing hundreds. A month later, government and oil workers went on strike, conducting the oil commerce to an impasse. Manifestations pursued their progression, on December 10, about hundreds of thousands of demonstrators invaded the streets in Tehran alone¹⁹⁶.

While he was exiled, Khomeini organized this upheaval, first from Iraq and after 1978 from France, claiming the resignation of the shah. During an official vacation abroad, in the beginning of 1979 of the shah and his family. The Regency Council¹⁹⁷ constituted to lead Iran during the absence of the shah found to be impotent, and Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, nominated by the shah in a hurry before his departure, was unable of achieving agreement with the members of National Front¹⁹⁸ and Khomeini. On February 1, more than one million Iranian in Tehran, responding to the request of Khomeini, manifested in the streets. Ten days later, Iranian armed troops proclaimed their impartiality, successfully deposing shah's government and pushing Bakhtiar to flee to France, where he was later killed by a member of the Islamic Republic in 1991 in Paris¹⁹⁹.

Khomeini was now not only the incontestable bellwether of the rebellion, he had also become what some called a "semi-divine" figure.²⁰⁰ On April 1, in the aftermath of the vast blatant approval in a national referendum, Iran was officially proclaimed an Islamic republic, sweeping along any form of opposition to the new regime. Consequently, the country witnessed a brisk restoration of conservative social principles. The Family Protection Act amended in 1975, which afforded more security and rights to women in marriage, was annulled, and a group of Khomeini advocates made the round in the streets imposing Islamic codes of dress and behavior surpassing the violence which had happened during the shah's reign.

¹⁹⁵ Martial Law is a temporary rule by military authorities of a designated area in time of emergency when the civil authorities are deemed unable to function. The legal effects of the law generally involves a suspension of normal civil rights and the extension to the civilian population of summary military justice or of military law.

¹⁹⁶ Abdy Javadzadeh, *Iranian Irony: Marxists Becoming Muslims*, (Dorrance Publishing, 2011), p. 172.

¹⁹⁷ The Regency Council of the Imperial State of Iran, was a nine-member body formed on 13 January 1979 by Mohammad Reza Shah to carry out his duties after he left Iran amidst the Iranian Revolution and served as the symbol of his continued claim on power.

¹⁹⁸ The National Front of Iran is an opposition political organization in Iran, founded by Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1949. It is the oldest and arguably the largest pro-democracy group operating inside Iran and in exile, despite having never been able to recover the prominence it had in the early 1950s.

¹⁹⁹ Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic*, (Routledge, 2002), p. 15.

²⁰⁰ David Patterson, *a Genealogy of Evil: Anti-Semitism from Nazism to Islamic Jihad*, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 192.

Khomeini's agent and clerics launched a clean-up campaign to eradicate any kind of Western influence, and, being persecuted and harassed, a large amount of the Western-educated elite escaped abroad. The best illustration of this aversion towards the Western culture, expressed itself in the November 1979 hostage taking at the U.S. embassy which definitely provided them the right to eliminate most of the regime's left-wing and any further oppositions.

VI-1- Iran Hostage Crisis:

Representing the United States in Iran has never been as perilous as since the conversion of Iran to an Islamic Republic. In fact, in the wake of a successful revolution by Islamic fundamentalists against the pro-American Shah of Iran, the United States became the target of fierce disapproval and the American embassy a visible target. Consequently, all these animosities conducted to an international crisis that occurred from November 4, 1979, to January 20, 1981. During the hostage crisis, Iranian militants stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran and took approximately 66 American citizens captive, holding 52 of them as hostages for 444 days.²⁰¹

Iran hostage crisis took place during the tumultuous aftermath of the Iranian Islamic revolution and the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy. The crisis has had significant geopolitical and human consequences on both domestic politics in the United States and deteriorated U.S.-Iranian relations for decades. The new Iranian government radically changed its relationship with the United States, mainly because of the close ties between Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and the American government. In fact, the deposed Iranian ruler had been extremely influenced by U.S. administrations, and this had engendered a profound skepticism and animosity among Iran's revolutionary chiefs. Actually, attacks against the U.S. embassy started at the end of 1978, the building had been the area of several manifestations by furious Iranians who disapproved the American attendance in their country. Thus, on February 14, 1979, almost one month after the departure of the shah from Iran, the U.S. embassy was assailed and temporarily seized. The embassy faced this attack, during which many of its staff were assassinated or harmed while Iran was in whirlwind of revolutionary alteration. This incident pushed the United States to have new attitudes towards Iran as a security measure. Consequently, embassy's windows were replaced with bulletproof glass and the embassy's personnel was reduced to just over 60 from almost 1400 men and

²⁰¹ Ballard C. Campbell, *Disasters, Accidents, and Crises in American History A Reference Guide to the Nation's Most Catastrophic Events*, (Facts On File, Incorporated, 2008), p.367.

women. Several U.S. attempts had been made to appease tensions with Iran's contingent administration, and in the beginning of the summer Iranian authorities tried to enforce the U.S. embassy security²⁰².

In October 1979 the U.S. government was informed that the newly overthrown shah urgently necessitated medical treatment convenient only in the United States. Communicating the information to the Iranian prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, the U.S. administration put out feelers before the Shah arrival on American soil. The shah set a foot in New York City on October 22. In spite of the fact that Bazargan, certified that the U.S. embassy and its staff were in security, young Islamists, calling themselves Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, invaded the embassy. The primary public reaction in Iran was reasonable, but on November 4 the embassy was attacked by a group of almost 3,000, who, after a brief resistance, took 63 American men and women hostage²⁰³.

The seizure of the embassy was mutinously planned in advance by the students who undertook it, after the arrival of the shah to the United States. And yet the reasons and objectives of the hostage takers are still ambiguous to western countries. One idea states that the hostages were taken as a way of exerting pressure to demand the coming back of the shah. Another theory advances an ideological fanaticism from the students, emanating from their extremist beliefs. According to this explanation, the embassy was taken generally because the students' radicalism was stirred by the revolution that symbolized their dissatisfaction and frustration. A third idea was widespread inside the Carter administration which have long claimed that the embassy was taken for mainly political reasons.

The three of the theories mentioned above enclose element of truth, but with some doubt with each. Concerning the first one, when the return of the shah to Iran was claimed by the students, Ayatollah Khomeini actually refused to negotiate with President Jimmy Carter government. According to former Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Khomeini '*understood*

²⁰² David Patrick Houghton, *US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis*, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.2.

²⁰³ James Ciment, *Postwar America: An Encyclopedia of Social, Political, Cultural, and Economic History*, (Routledge, 2015), p. 1246.

*very well that Jimmy Carter could not extradite the shah to Iran as demanded and therefore that this was not a real condition for the release of the hostages*²⁰⁴.

Concerning the second and third theories, it was obvious that the students were radicalized who were standing up to the United States, especially from the American point of view. However, this idea deprives any real hypothesis of considered aim from the explanation, opposing that the students might have had certain human purposes, other than just revenge or enmity for doing what they did. The students' actions were also rooted in a quest for cultural and national identity. They aimed to reclaim Iranian sovereignty and pride in the face of perceived foreign domination. This aspect of their activism highlights a complex interplay of nationalism and the pursuit of self-determination, which transcends simple opposition to the U.S.

According to another source, Ayatollah Khomeini knew nothing about the plan of the hostage taking, mainly because Mohammad Mousavi Khomeiniha persuaded the students to act in secret. Khomeiniha who was the secretary general of the reformist Association of Combatant Clerics²⁰⁵ apprehended that the government would use the police to stop the students as it was done in February. The interim government had been assigned by Khomeini, and this latter was likely to go along with the government's desire to re-establish order. The takeover advocates declared that their interest was apprehension of a further coup against their widespread revolution supported by the United States²⁰⁶.

Amidst political conflict in Tehran between the Islamic right and secular left and between several figures among the Muslim circle enclosing Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the hostages were apparently caught in that whirlwind issued from this crisis. It became quickly obvious that with widespread anti-American sentiment in postrevolutionary Iran, it would be arduous or hopeless to release the hostages. The hostage takers themselves, most likely were advocates of Khomeini, whose defeat to authorize the liberation of the hostages pushed Bazargan to quit the premiership on November and asked the United States to extradite the shah to Iran in exchange of the hostages. On November 12, Iranian foreign minister Abolhasan Bani-Sadr specified that the hostages would be delivered if the United States stopped intervening in Iranian matters, if the shah returned to Iran to be judged, and if

²⁰⁴ David Patrick Houghton, *US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis*, Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 53.

²⁰⁵ ACC is an Iranian reformist clerical political party. It is regarded as a left-wing party within the Iranian political spectrum.

²⁰⁶ Peter Chalk, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, (ABC-CLIO, 2012), p. 802.

funds in the possession of the shah were testified as being stolen to Iran. The United States reacted by declaring that Iran was free to make financial allegations against the shah in American courts and added that it would sustain making an international commission to inspect potential human rights violations under the shah's governance; as a precondition of any such actions, however, the hostages would have to be liberated²⁰⁷.

The United States backed its attitude by abstaining to buy Iranian oil, by freezing billions of dollars of Iranian assets in the United States, and by embarking on a fierce campaign of worldwide diplomacy anti Iranians. American diplomats acquired United Nations Security Council settlements against Iran, one on December 4 and a second one on 31. By the end of November, a complaint was made by the United States against the Iranian government in the International Court of Justice (which ruled in favor of the United States in May 1980). Consequently, a general agreement made by several countries against the Iranian hostage taking, and diplomats from international areas tried to arbitrate in the crisis. One noticeable event occurred on January 28, 1980, when Canadian diplomats orchestrated the escape of six American diplomats. In fact, the day of the hostage taking, six American diplomats escaped and hid at the home of the Canadian diplomat John Sheardown, under the protection of the Canadian ambassador, Ken Taylor. In late 1979, the government of Prime Minister Joe Clark made an Order in Council permitting Canadian passports to be delivered to the American citizens so that they could flee. With the collaboration of the CIA, which used the cover story of a film project, two CIA officers and the six American diplomats escaped on the board of a Swissair flight to Zurich, Switzerland, on January 28, 1980. Their extrication from Iran, is known as the Canadian Caper.²⁰⁸ Before the Canadian episode, on November 17, Khomeini had given the directive to free 13 hostages, with another hostage, who became seriously ill, on July 11, 1980, making the final number of 52 hostages. Throughout their capture, the hostages were put on trial for several crimes, including espionage.

From the first days of the hostage taking, the U.S. government and their military power were desperately trying to release the hostages, and by April 1980 a small U.S. military unit landed in Tehran for a rescue operation. Unable to accomplish their operation, eight U.S. force members were killed, their bodies left behind, were later exhibited before Iranian television cameras. Humiliated by the bitter defeat and collateral damages, the Carter administration, did its utmost to get back the bodies to the United States. Moreover Cyrus Vance, who was the

²⁰⁷ Lewis Perry, *American Rhetoric: Context and Criticism*, (SIU Press, 1989), p. 371.

²⁰⁸ Antonio J. Mendez, *The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA*, (HarperCollins, 2009), pp. 26-35.

secretary of State at that time and who had contradicted the operation, resigned in protest; and all further or potential attempts to rescue the hostages came to a pointless, and the hostages were isolated in unknown area.

By the mid of 1980 the United States had persuaded its closest friends to establish an economic embargo against Iran. Nevertheless, in spite of the embargo, Iranian determination did not alter, not even with the death of the Shah on July 27.²⁰⁹ Two successive events, however, brought a glimmer of hope to the crisis. The first one concerned the inauguration of a new Iranian government which led to a new approach from the Carter administration. The second one referred to the Iraq invasion on September 22 which led to the Iran-Iraq War. Consequently, during a visit of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Raja'i to the United Nations in October, several nations refused categorically any assistance to Iran in this crisis as long as it held the American hostages.

Afterwards, Iranian representatives embarked on vigorous negotiations. In spite of Raja'i insistence that there would be no possible deal, an Algerian diplomats acted as an intermediary during the negotiation operation. Arbitration abided throughout late 1980 and early 1981, during which the main focus of Iran was concentrated mainly on reclamation of its frozen assets and cancel the trade embargo. With the fulfillment of negotiations illustrated by the signing of the Algiers Accords on January 19, 1981, the hostages were liberated on January 20, 1981²¹⁰. In the same day, minutes after President Reagan was inaugurated the new President of the United States address, the 52 American hostages were liberated U.S. personnel. The hostages were flown on an Algerian airliner, from Tehran, Iran to Algiers, Algeria, where they were formally transferred to Warren M. Christopher, the representative of the United States, as a symbolic gesture of appreciation for the Algerian government's assistance in resolving the hostage taking²¹¹.

Since none of the Iranian's requirements were fulfilled, the hostage-taking is globally considered largely ineffective. Moreover, Iran lost worldwide assistance especially after its invasion of Iraq. However, anti-Americanism escalated more than ever which was ample to satisfy those Iranians who had advocated it. Political leaders such as Khomeini and Behzad

²⁰⁹ Makio Miyagawa, *Do Economic Sanctions Work?*, (Springer, 2016), p.173.

²¹⁰ <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises>, last accessed (8/6/2022).

²¹¹ Daniel Lee Haulman, *The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations, 1947-1994*, (Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), p.361.

Nabavi²¹² were put in a great post, while those who were allied or potentially allied with the American government were sidelined from the political sphere. According to Khomeini biographer, Baqer Moin, a specialist on Iran and Islam and the head of the BBC's Persian Service, referred to the crisis as "*a watershed in Khomeini's life*" that converted him from "*a cautious, pragmatic politician*" into "*a modern revolutionary single-mindedly pursuing a dogma.*" In Khomeini's accounts, *imperialism* and *liberalism* had negative connotation, while *revolution* changed into a sacred word, almost more important than *Islam*.²¹³

From American angle, however, the Iran hostage crisis severely sullied U.S. ardor and status, reducing it to the resentment of the aftermath of the Vietnam War. In addition to an indelible stain on U.S.-Iranian relations, the crisis precipitated the defeat of President Carter by Reagan during the presidential campaign of 1980. In 2000 the hostages and their families tried in vain to sue Iran for their hostage taking, under the Antiterrorism Act of 1996. In the beginning, the case was on the right track, when Iran was unable to supply a defense, then the State Department closed the lawsuit to avoid an international crisis. Consequently, a federal judge decided that no indemnity would be given the hostages due the treaty (Algiers Accords) the Government had made with Iran to release the hostages.²¹⁴

The Iran Hostage Crisis remains a significant episode in U.S. history, shaping American views of the Islamic republic and influencing diplomatic relations between the two countries. The crisis had dramatic effects on domestic politics in the United States and poisoned U.S.-Iranian relations for decades. The event has had also geopolitical repercussions, leading to the degradation of U.S.-Iranian relations and affecting Iran's international support and economic relations.

VI-2- Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988:

Iran-Iraq War refers to the long military conflict between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s. It started when Iraqi armed forces attacked western Iran along the joint border of the two nations on September 22, 1980. The conflict ended by a 1988 cease-fire, even though the

²¹²Behzed Nabavi is an Iranian reformist politician. He served as Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Iran and was one of the founders of the reformist party Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization.

²¹³ Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*, (I. B. Tauris, 2009), p.229.

²¹⁴ United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, *Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session*, (on H.R. 3485, 2000), p.12.

re-establishment of normal diplomatic relations and the removal of armed forces did not happen until the signing of a formal peace accord on August 16, 1990.²¹⁵

The conflict was caused by territorial, religious, and political quarrels between the two neighboring countries. Moreover, Iraq tried to take advantage of Iran's military and political havoc ensuing the 1979 Revolution to settle former border disagreements, obtain control of Iran's oil western province, as well as an obsession to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state. In fact, during the late of the 1960s the United Kingdom announced their intentions to withdraw from the Persian Gulf region thus, establishing a geopolitical reshaping of the area. Consequently, territorial conflicts between Iran and Iraq were revived and paved the way to new crisis between the two nations. In addition, Iraq wanted to impede Ruhollah Khomeini, the mastermind of the Islamic Revolution from spreading his new Iranian ideology to Iraq. There were also apprehensions among Saddam Hussein's government, that Iran, a theocratic country with a predominant Shia Muslims' population, would take advantage of sectarian tensions in Iraq by uniting Iraq's Shia majority against the nascent Ba'athist government²¹⁶, which was secular and controlled by Sunni Muslims.

Besides, the emergence of the new Baath regime, Saddam Hussein, had ceded certain territories during the Algiers Agreement of 1975²¹⁷ in exchange for the interruption of Iranian interference in Iraq. Nevertheless, the agreement had been contested in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79. In fact, lots of conflicts around the border started to occur very often with more and more Iranian intrusion in Iraq. Rulers of the Islamic republic of Iran expressed their wish to spread the revolution's principles of Islamic administration conducted by Shia clergy. Ruhollah Khomeini, the father of the revolution, had already established devotees for his doctrine in Iraq during his exile there; and the best illustration of Khomeini's adepts is characterized in an assassination attempts against the deputy prime minister of Iraq Tariq Aziz in April 1980 by Iraqi Shiit devotee of the Iranian Revolution.²¹⁸

Alongside, the relationship of the Iranian new government and the United States had plummeted especially after the hostage crisis of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. Iran was in

²¹⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica, 2006, p 356.

²¹⁶ Arab Socialist Renaissance Party or Pan-Arabist political party advocating the formation of a single Arab socialist nation.

²¹⁷ 1975 Algiers Agreement was signed by Saddam Hussein (Iraq) and Shah Mohammad Reza (Iran) in order to avoid full-scale war because of the territorial disputes over the Shatt al-Arab and Khuzestan. Along with the Agreement, both countries agreed to stop ties the Kurds in the other's country.

²¹⁸ Pierre Razoux, *The Iran-Iraq War*, (Harvard University Press, 2015), p.11.

blatant seclusion and chaos, and its troops were devastated and disappointed. Saddam was also convinced that by attacking Iran he would be considered as the main leader of the Arab world and thus moved aside his biggest rival, Haffaz Al-Assad. Being bitter because of the Algiers agreements which he found disproportionated, Saddam seized this opportunity to reaffirm territorial demand he had previously ceded and had been promised under the terms of the 1975 accord but that Iran had never given back. This led both Iran and Iraq proclaiming the treaty invalid and ineffectual.

Consequently, the only imminent border disputed between Iran and Iraq at the time of the Iraqi invasion of concerned the uncertainty of whether Iranian ships would fly Iraqi flags and pay Iraq navigation fees for the extension of the Shatt al-Arab river stretching several kilometers.²¹⁹ A previous crisis had already occurred in 1974 concerning Shatt al-Arab between Iranian-Iraqi in the region of the Shatt al-Arab waterway during the mid-1970s. Almost 1,000 were killed in the clashes. It was the most important crisis over the Arab waterway in modern times long before the Iran–Iraq War.²²⁰ (refer to map n°3, page 101).

Saddam Hussein claimed further requests, comprehending certain form of Arab self-governed in Khuzestan, a wealthy oil-producing area in Iran that was settled mainly by ethnic Arabs. He also requested that Iran renounced to the authority of the islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb, Persian Gulf islands which were under the command of the Arab sheikhdoms of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. Both had been under the British protectorate and were appropriated by Iran in 1971 when the protectorate expired²²¹.

²¹⁹ Samīr al- Halīl, Kanan Makiya, *Republic of fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*, (University of California Press, 1998), p. 270.

²²⁰ Williamson Murray, Kevin M. Woods, *The Iraq-Iran War: A Military and Strategic History*, (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 62-63.

²²¹ Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *Palestine and the Gulf States: The Presence at the Table*, (Routledge, 2009), p.48.

Map n°3: Iraq-Iran Disputed Territories:



Source : <https://www.sutori.com/en/story/the-iran-iraq-war-by-laura-khoa-paola>


In September 1980, the Iraqi troops cautiously went ahead a broad front into Khuzestan, unexpectedly attacking Iran. The Iraqi army seized the city of Khorramshahr nevertheless, they failed in taking the crucial oil-refining center of Abadan. At the end of December 1980, the Iraqi attacks sneaked in about 80-120 km inside Iran after encountering unpredictable and surprising fervent Iranian opposition.²²² The ardor and devotion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (an Iranian state militia originally assigned with protecting the Islamic Revolution from internal menaces) was so efficient that it led to a blatant victorious attack (H-3 Airstrike) by the Iranian militia in April 1981²²³. Months later, Iraqi troops were obliged to concede, and in September of the same year, the Iraqi militia was repelled across Iran's Karun River by the Iranian forces.²²⁴ (refer to map n°4, page 102)

²²² <https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War>, last acceded (9/6/2022).

²²³ The H-3 airstrike was a surprise air attack by the Iranian Air Force during the Iran-Iraq War on 4 April 1981 against the airbases of the Iraqi Air Force at the H-3 Air Base in western Iraq. The Iranians destroyed at least 48 Iraqi aircraft on the ground with no losses of their own. Based on the results achieved, it is considered one of the most successful raids in the history of aerial warfare.

²²⁴ Mark Grossman, R. Alio and Rolin G. Mainuddin Sheikh, *Encyclopedia of the Persian Gulf War*, (ABC-CLIO, 1995), p.142.

Map n°4: Iran Assault on H-3.



Source : https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Attack_on_H3

In May 1982 Iranian forces took back the city of Khorramshahr. Meanwhile, Iraq intentionally pulled out its troops from all invaded Iranian areas soon after and searched for a peaceful treaty with Iran. However, with the direction of Ruhollah Khomeini, who considered Saddam as an impediment to the Islamic Revolution, Iran stayed unbending and maintained the war with the ambition to defeat the Iraqi leader. Several useless attacks were launched

against Iran, mainly human assault waves compound mostly of unexperimented conscripts, usually young boys enrolled from the streets, which were shattered by the Iraqi forces.

Even though the Iran-Iraq combats were concentrated only around oil-rich areas, the global oil commerce had been lightly affected. However, in 1984 and the absence of hope to see the conflict came to an end, the two sides started assailing each other's oil-tanker shipping in the Persian Gulf region. Iran also assailed tankers directed from and to Kuwait and other Gulf countries, urging the American government and many other western nations to install war vessel in the Persian Gulf to secure the course of oil internationally. The attacks of the oil tankers, which implied hits on more than 100 oil tankers, engendered a rise of a worldwide concern in the Iran-Iraq crisis.²²⁵

In addition, the oil-exporting aptitude of both sides was seriously diminished several times because of various air strikes and pipeline shutoffs, and the important reduction in their income and foreign-currency earnings lowered their economic evolution plans to hit rock bottom. The Iraqi war was blatantly granted by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other neighboring Arab countries and was implicitly sustained by the United States and the Soviet Union, while the only main supporters of Iran were Syria and Libya²²⁶.

In 1987 the military luck turned in Iraq's side, which had assembled a militia of about one million and had acquired arsenal at the cutting edge of technology from France and the Soviet Union. This artillery was reinforced by the inclusion of considerable amounts of chemical weapons, which the Saddam's regime obtained or created during the 1980s. Meanwhile, the nation moved heaven and earth in order to obtain or produce additional weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as biological and nuclear arms.

In the mid of 1987 the United Nation Security Council had by common consent passed Resolution 598²²⁷, prompting Iraq and Iran to undertake a cease-fire, remove their troops to the worldwide acknowledged boundaries, and adjust and regulate their frontier altercations through equitable negotiations under the supervision of the UN. Iraq complied with the UN rules if Iran accepted too. Nevertheless, Iran required reforms that recognized Iraq as the only


²²⁵ Op.Cit. Pierre Razoux, p36.

²²⁶ Taylor & Francis Group, *The Middle East and North Africa 2004*, (Psychology Press, 2003), p.678.

²²⁷ United Nations Security Council resolution 598 was adopted unanimously on 20 July 1987, after recalling Resolution 582 and 588, called for an immediate ceasefire between Iran and Iraq and the repatriation of prisoners of war, and for both sides to withdraw to the international border.

assailant in this conflict, thus claiming compensation and damages, as well as the removal of all foreign navies from the Gulf region²²⁸. (refer to map n°5, page 104).

Map n°5: Attacks on civilian areas of Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait targeted during the "War of the Cities".



Source: Shura-yi Ali-i Difa, *The Imposed War*, p17.

In the beginning of 1988 Iranian troops with the collaboration of Iraqi Kurds put at risk the region ranging from Kirkuk (Northeastern Iraq) to the Turkish border and succeeded in infiltrating to the towns of Hajj Umran and Ḥalabjah in northeastern provinces of Iraq. They

²²⁸ John W. Garver, *China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World*, (University of Washington Press, 2011), p. 78.

were faced up with a firm opposition in the north, nevertheless, resorted to chemical weapons, Iraqi patrol killed almost 5,000 Kurdish civilians in and around Halabjah in March 1988.²²⁹

Military campaign started again with greater intensity in the gulf region, and in April 1988, Iraq this time employing chemical weapons against the Iranian forces got back the Al Faw peninsula (located in the extreme southeast of Iraq). A short time afterwards Iran Air flight 655, an ordinary passenger plane, was shot down by an American missile cruiser after being erroneously mistaken for a fighter jet. The catastrophe caused 290 dead, worsening the massive loss of Iranian civils. Exhausted by many years of war, Iran at last consent to the United Nations Resolution 598 on July 20, resulting into a cease-fire on August 20, 1988.²³⁰

Often compared to the First World War, the Iran-Iraq conflict had been one of the most devastating crises of the late 20th century. The global number of soldiers on both sides is uncertain, but both nations were completely devoted to fight. The amount of casualties was titanic, in total, around 500,000 people were killed during the war (with Iran having the largest part of the casualties), in addition to the tens of thousands of civilians killed in the competing Anfal campaign (Spoils) targeting Kurds in Iraq in 1988. The end of the war resulted in neither reparations nor border changes. The combined financial cost to both combatants is believed to have exceeded US\$1 trillion.²³¹

In August 1990, while Iraq was absorbed with its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq and Iran rehabilitated diplomatic relations, and Iraq consent to Iranian conditions for the end of the conflict: the retreat of Iraqi forces from settled Iranian territory, partition of sovereignty over the Shatt Al-‘Arab waterway, and the exchange of prisoner of war. The last prisoners’ exchange was done until March 2003.²³²

The Iran-Iraq War was marked by a prolonged and bloody stalemate caused by the use of chemical warfare that shaped the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Moreover, the course of economic evolution dropped under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, and his obsession of victory in the Iran-Iraq War eventually proved useless. Khomeini, however, was

²²⁹ James Ciment, *World Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era*, (Routledge, 2015), p. 274.

²³⁰ Edmund A. Ghareeb, Beth Dougherty, *Historical Dictionary of Iraq*, (Scarecrow Press, 2004), p. 107.

²³¹ James G. Blight, Janet M. Lang, Hussein Banai, John Tirman, Malcolm Byrne, *Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988*, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), IX.

²³² Op. Cit. Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 80.

capable to grasp his charismatic leadership over the Shiah in Iran, and he continued to be the predominant political and religious authority in Iran until his death.

During the Iran-Iraq War, the United States had an important role, mainly supporting Iraq. The U.S. support for Iraq during the war implied military and diplomatic assistance. This commitment redefined the way the United States considers political alliances in the Middle East that had a lasting effect on the dynamics of the area.

VII- The Aftermath of the Islamic Revolution and Present-Day Iran:

The Islamic Revolution in Iran, which culminated in the institution of an Islamic republic in 1979, had a deep and long-term effect on the country. However, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini on 3 June 1989 marked an end of an era both for his country and for the genesis of Islamic fundamentalism. Historically speaking, Khomeini was considered as one of the gargantuan leaders of his age. Ruling at the age of 76 one of the biggest revolutions of the twentieth century whose effect was noticed internationally, he led an authoritarian uprising from exile against one of the strongest regimes of the Middle East and succeeded in it. In the non-Muslim world, the revolution changed the perception of Islam, engendering much attention towards Islam both sympathetically and hostilely, to the point that some asserted that *"the world balance of power more than any political event since Hitler's conquest of Europe"*²³³.

For Iran, the era after Ayatollah Khomeini's death have been marked by the necessity for political reinforcement and economic changes. Reforms started in short order, when the Assembly of Experts AOE (overwhelmingly dominated by clergy) orchestrated by Ali Akbar Hachemi Rafsandjani designated Ali Khamenei Iran's president at that time, as the new leader after the death of Khomeini in June 1989. His election was unconstitutional according to the 1979 constitution. In fact, the supreme leader should be a high-ranking member of the clergy and a source of emulation, but Khamenei was only of middle-rank. Since his appointment was temporary until a referendum consented to the new constitution in which the criterion of rank was removed from the qualifications for leadership, the AOE reconfirmed its decision in the mid of 1989.

²³³<https://web.archive.org/web/20100920060544/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,923854,00.html>, last acceded (10/6/2022).

Few months after, the election of Khomeini's replacement started. Elected almost unanimously, Ali Rafsanjani, a dominant spokesman at the Majles since 1980, was chosen by a vast vote. Like Khomeini, he stood against Shah's modernization program, and when Khomeini was expelled from Iran in 1962, Rafsanjani was appointed a chief fund-raiser inside the country. With the return of Khomeini in 1979 after the overthrow of the shah, Rafsanjani was chosen to be one of Khomeini's chief lieutenants. He took part in the constitution of the Islamic Republican Party, served on the Revolutionary Council, and acted as interior minister in the beginning of the revolution. Rafsanjani progressively arose as the second most influential character in Iran. He was closely implied in Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), and he was said to have convinced Khomeini to accept the cease-fire of August 1988 that expeditiously ended the war.

Immediately after his election, Rafsanjani launched an operation to reconstruct the economy of the country especially after the disaster of the war. Described as a pragmatic powerful Islamic conservative leader, Rafsanjani embraced an "economy-first" plan, advocating a privatization policy against more state-owned economic inclinations in the Islamic Republic that would attract foreign investment. Moreover, Rafsanjani's espousal to deal with the United States over Iranian nuclear program and his free-market economic policies opposed with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his allies, who preferred avoiding Western intervention in the Middle East. The new president's political approaches were criticized by both Khomeini and the conservative parliament, and efforts by conservative members to restrain and suppress reforms by intimidating and oppressing political rebels usually ensued in violent demonstrations which were brutally stifled.

Domestically, Rafsanjani established family-planning policies contradicting this way the previous programs that advocated demographic growth. Even though the violation of human rights and the existence of any form of resistance persisted, there was a nuance of cultural freedom under the leadership of Rafsanjani. However, protestations and uprising against the government were severely punished.

After two terms of presidency and forbidden by the constitution from running for office for a third time, Rafsanjani nevertheless continued to be very active in political scene. Muhammad Khatami's surprise victory in the May 23, 1997 election was a surprise for all Iranian

conservatives.²³⁴ Khatami was one of the four candidates to run for the presidency and was the most moderate on social matters. With obvious and general approval from youth, women, and intellectual Iranians, he was chosen by nearly 70 percent of the population. Despite the broad support from these groups, Khatami faced criticism from the moderates he had appointed. This criticism often arises from concerns about the direction of governance and the inclusion of conservative elements in the government, particularly those accepted by the Majles (Iran's parliament). The tension between progressive aspirations and conservative acceptance highlights the challenges of navigating Iran's complex political environment.

Elections to choose Khatami's successor were fixed for June 2005. In May almost 1,000 presidential applicants were declared ineligible by the Council of Guardians from participating to the elections. Finally an election was held between former president Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the conservative mayor of Tehran who surprisingly defeated Rafsanjani, making more than 60 percent of the votes cast.

Unlike his reform advocator predecessor, Ahmadinejad had a more conservative tendency. Domestically, for instance, he banned state television and radio stations from broadcasting music for being considered improper and vulgar, though under his administration and for the first time since the Islamic revolution, women were admitted into important sporting events. Nevertheless, Ahmadinejad's defeat to handle the escalating rates of inflation and unemployment during his presidency paved the way to led to constant dissatisfaction negatively impacting his popularity in Iran. His outrageous and provocative position concerning Iran's nuclear program was also a cause of negative commentary. Consequently, even though conservative members reinforced again their authority over the Majles in the elections of March 2008, several reformist candidates were eliminated which worsened the situation for more critical conflict between the President and the majlis.

In spite of the fact that no Iranian president had not yet failed to win a second term, as the 2009 presidential election came close, some politicians doubted that Ahmadinejad's economic methods and his aggressive approach abroad might damage his potential re-election. He took a big risk to be defeated by one of his moderate adversaries. In early August of 2009, Ahmadinejad was re-elected for a second term as president. Frequent manifestation and

²³⁴<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iran-under-khatami-political-economic-and-military-assessment>, last accessed (10/6/2022).

protests continued in the following months, especially in university campuses and streets, when government troops fired on protesters, killing more than 10 people.²³⁵

In 2010, undergoing amplified constraints from foreign economic sanctions, Iran began draconian modification concerning its planned economy, beginning a progressive program to suppress extensive government fundings for essential consumer goods such as food, fuel, medicine, and other products during an interval of five years; these contributions were substituted with personal cash payments to the population. This contribution system was performed since Iran-Iraq War, a crucial efforts on the Iranian economy since it boosted wasteful consumption and depleted state funds. Nevertheless, in 2001, abrupt increases in the purchasing prices of goods contributed to a general panic that government fundings reductions might engender popular protest.

Inspired by a series of anti-government protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions that spread across much of the Middle East and African regions, demonstrators held antigovernment political gathering in Iran in February 2011. Joined together by the Arab Spring movement that overthrown Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak from command, Iranian population protested out of solidarity with Egypt and Tunisia, shouting negative slogans against Ahmadinejad and Khamenei resulting in violent repression against the protestants.

In March 2013, Hasan Rouhani, a veteran politician and cleric who was generally seen as a moderate conservative was enrolled in the race of presidency. In June 2013, Rouhani who was regarded as a fervent critic of Ahmadinejad' economic and direct methods in international affairs was elected to succeed Ahmadinejad as president. His blatant victory was considered as evidence of Ahmadinejad' defeat and Iran's increasing international isolation and disastrous economy. Rouhani promised that he would start again foreign negotiations concerning Iranian nuclear program in order to decrease sanctions against the country.

During the first term of presidency of Rouhani, economic situation started to be stabilized with a considerable economic level of inflation. This was mainly due to the reintegration of Iran into the worldwide economy after the signing of an agreement restricting its nuclear program. Reelected in 2017, Rouhani embraced a more direct reformist plan. From the

²³⁵ Negar Mottahedeh, *#iranelection: Hashtag Solidarity and the Transformation of Online Life*, (Stanford University Press, 2015), p.24.

beginning of his early second term, total market value of the goods and services produced by a country's economy during a fixed term (Gross Domestic Product) had drastically augmented and inflation was at its lowest since. Although the majority of involvement was made in the oil sector, the unemployment rate remained very high ensuing in colossal manifestation in December 2017. Nevertheless, the United States canceled its engagement to the nuclear agreement in the mid-2018, re-establishing severe sanctions, consequently, GDP dropped once again, and inflation reached its highest peak since decades.

An election of a new Majles was held in February 2020 while Iran was in a deep torment with the United States. The single possible alternative possible from the election favored Khamenei: The Guardian Council had banned almost 7,000 candidates, among them 90 sitting representatives of the Majles who wanted to be reelected. The majority of the eliminated candidates were reformists, leaving four-fifths of the legislature's seats totally undisputed. However, few days before the election, Iranian government declared the death of two people in Qom due to COVID-19, which were the first officially declared cases in Iran, resulting in a general panic. The country witnessed the lowest vote participation in the country's history since the 1979 revolution, which led to an overwhelming victory of the conservatives in the Majles.²³⁶

Decades later, Iranians still endure life under the 1979 constitution, embraced as an element of the Islamic Revolution and for many Iranians, the present government is more overwhelming than the previous one. Actually, a dictatorial system was supplanted with a religious dictatorial government, and the class divides of the Shah's epoch were substituted with another class divides. According to Shadi Mokhtari specialized in human rights, Middle East Politics and Political Islam at the American University in Washington D.C.

*Sons of the revolution's leaders and the business class that decides to work within the rules of the regime—they are the upper class in Iranian society. They flaunt their wealth, driving luxury sportscars around Tehran, posting Instagram pictures of their ski trips and beach trips around the world, all while the poor and the middle class are struggling to survive or maintain the appearance of a dignified life.*²³⁷

²³⁶ R. R. Asaadi, *Postrevolutionary Iran: The Leader, The People, and the Three Powers*, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021), p.58.

²³⁷ Emily Priborkin, "40 Years Later: Iran after the Islamic Revolution", *American University Washington DC*, (April 8, 2019): <https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20190408-40-years-later-iran-after-the-islamic-revolution.cfm>, last accessed date(12/06/2022).

With the impact of the Islamic revolution, people were forced to have double lives; it has caught them in a paradox of progressive allegiance to secular principles while going through the flow of piety as a disguise to escape problems with the government. The new government has brought down Iranians' faith and belief in religion, since they experienced a dual culture: the street culture, and the home culture. At home, rather than educating Iranians' children honesty and integrity, they are inculcated to dissimulate the truth. In spite of several negative alterations due to the revolution, there are encouraging revolutions happening alongside them, mainly among the youth. This latter has been a part of powerful social movements despite the repression, that could produce a ray of hope.

V- Conclusion:

The aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran continues to be a topic of debate, with differing perspectives on its outcomes and its global impact. The revolution introduced Islam as a form of modern governance and had far-reaching effects on the region, shaping global alliances and redrawing the geopolitical order in many ways. The Islamic Revolution was provoked by a strong resentment towards Pahlavi monarchy motivated by deep economic troubles, cultural differences, and religious reactions to the king's secular policies, one of the main characteristics of Iran during the Shah governance. The popular revolution that ended by the toppling of the monarchy and led to the settlement of an Islamic republic had made drastic changes on the nation. While Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians are acknowledged in the Iranian constitution of 1979 as official minorities, the revolutionary climate in Iran was not favorable to equal treatment of non-Muslims. Consequently, several religious groups were victims of great persecution, and a great number of them emigrated after the revolution.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran had far-reaching effects, reshaping the country and drastically shifting the balance of power in the Middle East. It also engendered serious issues to the global geopolitical order, issues that still exist nowadays. The events that followed, including the Siege of Mecca by Sunni Islamist insurgents and the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat by Islamist extremists, demonstrated how the revolution impacted the area beyond Iran's borders

The Islamic Republic carried by a revolutionary slogan "neither East nor West, only Islamic Republic" (i.e., neither Soviet nor American / West European models), and called for the rejection of capitalism, Western influence, especially American one, and social injustice in the

world mainly the Middle East. Revolutionists in Iran looked for allies from non-Muslim rebels such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua²³⁸, IRA in Ireland and anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, to such an extent as advocating leftist revolutionaries over Islamist, but ideologically different and strategically harmful causes, such as the neighboring Afghan Mujahideen.²³⁹ The revolution itself was sustained by the Palestine Liberation Organization. In terms of forthcoming effects, the crisis that arose from the Iranian Revolution abided to characterize the geo-politics for the next last three decades, until nowadays.

²³⁸The Sandinista National Liberation Front is a socialist political party in Nicaragua. Its members are called Sandinistas. The party is named after Augusto César Sandino, who led the Nicaraguan resistance against the United States occupation of Nicaragua in the 1930s.

²³⁹ Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (Harvard University Press, 1994), p.175.

Chapter three: Understanding the USA and Iran Interactions in Shaping their Identities.

I- Introduction:

Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and the hostage taking of the American embassy that year, Americans have had the tendency to see Iran as a dangerous and insecure country. Current apprehension concerning Iran's nuclear aspirations and pro-Palestinian assertions have only affirmed and worsened many Americans' point of views, that Iran is a threat that deserves to be part of the so called "axis of evil." While Americans conceived their relations with Iran within the limits of its nuclear program and provocative anti-Israel discourse, Iranians refer to their relations to the United States as a piece of a long and disturbing history of foreign intrusion and abuse that goes back to the nineteenth century.

The past is constituted of fractions of the present Iran, especially when we know that today's relations of the two nations have nothing to do with the past rapports. In fact, during the 1970s the American Government supported the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi by promoting and boosting his consistent and overloaded plan of political, social, and economic reforms; the well-known Shah's "White Revolution". As both nations have carefully analyzed recent chances to restore their disastrous relationships, the purpose of this chapter is to assess the evolution of the Iranian- American relations that swings from good partners to overt enemies. Thus, this part of the thesis depicts how Iran perceives the history of its relations with the United States under the Pahlavi dynasty and events leading to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

I- U.S. Iran Relations under the Pahlavi Dynasty

The early history of Persian-American relations has rarely been discussed, even though it was during this time (1856-1921), that Iranians contrived a positive idea of America as a friendly

nation. In fact, starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, Great Britain and Russia were deeply interested in Iran then known as Persia in their competition for imperial and economic supremacy. For both powers, Persia offered several opportunities such as control of the Caspian Sea and the coveted warm water port for Russia, in addition to the securing of India in aid of the British. All these sought-after objectives would have been achieved by enfeebling and dominating the country. After many years of intrusions and offensives, aggravated by the wastefulness and ineptitude of Persia's Qajar shahs, Britain monopolized nearly all of Persia's financial and economic resources. Nevertheless, in a popular movement, Iranians contested these economic oppressions and imposed their invalidation. These contestations, consolidated the country and laid the groundwork for Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Besides, Iranian people obliged the Shah to establish a new legislative council (Majlis) and accord them a constitution²⁴⁰.

During the First World War and in spite of the Iranian neutrality, Iran became a battleground for European conflicts which weakened the country. After the ceasefire, the British seized this opportunity to inflict disadvantageous agreements that made Iran under a British protectorate. Once again, the expansion of foreign control engendered a strong desire for national freedom which resulted in the adjournment of the treaties, the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty and the installation of the Pahlavi monarchy in 1925. At this point, the United States had little concern in the region but the Persians were looking for the Americans' help to financially recover after the First World War. Fiercely opposed by strong vested interests, U.S. intervention remained unaccomplished. Following this episode, there was no important U.S. interaction with Iran until the Second World War.

During the rule Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-41), foreign interventions in Iran were less straight, and this presumed level of independence continued until the Second World War. Nevertheless, because of the Shah's pro-German affinity, the Allied Powers led by Great Britain and the Soviet Union decided to depose the monarch from power. Forced to consent, Reza Shah resigned and sat on the throne his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in 1941.²⁴¹

The same as his precipitated and abrupt access to power, Mohammad Reza Shah's reign owed much to the machination and aid of foreign powers, particularly the entrance of the

²⁴⁰ Robert Wuthnow, *The Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion: 2-volume set*, (Routledge, 2013), p.56.

²⁴¹Shaul Bakhash, *The Fall of Reza Shah: The Abdication, Exile, and Death of Modern Iran's Founder*, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021), p.32.

United States as a crucial element in Iranian affairs. Even though American attention in Iran came comparatively late, the latter considered it as segment of the longer history of external abuse. For lot of Iranians, their first contact with the Americans was mainly limited Christian missionaries' task, whose work, besides their religious evangelizing, implied minor educational, medical, and social tasks. Nevertheless, their real intentions were to convert and educate the Iranian population and paved the way to the establishment of a democratic nation. To reinforce this missionary project, two eminent American financial specialists, Morgan Shuster and Arthur C. Millspaugh, were attributed absolute power by Tehran to contribute to Iran's modernization of its financial system (Taxes and foreign investment). Even though Shuster and Millspaugh's efforts were less successful than expected, their adventures represented the long history of American interest in Iranian improvement.²⁴²

By the 1920s, American oil companies also started to look for potential opportunities in Iran. In spite of the British control over Iran's oil market with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), American companies embarked on with Iranian development and politics. In fact, between the First and the Second World Wars, the dominion of Reza Shah was marked by his great thirst to launch development plans in readiness for modernizing and westernizing his nation. Like his father, the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi preserved close ties with the United States during the majority of his reign. He maintained a renovating economic reforms overtly pro-American and accumulated visits to the United States, where he was considered as a friend.

The American interests in Iran started during the Second World War and quickly amplified due to Iran's large oil reserves, which led Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States to depose the last Shah's father and thus preventing Iran's wealth from falling into the hands of the Axis control. With its strong ties to Western oil companies, Iran drew the attention of the United States as the question of access to oil for the reliability of Western economies intersected with the strategy of containment. In fact, the historian Mark Lytle has sorted out four key factors that guided American's interests in Iran at that time: *"the desire for secure Middle Eastern oil reserves, the State Department's efforts to incorporate Iran into a new*

²⁴² Yuka Kadoi, *Arthur Upham Pope and A New Survey of Persian Art*, (Brill, 2016), p. 17.

⁴ Mark H. Lytle, *The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953*, (Lynne Rienner Pub, 1987), XIX.

conception of American security, the department's long-term efforts to contain the Soviet Union, and the faith in American exceptionalism."²⁴³

Being conscient about the potential of his nation, the young Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi gone through hard times during his first few years of reign. In order to evade any future crisis, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, under a general agreement decided to withdraw their armed forces from Iran before the end of the war. However, Iran became involuntarily an area of discords with the arising of the Cold War between Washington and Moscow as the Soviets obstipated to stay in Iran and sustaining the socialist Azerbaijan Democratic Party to declare independence from Tehran²⁴⁴. The Soviets were also keen to maximize their presence in the area in order to access the untapped oil resources in northern Iran. The United States aptitude to expel the Soviet Union's troops was very arduous, nevertheless, with the help of the acute diplomatic intervention of the newly appointed Iranian Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, a disaster was barely avoided. In fact, in exchange for advantageous oil privileges in Northern Iran, Qavam convinced the Soviets to retire. From the moment the Soviets withdrew, Tehran started to stifle the separatist movement in Azerbaijan. Qavam's achievement was reached when in October 1947 the Majlis voted, finally, on whether to validate the oil privileges to the USSR. In an impressive approval of the Prime Minister's clever manipulation of the Soviet Union, the majlis disapproved the concession by 100 votes to zero (and two abstentions).²⁴⁵

In spite of the evident success of Qavam, the AIOC's monopolization of Iran's wealth was seen as an incontestable outrage and most blatant injury for Iranians' self-esteem. With the ambition of releasing Iran from foreign exploitation, a widespread idea enflamed popular opinion on nationalizing the British company. The nationalization endeavors in the Majlis were directed by Mohammad Mosaddeq, a charismatic veteran wholly devoted to freeing Iran from imperial supremacy. Under the leadership of the influential politician, the National Front, a loose coalition of mostly liberal, secular, and leftist groups, managed to curb the power of the shah. Mosaddeq's election as prime minister in April 1951 was a first main success for the

²⁴⁴ Richard W. Cottam, *Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), p. 70.

²⁴⁵ William Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism*, (Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 69.

National Front and the nationalization campaign thus, seriously impacting U.S-Iranian policy. Unlike Britain's hard and inflexible position, the United States firstly tried to find a compromise that could fit both Tehran and London. The U.S. apprehension was that extended hostility between Britain and Iran might lead to an economic crisis that would weaken Iran in front of the Soviet. The U.S. anxiety was confirmed when Mosaddeq's made a declaration in March 1952 that he would evade the British boycott by selling oil to any consenting clients, even though it was for a communist country. That was the final straw for Mosaddeq. In fact, in spite of his popularity, Mosaddeq's recourse to questionable authoritarian approaches, so-called communist affinities, and inflexibility towards the oil issue made Washington angry about his government.

It was from that moment (1952) that the United States under the Presidency of Truman started to move away from the neutral path and it aggravated when Eisenhower entered the White House. While the British have always struggled to gain American support to oust Mosaddeq and provoke a coup, the idea of dislodging him was ardently adopted by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, director of the CIA, Allen Dulles²⁴⁶. Arriving into the office, Eisenhower concretized the Soviet threat in his doctrine by accrediting the fierce engagement of U.S. forces to secure and protect the world from any form of communism. Consequently, on 11 July 1953, Eisenhower and Dulles gave the green light for a CIA coup to dismiss the prime minister.²⁴⁷ The conspirators also machinated with General Fazlollah Zahedi, the pretender of Mosaddeq's successor, and Ayatollah Mostafa Kashani, a previous friend of Mosaddeq whose considerable partisans from the religious working classes were primordial to the success of the coup. The plot started when the American ambassador, Loy Henderson, convinced Mosaddeq to bring order on the streets by opposing the CIA-financed demonstrators that were pretending to be Tudeh allies, who were quickly enrolled by the real Tudeh members. In August, protest against Mosaddeq resulted in at least 200 deaths. Obligated to flee, Mosaddeq was arrested and Zahedi was appointed as prime minister.²⁴⁸

III- The Fall of Mosaddeq Government and the Aftermath of the Coup:

The government of Mohammed Mosaddeq was overthrown in a coup coordinated by the CIA and MI6 in 1953. Several liberal Iranians argue that the coup and the succeeding

²⁴⁶ Joe L. Kincheloe, Shirley R. Steinberg, *The Miseducation of the West: How Schools and the Media Distort Our Understanding of the Islamic World*, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), p.64.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, p.65.

²⁴⁸ IBP, Inc, *Iran Country Study Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Developments*, (Lulu.com, 3 mars 2012), p.56.

U.S. assistance for the Shah attested the theory, which led to the "deeply anti-American character" of the 1979 revolution²⁴⁹. Besides the success of the coup to withdraw Mosaddeq from power, it served to erode U.S. foreign policy and propagated anti-American sentiment throughout Iran over the next two decades. However, it caused a series of policies that reinforced the relationship between Washington and the Pahlavi regime. After the installation of Zahedi as prime minister, Eisenhower unlocked \$45 million aid worth, the same aid that he had refused to Mosaddeq. A year after U.S. government sustained the Zahedi government, in other words the Pahlavi regime with \$85 million and an extra \$149 million was given in 1955 and 1956.²⁵⁰

In an attempt to pursue a neutral position in the Cold War crisis as Mosaddeq, the Shah adopted a close relationship with the United States, deciding overtly to support the Western camp. Throughout the late 1950s, cooperation between the United States and Iran continued to expand. In 1957, the CIA helped the Shah in creating SAVAK, Iran's apprehended intelligence and security agency.²⁵¹ SAVAK acted as the Shah's secret police, undermining national and foreign oppositions, gathering intelligence, arresting and torturing disapproval to the regime. It became quickly one of the main pillars upon which the Pahlavi dynasty relied on. The links between Washington and Tehran had never been so tied especially after the signing in March 1959 of a bilateral alliance. With the agreement, the United States acknowledged several points among which: To furnish Iran military and economic assistance, and, more importantly, to come to Iran's assistance in case of foreign aggressions.²⁵²

The Johnson administration continued in the footsteps of the Kennedy's one concerning the undeniable support for Shah Reza Pahlavi and his obsession of giving his country a new lease of life and reinforcing Iran's internal security. While encouraging crucial political, social, and economic reforms, the Shah's so-called "White Revolution", U.S. policymakers, who conceded on the importance of Iran, mainly for its neighboring borders with the Soviet Union, were on the alert concerning possible threats. Moreover, Iran was also considered as one of

²⁴⁹Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations*, (The New Press, 2013), p. 171.

²⁵⁰ United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Geoffrey Kemp, *U.S. Military Sales to Iran: A Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p.4.

²⁵¹D. L. Joy, *Malice in Wonderland: The Bush Junta from 2000-Present*, (Author House, 2011), p.285.

²⁵² Ben Offiler, *US Foreign Policy and the Modernization of Iran: Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and the Shah*, (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), p.24.

the most reliable U.S. allies in the area. In fact, unlike several Third World rulers, the Shah sustained U.S. actions in Vietnam and other controversial U.S. policies. The only source of disagreement between the two countries was the Shah's insatiable demand for more and more contemporary military equipment. One of the best example refers to the U.S. assistance to the Shah to establish his nuclear program since 1957 by providing Iran its first nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel, and after 1967 by supplying Iran with weapons grade endowed with uranium²⁵³. U.S. representatives continued to emphasize and congratulate the Shah on the importance of military modernization program, who attested him that the United States aimed to be responsive to his military needs.

An increasing discontentment concerning the Shah government and anti-Americanism arose in October 1964, when the Iranian Parliament (the Majlis) passed a status of forces bill the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). Awarding U.S. military personnel established in Iran and their dependents, full diplomatic immunity and despite of outspoken criticism, it was passed although by a narrow margin.²⁵⁴ In fact, the bill was obviously the price to pay in exchange for \$200 million credit from U.S. commercial banks for the acquisition of U.S. military equipment. On November 3, anti-government religious leader Ruhollah Khomeini, whose strong criticism against the status bill and incitement for the overthrow of the Iranian Government, was arrested and exiled to Turkey. The department of State alerted that the incident with Khomeini was the reflection of a more general popular opposition to the Shah Government, recently developed into an overt opposition of American policy in Iran, and that this new phenomenon constituted a menace to U.S. interests in Iran.

It was time for important political reforms in the Middle East, mainly because of the Six Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbors in June 1967 and the British withdrawal from the East of Suez. In addition to these regional changes, the Iranian reaction to these events manifested the Shah's increasing confidence on foreign policy matters, and the developing nature of the US-Iranian relationship. The character of the American relations with Iran took on a new aspect as U.S. economic aid to Iran stopped in 1967. With the increase of Iranian oil production, it started to be very hard for the Johnson administration to explain ongoing economic assistance, especially to a Congress that hope for diminishing foreign aid and was

²⁵³ Richard Ned Lebow, *A Democratic Foreign Policy: Regaining American Influence Abroad*, (Springer, 2019), p.156.

²⁵⁴ Matteo Gerlini, Massimiliano Trentin, *The Middle East and the Cold War: Between Security and Development*, (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), p. 118.

confused by Shah's relationship with the Soviets. The cessation of economic assistance as a negotiation tool emphasized the power of the U.S. military aid with Iran and made it extremely difficult for Washington to ignore the Shah's insistence for military credit. The Johnson administration decision to fully engage in to a five-year credit deal in 1968 reinforced the approach of supplying vast military credit to support Washington's decreasing control on the Shah. In view of the Iranian support for the American policy during the Six Day War and Britain's departure from the area, Tehran, i.e., the Shah became a crucial element of U.S. policy in the Middle East region. However, since the moment that the U.S. control over Iran began to wane, Washington started to consent to the Shah's style of modernity. In fact, the Shah administration's version of a contemporary Iran was set upon three main pillars: a modernized sophisticated military, prosper economy and the preservation of the Pahlavi dynasty reign²⁵⁵.

III-1-The 1967 War and the Oil Weapon:

On June 5, 1967, the Israel Defense Forces initiated Operation Focus, a coordinated aerial attack on Egypt quickly destroying its militia²⁵⁶. The Six-Day War was the result of several decades of political tension and military dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Countries that sent their troops in support of Egypt such as Iraq, Jordan, and Syria were also soon beaten by a strong Israeli military force. In order to restrain an attempt to prevent the war's amplification and Soviet intrusion, the United States sent the Sixth Fleet to the area as a demonstration of the American will, however, both nations refused to intervene in the conflict. Israel, then seized new crucial territories, among them the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The short conflict ended with United Nation intervention to ceasefire, but it seriously impacted the map of the Middle East and forever disturb Arab-Israeli relations. More than ever, the Six Day War brought a necessity for the United States to stabilize the Middle East area and prevent a Soviet invasion., hence, the importance of US-Iranian relations.

From the beginning of the Cold War, the Americans had tried to reach a set of goals in the Middle East region that went above bilateral relations with any nation for several reasons: to conserve the flux of oil to the West of Europe and the United States; entrance in and out of the Suez Canal; the isolation of Soviet power and preserve the usual local equilibrium of

²⁵⁵ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (Princeton University Press, 2021), p.435.

²⁵⁶ Simon Dunstan, *The Six Day War 1967: Sinai*, (Bloomsbury USA, 2009), p.18.

authority.²⁵⁷ These series of objectives were adopted by both the Kennedy and Johnson governments. In spite of the blatant allegiance of the United States to Israel and the U.S. reluctance towards the intransigent pan-Arabism led by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Americans did their best to avoid conflict. One of the best illustrations happened when President Eisenhower asked Israeli Forces to draw back from the Egyptian area during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Nevertheless, even though President Kennedy tried to convince both Egypt and Israel to lay down their weapons, he established the foundations of the U.S.-Israeli “special relationship”.²⁵⁸ As Warren Bass has noted:

*Kennedy sold major arms to Israel for the first time, paving the way for America to become, as it were, the arsenal of Jewish democracy; he began security consultations, paving the way for full-blown military-to-military joint planning; he gave Israel its warmest security assurances to date, paving the way for even more formal American commitments to repel Arab aggression; and he even replaced Marshall's old refusal to even think about domestic political constraints when handling Israel policy, paving the way for the misty-eyed invocations of eternal US-Israel friendship that are staples of any modern presidential aspirant's standard foreign policy speech.*²⁵⁹

According to American scholar Douglas Little²⁶⁰ concerning the U.S. policy towards Israel, President Lyndon Johnson had just followed the footsteps of his predecessor Eisenhower and Kennedy. Thus, according to him, President Johnson policy towards Israel, was established upon geostrategic factors that illustrated Israel as a counterbalance to the radical Arab countries.²⁶¹ Even though Iran is not an Arab but Muslim country, its strong ties with the United States, made Iran in a special situation in the Middle East region, mainly concerning Arab-Israeli hostility. In fact, unlike the other Arab countries, Iran had de facto acknowledged Israel as a state since 1950 and provided it with oil for several years. Moreover, during the late of 1950s, the Israeli intelligence service (Mossad) in cooperation with the CIA established and instructed Iran's secret police (SAVAK).²⁶² As surprising as it might seem,

²⁵⁷ John R. Deni, Karen Smith Stegen, *Transatlantic Energy Relations: Convergence or Divergence*, (Routledge, 2016), p.15.

²⁵⁸ Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order*, (Oxford University Press, 2015), p.32.

²⁵⁹ Zach Levey, “JFK and the U.S.-Israeli Relationship”, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 379-382.

²⁶⁰ Douglass little is an American historian specializing in American diplomatic history, twentieth century America, and United States relations with the Middle East and a Professor of History at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts.

²⁶¹ David Tal, *The Making of an Alliance: The Origins and Development of the US-Israel Relationship*, (Cambridge University Press, 2022), p. 2.

²⁶² Mark J. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran*, (Cornell University Press, 1991), p.124.

during the 1960s, Iran and Israel had friendly relationships even though Israeli activities in Iran were under the counter because of the sensitive Arab-Israeli-Iranian situation. Iran's acknowledgment of Israel tarnished its relationship with Egypt to the point that diplomatic relations were ceased. Worse, under the pretext of Egyptian threat, the Shah usually legitimized his request for huge amount of military aid. This apprehension was increased by Egypt's accumulation of armaments by the Soviets especially during the Yemen civil war. In other words, the Shah rejoiced after the defeat of Egypt, nevertheless, being the leader of a Muslim state, he could not assume to overtly support Israel and thus was constrained to be in the Arab side against Israeli invasion.

For the United States, Iran represented a key element in order to find an issue to the crisis. Thus, the American government aspired from the Shah to exploit his diplomatic and economic affinities with Israel and continue to supply Tel Aviv with oil. In addition, President Johnson also expected from Shah to use his influence to recommend the Israelis to employ military restraint advice to temperate Arab states like Saudi Arabia, to out distance from Egypt. Even if in reality, Iran did not play a major role during the Six Day War, Tehran was engaged in double dealing. For instance, when the Arab nations launched an oil embargo and ceased to provide oil to Western nations, Iran refused to play the game by abiding to supply Israel and the West with oil, thereby weakening the embargo. In spite of the fact that it reinforced Iran's links with Israel, the approval of the Shah concerning UN Security Council Resolution 242, which proclaimed the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied areas during the war, was questionable by the West.²⁶³ Nevertheless, the Shah performance during the war indicated the importance of his country for the United States and the American-dominated consortium²⁶⁴ that managed Iran's oil industry. The Shah's policy of perpetuating the flow of oil to the West and Israel gave him a kind of ascendancy over the oil consortium and a strong tool to achieve his objectives. Moreover, for the American government, the subject of oil was the pillar upon which its relations with Iran relied and the basis of stability of the Middle East.

In November 1967, in the middle of negotiations with the oil consortium's delegates, Iranian representatives put forwards Iranian actions during the Six Day Wars to apply pressure on the Americans²⁶⁵. The Iranian administration declared that an augmentation in oil production

²⁶³ Anna Cornelia Beyer, *Violent Globalisms, Conflict in Response to Empire*, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), p.59.

²⁶⁴ Consortium is an agreement, combination, or group (as of companies) formed to undertake an enterprise beyond the resources of any one member.

²⁶⁵ Christopher R. W. Dietrich, *Oil Revolution*, (Cambridge University Press, 2017), p.186.

would be a just “compensation” for Iran’s support, a reasoning which was refused. The refusal of consortium was caused by the apprehension that an important augmentation of the Iranian oil production would have opposite effect on the international oil market as well as certain undesirable precedents that could be taken advantage of by other oil manufacturing nations.

After the June crisis, the Shah’s expectancy to increase Iran’s oil income was that with the U.S. help, his request would face no objection from the consortium, mainly when he compared Iran with the turmoil caused by his neighboring Arab countries. The Americans were put again in a very critical bargaining situation since the United States counted on the Shah for repressing the Soviet Union’s invasion into the Middle East. The Shah quickly became disgruntled as the protracted negotiations continued, and in answer to the Iranian government’s discontentment. The Johnson administration unwillingly forced the oil companies to make a compromise that would please the Shah and avoid the risk that he would not cooperate with Western countries in case of a new crisis. (refer to table n°2, page 123).

Table n°2: Compagnies Members of oil Consortium and their Participation:

Gulf Oil Corporation	7%
Standard Oil Company (New Jersey)	7%
Standard Oil of California	7%
Texaco Inc.	7%
The British Petroleum Company, Ltd.	40%
Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij N.V. (Groupe Royal Dutch-Shell)	14%
Compagnie Française des Pétroles	6%
The Iricon Group of Companies (Groupe de 8 U.S. compagnies which had been jointed in 1955)	5%

Source : <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1965/12/A/27028>

Nevertheless, in April 1968, American and Iranian persistence triumphed as the consortium accepted to augment the production by 16.8 per cent over the next five years.²⁶⁶ This was due

²⁶⁶ Raymond F. Mikesell, *Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case Studies of Investor-Host Country Relations*, (Routledge, 2013), p. 248.

predominantly to the insistence that the Shah made on the Johnson administration to sustain Iran's request as a reward for its primordial support during the Six Day War and the non-support of Arab oil embargo. The Johnson administration proved by applying pressure on the oil consortium and meeting the Shah's demand that as Iran's autonomy from Washington dominance enhanced, the latter was probably well advised to give in to the Shah's demands, especially with the decrease of the British presence in Iran.

In fact, for several years, the principal actor in Persian Gulf had been Great Britain. Nevertheless, after the Second World War, British economy dropped dramatically and the widespread of nationalist anti-colonial crusade got its situation worse by putting an end to her rank as an imperial power. Coping with the economic crisis, Prime Minister Harold Wilson declared in January 1968 that Britain would withdraw its military occupation in the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971²⁶⁷. The withdrawal of the British from the Middle East would probably engender disequilibrium in areas that were relying on them. In addition, the Americans apprehended that this event would cause a power vacuum that the Soviet Union or some Arab countries would take advantage of.

The American government was very skeptical about the decrease of British occupation in a region of the globe where Washington was convinced that its presence seriously impacted regional stability. The Americans' disappointment was palpable because with their involvement in Vietnam and the prospective of losing a close ally, the Americans did not want to bear alone the burden of stability. Concerning the British withdrawal, Iran had other preoccupation. Indeed, the Shah's main concern was that when the British forces decreased, President Gamal Abdel Nasser would rush to fill the vacuum. As stated by the Shah, this disquietude covered a combined endeavor by Nasser and the Soviet Union to acquire crucial routes through the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The American government acknowledge that following Britain's departure from the area, Iran's role to maintain regional stability would be crucial since the risk Soviet invasion continued the obsession of the United States. American policymakers were also aware that without the British support in the Middle East, the United States would come to depend more on Iran. Even though, Saudi Arabia was also essential to the United States being an oil- producing state, Iran had the advantage of being led by a progressive and reformist monarchical regime²⁶⁸. The concern of British retreat went far

²⁶⁷ Jeff D. Colgan, *Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order*, (Oxford University Press, 2021), 150.

²⁶⁸ Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, *A Critical Introduction to Khomeini*, (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 271.

beyond a question of handing the commend of regional safety over to the Iranians. In fact, both the Americans and Iranians had similar preoccupation to maintain the Soviet and Arab forces far from the Gulf, in order to preserve stability and a constant flux of Iranian and Saudi Arabian oil to Western region. Nevertheless, the Shah showed that he was not going to take a back seat and expressed a desire to put forward Iranian's interest before those of the Americans.

The closure of the American Agency for International Development (AID) offices in Iran in 1967, indicated an important change in the US–Iranian relationship. The resolution to interrupt the AID in Iran arose when Congress tried to reduce foreign aid expenditures. The cessation of AID reflected the end of both economic collaboration as a means to have certain control over the Shah and modernization of U.S. policy with Iran. Even though the American approach of modernization became pragmatic, the Shah was still motivated to pursue a program to develop his nation. Thus, the Shah's White Revolution had implied agricultural modernization and several social issues, such as women's rights, partially to put Iran in line with Western countries and particularly to weaken the power of the conservative clergy.²⁶⁹ Nevertheless with the end of AID program in Iran, the American government was not able to contribute to the Shah's plans. Thus, as an alternative to the AID program, the American government suggested a new scientific accord between Iran and the United States in May 1968 to boost and approve "scientific and technical exchange" in order to show its intention to maintain good relationships. Such accords displayed the decreasing American control over the Shah but with a permanent concern over the future of Iran. In spite of the fact that modernization has always been considered as an important factor for the Americans, mainly because they considered it as the most reliable means to maintain Iran secure and stable, it was no longer the main focus of U.S. policy.

These scientific exchange plans might have had certain impact in strengthening ties between the United States and Iran, but since the American AID ended, it was the military sales relationship that became means of exerting pressure on Tehran. The American government knew that even if it reached two distinct deals for \$200 million of credit over four years in 1964 and 1966, Iran had already diversified its military procurement by purchasing weapons from both Great Britain and the Soviet Union but the Shah was still eager to increase Iran's military abilities. Taking advantages from American promises to respond to Iran military

²⁶⁹ Gholam Reza Afkhami, *The Life and Times of the Shah*, (University of California Press, 2009), p.257.

needs, the Shah wrote to President Johnson to request \$800 million of military credit over the next five years²⁷⁰. Dealing with the demand of the Shah, the U.S. government faced two major problems. First, the Congress was already struggling with previous Iranian military spending and thus reluctant to accept additional credits. Second, with Iranian escalating oil profit, it would be extremely arduous to reduce Iran's military spending. In fact, Iran's income from its oil resources showed that its economic situation increasingly improved than a decade before, making it very easy for Tehran to afford its military credits. In addition, the Shah declared several times that even though he was resolute to buy American arms, he would not be against the idea of getting his supplies elsewhere even from the Soviet Union which was out of the question for the United States. The Johnson administration had obviously resigned that sustaining the Shah's military program by supplying additional credit was politically primordial. Exactly, two years after the last \$200 million in 1966, the accord of augmenting military credit to Tehran was validated with a new agreement.²⁷¹

Several reasons explained the U.S. credit, among them were the power vacuum that would be engendered by the withdrawal of Britain; the providing of great support to radical Arab states by the Soviet Union; the necessity to impede Tehran approach to Moscow for weapons; and finally, the indispensability to keep good relationships with Iran. The end of U.S. AID in Tehran was an imminent sign that arms sales, not economic assistance, became the main key of control over Iran. In addition, the recourse of military credit echoed both the Shah's influence over the United States and the importance of arms sales to Tehran as the basis of US–Iranian relations.

IV-Nixon and the Shah: from a Client to a Partner:

In April 1969, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, visited the United States to attend the funeral of President Dwight Eisenhower and to meet the new American president, Richard Nixon²⁷². Having already met the Shah in Teheran as Eisenhower's vice president just after the coup in 1953 that re-established the Shah to power, the latter was delighted to meet the new president again. For his part, Nixon had always talked positively about his strong ties with the Shah. It is this "friendship" that has characterized US-Iranian relations during Nixon presidency. This latter is usually labeled as being a specific period in US–Iranian affairs that inaugurated a new relation between Washington and Tehran that varied

²⁷⁰ Stephen McGlinchey, *US Arms Policies Towards the Shah's Iran*, (Routledge, 2014), p.50.

²⁷¹ Gholam Reza Afkhami, *The Life and Times of the Shah*, (University of California Press, 2009), p.271.

²⁷² Ibid., p.300.

considerably from the previous ones. The change in U.S. Gulf policy from balancing under Johnson to Iranian primacy under Nixon mirrored the latter's great esteem for the Shah, which developed in an enthusiasm to repose trust in Iran, mainly compared with its ally-rival Saudi Arabia to secure the Persian Gulf. This idea relies on the belief that an authentic friendship joins Nixon and Mohammad Pahlavi. Nevertheless, based on myopic vision towards Iran and the upheavals that shackled both nations at the end of the 1970s, former members of the Nixon administration have refuted the friendship of the president and the Shah. In this perspective, it is necessary to stress on the development of U.S.'s arms' sales policy towards Iran in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In fact, Nixon's 1972 blank check on arms sales was unprecedented because it eliminated all constraints on Iranian arms purchases. However, while many put in the spotlight the special bonds between Washington and Teheran during the presidency of Nixon, others refute it completely. For lot of U.S. officials, Nixon's policy has nothing particularly special, but was rather a continuity of previous administrations' policies. Indeed, it maintained a certain cohesion to several previous policies taken by Washington for a number of years.

Nixon and his national security consultant, Kissinger tried to seek to carry out a plan that would combine Nixon's general suspicion of others and Kissinger's sense of superiority with their mutual preference for close control of policy²⁷³. While Kissinger changed almost the whole staff of Lyndon Johnson, Harold Saunders was maintained as the resident Middle East specialist after the departure of Robert Komer. According to Saunders, Nixon and Kissinger were concerned about having some continuity of personnel in a region where they did not understand very much²⁷⁴. At the heart of Nixon's policy towards Iran was his so-called Nixon Doctrine, which sought to accredit to some regional allies the necessary tools to defend their regions from communism. Given Iran's specific concern, the Shah was considered as being a partner who could be important to maintain some stability and prone to spread pro-American discourse in that area. The Shah embraced Nixon Doctrine and endorsed much of its rhetoric, stating that the era when foreign powers could interfere in the Middle East and Asia was over. the Nixon and Ford presidencies coincided with many important evolvments in the area. Besides the expanding Western dependency on oil which the cost beat record because of the embargo provoked by the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the United Kingdom's withdrawal creating

²⁷³ Ben Offiler, *US Foreign Policy and the Modernization of Iran: Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and the Shah*, (University of Nottingham, 2015), p.138.

²⁷⁴ Terry Sullivan, *The Nerve Center: Lessons in Governing from the White House Chiefs of Staff*, (Texas A&M University Press, 2004), p.111.

a vacuum that necessitated a rise of U.S. alliances. Undisposed to supply soldiers, Nixon applied a “Twin Pillars’ approach” that consisted of Iran and, to some extent, Saudi Arabia, to operate as America’s delegates and to assure the protection of the newly independent Arab states.

During his visit to the United States in 1969, the Shah recommended that his country be attributed special quota to sell bigger volume of oil to the Americans. As maintained by the Shah, the arrangement would generate around \$400-500 million profit that he would then expend on military materials²⁷⁵. Reproducing the criterion of the Nixon Doctrine, the Shah declared that specific relationships of this kind would permit the U.S. to exert an impact for stability and security without getting overtly implied in hostile areas. As for the U.S. such an opportunity would consolidate relations with Iran and simplify Washington’s balance of payments difficulties. Rejecting the offer of the Shah, the Nixon administration put forwards the economic repercussions of privileging Iranian oil above the others. Doing so, Nixon proved that he was not yet ready to satiate the Shah’s excessive military spending practices.

During an animated meeting in Teheran between the Persian Gulf members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), led by Iran, and the oil companies, Washington represented by Undersecretary of State John Irwin was responsible of reassuring the Shah of Washington’s sustenance. The debate deduced with an arrangement that accorded the Persian Gulf nations a rise in their oil income by \$1.3 billion annually²⁷⁶. The triumph of the negotiation was described by the Shah’s closest advisor, Asadollah Alam as being “*a blaze of glory...a triumph for the ShahanShah, who is rapidly assuming leadership not only over the Persian Gulf, but the Middle East and the entire oil-producing world.*”²⁷⁷ In fact, because of its increasing oil income, Iran was pretending to a predominant role in the Middle East. Even though these turnrounds paved the way to important modifications within the infrastructure of international oil economy, Tehran’s latter ascendancy gave wings to the Shah to afford the military needs he had long coveted without expecting American credits.

Similar to the precedent government, Nixon foreign policy advisors knew that the decline of U.S. influence over Iran meant that they would have to be attentive to the Shah’s needs.

²⁷⁵ Roham Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf*, (Diplomatic History, 2012), p.337.

²⁷⁶ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists nov. 1976, Vol. 32, n° 9 · Magazine, p10.

²⁷⁷ Asadollah Alam, *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969-1977*, (Tauris,1991), p.200.

Despite the recession emphasis on modernization, the Americans accepted Iran's rapid rate of economic evolution during the 1970s. The outstanding contrast between the Nixon and Johnson administration was Kissinger's aversion for the Kennedy ardor for encouraging countries towards reform. Nevertheless, the idea that Kissinger's appointment as the president's national security advisor induced Washington to reject the Kennedy-Johnson insistence on Iran's economic evolution and, therefore, that this marked a blatant shift in U.S. policy towards Iran, went against two main factors. Firstly, during Lyndon Johnson presidency, the U.S. authority over Iran's spending had already decreased in a significant manner due to the rise in its oil income. Moreover, the approach of lengthening military credit embraced by the Johnson administration was for Washington a way to keep close relations with Iran rather than a desire to encourage the Shah to reforms and development.

Secondly, despite the affinities with the Shah, the Nixon administration attention was concentrated on maintaining detente with the Soviet Union, working on an opening to China, and remove the United States from Vietnam. In addition, Nixon was annoyed by the Shah's insatiable appetites for military equipment. The problem about Iran's expanding military was unjustified in Washington's eyes since there was no immediate military threat to Iran that would explain new inputs of military equipment. For the Nixon administration therefore not only saw economic evolvement essential to achieve the goal of Iranian stability but was actually doubtful about increasing arms sales to Iran. For at least his first few years in office, Nixon was as careful as his predecessors about over increasing military sales to the Shah. Nixon goals of attaining certain degree of control over the Shah in order to decrease the damage his military plan might affect Iran's economic growth corresponded to the policy pattern style followed by both Kennedy and Johnson. Rather than focusing on reforms and development, Washington emphasized on stability and security matters and a need to preserve a close relationship with the Shah, even at the cost of pushing a modernization agenda. In reality it was obvious that the Shah was pressed around increasing Iran's military capability, regarding quantity and quality of materials. If the U.S government could not restrict the Shah's military extravagance, it would at least try to ration the quantity of purchases, diverting the Shah from exorbitant expenses. By doing so, Nixon adopted the policy pattern elaborated by Lyndon Johnson. Ancient U.S. army general Douglas MacArthur repeated

advice that had been given to Lyndon Johnson by stating that “*It might be preferable for us to cede to a sale rather than to see the sale go to another supplier.*”²⁷⁸

So far from embracing a new strategy, the extension of military credit was considered by the United States as being a well-established tactic for cultivating close relations with Tehran. The hypothesis which claimed that Nixon was embracing a strategy which was different from his predecessors was weakened by an assessment of the administration’s arms sales policy by American officials in the summer of 1970. At the same period, staffs of the Departments of State and Defense contacted the embassy in Tehran declaring, “*we believe we must examine again the question of whether our military sales to Iran are in our overall interests, whether they may affect area security and stability, and whether there is a military requirement for this equipment.*”²⁷⁹ The Defense Department also enquired if Iran actually required the amount of materials the Shah was obsessed to obtain considering the instability of the area. The aims of the telegram sent to the embassy urging to evaluate the policy within the State and Defense Departments echoed this predisposition of reserve concerning the military credit policy. Douglas MacArthur fiercely criticized the suggestion of changing policy putting forward that decreasing military sales to Iran would probably conduce to a dissolution of the peculiar links that have taken years to establish under the Soviet threat. In spite of all these debates around Iran’s armament, Nixon and Kissinger, just as Johnson had, conserved the policy of resorting to credit as a way of exerting pressure and keeping the Shah on their side.

Nevertheless, the Shah’s concept of modernization did not ineluctably match to every single angle expected by the U.S. government especially after amelioration of Iran’s relationship with the Soviet Union. In fact, one of the ambitious Soviet–Iranian projects of the late 1960s was an accord to supply Iran with a steel mill near Isfahan²⁸⁰. Following this accord with Moscow, other projects soon saw the light of day, among them construction of a dam on the Aras River, set up to afford electricity for the area. The Shah’s aplomb was further enhanced by the death of two of his biggest challengers, the commander of SAVAK General Teymour Bakhtiar, and President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Internationally, Iran’s value was well established in the Middle East. In spite of the limited British political influence in the Gulf,

²⁷⁸ Andrew Scott Cooper, *The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East*, (Simon and Schuster, 2012), p.43.

²⁷⁹ FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME E–4, DOCUMENTS ON IRAN AND IRAQ, 1969–1972, Telegram 115967 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran.

²⁸⁰ Dilip Hiro, *Iran under the Ayatollahs*, (Routledge, 2013), p. 280.

their significant removal gave Iran the chance to claim its authority in the region, which was welcomed by both the Americans and the British. Moreover, the withdrawal of the British in 1971 created another chance for the Shah to prove his influence in the Persian Gulf. Iran alleged authority over the crucial islands of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa in the Strait of Hormuz, which were monopolized by the British and dominated entrance to the Persian Gulf. A claim which was fiercely rejected by the other important U.S. ally, Saudi Arabia. At the same time Washington did not want to be caught in a conflict implying two of its close allies in the Gulf. Being aware of the critical and difficult role that they found themselves in, British officials secretly informed the Shah about their withdrawal in the following 24 hours. Seizing the opportunity, the Shah immediately sent his troops to move onto the Tunbs as soon as British forces were gone. Even though the British were not proud of that anecdote, it enabled Iran to establish itself in the Tunbs without implying the United Kingdom or the United States in a sensitive area. In spite of the fact that Iran's accomplishment was not accepted by Saudi Arabia, it proved the Shah's significant dominance in the region. Nevertheless, despite the growing assurance of the Shah, Iran continued to feel threatened by Iraq. The Iraqi threat was aggravated by its close ties with the Soviet Union, which conducted the Shah to wonder whether Baghdad had become the last resort of Soviet development in the Middle East. Even though the threat of a potential attack of the region by the USSR had significantly decreased since the beginning of the Cold War, the Americans were still on the alert about attempts by Moscow to amplify its authority through radical measures in countries such as Iraq and Syria.²⁸¹

At the end of 1970, the Shah was concerned about the amplification of the Soviet influence along Iran's periphery. In fact, being a part of its tactic of expansion into the Middle East through diplomatic means, the Soviet Union signed an agreement of friendship with Iraq in April 1972.²⁸² For the Shah, the most disturbing side of the treaty was its vague promise that the two nations would agree on military issues in order to sustain mutually. In spite of the fact that the Soviet had already been providing the Ba'athist regime with weapons, the treaty amplified the risk that Iraq would permit the settlement of Soviet military bases on its territory if it was judged necessary to the security of the Soviet Union. It was in the middle of this

²⁸¹ Cyril E. Black, *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence*, (Princeton University Press, 2015), p. 312.

²⁸² John Grenville, Bernard Wasserstein, *The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts*, (Routledge, 2013), p. 411.

developing hostility between Iraq and Iran and friendship between Baghdad and Moscow that Richard Nixon came to Tehran towards the end of May 1972.

Coming from Moscow after several meetings with the Soviet, Nixon had tried to implant a bigger platform for detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. For U.S. officials, it was necessary for the president to make a halt in Tehran to comfort the Shah of the American's perpetual assistance for his regime in spite of Washington's increasing rapprochement with Moscow. The resolution to allow Iran to buy any military hardware with the important exception of nuclear weaponry strengthened the strong relationship between Nixon and the Shah. By deleting previous limitations on the Shah's purchase from the United States, Nixon had taken a step forward from his predecessors. In fact, Iran's arms acquisition would not be controlled by Washington and would have free reign.

Nixon's decision indicated the cession of any relations between military sales and Iran's internal evolvment. Nevertheless, in many aspects Nixon's new policy did not divert from that of the Johnson administration. To cope with the decline of U.S. authority over the Shah, President Johnson had amplified the amounts of military credit to Tehran in order to facilitate arms sales. The only difference was that, Johnson made it a point of honor to guarantee that all sales implied Washington's acquittance, a condition that Nixon abdicated. The quantity of arms sales approved by Johnson was also relatively inferior compared to the one of Nixon: \$200 million between 1964 and 1968; \$200 million between 1966 and 1970; plus \$100 million per year from 1968 until 1973²⁸³. Over time the U.S. ability to neglect the Shah's request was increasingly deceasing. From early stages of the Nixon administration, Iran's colossal oil wealth gave the Shah enough confidence that he could easily afford for the arms he had coveted. Along with the increasing menace from Iraq and Soviet intrusion in the Persian Gulf, it was difficult than ever for the United States to decline the Shah's demands for arms sales. The Nixon administration simply adjust itself to the developing character of the US-Iranian relationship with the only means accessible to the U.S, arms sales and by abolishing all precedent restrictions.

In the end, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon were all constrained to cope with the perspectives of an Iranian monarch growing in confidence. In fact, the Shah was not resolved to maintain his own vision of modernization but to inscribe his own perception on Iranian history. For U.S. officials, the decline of the American authority over Tehran generated a necessity to

²⁸³ Stephen McGlinchey, *US Arms Policies Towards the Shah's Iran*, (Routledge, 2014), p.89.

conserve close links with the Shah to reassure him about Washington's goodwill and making concessions concerning arms sales.

V- US-Iran Relations during the Presidency of Ford: The Beginning of the End:

The deterioration of U.S-Iran relations began immediately after the Watergate scandal, that is to say after the unsuccessful negotiations between President Ford's government and the Shah concerning American nuclear exports to Iran. To the great displeasure of the Shah, he did not have the benefit of the same particular relationship with President Ford as the one he had with Nixon. In spite of the fact that Kissinger did his utmost to sustain the intimate U.S-Iran relationship and defend a nuclear agreement, the Shah's misdemeanors were no longer tolerated as they had been under Nixon. Ford tried to calm these tensions by imposing a nuclear agreement on the Shah those implied safeguards that went above Iran's commitments under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was the most important global treaty on the world's deadliest weapon. It was a landmark international treaty whose purposes were to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to encourage cooperation in the peaceful recourse of nuclear energy and to further the objective of reaching nuclear disarmament. Iran was one of the original 62 signatories to the NPT that went into effect in 1970 and has been the standard of nuclear arms control ever since²⁸⁴. The treaty forbade nations other than United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France from possessing nuclear weapons. In return, the non-nuclear signatories were allowed to promote peaceful nuclear programs for power generation.

In the beginning, the Shah was offended by Ford's demands and rejected it, considering them as an infraction to Iran's sovereignty and a step back for Iran being treated again as a client, rather than a partner. When President Ford took the decision to conserve and reinforce arms relations with Iran, he consolidated a powerful accord that was almost impossible for a successor to destroy by maintaining the policy of his predecessor Richard Nixon. In fact, the latter had given the Shah a "blank cheque" to buy all American arms he wanted except nuclear weapons. In spite of the fact that the U.S authority would be challenged, the necessity of sustaining certain allied in the Middle East to face the threat of the Soviet Union, even during a time of détente, remained primordial.

²⁸⁴ James Ciment, *Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II*, (Routledge, 2015), p.1180.

The declassification of the diaries of former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, who worked in both the Nixon and Ford administrations, represents a crucial milestone in the process of understanding the origins of the Iranian Revolution. Brent's papers essentially divulged that in 1976 the U.S and Saudi Arabia conspired to force down oil prices in order to provoke a financial catastrophe that deteriorated Iran's economy and seriously reduced the Shah's authority. In the beginning of January 1977, Iran's economy was shattered by unprecedented turmoil in international oil markets. Substantial amounts of money in anticipated revenue were canceled by abrupt and sudden decline in regular oil exports, while total oil production dropped to 38% in comparison to the month before. Moreover, financial crisis constrained the Shah to revise its budget, annul new projects, freeze foreign aid programs, and take out a \$500 million emergency loan from Western banks²⁸⁵.

Iran misfortune was engendered by Saudi Arabia's daring action to challenge an increase in oil prices consented by the rest of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at a December 1976 meeting in Doha, Qatar.²⁸⁶ The Saudi Oil Minister, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, had declared that his government would compensate for the repercussions of the price increase by selling more of its own petroleum at a lower price. Yamani's menace to supply the market with cheaper oil never happened, but OPEC's two-tiered pricing system stayed in effect for six months and caused Iranian finances serious damage in addition to high unemployment and social unrest that paved the way to prerevolutionary situation. Historians usually argue that President Carter, a Democrat, messed up with Iran, allowing the country to become one of the main U.S. adversaries in the area. Nevertheless, the accounts connoted that his Republican predecessor not only was responsible for the Shah's collapse but also was longing for a collaboration with Saudi Arabia and precipitated the Islamic revolution.

The rise of oil prices in the beginning of 1970s started to tire the American economy, the U.S. started to be exasperated towards Iran. After the end of oil embargo on the Americans because of their support to Israel, Washington was annoyed with the Shah from keeping oil prices from falling. Several CIA analysts warned the U.S. declaring that the Shah's ambitious project of the country was creating economic paradox and cultural crisis that were stirring Iran. By late 1976 the Shah underwent a deep financial crisis so that he wanted the OPEC to raise oil prices by 25%, a request that the U.S. fiercely rejected pretexting a potential

²⁸⁵Karen A. Feste, *Terminate Terrorism: Framing, Gaming, and Negotiating Conflicts*, (Routledge, 2015), p.120.

²⁸⁶ Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz*, (Brill Archive, 1979), p.59.

disequilibrium on the world financial structure²⁸⁷. The U.S. officials, among those recommending pressure on Iran was William Simon, who worked as treasury secretary and energy czar²⁸⁸ under the Nixon and Ford administrations. Simon, had been collaborating with Saudi Arabia behind the Shah's back to try help on oil prices in return for political and military assistance. His actions were part of broader U.S. efforts to manage the oil crisis and stabilize global oil markets. As a result, Saudi Arabia emerged as a dominant player in the global oil market, further marginalizing Iran. The Shah was ruined having spent too much money on American weapons and a disproportionate modernization which forced him to abandon further plans. Consequently, the Shah started to impose drastic restrictions that provoked a rise in unemployment, a decrease of investor confidence, and consternation among middle-class Iranians. During the same year of the Doha summit, the first mass demonstrations that paved the way to the revolution arose on the streets of Teheran accentuating the economic chaos.

VI- President Carter and the Tragedy of Foreign Policy:

In 1977 the U.S. and Iran were still enjoying friendly diplomatic relationship. President Carter and Pahlavi's official discussions were focused on peace expectations for the Middle East region as well as the ways to overcome the energy crisis that had hit the U.S. and other Western countries in the early 1970s. Moreover, Carter had the ambition to have the sustain of Iran in reconvening peace talks between Israel and Egypt and to obtain Iran's cooperation in supporting nuclear non-proliferation negotiations with the Soviet Union. In the late 1970s, one of the most prerogatives of President Carter's foreign policy involved human rights. However, by 1977, the Shah's regime had accumulated disastrous reputation in the international community for its human rights record. During the year, the Shah replied to Carter's "polite reminder" by granting amnesty to some prisoners and allowing the Red Cross to visit Iranian prisons. Thereby, several liberal oppositions constituted organizations and emitted open letters revealing the Shah's misconduct. Nevertheless, Carter enraged anti-Shah Iranians with a New Year's Eve 1978 toast to the Shah in which he declared: *"Under the Shah's brilliant leadership Iran is an island of stability in one of the most troublesome regions of the world. There is no other state figure that I could appreciate and like more"*²⁸⁹. It was that stability that was threatened and shaken by protesters against the Shah including middle-

²⁸⁷ Seth Cantey, *The Middle East and South Asia 2018-2019*, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), p.9.

²⁸⁸ Energy Czar, and also later Climate Czar, is a nickname, using the political term "czar", for the person in the Government of the United States given authority over energy or climate policy within the executive branch.

²⁸⁹ John Robert Tipton, *My Iranian Revolution*, (iUniverse, 2013), p.31.

class liberals who looked for political and economic reforms, as well as communist party members and militant Islamic fundamentalists.

Islamic revolution began as an opposition to both the Shah and the United States. The exiled Ruhollah Khomeini associated the two and referred to the United States as the “Great Satan.” Pushed by democratic foreign policy, Carter officials urged the Shah to improve his government and appease the voices of discontent. But the situation was irretrievable; in January 1979, the Shah, secretly ill with cancer, fled the country for exile (initially in Egypt, and then Morocco)²⁹⁰. On February 1, 1979, the Ayatollah returned to Iran from his exile and gained control, with his proponent seizing the air force. The previously pro-Shah military abstained to launch a civil war and submitted to the new leader by the end of February.²⁹¹

Ruhollah Khomeini proclaimed Iran an Islamic Republic, restoring the country to sharia law (the theocratic law of Islamic tradition) and launching a rhetorical war against the United States. Revolutionary students apprehended an intervention from the United States, especially its Central Intelligence Agency. Nevertheless, the CIA rejected a plan to overthrow the new Iranian government. Khomeini, who referred to America as the "Great Satan", immediately replaced the Shah's prime minister by a moderate politician called Mehdi Bazargan. Until that moment, the Carter government was still optimistic about having normal relationships with Iran, but by the end of 1979, tensions between Iran and the United States reached their peak. Suffering from terminal cancer, the Shah asked to enter the United States for treatment of his cancer. The U.S. embassy in Tehran fiercely recommended American officials to oppose the request, as they were struggling to appease the tensions between the new interim revolutionary government and the United States. However, President Carter conceded to let the Shah in, after intense pressure from Henry Kissinger and other pro-Shah political leaders. Consequently, the Shah was allowed to seek treatment and find sanctuary in a luxurious residence in Santa Monica. Iranians' dubiety that the Shah was trying to machinate against the new Iranian government grew substantially giving this later an umpteenth proof that the former monarch was an American puppet. In fact, the Shah had been an exemplary U.S. ally during the Cold War especially since the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. Years following the coup, the U.S. deluged aid on Iran, while the latter served as a faithful source of oil exports. In

²⁹⁰ Antonio M. Gotto, Jennifer Moon, *Weill Cornell Medicine: A History of Cornell's Medical School*, (Cornell University Press, 2016), p.164.

²⁹¹ Mary Elaine Hegland, *Days of Revolution: Political Unrest in an Iranian Village*, (Stanford University Press, 2013), p.266.

addition, Iran was crucial for the U.S. not only for the oil it afforded but also because of its impact on OPEC and its strategic location between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, disastrous economic conditions, the disliked Pahlavi's "White Revolution", and an Islamic revival all paved the way to escalating indignation among Iranians, many among them also hated the United States for its aids to the Shah and its role in the 1953 coup.

The Shah's exile in the United States in October 1979 for medical treatment provoked mass protests all over Iran. Shortly after the Shah entry to the American soil, a group calling itself Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam assailed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took 66 American captives provoking the most memorable hostage crisis in the U.S history.

The crisis rapidly became the center of foreign and national concern, and Carter was determined to release the hostages. Refusing the Iranian request of exchanging the Shah for the liberation of the hostages, the crisis got worse for his government. Carter abandoned the idea of reaching an amicable solution to the hostage crisis and played his last card launching Operation Eagle Claw. On April 24, 1980, a group of 118 highly trained soldiers from Delta Force, an elite U.S. military unit, were to debark in the desert south of Teheran, assailed the embassy, and free the hostages²⁹². The mission was a total disaster, three helicopters broke down and the mission was aborted. As the other helicopters took off, one of them crashed and it ended with the death of eight American soldiers. The U.S. soldiers departed and were constrained to leave their dead teammates behind²⁹³. The collapse of the mission was celebrated increasing Ayatollah Khomeini's status in Iran and negatively impacting Carter's credibility in the United States. What was meant in the beginning to be a brief symbolic hostage taking lasted 444 days especially after that Khomeini had given it his full support and tarnishing the Carter administration. The latter struggled trying to solve the crisis. Khomeini enabled 13 women and an African American man hostages to be liberated, referring to the Islamic textbook not to hold women and attempting to generate discord in American public opinion by soliciting black radicalism in the United States.

Carter did not have lot of options to liberate the hostages and examined only few alternatives. In April 1980, he froze Iranian assets and impeded the shipping of military spare parts to Iran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, aggravated the situation of Carter. He got hard times with the Soviets, annulling an arms control agreement, boycotting the 1980

²⁹² Richard Trahair, *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations*, (Enigma Books, 2012), p. 281.

²⁹³ Ibid, p.282.

Moscow Olympics, and ceasing grain shipments to the Soviet Union. He also launched the Carter Doctrine, which asserting that a Soviet move on the Persian Gulf corresponded to a direct menace to the United States, but his popularity hit rock bottom especially due to his incapacity to free the hostages. Iran declined the negotiation concerning the return of the hostages until the Iraq assault in September 1980. The deterioration of American-Iranian relations, from friends to enemies, stimulated and boosted the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. The United States' resentment with Iran led it to support Iraq after the war turned against them. The United States provided Iraq with military equipment which aggravated anti-American feeling in Iran.

However, with the deterioration of U.S. economy the Republicans designated for the presidency Ronald Reagan, a long-time anti-communist who assured to get an end to détente and drastic measure against Iran. Reagan was elected in November, and on the day of his inauguration the hostages were released. With the help of Algerian government serving as a mediator, negotiations abided until an accord was attained in January 1981²⁹⁴. In exchange for the 52 hostages, Iran demanded over \$7 billion in monetary indemnity and the unfreezing of Iranian assets in the United States. The Iranian government delayed the release of the hostages for hours after Carter left officially the White House on January 20, 1981.²⁹⁵ Proponents of the takeover declared that in 1953, the American Embassy had enacted as a "den of spies" from which the coup was organized²⁹⁶. Sensitive documents were later found in the embassy connoting certain staff members had been collaborating with the Central Intelligence Agency. Afterwards, the CIA confirmed its role and that of MI6 in Operation Ajax. Carter's successor had his own batch of arduousness negotiating with Islamic radical groups to lead a trade of arms for hostages (a contradiction of Reagan's own engagement not to negotiate with hostage takers), which generated the Iran-Contra scandal in his second term. U.S.-Iranian relations have never recovered from the hostage crisis.

Forty years have now passed since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and its subsequent victory over secular Iran's absolute sovereign, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and his apparently indestructible monarchy. The revolution that overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979 formulated a set of belief about religion, social life, and political principles that were lately

²⁹⁴ Dore Gold, *The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West*, (Simon and Schuster, 2009), p. 87.

²⁹⁵ Donald Worster, *Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West*, (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.36.

²⁹⁶ Adam Parfrey, *Extreme Islam: Anti-American Propaganda of Muslim Fundamentalism*, (Feral House, 2015), p.189.

regarded axiomatic. What was beyond the bounds concerning the defeat of the shah and the ascension of power of Muslim clerics fascinated the world especially during the hostage crisis. The consequent settlement of an Islamic Republic in Iran subsequently altered the country's national policy and society and its effect resounded far beyond its borders reestablishing the geopolitics of the Middle East. In fact, since the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, Iran had become the basic part on which the U.S. relied on to protect Western interest in the area. However, the Islamic Revolution generated an overwhelming crucial loss for the United States. Four decades later, the legacy of the Islamic revolution and the hostage taking are still overwhelmingly tarnishing U.S.-Iranian relations. In Iran, the incident was regarded by the majority as a momentous collapse of American influence in Iran. Whereas in the United States, the hostage-taking was considered as a transgression of a centuries-old principle of international law that awarded diplomats immunity from arrest and diplomatic supremacy in the territory of the host country they reside. As a result of the Iranian takeover of the American embassy, the United States and Iran severed all links and had no formal diplomatic relationship since that incident.

In 2016, the BBC published a report which declared that the government of United States President Jimmy Carter had extensive contact with Ruhollah Khomeini and his administration in the beginning of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The report was relied on "declassified US diplomatic telegrams". According to the article of The Guardian, Khomeini *"went to great lengths to ensure the Americans would not jeopardize his plans to return to Iran - and even personally wrote to US officials"* and promised them not to worry about their interests in Iran, particularly oil. According to the report again, in exchange, Carter's government helped Khomeini and made guaranteed that the Shah's army would not attempt a military coup²⁹⁷. Iran's political leaders had rejected these declassified documents putting in doubt their veracity. Even though, on 27 January 1979, Khomeini told the Americans weeks before the overthrow of Shah's government; *"It is advisable that you recommend to the army not to follow BakhtiarYou will see we are not in any particular animosity with the Americans....There should be no fear about oil. It is not true that we wouldn't sell to the US"*.²⁹⁸

Before the Islamic revival, the United States was Iran's predominant economic and military partner. Moreover, with almost 30,000 Americans expatriates living in Iran for technical, consulting and teaching purposes, it made easy the modernization process of Iran's

²⁹⁷ Saeed Kamali Dehghan, *David Smith*, the Iranian Revolution, *The Guardian*, 10 June 2016

²⁹⁸ Ray Takeyh, *The Last Shah*, (Yale University Press, 2021), p.236.

infrastructure and industry. Even though, several analysts put forward that the process modernization may have been too brisk which exasperated an important part of the population in the country and conducted to the Revolution in 1979.²⁹⁹

Besides losing all international assistance in the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was unsuccessful to get any of the concessions it had asked to the United States. After the hostage crisis, the United States Executive Order 12170 froze about \$12 billion in Iranian assets, including five bank deposits, gold and other properties³⁰⁰. As maintained by American officials, most of those were released in 1981 as part of the Algiers Accords in exchange to the hostages. However, some assets Iranian officials declared \$10 billion (but U.S. officials stated less) are still frozen, awaiting legal steps arising from Iran. Today, some \$1.973 billion of Iran's assets remain frozen in the United States, and the U.S. has not imported any oil from Iran since 1992.³⁰¹

The results of the sanctions on Iran's have amplified anti-American feeling amongst Iranians and only served to reinforce the energy of Iranian politicians and religious leaders in depicting the United States as the common enemy. Through the years, chants and slogans such as "Death to America" and the burning of the U.S. flag have been frequent characteristics of several protestation and public events in Iran, even nowadays, mainly because of the impacts of the Iranian hostage crisis have lingered. The Americans still nourish deep suspicion about the Middle East and Islamic world. beginning with the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis and worsening after the attacks of September 11, 2001. In fact, since the terrorist attacks generations of Americans came to see the Islamic world with great suspicion. Even though certain American presidents have tried to appease this animosity, especially with the rise of hate crime incidents perpetrated against Arab and Muslim communities.

VII-The Iran-Contra Affair

On the fifth of October of 1986, Nicaraguan government forces shot down an American cargo plane carrying supplies intended for the Contras, a rebel groups whose purpose was to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. One month later, a report about a secret trip made by the personnel of the government of President Ronald Reagan to Iran was

²⁹⁹ Ian Bremmer, Preston Keat, *The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge in an Uncertain World*, (Oxford University Press, 2010), p.84.

³⁰⁰ Shirzad Azad, *East Asia and Iran Sanctions: Assistance, Abandonment, and Everything in Between*, (Springer Nature, 2022), p.72.

³⁰¹ Shirzad Azad, *Koreans in Iran: Missiles, Markets and Myths*, (Algora Publishing, 2018), p.68.

divuligated by a Middle Eastern journalist. The report revealed that Reagan's staff had been to Iran to negotiate the sale of missiles in return of the liberation of American hostages retained in Lebanon. Apparently, these two incidents were distinct and had nothing to do with each other, however, the world quickly found out the link between these two affairs and the ensuing scandal named as the Iran-Contra affair.

The Iran-Contra Affairs was a direct consequence of the Reagan government's foreign policies toward in all probability two separate nations, Nicaragua and Iran. The U.S. government thought that alterations that happened to these two areas in the 1970s menaced the American interests and authority.³⁰² The affair stemmed from the decision of the Reagan's administrations despite the U.S. trade embargo to sell weapons to Iran, a country which was desperately in need of materiel during its conflict with Iraq. In return, Iran was expected to use its influence to secure the release of American hostages held in Lebanon. The materials and weapons were sold at expensive prices, and the benefit of this transaction was used to fund the Contras, a rebel group aiming to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.

In Nicaragua, a socialist movement called the Sandinistas took power through a bloody revolution in 1979 which led to the loss of tens of thousands of Nicaraguan lives and a worldwide violent debate. Apprehending a general proliferation of socialism throughout Latin America, the government backed paramilitaries named the contras who tried to topple the new revolutionary regime the left-wing Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The support for the Contras by the Americans was driven by an anti-communist ideology and geopolitical concerns about the emergence of communism in Central America.

Meanwhile, power was also transferred in Iran when a radical Islamic movement toppled the U.S.-backed government. Considering that the revolutionary government was hostile toward the United States and potentially tied with the Soviet Union, the Administration tried to support moderate elements within Iran, a policy that became more complex when Iranian-backed Lebanese terrorist groups seized American hostages³⁰³. Furthermore, Ruhollah Khomeini overtly declared his intention to spread his Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East and overthrow the governments of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other states around the Persian Gulf. This was enough for the American government to sound the alarm and perceived Khomeini as a serious threat to the United States.

³⁰² M.B. Malik, *Double Standards*, (Matador, 2016), p. 208.

³⁰³ Ibid, p. 209.

It was Iran's need for weapons, and the United States' desire to re-open diplomatic relations that led to the Iran arms deal which resulted the scandal of contra affair. The wider framework of the scandal implied the Reagan administration's secret backing of the Contras. This was done in spite of the Boland Amendment³⁰⁴ passed by the U.S. Congress, which prohibited the federal government from supplying any assistance to the Contras with the intention of toppling the Nicaraguan government.³⁰⁵

The American administration undertook a covert weapons deal and other transactions that either were banned by the U.S. Congress or infringed the asserted government's public policy. The arms-for-hostages proposition had split the U.S. administration, with some members, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz, opposing the deal.³⁰⁶ However, with the backing of the president, the project developed until the illegal sale of arms to Iran. The transaction had permanent backlashes for various personnels of the Reagan administration, with many members being sued for obstruction of justice to perjury and retention of evidence.

The Iran-Contra Affair were pivotal incidents that marked the political landscape of the 1980s and had durable repercussions on U.S. foreign policy and international relations especially in the Middle East and Central America. This clandestine activity had legal and diplomatic implications, potentially affecting Iran's standing in the international scene. The affair was lately acknowledged by President Reagan himself as being a mistake during his deposition before Congress, pointing out that the decision was not without contestation and was later acknowledged as a political "faux pas".

VIII- Human Rights and Ideological Conflicts:

The relationship between the United States and Iran has been characterized by lots of ideological disagreements and human rights issues. The American government assigns the degradation of their rapports to the 1979-81 Iran hostage crisis, Iran's recurrent human rights violations since the Islamic Revolution, several constraints on the use of espionage procedures, its anti-Western ideology in addition to its nuclear program.

³⁰⁴ Named after its chief sponsor, Democratic Rep. Edward P. Boland from Massachusetts, the Boland Amendment refers to two U.S. legislative amendments passed between 1982 and 1984, both aimed at limiting U.S. government assistance to the Contras in Nicaragua.

³⁰⁵ James Ciment, *Postwar America An Encyclopedia of Social, Political, Cultural, and Economic History*, (Taylor & Francis, 2015), p. 159.

³⁰⁶ Kyle Longley, *Deconstructing Reagan Conservative Mythology and America's Fortieth President*, (M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 110.

On the other hand, the motives behind Iranian resentment towards the United States concern the conflict between the Islamic doctrine and what they consider as a tyrannical and oppressive authority, the overwhelming U.S backing for Israel, and the Iranian government's rancor for the American implication in the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 when he attempted to nationalize Iran's oil industry. Iran has been blamed for serious human rights abuses especially during the White Revolution, such as illegal and random murders, arbitrary arrest or detention, obligatory deportation, torture, and indecent incarceration circumstances. The UN Human Rights Council has indicated to the commission of international crimes the killing, arrest or forced exile, rape and torture of lots of people especially human rights lawyers and activists during uprisings³⁰⁷.

The US has also imposed sanctions on individuals and entities in Iran for these human rights violations, particularly those perpetuated against women and girls, among them those performed in the course of the violent repression on protests in Iran. The situation may lead to confusion when we notice that while the Americans have denounced human rights abuses in Iran, the U.S has always turned a blind eye to human rights abuses in Israel for example. Critics argue that American administration's assertion that Israel has not infringed worldwide humanitarian law is condemned by human rights advocates, who argue it misrepresents facts to legitimize ongoing arms supply despite blatant evidence of rights breaches. Should not be important for the United States to address human rights abuses with the same degree of urgency, regardless of where they occur and who perpetrates them.

The American administration's criticism of human rights violations in Iran, while coping with disapproval for its response to human rights abuses in Israel, has a notable effect on global human rights advocacy. The juxtaposition of these standpoints may lead to a deep analysis of the American contradictions in dealing with human rights abuse in a different geopolitical area. This energy and controversy can boost the global discourse on the prominence of human rights issues. It may incite and stimulate a debate on the apparent discrimination in handling human rights violations and the probable effects of geopolitical actions to start, direct, or prevent a specific policy change.

³⁰⁷ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/iran/report-iran/>, last accessed (10/12/2023).

VIII- 1- Ideological Conflict and its Impact on U.S Iran Relations:

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been known to challenge the universalization of human rights, with political propagandist advocating a total repudiation of the Western concept of human rights. Iran's devotion to spread the seeds of the Islamic Revolution in areas like Europe, Africa, and Latin America have been fulfilled and prioritized by its foreign policy to discredit the American supremacy and become the leading authority in the Middle East. From that historical event and for these reasons, ideologies and political posturing have been a main part in the disagreement between Iran and the United States. The two nations have collaborated in certain situations; however, the ideological perspectives and activities of each country have discouraged further sustained collaborations mainly because of the ideological positions of each country.

First and foremost, it is important to understand the meaning of the word ideology to fully understand its impact on the relation between Iran and the United States. Initially, the term ideology was a concept introduced by Destutt de Tracy in 1796 as the name for his own “science of ideas”. His philosophy of *idéologie* aimed to explain concepts and deliver guarantees of trustworthy knowledge. He put forward the importance of human sensations in the formation of knowledge, emphasizing the physiological nature of sensation, and analyzed ideas into the sensory elements of which he believed them to be composed.³⁰⁸ For Tracy, the perfect ideology was the product of the impact of the environment on what people think. He assumed that understanding this origin of idea would help make people more in harmony with their environment and thus more productive and fruitful.

According to Christine Sypnowitch³⁰⁹ ideologies are not merely abstract ideas but serve specific political purposes. They can reinforce existing power structures and influence social norms and legal frameworks. This perspective aligns with the view that ideologies often exist to support particular interests or viewpoints rather than to seek objective truth. Sypnowitch's work on cultural heritage also touches on ideology, as she investigates how cultural narratives and values are constructed and maintained through ideological frameworks. This exploration highlights the role of ideology in shaping collective identities and societal priorities. On the

³⁰⁸ <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Antoine-Louis-Claude-Comte-Destutt-de-Tracy>.

³⁰⁹ Christine Sypnowitch is a Professor of Philosophy at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario. She is also cross-appointed to the Faculty of Law and serves as the Head of the Philosophy Department. Her academic work focuses on various areas, including political philosophy, jurisprudence, and feminist philosophy.

other hand, Daniel Bell³¹⁰ argues that the traditional ideologies of the 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly socialism and communism, had lost their relevance and effectiveness in addressing the complexities of modern society.³¹¹

On this view, ideology is far from being a science, as De Tracy contends, or any set of action-oriented beliefs as Bell puts it, is inherently conservative, quietist, and epistemically unreliable. Ideology conserves by camouflaging flawed social conditions, giving an illusory account of their rationale and role, in order to legitimate and win acceptance of them.³¹² These perspectives on the current impact of ideology have all a common trait of influence on a specific group that goes against any desired result of common interest. Since ideology is the primary source of conflict history shows us how it has been the case of trouble for the United States and Iran since 1979 to 2016.

Taking into account international concept facilitate the way we grasp the U.S- Iranian conflict revealing a critical fact. The point is that each country concocts an ideology based on the way each one discerns the threat that the other constitutes. On the American side, the U.S. government is apprehensive about the Iranian lust for nuclear weapons to terrorize the West. On the other side, Iran thinks that the U.S. wants to impede Iranian nuclear eagerness and appropriate this power. In a constructivist view, the state of US-Iran relations cannot be solely attributed to conflicting geopolitical, military, or economic interests. Instead, it is argued that the relationship is shaped by ideas and narratives of grievance and threat developed in each country about the other. These ideas and narratives are often rooted in historical events and have led to the construction of intersubjective meanings characterized by hostility, trauma, and distrust. Alexander Wendt applies Constructivism to the international state system, arguing that states are engaged in social relationships which derive meaning independently of the actual material environment. In Wendt's theoretical view, states begin their interactions with a blank slate: nothing predisposes them to conflict or to cooperation.³¹³

The constructivist approach puts forward that the development of the Iranian-U.S. relationship is impacted by the intersubjective meaning built with animosity, trauma, and suspicion, which has undoubtedly deteriorated the relations since 1979. This outlook indicates that the relationship is not simply fueled by material interests but is also stimulated by thoughts and

³¹⁰ Daniel Bell, a prominent sociologist and intellectual, is best known for his influential work "The End of Ideology," published in 1960.

³¹¹ <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/daniel-bell-and-the-end-of-ideology/>, last date accessed (23/12/2023).

³¹² <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-ideology/>

³¹³ <https://internationalrelations6.blogspot.com/2015/09/constructivism-is-arguably-most.html>

historical discourses that have evolved in both sides. The constructivist view provides a new perspective by drawing attention to the necessity of understanding and handling the thoughts and historical discourses that have molded the relationship and led to all these hostilities.

IX- Media's Role in Shaping U.S- Iran Relations:

The media and public perception of Iran-US relations have been influenced by various factors, including diplomatic interactions, historical events, and media portrayals. The work of Ferrero in 2009, titled "*The Iran Narrative: The Ideational Context of US Foreign Policy Decision-Making toward the Islamic Republic of Iran*," offers precious perceptions to the ideational context of U.S foreign policy decision-making concerning Iran. The study explores the way sociopolitical hypothesis was made in producing news about Iran and how the news discourse still shapes the rapports between the nation and the world specifically the United States. Using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a multidisciplinary approach, the study focused on 171 front-page TNYT news articles from 2001 until 2009. The analysis divulged that the news media depicted an overall negative picture of Iran especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11. This unfavorable representation aggravated the bad image of Iran as the "*negative Other*," impacting specific insights and positions towards the country, mainly in the context of U.S foreign policy decision-making.³¹⁴ This aligns with the constructivist view, which emphasizes the importance of ideas and narratives in shaping international relations, including the relationship between the United States and Iran.

The media has been used in both countries as a "soft power"³¹⁵. In 2012, Joseph Nye of Harvard University showed that with soft power, "*the best propaganda is not propaganda*", he added that during the Information Age, "*credibility is the scarcest resource*" In this book he wrote: "*when one country gets other countries to want what it wants might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants*"³¹⁶

The media excels at the use of soft power, roughly because it allows countries to forecast their values, ideals, and culture across borders. This ascendance is often accomplished through

³¹⁴https://www.academia.edu/7707193/The_Iran_Narrative_The_Ideational_Context_of_US_Foreign_Policy_Decision-Making_toward_the_Islamic_Republic_of_Iran, last accessed (02/01/2024).

³¹⁵ In politics (and particularly in international politics), soft power is the ability to co-opt rather than coerce (in contrast with hard power). It involves shaping the preferences of others through appeal and attraction. Soft power is non-coercive, using culture, political values, and foreign policies to enact change.

³¹⁶<https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304451104577389923098678842>, last accessed (02/01/2024).

channels like radio, television news, music, and social media, and it is seen as a fundamental element of a country's soft power tactic. Whereas hard power is implemented through military resort, economic sanction and manipulation at times, soft power acts smoothly with persuasion and embellishment. The media's role in framing perceptions and diffusing makes it a primary means for government to apply soft power on the international scene.

Whereas there has been significant attention in the United States concerning Iran's military powers and actions, less focus has been given to Iran's "soft power" and its endeavor to spread its ascendancy. Iran is clearly involved in a "soft war" with the west, mainly the United States. according to the former Iranian intelligence chief Heidar Moslehi, "*We do not have a physical war with the enemy, but we are engaged in heavy information warfare with the enemy.*"³¹⁷

Iran resorts to formal and informal means to conduct its soft war, among these means, the country employs official television broadcasting via organizations like the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting to informal cultural centers. However, Iran has certain defects that arose from its authoritarian regime. In fact, it is evident that the United States' support of democratic values, open markets, and free press are regarded significant weaknesses for Iran. These strengths of the United States are seen as defects for Iran because of its authoritarian system, self-perception as the vanguard of Shia Islam, and several limitations in its political authority, economy, military, and diplomatic position leading to inefficiency and corruption. These factors have created vulnerabilities for Iran, making it susceptible to external influence and pressure.³¹⁸

Furthermore, the Iranian authoritarian political system and the country's efforts to limit and supervise access to information make it sensitive to Western information campaign. To that point, the West especially the United States should increase their energy to rival with Iran beyond military, financial, and diplomatic methods by also through soft power. Since soft power is about influencing the choices of others by co-opting rather than coercing them, the Iranian government applied this definition at a higher level. The regime has not been committed to just convince others through lures, but has also tried to affect the citizens through manipulation and even distortion of information. Soft power in Iran is indissolubly

³¹⁷"Iran Adopts Aggressive Approach Toward Enemies," *Tehran Times*, July 18, 2011, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/244231/Iran-adopts-aggressive-approach-toward-enemies>, last accessed (06/01/2024).

³¹⁸ <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/irans-foreign-policy-weaknesses-and-opportunities-to-exploit-them/>, last accessed (06/01/2024).

related to its radical ideology and imperial heritage. Additionally, it is profoundly determined by Ruhollah Khomeini's understanding of political principles within Twelver Shia Islam³¹⁹, the predominant religious group in Iran, which he thought was the best way to create a perfect Islamic government. Bearing in mind Khomeini's maxim "neither East nor West but Islamic Republic" highlighted his ideal of the Islamic revolution to transcend the Iranian borders and spread it throughout the Middle East. Soft power in Iran can also be interpreted by what is confronted to i.e. the West, especially the American culture and its foreign policy. In fact, Iranian rulers have frequently manifested their apprehension concerning the American supremacist aspiration in the Middle East in addition to anti-Zionist and anti-Sunni stance.

Iranian handling of soft power is completely opposed with Western region like the United States, where soft power is the responsibility of adept entertainment sector which are usually non-governmental.³²⁰ Western countries enjoy considerable hard power benefit, putting Iran in a difficult, almost impossible posture to overcome the West. Therefore, having recourse to soft power for the Iranian leaders is recognition of a fact and a tactical attempt to stay competitive and plausible on the global scene. Formal and informal organizations like the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, cultural centers, universities, and charitable foundations were created in order to generate "cultural trenches" to preserve the nation's credibility.³²¹ One of the main media companies directed by Iran is named "*Seda va Sima-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslami-e Iran*", which means "*The Voice and Vision of the Republic of Iran*." The company which is usually called the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) was set up after the Islamic revolution in 1979. Its logo posted below features two intertwined characterization of the Arabic word "laa", signifying "no," which represent defiant Iran saying "no" to the West (United States) and the East (Soviet Union).³²² (refer to figure n°4, page 149).

Figure n°4: Logo of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting

³¹⁹ Twelver Shia Islam is characterized by its belief in the succession of twelve divinely ordained leaders, the occultation of the 12th Imam, and its significant influence in certain geographical regions.

³²⁰ Edward Wastnidge, "The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power: From Cultural Diplomacy to Soft War," *Politics* 35, nos. 3-4 (2015): 364-377.

³²¹ Babak Rahimi, "Censorship and the Islamic Republic: Two Modes of Regulatory Measures for Media in Iran," *The Middle East Journal* 69, no. 3 (Summer 2015): 375.

³²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Broadcasting.



Source : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Broadcasting

The IRIB's assignment was to draw attention and rekindle the newly established Islamic Republic as well as the sacred spirit of the Islamic Revolution that reject all kind of Western interventions at all levels. Yet, nowadays, Iran monopolizes all national and radio broadcasting which is constitutionally mandated to act as Iran's sole legal TV and radio broadcaster, demonstrating the only recognized ideology and propagating its perception of Islam.³²³ The organization also manages several international news television channels, satellite television channels for international viewers, and provincial television channels all over the country including parliamentary networks.

However, despite the strict prohibition, lots of Iranian households possess satellite dishes that give them access to different Persian-language channels, including international broadcasters. The possession of these satellite dishes is technically illegal, and the authorities have been known to confiscate them, especially following periods of discords. It is essential to keep in mind that while the IRIB preserve a monopoly over television and radio broadcasting, there is a myriad of news and opinions accessible online and in the press. In addition, Western broadcasters such as BBC Persian TV intended to target Iranian audiences despite the fact that their satellite broadcasts have been confronted to intentional interference from within Iran.³²⁴ In parallel with other facet of the country soft power, the Iranian government set up the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO) as an effort to boost and rehabilitate cultural and religious extension. Considerably centralized, the ICRO is potentially controlled by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic but is financed by and submitted to the supreme leader's cabinet. The organization task is to increase affinities with different populations and nations on the international scene especially Muslim countries through educational, religious,

³²³ Ilan Berman, *Digital Dictators: Media, Authoritarianism, and America's New Challenge*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2018), p. 102.

³²⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14542234>, last accessed (07/01/24).

and artistic events and exhibitions³²⁵. The ICRO adapts its messages in line with the target audience. For instance, Persian communities are intended in areas such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan along with Shia communities in Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Syria. Cultural exhibitions are done by the ICRO abroad especially for Iranian expatriates to boost Persian culture, language and literature. The organization is also in charge of a local publishing shop acknowledged internationally called Al Hoda which prints and spread literature on Iran and Persian culture in 25 languages³²⁶.

Even though companies such as IRIB and ICRO do not have as much international influence as their rivals such as BBC or Al Jazeera, Iran' soft power has more than one trick up its sleeve. In fact, Iran is spreading its ideology via a judicious system of television programs, social media market, cultural corporations, and other official and unofficial platforms organizations.

Nevertheless, even if the country is reaching unexpected regions of the planet through these programs, its soft power has certain defects. The drawbacks stand in the degree of corruption in Iran and the difficulty to reach Sunni regions due to differing identities. Moreover, Iran's authoritarian political strategy and efforts to control access to information undermines the nation in terms of ideological competition towards Western countries like the United States. This vulnerability draws attention to the challenges and constraints related to the recourse of soft power in Iran, including limitations in informal alliances, sectarian and ethnic aspects, economic competition, weakness facing ideological competition, and limitations in cultural expansion.

Through the looking glass, Iranian leaders have raised the alarm concerning the growing concern and interest of the Iranian population towards the West especially American culture and its political laxness. Iranian apprehension has increased concerning the concept of "*Westoxification*"³²⁷ that involves the loss of Iranian culture to the detriment of Western arts and education which are considered as being a part of Western soft power strategy. As Ayatollah Khamenei deplored it:

³²⁵ Amin Saikal, *Iran Rising The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic*, (Princeton University Press, 2021), p. 161.

³²⁶ Peter Mandaville, *The Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power: How States Use Religion in Foreign Policy*, (Oxford University Press, 2023), p.129.

³²⁷ Reflecting the tension between Iran and the West, the term "Westoxification" has been used in Iranian discourse to describe the perceived negative influence of Westernization on Iranian society. It reflects concerns about the erosion of traditional values and the spread of social ills typically associated with the modern, Western world.

The issue of engineering information and the new means of mass communication that have entered the arena are all tools for dominating the culture of a country . . . The same is true of the internet, of cyberspace, and of information services and tools. These things cannot be in the hands of the enemy. Yet, today they are in his hands. Today, [the media networks] are tools and instruments for cultural infiltration. Today, they are the enemy's tools for cultural domination.³²⁸

Influential Iranian scholars, such as Samad Behrangi, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, and Ali Shariati, have increased the discourse on Westoxification. Their works have highlighted the effect of Western impact on the Iranian society and the urgency to protect the Iranian culture in the face of foreign cultural influences. Khamenei has also expressed disquietude concerning the exposure and sensitivity of the youth towards the temptation of Western culture. The Iranian leader anxiety is justified when it is known that a least 70 percent of the citizens possess satellite dishes to stream Western channels, in spite of their prohibition by the Iranian government. In fact, A large proportion of the population receives some unfiltered news and information that have the impact which Khamenei dreaded.³²⁹

Obviously, a domestic movement exists within the Iranian society that strive to oppose the regime by discrediting it, however, the extent of the impact of foreign media that has incited this opposition is disputable. Stimulated by lot of resentment and frustration against the government's economic policies, Khamenei's totalitarian regime, women's condition and corruption, lots of Iranians have expressed their discontentment in several manifestations between 2017 and 2019.³³⁰

Iran's theocratic regime and its attempts to control access to information make it vulnerable to a U.S. and Western information campaign, indicating that the U.S strengths including its democratic values and commitment to a free and independent media are parts of Iran's most acute weaknesses. It is evident that the U.S. exploits these weaknesses through ideological means, such as promoting pluralism, democratic principles, and open markets, which are sadly lacking in Iran. The relationship of the media with the American government molds considerably the public opinion of worldwide incidents especially concerning the Middle East. However, apprehension exists concerning the credibility of these news due to the media tendency to exaggerate an event to correspond and sustain the government's discourse. These

³²⁸ Ayatollah Khamenei, "Speech on 27th Demise Anniversary of Imam Khomeini," June 3, 2016, <http://english.khamenei.ir/news/3891/Ayatollah-Khamenei-s-Speech-on-27th-Demise-Anniversary-of-Imam>, last accessed (07/01/24).

³²⁹ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-soft-war-iran>, last accessed (07/01/24).

³³⁰ <https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/more-protests-no-progress-the-2018-iran-protests/>, last accessed (07/01/24).

exaggerations are usually reached with elaborated strategies through several platforms, from television, radio and social media.

Conclusion

Iran and the United States have had relations with each other since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and American missionaries have been there even longer than that period. Nevertheless, the American' real engagement with Iran exists really from the Second World War. Their cooperation has been extremely close and privileged, but the relationship took a turning point, initially with the implication of the CIA in the coup of 1953 which caused the overthrow of the prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh, and then by the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which led to an irreversible split. In fact, the two prior partner became enemies referring to each other, respectively, as the "Great Satan" and a member of an "Axis of Evil."³³¹

The different interactions between the United States and Iran have had an aggregated impact on Iran's identity, both the one constructed for it by the U.S and the one it constructs for itself. These interactions have informed and forged Iran's identity, impacting its interests and attitudes. Furthermore, regarding Iran the media has always followed specific narrative that reflected the American advocacy. This attitude has generated a reflection of Iran as a pariah nation, governed by a dictator and implicated in terrorist activities. Nevertheless, the evolving media landscape, the influence of social media, and the polarization of political values have all contributed to a growing awareness of the interactions of government and media. Likewise, the war in Iraq was launched on the basis of false declaration of the presence of weapons of mass destruction and links with al-Qaeda which resulted in an awful number of victims and colossal cost. The absence of judicial proceedings against those who were responsible for the war, like George W. Bush and his administration remains disturbing. Perhaps, it is because this necessitated the fostering of critical minds, requirement for government transparency and the commitment of a strict selection of media sources. By doing so, populations can empower themselves to forge a narrative that gives priority to justice and international cooperation.

Chapter four: U.S. Foreign Policy in Iran in the Aftermath of 9/11

I- Introduction

³³¹ Avery Elizabeth Hurt, *U.S.-Iran Relations*, (Greenhaven Publishing LLC, 2017), p. 37.

The United States has long been assigned as the “indispensable nation” a pillar of international security and order especially after the Second World War. The nation has raised democracy and opposed dictatorships as well as human rights abuses, worldwide with economic, diplomatic, and military actions. Yet in the post 9/11 era, the question of what role the United States should take on the world stage and its military spending concerning foreign policy is debatable. In fact, a current survey states that a lot of countries believe that the United States is playing the role of the “Policeman” more than it should be³³². In line with debates on Reddit³³³, some put forward that the existence of a superpower or two with the capacity of stabilizing the world is suitable, as they can stop intensive conflicts and furnish assistance to countries in distress. This standpoint highlights the utility of superpowers in international equilibrium.³³⁴

The perception of the United States as the "policeman" of the world is a multifaceted issue that involves international relations, defense spending, and public confidence in law enforcement which were put under the spotlight after the attacks of 9/11. In fact, the U.S foreign policy altered in many distinct manners after the terrorist attacks perpetrated against the United States on September 11th, 2001, especially concerning the number of the U.S interventions in foreign conflicts, the money spent in defense and particularly the redefinition of a new worldwide enemy as terrorism.

After the election of George W. Bush in the beginning of 2001, the first decision he took as a president concerning foreign policy was the settlement of a "missile shield" over parts of Europe. The shield was placed to add more security against external menace such as North Korea or Iran. Making the fight against terrorism his main objective, President Bush displaced the focus of his foreign policy. In a speech given on September 20, 2001 he declared:

We will direct every resource at our command every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.....we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism, every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with

³³² James Steinberg, Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, (Princeton University Press, 2014), p.54.

³³³ Reddit is a popular social news aggregation, web content rating, and discussion website with a significant influence. It is organized into areas of interest called "subreddits," covering topics ranging from news and entertainment to niche hobbies and interests.

³³⁴https://www.reddit.com/r/PoliticalDiscussion/comments/27pgry/if_the_united_states_was_not_the_worlds_police/?rdt=49174, last accessed (18/07/2024).

One of the most important modifications in the American foreign policy was the center of attraction on preventive rather than preemptive actions³³⁶ which were also known as the Bush Doctrine. The expression of "Bush Doctrine" is assigned to the U.S. foreign policy approach that President George W. Bush exercised during his two terms from January 2001 to January 2009 and it was the foundation for the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. The term 'preemptive war' is usually confounded with the term 'preventive war'. The difference is that a preventive war is cast to dismantle a possible menace of a particular group or nation, when an assault by that group or country is not imminent. A preemptive war is made when apprehending a possible attack from another country, which is considered by lot of politicians as being a sort of aggression and thus illegal³³⁷. Nevertheless, launching a preemptive war is less dangerous and has less consequence than does the launching of a preventive war. The Bush Doctrine was based on preemptive actions. It emphasized the idea of preemptive war and the legitimacy of a preventive strike, affirming the United States' right to act preemptively in exercising its inherent right of self-defense. The doctrine's emphasis on preemptive actions and the legitimacy of preventive strikes was a significant departure from previous foreign policy strategies and had implications for international relations and the use of military force.

When one side is the first to launch an armed attack that is to say "break the peace" without any forearmed assault from the other side and with no authorization from the UN Security Council, is completely illegitimate. However, some authors and politicians argue that when a potential enemy seems to concoct a future possible assault, even if the attack has not been made, that attack has in fact 'already started'³³⁸. In warfare preemptive, attacks are often used by countries when these later suspect an eminent attack from their enemies. For instance, during the presidency of Harry S. Truman, there was an assault against South Korea from North Korea in 1950 and Truman' administration urged the president to retaliate. Truman promptly decided that the United States would fight to aid South Korea. He announced the ordering of U.S. air and naval forces to South Korea to aid the democratic nation in repulsing

³³⁵<https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv>, last accessed (18/07/2024).

³³⁶ A preemptive war is a war that is commenced in an attempt to repel or defeat a perceived imminent offensive or invasion, or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending (allegedly unavoidable) war shortly before that attack materializes. It is a war that preemptively 'breaks the peace'.

³³⁷ Shue, Henry and Rhodin, David, *Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification*, (Oxford University Press, 2007), p.116.

³³⁸ <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/>, last accessed (18/07/2024).

the invasion by communist North Korea. This decision was made to enforce a United Nations resolution calling for an end to hostilities and to stem the spread of communism in Asia.³³⁹

The doctrine of preemption regained strength again after 9/11, especially with the U.S. invasion of Iraq. George W. Bush administration insisted to interfere and intercept Saddam Hussein from using or giving terrorist groups Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Claiming that American and international security was in danger, the Congress passed its mutual determination in October 2002 allowing the United States to dismantle the regime of Saddam Hussein³⁴⁰. Yet, soon after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States amplified its policy adding preventive warfare. However, it was later asserted that no nuclear or biological weapons competence existed and that the administration of Bush was mistaken. The Iraqi war was launched to prevent some perceived but not clear evident threat. The inability to locate WMD in Iraq led to widespread skepticism and criticism of the intelligence that had been used to justify the invasion. This raised questions about the accuracy and reliability of intelligence assessments, both within the United States and among its international allies.

Besides Iraq, the United States has also seen its relations with Iran getting degraded. In fact, there have been evidence throughout the previous chapters that the relationship between the United States and Iran has been complex and has undergone significant shifts especially since the Islamic Revolution. However, the period before and after 9/11 witnessed a complex interplay of cooperation, missed opportunities, and deteriorated relations between the United States and Iran. Before the 9/11 attacks, U.S-Iran relationship was dominated by historical incidents and long-lasting mutual tension. Iran's implication in several local conflicts and its support for extremist ideas had strained relations with the Americans. On the other hand, there have also been few collaborations, such as Iran's support to U.S. forces and the rebels Afghanistan in the 2001. Immediately after the attacks of 9/11, there were initial indications of probable coordination between the two nations to topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and worked directly with the State Department to restore the recent government in Kabul. Mohammad Khatami who was Iran's president at that time, strongly disapproved the attacks manifesting his sympathy to the United States which gave glimmer of hope for a possible switch in Iran's foreign policy towards a more conciliable relations with the U.S.

³³⁹ <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/truman-orders-u-s-forces-to-korea-2>, last accessed (18/07/2024).

³⁴⁰ George, and Jens Ohlin, *Defending Humanity*. New York, (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.264.

However, this brief cooperation abruptly fell through when President George W. Bush introduced Iran into the "Axis of Evil" during his first State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, alongside Iraq and North Korea. The concept of an axis of evil, comprising Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, citing their potential harm to the United States and its allies by potentially providing WMD and missiles to terrorists. This pejorative categorization, along with ensuing events, paved the way to the decline of relations between the two nations.

II- The Bush Doctrine:

The term "Bush Doctrine" refers to the U.S. foreign policy strategy that President George W. Bush applied during his two terms of presidency, from 2001 to 2009. The doctrine is marked by a shift towards preemptive military action, a change from previous doctrines that were based on containment and multilateralism to the use of unilateralism³⁴¹ and military hegemony.

The Bush administration chose unilateral action rather than multilateral cooperation, drastically opposing with the former administration's focus on diplomacy and alliances. This shift was epitomized in the sentence, *"If you are not with us, you are against us,"* which underlined a binary worldview of international relations.³⁴² Henry C.K. Liu, a commentator on global economics and politics, has sharply depicted the concept of U.S. unilateralism, especially during Bush' presidency. He declares that the U.S. has applied a foreign policy that usually ignore multilateral agreements and international consensus, which he considers as prejudicial to international stability. Unilateralism has a longstanding history in the United States. When George Washington addressed his people in his popular and influential Farewell, alerted that the United States have to *"steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world"*. Decades after, this attitude was described as "isolationism", whether it was criticized by some historians as being an inappropriate term, they preferred to say that during the era of President Washington, U.S. foreign policy was driven by unilateralism³⁴³.

³⁴¹ Unilateralism is any doctrine that supports one-sided action. Such an action may be in disregard for other parties, it was coined to be an antonym for multilateralism, which is the doctrine which asserts the benefits of participation from as many parties as possible. The two terms together can refer to differences in foreign policy approached to international problems. When agreement by multiple parties is absolutely required for example, in the context of international trade policies bilateral agreements (involving two participants at a time) are usually preferred by proponents of unilateralism.

³⁴² <https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2002/10/the-bush-doctrine?lang=en>, last accessed (20/07/2024).

³⁴³ Bradley F. Podliska, *Acting Alone: A Scientific Study of American Hegemony and Unilateral Use-of-Force Decision Making*, (Lexington Books, 2010), p.116.

Discussion about unilateralism was raised again with the invasion of Iraq. While most of countries have sustained the American intervention, other like France, Germany and Turkey did not. Many politicians argued that the United States was "*going to set alone*" in Iraq without any approval from multilateral institutions such as NATO and the United Nations. Those who were favorable to U.S. unilateralism claimed that other countries should not have the right to use the veto power on the detriment to American interests especially concerning U.S. national security. Partisans of the American unilateralism tend to think that a multilateral organization like the United Nations, is morally questionable since it treats non-democratic, and authoritarian nations as democratic countries. On the other side, opponents of American unilateralism highlight the ethical involvements of embarking into an armed battle that may necessitate the intervention of insurgents from other nations that have nothing to do with 9/11. Multi-lateralists, who encourage the alliance of multiple countries pursuing a common goal, argue that co-operation reinforces the ties between countries and peoples.

When President Bush introduced his National Security Strategy in 2002 concerning preemptive war policy, and the will to go on a war alone it has created turmoil throughout the world. The attacks of 9/11 and its resulting war on terrorism served as justification for all Americans' actions. Nevertheless the U.S. policy of preventive war is particularly importunate due to its evident illegitimacy. Even before the terrorist attacks, Bush' government tends towards military solution, consequently it sounds logical coherent the U.S. launched huge military operations to depose Afghanistan and Iraq regime. Consequently, revenge, perpetual intimidation and threats of the use of force against vicious states, legitimized by the war on terrorism, have become a device of the Bush administration.

Some argue that the origin of military hegemony goes back to the Monroe Doctrine which was a declaration that warned European powers against further colonization and interference in the Americas. It characterized a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy, establishing a sphere of influence that the U.S. claimed over the Western Hemisphere and beyond. Over time, the doctrine developed into a motive for U.S. unilateral interventions in Latin America. The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 which was a substantial expansion of the Monroe Doctrine, permitting the U.S. to interfere militarily in Latin American countries to preserve stability and stop European influence. This switch from a defensive attitude to an active interventionism paved the way for a more forceful U.S. military presence in the area.³⁴⁴ Its development from

³⁴⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/event/Monroe-Doctrine>, last accessed (21/07/2024).

a defensive policy to an excuse for intrusion mirrors the complexities of American imperialism and the constant challenges of preserving authority in an evolving international scene.

The concept of U.S. hegemony has again evolved significantly from the period before the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. Covering from almost 1947 to 1991, the period was marked by the emergence of the United States as a dominant global power, characterized by military, economic, and ideological hegemony.³⁴⁵ However, when the Bush administration came to power, it initiated the highest increase in military spending since the Cold War, emphasizing more than ever the U.S. military hegemony. According to certain scholars, American hegemony is positive to both the United States and the world because it significantly contributes to global stability and decreases security competition by making the balance of power imperturbable and continues to provide important advantages to the United States³⁴⁶.

Despite these positive aspects, American hegemony is not without its challenges. Critics argue that it can conduct to unilateral actions that may not adjust to the interests of other countries, eventually promoting animosity and resistance. Furthermore, the upsurge of other powers, like China, represents an important challenge to U.S. supremacy, leading to a more multipolar world that could rise rivalry and disagreements. Additionally, the United States' relative power position is decreasing and considered the U.S strategy of primacy to be misplaced to American interests. In the months leading up to the attack on Iraq in 2003, Bush administration desperately attempts to link Iraq to terrorism and Al Qaeda to justify Iraq invasion, depicting an image of the U.S. struggling with an evil. According to the scholar Richard A. Falk:

*It's not surprising that other cultures want no part in our liberal democracy, yet America insists on thrusting it upon them anyway, often by force. This is because America thinks that America is the best. Furthermore, America thinks that America knows what's best for everyone else. While neither of the above are necessarily true, unfortunately America has the military strength to impose its will upon others.*³⁴⁷

Besides, the question if U.S. military hegemony is innocent and correct, one must ask whether at least it is politically advantageous. Some conservative assert that aside the fact that it is an

³⁴⁵<https://apcentral.collegeboard.org/series/america-on-the-world-stage/cold-war-and-global-hegemony-1945-1991>, last accessed (21/07/2024).

³⁴⁶ <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089>, last accessed (21/07/2024).

³⁴⁷ By Richard A. Falk, *Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing*, (World, Routledge, Sep 11, 2002), p 125.

advantageous strategy for the United States, it is the only manner to keep the status quo. Obviously while some argue that American military hegemony arose long before George W. Bush administration and the attacks of 9/11, others assert that the hallmark of American military hegemony is solely tied to the Bush administration alone. In addition, while there are some who increase the value and encourage U.S. military primacy, especially in foreign policy, there are also others who consider it as being immoral, unethical, and extremely dangerous for the world stability.

Charles Krauthammer³⁴⁸ was the first to use the expression “Bush doctrine” in June 2001 when he talked about the Administration of Bush *"unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM treaty and rejecting the Kyoto protocol."*³⁴⁹ After the attacks of 9/11, the expression took another dimension and thus referred to the policy that the United States had an absolute right to protect itself from any country that conceal, harbor or support terrorist groups thus justifying the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Lots of experts attributed specific policy elements to Bush’ Doctrine such as "preemptive actions" as a response to an immediate or apprehended future menace to the Americans’ safety. This strategy was used mainly in the Middle East to face and control international terrorism and most noticeably to legitimize Iraq’s invasion.

The Bush Doctrine principles originated from neoconservative disillusion concerning President Bill Clinton administration and its approach to the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein during the 1990s. In fact, overthrowing Iraq in 1991 Persian Gulf War³⁵⁰ was not enough for the U.S since it had just forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The aftermath of the war witnessed Iraq subjected to strict sanctions and ongoing military monitoring, which contributed to significant humanitarian issues within the country. Additionally, the failure to remove Saddam Hussein created a power vacuum and ongoing conflict that would later contribute to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and finalizing what Bush’ father had started.³⁵¹

³⁴⁸ Charles Krauthammer was an American political columnist. A conservative political pundit, in 1987 Krauthammer won the Pulitzer Prize for his column in The Washington Post. His weekly column was syndicated to more than 400 publications worldwide.

³⁴⁹ https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/09/charlie_gibsons_gaffe.html, last accessed (21/07/2024).

³⁵⁰ The Gulf War (1990 – 1991), also known as Operation Desert Shield for operations leading to the buildup of troops and defense of Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Storm in its combat phase, was a war waged by coalition forces from 35 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait arising from oil pricing and production disputes.

³⁵¹ <https://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War>, last accessed (21/07/2024).

The decision was influenced by neoconservatives³⁵² in the United States and aspiration to depose Saddam Hussein. The terms of the contract outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1441³⁵³ after the war stated that Iraq must be subjected to various United Nations resolutions that mandated the disarmament of its WMD programs. These resolutions required Saddam Hussein to allow international weapons inspectors to oversee the destruction of any existing WMDs and to prevent the development of new ones. Neo-conservatism's adherents have continuously been raging against Saddam Hussein because this latter has always temporized and avoided the inspections of the United Nations.

Members of neoconservative sent a letter to President Bill Clinton in January 1998 inciting him to a declaration of war against Saddam. For them there was no doubt that Saddam could deploy Weapons of Mass Destruction he might obtain. Their main arguments were the interference of Saddam to U.N. weapons inspectors and Saddam's discharging of SCUD missiles³⁵⁴ against Israel during the Gulf War in addition to his employment of chemical weapons against Iran during the 1980s. As the crucial point of their letter, they state:

*Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which depends for its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners and upon the cooperation of Saddam Hussein, is dangerously inadequate. The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.*³⁵⁵

One of the characteristics of Bush Doctrine is the peculiarity of "America first" a unilateralism that manifested itself long before the event of 9/11. One consequence of this particularity happened just two months after the election of George W. Bush and the withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol an international treaty which extends the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that commits state parties to decrease greenhouse gas emissions to reduce worldwide greenhouse

³⁵² The political ideology of conservatism is often attributed to Edmund Burke, an Irish statesman and philosopher. Burke is recognized as the first explicitly conservative political theorist, particularly for his critiques of the French Revolution. William F. Buckley Jr. is often regarded as a central figure in the establishment of contemporary American conservatism during the 1970s among liberal hawks who became dissatisfied with the increasingly pacifist foreign policy of the Democratic Party, and the growing New Left and counterculture, in particular the Vietnam protests.

³⁵³ <https://press.un.org/en/2002/sc7564.doc.htm>, last accessed (21/07/2024).

³⁵⁴ Scud is the name of a series of tactical ballistic missiles developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It was exported widely to both Second and Third World countries. The term comes from the NATO reporting name attached to the missile by Western intelligence agencies.

³⁵⁵ <https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2008/1/27/444438/> - Signers of the letter included Donald Rumsfeld, who would become Bush's first Secretary of Defense, and Paul Wolfowitz, who would become Undersecretary of Defense.

gas. Bush judicially argued that transitioning American industry from coal to cleaner or natural energy would probably rise up energy costs and overturn the American manufacturing infrastructures. The U.S. resolution made the United States the second country along with Australia not acquiescing to the Kyoto Protocol.

There is another important point concerning Bush's Doctrine. After the attacks of 9/11, Bush declared to his nation that in combating terrorism, the country would not differentiate between terrorists and those who conceal terrorism. According to Bush declaration, 9/11 events were triggering factors to see any nation that continues to harbor and support terrorism or criticize his doctrine as a hostile regime. This gave the United States and its allies a motif to assail Afghanistan, which was supposed to host al-Qaida and employ a preventive strategy. Iraq, Iran and North Korea were labeled by the United States with the term "*axis of evil*" that encouraged terrorists and hide WMD. A term which was used for the first time by President Bush during his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002³⁵⁶. The expression was minted by David Frum, a speechwriter for Bush, who initially referred to it as the "axis of hatred" before it was changed in the final speech to "axis of evil". This phrase was destined to remind the past Axis powers of the Second World War, which embedded Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan.³⁵⁷ The term was often used during Bush presidency to pinpoint United States's enemies and those who impede its crusade against terrorism.

*We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.*³⁵⁸

As Washington Post columnist Dan Froomkin commented:

*Bush was putting a new spin on traditional war policy. Pre-emption has in fact been a staple of our foreign policy for ages and other countries' as well... The twist Bush put on it was embracing 'preventive' war: Taking action well before an attack was imminent... invading a country that was simply perceived as threatening.*³⁵⁹

In fact, by the end of 2002 Bush openly accused Iraq of this declaration proved that neoconservatives who addressed a letter to Bill Clinton in 1998 gained confidence during the presidency of Bush.

³⁵⁶ See appendix I, pp.208-215.

³⁵⁷ William Safire, *Safire's Political Dictionary*, (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.31.

³⁵⁸ Richard A. Melanson, *American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush*, (Political Science, 2005), p. 309

³⁵⁹ http://busharchive.froomkin.com/BL2008091201471_pf.htm, last accessed (21/07/2024).

Nevertheless, a ferocious insurgency broke out against the U.S presence in Iraq and its incapability to set up a functional democratic government there which tarnished the integrity of the Bush Doctrine that precipitated the collapse of the doctrine especially with the absence of evidence of the existence of WMD. After that the American military force in Iraq was mainly concentrated on repairing war consequences and pacification. The concern of the U.S army with Iraq had given the Taliban in Afghanistan the opportunity to reverse American successes there. Thereafter by the end of 2006, public disappointment concerning the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq allowed Democrats to take back command of the U.S Congress.

Until today Bush's Doctrine resulted in criticism and controversy. Lot of people on the American soil and abroad questioned the real intention behind the invasion of Iraq, based on possibility of revenge after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Even today reasons behind the invasion are still ambiguous if the invasion of Iraq by the United States is legally legitimate and, at the same time, if the opposition of Iraq to the invasion is legitimate. While the doctrine has its loyal supporters, many argue that rather than having evolved its power and promote democratic principles, the United States has instead worked for isolating the country, discrediting it internationally and has served as means for American imperialism. However, others declare that the doctrine was covered by lots of ambiguities and that it was employed only to deploy goodwill while unilaterally conducting the interests of the United States. The doctrine, as outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, introduced a framework for U.S. foreign policy that was both assertive and controversial. Its ambiguities regarding preemption, democracy promotion, unilateralism, threat definitions, and implementation challenges have led to ongoing debates about its implications for international relations and security.³⁶⁰

III- The War on Terror: Bush's Axis of Evil

The terrorist attacks of September 11 were transformative events, both in the way the Americans view their own perception of security and the way the country engages with the world, especially the Middle East. In fact, the region is home to organizations which share both ideology and methodology with the perpetrators of the 9/11 which led to an ongoing international military campaign led by the United States as an initial response to the attacks. This campaign was mainly aimed at terrorist organizations, particularly Al-Qaeda, and attempted to eradicate their networks and avoid future potential attacks. President George W.

³⁶⁰ <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html>, last accessed (25/07/2024).

Bush officially launched this campaign shortly after the attacks, defining it as an international effort to fight terrorism and those who support it.

In the beginning of 2005, the United States was not in their best lights. Wedged in a manhunt for Osama bin Laden, the head of the attacks of 9/11, the U.S was trapped in a war with both Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the U.S government was emerged into a fierce negotiation with George W. Bush's "axis of evil"; North Korea and Iran which were devoted to acquire the nuclear power. The situation aggravated for George W. Bush's plan for a second term mandate when the hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast and debilitated New Orleans. To make matters worse the price of gasoline rose dramatically due to the damage of the refineries of the Gulf of Mexico hitting the Americans financially since it had already been trying to fill a budget deficit of more than \$400 billion due to the war.³⁶¹ According to a report made at the end of the year by a group of bipartisan commission on 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States was less disposed than it had been was four years earlier for another terrorist attacks³⁶². A decade ago, the country rose triumphant from the Cold War, however, disagreements after 9/11, befouled the prestige of the United States. In addition, foreign nations were confused by the arbitrary development of U.S. foreign policy during the presidency of Bill Clinton. As the country had been a global commander since the Second World War and conserved this status after the Cold War, the majority of the Congress' members diverted from "the constitutional" world order that so many presidents tried to keep before³⁶³. *By the end of the century, the United States was the lonely superpower with one or a few partners, opposing most of the rest of the world's states and peoples.*³⁶⁴ This tendency worsened after the election of George W. Bush especially when he refuted the Kyoto Protocol³⁶⁵, rejected the Antiballistic Missile (ABM)³⁶⁶, and escaped the International

³⁶¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/13/us/deficit-will-climb-in-2006-white-house-says.html>, last accessed (25/07/2024).

³⁶² <https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>.

³⁶³ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, (Princeton University Press, 2009), p.136.

³⁶⁴ Smauel Huntington, « the Lonely Superpower, » *Foreign Affairs* 78 (March-April 1999) p.41.

³⁶⁵ The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty which extends the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that commits state parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, based on the scientific consensus that (part one) global warming is occurring and (part two) it is extremely likely that human-made CO2 emissions have predominantly caused it.

³⁶⁶ An anti-ballistic missile is a surface-to-air missile designed to counter ballistic missiles and is used to deliver nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional warheads in a ballistic flight trajectory. The term is a generic term conveying a system designed to intercept and destroy any type of ballistic threat, however it is commonly used for systems specifically designed to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

Criminal Court (ICC)³⁶⁷. Bush's arrogant attitude towards foreign policy was displayed in Iraq's invasion without the approval of the U.S allies and the United Nation (UN) in March 2003, in addition to his rejection of the UN convention of the Rights of the Child in 2006. Moreover, the president's doctrine which had relied on the amplification of the U.S. supremacy took form after the attacks of 9/11 impelling the U.S. government to respond fiercely to the terrorist attacks rather than cooperating with the UN.

Instantly after the attacks of September 11th, a worldwide compassion emanated towards the United States for fear of terrorism. However, this support gradually dispersed when Bush's government invaded Iraq and Afghanistan and got worse with the creation of Guantanamo Bay detention camp.³⁶⁸ A survey made in December 2002 demonstrated a critical moment in American political history, highlighting a growing disillusionment with government institutions that has persisted in various forms over the years.³⁶⁹ The decline in trust was part of a broader trend noticed long before the attacks of 9/11. From 1964 to 1974, the percentage of Americans who believed the government was managed for the benefit of all, decreased dramatically, from 64% to 25%. Ironically, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, there was a momentary rise in trust levels, with about 60% of the public expressing confidence in the government briefly after the attacks. However, this was an ephemeral growth, and the fundamental issues of public mistrust persisted.³⁷⁰ Indeed in lot of consequent polls made worldwide, the majority of participants consider the United States as being the first menace to the world harmony. Noam Chomsky, a noticeable critic of the American predominance over the world, predicted that the war on terrorism would be harsh since the country was "*a leading terrorist state*", arguing that its military interventions and foreign policies have often resulted in significant harm to civilian populations and have perpetuated cycles of violence.³⁷¹ Chomsky forecast that the war on terrorism would be exceptionally harsh, quoting the historical context of U.S. interventions that have contributed to international instability. Chomsky warns that responding to terrorism with overwhelming military force may perpetuate a cycle of violence rather than resolve the underlying issues. He argues that such

³⁶⁷ The International Criminal Court is an intergovernmental organization and international tribunal that sits in The Hague in the Netherlands. The ICC has the jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

³⁶⁸ See appendix I, p. 216.

³⁶⁹ <https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-2019/>, last accessed (28/07/2024).

³⁷⁰ <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/>, last accessed (28/07/2024).

³⁷¹ <https://chomsky.info/the-greatest-threat-to-world-peace/>, last accessed (28/07/2024).

responses often play into the hands of terrorist organizations, which aim to provoke a deeper engagement from Western powers, thereby drawing them into prolonged conflicts.³⁷²

The war against terrorism has conducted the United States to start sustaining a diverse of odious and detestable political methods. Economically speaking, the United States tends to advocate freedom of trade, preserve its agriculture from international competition, and look for extended protection for American drug firms and owners of intellectual property. All these U.S. attitudes are pointed out by nations that share the same U.S ideals and principals but are sorry about the hypocrite side of the American government. Beginning with Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001³⁷³, the United States entered into a long period of war, including the war in Afghanistan, launched in 2001, and the war in Iraq. The U.S. troops should have retreat from Afghanistan by the end of 2016 but the legacy of the conflict and subsequent developments have kept U.S. military engagement in the region ongoing.³⁷⁴

By the end of December 2014, the cost for the war on terror totaled \$1.6 trillion, according to the Congressional Research Service. At that time, operations in Afghanistan came at a cost of \$686 billion and accounted for 43 percent of the total cost of the war on terror.³⁷⁵ Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched in March 2003; the war was justified in the context of the September 11th attacks, the global war on terror and idealistic ambition of liberating the country from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Today, Iraq is still implicated in conflict fighting the terrorist group ISIS. The war in Iraq cost \$815 billion by the end of 2014 according to the Congressional Research Service.

One of the most destabilizing consequences of September 11th attacks was the psychological disorder widespread all over the country. The event sent shockwaves through the U.S. territory; thus, the American government avail the opportunity to convince its citizens that the best way to fight terrorism and be secure was only possible by giving up a part of their freedom and civil liberties.

On the national level, the politics of September 11 has been altered completely, with a change in centralization of the federal government power. Indeed, an office tackling about homeland security was made; airline security became a matter of federal government with an inflation of defense spending which drew the domestic budget back into shortage. The idea of creating a

³⁷² <https://billmoyers.com/story/chomsky-the-cost-of-violence/>, last accessed (28/07/2024).

³⁷³ Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was the official name used by the U.S. government for the Global War on Terrorism. On October 7, 2001, in response to the September 11 attacks.

³⁷⁴ <https://www.rt.com/usa/408498-cost-war-on-terror/>, last accessed (28/07/2024).

³⁷⁵ <https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-timeline-3306300>, last accessed (28/07/2024).

new cabinet department of national defense is not new; it has been negotiated since Carter presidency. Thanks to the Patriot Act,³⁷⁶ Congress has given an enormous power to the federal executive branch to manage surveillance using all means of scrutiny on the national and international level.

The "Axis of Evil" rhetoric had substantial inference for U.S. foreign relations. It hardened rapports with countries like Iran, which became less cooperative with U.S. initiatives following their inclusion in the sphere of the "axis of evil". Critics of the Bush administration argued that the linkage of these countries was overly simplistic and did not accurately reflect the geopolitical realities, particularly given the historical context of Iran and Iraq's long conflict. Moreover, Iran perception of terrorism is quite intriguing. The country views itself as a victim of terrorism, having faced numerous attacks from various groups, including those linked to Sunni extremism. The Iranian government has often framed its military actions against groups like ISIS as part of its own war on terror, targeting not only ISIS remnants but also groups it perceives as threats, such as Kurdish and Baluch separatists. This self-portrayal complicates the narrative, as Iran simultaneously supports groups like Hezbollah, which the U.S. designates as a terrorist organization.³⁷⁷

Even though the Bush Doctrine came to an end in 2006, the War on Terror he initiated has not officially ended. By then the military force in Iraq was concentrated on the manners to heal and retrieve the country. However, the military focus on Iraq had given the opportunity to the Taliban to reverse American successes in Afghanistan. Consequently, negative public opinion concerning the administration of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan enabled the Democrats to take back the command of the Congress. In addition, eight American retired generals and admirals required the resignation of the Secretary of Defense Donald Henry Rumsfeld (in what was called the "Generals Revolt"), incriminating him of "abysmal" military methods and deficiency in strategic competence. Consequently, President Bush urged the resignation of the Rumsfeld from the U.S. administration in 2006³⁷⁸.

The War on Terror has had profound implications for global politics and security. It has led to important military expenditures and has been compared in scope and impact to the Cold War.

³⁷⁶ The USA PATRIOT Act, officially titled the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," was enacted in response to the September 11 attacks in 2001. The primary aim of the Act was to enhance the government's ability to prevent and respond to terrorism by expanding law enforcement's surveillance and investigative powers.

³⁷⁷ <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-attack-pakistan-syria/>, last accessed (28/07/2024).

³⁷⁸ Hal Brands, William Inboden, *The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush's Decision to Surge in Iraq*, (Cornell University Press, 2019), p 315.

The campaign has also arisen decisive questions about civil liberties, human rights, and the effectiveness of military interventions in achieving long-term peace and stability. In addition, the campaign has raised a complex landscape of terrorism, with new groups like ISIS emerging in the aftermath of the Iraq War. The U.S. military's involvement has often been criticized for creating conditions that stimulate further radicalism and violence.

Nevertheless, there was a shift in Strategy under the presidency of Barack Obama and an evolvment in the approach of the War on Terror. The term "War on Terror" became less prominent in official discourse, with a focus on targeted actions against specific terrorist groups rather than a broad, undefined global conflict. This shift included a gradual winding down of military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, although counterterrorism operations continued.³⁷⁹ As of now, the U.S. remains involved in various counterterrorism operations, particularly against groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The nature of these operations has shifted towards intelligence-driven actions rather than large-scale military invasions, reflecting a change in strategy while still acknowledging the ongoing threat of terrorism.³⁸⁰

It is important to note that although there were no direct links between Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, Iraq and Iran were commonly understood to be geopolitical enemies and that the concept of an axis of evil has just served as a unifying framework for those advocating for a second invasion of Iraq .The introduction of Iran into the "Axis of Evil" was part of a broader strategy to address the perceived threats posed by these countries and to rally international support for actions aimed at preventing regimes that sponsor terror from threatening the United States and its allies with WMD.

IV- U.S. Foreign Policy: The Great Return of Islamophobia:

More than two decades has passed since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The American occupancy still exists in Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, and Iraq, training and sustaining local forces to fight terrorism. Whether it is called; "*War on Terror*," "*campaign against Islamic terrorism*," or impeding "*radical Islamic evolvment*," the operation has taken too much time and it is clearly not over yet. As the head of the government, two presidents have conducted this campaign; George W. Bush, Barack Obama. Both of them have demonstrated striking divergence in their discourses and style and some reforms in policies' orientations.

³⁷⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-on-terrorism>, last accessed (30/07/2024).

³⁸⁰ <https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/war-on-terror-timeline>, last accessed (30/07/2024).

During the speech done few days after 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush called for a global “War on Terror”. In his speech, the former president pledged to protect the Americans from terror launching an ongoing endeavor to thwart terrorists before they act emphasizing that it was not “*just America’s fight.*” Rather, “*it was the world’s fight...a civilization’s fight.*” George W. Bush’ discourse highlighted a sort of us versus them division, an assumption constructed around the “Clash of Civilizations” a theory advanced by academics like Samuel Huntington³⁸¹. In spite of being fiercely criticized, his book advances a theory that asserts two distinct entities designated as “Western civilization” and “Islamic civilization” that will certainly collide because of their outstanding “*differences in culture that is basic values and beliefs.*”³⁸² According to Huntington “Islam has bloody borders,” that impede it to embrace liberal ideals such as “pluralism, individualism and democracy.”³⁸³ This book has been at the basis born by the majority of American foreign policy makers who see the Middle East as a violent, unstable and backwards region. From the moment former president Bush declared “*either you are with us or you are with the terrorists,*” he gave no alternative and indirectly linked “terrorists” to “Muslims.”. President Bush fostered his “us” versus “them” dichotomy during his speech at the State of the Union in 2002 by affiliating the “them” to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, naming them the “Axis of Evil”.

Furthermore, Huntington’s theory has significantly influenced U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East since its introduction in the early 1990s particularly regarding Iran. The theorist claimed that post-Cold War conflicts would primarily be cultural rather than ideological or economic, with a particular focus on the tensions between the Western world and Islamic civilizations. This perspective has shaped how U.S. policymakers view and interact with Iran. The theory has helped to shaping U.S.-Iran relations as a civilizational conflict. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which resulted in the establishment of an Islamic Republic, the U.S. viewed Iran not just as a geopolitical enemy but as an illustration of a wider Islamic menace to Western principles and interests. This image has conducted to a more conflictual position, emphasizing the ideological split between the secular, democratic West and the theocratic,

³⁸¹ Samuel Phillips Huntington was a prominent American political scientist, academic, and adviser, best known for his influential theories on civil-military relations and international relations. He spent over fifty years at Harvard University, where he directed the Center for International Affairs and contributed significantly to political discourse in the United States and beyond.

³⁸² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (Simon & Schuster, 2007), p.183.

³⁸³ Richard Jackson, Georg Sørensen, Jørgen Møller, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, (Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 322.

authoritarian regime in Iran.³⁸⁴ The Clash of Civilizations theory has also affected certain policy decisions, among them the justification for military interventions in the Middle East. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003, for example, was in part legitimized by the conviction that the removal of Saddam Hussein would sustain the resistance against the influence of Iran and boost democracy in a territory seen as inimical to the Western. This joins Huntington's affirmation that conflicts would occur because of cultural identities, conducting to a more hostile U.S. attitudes in the area. Moreover, the theory has complicated diplomatic relations with Iran. The U.S. has usually perceived its involvement with Iran through the lens of civilizational conflict, leading to dubiety about a possible for fruitful cooperation. This standpoint has provided ongoing sanctions and defensive military stance, as U.S. policymakers continued to be suspicious about Iran's intentions, perceiving them as part of a broader struggle between civilizations.³⁸⁵

Additionally, during the Afghanistan invasion, many al-Qaeda members and Taliban fighters were captured and transferred at the Guantánamo Bay detention camp, a site which has been a significant element of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the context of the War on Terror.

Lots of suspected enemy combatants were carried off abroad and kept in secret prisons (so-called “black sites”), under a special program conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Bush government initially claimed that the Guantánamo detainees were not tied to constitutional defense because the base was external to the American boundaries. Moreover, the administration also affirmed that the Geneva Convention was irreverent to the detainees since they had the status of enemy combatants³⁸⁶. Also, the U.S. government vindicated the creation of Guantanamo as an essential action to protect national security. However, the camp has been covered by legal controversies concerning human rights and the treatment of prisoners. Critics argue that the limitless detention without trial and the use of rude interrogation techniques similar to torture, threatening the U.S.'s moral authority and commitment to human rights. This has driven to notable backlash from international human rights organizations complicating diplomatic relations with foreign nations. The camp has

³⁸⁴ Qamar ul-Huda, *Reenvisioning Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution in Islam*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2024), p. 244.

³⁸⁵ <https://www.e-ir.info/2017/04/02/the-clash-of-civilizations-thesis-a-critical-appraisal/>, last accessed (30/07/2024).

³⁸⁶ United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, Amending Title 10, United States Code, to Authorize Trial by Military Commission for Violations of the Law of War, and for Other Purposes: Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on H.R. 6054, Together with Additional and Dissenting Views (including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office), U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006, p 6.

stained the U.S. relation with Muslim countries mainly because it was perceived as a symbol of U.S. imperialism and a violation of Islamic values, contributing to anti-American sentiment in the region. This perception has hindered U.S. efforts to foster alliances and cooperation in counterterrorism initiatives, as many countries are reticent to be allied with a facility that is largely attacked for its human rights violations.

With the election of Barack Obama in the 2008, lot of Americans expected that the newly elected president would readjust Bush administration policies that unfairly compromised the lives of millions of Muslims. Nevertheless, the two terms of Presidency of Barack Obama did little to reform and fix the damages that had been done by the former president. The very opposite has been done to amplify Islamophobic narratives within the American borders and inspiring U.S. foreign policy decisions. As an illustration, the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, immigration restriction reforms that were once implemented by Bush were prolonged and reinforced by the administration of Obama. The later declared that the detainees at Guantánamo would no longer be appointed as enemy combatants, but they would continue to be kept indefinitely. In addition, Obama's administration prolonged and restated the American Patriot Act and created the famous "secret kill list,"³⁸⁷ doing this President Obama did not just take the torch from his predecessor, but actually amplified it.³⁸⁸ All these political orientations have raised Islamophobia in the U.S. with a notable increase in negative perceptions of Islam. A 2011 poll indicated that 61% of Americans held a negative view of Islam, a stark rise from 39% shortly after the attacks.³⁸⁹

For the U.S-Iran context, the post-9/11 era saw a hardening of attitudes towards Iran, which has contributed to a perception of Iran as a hostile authority, further complicating diplomatic relations. U.S. policy makers have exploited Islamophobia for political gain, associating with anti-Muslim groups and rhetoric to rally support. The interaction of Islamophobia with U.S. foreign policy towards Iran post-9/11 has created a complex and often conflictual relationship. The political exploitation of fear and prejudice has not only affected how Americans view Iran but has also shaped the strategies employed by the U.S. government in its foreign policy

³⁸⁷ The Disposition Matrix, informally known as a kill list, is a database of information for tracking, capturing, "rendering", or killing suspected enemies of the United States. Developed by the Obama administration beginning in 2010, it goes beyond existing kill lists and is intended to become a permanent fixture of U.S. policy. The process determining criteria for killing is not public and was heavily shaped by National Counterterrorism Director and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John O. Brennan.


³⁸⁸ Michael J. Boyle, *The Drone Age: How Drone Technology Will Change War and Peace*, (Oxford University Press, 2020), p.308.

³⁸⁹ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/05/the-united-states-of-islamophobia/>, last accessed (30/7/24)

decisions. As a result, the potential for diplomatic engagement has been significantly hindered by the prevailing Islamophobic sentiments in the American society.

The upsurge of Islamophobia has also conducted to growing xenophobia and apprehension of Muslims among Americans, which alternately impact public backing for foreign policy decisions concerning Iran. In fact, lot of Americans associate Islam with terrorism, leading to a hesitancy to support diplomatic efforts that could ameliorate relations. This apprehension is aggravated by episodes of brutality and terrorism that are usually prejudicial to Islamic ideology, further reinforcing bad views of Iran and its people. (refer to figure n°5 page 171).

Figure n° 5: Prejudice towards Muslims: Data reported from 2007 and 2009.




Source : <https://news.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-west.aspx>.

Islamophobia has also impacted the Iranian American community, which often deals with discrimination and bigotry. This social disgrace thickens Iranian Americans' struggle to aspire for a more appropriate U.S.-Iran relations, as they may be seen through the lens of mistrust and animosity. Today, Islamophobia has become a new political orientation and the political climate has made it hard for moderate voices within the Iranian community to undertake a constructive dialogue about U.S.-Iran relations. For instance, since the beginning of the

virulent political campaign of Donald Trump in 2016, anti-Muslim discourse was at the heart of his campaign. (refer to figure n°6, page 172). According to a report made by the Brennan Center³⁹⁰ the manner the president and his government have hounded Muslims in their speeches is inappropriate. Muslim communities have been unfairly treated through over five distinct ways: the use of anti-Muslim discourse which contributes to a climate of fear and suspicion towards Muslim communities. Islamophobic representatives were put in key positions such as Steve Bannon, who served as the President's Senior Advisor, Michael Flynn, the former National Security Advisor and Sebastian Gorka Deputy Assistant to the President, all of them played significant roles in shaping policies that discriminated against Muslims. Discriminatory Policies were strengthened to impede immigration procedures especially towards Arabs and Muslims and discouraged reaction from U.S government against the proliferation of hate crimes towards minority groups³⁹¹.

Figure n°6: Documented incidents of hate since the election of Donald Trump.



Source: Adam Peck/ThinkProgress.

There has been a pervasive stereotyping of Muslims, often associating them with extremism and terrorism. This has led to a broader societal stigma that affects not only individual Muslims but also the community as a whole. The last strategy concerns cultural and social marginalization. The association of political rhetoric and policy has led to the marginalization of Muslim communities in social and cultural contexts. This marginalization is mirrored in

³⁹⁰ The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law School is a non-partisan law and public policy institute that is sometimes seen as liberal or progressive. The organization is named after Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan.

³⁹¹ Erdoan A. Shipoli, *Islam, Securitization and US Foreign Policy*, (Springer 2018), p.239.

public perceptions and the way Muslims are treated, which often conducts to discrimination and social exclusion.

Weeks after taking office, Trump started to put in practice his proposals, starting with an executive decree prohibiting access to travelers from seven Muslim countries to the U.S territories. Even if President Trump has given the coup de grace to the Muslim and the Arab community, it was not his own initiative. In fact, it was a continuity and intensification of decisions and policies launched by President George W. Bush in post 9/11 and their readjustment by President Barack Obama. This latter's actions, national security laws and discriminatory policies have submitted Muslim Americans to extreme surveillance and pervasive persecution. Islamophobes was given the green light to magnify law enforcement officers. According to a new FBI report on hate crime statistics of hate-motivated murders, largely committed by white supremacists, spiked to their highest number in the last three decades.³⁹²

Muslims were not the only group that has been lynched by discriminatory rhetoric; the attack also aims immigrants and foreigners. Trump often bombarded the media by improper statements as follow *"Islam hates us"*, *"The Muslim community does not report terrorists' activities"*, an accusation that the FBI itself affirms that it contradicted reality. Moreover, the U.S. government suggested the watching of certain mosques and authorized the idea of registering Muslims in specific database a proposition that had been rejected after a general disapproval. Farah Elahi, a researcher and policy analyst at Runnymede Trust³⁹³ said: *"Islamophobia had now manifested structurally in policy...Both policy and the media have framed Muslims within a counter-terrorism deviant perspective, filtering into people's understanding of the Muslim community and the way in which they're perceived."*³⁹⁴ Circumstances have redefined the social and political perception of Muslims, who are identified and through specific stereotypes that stigmatize them as the "other", an attribute which has seen anti-Muslim hate crime after the 9/11 events soar.

³⁹² <https://www.newsweek.com/hate-crimes-under-trump-surged-nearly-20-percent-says-fbi-report-1547870>, last accessed (30/07/2024).

³⁹³ The Runnymede Trust is a race equality think tank. It was founded in 1968 by Jim Rose and Anthony Lester as an independent source for generating intelligence for a multi-ethnic Britain through research, network building, leading debate and policy engagement.

³⁹⁴ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263569878_Islamophobia_community_cohesion_and_counter-terrorism_policies_in_Britain, last accessed (30/07/2024).

The rise of Islamophobia in the U.S. has contributed to a negative public perception of Iran and its leadership. An already stained historical backdrop which made it more challenging for Obama to initiate a meaningful dialogue with Iran, despite certain administration's efforts to improve relations. This sentiment was often reflected in political discourse, where Iranian leaders were portrayed as hostile and untrustworthy. Such rhetoric not only affected public opinion but also constrained the Obama administration's ability to engage with Iran effectively. In fact, the pervasive Islamophobic attitudes in the U.S. complicated these cooperations, as they inflamed skepticism about Iran's intentions and the viability of any deals made. Parallely, in Iran, radical leaders used the U.S.'s negative portrayal of Muslims to reenforce their own anti-American narratives, making it difficult for more moderate voices to gain traction and set the stage for future tensions.³⁹⁵

Obviously ideological vetting³⁹⁶ is not a new phenomenon in U.S. history. It was applied on Anarchists in the early 20th century and Communists during the Cold War. However ideological exclusion has reached unprecedented measures that go against the principles of democracy. During the Trump administration, there has been a resurgence of calls for "extreme vetting" of immigrants, which includes ideological tests. This approach echoes past practices, as it aims to ensure that those entering the U.S. share American values and do not hold extremist views. Critics argue that such measures can lead to discrimination and violate constitutional rights, while proponents assert, they are necessary for national security.³⁹⁷

Thus, Muslim aspirants to immigration and refugees are submitted nowadays to strict scrutiny implying a complete medical control and the gathering of biometric data, a long and fastidious process that could take years. The process is worse for visa applicants coming from countries in conflict, implying endless interviews and a security vetting by several U.S. law enforcement, intelligence and security agents that verify applicants' backgrounds and the motivations they push them to quit their country; measures that can be extremely interminable for people in danger and vulnerable position. Conversely, many of the applied examinations


³⁹⁵ <https://millercenter.org/president/obama/foreign-affairs>, last accessed (30/07/2024).

³⁹⁶ Ideological vetting refers to the process of assessing individuals' beliefs and ideologies to determine their suitability for certain roles, particularly in contexts like immigration, employment, or security clearances. This practice often aims to ensure that individuals do not hold views that are considered extremist or contrary to the values of the host country.

³⁹⁷ <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/04/513289953/trump-backers-want-ideology-test-for-extreme-vetting>, last accessed (30/07/2024).

and tests are proved to be erroneous most of the time. Indeed, as it has been analyzed ideological tests are not merely reliable since they do not predict how people would act³⁹⁸.

Figure 7: Presidents' rating in Western Europe.



Source: Pew Research Centre, Spring 2017.

U.S. perennial support for Israel continues to be one of the incontestable examples of American Islamophobia. In fact, the United States was the first country to acknowledge Israel as a state in 1948, and also the first to acknowledge Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017. This later has always been a significant ally to the United States. *Year after year, Israel has been a top recipient of US foreign military aid. In the fiscal year 2017, it received 3.2 billion US dollars and 3.1 billion in 2018, despite being a high-income country with a relatively small population of 8 million.*³⁹⁹(refer to figure n°7, page 175).

Obviously, much more could be said on Islamophobia, especially concerning the hate towards Islam which is over present within evangelical circle. It is also worth to depict the way right-

³⁹⁸ Van Avermaet, *Language Testing, Migration and Citizenship: Cross-National Perspectives on Integration Regimes*, (Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti, Piet Van Avermaet A&C Black, Oct 27, 201), p.6

³⁹⁹ Andrew Leonard, Is US Support for Israel Becoming Conditional? the defense post, September 29, 2020, p176.

wing politicians take advantage from the apprehension of Islam in a low-down opportunistic way to manipulate public opinion and apply discriminatory laws. After all it is to be hoped that peace and root of prejudice will be pulled and allow Americans to go beyond scapegoat and demonizing of religious and ethnic minorities in the United States. American civil right and freedom are too precious to be discredited and jeopardized in the name of absurd and biased politics. The government should not be the only side responsible in confronting Islamophobia and other forms of racism. At work, among neighbors, at schools and fellow citizens should also elevate awareness in contesting and fighting racism wherever and however it arises. To summarize the most shocking facet of the American empire is that their politicians are and remains undoubtedly Islamophobic and the fear of Islamic terrorism is forged and stirred to lubricate the wheels of empire.

V- Nuclear Issue and its Implications:

The Iranian nuclear issue has its roots in the country's pursuit of nuclear technology, which began in the 1950s under the "Atoms for Peace"⁴⁰⁰ program supported by the United States. However, the situation evolved significantly after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which led to a shift in Iran's nuclear ambitions and international relations.

In fact, wanting to follow suit of the West, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, signed agreements under Atoms for Peace, which comprised the creation of a research reactor and the supply of nuclear technology. Nothing could have predicted that this initial cooperation intended for peaceful scientific exploration would pave the way for Iran's ensuing nuclear ambitions evolving amid geopolitical tensions and worldwide suspicions regarding Iran's intentions. Even though the initiatives of the Shah's government attempted to evolve nuclear capacities for peaceful purposes such as energy production and scientific research, things have drifted off course, especially after the Islamic Revolution.

Under the Atoms for Peace framework, Iran established its nuclear research infrastructure, including the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). The TNRC was instituted in 1967 and was at first run by the University of Tehran. It was equipped with a 5-megawatt

⁴⁰⁰ Atoms for Peace was a program initiated by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, aimed at promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower's vision was to share nuclear technology for peaceful purposes through an international framework, primarily under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The initiative aimed to create a cooperative international environment for nuclear technology, encouraging countries to work together rather than compete militarily.

nuclear research reactor a crucial aid provided by the American company American Machine and Foundry, which was fueled by highly enriched uranium. This reactor was designed for research such as the production of radioisotopes for medical and agricultural applications.⁴⁰¹ In 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ratified it in 1970, which imposed to its nuclear program a strict verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁴⁰² This event characterized an important dedication to pacific nuclear development despite certain apprehension concerning possible military applications.

Furthermore, after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the TNRC coped with operational problems due to the U.S. interruption of provisioning of highly enriched fuel, which constrained the reactor to close down for many years. This period was notable for serious political turmoil and a reexamination of Iran's nuclear program. Subsequently after the revolution, the nuclear plan became under the control of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TNRC evolved into a central point for fundamental research in nuclear energy and started to develop its abilities like the establishment of the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories.⁴⁰³ Established as part of the TNRC, these laboratories are integral to Iran's nuclear technology training and research efforts and have been involved in a range of activities, including Plutonium Separation, Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Activities and Storage of Nuclear Materials.⁴⁰⁴(refer to map n° 6, page 178).


⁴⁰¹ <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/sixty-years-of-atoms-for-peace-and-irans-nuclear-program/>, last accessed (2/08/2024).

⁴⁰² IAEA is an intergovernmental organization established to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to prevent its use for military purposes, including the development of nuclear weapons. Founded in 1957, the IAEA operates under the framework of the United Nations and is often referred to as the "Atoms for Peace and Development" organization.

⁴⁰³ Also known as the Jaber Ibn Hayan Research Department (JIHRD), is a facility associated with the AEOI. Established in 1990, this laboratory is primarily involved in nuclear fuel-cycle activities. It has been designated as a Top Alert entity due to its connections with activities related to WMD and has faced sanctions for its involvement in such activities.

⁴⁰⁴ Gary Samore, *Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes A Net Assessment*, (Taylor & Francis, 2013), p.60.

Map n°6: Map of the main sites of Iran's nuclear program



Source : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_facilities_in_Iran#/media/File:Iran_nuclear.

In the course of time, the TNRC has been observed for its possible connection to the development of nuclear weapons. It has been appointed as a site that has procured goods and technology for Weapons of Mass Destruction programs.

By the early 2000s, apprehension concerning the pursuit of the development of nuclear weapons amplified. In 2003, the IAEA launched the scrutiny of Iran's nuclear operations after the discovery that the country had hidden elements of its program such as the production of yellowcake⁴⁰⁵ and advanced centrifuge designs which plays a primordial role in the enrichment of uranium for nuclear fuel.⁴⁰⁶In the light of this disquietude, the EU-3⁴⁰⁷ (France,

⁴⁰⁵ Yellowcake, or uranium concentrate, is a key intermediate product in the nuclear fuel cycle, primarily produced from the milling of uranium ore.

⁴⁰⁶<https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/history-irans-nuclear-program>, last accessed (02/08/2024).

⁴⁰⁷ Also known as the E3, it refers to a group of three major European countries: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. This grouping emerged as a significant diplomatic entity, particularly in the context of international negotiations and foreign policy initiatives.

Germany, and the UK) initiated diplomatic negotiations with Iran. In fact, the E3 played a crucial role in diplomatic efforts, especially concerning nuclear negotiations with Iran. They were instrumental in the debate intended at restraining Iran's nuclear program, working together with other global powers in what is often referred to as the E3+3 or P5+1 format, which includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany.⁴⁰⁸ Among the agreement's proposals, Iran was suggested to export a significant portion of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey. In return, Iran would receive higher-enriched uranium for use in a research reactor. This was aimed to build trust and decrease frictions concerning Iran's nuclear pursuit. Thus, in October 2003, Iran acquiesced to interrupt its enrichment activities and collaborate with the IAEA, driving to the Tehran Declaration.⁴⁰⁹

The P5+1 began formal negotiations with Iran in 2013, leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, which was finalized in July 2015. This agreement aimed to limit Iran's nuclear capabilities in exchange for relief from the economic sanctions. In fact, Iran has undergone a long-standing policy aimed at isolating it economically and politically since the seizure of the US. Embassy in 1979. Over the years, sanctions have expanded to include various sectors, including military, financial, and energy.

These sanctions have had a deep effect on Iran's economy, regressing it considerably. Statistics estimates that Iran's economy is 15 to 20 percent smaller than it would have been without sanctions, costing the country around \$160 billion in lost oil revenue. Additionally, over \$100 billion in Iranian assets remain frozen in foreign accounts.⁴¹⁰

The JCPOA, which aimed to limit Iran's nuclear program was planned to prolong the time it would take for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon, if it chose to pursue that path. Negotiating nations apprehended that Iran's evolves to become a nuclear weapons state propelling the area into a new crisis. One concern was that Israel would take preemptive military action against suspected nuclear facilities in Iran, as it had in Iraq and Syria, which may launch retaliations

⁴⁰⁸ https://web.archive.org/web/20140905064612/http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/30/p51_or_e33, last accessed (3/08/2024).

⁴⁰⁹ The Tehran Declaration of 2003 refers to an agreement reached between Iran and three European countries—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—during negotiations concerning Iran's nuclear program. This declaration was part of broader diplomatic efforts to address concerns about Iran's potential development of nuclear weapons.

⁴¹⁰ <https://www.cfr.org/background/international-sanctions-iran>, last accessed (3/08/2024).

by Lebanon-based Hezbollah or disturbance to the transport of oil in the Persian Gulf.⁴¹¹ Nevertheless, the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 under President Trump led to the re-establishment of sanctions and an ensuing acceleration of Iran's nuclear program. In fact, the Trump administration believed that the JCPOA's clauses were meagre to restrain Iran's nuclear aspirations. Detractors of the deal emphasized that it afforded Iran the right to restart certain nuclear activities after a specific period, which they saw as a considerable defect. In addition to nuclear concerns, the U.S. administration was also skeptical concerning Iran's ballistic missile plan and its implication in local disputes. The JCPOA did not deal with these matters which increased discontent of U.S. officials. Donald Trump who was then a candidate, made the renegotiation of the JCPOA one of his main foreign affairs campaign promises. Describing the Iran deal as a "*disaster*", so "*terrible*" that could lead to "*a nuclear holocaust*", Trump declared at a campaign rally that "*this deal, if I win, will be a totally different deal*"⁴¹². Central figures in Trump's administration, especially National Security Advisor John Bolton, were fervent proponent for a total removal from the JCPOA. Bolton among other key figures encouraged their government to apply a "*maximum pressure*" tactic to force Iran to modify its attitudes. This has increased fears of a potential nuclear chaos, with ongoing debates about the reality of Iran's nuclear objectives. After the departure, the U.S. re-introduced sanctions aiming crucial branches of Iran's economy, like energy and finance. The intention was to employ economic constraints on Iran in order to push it to revise its policies which finally led to a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy towards Iran.

At present, Iran has considerably increased its nuclear capacities, diminishing the time it would need to make enough fissile material essential for both nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not hidden its apprehension concerning Iran's technical aptitude and despite these competencies, Iran maintains that its nuclear program is destined for peaceful objectives. Nevertheless, the Iranian nuclear issue remains a complex and contentious topic, involving a mix of historical grievances, geopolitical tensions, and differing interpretations of Iran's nuclear ambitions. The international community continues to grapple with how to address these challenges while ensuring regional stability and preventing nuclear proliferation.

⁴¹¹ <https://www.cfr.org/background/what-iran-nuclear-deal>, last accessed (3/08/2024).

⁴¹² Luciano Zaccara, *Foreign Policy of Iran Under President Hassan Rouhani's First Term (2013–2017)*, (Springer Nature Singapore, 2020), p. 81.

VI- U.S. Diplomatic Efforts and Challenges:

The United States has been engaged in a complicated and evolving diplomatic relationship with Iran concerning its nuclear program, especially since the early 2000s. The JCPOA agreement aimed to limit Iran's nuclear program in exchange for relief from economic sanctions. Under the agreement, Iran has also agreed to reduce its uranium stockpile by 98% and maintain enrichment levels significantly below those needed for weaponization.⁴¹³ The major purpose has been to discourage Iran from elaborating nuclear weapons while dealing with regional security issues.

In recent years, Iran has declared its program to create a new research reactor at its nuclear site in Isfahan, pointing out continuing involvement in its nuclear abilities. Parallely, the TNRC still plays an important role in Iran's nuclear research landscape, trying to equilibrate scientific progress with international inspection concerning nuclear proliferation. Attempts to restore the JCPOA have coped with numerous challenges like Iran's increased uranium enrichment and the geopolitical complexities involving other nations, such as Russia and China. However, the present diplomatic landscape is strained with instability and negotiations trying to re-establish trust in the deal while tackling with the worries of various participants about Iran's nuclear ambitions. In addition, the absence of trust between the U.S and Iran add another reason among so many others to efficient negotiations. In fact, Iran's leaders have been dubious about U.S. motives, especially in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. This incident has led Iran to be skeptical about making concessions, worrying that any deal may not be respected in the future. The infliction of sanctions may conduct to a stalemate in diplomatic efforts. If Iranian leaders feel tied by sanctions, they may embrace a more tenacious position, refusing to adhere to any constructive negotiations. It was the case after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, where Iran deliberately hastened its nuclear actions as a riposte to prolonged sanctions, efficiently slowing the development of diplomatic talks.

⁴¹³ <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal>, last accessed (5/08/2024).

Iran's constant involvement in its nuclear program, implying the enrichment of uranium to levels close to weapons-grade, complicate diplomatic efforts. The quick advancements in its nuclear capabilities have made it difficult for Iran to acquiesce to important concessions, as they want to keep the ability to quickly resume their nuclear activities if negotiations collapse.⁴¹⁴

The U.S. and its allies have always been concerned about Iran's military capacities and its impact on the area. In fact, the broader geopolitical landscape, such as certain conflicts implying Iran's support for groups in the Middle East and its missile program add layers of complexity to the negotiations and complicate diplomatic efforts. The international organizations such as the United Nations, has affirmed the necessity to get to diplomatic solutions to reestablish the JCPOA and guarantee Iran's conformity with its nuclear commitments. However, differing views among the P5+1 countries on how to approach negotiations have hindered progress.

The U.S. diplomatic efforts regarding Iran's nuclear program have also faced numerous challenges, from trust deficits to regional instability. While there are indications of a potential reopening of negotiations, the path forward remains fraught with complexities that require careful navigation by all parties involved. The outcome of these diplomatic efforts will significantly impact not only U.S.-Iran relations but also broader regional security dynamics. In fact, the possibility for Iran to produce nuclear weapons constitutes important risks to regional stability, especially concerning its relationships with neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel. The latter has long seen a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat and has hinted at preemptive military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. This situation creates a precarious balance, where any miscalculation could lead to significant military conflict in the region. Moreover, the ongoing tensions have implications for global security. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East could trigger an arms race, prompting other countries in the region to pursue their own nuclear capabilities in response to Iran's advancements. Besides, the broader geopolitical context in the Middle East makes the situation more complex for negotiations. Iran's involvement in regional conflicts and its relationships with certain neighboring nations create a challenging environment for diplomacy.

⁴¹⁴<https://armypowerinfo.com/Nuclear-Proliferation/details/21/Iran-nuclear-ambitions-Diplomatic-efforts-and-challenges>, last accessed (4/08/2024).

Any agreement on nuclear issues must also consider these regional dynamics, which can influence both Iran's and the U.S.'s negotiating positions.

VII- Impact of U.S-Iran Relations on Regional Stability:

The relationship between the United States and Iran has been historically marked with tension, mainly since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. This rancor goes back to key events like the U.S. hostage crisis and the freezing of Iranian assets, which add extra layers to the already existing animosity that persists today. Even though, there have been a few approaches to regularize their relations, many geopolitical factors such as Iran's nuclear aspiration and regional security dynamics, still complicate their rapports.

The constant friction between the U.S. and Iran considerably impacts local stability in the Middle East. The American government has applied a “maximum pressure campaign” after the U.S withdrawal from JCPOA in order to extend the time Iran would need to develop a nuclear weapon, which was the main objective of the original JCPOA. The campaign sought also to limit Iran's nuclear program through economic sanction by targeting Iran's oil exports and financial systems. The U.S. government also attempted to cause economic difficulties that would force Iran to comply with U.S. exigencies and restrain Iran's power in the Middle East, especially its help for proxy groups in certain areas. In fact, Iran's support for many militant groups across the region, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and militias in Iraq and Syria, represents a serious issue to U.S. interests and its allies, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, by the past, Iran has been involved in several attacks against U.S. forces and allies. For example, Iranian-backed groups have been implicated in the deaths of over a thousand American soldiers in Iraq, and Iran was incriminated in the 1996 Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia, where 19 U.S. servicemen were killed.⁴¹⁵ Effectively, Iran supplies considerable aid to different militant groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. The aid consists of weapons, training, and financial supports, permitting these groups to lead activities that threaten U.S. and its allies. For instance, the

⁴¹⁵ <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76693/html/CHRG-112shrg76693.htm>, last accessed (5/08/2024).

Houthis⁴¹⁶ have several times attacked Saudi targets, demonstrating Iran's ability to express power through proxies. Iran's support of militant groups adds tensions and instability in the region. Iran's support for Shia groups represents a direct threat to Saudi Arabia's security, especially when with the presence of a Shia minority within its borders. In addition, nuclear concerns contribute to the already existing distrust which is justified by the American military presence in the area being a response to the Iranian threat and comfort U.S. allies. While this strategy has limited Iran's financial resources for supporting proxy groups, it has not fundamentally altered Iran's regional behavior. Nevertheless, this atmosphere engenders a perpetual cycle of tension that jeopardizes regional stability.

The U.S.-Iran relationship also affects the relations within the Middle East. As an example, Saudi Arabia and Iran's opposition is not exclusively built on sectarian disparity but also on their mutual lust for regional ascendancy and control. Similarly, the dynamics between the U.S. and Iran have had deep impact on Iraq's political landscape, security situation, and social fabric, especially following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. In fact, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran broadened its authority in Iraq, assisting Shia political parties and militias which engendered a complicated environment where Iraq is usually caught between U.S. interests and Iranian influence. The presence of U.S. troops in Iraq has also been a point of disagreement, with Iran usually looking unfavorable on this threat. Parallely, Iran has promoted several militia groups such as Shia groups that function in Iraq, which has alienated Sunni populations weakening the safety of the area and often leads to violence.

The historical parallels in US-Iran relations reveal a complex interaction full of intervention, authoritarianism, and regional conflict. Grasping these patterns is primordial to depict current conflicts and a probable future agreement for the stability of the Middle East. The heritage of former incidents persists on molding the geopolitical landscape, impacting both domestic and foreign policies in Iran and a larger area. A reevaluation in U.S.-Iran relations could probably pave the way to better ties between Iran and its regional enemies, which might restore the stability of the region but could also disturb the equilibrium of existing power.

VIII- U.S. Foreign Policy Outlook with Iran:

⁴¹⁶ The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, are a Zaydi Shia movement that emerged in northern Yemen in the 1990s. They represent a complex and evolving force in Yemen's ongoing conflict, characterized by their anti-corruption rhetoric, military capabilities, and significant geopolitical implications. Their actions continue to influence regional stability and international relations, particularly in the context of their ties to Iran and the broader Middle Eastern conflicts.

September 11th 2001 attacks have had major ramifications around the world. The United States launched a war on terrorism, invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in addition to the tremendous impact of the Patriot Act on the domestic level which restructured the nation's role in the world. Moreover, the attacks have had terrible consequences on the international economy. In the history of humankind, there has been no other single terrorist event like the attacks of 9/11 which have had such a negative impact on the economy of countries internationally and at the same time on the emotional condition of millions of people around the world. The consequences of the terrorist attacks were tremendous, and besides economy they have impacted different sectors such as travelling and tourism. Passing the first days of the shock, the attacks have derived in a deep market recession due to the cost of security measure to impede similar attacks in the future. It was hard to believe that the U.S. had been so vulnerable to such a violent act considering the level of its national security. The country has been previously the target of terrorist actions such as in 1993, when terrorists detonated explosives in a van parked underneath the World Trade Center, but an attack of such a magnitude as 9/11 was much more difficult to accept, and has resulted in severe measure taking on the national and international level. The attacks were a transformative event that left an indelible mark on the United States, radically altering the nation's psyche, security posture, geopolitical standing, and cultural fabric. The 9/11 event also reshaped American attitudes towards foreign policy and its legacy continues to shape American society and policy to this day.


Over the past few years, no other subject has been argued so frequently with so much eagerness, as how to assess the sources of America's conduct, the way it conducted internationally, and the extent to which its actions have contributed or not to the global order. One can recall the years of the Cold War and the Vietnam War, when the U.S. foreign policy had been the main subject of international media. There are obviously three major reasons why the United States have always been on the world's radar. First, whether we like it or not the United States of America remains a superpower. Second, since the attacks of 9/11 the nation has faced important challenges that range from terrorist threat to economic crisis, in spite of everything, it has always fallen on its feet. Finally, in less than a decade, the country has shifted from being led by George W. Bush, one of the most controversial presidents of the twenty first century to elect an Afro-American president with a typical African name Barack Hussein Obama. This depicts how it is difficult to characterize the United States and revealed a new sense of uncertainty about where America stands now, and what the future holds for its

citizens. Insecurity and the cost of fighting two wars abroad, with perpetual headlines informing Americans that in near future China will have become the strongest economy of the world sounds badly in Americans' mind with only one conclusion to be drawn. For the Americans, the best days are behind, especially with the potential re-election of Donald Trump.

During the presidency of Barack Obama, the U.S. foreign policy team led by the Secretary of the State Hilary Clinton who was carefully adjusting to a world where it was becoming obvious that America could no longer run the world alone. Before anything else, President Obama sought to dissociate his administration's foreign policy from the more unilateral and militaristic approach of the previous Bush administration. He attempted desperately to rehabilitate America's global status and diplomacy, which had been damaged by the Iraq War and several contentious policies of Bush's administration. One of his promises was to leave the obsession of terrorism behind and start to focus on a range of other transnational issues like nuclear proliferation and climate change. Undoubtedly, Obama accomplished some notable achievements like the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate agreement, and the normalization of relations with Cuba. Even though his record had not completely succeeded in restoring the reputation of the United States, international public opinion on the U.S; nevertheless, bounced back after Bush's fiasco.

From the point of view of certain critics, Obama's accomplishments fade in comparison with the extent of his failures. Some critics argue that Obama's foreign policy was ultimately a failure, as it did not properly deal with emerging threats and conflicts around the world. There were also worries that Obama's aspiration for retreat and diplomacy was sometimes fulfilled at the expense of American leadership and influence on the international scene. Despite Obama's efforts to decrease U.S. military engagement, the Middle East remained entangled in conflict and instability, with ongoing wars in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. Security in Afghanistan has worsened with a rise of ISIS and the group's expansion across the Middle East. While Obama sought to distance the U.S. from authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Bahrain, he was also accused of not doing enough to pressure these allies on human rights and democracy. This contradictory approach was seen as jeopardizing America's credibility and values-based foreign policy. (refer to map n°7, page 187).

Map°7: U.S. presence influence in the Middle East.



Source: www.young-diplomats.com/american-influence-middle-east-decline-rise-stagnant/

In addition, Obama's response to the Arab Spring uprisings was seen as hesitant and reactive, missing opportunities to shape the outcomes in countries like Libya and Syria. In fact, American foreign policy and foreign intervention have been the subject of much debate, praise and criticism, and the best example is the U.S. intervention in Libya. In 2011, the U.S. intervened in the First Libyan Civil War by supplying air assistance to rebel troops. Consequently, there was lot of hypotheses in The Washington Post that President Barack Obama made a covert action, bringing to light that he gave permission to the CIA to conduct a

secret mission to furnish weapons and assistance to the Libyan opposition, resulting in the death of President Muammar Gaddafi.

Before the Arab Spring, there was evidence that the voice of people of the region was insignificant for the West. There was a general belief that this voice was too split, politically disorganized and too radical to be taken seriously. Likewise, there was a fallacious hypothesis that the Arab authoritarian regime was there to stay. However, this assumption did not fit new generations of Arabs and Muslims who started asserting themselves. The old political order was progressively abating and a new one emerged on the basis of democracy which is now at the heart of the politics of the region.

The rapid and unforeseen revolutions in the Middle East are posing huge challenges to the American policy performances. There has always been balancing attitudes in American foreign policy between promoting American “values” (foreign policy idealism)⁴¹⁷ and preserving American “interests” (foreign policy realism)⁴¹⁸. Depicting those turbulent events, it has become somewhat habitual for analysts to point out failings in American foreign policy. It is not politically correct to hold the United States responsible for all, yet we also cannot disregard the repercussions of decades of U.S. interests and involvement in the Middle East. Nor can we neglect the way America stayed at the background over the past decade refusing to get fully implied in a political crisis that it helped to start. The defeat of the Arab Spring went back to Barack Obama’s static attitude years ago, specifically after his famous Cairo speech in 2009, called “*a new beginning*”. The speech represented a promise president Obama made of a new era for U.S. foreign policy in the region, many believed that he would promote to establish democracy once the protests started. But it was not the case.

When the United States did get implied, its actions were bounded. President Obama went into Libya with NATO pretending humanitarian intervention, but was accused of going beyond his mandate and rapidly left the situation to France and Britain. President Obama would later call a failure to plan for the aftermath of the Gaddafi regime the “worst mistake” of his presidency⁴¹⁹. In Yemen, American efforts were hidden again. While President, Ali Abdullah

⁴¹⁷ Idealism in the foreign policy context holds that a nation-state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its conduct and rhetoric in international affairs. For example, an idealist might believe that ending poverty at home should be coupled with tackling poverty abroad.

⁴¹⁸ Realism, although a highly diverse body of thought, it is unified by the belief that world politics is always and necessarily a field of conflict among actors pursuing power. The theories of realism are contrasted by the cooperative ideals of liberalism.

⁴¹⁹ Malloy, Allie and Treyz, Catherine, CNN, Obama admits worst mistake of his presidency, April 11, 2016.

Saleh, was obliged to resign due to the uprising, Obama allowed both Saleh and forces loyal to him to pursue to exercise influence in the country, further inflaming the civil upheaval. Saudi Arabia then intervened in 2015 to preserve its interests against the rebellion and its Iranian backers.⁴²⁰ Unlike the Egyptian and Tunisian protests, which seemed to have little centralized leadership, protests in Yemen seemed to have been coordinated and governed by a coalition of Yemeni opposition groups.

Like the rest of world, the Obama Administration was not prepared for the Arab Spring. Along with lot of nations, he was acknowledging the Egyptian revolution and cheering the democratic aspirations of the protesters as a demonstration of longstanding American standards and principles. This apparent support of democracy in Middle East, however, went against abiding American policy where political stability was put forward over parliamentary democracy; stability of course referred to support for authoritarian regimes that preserved U.S. interests in the region⁴²¹.

Writing about American interests in the Middle East, William Quandt, a leading Middle East scholar and former member of the National Security Council in the Nixon and Carter Administrations put forward three concerns: oil, Israel, and the Soviet Union. These elements were the driving forces behind American Middle East policy during the 1950s and the 1980s, especially when we know that the biggest energy reserves (two-thirds of the world's total) are located in the Saudi Arabia.⁴²² The questions of oil, Israel and the United States meet at a regional level because of the U.S. resolution to adopt Israel as a local ally to protect its interests. In addition, the U.S. overtly supports the Israeli political strategy of using policies of “terror and expulsion” in an endeavor to enlarge its territory by killing and displacing Palestinians⁴²³. This implicit strategic alliance between America, Israel, and the Arab Nation was confirmed in a critical article by Noam Chomsky and Irene Gendzier, two specialist of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis who present incontestable evidence that oil politics played a serious role in the founding of Israel, the policy then adopted by the United States toward Palestinians, and subsequent U.S. involvement in the region:

The status quo will persist in the region for as long as we want it to. The current

⁴²⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Yemen/Arab-Spring-and-civil-war>, last accessed (7/08/2024).

⁴²¹ Colonel Patrick Anderson United States Army. US Support for Democracy in Authoritarian Regimes, United States Army War College Class of 2012.

⁴²² Goldberg Ellis, Reşat Kasaba, S. Migdal Joel, F Philip Robert. Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society, University of Washington Press, 1993, p 165.

⁴²³ <https://globeistan.com/?p=96717>, last accessed (9/08/2024).

*situation will stay the way it is even for twenty or thirty years, until the Arabs agree to convert it into a "real peace" with Israel, in which normal relations will be established between the Arab states and Israel and extensive territorial changes will be made in Israel's favor.*⁴²⁴

According to Scholars from the Dependency School of political development, what follows from these policies is that any act towards democratization of the Middle East represents a threat to U.S. concern and interests in the area, mainly because democratic power will refuse to make concessions to Western foreign policy interests. The United States has countered democracy in the Middle East, because *"it is much simpler to manipulate a few ruling families-to secure fat orders for arms and ensure that oil price remains low-than a wide variety of personalities and policies bound to be thrown up by a democratic system,"* highlights the veteran Middle East journalist Dilip Hiro⁴²⁵. Similarly, Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and Democratic Party presidential candidate, observed a same apprehension concerning the impacts of the Arab Spring on the U.S. foreign policy. "In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya," he observed, "strong Islamic sentiments have emerged despite the democratic and Western-oriented facade of the initial Arab Spring uprisings. The future orientation of these states is likely to be less helpful to U.S. interests and policies in the region than their predecessors."⁴²⁶

Referring to the Arab Spring, President Obama gave a crucial foreign policy speech on May 19, 2011, where he spoke about *"a new chapter in American diplomacy."*⁴²⁷ Unlike his predecessors, he sought compromises between American interests and American values in the Middle East. The fact that the U.S. has pursued the sale of weapons to Bahrain-despite its crackdown on pro-democracy protesters and the denial to give American aid to Egypt to progress on democratization, despite the arrest of American NGO⁴²⁸ workers by the Egyptian military invokes a longstanding continuity of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.⁴²⁹ This failure to effectively leverage the regional upheaval was seen as a major missed opportunity.

⁴²⁴ Exposing Israel's Foreign Policy Myths: The Work of Amnon Kapeliuk.

⁴²⁵ Dilip Hiro was a prominent Indian author, journalist, and commentator known for his expertise in the politics of South Asia and the Middle East. His work has been influential in shaping the understanding of contemporary issues in the regions he studied. His ability to analyze and articulate the intricacies of political relationships has made him a respected figure in journalism and academia.

⁴²⁶ Wesley Clark, Why US Shouldn't Rush to War in Syria, CNNOPNION (March 9, 2012, 12:34 PM), last accessed (9/08/2024).

⁴²⁷ <https://whitehouse.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/19/obama-announces-new-chapter-in-american-diplomacy/>, last accessed (9/08/2024).

⁴²⁸ Non-Governmental Organization

⁴²⁹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/05/20125120655116284.html>, last accessed (9/08/2024).

The abiding estrangement between the United States and Iran constitutes one of the main blatant contradictions for the American foreign policy in the Middle East. The main contradiction of U.S. foreign policy in the region is characterized by a reliance on authoritarian allies for strategic gains, which often conflicts with its professed values of democracy and human rights and discredits U.S. effectiveness in the area. However, the world has been dramatically altered since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 which generated a sectarian government and provoked a rupture in the U.S.-Iranian relations. Those alternations have been palpable even during Iran's revolutionary politics, with the ascension of Mohammed Khatami and his political reform moving from stance of confrontation to conciliation. This shift aimed to improve Iran's relations with the West and neighboring countries, promoting dialogue and cooperation instead of hostility. Nevertheless, the entrenched conservative opposition and systemic challenges ultimately constrained his success in fully promoting democracy in Iran. Despite some uncertain revolutionary attempts from Iran, the relation with the United States persists being rough and fluctuant. Neither Iran's modernization efforts nor Washington's efforts have decreased U.S. apprehension concerning Iranian backing for certain terrorist groups and its quest of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, in contrast with his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency was characterized by growing animosity towards the U.S. He embraced a confrontational position, often using provocative rhetoric against the West and Israel. Ahmadinejad's government refused to communicate, viewing the U.S. as its main enemy. His obsession by Iran's nuclear program, support for groups opposed to U.S. interests in the region and disregard to international pressure worsened relations, leading to reinforced sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

Once again, the U.S. underwent a substantial shift from the Bush to Obama administrations, moving from a more confrontational, militaristic approach to one focused on diplomatic engagement and negotiation especially with the election of the new President Hassan Rouhani in 2013. In fact, in contrast to Ahmadinejad, Rouhani adopted a more conciliatory approach aimed at improving relations with the West. However, the basic ideas of stopping Iran's nuclear aspirations and controlling its regional influence remained the same across both Bush and Obama presidencies. Besides including Iran as part of the "Axis of Evil" and pursuing "coercive diplomacy" Bush's administration took a more aggressive and direct posture towards Iran, with a priority on isolating the country and preventing it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Unlike his predecessor, Obama tried to engage into a more diplomatic

approach towards Iran, highlighting the need for direct engagement and negotiation. This strategy, in addition to Rouhani's diplomatic engagement led to the landmark Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2015, which lifted sanctions in exchange for Iran restraining its nuclear program. This shift highlights the impact of leadership styles and political ideologies on international relations and the complexities of negotiating peace and cooperation. Nevertheless, Obama's foreign policy towards Iran was not without its critics, who put forwards that it was too conciliative and failed to properly address Iran's regional effraction and support for terrorism. Even though lots of differences in the U.S. approaches, there was also some similarities and continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations on Iran policy. Both administrations maintained economic sanctions and sought to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, though specific strategies and tactics that draw attention on the U.S. constant and salient interests in the Gulf region. These interactions and policies have significantly influenced the trajectory of U.S.-Iran relations, reflecting contrasting approaches that have led to varying degrees of tension and engagement. The dynamics of U.S.-Iran relations changed drastically again when President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA, restoring severe sanctions on Iran. This incident jeopardized Rouhani's endeavors and paved the way to additional tensions, as Ahmadinejad's confrontational heritage resurged in the form of strengthened hostility from both sides. The withdrawal not only affected Iran's economy but also deceased the chance for diplomatic cooperation, leading to a cycle of worsening that has remained.

The repercussions of the JCPOA withdrawal have also destabilized the balance of power in the Middle East. With the U.S. stepping retraction from its prior engagements, Iran has tried to increase its authority through proxy groups across the area, undertaking in what is often defined as gray-area warfare⁴³⁰ against American interests. This has forced the U.S to re-evaluate its approach, putting forward more comprehensive tactics to respond to Iran's regional activities besides the nuclear matter. As of now, negotiations reflected an acknowledgement that the substitute to a diplomatic commitment could engender more disagreement in the region with both sides being subjects to internal and external pressures.

The permanent alienation between the United States and Iran represents the main paradox for American policy in the Persian Gulf. In the years ahead what is coming remains complex, with both nations needing to manage their past resentment, frustration and ongoing strategic

⁴³⁰ Gray zone warfare, describes a strategic space that exists between open conflict and peace in international relations. This type of warfare involves tactics that are not clearly defined as acts of war but are aggressive enough to undermine an opponent's stability or interests.

interests to raise a more stable Middle East. In spite of conflictive relation, there are spheres where U.S. and Iranian interests align, like encountering drug trafficking from Afghanistan and facing the threat posed by ISIS. Productive dialogue could possibly pave the way to stronger relations and better regional stability, but this necessitates an important shift in U.S. policy and Iranian attitudes.

Conclusion

Geographically, Iran occupies a crucial position in the Gulf Region, neighboring countries that have gone through important U.S. military actions like Iraq and Afghanistan. This area offers Iran a key role in regional security dynamics and counter-terrorism efforts. Lot of politicians and analysts declare that getting involved with Iran could be salutary and advantageous when tackling regional problems and fighting terrorism. Despite its assertion of combating terrorism, Iran's activities usually oppose this narrative. The U.S. and its allies incriminate Iran of supporting terrorism through its aid for militant groups and its implication in local crisis. On the other hand, the U.S military presence in the Middle East, particularly in countries bordering Iran, is also perceived as a direct threat. This duality creates a complex landscape where Iran is both a target of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts and a participant in the broader geopolitical struggle against terrorism. The future of U.S. relations with Gulf countries, especially regarding Iran, will likely rely on the capacity to deal and manage different tensions while fostering cooperation among Gulf states.

Even though the U.S. aims to ensure that its presence in the region align with the interests of its allies, especially in response to Iran's ambitions and the broader geopolitical landscape, it should also demonstrate its good faith towards Iran. The U.S. could work towards reinitiating the JCPOA, which aimed to limit Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. This attitude could serve as a foundation for broader negotiations on other issues like reopening embassies or appointing special envoys to ease dialogue. Finding common ground on regional security issues, such as combating terrorism or addressing the humanitarian crisis in Syria could also help decrease hostilities and promote cooperation. Recognizing and addressing historical injustices, such as U.S. implications in Iran's political affairs in the past, could lead to a more respectful and constructive dialogue with Iran, ultimately contributing to regional stability and mutual understanding.

General Conclusion

It has been more than two decades since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Today, the attacks characterize a generational switch, with American children born after the terrorist attacks entering the age of majority and having grown up in a country that has waged a long struggle against a so-called 'War on Terror'. During this period, Americans' obsession has turned around phobia that terrorism would expand ever more dangerous besides an expanded paranoia of stories implying smallpox, jihadist snipers, trapped-luggage and other solipsist scenarios. Nevertheless, in spite of the magnitude of the attack, it is not an event that could easily be perpetrated again, since the singularity of 9/11 was in term of competency and capability. In fact, while most of Americans tend to see the planning of the assaults of 9/11 as the norm, one must keep in mind that such a large-scale attack is an exception. Moreover, besides the United States, many other countries have invested a lot of money and equipment to enhance their security and identify future apprentice of Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups within and outside the American soil. Therefore, all these draconian measures make a potential terrorist attack much harder to organize today.

Generally speaking, foreign policy deals with the manner a country interacts with foreign nations and how it fixes standards of interaction for its organizations. The main principles of the foreign policy of the United States, including all the Bureaus and Offices in the United

States Department of State, as quoted in the Foreign Policy Agenda of the Department of State, are *"to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community"*⁴³¹. However, despite the apparent devotion to democratic values, the U.S. foreign policy has always been the subject of much debate, acclaim and criticism, both nationally and internationally. Questioning whether the decisions of the American government have altered the destiny of other nations throughout several decades. In this regard, U.S. foreign policy adjustments following the 9/11 were mainly characterized by a focus on military action, intelligence reforms, and a reconfiguration of global alliances that continue to influence U.S. foreign relations. The feedback of the attacks was unprecedented and the immediate answer of the United States was to launch a war in Afghanistan in 2001, and later on Iraq in 2003. Even though, there was no connection between Iraq and 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush wore himself out to legitimize the wars and impose his new doctrine. Critics argue that the Bush administration misled the public into believing that Iraq was connected to 9/11 to justify the invasion. This narrative was fueled by a desire to address perceived threats in the Middle East, but it was largely based on speculation and political motivations rather than solid evidence.⁴³²

Furthermore, the attacks revived a sense of determination and solidarity, which did not happen since the Second World War. For the first time in U.S. history both Democrats and Republicans urged their government to declare war on terrorism whatever it takes. Unfortunately, one of the results of this harsh political shift was the tremendous escalation of hate crimes towards the Arab and Muslim communities and infractions of the American civil rights. Nevertheless, while initially supportive, the democrats later raised concerns about the strategy and execution of the War on Terror, especially regarding the Iraq War. This divergence in perspectives highlighted the complexities and challenges of U.S. foreign policy of the post-9/11 era.

One of the most apparent defects of U.S. foreign policy stands in its disproportionate ego which is better represented by the discourse of Madeleine Albright, United Nations' ambassador and former U.S. Secretary of State when she declared in 1998: *"If we have to use force, it is because we are America: we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see*

⁴³¹ [https://2009-](https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/107330.htm#:~:text=The%20State%20Department%20has%20four,American%20values%20and%20policies%3B%20and)

[2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/107330.htm#:~:text=The%20State%20Department%20has%20four,American%20values%20and%20policies%3B%20and](https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/107330.htm#:~:text=The%20State%20Department%20has%20four,American%20values%20and%20policies%3B%20and), last accessed (12/10/24).

⁴³² <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/9-11-and-iraq-the-making-of-a-tragedy/>, last accessed (12/10/24).

further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us"⁴³³ The worst side of U.S. foreign policy is the underestimation of the impact of the American government's interventions abroad. Neither George W. Bush nor Barack Obama stand out from the crowd, both followed the path of their predecessors. In fact, Obama administration's approach was shaped by the belief that collaboration and diplomacy are essential components of effective leadership while Bush administration's foreign policy was characterized by a strong emphasis on military strength and preemptive action. Nevertheless, both strongly believe in the perpetual conviction of the American exceptionalism. A legacy that can be traced back to the founding of the nation and continues to shape American foreign policy and national identity as a decisive leader and protector. In this regard, the Americans would never passively tolerate another attack or interference in their political affairs, hence the U.S. attitudes towards international authorities, with almost no solicitude for its acts. The attacks of 9/11 and the escalation of terrorist threat, became a long-awaited opportunity for the U.S. government to assert its role as a leader and world' protector through the campaign of "the War on Terror". The attacks have also catalyzed U.S. adoption of unilateralism, preemption, and military hegemony, exacerbating historical traumas with Iran and accelerating bilateral decline.

Moreover, there will always be a deep stain in the American history since the objectives of the terrorist were not randomly attacked. Beyond the scope of the assaults which were destined to terrorize the United States, Al Qaeda intended to send a message by aiming specific targets. In fact, the World Trade Center is the most appropriate symbol of U.S. capitalism, while the Pentagon remains as an emblem of US military power. On the one hand, Osama bin Laden utilized terrorism as a strategic tool to further his ideological goals and frame his actions as part of a holy war against perceived enemies, particularly the United States. He sought to portray his violent actions as a legitimate response to what he viewed as American aggression in the Muslim world. By casting his terrorist activities in a religious light, Bin Laden aimed to rally support among Muslims and legitimize his cause, framing it as a struggle for justice and liberation from foreign influence⁴³⁴. On the other hand, the Bush administration leveraged the concept of terror to justify military actions both domestically and internationally. Following the September 11 attacks, the administration framed its response as part of a broader "War on Terror," which included the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The invasion of Afghanistan

⁴³³ <https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1998/980219a.html>, last accessed (12/10/24).

⁴³⁴ Hans-Liudger Dienel, *Terrorism and the Internet Threats, Target Groups, Deradicalisation Strategies*, (IOS Press, 2010), p. 57.

was justified as a necessary action to dismantle al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban regime that harbored them. However, the subsequent invasion of Iraq was more controversial, as it was based on claims of weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorism that were later discredited.⁴³⁵

In fact, based on its evangelist background, Bush's government had a very dualist perception of good and evil. The counterattack of Bush consisted on a declaration that his nation was going to war against evil more specifically "Axis of Evil". According to this rhetoric, it is assumed that the United States views itself as a representation of the good and had the divine mission to save the world from evil and spread democracy. But the reality is far from the described perfection. On October 26, 2001, U.S. Congress adopted the Patriot Act; the abbreviation of: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. The Act comprehends lots of provisions involving the authority and prerogatives of the executive power, thus reducing the power of Congress, in addition to numerous measures limiting basic human rights⁴³⁶. Moreover, with its detention camp of Guantanamo, Bush's administration violates important human rights and despite criticism over the camp, the U.S. authorities tend to ignore any information that undermines their policy. Even though, President, Barack Obama, gave the impression that he took all those criticisms into consideration, he went with the flow of his predecessor and the camp is still open. Furthermore, in 2013, Obama was at the heart of a polemic exposed by Edward Snowden a former contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA), concerning the existence of PRISM surveillance program.⁴³⁷ The revelations divulged that the NSA was not only spying on foreign entities but also on U.S. citizens. These revelations raised significant concerns about privacy and civil liberties which deteriorated relations with foreign corporate stakeholders. Besides the war on terror, this incident proved that the United States, 'the model of democracy and virtue for the world to emulate' like the founding fathers

⁴³⁵ Stanley A. Renshon, Peter Suedfeld, *Understanding the Bush Doctrine, Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism*, (Taylor & Francis, 2012), p.178.

⁴³⁶ Cary Stacy Smith, Li-Ching Hung, *The Patriot Act Issues and Controversies*, (Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 2010), p.239.

⁴³⁷ PRISM is a code name for a program under which the United States National Security Agency (NSA) collects internet communications from various U.S. internet companies. PRISM collects stored internet communications based on demands made to internet companies such as Google. Among other things, the NSA can use these PRISM requests to target communications that were encrypted when they traveled across the internet backbone, to focus on stored data that telecommunication filtering systems discarded earlier, and to get data that is easier to handle.

envisioned it, was a “flawed democracy”.⁴³⁸ This approach in U.S. foreign policy aggravated the problem of nuclear proliferation through a combination of military strategies, diplomatic failures, and a focus on unilateralism which reinforced the geopolitical position of Iran. This strategy not only stressed on the value of nuclear weapons for U.S. security but have encouraged other countries to pursue their own nuclear programs as a counterbalance to U.S. power. Moreover, the lack of effective diplomatic engagement with countries like Iran and North Korea, instead of fostering cooperation often alienated these nations, making them more resistant to non-proliferation agreements. This approach decreased the credibility of the U.S. in conducting global non-proliferation efforts, as other nations discerned a duplicity in U.S. policy, whereby the U.S. sustained its nuclear weaponry while forcing others to disarm.⁴³⁹

In addition, the events of 9/11 catalyzed a wave of negative stereotypes about Muslims, which often blended various Muslim identities into a singular, threatening image. This stereotyping has roots in historical events, such as the Iran Hostage Crisis, which instituted a narrative of Iran as a hostile nation. The depiction of Iranian leaders, particularly during the Islamic Revolution, has led to a perception of Iran as a monolithic threat, reinforcing Islamophobic sentiments in the American society. Islamophobia has infiltrated political discourse, impacting the way U.S. policymakers tackle with Iran. The framing of Iran as part of the "Axis of Evil" has been critical in vindicating hostile foreign policies, including sanctions and military actions. This rhetoric not only discriminates Iran but also promotes a climate of apprehension and suspicion among the American public, impeding diplomatic engagement. Addressing these issues necessitates a real work to cope with Islamophobia and encourage a more nuanced understanding of Iran and its people. The interactions between the U.S. and Iran have seriously affected their national identities. Both nations have used public diplomacy strategies to impact perceptions and shape their identities on the global stage. The U.S. has often tried to foster democratic values and human rights in Iran, while Iran has put forward its cultural heritage and resistance to Western hegemony. The historical events, media portrayals, and public diplomacy efforts have all conducted to an intricate relationship dominated by mutual distrust and contrasting narratives. Indeed, these strategies reflect deeper ideological divides and have further complicated the relationship, as each side attempts to assert its

⁴³⁸ <https://ivn.us/posts/the-us-is-not-a-model-of-democracy-for-the-world>, last accessed (16/10/24)

⁴³⁹ <https://www.wagingpeace.org/the-bush-administrations-nuclear-policies-and-the-response-of-citizens/>, last accessed (16/10/24).

narrative and identity in the face of the other. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for comprehending the broader geopolitical landscape and the identities that emerge.

Even though, today's US-Iran relationship is characterized by a dangerous standoff with the specter of violent confrontation looming at any moment, it was not always the case. In fact, Iran and the United States have this particular experience of having been close allies until 1979 and the bitterest of enemies in the ensuing period. Indeed, Washington had a particular relationship with Teheran; strong ties and strategic alliances based on an assumed mutual interest in containing communist encroachment. However, since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the overthrow of the Shah, the new Islamic Republic of Iran has become a major foreign policy issue for American government.

There have been certain events that have shifted the Iranian relations towards the United States from client to a partner than an enemy such as the geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East that have evolved over the years. By drawing on extensive documents, the investigation demonstrates not only the importance of Iran arming but also how it reflected, and contributed to the evolution of U.S.-Iranian relations from a position of Iranian client state dependency to a situation where the U.S. became heavily exploited by the Shah for the protection of the Gulf region, until this strategy collapsed in 1979 with the Islamic Revolution. Although the events of 9/11 led to the occurrence of tensions between the USA and the Gulf region, the U.S. government must recognize its enduring and salient interests in the Gulf region. What makes Iran a more relevant case for the focus of American foreign policy, is its strategic location, historical ties, security concerns, economic resources, and its broader implications for regional stability. The upsurge of new threats for example such as the Islamic State (ISIS), has incited both Iran and the U.S. to reconsider their positions. In some instances, they have found common ground in combating shared threats, however, its support for various militant groups complicates its role in the international community. Besides, Iran's economy has faced severe challenges due to sanctions and isolation imposed by the U.S. which reinforces the Iranian resentment. The shifting alliances in the Middle East, particularly the normalization of relations between Israel and several Arab states, have worsened the strategic calculations for both Iran and the U.S. This changing landscape may encourage both nations to reassess their positions and explore potential partnerships to counterbalance new regional dynamics.⁴⁴⁰ Furthermore, the negotiations surrounding Iran's nuclear program, particularly the Joint

⁴⁴⁰<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/america-and-iran-from-containment-to-coexistence/>, last accessed (18/10/24).

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) established in 2015, marked a significant moment in U.S.-Iran relations. In fact, today's Iranian nuclear program remains a contentious issue, with ongoing debates about its peaceful intentions versus military aspirations. The legacy of the Atoms for Peace program is complex; while it facilitated the initial development of Iran's nuclear capabilities, it also contributed to the current geopolitical challenges surrounding nuclear proliferation in the region. As Iran continues to advance its nuclear program, the implications for regional and global stability remain profound.

Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the United States have been extremely active abroad, invading two countries, attacking, droning and applying sanctions against many others. At the same time the menace of extremist violence and terrorism has tragically metastasized especially in the Middle East region. Even if today Al Qaeda loses ground in term of threat and effectiveness, it persists to inspire international fear. Today more than ever the United States seems to be trapped in three embarrassing situations: tensions with Iran are being palpable, the everlasting trouble with Russia and an economic narrow struggle with Beijing. Iran's military actions and its ascendancy in the Middle East represent serious challenges. The U.S. must consider how to respond to Iranian missile attacks and its support for proxy groups in the region, particularly in light of Israel-Palestine conflicts. The U.S. will probably need to look for foreign assistance for its policies towards Iran, especially if it aims to promote democratic movements or regime change. Developing alliances with allies in Europe and the Middle East will be primordial for any efficient approaches, especially in the face of Iran's growing ties with other global powers.

The challenges for future American leaders will stand in the difficulty to persuade their people that international reengagement is necessary and that an effective foreign policy is set upon a stable, and a reliable nation. The country has to learn from its precedent mistakes. Neither international campaign nor isolationism have been beneficial to the United States. Not all international problems necessitate U.S. intervention. The U.S. government should employ the policy of selectivity concerning future challenges in order to apply military power with more efficiency.

Bibliography

I- Official documents:

- 1- Public Law: U.S. Patriot Act, 107th Congress. 1st session. HR 3162. 24 October 2001.
- 2- The 9/11 Commission Report, by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks.

II- Books:

- 1- Abderrahim, Tasnim, and Katharina McLarren, eds. *Tunisia's International Relations since the 'Arab Spring': Transition Inside and Out*. London: Routledge, 2018.
- 2- Abou El Fadl, Khaled M. *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists*. HarperOne, 2009.

- 3- Adi, Mohammad-Munir. *The Usage of Social Media in the Arab Spring*. Social Science 2014.
- 4- Afsaruddin, Asma. *Striving in the Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- 5- Al Qahtani, Mnahi Mutlaq. *Arab Spring or Arab Autumn: A Case Study of Egypt and Syria*. Sintok: Universiti Utara Malaysia, 2014.
- 6- Alsultany, Evelyn. *Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11*. New York: New York University Press, 2012.
- 7- Ambrose, Stephen. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. New York: Penguin, 1991.
- 8- Amin, Galal A. *Whatever Happened to the Egyptian Revolution?* Oxford University Press, 2013.
- 9- Ansari, M. Ali. *Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust*. London: Hurst Publishers, 2006.
- 10- Asher, Jerry, and Eric Hammel. *Duel for the Golan: The 100-Hour Battle that Saved Israel*. Novato, CA: Pacifica Military History, 1987.
- 11- Avermaet, Van, Guus Extra, and Massimiliano Spotti. *Language Testing, Migration and Citizenship: Cross-National Perspectives on Integration Regimes*. London: A&C Black, 2011.
- 12- Badran, Adnan, Elias Baydoun, and John R. Hillman. *Major Challenges Facing Higher Education in the Arab World: Quality Assurance and Relevance*. Cham: Springer, 2019.
- 13- Bailey, Beth, and Richard H. Immerman. *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*. New York: New York University Press, 2015.
- 14- Baldwin, David A. "Congressional Initiative in Foreign Policy." *The Journal of Politics*, November 1966.
- 15- Bartal, Shaul. *Jihad in Palestine: Political Islam and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- 16- Bassiouni, Cherif M. *Libya: From Repression to Revolution: A Record of Armed Conflict and International Law Violations, 2011-2013*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013.
- 17- Ba-Yunus, Ilyas, and Kassim Kone. *Muslims in the United States*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006.

- 18- Borgeson, Kevin, and Robin Valeri. *Terrorism in America*. Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2009.
- 19- Bowen, Jeremy. *The Arab Uprisings: The People Want the Fall of the Regime*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013.
- 20- Boyle, Michael J. *The Drone Age: How Drone Technology Will Change War and Peace*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.
- 21- Brands, Hal, and William Inboden. *The Last Card: Inside George W. Bush's Decision to Surge in Iraq*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019.
- 22- Brierley Watson, Jack. *Success in Twentieth Century World Affairs Since 1919*. London: J. Murray, 1974.
- 23- Brigham, Robert K. *Iraq, Vietnam, and the Limits of American Power*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2008.
- 24- Brigham, Robert K. *Is Iraq Another Vietnam?* New York: PublicAffairs, 2006.
- 25- Brown, Harold. *Thinking about National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.
- 26- Buckley, Mary, and Robert Singh, eds. *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.
- 27- Burak, Alexander. *Russia's Visionaries: Direct Speech*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020.
- 28- Burg, Steven L., and Paul Shoup. *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93*. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- 29- Campbell, David. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
- 30- Carew, Anthony. *Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987.
- 31- Carter, Malkasian. *The Korean War*. New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc., 2008.
- 32- Cesari, Jocelyne. *Encyclopedia of Islam in the United States*. Vol. 1. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007.
- 33- Chalmers, Johnson. *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001.

- 34- Chomsky, Noam, Gilbert Achcar, and Stephan R. Shalom. *Perilous Power: The Middle East and U.S. Foreign Policy: Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War, and Justice*. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- 35- Chomsky, Noam. *Middle East Illusions: Including Peace in the Middle East? Reflections on Justice and Nationhood*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
- 36- Christol, Carl Q. *International Law and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004.
- 37- Clark, Wesley K. *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire*. New York: Public Affairs, 2003.
- 38- Coll, Steve. *The Bin Ladens: The Story of a Family and Its Fortune*. New York: Allen Lane, 2008.
- 39- Cooley, John K. *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*. Virginia: Pluto Press, 1999.
- 40- Corwin, Edward S. *The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1957*. New York: New York University Press, 1957.
- 41- Cox, Michael, and Doug Stokes. *US Foreign Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- 42- Crane, Ken R. *Iraqi Refugees in the United States: The Enduring Effects of the War on Terror*. New York: NYU Press, 2021.
- 43- Crenshaw, Martha, and Gary LaFree. *Countering Terrorism*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017.
- 44- Crockatt, R. *America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism and the Global Order*. New York: Routledge, 2012.
- 45- Ryan, David. *Frustrated Empire: US Foreign Policy, 9/11 to Iraq*. Pluto Press, 2007.
- 46- Davies, Nicolas J. S. *Blood on Our Hands: The American Invasion and Destruction of Iraq*. New York: Nimble Books LLC, 2010.
- 47- Davis, John. *The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy*. New York: Routledge, 2016.
- 48- De Conde, Alexander. *The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1797-1801*. New York: Scribner's, 1966.
- 49- Dumond, Joseph F. *Remembering the Sabbatical Years of 2016: Breaking the Curses by Obedience*. Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Corporation, 2013.

- 50- Eldridge, Thomas R., Susan Ginsburg, Walter T. Hempel II, Janice Kephart, Kelly Moore, and Joanne Accolla. *The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. e-artnow, 2018.
- 51- El-Hasan, Hasan Afif. *Killing the Arab Spring*. Algora Publishing, 2019.
- 52- Eliotes, Nicholas A. *U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf: May 10, 1982*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Editorial Division, 1982.
- 53- Ellwood, David W. *Anti-Americanism in Western Europe: A Comparative Perspective*. Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center, 1999.
- 54- Emerson, Steven. *Jihad Incorporated: A Guide to Militant Islam in the U.S*. Prometheus Books, 2006.
- 55- Emery, C. *US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution: The Cold War Dynamics of Engagement and Strategic Alliance*. New York: Springer, 2013.
- 56- Entessar, Nader, and Kaveh Afrasiabi. *Trump and Iran: From Containment to Confrontation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.
- 57- Ernst, Carl. *Islamophobia in America: The Anatomy of Intolerance*. New York: Springer, 2013.
- 58- Fabbrini, Sergio. *The United States Contested: American Unilateralism and European Discontent*. Routledge, September 27, 2006.
- 59- Falk, Richard A. *Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World*. Routledge, September 11, 2002.
- 60- Farber, David. *Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's First Encounter with Radical Islam*. Princeton University Press, 2005.
- 61- Fawcett, Louise L'Estrange. *The International Relations of the Middle East*. Oxford University Press, 2005.
- 62- Flank, Lenny. *Voices from the 99 Percent: An Oral History of the Occupy Wall Street Movement*. Red and Black Publishers, 2011.
- 63- Fraihat, Ibrahim. *Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring*. Yale University Press, 2016.
- 64- Franck, Thomas M., and Edward Weisband. *Foreign Policy by Congress*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- 65- Frater, Jamie. *Listverse.com's Epic Book of Mind-Boggling Lists: Unbelievable Facts and Astounding Trivia on Movies, Music, Crime, Celebrities, History, and More*. Ulysses Press, May 13, 2014.

- 66- Fukuyama, Francis. *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*. 2018.
- 67- Fukuyama, Francis. *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy*. 2014.
- 68- Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. 2006.
- 69- Gall, Carlotta. *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, April 8, 2014.
- 70- Gardner, Lloyd C., and Marilyn B. Young. *Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam: Or, How Not to Learn from the Past*. The New Press, July 19, 2011.
- 71- Gasiorowski, Mark J. "The 1953 Coup d'État in Iran." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- 72- Gause, F. Gregory, III. "The International Politics of the Gulf." In *International Relations of the Middle East*, edited by Louise Fawcett. Oxford: The University Press, 2005.
- 73- Geraghty, Timothy J. *Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983—The Marine Commander Tells His Story*. Potomac Books, 2009.
- 74- Gordon, Ann, Edward Day L., and Christopher Bader D. *Fear Itself: The Causes and Consequences of Fear in America*. NYU Press, 2020.
- 75- Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard Trainor E. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. Vintage Books, 2007.
- 76- Grand, Stephen. *Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions Elsewhere Can Teach Us about the Prospects for Arab Democracy*. Brookings Institution Press, 2014.
- 77- Gresh, Geoffrey, and Tugrul Keskin. *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From American Missionaries to the Islamic State*. Taylor & Francis, 2018.
- 78- Guardino, Peter. *The Dead March: A History of the Mexican-American War*. Harvard University Press, 2017.
- 79- Gulyas, Aaron John. *Conspiracy Theories: The Roots, Themes and Propagation of Paranoid Political and Cultural Narratives*. McFarland, 2016.
- 80- Hamilton, A. Neil. *The 1970s*. Infobase Publishing, 2009.
- 81- Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. *The Federalist*. Courier Corporation, 2014.

- 82- Han, Eun-Jeong, Min Wha, and JongHwa Lee. *Korean Diaspora across the World: Homeland in History, Memory, Imagination, Media, and Reality*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2019.
- 83- Hastedt, Glenn P. *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2020.
- 84- Hegghammer, Thomas. *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- 85- Heinze, Marie-Christine. *Yemen and the Search for Stability: Power, Politics and Society after the Arab Spring*. Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.
- 86- Herring, George C. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- 87- Hewitt, Christopher. *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda*. Routledge, 2003.
- 88- Hiro, Dilip. *Blood of the Earth: The Battle for the World's Vanishing Oil Resources*. PublicAffairs, 2007.
- 89- Hollander, Paul. *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact*. Capercaillie, 2005.
- 90- Holmes, Dave, and Norm Dixon. *Behind the US War on Afghanistan*. Resistance Books, 2001.
- 91- Hook, Steven W., and John Spanier. *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*. SAGE Publications Press, 2012.
- 92- Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton University Press, 2009.
- 93- Jackson, Richard, Georg Sørensen, and Jørgen Møller. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Oxford University Press, 2019.
- 94- Jesenský, Marcel. *The United Nations under Ban Ki-moon: Give Diplomacy a Chance*. Springer, 2019.
- 95- Johnson, Chalmers. *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004.
- 96- Joyce, Miriam. *Bahrain from the Twentieth Century to the Arab Spring*. Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012.
- 97- Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. University of California Press, 2003.

- 98- Kahane, Meir. *The Story of the Jewish Defense League by Rabbi Meir Kahane*. Editorial Benei Noaj, 2008.
- 99- Kasten Nelson, Anna. *The Policy Makers Shaping American Foreign Policy from 1947 to the Present*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
- 100- Katzenstein, Peter J., and Robert O. Keohane. *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*. Cornell University Press, 2011.
- 101- Kazin, Michael, and Joseph Anthony McCartin. *Americanism: New Perspectives on the History of an Ideal*. University of North Carolina Press, 2006.
- 102- Kellner, Douglas. *Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy: Terrorism, War, and Election Battles*. Routledge, 2015.
- 103- Kelly Hoskins, Richard. *Vigilantes of the Christendom: History of the Phineas Priesthood*. Virginia Publishing Company, 1997.
- 104- Kinch, Penelope. *The US-Iran Relationship: The Impact of Political Identity on Foreign Policy*. I.B. Tauris, 2016.
- 105- Kissinger, Henry. *Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement and Extrication from the Vietnam War*. Simon and Schuster, 2003.
- 106- Kitfield, James. *War and Destiny: How the Bush Revolution in Foreign and Military Affairs Redefined American Power*. Potomac Books, 2005.
- 107- Klaas, Brian. *The Despot's Apprentice: Donald Trump's Attack on Democracy*. Oxford University Press, 2017.
- 108- Kolko, Joyce, and Gabriel Kolko. *The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
- 109- Korany, Bahgat, and Rabab El-Mahdi. *Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond*. American University in Cairo Press, 2012.
- 110- Kowalski, Kathiann. *Checks and Balances: A Look at the Powers of Government*. Lerner Publications, 2017.
- 111- Krastev, Ivan, and Alan McPherson. *The Anti-American Century*. Central European University Press, 2007.
- 112- Kriner, Douglas L., and Eric Schickler. *Investigating the President: Congressional Checks on Presidential Power*. Princeton University Press, 2016.
- 113- Kura, N. O. *Congress of the United States: Powers, Structure, and Procedures*. Nova Publishers, 2001.
- 114- Lansford, Tom. *9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide*. ABC-CLIO, 2012.

- 115- Lind, Michael. *Vietnam, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict*. Free Press, 2014.
- 116- Lindberg, Tod. *Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled Partnership*. Routledge, 2004.
- 117- Lindberg, Tod. *Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide*. Routledge, 2007.
- 118- Litwak, Robert. *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy Containment After the Cold War*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000.
- 119- Lucas, Eileen. *Islam in Society*. Greenhaven Publishing LLC, December 15, 2018.
- 120- Lynch, Timothy J., and Robert Singh. *After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- 121- Lyon, David. *Surveillance after September 11*. John Wiley & Sons, 2003.
- 122- Mahan, Sue, and Pamala Griset. *Terrorism in Perspective*. SAGE Publications, November 21, 2012.
- 123- Manhire, Toby. *The Arab Spring: Rebellion, Revolution, and a New World Order*. Guardian Books, 2012.
- 124- Mansbach, Richard W., and James McCormick. *Foreign Policy Issues for America: The Trump Years*. Routledge, 2019.
- 125- Maszka, John. *Terrorism and the Bush Doctrine*. 2008.
- 126- Matthiesen, Toby. *Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn't*. Stanford University Press, 2013.
- 127- May, Ernest. *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68*. Boston: Bedford Books, 1993.
- 128- Mazur, Sławomir. *National and International Security in Contemporary Changing*. Mieczysław Bieniek, 2012.
- 129- McGovern, George, and William R. Polk. *Out of Iraq: A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now*. Simon and Schuster, 2006.
- 130- McMahon, Kevin De J. *Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How the Presidency Paved the Road to Brown*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
- 131- McWhinney, Edward. *The September 11 Terrorist Attacks and the Invasion of Iraq in Contemporary International Law: Opinions on the Emerging New World Order System*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, January 1, 2004.
- 132- McWilliams, Wayne C., and Harry Piotrowski. *The World since 1945: A History of International Relations*. U.S.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

- 133- Md Saiful Karim. *Maritime Terrorism and the Role of Judicial Institutions in the International Legal Order*. BRILL, October 20, 2016.
- 134- Melanson, Richard. *American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush*. 2005.
- 135- Middleton, Jessica L. *The Sovereign Citizen Movement: Strain, Conflict, and the American Dream*. Arkansas State University, 2014.
- 136- Milani, Abbas. *The Myth of the Great Satan: A New Look at America's Relations with Iran*. Hoover Press, 2013.
- 137- Miles, Alex. *US Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine*. New York: Routledge, 2013.
- 138- Morgan, Patrick M., Keith Nelson, and A. G. Arbatov. *Re-viewing the Cold War: Domestic Factors and Foreign Policy in the East-West Confrontation*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000.
- 139- Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. McGraw-Hill, 1993.
- 140- Murray, Donette. *US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations since the Islamic Revolution*. Routledge, September 11, 2009.
- 141- Nash, Gary B. *Containment Defined, The American People: Creating a Nation and a Society*. 6th ed. New York: Pearson Education, 2008.
- 142- O'Hanlon, Michael E. *The Future of Land Warfare*. Brookings Institution Press, 2015.
- 143- O'Connor, Brendon, and Martin Griffiths. *Anti-Americanism: Historical Perspectives*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007.
- 144- Osinga, Frans, and Tim Sweijjs. *NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century Insights from Theory and Practice*. Springer Nature, December 3, 2020.
- 145- Painter, David. *The Cold War: An International History*. Routledge, March 11, 2002.
- 146- Palmer, Monte, and Princess Palmer. *Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity, and Challenges*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.
- 147- Paterson, Thomas, Clifford J. Garry, Shane Maddock, Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth Hagan. *American Foreign Relations: A History, Volume 2: Since 1895*. Cengage Learning, 2009.

- 148- Paul, David M., and Rachel Anderson Paul. *Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009.
- 149- Pauly, Robert, and Tom Lansford. *Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War*. Taylor & Francis, July 5, 2017.
- 150- Peña, Charles V. *Winning the Un-war: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism*. Potomac Books, Inc., 2006.
- 151- Perry, M., and Howard E. Negrin. *The Theory and Practice of Islamic Terrorism: An Anthology*. Springer, 2008.
- 152- Perusek, Glenn Wesley. *Shifting Terrain: Essays on Politics, History and Society*. Peter Lang, 2006.
- 153- Phillip, Mark. *Conversations in Early American History, 1492-1837*. A.J. Cornell Publications, 2008.
- 154- Pickering, Leslie James. *The Earth Liberation Front, 1997-2002*. Arissa Media Group, 2007.
- 155- Podliska, Bradley F. *Acting Alone: A Scientific Study of American Hegemony and Unilateral Use-of-Force Decision Making*. Lexington Books, 2010.
- 156- Pollack, Kenneth M., Daniel Byman, Akram Al-Turk, Michael Doran, Khaled Elgindy, Stephen Grand, Shadi Hamid, Bruce Jones, Suzanne Maloney, Jonathan Pollack, Bruce Riedel, Ruth Hanau Santini, Salman Shaikh, Ibrahim Sharqieh, Ömer Taşpınar, Shibley Telhami, and Sarah Yerkes. *The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East*. Brookings Institution Press, October 1, 2011.
- 157- Poznansky, Michael. *In the Shadow of International Law: Secrecy and Regime Change in the Postwar World*. Oxford University Press, 2020.
- 158- Pradhan, Prasanta Kumar. *Arab Spring and Sectarian Faultlines in West Asia: Bahrain, Yemen and Syria*. Pentagon Press, 2017.
- 159- Quandt, William B. *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*. Brookings Institution Press, 2015.
- 160- Ranstorp, Magnus. *Understanding Violent Radicalization: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe*. Routledge, 2010.
- 161- Record, Jeffrey. *Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq*. Potomac Books, Inc., 2010.
- 162- Revel, Jean François. *Anti-Americanism*. 2003.

- 163- Rosenberg, Norman, Paul Johnson, James McPherson, Alice Fahs, Emily Rosenberg, Gary Gerstle, and John Murrin. *Liberty, Equality and Power*. Wadsworth, 2011.
- 164- Rossides, Eugene T. *The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-year Retrospective*. Academy of Political Science, 1998.
- 165- Rugh, William A. *American Encounters with Arabs: The "Soft Power" of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006.
- 166- Rugh, William A. *American Encounters with Arabs: The Soft Power of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East*. U.S.: Praeger Publishers Inc, 2005.
- 167- Sadiki, Larbi. *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization*. Routledge, 2014
- 168- Scheer, Robert. *How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam*. Santa Barbara, CA: Center for Study of Democratic Institutions, 1970.
- 169- Schmid, Alex. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. Routledge, 2011.
- 170- Sek, Lenore. "Congress and Trade Negotiating Authority." In *Congress and Foreign Policy*, 1991.
- 171- Sexton, Jay. *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012.
- 172- Shehabi, Ala'a, and MarcOwen Jones. *Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf*. Zed Books Ltd, 2015.
- 173- Shue, Henry, and David Rhodin. *Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- 174- Simone, Ernest. *Foreign Policy of the United States, Volume I*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006.
- 175- Slany, William Z. *U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assets and U.S. Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime Ustasha Treasury: Supplement to Preliminary Study on U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II*. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, 1998.
- 176- Smith, Cary Stacy, and Li-Ching Hung. *The Patriot Act: Issues and Controversies*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 2010.

- 177- Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Timothy Dunne. *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- 178- Sodiq, Yushau. *A History of the Application of Islamic Law in Nigeria*. New York: Springer, 2017.
- 179- Sorensen, Theodore. "Political Perspectives: Who Speaks for the National Interest." In *Congressional Restraints on Executive Power*, edited by Thomas M. Franck, 1981. New York: New York University Press.
- 180- Soufan, Ali. *The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011.
- 181- Spanier, John. *American Foreign Policy since World War II*. 13th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995.
- 182- Steinberg, James, and Michael E. O'Hanlon. *Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- 183- Stewart, Richard W. *American Military History: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2005.
- 184- Stich, Rodney. *Iraq, Lies, Cover-Ups, and Consequences*. Silverpeak Enterprises, 2005.
- 185- Taji-Farouki, Suha. *Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur'an*. London: Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2006.
- 186- The Research Unit for Political Economy. *Behind the Invasion of Iraq*. New York: NYU Press, 2003.
- 187- Trager, Eric. *Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016.
- 188- Trager, Frank. *Why Vietnam?* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.
- 189- Tripp, Charles. *The Power and the People: Paths of Resistance in the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- 190- United States Tariff Commission. *Colonial Tariff Policies*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922.
- 191- Wadhia, Shoba Sivaprasad. *Beyond Deportation: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases*. New York: New York University Press, 2017.
- 192- Waugh, Earle H., and Baha Abu-Laban. *The Muslim Community in North America*. Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1983.

- 193- Wieland, Carsten. *Syria: A Decade of Lost Changes: Repression and Revolution from Damascus Spring to Arab Spring*. Seattle: Cune Press, 2012.
- 194- Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.
- 195- Yukich, Grace. *Muslim American Activism in the Age of Trump*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

III- JOURNAL ARTICLE

- 1- Deutch, John and H. Smith, Jeffrey, “Smarter Intelligence”, *Foreign Policy*, no. 128, (January/ February 2002): pp. 64-69 (6 pages).
- 2- Dobbins, James. “Who Lost Iraq”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 5 (Sep.- Oct., 2007) : pp. 61-74 (14 pages).
- 3- CHAN, S., & SAFRAN, W. “Public Opinion as a Constraint against War: Democracies’ Responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (APRIL 2006) : pp. 137-156 (20 pages).
- 4- Riedel, Bruce. “Al Qaeda Strikes Back”, *Foreign Affairs*, (May/June 2007): pp. 62-68 (6 pages)
- 5- Ruth Dassonneville, Fernando Feitosa, Marc Hooghe, Jennifer Oser. “Policy responsiveness to all citizens or only to voters? A longitudinal analysis of policy responsiveness in OECD countries”. *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 60, Issue 3, (August 2021): 583-602,
- 6- Ajami, Fouad. “An Arab Spring”, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2005. Vol. 84, Number 3.
- 7- Laird, Melvin R. “Iraq is not another Vietnam but it Could Become One If We Continue to Ignore Vietnam’s True Lessons”, *Foreign Affairs*, November/ December 2005.
- 8- Zaid Eyadat and Mohammad Mahafza “Culture and Foreign Policy: American Foreign Policy Post 9/11 “, *Il Politico*, Vol. 75, No. 2, (May-August 2010), pp. 163-177.

- 9- Youri Devuyt “Religion and American foreign policy: the Bush-Obama divide and its impact on Transatlantic relations” *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (305) (Jan-March 2010), pp. 35-46.
- 10- Paul R. Pillar “Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 127, No. 3 (Fall 2012), pp. 477-478
- 11- Wang, Amy B. "Trump asked for a 'Muslim ban', Giuliani says — and ordered a commission to do it 'legally'". *The Washington Post*. Retrieved January 30,2017.
- 12- Michael Doran, “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics”. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 117, No. 2 Summer, 2002, pp. 177-190.
- 13- Monten, Jonathan "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy". *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring, 2005), pp. 112-156 (45 pages).
- 14- Neeraj Kaushal, Robert Kaestner and Cordelia Reimers “Labor Market Effects of September 11th on Arab and Muslim Residents of the United States” *The Journal of Human Resources* Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring, 2007), pp. 275-308.
- 15- Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Bush Doctrine: The Dangers of American Exceptionalism in A Revolutionary Age”, *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 27, No. 4, Special Issue on the Bush Doctrine and Asia (2003), pp. 183-216 (34 pages).
- 16- Robert Jervis “Understanding the Bush Doctrine” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall, 2003), pp. 365-388.
- 17- Robert Jervis “Power without Influence : The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall, 2003), pp. 365-388 (24 pages).

IV- Webography

- 1- <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0045.xml>, last accessed (02/05/22).
- 2- https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4990&context=journal_articles, last accessed (25/07/22).
- 3- <https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rlawrence/Lawrence%20on%20Trade.pdf>, last accessed (25/08/22).

- 4- <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>, last accessed (4/08/22).
- 5- https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Presidents_of_the_United_States_on_the_United_States, last accessed (8/012/22).
- 6- <https://www.britannica.com/topic/jihad>, last accessed (7/07/23).
- 7- <https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/evangelical-history/an-faq-on-america-as-a-city-on-a-hill/>, last accessed (22/09/23).
- 8- <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/16/how-geography-explains-the-united-states/>, last accessed (19/11/23).
- 9- <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR236Venhaus.pdf>, last accessed (4/1/24).
- 10- https://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/a-genealogy-of-anti-americanism, last accessed (22/06/24).

V- Encyclopedia and dictionaries:

- 1- Encyclopedia Britannica, Ultimate Reference Suite, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 2009.
- 2- Scott, John and Marshall, Gordon. A Dictionary of Sociology, Oxford University Press, 2009.

Appendix:

Article II of the Constitution of the United States

Section 1

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chose by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chose the President. But in choosing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall choose from them by Ballot the Vice President.

The Congress may determine the Time of choosing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them. Before he enters on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: – I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.

Section 2

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Section 3

He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Section 4

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Source: <https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/>, last accessed date (4/9/24)

Citizen Genêt Affair: the Citizen Genêt Affair occurred in 1793 and involved Edmond-Charles Genêt, a minister from the revolutionary French government. He was sent to the United States during a time when France was at war with Great Britain and Spain. Genêt's actions, which included attempts to recruit American privateers to fight for France and to undermine U.S. neutrality, sparked significant controversy and diplomatic tension between the United States and France. The affair highlighted the challenges the U.S. faced in maintaining neutrality amidst European conflicts. Ultimately, the situation was resolved when

Genêt was recalled by the French government, leading to the establishment of clearer diplomatic protocols for future interactions.

XYZ Affair

The XYZ Affair was a separate but related diplomatic incident that took place between 1797 and 1798 during John Adams's presidency. It involved a confrontation between the United States and France, where American diplomats were approached by French agents who demanded bribes for negotiations. The names of these agents were kept secret and referred to as X, Y, and Z, which is how the affair got its name. The XYZ Affair escalated tensions between the two nations and contributed to the Quasi-War, an undeclared naval conflict between the United States and France. It underscored the fragile nature of U.S.-French relations during this period and the complexities of international diplomacy.

The Quasi-War: the Quasi-War was an undeclared naval conflict between the United States and France that lasted from **1798 to 1801**. This conflict arose in the context of deteriorating relations following the **XYZ Affair**, where French agents demanded bribes from American diplomats, leading to widespread anti-French sentiment in the U.S.

Key Events

- On **July 7, 1798**, the U.S. Congress rescinded treaties with France, marking the official start of the Quasi-War. This decision was influenced by France's aggressive actions, including the seizure of American merchant ships.
- The conflict was characterized by naval engagements, primarily involving the U.S. Navy's efforts to protect American shipping interests against French privateers. During this period, French ships seized over **300 American vessels**, prompting the U.S. to take military action.

The Quasi-War was significant for several reasons:

- It was the **first international conflict** faced by the United States after gaining independence, testing the young nation's military and diplomatic capabilities.
- The conflict led to the establishment of a more robust U.S. Navy, marking its first actions to protect American shipping abroad and asserting control over the Caribbean.
- It also sparked political debates regarding the constitutionality of the conflict and the extent of executive power in military engagements.

Source: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/xyz>, last accessed date (7/9/24)

National Security Council Paper NSC-68

NSC-68, formally titled "**United States Objectives and Programs for National Security**," was a pivotal document in U.S. foreign policy, presented to President Harry S. Truman on **April 7, 1950**. It was crafted by the National Security Council, primarily under the leadership of **Paul Nitze**, and it outlined a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the perceived threat of Soviet expansion during the early Cold War period. NSC-68 had a

profound impact on U.S. foreign policy for decades, laying the groundwork for America's Cold War strategy. It influenced military and diplomatic decisions, leading to increased U.S. involvement in conflicts such as the Korean War and shaping the overall approach to international relations during the Cold War era.

Key Themes and Objectives

- **Containment Strategy:** NSC-68 emphasized the need for a robust containment policy to prevent the spread of communism. It argued that the Soviet Union posed a significant threat not only to the United States but to global civilization itself, framing the conflict in stark, existential terms.
- **Military Build-Up:** The document called for a substantial increase in U.S. military spending and capabilities. It proposed that the U.S. should develop its military forces to counter the Soviet threat effectively, which included expanding the nuclear arsenal and conventional forces.
- **Global Commitment:** NSC-68 advocated for a global approach to U.S. foreign policy, suggesting that the U.S. should support allies and resist Soviet influence worldwide. This marked a shift from previous policies that were more isolationist in nature.

S.J. Res. 229 refers to a joint resolution introduced in the United States Congress. However, based on the search results, it appears that there is no specific information available regarding S.J. Res. 229 itself. It is possible that it pertains to a resolution that has not been widely documented or that it is a less prominent piece of legislation.

In general, joint resolutions like S.J. Res. 229 can serve various purposes, including:

- **Authorizing actions:** They may authorize the use of military force or other governmental actions.
- **Expressing sentiments:** They can express the sentiments of Congress on particular issues.
- **Amending laws:** They may propose amendments to existing laws or the Constitution.

Source:<https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/senate-joint-resolution/229/all-info>, last accessed (10/10/2024)

President Delivers State of the Union Address at the United States Capitol

Washington, D.C, on January 29, 2002

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Mr. Speaker, Vice President Cheney, members of Congress, distinguished guests, fellow citizens: As we gather tonight, our nation is at war,

our economy is in recession, and the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers. Yet the state of our Union has never been stronger. (Applause.)

We last met in an hour of shock and suffering. In four short months, our nation has comforted the victims, begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression. (Applause.)

The American flag flies again over our embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay. (Applause.) And terrorist leaders who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their own. (Applause.)

America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror. We'll be partners in rebuilding that country. And this evening we welcome the distinguished interim leader of a liberated Afghanistan: Chairman Hamid Karzai. (Applause.)

The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today women are free, and are part of Afghanistan's new government. And we welcome the new Minister of Women's Affairs, Doctor Sima Samar. (Applause.)

Our progress is a tribute to the spirit of the Afghan people, to the resolve of our coalition, and to the might of the United States military. (Applause.) When I called our troops into action, I did so with complete confidence in their courage and skill. And tonight, thanks to them, we are winning the war on terror. (Applause.) The man and women of our Armed Forces have delivered a message now clear to every enemy of the United States: Even 7,000 miles away, across oceans and continents, on mountaintops and in caves -- you will not escape the justice of this nation. (Applause.)

For many Americans, these four months have brought sorrow, and pain that will never completely go away. Every day a retired firefighter returns to Ground Zero, to feel closer to his two sons who died there. At a memorial in New York, a little boy left his football with a note for his lost father: Dear Daddy, please take this to heaven. I don't want to play football until I can play with you again some day.

Last month, at the grave of her husband, Michael, a CIA officer and Marine who died in Mazur-e-Sharif, Shannon Spann said these words of farewell: "Semper Fi, my love." Shannon is with us tonight. (Applause.)

Shannon, I assure you and all who have lost a loved one that our cause is just, and our country will never forget the debt we owe Michael and all who gave their lives for freedom.

Our cause is just, and it continues. Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst fears, and showed us the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our enemies' hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of

American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world.

What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning. Most of the 19 men who hijacked planes on September the 11th were trained in Afghanistan's camps, and so were tens of thousands of others. Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning.

Thanks to the work of our law enforcement officials and coalition partners, hundreds of terrorists have been arrested. Yet, tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. (Applause.) So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk. And America and our allies must not, and will not, allow it. (Applause.)

Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world. (Applause.)

Our military has put the terror training camps of Afghanistan out of business, yet camps still exist in at least a dozen countries. A terrorist underworld -- including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-i-Mohammed -- operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities.

While the most visible military action is in Afghanistan, America is acting elsewhere. We now have troops in the Philippines, helping to train that country's armed forces to go after terrorist cells that have executed an American, and still hold hostages. Our soldiers, working with the Bosnian government, seized terrorists who were plotting to bomb our embassy. Our Navy is patrolling the coast of Africa to block the shipment of weapons and the establishment of terrorist camps in Somalia.

My hope is that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own. Many nations are acting forcefully. Pakistan is now cracking down on terror, and I admire the strong leadership of President Musharraf. (Applause.)

But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will. (Applause.)

Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.

Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom.

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, aiming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. (Applause.) And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.

We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. (Applause.)

Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch -- yet it must be and it will be waged on our watch.

We can't stop short. If we stop now -- leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked -- our sense of security would be false and temporary. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight. (Applause.)

Our first priority must always be the security of our nation, and that will be reflected in the budget I send to Congress. My budget supports three great goals for America: We will win this war; we'll protect our homeland; and we will revive our economy.

September the 11th brought out the best in America, and the best in this Congress. And I join the American people in applauding your unity and resolve. (Applause.) Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit directed toward addressing problems here at home. I'm a proud member of my party -- yet as we act to win the war, protect our people, and create jobs in America, we must act, first and foremost, not as Republicans, not as Democrats, but as Americans. (Applause.)

It costs a lot to fight this war. We have spent more than a billion dollars a month -- over \$30 million a day -- and we must be prepared for future operations. Afghanistan proved that expensive precision weapons defeat the enemy and spare innocent lives, and we need more of them. We need to replace aging aircraft and make our military more agile, to put our troops anywhere in the world quickly and safely. Our men and women in uniform deserve the best weapons, the best equipment, the best training -- and they also deserve another pay raise. (Applause.)

My budget includes the largest increase in defense spending in two decades -- because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay. (Applause.)

The next priority of my budget is to do everything possible to protect our citizens and strengthen our nation against the ongoing threat of another attack. Time and distance from the events of September the 11th will not make us safer unless we act on its lessons. America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.

My budget nearly doubles funding for a sustained strategy of homeland security, focused on four key areas: bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and border security, and improved intelligence. We will develop vaccines to fight anthrax and other deadly diseases. We'll increase funding to help states and communities train and equip our heroic police and firefighters. (Applause.) We will improve intelligence collection and sharing, expand patrols at our borders, strengthen the security of air travel, and use technology to track the arrivals and departures of visitors to the United States. (Applause.)

Homeland security will make America not only stronger, but, in many ways, better. Knowledge gained from bioterrorism research will improve public health. Stronger police and fire departments will mean safer neighborhoods. Stricter border enforcement will help combat illegal drugs. (Applause.) And as government works to better secure our homeland, America will continue to depend on the eyes and ears of alert citizens.

A few days before Christmas, an airline flight attendant spotted a passenger lighting a match. The crew and passengers quickly subdued the man, who had been trained by al Qaeda and was armed with explosives. The people on that plane were alert and, as a result, likely saved nearly 200 lives. And tonight, we welcome and thank flight attendants Hermis Moutardier and Christina Jones. (Applause.)

Once we have funded our national security and our homeland security, the final great priority of my budget is economic security for the American people. (Applause.) To achieve these great national objectives -- to win the war, protect the homeland, and revitalize our economy - - our budget will run a deficit that will be small and short-term, so long as Congress restrains spending and acts in a fiscally responsible manner. (Applause.) We have clear priorities and we must act at home with the same purpose and resolve we have shown overseas: We'll prevail in the war, and we will defeat this recession. (Applause.)

Americans who have lost their jobs need our help and I support extending unemployment benefits and direct assistance for health care coverage. (Applause.) Yet, American workers want more than unemployment checks -- they want a steady paycheck. (Applause.) When America works, America prospers, so my economic security plan can be summed up in one word: jobs. (Applause.)

Good jobs begin with good schools, and here we've made a fine start. (Applause.) Republicans and Democrats worked together to achieve historic education reform so that no child is left behind. I was proud to work with members of both parties: Chairman John Boehner and Congressman George Miller. (Applause.) Senator Judd Gregg. (Applause.) And I was so proud of our work, I even had nice things to say about my friend, Ted Kennedy. (Laughter and applause.) I know the folks at the Crawford coffee shop couldn't believe I'd say such a thing -- (laughter) -- but our work on this bill shows what is possible if we set aside posturing and focus on results. (Applause.)

There is more to do. We need to prepare our children to read and succeed in school with improved Head Start and early childhood development programs. (Applause.) We must upgrade our teacher colleges and teacher training and launch a major recruiting drive with a great goal for America: a quality teacher in every classroom. (Applause.)

Good jobs also depend on reliable and affordable energy. This Congress must act to encourage conservation, promote technology, build infrastructure, and it must act to increase energy production at home so America is less dependent on foreign oil. (Applause.)

Good jobs depend on expanded trade. Selling into new markets creates new jobs, so I ask Congress to finally approve trade promotion authority. (Applause.) On these two key issues, trade and energy, the House of Representatives has acted to create jobs, and I urge the Senate to pass this legislation. (Applause.)

Good jobs depend on sound tax policy. (Applause.) Last year, some in this hall thought my tax relief plan was too small; some thought it was too big. (Applause.) But when the checks arrived in the mail, most Americans thought tax relief was just about right. (Applause.) Congress listened to the people and responded by reducing tax rates, doubling the child credit, and ending the death tax. For the sake of long-term growth and to help Americans plan for the future, let's make these tax cuts permanent. (Applause.)

The way out of this recession, the way to create jobs, is to grow the economy by encouraging investment in factories and equipment, and by speeding up tax relief so people have more money to spend. For the sake of American workers, let's pass a stimulus package. (Applause.)

Good jobs must be the aim of welfare reform. As we reauthorize these important reforms, we must always remember the goal is to reduce dependency on government and offer every American the dignity of a job. (Applause.)

Americans know economic security can vanish in an instant without health security. I ask Congress to join me this year to enact a patients' bill of rights -- (applause) -- to give uninsured workers credits to help buy health coverage -- (applause) -- to approve an historic

increase in the spending for veterans' health -- (applause) -- and to give seniors a sound and modern Medicare system that includes coverage for prescription drugs. (Applause.)

A good job should lead to security in retirement. I ask Congress to enact new safeguards for 401K and pension plans. (Applause.) Employees who have worked hard and saved all their lives should not have to risk losing everything if their company fails. (Applause.) Through stricter accounting standards and tougher disclosure requirements, corporate America must be made more accountable to employees and shareholders and held to the highest standards of conduct. (Applause.)

Retirement security also depends upon keeping the commitments of Social Security, and we will. We must make Social Security financially stable and allow personal retirement accounts for younger workers who choose them. (Applause.)

Members, you and I will work together in the months ahead on other issues: productive farm policy -- (applause) -- a cleaner environment -- (applause) -- broader home ownership, especially among minorities -- (applause) -- and ways to encourage the good work of charities and faith-based groups. (Applause.) I ask you to join me on these important domestic issues in the same spirit of cooperation we've applied to our war against terrorism. (Applause.)

During these last few months, I've been humbled and privileged to see the true character of this country in a time of testing. Our enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil. (Applause.)

The American people have responded magnificently, with courage and compassion, strength and resolve. As I have met the heroes, hugged the families, and looked into the tired faces of rescuers, I have stood in awe of the American people.

And I hope you will join me -- I hope you will join me in expressing thanks to one American for the strength and calm and comfort she brings to our nation in crisis, our First Lady, Laura Bush. (Applause.)

None of us would ever wish the evil that was done on September the 11th. Yet after America was attacked, it was as if our entire country looked into a mirror and saw our better selves. We were reminded that we are citizens, with obligations to each other, to our country, and to history. We began to think less of the goods we can accumulate, and more about the good we can do.

For too long our culture has said, "If it feels good, do it." Now America is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: "Let's roll." (Applause.) In the sacrifice of soldiers, the fierce brotherhood of firefighters, and the bravery and generosity of ordinary citizens, we have glimpsed what a new culture of responsibility could look like. We want to be a nation that serves goals larger than self. We've been offered a unique opportunity, and we must not let this moment pass. (Applause.)

My call tonight is for every American to commit at least two years -- 4,000 hours over the rest of your lifetime -- to the service of your neighbors and your nation. (Applause.) Many are already serving, and I thank you. If you aren't sure how to help, I've got a good place to start. To sustain and extend the best that has emerged in America, I invite you to join the new USA Freedom Corps. The Freedom Corps will focus on three areas of need: responding in case of crisis at home; rebuilding our communities; and extending American compassion throughout the world.

One purpose of the USA Freedom Corps will be homeland security. America needs retired doctors and nurses who can be mobilized in major emergencies; volunteers to help police and fire departments; transportation and utility workers well-trained in spotting danger.

Our country also needs citizens working to rebuild our communities. We need mentors to love children, especially children whose parents are in prison. And we need more talented teachers in troubled schools. USA Freedom Corps will expand and improve the good efforts of AmeriCorps and Senior Corps to recruit more than 200,000 new volunteers.

And America needs citizens to extend the compassion of our country to every part of the world. So, we will renew the promise of the Peace Corps, double its volunteers over the next five years -- (applause) -- and ask it to join a new effort to encourage development and education and opportunity in the Islamic world. (Applause.)

This time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity -- a moment we must seize to change our culture. Through the gathering momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater good. (Applause.) And we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace.

All fathers and mothers, in all societies, want their children to be educated, and live free from poverty and violence. No people on Earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.

If anyone doubts this, let them look to Afghanistan, where the Islamic "street" greeted the fall of tyranny with song and celebration. Let the skeptics look to Islam's own rich history, with its centuries of learning, and tolerance and progress. America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. (Applause.)

No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. (Applause.)

America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.

In this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old rivalries. America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before, to achieve peace and prosperity. In every region, free markets and free trade and free societies are proving their power to lift lives. Together with friends and allies from Europe to Asia, and Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom. (Applause.)

The last time I spoke here, I expressed the hope that life would return to normal. In some ways, it has. In others, it never will. Those of us who have lived through these challenging times have been changed by them. We've come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it must be opposed. (Applause.) Beyond all differences of race or creed, we are one country, mourning together and facing danger together. Deep in the American character, there is honor, and it is stronger than cynicism. And many have discovered again that even in tragedy -- especially in tragedy -- God is near. (Applause.)

In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we've been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced a choice more clear or consequential.

Our enemies send other people's children on missions of suicide and murder. They embrace tyranny and death as a cause and a creed. We stand for a different choice, made long ago, on the day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity of every life. (Applause.)

Steadfast in our purpose, we now press on. We have known freedom's price. We have shown freedom's power. And in this great conflict, my fellow Americans, we will see freedom's victory.

Thank you all. May God bless. (Applause.)

How Do Military Personnel Meet the Definition of Prisoners of War?

In 2002, the U.S. decided to use the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base as a military prison. The U.S. transferred the prisoners to Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. These prisoners are referred to as enemy combatants. Because the enemy combatants are not treated as Prisoners of War (POWs), they are not protected by the Geneva Convention. This picture shows “enemy combatants.” Are they being treated fairly? Should they be regarded as POWs?

The Geneva Conventions include treaties that protect service members if they ever become a POW. The Geneva Conventions were established after World War II. According to Article 17 of the Geneva Convention, POWs are only required to give their name, rank, date of birth, and serial number. In addition, POWs should not be physically or mentally tortured. Furthermore, the Geneva Conventions state that POWs should be treated humanely. According to Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Prisoners of War belong to one of the categories:

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:

1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:

- (a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
- (b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
- (c) That of carrying arms openly;
- (d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.

4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.

5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

Source: <https://blog.gitmomemory.org/2012/10/23/difference-between-enemy-combatants-and-prisoners-of-war>, last accessed (24/10/24).